coalition and the liberal democrats Duncan Brack introduces this special issue of the Journal of Liberal History, devoted to the impact of the coalition government of 2010–15 on the Liberal Democrats and of the Liberal Democrats on the coalition.

elcome to this spe- support has fallen back not to the the rapid formation of an effective cial issue of the Journal level of 1970 (the last election at majority government. And fur- Wof Liberal History (and, which the number of Liberal MPs thermore, no one bounced Lib- incidentally, the longest issue we was in single figures) but to the Lib- eral Democrats into coalition. The have ever published). eral nadir of the mid 1950s. highly democratic process the party If the history of the Liberal For the remainder of the issue, followed in agreeing the deal helps Democrats since the party’s for- Phil Cow- we invited a wide range of con- to explain why the Liberal Demo- mation in 1988 can be likened to a ley used the tributors (mostly, though not crats avoided the disastrous splits so roller-coaster ride – from the lows entirely, drawn from within the characteristic of Liberal history in of 1989, fourth placed behind the term ‘zug- Liberal Democrats) to write about the early twentieth century – and Greens in the European elections, any topic of their choosing of rel- also why it was the Conservative and of 2006 and 2007, when suc- zwang’ to evance to the impact of the coali- parliamentary party that was more cessive leaders were forced out of tion on the party and of the party prone than Liberal Democrat MPs office, to the highs of 1997, with a describe the on the coalition. Their thoughts to rebellion in Parliament. doubling in the number of seats, are gathered under four headings: The second reason behind the and of 2005, and the highest num- predicament overviews of why the coalition 2015 catastrophe was the perfor- ber of seats won by a third party experiment ended so disastrously; mance of the Liberal Democrats in since 1923 – then the period from the Liberal aspects of how the coalition worked coalition: could the party have run 2010 to 2015 has encapsulated even in practice; reviews of some of the things better? Here our contribu- more dramatic swings in fortune Democrats impacts on the party; and com- tors differ widely in their views, over just five years. The collapse parisons of the coalition with other and this will be the contested from 2010, when the Liberal Demo- found them- experiences. ground for much debate and discus- crats gained their highest share of So what went wrong? How did sion in the future. the vote in any election so far (23.0 selves in in the party crash so disastrously from I share the views of those who per cent, the second highest total 2010 to 2015? Between them our think the party made serious mis- enjoyed by a Liberal party since May 2010. A contributors identify four reasons. takes – a series of decisions and 1929) to the catastrophic 7.9 per cent term used The first was simply the deci- actions that in the end almost of 2015 represents the largest fall sion to enter into coalition with the entirely submerged the Liberal suffered by any party at any Brit- in chess, Conservative Party, the historic Democrats’ identity and led vot- ish election ever (leaving aside the enemy of the Liberal Democrats and ers to conclude that the party had unusual elections of 1918 and 1931, ‘zugzwang’ its predecessor parties. Probably, simply made itself irrelevant and when Liberal factions fought each this was the main factor underlying that the coalition was in reality a other). And in between, of course, describes the scale of the defeat in 2015 – but Conservative government (a view Liberals participated in national none of our contributors argue that which voters may well be reassess- government for the first time since the posi- it was the wrong thing to do. ing now, but rather too late for the 1945, in the first coalition to be In the meeting organised by the Liberal Democrats!). formed in peacetime since 1931. tion where Liberal Democrat History Group The first mistake lay in the allo- This five-year period is there- in July (to be reported in full in the cation of government departments. fore a prime candidate for study and a player has winter issue of the Journal), Pro- Although one can follow the logic analysis – and indeed will be the fessor Phil Cowley used the term behind the responsibilities the five subject of many books and articles to make a ‘zugzwang’ to describe the predica- Liberal Democrat cabinet minis- to come over the next few years. ment the Liberal Democrats found ters ended up with, with the ben- This issue of the Journal of Liberal move (since themselves in in May 2010. A term efit of hindsight it was a mistake History aims to offer raw material used in chess, ‘zugzwang’ describes for the party not to have control of for the political scientists and histo- it’s their the position where a player has to any major spending department, rians writing those analyses. make a move (since it’s their turn) such as education or transport. One The core of the issue is provided turn) but but every possible option open to Lib Dem cabinet minister mainly by the interviews with Nick Clegg every pos- them worsens their position. After appeared in public to defend spend- and ten other former ministers, the 2010 election had resulted in a ing cuts and another was largely on their experiences of coalition, sible option hung parliament, Liberal Demo- invisible outside Scotland. Consti- conducted by Adrian Slade (our crats knew that coalition with the tutional reform and climate change most sincere thanks go to Adrian open to Tories was a highly risky choice; are important issues for the party for his hard work in this respect). but every alternative (a confidence but are much less salient to the gen- To accompany this, we asked John them wors- and supply arrangement, or no deal eral public. And although many Curtice and Michael Steed to ana- at all – there was never a realustic Liberal Democrat junior minis- lyse the 2015 election result in ens their prospect of coalition with Labour) ters had real achievements to their detail; their findings show how looked worse – and the finan- credit, they were usually not obvi- in most of the country the party’s position. cial situation seemed to require ous to the electorate.

4 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the liberal democrats Duncan Brack introduces this special issue of the Journal of Liberal History, devoted to the impact of the coalition government of 2010–15 on the Liberal Democrats and of the Liberal Democrats on the coalition.

More importantly, the Liberal in going overboard, during the The party media’s focus on the likelihood of a Democrats forfeited voters’ trust, first nine months, in proving that hung parliament and another coali- above all by the tuition fees epi- it could work. Obviously it was made seri- tion, the Liberal Democrats clearly sode, a disaster from start to finish. important to demonstrate that a had to give some indication of what Having had the argument within coalition, unfamiliar as it was to the ous mistakes they were likely to do, and could the party, fought an election with electorate, could deliver effective not realisically be anything other phased abolition of fees in the man- government, but the Liberal Dem- – a series than even-handed. In any case, ifesto, and forced all its parliamen- ocrats did this so impressively well probably by then the party’s fate tary candidates to sign a pledge that – once again – they submerged of decisions was sealed – and it wasn’t as though opposing any increase in them, the their identity. Everyone remembers there were many near-misses which worst possible thing that ministers the ‘Rose Garden’ press conference, and actions could perhaps have been saved: could have done was to scrap all of and the picture of the two lead- that in the only four Liberal Democrat seats that and sign up to a rise in fees. It ers entering Number 10 with Nick were lost by less than 2,000 votes; did not matter that the commit- Clegg’s hand on Cameron’s back. end almost most were lost by far more. ment to abolish tuition fees was not But the impression of unity, of an The fourth factor was entirely an election priority: it symbolised indivisible whole, was underlined entirely sub- outside the party’s control: the fact the Liberal Democrats in the minds time and time again. At the Liberal that the overriding issue in the elec- of the electorate. Although I accept, Democrat conference in September merged the tion became whether the country as several of our contributors argue, 2010, Clegg claimed that the coali- could risk what seemed likely to be that most of the damage to the par- tion was ‘more than the sum of our Liberal Dem- a weak Labour government at the ty’s standing had been done before parts’, and in March the following mercy of the SNP. Again, however, the vote on tuition fees in Decem- year he was captured on micro- ocrats’ iden- this helped to marginalise the posi- ber 2010, it helped to create the phone joking with Cameron that tion of the Liberal Democrats. image, which was never shaken off, ‘If we keep doing this we won’t find tity and led The remaining question hang- that the Liberal Democrats in gen- anything to bloody disagree on in ing over the coalition is: was it eral –and Nick Clegg in particular the bloody TV debate’. voters to con- worth it? Did the party achieve – had abandoned their own beliefs Of course, this went into sharp enough to make the electoral set- simply to get into power . reverse after the 2011 local, Scot- clude that back of 2015 justifiable? We do not This image was reinforced by tish and Welsh elections, and the have space, in this issue, to review Liberal Democrat agreement to a AV referendum disaster but – again the party individual policy areas, but we aim series of high-profile Tory policies with hindsight – by then it was too to run a series of articles analysing – most notably, reform of the NHS, late. In the first twelve months of had simply issues in detail in future issues. One the introduction of the so-called the coalition the Liberal Democrats made itself can argue, however – and some ‘bedroom tax’ and the lowering fell from 23 per cent to 9 per cent in of our contributors touch on this of the top rate of income tax to 45 the opinion polls, and essentially irrelevant – that the 2010–15 experience has pence; and, more generally, sign- never recovered thereafter. helped at least to create an image of ing up to the austerity programme, The third contributory reason and that the coalition as a form of government despite fighting the 2010 election behind the 2015 catastrophe was the that can work, and work effectively on a very different message. Poli- election campaign itself: could the coalition was – a rather different image than that cies like these were what the elec- party have fought the election more prevailing in 2010. What happened torate expected from the Tories, effectively? Certainly many party in reality a to the Liberal Democrats as a result not the Liberal Democrats, leaving activists – including several of of it, however, is likely to deter any voters with the impression that the our contributors – found the cam- Conservative other party from signing up to coa- party had no real influence within paign deeply uninspiring, focusing lition in the near future. the coalition. Although there were mainly on what difference the Lib- government. These are matters of specula- genuine Liberal Democrat achieve- eral Democrats could make to the tion; but what we offer in this issue ments in coalition – same-sex mar- other two main parties, giving the of the Journal is the story – or, more riage, the pupil premium, the Green Tories a heart and Labour a brain, accurately, many stories – of what Investment Bank, to name a few cutting less than the Tories and happened during those five years of – none of these resonated strongly borrowing less than Labour, and coalition government. I hope you with significant numbers of voters. so on. This seemed to convey two enjoy reading them. Probably the only economic policy messages: the Liberal Democrats the electorate liked and recognised were desperate to get into power, Duncan Brack is the Editor of the Jour- as Liberal Democrat – the raising and didn’t much mind with whom; nal of Liberal History. During the coa- of the income tax threshold – was and the party didn’t stand for any- lition years, he was special adviser to coopted by the Tories anyway. thing by itself. To an extent, how- Chris Huhne, 2010–12, and Vice Chair The other way in which the ever, the party did not have much of the Liberal Democrats’ Federal Policy party mishandled coalition was choice in its approach: given the Committee, 2012 to date.

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