THE TOSS-BOMB PROCEDURE 4. At pitch attitude, the bomb F-100 pilot Lt. 1. Attack begins. Jettison fuel is released to arc toward Harris Kirk races tanks and descend to just the target. After release, for the cockpit above ground level. Engage the pilot now has only 54 during an alert engine afterburner and ap- seconds to escape the exercise at a proach target at 575 mph. nuclear blast. USAFE base in West Germany. 2. Pull up at attack point with a constant four Gs. Monitor the 5. The Mk 7 bomb was the cross-pointer mounted gauge first nuclear weapon that on the instrument panel. could be carried by USAF (and Navy) fighter aircraft. 3. The aircraft pulls into an Immelmann maneuver. The One-Way Nuclear Mission A principal target was the “Fulda Gap,” a logical geograph- During the Cold War, some ical highway for massive Soviet armored formations to pour Turkey. There was also a training group at Sidi Slimane AB, right intermediate station. Still, despite all the extra fuel, the Air Force fighter pilots had into West Germany. A bottleneck there could buy valuable Morocco, and there was an F-100C-equipped air defense Super Sabre’s combat radius was limited. time for NATO to respond to an invasion. squadron in the Netherlands. Targets closer than 450 nautical miles (518 miles) from more firepower than range. The North Atlantic Council had previously approved this The European-based fighter wings were tasked to carry home base did offer a potential round-trip mission. These strategy for NATO in September 1950, with tactical nuclear the new Mk 7 nuclear bomb. Their targets were airfields, short-range targets also allowed up to 20 minutes of loiter weapons deemed essential. The Air Force responded by railroad yards, radar sites, even major bridges—anything time in the target vicinity, while the National Command Cen- By John Lowery forming a Quick Reaction Alert, later termed Victor Alert, that would help slow or stop the Soviet juggernaut lined up ter awaited a presidential order declaring H hour, (weapon that paired jet fighters with nuclear weapons. (See “Victor against NATO’s forces. delivery time). Still, a delay in declaring H hour while the President Dwight D. Eisenhower, upon taking office in Alert,” March 2011.) During the late 1950s to early 1960s, the cadre of F-100C fighters were en route meant a one-way mission. Yet, the 1953, officially recognized the tremendous threat to America’s The mission fell first to American fighter pilots, later joined fighter pilots was largely unseasoned. Predominantly, they pilots accepted this as part of the job. European allies by the Soviet Union’s massive conventional by those in allied air forces, who planned and prepared for were 23-year-old, recent graduates of flight school who had Some targets were more than 1,000 miles away. One of military forces. NATO faced possible invasion by 175 active predominantly one-way nuclear strikes against massed Soviet received minimal type training in the F-100. With about 250 the more distant targets was a Soviet air defense center lo- Soviet divisions, with another 125 reserve divisions deploy- forces. A few targets were close enough to NATO bases that a to 300 flying hours, flying an airplane with demanding aero- cated about 60 miles southwest of Kiev, Ukraine. Part of the able within a month. Neither the US nor the war-weary NATO return trip was feasible. But for most, the limited range of the dynamic characteristics—particularly when configured for attack route was to be flown at high altitude to Vienna; once countries could afford to rebuild armies that could match fighters meant they would only have enough fuel to escape nuclear war—they suffered a very high accident rate. inbound to the target the pilot was to turn at a large Danube the Soviet numbers. the nuclear blast, bail out, then escape and evade back to In the nuclear mission configuration the specially modified River bridge and descend to 50 feet for a low-level dash to Eisenhower decided that the only reasonable counter was friendly territory. F-100Cs were programmed to carry the Mk 7 weapon on the deliver the weapon. to equip Air Force jet fighters based in Europe with “tactical” left intermediate pylon station, a 200-gallon fuel tank on the While weapons and delivery methods evolved over time, nuclear bombs. These could be targeted at the massed Soviet LARGELY UNSEASONED left outboard wing station, a similar fuel tank on the right a primary technique for the F-100C was the Low Altitude forces and infrastructure, offering either a deterrent or, failing Soon after Eisenhower’s decision, the new F-100C Super inboard wing station, and a larger 275-gallon tank on the Bombing System (LABS) over-the-shoulder, toss-bomb pro- and Tsukamoto BetsyMoore Mike illustration: Staff USAF. Photo: that, a way to effectively fight a third world war. Sabre began replacing F-84G fighter-bombers and F-86 in- The advantage of this approach was that the US already had terceptors throughout Europe. It was larger, faster, and had SOME TARGETS WERE a significant inventory of atomic bombs, while Russia, which longer range than the jets it replaced. The “Hun” was delivered had detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949, did not (yet). to fighter wings in England, West Germany, Spain, Italy, and MORE THAN 1,000 MILES AWAY. 104 OCTOBER / NOVEMBER 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM OCTOBER / NOVEMBER 2017 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 105 ONEWAY MISSION Moscow SOVIET UNION Berlin West East POLAND Germany Germany Bitburg AB Once past 450 nautical miles (518 actual 450 nautical miles miles) without refueling, there was no return. Ramstein AB Czechoslovakia Austria Hungary An airman with a working dog guards a Matador nuclear missile launching cedure. As he approached the target, the pilot would have training in weapon delivery techniques and use of the instru- site in West Germany on May 8, 1959. already jettisoned his empty wing fuel tanks, and at a des- ment panel-mounted cross-pointer gauge. ignated point he descended to 50 feet above ground level. A special concern with Super Sabres during nuclear Then, with the engine’s afterburner engaged for maximum training flights was the jet’s heavy gross weight takeoffs. The could cause a sudden snap out of control to the right. Con- Shortly thereafter, a very detailed “two-person concept” thrust, he raced toward the target at 575 mph (500 knots). At external configuration consisted of the three wing pylon fuel sequently, mock dogfights with the three-tank configuration was mandated. This procedure required the presence of the proper point he pulled up with a constant four Gs into an tanks, plus a “Blue Boy” practice nuclear weapon, referred to were prohibited. Still, the young pilots often did it anyway— armed guards equipped with dogs at the alert aircraft. They Immelmann maneuver (a half loop). Meanwhile, he moni- as a “shape.” It was identical in size and weight to the actual with predictable results. were to have eight-by-10 headshot photos of the alert duty tored the aircraft’s track to the target and his applied G force Mk 7 nuclear bomb. There were maintenance problems, too. When training pilot and the crew chief. with a cross-pointer gauge mounted on the Hun’s instrument Great care was required for training flights without the flights included the Blue Boy—which like the Mk 7, weighed When approaching or working around a nuclear weapon, panel. At a pitch attitude 1,680 pounds—the shape’s weight, coupled with that of the only the pilot on duty was allowed access to the aircraft’s approaching vertical the jet fuel in the left wing pylon tank, placed heavy stress on the cockpit. He had to know the daily password and be accom- LABS released the bomb THEIR SURVIVAL, IF CAPTURED BY THE left landing gear tire. As a result, tires often failed on takeoff, panied by the ship’s crew chief or armament technician. The and it would arc toward PEOPLE THEY HAD JUST BOMBED WITH A causing numerous major accidents. Although foreign object procedure of the pilot arming and then disarming the Mk 7 the target. tire damage from nuts, bolts, and screws on the ramp or bomb also was discontinued. Once the weapon re- NUCLEAR WEAPON, WAS PROBLEMATIC. runway was sometimes involved, often the primary culprit Supreme Headquarters Allied Power, Europe, Commander leased the pilot had just was the crew chief’s failure—during predawn, preflight in- Gen. Lauris Norstad personally visited Ramstein to verify 54 seconds (about 10 miles at maximum speed) to get clear shape, since the aircraft retained the three asymmetrically spections—to increase tire inflation for a heavy configuration. implementation of these more stringent security procedures. of the nuclear blast. As the bomb fell through 1,500 feet, it wing-mounted pylon fuel tanks. Known as the 1-E3 config- The service of the F-100Cs in Europe was relatively brief, would radar-detonate, to maximize its destructive shock wave. uration, the extra fuel in the pylon tanks provided increased GREEN LIGHT MEANS ARMED replaced at first by the improved F-100D. Newer nuclear Meanwhile, the pilot faced the threat of the intensely bright flight training time for the pilots, while the empty weapons On their alert duty day, four pilots from each of the various weapons also were acquired, such as the more streamlined flash from the nuclear explosion, which could potentially station remained available for immediate loading in case of fighter squadrons began Victor Alert at midnight.