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Delivering Air and Space Power for the Alliance

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Delivering Air and Space Power for the Alliance ALLIED AIR COMMAND AIR POWER - NATO’S ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Whilst the Alliance can use a variety of military/non-military tools ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2016 to change the behaviour of decision makers, the exploitation of the Air environment offers specific, flexible and responsive ways to deliver effects and create, exert and maintain influence. How- ever, should a crisis arise, the distinctive nature of the Air environ- ment has two major implications for the application of military force: Air Power is inherently joint, because although it operates in the air, it creates effects and exerts influence primarily in other environmental domains Scrambled over 850 Aircraft to safeguard NATO airspace Air Power is pervasive because it offers the advantage of Completed 3 successful Baltic Air Policing rotations involving 6 finding, fixing and engaging the adversary unimpeded by nations, 500 personnel and over 30 aircraft ALLIED natural terrain or physical barriers , so potentially allowing Performed 24/7/365 NATO Ballistic Missile Defence. Operational access/‘eyes-on’ to any point on the surface of the earth authority over NATO’s first permanent Ballistic Missile Defense Air Power’s unique combination of core attributes (speed, reach engagement resource, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in and height) enable and enhance its additional attributes (ubiquity, AIR Romania agility and rapid force concentration) to deliver unparalleled flexi- Conducted 24/7 Operational Control for NATO augmentation of bility, versatility and responsiveness in the achievement of military Turkish Air Defence and sustainment of Assurance Measures and effect. Tailored Assurance Measures COMMAND Received Operational Control of NATO Airborne Early Warning ALLIED AIR COMMAND’S CONTRIBUTION TO and Control (NAEW&C) Force on 1 Nov 16 NATO’S CORE TASKS - COLLECTIVE DEFENCE, Completed 460 Airborne Early Warning And Control missions DELIVERING AIR AND SPACE CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COOPERATIVE including support to Counter ISIL Coalition missions Prepared and executed 31 NATO exercises including the first SECURITY POWER FOR THE ALLIANCE RAMSTEIN ALLOY series An independent Air component is necessary to fully exploit com- Hosted 2 Air Commanders’ Conferences and 2 NATO Air Chief mand and control, and integrate Allied Air Power. NATO’s Allied Symposiums including 6 Partner Air Chief delegates Air Command exploits the flexibility and responsiveness of Allied Awarded 10 SACEUR-level recognitions and 4 NATO Meritorious Air Power by providing a ready, responsive and robust team Service Medals trained/equipped to plan, integrate and deliver Air Power. Allied Trained over 300 students during multiple courses at the DACCC Air Command’s ability to exploit Air Power has significant strategic and conducted 2 DACCC deployments to Slovenia and Sardinia potential in its own right, and acts as a force multiplier by enabling Completed 2 NATO no-notice verifications and executed 18 and enhancing NATO’s military and non-military effects. internal/external exercises at CAOC Uedem, including Joint LIVEX BALTOPS and 5 Finland Sweden Training Events Completed 4 NATO evaluations and 25 internal/external exercises at CAOC Torrejon, training 250 personnel Accomplished 2 Mobile Training Team missions to Partners Serbia and Azerbaijan and 1 Air Expert Staff visits to United Arab Emirates Conducted 11 evaluations to rate the operational combat readiness and the capabilities of tactical air forces for SACEUR Expanded the Airfield DataBase and Aircraft Cross Servicing Program. Conducted Security Investment Program inspections at 40 NATO Airfields. Accredited 2 new Air Ground Operations Schools including Finland, the 2nd accreditation of a PfP Nation. Implemented AIRCOM-wide Air Command and Control syndicate © HQ AIRCOM Public Affairs Office ALLIED AIR COMMAND HERITAGE ALLIED AIR COMMAND Mission: Deliver Air and Space Power for the Alliance Ramstein Air Base Germany has been home to a NATO Air Power headquarters since 1974. The 2010 NATO Command Structure reorganisation consolidated 10 air entities into a single Allied Air Vision: A ready, robust Team trained, equipped and trusted to Command supported by 2 regional Combined Air Operations command and control Air and Space Power for the Alliance Centres (CAOCs) and a Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACCC). MISSION FOCUS AREAS The Allied Air Command Ready to Deter provides 24/7 Command and Control of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility. Standing missions include Air Policing, Ballistic Missile Defence and Operational Control of Integrated Air and Missile Air Command and Control for Very High Readiness Joint Task NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW). During crisis, the Defence (BMD) & Air Policing enhanced & tailored Forward Presence Force (Air) Support to Strike Ops Headquarters is trained, equipped, and organised to perform as a Joint Force Air Component, from Ramstein, which will plan and Ready to Fight execute NATO Air and Space Operations. Finally, the AIRCOM Commander serves as the primary advisor and proponent to SACEUR and NATO on all air and space matters. ORGANISATION Air Command and Control Deployable Air Control Centre, Recognised Operational Control of Anti-Access Area Denial Air Picture Production Center, Sensor NATO Airborne Early Warning Challenge Fusion Post CAOC Uedem Ready to Lead HQ AIRCOM DACCC CAOC Torrejon A single Headquarters Allied Air Command with 500 personnel Interoperability & NATO Partnerships Aircraft Cross Servicing & Single Sky Evaluations and Forward Air Controller Alliance Ground Surveillance from 25 NATO Nations and 3 Partner Nations Initiatives Capability Section (JTAC) Two Combined Air Operations Centres at Torrejon, Spain, and at Uedem, Germany, each with 180 positions Resilient RESPONSIBILITIES One Deployable Air Command and Control Centre at Poggio- Advises and advocates to SACEUR and NATO on all Air and Space doctrine, Renatico, Italy, with 280 positions AIR PROPONENT requirements and forces More than 50 Control and Reporting Centres/Posts under Plans, exercises and executes Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) C2 OF NATINAMDS NATO and national command Operations within SACEUR’s AOR from peacetime through conflict Some 30 Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) air bases for DEVELOP PERSONNEL Develop, prepare and empower personnel as future NATO leaders launch of fighter aircraft executing NATO Air Policing and 5 The Team, our Personnel and NAEW air bases for Airspace surveillance and Early Detection. Families .
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