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The Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition Meeting report Margaret Macmillan, Andrew Thorpe, John Barnes, Stuart Ball Andrew Hudson The history of the Lib-Labs Labour interests within the Liberal Party Jaime Reynolds and Robert Ingham Archie Macdonald MP for Roxburgh and Selkirk, 1950–51: biography Jürgen Frölich The German Liberals Between third force and marginal force Adrian Slade ‘Hard man’ with heart Interview with Bill Rodgers Liberal Democrat History Group Oral history Interviewers needed We would like to hear from nother new, but related, anyone willing to volunteer HISTORY History Group project some time to interview a Ais a new publication: small number of key Liberal an Oral History of twenti- (or SDP or Liberal Demo- eth century Liberalism – a crat) activists about their thematic study of the Liberal period in the party, and their GROUP NEWS Party and liberalism, drawing experience in particular areas upon interviews with Lib- (campaigning, for example, eral activists and politicians, or policy-making, or party Contribute to Whatever your experi- as well as autobiographical organisation). ence, you are welcome to sources. Liberal Democrat Guidance will be given contribute. If you have or Many of the necessary with questions and interview history know of party records or interviews have already been techniques. other documentary material conducted, for other pur- If you are able to help, he Liberal Democrat that might be of historical poses (such as PhD theses), please write to Robert Ing- History Group is aiming interest please give us details. and we hope that the new ham, the Journal’s Biographies to establish an archive T Liberal Archive (see left) Editor, who is coordinating of personal recollections of will also contribute valuable the project, at: party history. Large or small material. We’d now like as many Maybe your story is a brief We also, however, need to • biographies@liberalhisto readers of the Journal as pos- anecdote, or maybe it’s a interview a number of key ry.org.uk; or sible to send us your Liberal, lifetime memoir. Feel free party figures – and for that • 10 Beltinge Road, Herne SDP and Liberal Democrat to write your story whether we need help! Bay, Kent CT6 6DB anecdotes and recollections: it be 100 words or 10,000 every story is vital. words long.

What sort of information Be honest are we looking for? This is the most important ‘The View from Knowsley’ We’re looking for personal thing about any story on this recollections and information site. We want it to be a accu- A Conference at Knowsley Hall, Liverpool; 19–20 March 2004 from people who have been rate and authentic. ‘The View from Knowsley’ will be an unparalleled opportunity to active (or whose forebears discuss the work of statesmen on both sides of British politics for the were active) in the Liberal, best part of a century. Social Democrat or Liberal What will happen to your For historians, the Earls of Derby are particularly interesting in Democrat parties. story? party political terms, having both a Whig/Liberal and a Conservative Our main aim is to ensure inheritance. that the party’s ‘folk Although the fourteenth Earl of Derby is known to history as a What are our main areas memory’ is preserved. Conservative Prime Minister, he made his political reputation as a of interest? Your contributions will be Whig, and in the 1830s served in the great reforming Cabinet of Earl Our interest ranges across the archived and we aim to make Grey. Melbourne saw Stanley – as he was then known – as a future whole history of the Liberal them accessible for research- leader. Democrats and its predeces- ers through our website, the The fifteenth Earl, having long been on the ‘liberal’ wing of the sors from the nineteenth cen- Journal of Liberal History and Conservatives, eventually joined Gladstone’s second government tury to the present day. other publications. after spectacularly falling out with Disraeli. His diary is a rich source We would like to hear for the history of both parties. memories of party personali- In addition, the seventeenth Earl served in Lloyd George’s ties, elections, local constitu- Send contributions to: government and acted on its behalf as ambassador in Paris. ency history, triumphs and Liberal Democrat His- The conference will include presentations about the fourteenth Earl’s disappointments. tory Group Liberal Archive earlier career, the fifteenth Earl’s work as a Liberal Colonial Secretary project, at: and the seventeenth Earl’s role, as well as their Conservative contributions. Cover illustration • biographies@liberalhisto The author of the fourteenth earl’s first modern biography and the ‘The Great Improviser’, from ry.org.uk; or editor of the fifteenth earl’s diaries will both be presenting papers, Punch, 9 June 1920 - Looyd along with a range of historians discussing a fascinating and long- George still in command of the • 10 Beltinge Road, Herne neglected area of political history. Coalition (see meeting report, Bay, Kent CT6 6DB page 29). More details can be found at www.viewfromknowsley.com

2 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 Journal of Liberal History Issue 41: Winter 2003 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group.

ISSN 1479-9642 The history of the Lib-Labs 4 Andrew Hudson considers the history of what became known as Lib- Editor: Duncan Brack Labbery: the representation of labour interests in parliament through the Deputy Editor: Sarah Taft Liberal Party Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Biography: Archie Macdonald 11 Jaime Reynolds and Robert Ingham analyse the career of Archie Patrons Macdonald (1904–83), Liberal MP for Roxburgh and Selkirk 1950–51 Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; Professor Earl Russell; Professor John Vincent Letters to the Editor 15 Editorial Board Peter Hatton and Larry Iles Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry Doyle; Dr David Dutton; Professor David The German Liberals 16 Gowland; Dr Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Ian Hunter; Dr J. Graham Jones; Between third force and marginal force. Dr Jürgen Frölich outlines the Tony Little; Professor Ian Machin; Dr Mark Pack; role of the Free Democratic Party in German Federal politics Dr John Powell; Jaime Reynolds; Iain Sharpe ‘Hard man’ with heart 23 Editorial/Correspondence Interview with Bill Rodgers; by Adrian Slade Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed publication; all articles submitted will Report: The Liberal Party and general 25 be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: elections since 1945 Duncan Brack (Editor) 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ with David Butler and Neil Stockley; report by David Cloke email: [email protected] All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. Report: The fall of the Lloyd George 29

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Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; email: [email protected] Liberal Democrat History Group The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of historical Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal and other Published by the Liberal Democrat History occasional publications. Group, c/o 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ For more information, including details of publications, back issues of the Journal, tape Printed by Kall-Kwik, records of meetings and archive and other research sources, see our web site at: 426 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5TF www.liberalhistory.org.uk. December 2003 Hon President: Earl Russell Chair: Tony Little

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 3 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS

Andrew Hudson considers the history of what became known as Lib-Labbery: the representation of labour interests in parliament through the Liberal Party.

Lib-Labs have been defined by F. A. S. Craig as ‘Candidates who were in most cases nominees of the local Liberal and Radical Associations but who Labour MPs in the ib-Labbery in these sit- parliamentary career was over and campaigned mainly on Commons: Francis uations was not an alli- was nominated for his record as a Carrouthers ance with the Labour campaigner for maritime safety. trade union and labour Gould, The Party. Cooperation with It would also exclude honorary 1 Westminster issues.’ According to Gazette, 10 the Labour Party coex- figureheads such as Batty Langley February 1906 Listed with Lib-Labbery during who was made the first president Shepherd, the term the first decade of the last century of the National Association of ‘Lib-Lab’ probably but, by that time, Lib-Labbery Railway Clerks, largely because was in the process of being super- they wanted an MP as a figure- originated as a term seded by the Labour Party. head. Langley was an employer of abuse which was Craig’s definition excludes in Sheffield and his selection as MPs such as Joseph Chamber- a Liberal candidate for the Atter- abbreviated from lain and Charles Dilke who were cliffe division of Sheffield in 1894 ‘Liberal-Labour’, a sympathetic to labour interests caused considerable contention but not involved in the trade amongst local trade unionists and term which the MPs union movement. It would also resulted in Ramsay Macdonald proudly referred to exclude Samuel Plimsoll, as he resigning from the Liberal Party only became president of the and joining the Independent 2 themselves by. Seamen’s Union after his brief Labour Party.3

4 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS

One of the earliest figures in 1867 Reform Act, which enfran- serious differences that had sepa- the history of Lib-Labbery was chised male adult householders rated union leaders, such as Will the radical campaigner Francis in urban areas. A Labour Repre- Allen of the Engineers Union, Place, who Cole describes as try- sentation League was formed in who was president of the Labour ing to instil reformism and the 1869 by the ‘Junta’, which was a Representation League, from Liberal-labour alliance before its dominant force within the Lon- the Liberals.9 The Lib-Lab era time,4 although Wallas makes no don Trades Council. It was effec- had begun. The League, how- reference to this in his biography tively a successor to the National ever, made little progress – only of Place. Place had campaigned in Reform League.7 It was largely a increasing its parliamentary rep- support of the 1832 Reform Act London movement that sought resentation at the 1880 election but his greatest personal achieve- to return working-class men to by one member to include Henry ment was to get parliament to parliament and to register work- Broadhurst who was secretary of repeal the Combination Acts ing-class voters without reference the Parliamentary Committee of that suppressed combinations of to their opinion or party bias. In the TUC. The League expired the working men. Wallas describes practice, it sought to have work- following year. Francis Place as trying to coach ing-class candidates adopted as Lib-Labbery however, made middle-class radicals in the dif- Liberals and to influence Liberals some progress during the 1885 ficult art of acting with the to support working-class aims in election despite a lack of enthu- working men of the day and as parliament. siasm on the part of the TUC, regarding the repeal of the Corn The Labour Representation which had rejected a motion Laws as more practicable than League had its first success in the calling for a parliamentary fund in parliamentary reform.5 Another 1874 general election with the 1882. Eleven Lib-Lab MPs were early figure was William Newton, return of two miners, Alexan- Wallas elected. The 1884 Reform and who contested Tower Hamlets in der Macdonald for Stafford and Redistribution Act had reduced 1852 without success. Together Thomas Burt for Morpeth, as describes the number of multi-member with George Howell and W. R. Liberals. The introduction of the urban seats in which Liberal Asso- Cremer, he subsequently became secret ballot had undoubtedly Francis ciations could adopt a Lib-Labber one of the first trade union can- helped by preventing any oppor- Place as as one of their candidates, but this didates in 1868, although he was tunity for intimidation from loss had been offset by the exten- again unsuccessful. Place had said employers. However, during trying to sion of the franchise within county that ‘everyone who may expect the election part of the work- constituencies that included min- general results in a short time will ing-class vote had been cast for coach mid- ing areas where working-class be disappointed.’6 He was to be the Tories against the more reac- voters were in the majority. Of vindicated. tionary of the Liberal candidates dle-class the eleven Lib-Lab MPs returned Lib-Labbery began to develop and there were allegations that radicals in 1885, six were miners. Min- as a political force in the 1860s they had helped to disorganise ers’ MPs were to form the core within the National Reform the Liberal vote. in the dif- of Lib-Labbery until the Miners League which was founded to The refusal of Gladstone’s gov- Federation of Great Britain affili- extend the franchise and whose ernment to repeal the Criminal ficult art of ated to the Labour Party in 1908. secretary, George Howell, was a Law Amendment Act prevented The newly elected Lib-Lab MPs member of the London Trades any alliance with the Liberals, acting with met prior to the state opening of Council and became the first par- towards whom most of the union the work- parliament at Henry Broadhurst’s liamentary secretary of the Trades leaders were drawn because of TUC office before marching to Union Congress. Direct working- their radical predilections and ing men of parliament as a group.10 class representation only became connections.8 The repeal of this The following year, the TUC feasible with the passage of the legislation in 1875 removed any the day. created a special Labour Electoral

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 5 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS League Committee, which soon Lib-Lab- who was in the Engineers Union to Lib-Labbery with only three separated to become the Labour but had played a prominent role Lib-Lab candidates being selected Electoral Association and sought bery was by in organising the 1888 London – of whom only one, R. B. Cun- to promote the return of work- dock strike; Joseph Havelock ninghame-Graham, was ever ing-class men to parliament and, no means Wilson, the secretary of the elected. Keir Hardie had himself in practice, to secure the adop- Seamen’s Union; and Keir Har- attempted to become adopted as tion of its candidates by local universally die. The first two subsequently a Liberal candidate in the Mid- Liberal and Radical Associations. popular became Lib-Labbers, but Keir Lanark by-election in 1888 with- It worked largely with local Hardie remained an independent out success.16 trades councils, which were in amongst labour MP and the Independ- Although the victory of many cases still dominated by ent Labour Party was formed at socialist ideas at the 1890 TUC Liberal trade unionists. It opposed trade a conference held at Bradford was temporary, support for ‘New’ three-cornered fights and refused the following year. Lib-Lab- Unionism and socialist ideas to support independent labour union- bers also faced hostility in many grew amongst the trade union candidates against Liberals.11 The ists. Its local Liberal Associations whose rank and file, particularly in the League lasted until 1894. caucuses were often hostile to trades councils. In 1893, the TUC The number of Lib-Lab MPs support- both working-class candidates adopted a largely socialist pro- was slightly reduced by the loss and interests. After the 1892 elec- gramme and voted for a special of three sitting members. There ers were tion, T. R. Threlfall, the secretary fund to support working-class were only two new entrants, one of the Labour Electoral League, candidates, but only those who of whom, R. B. Cunninghame- largely himself a staunch Liberal, com- subscribed to ‘collective owner- Graham, sat as a Radical MP and members plained that: ship of the means of production, subsequently joined the Inde- distribution and exchange’.17 pendent Labour Party. of the Of the thirteen Labour MPs However congress narrowly Lib-Labbery was by no means in the present house, four ran rejected a motion to establish an universally popular amongst older craft in opposition to or without independent working-class party trade unionists. Its supporters recognition of the caucus, five and the TUC leadership was still were largely members of the unions. represented constituencies dominated by Lib-Labbers who older craft unions that supported where organised miners abso- fought back. conciliation and arbitration with lutely dominated the position In 1895, new rules were wages being determined accord- and where the shopkeepers and brought in with the aim of curb- ing to a sliding scale based on employing classes are so small in ing the influence of socialists. the selling price of the relevant number to have comparatively Trades councils, which had by product. They also opposed state little power and only four either that time come largely under intervention and regulation and captured or outgeneralled it.13 socialist control, were excluded preferred trade union funds to from representation at the be used for Friendly Society Joyce places some of the blame TUC and being a delegate was purposes rather than in support on the Liberal tradition that restricted to either trade union of industrial action. In contrast, candidates were expected to pay officials or people working in the newer general trade unions their own electoral expenses and the trade they represented. This had dispensed with the Friendly contribute towards the running rule had the effect of also exclud- Society role and used their funds of their constituency organisa- ing prominent Lib-Labbers such to support their members during tions – since working-class con- as Henry Broadhurst and John strikes and lockouts; their leaders stituencies often had the poorest Burns.18 The TUC also brought were sympathetic to socialism. In organisations and thus were most in a number of illiberal rules such 1890, the ‘New’ Unionism had reliant on rich candidates.14 as the card vote by which del- temporarily captured the Trade Mining constituencies were egates ceased to make decisions Union Congress and nearly all largely an exception to the lack as individuals. the socialist resolutions were car- of working-class candidates, The concern about the lack ried. Henry Broadhurst resigned since they were often so socially of enthusiasm for Lib-Labbery his position as secretary following cohesive that the support of the at constituency level was shared the passage of a resolution in sup- miner’s leaders could be essential by some people in the Liberal port of the eight-hour day.12 in delivering the vote. According hierarchy. The Chief Whip, Her- In the 1892 general election, to Shepherd, Thomas Burt was bert Gladstone, and the national ten Lib-Lab MPs were elected able to use the strength of the agent, Henry Schnadhorst, were showing that no progress had union’s influence to force the concerned at the dearth of work- been made in increasing the retirement of the sitting MP for ing-class Liberal candidates. A number of sitting Lib-Lab MPs Morpeth in 1874.15 The Min- National Liberal Federation fund since the previous two elections. ers Federation was also prepared was made available to give some Three independent socialist MPs to finance candidates. Scotland assistance to such candidates, were also elected: John Burns, proved to be particularly hostile although it was limited and little

6 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS use was made of it. Sam Woods, with Ramsay Macdonald, the the secretary of the parliamentary secretary of the LRC. The out- committee of the TUC, was sup- come was a confidential agree- ported by the party hierarchy to ment under which certain seats stand as a Liberal candidate for would only be fought by one of Walthamstow in a by-election in the parties.24 The agreement was 1897 after losing his seat at Ince unenforceable due to the auton- in the 1895 election.19 omy of local Liberal Associations, The socialists managed to pre- but pressure could be brought vail at the 1899 TUC conference, on them such as ensuring that and the TUC passed a resolu- dissident associations received tion calling for a conference of no outside support. Clarke sug- representatives of trade unions, gests that the Liberal Party had cooperatives and other organi- difficulty contesting seats in the sations with a view to devising Khaki election of 1900 and that ways of securing the return of the party headquarters found it an increased number of labour easier to discourage a local party members to the next parliament. from fighting than to dictate to This conference was called in a constituency which candidate 1900.20 The success of the resolu- should be chosen.25 The Liberal tion is thought not to have been Party gave up around thirty-five solely due to the socialists. Seven seats. Sitting Lib-Labbers were major unions that voted for the given a free run by the LRC. resolution were under strong The highest number ever of socialist influence, but they Lib-Lab MPs were returned at accounted for less than half of the the 1906 election. Twenty-three total vote in favour of the resolu- in all were elected, of whom tion. The difference is thought to fourteen were miners – but they have been made up from the bulk were outnumbered by twenty- of the smaller unions. It has been nine LRC MPs. Both groups suggested the motion was passed cooperated on the passage of the because the establishment did not 1906 Trades Disputes Bill, but exert itself to oppose it.21 The the LRC MPs formed their own vote was 546,000 to 434,000 in Labour Party with its own whips favour, with the miners and cot- and officers. The Lib-Lab MPs ton unions voting against it. formed their own parliamentary The conference of representa- group, electing the miners’ presi- tives voted to form the Labour dent, Enoch Edwards, as their Representation Committee chair and Richard Bell as secre- (LRC), which managed to get tary. The Lib-Lab group regarded two of its parliamentary candi- themselves as a loose group of dates elected in the 1900 election. trade unionists supporting the One of them, Richard Bell, the Liberal Party rather than a party secretary of the Amalgamated within a party. An uneasy truce Society of Railway Servants, prevailed with the secret electoral subsequently joined the Liberal pact remaining in place. Party. In contrast, eight Lib-Lab- There was some resentment at bers were also returned in 1900. local level. Clarke describes some The LRC’s fortunes improved of the greatest bitterness against with two by-election victories: Lib-Labbers occurring amongst David Shackleton at Clitheroe rank-and-file trade unionists. and Arthur Henderson at Barnard There had been opposition to the Castle. Both successful candidates election of Sir Henry Vivian, who had been Liberals and Shackle- was a cooperator, at Birkenhead ton could probably have been a in 1903, and the trades council Liberal candidate.22 Henderson in Burnley had opposed the Lib- was supported by the local min- Lab candidate Fred Maddison ers as the Liberal candidate was and supported Henry Hyndman a local landowner.23 The results Lib-Labs: John who was the Social Democratic Burns, Thomas worried Herbert Gladstone and Burt, Henry Federation candidate at the 1906 resulted in his secret meeting Broadhurst election.26

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 7 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS

Between the 1906 and 1910 Labour: Keir Vivian and Joseph Havelock Wil- elections, however, some maver- Hardie, Ramsay son lost theirs. icks broke ranks. An independ- MacDonald, By-election results showed Arthur Henderson ent socialist, Victor Grayson, was that there was still some residual returned in a by-election in the support for Lib-Labbery at grass- Colne Valley in 1907 despite roots level. Although, for example, opposition from the TUC. Walter Havelock Wilson failed to win Victor Osbourne, the secretary of Battersea in a by-election, there the Walthamstow branch of the is evidence that in mining areas Amalgamated Society of Railway there was continued support for Servants (ASRS) successfully Lib-Labbery and that the miners’ challenged the legality of his leaders’ decision to affiliate to the union’s political levy in the courts Labour Party was unpopular. In a with the result that political funds by-election at Hanley, held after were declared to be ultra vires by the death of Enoch Edwards in the House of Lords in 1909. It 1912, the electorate rejected was, however, a Pyrrhic victory, the Labour Party and returned a as the funds were used mainly Tory in a three-cornered contest. to pay MPs’ salaries and one of In 1913, the Derbyshire miners the victims was Richard Bell supported their agent, Barnet whose position as secretary of the Kenyon, who stood as a Lib- ASRS was becoming increasingly Lab candidate in a by-election untenable owing to his support of for Chesterfield and who, as a the Liberal Party. Bell stood down result, became the last Lib-Lab at the 1910 election. MP elected to parliament. In a In 1908, the Miners Federation subsequent by-election in Der- of Great Britain voted to affiliate byshire North-East, the miners to the Labour Party, despite the fielded a candidate who secured opposition of the miners’ leaders. official Labour endorsement, but According to Craig, the miners’ the seat was lost to a Unionist in MPs were allowed to retain the a three-cornered fight. Two min- Liberal whip until parliament ers’ MPs were expelled from the was dissolved at the next general Labour Party for leaning towards election if they wished.27 Three Liberalism. 29 miners’ MPs declined to join the The last survivors continued Labour Party. Enoch Edwards to sit in parliament until the 1918 refused to let them stand as Min- election when they either stood ers Federation approved candi- down, like John Burns and Thomas dates, on the grounds that ‘others Burt, or they changed their label. had supported the bill’.28 They Thomas Burt had been a Lib-Lab were, however, allowed a free run MP throughout the whole period at the election. of Lib-Lab representation and had Only six Lib-Lab MPs were become the Father of the House. returned in the January 1910 elec- John Ward, who represented the tion, including the three dissident Navvies’ Union, continued to rep- miners who all represented seats resent Stoke on Trent until 1929 in the North-East. The Labour – describing himself as an Inde- Party increased its number of seats pendent Labour candidate but to forty, although this increase was being supported locally by both largely accounted for by a change Liberals and Conservatives. Barnet of allegiance on the part of miners’ Kenyon continued to represent MPs – the bulk of whom stood as Chesterfield as a Liberal until Labour candidates. The December that same election in 1929. Joseph 1910 election produced the same Havelock Wilson was returned to number of Lib-Labbers and an parliament as a National Liberal, increase in the number of Labour representing Middlesbrough, until MPs by two. There was a slight 1922. change amongst the individual Was Lib-Labbery doomed to Lib-Labbers, however. John Burns failure, and the rise of the Labour and the three dissident miners Party inevitable? Dangerfield retained their seats but Sir Henry places the origins of the decline

8 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS of Liberalism as far back as the began increasingly to be passed. in their communities. There may 1906 election.30 Pelling suggests It was also during this period that have also been an innate conserv- that the decline was not due to the future leading elements of the atism of the non-partisan variety any sordid intrigues between Labour Party, including Ramsay in the electorate of mining com- Lloyd George and a few Con- Macdonald and Arthur Hender- munities that manifested itself in servative leaders or the impact son, ceased to support the Liberal continued support for Liberalism. of the First World War but to the Party. Had the Liberal Party been This support appears to have long-term social and economic able to field around fifty work- been eventually transferred to changes that were simultaneously ing-class candidates by the mid- the Labour Party, with coalfield uniting Britain geographically but 1890s, history might well have areas such as Durham, Glamorgan dividing the inhabitants in terms followed a different path. Pelling and Northumberland becoming of class.31 Splits had occurred in suggests that during that period Labour strongholds. the Liberal ranks prior to the war; there was an even greater factor The agreement with the LRC there was a major split over Irish eroding the votes of the smaller was arguably a panic measure to Home Rule in the latter half of unions: the lukewarm attitude of prevent the anti-conservative the 1880s. However the Liberal the Liberal leaders towards the vote from being split as much as it Party had retained the vote of the payment of MPs – even though was the result of any fear of being bulk of the working-class com- it was proposed in the Newcas- superseded by the Labour Party. munity eligible to vote.31 tle Programme supported by Clarke suggests that the under- The failure of Lib-Labbery Gladstone.32 standing was advantageous to to make sufficient progress in The unions themselves could both sides, rendering the bidding the Liberal Party may, however, have shown a more positive atti- and counter-bidding for trade have been a crucial factor in the tude and followed the example union support at constituency party’s failure to adapt to social of the miners. A scheme was level irrelevant. However it also change. There are probably three established for their union by had the effect of ensuring that key phases. First, there was the Ben Pickard who was a Yorkshire subsequent labour representation failure of the Lib-Labbers to miner and an MP from 1885 to would be increasingly outside make any significant progress in 1904. Under the scheme each Liberal control. securing an increased number of district of the miners’ union paid Clarke acknowledges this and MPs between the 1886 and 1892 into a central fund for financ- that the act was the death knoll of elections. The second phase was ing candidates.33 The support Lib-Labbery, stating: ‘whereas Lib- the capture of the TUC policy- for miners’ candidates in mining Lab MPs were once a concession making process by socialist ele- constituencies was not com- to labour, now that the Lib-Lab ments during the 1890s and the pletely unconditional and owed MPs were merely a rump, they subsequent decision to field LRC The failure much to the fact that the local were a provocation’.34 He also candidates. The third element was miners’ leaders were people who suggests that the LRC made Lib- the Lib-Lab pact in which the of Lib- had built up respect in local com- Labbery redundant. Although the Liberal Party effectively encour- Labbery munities over a period of time. Lib-Lab group reached its highest aged labour representation out- The affiliation of the Miners numbers following the 1906 elec- side its ranks. There is one more to make Federation of Great Britain to the tion, it was by that time too little stage to the process – the decision Labour Party was not universally and too late. of the Miners Federation of Great sufficient welcomed, as shown by the by- The leadership of the TUC Britain to change its allegiance to election results in Staffordshire was still inclined towards Lib- the Labour Party – though by that progress in and Derbyshire between the eralism and there were few dif- time Labour Party MPs outnum- the Liberal December 1910 election and the ferences in policy between the bered Lib-Labbers in Parliament. outbreak of the First World War. Liberal and Labour Parties. A. H. The first two phases were Party may They suggest that the re-election Gill, the Labour MP elected to probably the most significant. Had of the sitting MPs in the 1910 the multi-member constituency the Lib-Labbers increased their have been elections following their change of Bolton in 1906, was described representation in the 1892 elec- of party allegiance may well have by the Manchester Courier as ‘a tion, they would have continued a crucial been a personal vote, whilst the worthy Liberal-Labour who to have been seen as an effective factor in decision of the rank-and-file would not offend the mildest means of working-class represen- miners in Chesterfield to sup- Liberal in his loyalty to Lloyd tation. The seeds of change were, the party’s port their agent Barnet Kenyon George’.35 The Labour Party however, probably sown after the suggests that support for Liberal- was, however, independent and election but prior to the forma- failure ism was by no means dead. Fen- enshrined socialism in its con- tion of the Labour Representa- wick, Burt and Wilson were not stitution following the end of the tion Committee. It was during to adapt allowed to stand as miners’ can- First World War. this period that the Lib-Labbers to social didates in the 1910 election, but A counterfactual scenario began to lose control of the TUC they were not opposed – suggest- could be constructed in which and socialist-instigated motions change. ing that they had a high standing the Liberal Party adapted more

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 9 THE HISTORY OF THE LIB-LABS quickly to working-class eman- Party would have recovered from Trade Unions Since 1889 Vol 1 cipation and the demands of the split as it recovered from the (Oxford University Press, 1964), p. working-class representation. The divisions over Irish Home Rule 51. 9 Cole, Short History of the British payment of MPs, the persuasion in the 1880s. Working-Class Movement, p. 74. of local Liberal Associations that As it was, Lib-Labbery was a 10 Shepherd, ‘Labour and Parlia- the adoption of working-class failure. The Lib-Lab MPs were ment’, pp. 187–211. candidates was in their long-term criticised by Joseph Chamberlain 11 Cole, Short History of the British interests, and greater financial sup- as ‘the fielders and runners of the Working-Class Movement, p. 231. 12 Ibid., p. 247. 37 port from the trade unions could Gladstone Party’. However they 13 T. R. Threlfall, The Political Future have resulted in the TUC retain- were the first working-class MPs. of Labour in the Nineteenth Cen- ing its allegiance to the Liberals. Johnny Clynes, who was a cabi- tury (1894), pp. 213–14. It would also have removed any net minister in the first Labour 14 Peter Joyce, The Realignment of perceived need for a pact with the cabinet, described Thomas Burt the Left: A Short History of the Relationship between the Liberal LRC by preventing it from being and Alexander Macdonald as Democrat and Labour Parties formed in the first place. A small the ‘forlorn hope of the mighty (Macmillan, 1999) pp. 19–20. socialist party would probably army of British workers flung 15 Shepherd, ‘Labour and Parlia- have gained a few seats in Parlia- upon the gates of St Stephens; ment’, pp. 187–211. ment but it may not have pre- and those gates have never been 16 Henry Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party 1880–1900 (Macmillan, 38 sented a serious challenge. Under shut against us since’. Shepherd 1954), p. 65. such a scenario, the 1910 election claims that, in the mythology of 17 Cole, Short History of the British may well still have resulted in a The Lib- Labour history, the Lib-Labbers Working-Class Movement, p. 251. hung parliament, as the electoral are little remembered as labour 18 Ibid., p. 253. agreement with Labour pre- Labs con- pioneers and suggests that ‘as 19 Shepherd, ‘Labour and Parlia- ment’, pp. 187–211. vented any large-scale splitting of tributed former working men represent- 20 Cole, Short History of the Brit- the anti-conservative vote. There ing working-class interests for ish Working-Class Movement, p. was also a large contingent of Irish directly to the first time, they contributed 261–62. Nationalist MPs who may have directly to the growth of the tra- 21 Clegg et al., A History of British held the balance of power. the growth dition of radical and democratic Trade Unions Since 1889, p. 303. 22 George Bernstein, Liberalism and As the Lib-Labbers had a track politics in the late nineteenth and Liberal Polities in Edwardian Eng- of the tra- 39 record of supporting the party early twentieth centuries’. They land. leadership – they were staunch dition of are also a part of Liberal history 23 Ibid. supporters of Gladstone when which should be acknowledged 24 Kenneth Morgan, The Age of Lloyd the divisions over Irish Home with pride. George (Allen and Unwin, 1971), radical and p. 34. 36 Rule occurred – they would 25 P. F. Clarke, Lancashire and the probably have supported the democratic Andrew Hudson is a member of the New Liberalism (Cambridge Uni- leadership over entry into the executive of the Association of Liberal versity Press, 1971), p. 314. First World War. John Burns, politics in Democrat Trade Unionists. 26 Ibid., p. 332. the first working-class cabinet 27 F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamen- the late tary Election Results 1885–1918 1 F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamen- minister, resigned as President (1977), p. xiv. tary Election Results 1885–1918 of the Board of Trade over the 28 Clegg et al., A History of British nineteenth (1977), p. xiv. Trade Unions Since 1889, p. 419. declaration of war on Germany 2 John Shepherd, ‘Labour and Par- 29 Henry Pelling, Popular Politics in and was probably as representa- and early liament: The Lib-Labs as the First Late Victorian Britain (Macmillan, tive of the Lib-Labbers as Ramsay Working-Class MPs 1885–1906’, 1968), p. 116. twentieth in Eugenio Biagini and Alistair Macdonald was of the Labour 30 G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death J. Reid, Currents of Radicalism Party in his opposition to the war. of Liberal England (1936), p. vii. centuries. (Cambridge University Press, 31 Pelling, Popular Politics in Late Burns had initially been elected 1991), pp. 187–211. Victorian Britain, p. 120. as an independent socialist. The They are 3 Malcolm Wallace, Single or 32 Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party Lib-Labbers would probably have Return: The History of the Trans- 1880–1900, p. 223. port Salaried Staffs Association supported the Asquith faction in also a part 33 Pelling, Popular Politics in Late (TSSA, 1996), p. 13. the 1918 election had the split Victorian Britain, p. 107. 4 G. D. H Cole, Short History of the of Liberal 34 Clarke, Lancashire and the New still been in existence. Joseph British Working-Class Movement Liberalism, p. 336. Havelock Wilson, who was 1789–1947 (Allen and Unwin, history 35 Manchester Courier, 8 December elected as a National Liberal in 1947), p. 139. 1909. 5 Graham Wallas, The Life of Fran- 1918, was not a member of par- which 36 Shepherd, ‘Labour and Parlia- cis Place 1771–1854 (Allen and liament when the split occurred ment’, pp. 187–211. Unwin, 1925), p. 25 and pp. should be 37 Clegg et al., A History of British and, like Burns, had been initially 390–91. Trade Unions Since 1889, p. 279. elected as an independent social- 6 Ibid. 38 J. R. Clynes, Memoirs 1869– ist. The anti-coalition Liberals acknowl- 7 Cole, Short History of the British 1924, p. 21. Working-Class Movement, p. 211. would have remained the main 39 Shepherd, ‘Labour and Parlia- edged with 8 H. A. Clegg, H. A. Fox and N. A. F. left-of-centre party throughout ment’, pp. 187–211. Thompson, A History of British the twenties, and the Liberal pride.

10 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 Jaime Reynolds and Robert Ingham analyse the career of Archie Macdonald (1904–83), Liberal MP for Roxburgh and Selkirk for just eighteen months, between the 1950 and 1951 elections. BIOGRAPHY: ARCHIE MACDONALD

midst the wreckage 1950s2 – though perhaps the least was refused on health grounds: he of the February 1950 remembered today. had had a serious thyroid opera- general election, when Archibald James Florence tion in 1935. In 1940 he became the Liberal Party made Macdonald was born on 2 May Secretary of the Paint Industry its last effort at revival 1904 in Uniondale, South Africa. Export Group, a position he held Abefore the era of Jo Grimond, just His parents were Dr G. B. D. until 1949. He was also Director three seats were wrested from the Macdonald, an eye surgeon and Secretary of the Wartime other parties: Grimond’s Orkney originally from Aberdeen, and Paint Manufacturers’ Association and Shetland; Huddersfield West, Beatrice Blanche Meeking. They from 1943 to 1945. He was a where Donald Wade won, thanks travelled widely in Africa and director of Robert Bowran and to a local pact with the Conserva- Asia studying tropical eye diseases Co. Ltd, a paint manufacturing tives; and Roxburgh and Selkirk and finding cures for them. After firm, from 1949 to 1953 and in the Scottish Borders, where spending a short time in South then of Joseph Freeman Sons and Archie Macdonald defeated the Africa, the family moved to Co. Ltd (later Cementone) from sitting Tory. Macdonald’s victory Australia, where Macdonald was 1956, serving as vice-chairman was one of the very rare Liberal educated at Chatswood Grammar from 1962 to1966.3 gains in three-cornered general School, Sydney, and the Royal He played little role in Liberal election contests with the other Australian Naval College. He was politics before the 1945 general two parties during the long years a highly successful wool buyer election, when he stood as can- in the electoral wilderness from in Australia in the mid-1920s, didate for Roxburgh and Selkirk. the end of the 1920s to the mid- and then in the early 1930s, after Captain George Grey, MP for 1960s.1 his arrival in Britain, he and his Berwick-on-Tweed until his Macdonald’s triumph was brother established their own death on active service in 1944, short-lived. The Conservatives firm importing decorative woods had heard Macdonald speak at regained the seat at the next gen- and tinned fruit and vegetables a paint industry meeting and eral election, in October 1951, from Australia. From 1933 he persuaded him to offer himself and it was to remain in their worked for Rowntrees, and it as a Liberal candidate. He was hands until David Steel’s victory was Seebohm Rowntree (one suggested as a suitable candidate in the enlarged Roxburgh, Sel- of the founders of Management for Roxburgh and Selkirk on kirk and Peebles constituency at a Research Groups) who encour- account of his experience in by-election in 1965. Nevertheless aged his successful application for the cloth trade.4 Macdonald was Archie Macdonald’s victory put the job of Joint Chief Executive interested in public service and him amongst the tiny handful of that association in 1937. of an independent non-partisan of Liberal MPs during the nadir Macdonald volunteered for frame of mind and this may have of the party’s fortunes in the service on the outbreak of war but attracted him to the Liberals.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 11 BIOGRAPHY: ARCHIE MACDONALD

His background in business and not universally welcomed. An all times to put country before importing/exporting was not official of the Scottish Liberal party and to establish a ‘Con- untypical for a Liberal activist in Federation reported in July 1944 stituency Council’ including the party of the 1940s and 1950s. that ‘he is a Right Wing Liberal representatives of the Labour and The constituency was and and disinclined to fight Labour’. Conservative parties. He stressed remains one of the most pros- A later report was similarly nega- the importance of profit-sharing perous parts of Scotland, with tive.7 Shortly afterwards he seems in industry, equal pay for women a substantial local agricultural to have explored the possibility and home rule for Scotland.11 industry based on sheep farming, of transferring his candidacy to Certainly Macdonald’s perform- stock raising and upland farms. It Aberdeen, but nothing came of ance was impressive, not least was also one of great textile and this.8 It is unclear what might when contrasted with the defeat clothing areas of Britain, special- have prompted these criticisms, of Sir William Beveridge, founder ising in high-quality tweeds and but in any case the energy and of the welfare state and the knitwear in the mills of towns commitment that Macdonald put incumbent Liberal MP for the like Galashiels and Hawick. It into his campaign in 1945 and neighbouring Berwick-upon- is also ‘a real land of the lairds’. the friendships that he built with Tweed constituency, who lost When canvassing Macdonald many local Liberal figures suggest by a slightly larger margin than often encountered the response: that they were soon forgotten. Macdonald. ‘I’d like to vote for you, but if I The Scottish Liberal hierar- Doubtless Macdonald ben- did the laird would know and chy was also concerned about efited also from his connections then where would I be?’ The val- the dilapidated state of the party with the local Craigmyle family. leys abound with the castles and organisation in Roxburgh and Shortly after the election on 12 stately homes of noble Scottish Selkirk, and in almost every other Macdon- September 1945, he married the families. Also many retired mili- Scottish constituency. Particularly ald made Honourable Elspeth Ruth Shaw tary people lived there. seen in this context, Macdon- (b. 1921). Her father was the In the early post-war years, ald’s result in 1945 far exceeded much of second Lord Craigmyle, a former politics in Roxburgh and Selkirk expectations. He held the Lib- Liberal MP, and her grandfather, was still notably shaped by tradi- eral vote steady while the Tory the broad, the first Baron Craigmyle, had tional aristocratic influence, above vote fell away, reducing Scott’s been a minister under Rose- all that of the Tory Dukes of Buc- majority to 1,628. The Labour classless bery, Campbell-Bannerman and cleuch, the most powerful of the vote jumped from 17 per cent to appeal of Asquith.12 Her maternal grand- great landowners in the Borders. 29 per cent, but was not enough father was the Earl of Inchcape, The constituency had been held to push Macdonald into third the Liberal a mighty shipping magnate, who by the Conservatives5 from the place.9 had served in Lloyd George’s early 1920s, first by the Earl of One of the features of the Party – ‘the government during the First Dalkieth and then, on his succes- 1945 general election was that in World War. A fierce proponent sion to the title as Eighth Duke a few constituencies the Liberals only party of free trade and laissez-faire, he of Buccleuch and Queensbury in managed to supplant Labour as that can famously defected to the Con- 1935, by his brother Lord William the beneficiary of the large anti- servative Party in 1926.13 Scott. Liberalism had, however, Conservative swing. Local factors unite the After the 1945 election Mac- always been strong in the con- and the quality of candidate and donald was active in policy devel- stituency.6 In 1935 the Liberal campaign made a difference. In great bulk opment within the Liberal Party. candidate had gathered a third Roxburgh and Selkirk, Macdon- He chaired a party sub-commit- of the votes, some 6,000 behind ald probably shared some of the of the peo- tee studying co-partnership in Scott. There was also a significant anti-Tory swing, compensating ple, as it industry14 and was also a member Labour vote in third place. It was for any Liberal votes that shifted of the Liberal Reconstruction a seat where the traditional politi- to Labour. Personal factors may represents Committee, established after the cal culture had arrested the sharp also have played a part. The right- election to overhaul the party decline in Liberal support evident wing Scott was vulnerable to the all shades organisation, and the Liberal elsewhere in the country, but it backlash against the ‘Guilty Men’ Party Council.15 was hardly a hot prospect for a of the Conservative Party, blamed of opinion As a result of the 1945 per- Liberal win. for the failure of the appease- from pro- formance and Macdonald’s nurs- Macdonald was adopted as ment policy of the 1930s.10 In ing of the constituency, Roxburgh Liberal candidate for Roxburgh his election address Macdonald gressive and Selkirk had become one of and Selkirk in summer 1944, made much of the broad, class- the Liberals’ most winnable seats after touring the constituency less appeal of the Liberal Party Conserva- at the 1950 general election.16 with Lady Glencoats, a promi- – ‘the only party that can unite Macdonald was again selected as nent figure in the Scottish Lib- the great bulk of the people, as tives to candidate to fight Scott. Helped erals, and addressing meetings it represents all shades of opinion moderate by a much increased turnout (up in each of the five main towns. from progressive Conservatives to by 8.5 per cent) and a fall in the However his candidature was moderate Labour’ – promising at Labour’. Labour vote of 4.7 per cent, Mac-

12 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 BIOGRAPHY: ARCHIE MACDONALD

in one debate that the United opposing the economic right Nations should become the which was vocal in the Liberal sole buyer of vital raw materials Party at the time. Macdonald in order to avoid countries bid- was perhaps the most prominent ding up prices against each other. of the signatories of the letter to He also argued strongly for the the Guardian of 27 March 1953 Liberal policy of co-partnership announcing the establishment of in industry, a cause with which the Radical Reform Group to he was closely identified.19 He oppose laissez-faire (though sup- was an active MP. In the eight- porting free trade). The group een months of the Parliament aimed to promote ‘the policy of he made speeches in thirteen social reform without Socialism debates in the House, mostly on which Liberals have developed economic questions, and often from 1908 onwards’.24 spoke in Committee, as well as His gradual withdrawal from asking some fifty questions front-line politics was partly In 1951 Macdonald faced a a reaction to the exhausting new Conservative candidate, experience of sitting in the Commander C. E. M. Donald- 1950–51 Parliament, where the son.20 The Liberals, divided and Conservative opposition was exposed by the intense Labour– intent on wearing down the Conservative struggle in the Labour Government, with its 1950–51 Parliament and ill-pre- wafer-thin majority, by means pared for another general election of repeated all-night sittings. The so soon, were in trouble. It was no strain on the nine-strong band surprise that Macdonald lost his of Liberal MPs was particularly seat in a bruising campaign. In intense. Macdonald had a young donald was elected with a major- Archie Macdonald fact he did well to keep the mar- family and continued to work ity of 1,156.17 and family gin of defeat down to 829 votes. for Robert Bowran, where the New Members of Parliament Macdonald had worked hard as Managing Director, despite being are often advised to wait for a constituency MP, writing over a 1950 Liberal candidate himself, weeks or months before making 2,000 letters to ministers on was unsympathetic towards Mac- their maiden speeches, in order behalf of his constituents during donald’s political commitments. to soak in the ambience of the his eighteen-month tenure.21 The By the end of the parliament House of Commons, and to Liberal poll actually increased by Macdonald was utterly exhausted choose uncontroversial subjects some 250 votes, perhaps partly and had developed problems with to raise. New Liberal Members as a result of tactical voting by a nerve in his face due to stress. in the middle of the twentieth Labour supporters. However, on The 1951 election in Roxburgh century could not take advan- a very high turnout the Tory vote and Selkirk, during which he tage of this advice. In his maiden rose by over 2,000.22 Donaldson was subjected to sharp personal speech, in the debate on the was to hold the seat until his attacks by the Conservatives, left King’s Speech in March 1950, death in 1965, when, at the ensu- its mark. Macdonald spoke on self-govern- ing by-election, David Steel won According to his son, Mac- ment for Scotland and Wales. The Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles donald was ‘not a career poli- speech was greeted with the usual for the Liberals. tician with personal political courtesy, except by Bob Boothby, It is curious that, although ambitions. His interest in a who fiercely attacked the ideas it Macdonald remained a commit- political position … was the contained. Jo Grimond also made ted Liberal for a further twenty opportunity it gave to help his maiden speech on devolution years and seems to have retained individuals with difficulties and shortly afterwards in support of some political ambitions, he did to serve his community … He Macdonald.18 not stand again for parliament or had many interesting and crea- With his background in busi- – as one of the party’s very few tive political ideas but lacked the ness, Macdonald was pressed recent MPs – play a significant political instincts to trim them in straight away into action as an role in the Liberal revival of the order to “sell” them successfully economic spokesman for the later 1950s. He did not contest … he was always an individual Liberal Party, calling for econ- the expanded Roxburgh, Selkirk thinker and would never support omy, deregulation, and on one and Peebles constituency in 1955, a policy with which he disagreed occasion declaring his belief in despite invitations from local Lib- simply because it was avowed by ‘substantial profits’. However, he erals to return.23 a party to which he belonged.’25 was by no means an out-and-out He remained active in the He found a more satisfying laissez-faire free-trader, proposing party debates of the early 1950s, outlet in local government in

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 13 BIOGRAPHY: ARCHIE MACDONALD Hampstead, where he lived for He was not However, it seems that he was win support in Conservative and most of his life. He served as a not converted by Conservative ‘respectable’ circles for the ideas Hampstead borough council- policies, profoundly disagreeing of the British Union of Fascists. a politi- Nevertheless he served in the lor and Liberal group leader with many of them, as he openly army during the Second World War from 1962–65. His brief Liberal cian and told the Hampstead Tories. as Field Marshal Alexander’s mili- municipal career ended with the Macdonald’s role in the Liberal tary secretary. Scott was not alone reorganisation of London politics above all Party, after its promising start, was in his right-wing views. His brother, in 1964. He stood as one of the unfulfilled, and clearly disappoint- the Duke of Buccleuch, was an not a ‘party admirer of Hitler and lobbied for a Liberal candidates for Camden ing to himself. One can only agree negotiated peace with Germany in in the Greater London Council man’. He with the view of his son Michael 1940; see John Colville, Fringes of elections of that year, polling that ‘he was not a politician and Power, p. 83. Scott’s fellow Con- badly, and was also defeated in was always above all not a “party man”. He servative MP for the neighbouring Hampstead Town Ward for mem- was always his own man and so Peebles and Midlothian constitu- his own ency, Captain ‘Jock’ Ramsey, was bership of the new Camden Bor- was very difficult for politicians to interned during the war for his pro- ough Council.26 man and so use. He should really have been an Nazi activities. He retained some connec- independent.’29 11 Election Address of A. J. F. Mac- tions with the Scottish Borders. was very Archie Macdonald died on 20 donald, Liberal Candidate (1945). According to David Steel in his April 1983, aged seventy-eight. 12 See Robert Shiels, ‘Tommy Shaw: Lawyer, Politician and Judge’, Jour- memoirs, Against Goliath, Mac- difficult for He was survived by his wife and nal of Liberal History 38, spring donald indicated a willingness to two sons, Michael and Ian. 2003, pp. 22–23. contest the 1965 by-election in politicians 13 James Lyle Mackay, first Earl of Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, to use. Dr Jaime Reynolds studied politics at Inchcape (1852–1932) shipowner suggesting that Steel might stand LSE, and has a long-standing interest – most prominent figure of his time in British shipping; 1917, Commit- down as candidate in his favour He should in Liberal Democrat and electoral his- tee of Imperial Defence; 1921–22, and act as agent, although Mac- tory. Dr Robert Ingham is a historical ‘hawkish’ member of the Geddes donald’s family consider this to be really have writer, and Biographies Editor of the Committee which recommended unlikely. In the event, Macdonald Journal of Liberal History. sweeping cuts in public expendi- returned to support and speak for been an ture. Liberal until 1926 when he joined the Conservative benches 27 1 The others were Colne Valley, in Steel in the by-election. in Lords. Ardent and committed independ- somewhat unusual circumstances, Macdonald roundly con- free trader and fierce opponent of in 1931, Orkney and Shetland in state intervention. He contributed demned his Conservative ent. 1950, and North Devon in 1959. £50,000 to the Liberal election opponents in Hampstead on his A few more were gained in the campaign in 1923. borough council defeat in 1965 absence of a candidate from 14 The Times, House of Commons one or other of the main parties, and predicted that the Liberals 1950. and Torrington and Orpington at had a bright future in the area.28 15 The Times, House of Commons by-elections in 1958 and 1962 1951; Alan Watkins, The Liberal Less than six years later, and after respectively. Dilemma (1966), p. 43. much agonising, he joined the 2 A total of twelve Liberal MPs sat 16 The third most winnable after Conservative Party and served as in Parliament between the 1950 Caithness and Sutherland and election and the end of the dec- a Camden councillor until 1976. Orkney and Shetland. ade. Apart from Grimond, Mac- Macdonald was a public-spirited 17 The full result was: Macdonald donald was the only one who sat 15,347 (39.4%), Scott 14,191 man – he was also for many years for a Scottish constituency. (36.4%), Thomas (Lab) 9,413 a magistrate and a member of 3 Information provided by Michael (24.2%). Electorate 47,430, the Board of Visitors of Worm- Macdonald . turnout 82.1%. The constituency 4 Ibid. wood Scrubs – and was no doubt boundaries were unchanged from 5 The Conservatives ran under the attracted by the prospect of again 1945. label ‘Unionist’ in Scotland. 18 HC Deb, 10 Mar 1950, cc. 615– being able to serve his local 6 The separate Roxburghshire and 29. community and disappointed Peebles & Selkirk seats were 19 For example on the debate on the that, at the time, membership Liberal from 1906 to 1923 and second King’s Speech of the par- Hawick Burghs (Hawick, Galashiels of the Liberals offered limited liament, see HC Deb, 7 Nov 1950, and Selkirk) was a safe Liberal opportunities to hold public cc. 774–84. seat until its abolition in 1918. 20 According to David Steel, Com- office. It is often now overlooked 7 Esslemont Papers, Aberdeen Uni- mander Donaldson was not a that the 1970 election was one versity Library, MS3037/1/4/42 strong candidate and his victory of the Liberal Party’s worst and a–b. in 1951 was unexpected; Dav- 8 Ibid. one of its consequences was to id Steel, Against Goliath (1989) 9 The full result was: Scott 13,232 strengthen the role played in the pp. 33–34. (37.9%), Macdonald 11,604 21 Information supplied by Michael party by ‘wild’ Young Liberals (33.2%), Thomas (Lab) 10,107 Macdonald. such as Tony Greaves and Gor- (28.9%). Electorate 47,492, turn- 22 The detailed result was Don- don Lishman with whom Mac- out 73.6%. aldson 16,438 (40.6%), Mac- 10 He had been a member of the donald – who had become more donald 15,609 (38.6%), White ‘January Club’, established by conservative in his views in later (Lab) 8,395 (20.8%). Electorate Sir Oswald Mosley in 1934 to life – was particularly out of step. 47,614, turnout 84.9%.

14 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 LETTERS

23 Steel, Against Goliath, p. 37, says 25 Michael Macdonald note to the Understanding through Africa, that after much toing and froing authors, 8 October 2002. 1912–14’). Harcourt remained Macdonald declined the Liberal 26 The Liberal candidates won 6% throughout the leading Cabinet Association’s invitation. However of the votes in the three-member his son doubts whether Macdon- constituency. Macdonald polled advocate of détente with Ger- ald considered returning to fight slightly better than the other two. many; he organised the Cabinet the seat, although asked to do so 27 Steel, Against Goliath, p. 37, and majority that led to the Haldane by local Liberals. The Conservative information provided by Michael mission to Berlin in1912. He majority increased to 15.6%, with Macdonald. was also totally dismissive of any the Liberal in second place on 28 Hampstead and Highgate Express 32.1%. and Hampstead Garden Suburb obligations towards Russia, and 24 Watkins, The Liberal Dilemma, and Golders Green News, 15 May challenged the phrase ‘Triple p. 70. The letter was also signed 1964. Entente’ whenever it appeared in by Desmond Banks, E. F. Allison, 29 Michael Macdonald note to the Cabinet papers. As I stated in my Norman Clark, Peter Grafton and authors, 8 October 2002. letter in issue 30, more ministers Philip Skelsey. considered resigning during the fraught Cabinet meetings of 30 July – 4 August 1914. Although Belgium was a useful pretext for backing down, I am sure the prime motive in Harcourt’s case was to avoid splitting the party; LETTERS once it was clear that Asquith, Grey and Churchill could not be Peter Hatton colonial Africa (especially moved, more resignations could Having done a PhD on the Ugandan cotton and Ghana- only have led to a coalition or a Colonial Office under Lewis ian cocoa); he even sacked minority Tory government. (Loulou) Harcourt over thirty a Governor of Kenya (then years ago, I was delighted to see the British East African Pro- Patrick Jackson’s biographical tectorate) for sharp practice Larry Iles article about him in issue 40. He over an African land reserve. With reference to the special is most illuminating on his years 5. As MP for Rossendale, in issue 39 of the Journal of Liberal as his father’s secretary (and man- Lancashire (and with an History, it is a pity that Lord ager?) and his social and political ennobled ex-MP for Old- Rennard agrees so readily with background. ham as his number two) he Bill Rodgers’ contemporary However, it seems to me per- was zealous in securing sup- document indicting Tony Cook’s verse not to consider Harcourt’s plies of cotton, palm oil, rub- SDP candidature for the Dar- contribution in office to colonial ber and chocolate for British lington by-election debacle in / imperial policy. I would sum- (especially Lancashire) 1983. Both of them underesti- marise the main heads there as: industries. mate the impact of the media, 1. Amalgamating the Nigerias 6. He kept a close eye on Liv- and in particular the behaviour (1912–14). erpool shipping interests and of Vincent Hanna, the avowedly 2. Further developing Domin- when he thought Treasury pro-Labour, Newsnight inter- ion status – especially at the actions over the silver coin- rogator. He went overboard in Colonial / Commonwealth age of British West Africa praising Labour’s Ossie O’Brien conference of 1911, and was threatening them he in his reports, and gave Cook through his close relations won a tussle with Lloyd the kind of merciless battering (via the first Governor-Gen- George on this issue. at press conferences that even eral, (Lord) Herbert Glad- I could go on, but I hope that veteran candidates would have stone (son of W. E.)) with the this is more than enough to sug- found difficult to withstand. new Union of South Africa. gest that Jackson’s argument that Hanna later admitted that he had 3. Vigorously defending the Harcourt ‘looked to the past and really gone for Cook, hammer policy of coastal concentra- failed to come to grips with the and tongs. tion in British Somaliland industrial and social problems The argument that Cook was when the Tories (amend- of the new century’ is not the a lightweight TV reporter is also ment to King’s Speech, whole story. overdone; Tyne Tees always spe- February 1914) demanded The other section I would cialised in young and telegenic aggressive action against like to comment upon is Har- presenters. A much worse fault Muhammad Abdille Rah- court and foreign policy (in was that on policies Cook chose man (‘the mad mullah’ to the 1971 I published an article in to be rigorously – and rather British press). European Studies Review enti- emptily – centrist, rather than 4. Supporting peasant proprie- tled ‘Harcourt and Solf: the take strong stands, as O’Brien tor export development in Search for an Anglo-German and Fallon both did.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 15 Dr Jürgen Frölich outlines the role of the Free Democratic Party in German Federal politics. THE GERMAN LIBERALS No other established party in the Federal BETWEEN THIRD FORCE AND MARGINAL FORCE Republic of Germany has had as contentious an image as the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Its imminent death, in terms of political significance, has been predicted many times and it has been declared superfluous on the grounds that the Federal Republic is no longer in need of a Liberal party. On the other hand, even though it is currently the smallest party in the German Bundestag, elected with a 7.4% share of the vote in September 2002 – the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) both gained 38.5% and the Greens 8.8% – it can Party logo from hat makes it the long- and the Green Party’s five years. 1953 est-serving party in the Furthermore, looking back on boast more than forty federal government, German contemporary history, it years of participation in as compared with the becomes evident that the decisive CDU’s thirty-six years, changes of 1948–49, 1955, 1969, the government. Tthe SPD’s twenty-one years 1982 and 1989–90 were brought

16 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 THE GERMAN LIBERALS BETWEEN THIRD FORCE AND MARGINAL FORCE

about only with the support of the share of the mandates. The FDP coalition in 1982 – when a new FDP. But how can this not-unim- could always claim a share of grouping of CDU and FDP led to portant role of the Liberals be the vote of between 5.8% and the replacing of the SPD Chan- explained in the face of the level 12.8% (see table). Since no party, cellor, Helmut Schmidt, with the of criticism of the party in both with the exception of the CDU leader of the CDU, Helmut Kohl journalism and historiography? in 1957, has ever managed to – was an occasion that particu- Looking back at the German gain an absolute majority of larly produced much long-lasting national electoral system and at mandates or votes, it was always anger and aggression against the the party political system as they necessary to form a coalition of FDP on the part of the left of crystallised in the first decade after two or more parties. Until the German politics and public opin- 1949, one could gain the superfi- Green Party entered Parliament ion, who forgot that the SPD had cial impression that there were in 1983, the FDP therefore had Because performed a similar manoeuvre in only two parties at work. In 1949 the power to select one of the 1966 by joining the Great Coali- eight political parties entered the two major parties with whom the Liber- tion and sending the FDP into the Federal Parliament, but with the to form a working coalition. ranks of the opposition. introduction of the ‘Five Percent The exception was from 1966 als were But the blame for the contro- Clause’ in 1953, the ban on the to 1969, when the CDU and versial image of the FDP cannot Communist Party in 1956 and SPD formed a ‘Great Coalition’. known for solely be laid at the door of anti- the rise of Chancellor Adenauer Consequently, for many years the ‘tipping the Liberal political commentators and the CDU as a leading politi- FDP played a crucial role in par- and political scientists. There are cal force, the number of parties liament, several times preventing balance’, – at first sight – some inconsist- represented in the Bundestag was a change in electoral system from encies in the development of the reduced to three, with the CDU proportional to majority voting, they were party since its inception. So it is and SPD as the so-called ‘big’ or which was a particular goal of the useful to outline a brief history of ‘people’s’ parties. Only one of the CDU in the mid fifties and the unable to the FDP. smaller parties, the FDP, survived late sixties. establish Even at its founding on 11 the first decade of the Federal Because the Liberals were December 1948 in the South Republic. known for ‘tipping the balance’, firm public Hessian town of Heppenheim, It managed this because the they were unable to establish it was not clear what the politi- founders of the Republic had firm public support, as the party support, as cal aims of the party would be. decided in favour of a system of in opposition would always try to The regional parties that formed proportional representation and isolate itself from the FDP, par- the party the FDP, nine months before against a majority vote system. ticularly in the case of the CDU in opposi- the Federal Republic was born, Half of the parliamentary seats are after 1969 and of the SPD from had varying ideas as to what filled by representatives directly 1982 to the present. Furthermore, tion would the party would represent. Two elected by their constituents; because many journalists and con- main movements prevailed: on however, the so-called ‘Second temporary historians have sympa- always try the one hand were the so-called Vote’ is also decisive for the com- thised with one of the two major ‘Old Liberals’ of Southern Ger- position of Parliament since every parties, and still do so, it is not to isolate many and the Hanseatic cities, political party that wins more surprising that the FDP has been itself from who strove to revive the left than 5%, or at least three con- given little credit for its politi- Liberal movement of the Weimar stituencies, gets a proportional cal achievements. The change of the FDP. Republic and wanted to place the

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 17 THE GERMAN LIBERALS

Election FDP CDU/CSU SPD Greens PDS Others % / seats % / seats % / seats % / seats % / seats % / seats 1949 11.9 / 52 31.0 / 139 29.2 / 131 – – 27.9 / 76 1953 9.5 / 48 45.2 / 243 28.8 / 151 – – 15.5 / 45 1957 7.7 / 41 50.2 / 270 31.8 / 161 – – 10.3 / 17 1961 12.8 / 67 45.4 / 242 36.2 / 190 – – 5.6 / – 1965 9.5 / 49 47.6 / 245 39.3 / 202 – – 3.6 / – 1969 5.8 / 30 46.1 / 242 42.7 / 224 – – 5.4 / – 1972 8.4 / 41 44.9 / 225 45.8 / 230 – – 0.9 / – 1976 7.9 / 39 48.6 / 243 42.6 / 214 – – 0.9 / – 1980 10.6 / 53 44.3 / 226 42.9 / 218 1.5 / – – 0.4 / – 1983 7.0 / 34 48.8 / 244 38.2 / 193 5.6 / 27 – 0.4 / – 1987 9.1 / 46 44.3 / 223 37.0 / 186 8.3 / 42 – 1.3 / – 1990 11.0 / 79 43.8 / 319 33.5 / 239 5.0 / 8 2.4 / 17 4.3 / – 1994 6.9 / 47 41.5 / 294 36.4 / 252 7.3 / 49 4.4 / 30 3.5 / – 1998 6.2 / 43 35.1 / 245 40.9 / 298 6.9 / 47 5.1 / 36 5.8 / – 2002 7.4 / 47 38.5 / 248 38.5 / 251 8.8 / 55 4.0 / 2 2.8 / –

FDP at the centre of the politi- General elections a coalition with the CDU from opposition – a position that lasted cal spectrum with good relations 1949–2002 (up 1949 to 1956, and then again three years. During that period with both sides; opposing them to 1987 Federal from 1961 to 1966, under the it found itself threatened by the Republic; since were the Free Democrats of 1990, United chancellorship first of Konrad possibility of electoral reform, just North Rhine–Westphalia, Hesse Germany) Adenauer and then, from 1963, as it had been in 1956. and Lower Saxony, who identi- of Ludwig Erhard. The latter, New similarities with the fied themselves with the national although a member of the CDU, SPD were found on the topic of Liberal tradition, and saw the was considered a genuine Liberal Ostpolitik. The construction of FDP as a party for the bourgeoi- because of his economic policy the Berlin Wall in 1961 changed sie, reformed National Socialists convictions. all consideration of the possibil- and former soldiers from World The main problem of the ity of a reunified Germany. With War II. Both tendencies shared Adenauer era revolved around reunification hopes pushed to the a disapproval of any economic the question of national reuni- distant future, the FDP thought it dirigisme or political influence fication. The Free Democrats more important to improve rela- on the part of the churches, as suspected that, in supporting their tionships with the Eastern block well as the hope of a reunified goal of Western integration, Ade- and between the two German Germany. Despite the presence of nauer would neglect their other nations. In 1969, Willy Brandt well-known ‘Old Liberals’ Theo- aim of reunification with East headed an SPD/FDP coalition dor Heuss and Thomas Dehler, Germany and the Saar region. for which Ostpolitik was the who were the leading figures in In 1956 the coalition fell apart, main basis. During this period the the Southern German parties, leaving the FDP as an opposition FDP changed its stance towards the ‘national’ side at first seemed party for the first time. After the the centre-left and, particularly the stronger force. It was soon triumph of the 1961 elections amongst the younger, more suspected, though, that they con- under the slogan ‘With the CDU, left-leaning party members, it doned the infiltration of the FDP but without Adenauer’ – who by was social-Liberal concepts that by former National Socialists, that time was 85 years old – the temporarily gained more influ- and as a result the ‘Old Liberals’ FDP/CDU coalition returned, ence. The highpoint of this trend gained more and more influence albeit with Adenauer still as chan- was the so-called ‘Freiburg Pro- until the middle of the 1950s. cellor. At least he was replaced gramme’ of 1971, which placed This is not to imply that the within two years by the ‘father greater emphasis on reforms in early FDP was undiscriminating of the economic miracle’, Lud- the areas of education, civil rights about who it was willing to form wig Erhard. But since differences and social welfare. But, with the a coalition with. On the contrary, remained surrounding the ques- onset of the oil crisis and the whilst representing a bourgeois tion of Ostpolitik, the coalition changing economic framework body of voters, it was without failed once again in 1966. Con- of the mid 1970s, the FDP began doubt on the same side as the tributing to this failure were the to focus once again on its Liberal CDU, with whom it shared more increasing differences in opinion economic principles, which lead in the way of economic policies on the matter of fiscal policy. Yet to increasing tensions within than the SPD. The FDP formed again, the FDP found itself in the SPD/FDP coalition. The

18 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 THE GERMAN LIBERALS

coalition eventually failed because as a resolution during the party bership, but since the split-up of of further differences over NATO conference in Wiesbaden in 1997 the social-Liberal coalition the rearmament, which reflected the and in which a general reform of FDP has focused its efforts on coalition partners’ more general German economic and social pol- the more self-supporting parts disagreements in the areas of secu- icies was demanded. Nevertheless, of the new middle classes to get rity and foreign policy. In 1969 in 1998 and 2002 the majority of support from independent retail- the FDP provided Walter Scheel the Germans placed their trust ers, the self-employed, doctors, as Foreign Minister, followed in in more traditional German lawyers and so on. Naturally these 1974 by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, social policies – as exemplified, changes of pressure groups within both of whom sought to bring for instance, by the debate about the party have left some traces on the Western partners together and the ‘German Way’ during the last the party’s policies, but they have to create understanding with the election campaign – leaving the not changed its general attitude. East, forming a foreign policy that FDP, for the first time in its his- This brief historical sketch would become a trademark of the tory, in opposition for two con- demonstrates that the FDP has FDP. secutive terms. However, the FDP had a much greater influence In the autumn of 1982 the is currently represented in five of on Federal German history than FDP effected a change in govern- the sixteen state governments. the votes and the historiography ment, abandoning the coalition The party’s political changes would lead one to expect. It was with the SPD in order to create a meant changes in the nature of the FDP that has facilitated all coalition with the CDU. This was its supporters, which can only the important, fundamental deci- reflected in the change of chan- briefly be outlined here. In the sions and changes of the last half cellors from Helmut Schmidt to beginning the FDP was mainly century, because it was Federal Helmut Kohl and meant a funda- supported by the so-called ‘old German Liberalism that secured mental alteration in both foreign middle classes’ (‘Alter Mit- majority support for these and economic policy. Within this telstand’) of protestant master changes in both Parliament and context, the Federal Republic craftsmen, merchants and farmers public life. The Liberals were the was able to act upon the changes and by former soldiers. During most determined advocates for a that Gorbachev was undertaking the period of the social-Liberal model of society that was based in the East, and this culminated coalition the ‘new middle classes’ on private ownership and not in the extraordinary success of – employees and senior staff – socialist concepts. They passed 1989–90. Although it is Kohl Party Leaders of became more important amongst laws on this basis, with the help of who is generally credited with the FDP the party organisation and mem- the larger CDU and even before this feat, it was only with the help of the Liberal Hans-Dietrich 1948–49 Theodor Heuss Genscher, who worked along- (MP Reichstag 1924–32, Federal President 1949–59) side him as Foreign Minister, 1949–54 Franz Blücher that the unification process was (Minister of the Marshall Plan and Vice Chancellor 1949–57) accomplished. In the first elec- 1954–57 Thomas Dehler tions of the reunified Germany (Justice Minister 1949–53, Head of Parliamentary Party 1953–57) in 1990, the FDP was able to win 1957–60 Reinhold Maier 11% of the vote and continue a (Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg 1945–53) coalition with the CDU, as many 1960–68 Erich Mende of the leading politicians of the (Head of Parliamentary Party 1957–63, Minister for Domestic German Relations Liberals were originally from the and Vice Chancellor 1963–66) DDR and had long supported 1968–74 Walter Scheel Minister reunification. ( for Economic Cooperation 1961–66, Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Within the unified Germany, 1969–74, Vice-president of Parliament, Federal President 1974–79) however, the FDP slowly began 1974–85 Hans-Dietrich Genscher to lose electoral support as a result (Minister of the Interior 1969–74, Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor 1974–92) of problems deriving from the 1985–88 Martin Bangemann unification process itself. Fur- (General Secretary of FDP 1973–75, Economic Minister 1984–88, EU thermore, at the same time the Commissioner 1989–99) FDP began to adopt the ideals of 1988–93 Otto Graf Lambsdorff Anglo-American ‘neo-liberalism’. (Economic Minister 1977–84) This new orientation, which was 1993–95 Klaus Kinkel in some regards a return to the (Justice Minister 1991–92, Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor 1992–1998) FDP politics of the fifties and 1995–2001 Wolfgang Gerhardt early sixties, was finally evident (Hessian State Minister 1987–1991, Head of Parliamentary Party since 1998) in the ‘Guidelines to the Liberal since 2001 Guido Westerwelle Civic Society’, which was passed (General Secretary of FDP 1994–2001)

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 19 THE GERMAN LIBERALS

over economic policy, and later its programme that has trans- blocked the anti-communist hard- formed the FDP in the eyes of liners in the CDU who wanted to the public into the ‘most Western break off communication with party in Germany’. However, this the East. Throughout these politi- new programme and leader, sup- cal manoeuvrings, the strong man ported mostly by young voters, within the FDP was Hans-Diet- were probably not the main rea- rich Genscher, who was Minister son for the outcome of the 2002 of the Interior from 1969 to 1974, elections, in which the party later Foreign Minister from 1974 gained far more votes than was to 1992, and also Vice Chancellor generally expected. Nevertheless, under both Helmut Schmidt and the FDP remains in opposition. Helmut Kohl. Both change and In terms of the constants of continuity are therefore firmly Liberal politics over the history of linked with the FDP, as the two the Federal Republic, two main political camps to left and right points should be mentioned. the Federal Republic of Germany Party logo from could seldom hold a majority of First, economic and social poli- was founded, in the Economic 2002 their own before 1998. cies have always followed a deci- Council and the Parliamentary The increasing paralysis within sively Liberal bent, hostile to state Council, the predecessors of the the domestic policy of the Fed- intervention, but not excluding Federal Parliament. They sup- eral Republic since the 1990s support for welfare state meas- ported Adenauer and his policy of (the ‘German Disease’) might ures, especially during the social- Western integration and entrance be explained by the decreasing Liberal coalition. However, for into NATO, both of which were strength of the FDP within Parlia- most of its history the FDP has strongly opposed by the SPD. ment, and the party’s weak oppo- had much less sympathies for the They criticised from early on sition to the extension of West welfare state than – in my opin- the unshakable attitude of the Germany’s welfare system to the ion – for example the Liberal first chancellor over his poli- East and the resulting transforma- Democrats in Britain. cies towards the East and always tion of that system, despite the Second, on the matter of the created new approaches that fact that the party held the Federal national question, the FDP has finally led to a policy of détente, Ministry for the Economy for always supported the self-deter- although this could only be many years. However, one should mination of Germans in both the made effective through a change not overlook the fact that, since West and the East. In the 1960s in political camps by the FDP. 1972, this ministry has had much the national question, for the FDP, Through the swap in coalition less political weight and influence went hand in hand with a concept partners, as a result of which they in comparison with the Ministry of foreign policy that was founded made many enemies, the FDP of Finance, which has always been on détente and reliability without secured a successful shift in eco- filled by a member of one of the abandoning the aim of a peaceful nomic policies during the 1980s. two ‘big’ parties. reunification. While this was in It was also the FDP who secured In retrospect, the official retire- harmony with the main elements – together with the CDU – the ment of Hans-Dietrich Genscher of traditional nineteenth-century majority in favour of unifica- in 1992 has been as much a loss Liberalism, the third aim of that tion, against strong counteracting for the FDP as the crises of the previous period – a constitutional forces amongst the Social Demo- 1950s, and changes of coalition state – is no longer reflected in crats and the Greens. Even Berlin in 1969 and 1982, as Genscher, Liberal programmes and policies. would not have become German even after his withdrawal as party This is primarily due to the fact capital without the votes of the leader in 1985, had been the that the Federal Republic already Liberals – together with the East ‘strong man’ of the party. Under corresponds to Liberal concepts German Greens and the Party Genscher’s leadership, the party of a constitutional state and that of Democratic Socialism (PDS) had always been able to recover all the other important parties – because a majority of the two from such critical events within conform to this, with the possible main parties supported the ‘old’ a few years, but his exit from the exception of the successor to the capital, Bonn. political stage has led to a number SED, the PDS, which is repre- In addition to serving as a cata- of smaller crises that have evolved sented in the Bundestag by only lyst for political change, the FDP into a lasting crisis. This is evident two MPs. has also served to steer politics in the sudden changes of party Since 1990 the ‘National away from either extreme. This leader: Klaus Kinkel from 1993 Question’ has naturally lost any was particularly apparent in the to 1995, Wolfgang Gerhardt from meaning. It has been replaced by 1970s and 1980s, when it first 1995 to 2001 and, since 2001, issues like reliability in German blocked the left wing of the SPD Guido Westerwelle. Nevertheless, foreign policy and the restructur- from gaining too much influence there has been a reassessment of ing of the social system towards

20 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 more freedom and responsibility That the FDP as a ‘Third Force’ the history of Liberal parties in for the individual. If one believes has contributed much is without other parts of the world, espe- that the best thing to have hap- question for the author. Germany cially in Great Britain, teaches us pened to the German nation dur- needs a party with a clear orien- that this is not impossible. ing its strange development over tation towards the Western world, the last century is the so called including the whole North Dr Jürgen Frölich is deputy head of ‘Arrival in the West’ of a unified Atlantic area, both in respect of the ‘Archiv des Liberalismus’ at the Germany, it can only be hoped a common policy and common Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation, that the FDP will be able to con- values. And maybe some day such Gummersbach and, since 1989, has tinue its role as a ‘Third Force’ a political entity can become the been co-editor of the Jahrbuch zur and to make an important, if second or even first force, even if Liberalismus-Forschung. not decisive, contribution to the it does not look so at the moment Federal Republic of Germany. or in the near future. However, SDP CARTOONS

July at Gallery 33, near London efited from a donation made to to come and browse. Anyone Chris Radley Bridge, saw an extensive exhibi- the Group for each cartoon sold. (cartoonist), left; interested should contact Maria tion of cartoons from the Social Not all the cartoons were Maria Linforth- Linforth-Hall on 020 7407 8668 Democrat newspaper, many of sold, however, and Gallery 33 Hall, Gallery or [email protected]. A which were reproduced, with (33 Swan Street, London SE1) is Administrator, 25% donation to History Group commentary, in Journal of Liberal still holding a stock of originals. bottom right, funds will be made on sales from with a character History 39. Liberal Democrat Whenever they gather a dozen from many of the those who identify themselves as History Group resources ben- enquiries they invite people cartoons! Journal readers.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 21 Adrian Slade talks to Lord Bill Rodgers of Quarry Bank, Labour Cabinet Minister under Callaghan, member of the ‘Gang of Four’ founders of the SDP, and Leader of the Liberal Democrat in the House of Lords.

‘HARD MAN’ WITH HEART

xford friend of with housing in those days. I used as he was apparently named, only Shirley Williams to travel around the city with him mustered 6,000 votes. and Dick Taverne; on the trams. When you are eight ‘It was a great lesson about the political contem- or nine you are easily impressed importance or not of candidates’, porary of the then and I became very aware of the he says. ‘After the election I wrote OLiberals Robin Day and Jeremy absolute poverty in the old ten- to all the parties and then decided Thorpe; Secretary of the Fabian ement slums, compared to the to join the Labour Party.’ Society in the ’50s; victor of the comfort of the semi-detached in Educated at Quarry Bank Stockton-on-Tees by-election in which we lived. I well remember school, from which he takes the ’62; junior, senior or cabinet min- seeing children outside the pubs title of his peerage, he went to ister in the Labour governments without shoes. My father had a Oxford in the late ’40s and began of the ’60s and ’70s; member of great sense of public service and, to be politically active, although the ‘Gang of Four’ that founded although he never revealed his he did not see himself as inevita- the SDP and, at least as far as Lib- political views to me until after bly going into politics. ‘I actually erals were concerned, the ‘hard he retired, he deliberately used to wanted to become a journalist,’ man’ of the Alliance seat nego- take me round to the housing and he says, ‘and when I’d finished tiations; Director-General of the the hospitals. So my interest came at Oxford I badly needed a job. RIBA and then the ASA; leader from what I saw and my father’s I applied for two, one with the of the Liberal Democrats in the commitment to improving those Liverpool Daily Post as a trainee, House of Lords – Bill Rodgers is conditions.’ the other with the Fabian Soci- widely remembered for a lifetime In the 1945 election Bill Rodg- ety. I really wanted the Liverpool of politics that effectively began ers actually supported the Liberal job but they took so long to when he was just eight years old. candidate in Toxteth East because make up their minds I took the ‘I was born in Liverpool’ he he thought he was the best man Fabian Society offer instead.’ And says. ‘My father was clerk to the for the job. That may have been he stayed there for the next nine Health Committee, which dealt so but sadly Professor Lion Blease, years, a number of them as the

22 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 ‘HARD MAN’ WITH HEART

Society’s youngest-ever General be that “you can’t have socialism working with Roy Jenkins at the Secretary. without taxation”. Forget the Treasury was the least rewarding. He was not very happy with word “socialism” but my view ‘For all George’s short-comings the Labour Party of the ’50s. ‘It then, and still is, that you don’t get it was very exciting all the time. was in a mess. After the 1945–51 a fair and just society unless you are I got on with him and learned a government had done its work prepared to pay for it. So I remain huge amount, and when I moved it ran out of ideas. There was a one of those who still thinks that, with him to the Foreign Office, I serious split between the consoli- if you want better public services, learned a lot more’, he says. dators under Herbert Morrison you have to be prepared to pay for ‘Roy Jenkins had given me and the traditional left under them through taxation.’ my Fabian Society job and we Aneurin Bevan. Although in Although in the ’50s he had always got on very well’, he says. some ways I preferred the left, I been lukewarm about the con- ‘He was like an elder brother. I thought they were off the point, cept of Europe, he attributes his don’t know whether we were of particularly about nationalisation. subsequent enthusiasm to what he like mind. He was much more I did not think we should imme- sees as the final collapse of British liberal and tolerant than I was, diately be nationalising cement, independent influence after Suez, and fastidious. That’s probably sugar and so on. It was a nonsense. and Europe was part of his plat- a strength. I am not sure what That view gradually became form when he first stood unsuc- he meant when he referred in more and more developed within cessfully in a by-election in 1957. My view your last interview1 to my Mor- the party, although it really took His second by-election, which risonian tendencies, but I suppose from 1959 to Blair before it the older Liberals remember bet- then, and that almost from the beginning change came in full. I think the ter, was at Stockton-on-Tees in he had been moving to a more Labour governments in between Orpington year, 1962. Rodgers still is, that liberal form of social democracy, managed well and did some good eventually won with a majority you don’t whereas I was much more main- things, particularly Roy Jenkins, of 7,000 over the Tories but only stream, rigid and probably more but there was not really a coher- after Prime Minister Macmillan get a fair boring. But working for Roy at ent view of what we were about.’ had paid his first ever visit to a the Treasury was less exciting. His Bill Rodgers was a founder by-election, to ward off the Lib- and just style was very different from what member of the Campaign for eral challenge. He just kept the I was accustomed to and perhaps Democratic Socialism and in the Tories in second place. What did society being a close friend did not make early ’60s was a strong supporter Bill Rodgers think of the Liberals unless you it easier. of Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell of those days? In the 1974–79 parliament, in his attempts to rid the party of ‘A lot of them booed me at my are pre- Rodgers was a junior minister at its anti-nuclear stance on defence by-election but I liked them’, he Defence for two and a half years, and its ‘Clause Four’ commitment says, ‘even if I did not take them pared to joining the cabinet as Secretary of to nationalisation. ‘I didn’t agree very seriously. But, when I came State for Transport in 1976. ‘With with Hugh’s opposition to Europe into the House, I developed a pay for it. the exception of Ernie Marples but I think he would have come great respect for Jo Grimond So I remain and Barbara Castle very few peo- round, and, had he lived, we might and listened to his speeches very ple have made much of an impact have seen a significant change in seriously. They were thoughtful, one of in that job. The timescales are too the party and a more convincing reflective and right, although long and you need a particular alternative to the Tories. He would they did not always seem to get those who sort of personality to get any- have been an outstanding prime to grips with the rough, tough where.’ During this period, there minister and more successful than brutality of questions. At least that still thinks was a very real threat that the Wilson’, he believes. was what I thought. I also had a that, if you government would lose its major- ‘Wilson wasted those first lot of time for Eric Lubbock.’ ity in a vote of confidence. This eighteen months after ’64,’ he Bill Rodgers makes it pretty want better brought Bill Rodgers once again says. ‘He was waiting for the clear that he was never a Harold face to face with the Liberal Party. moment to get a big majority, Wilson man, and he obviously public serv- ‘Oh yes, I remember that well. so we never dealt with the crisis responded well to Wilson’s rival Peter Jenkins of the Guardian that was coming. I don’t think he George Brown, for whom he ices, you rang me and said that David Steel was a good prime minister. He later worked as a junior minister. have to be wanted to talk to Jim Callaghan, did not always tell the truth. His His ministerial career covered which I thought was interesting. strength was that he was a good all the major departments except prepared So I spoke to David and then told picker of people: Roy Jenkins education, and included being Jim what he had in mind (a pos- instead of Antony Crosland for Secretary of State for Transport to pay sible pact). Jim said he would be Home Secretary and then Chan- in the mid-70s. He claims that happy to talk. They did and the cellor, for example.’ his first job, under George Brown for them Pact, which I voted for, was the For a moment Bill Rodgers at the Department for Economic through result. Over the period of the Pact philosophises about his approach Affairs, gave him the most sat- I dealt with David Penhaligon on to politics. ‘The phrase used to isfaction and, interestingly, that taxation. transport. He was quite different

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 23 ‘HARD MAN’ WITH HEART from me in style and approach Like Roy (effectively an agreement that the Labour Party and attributes but we did find a good deal of the life left in Polaris meant that them in great measure to the common ground. In fact I think Jenkins, no firm policy decision need yet success of the Liberal Democrats. Liberal influence was generally be made), Owen became very He also admits to an admiration much greater during the Pact Bill Rodg- angry with me. He regarded me for Tony Blair. ‘I am not a wholly than most Liberals supposed.’ as having let him down. He was one-party man. I am capable of Rodgers and Steel did not ers has angry with Shirley too but I had recognising worth in other par- renew their communications welcomed to be punished and he was ruth- ties. There is now a new Labour prior to the formation of the SDP. less about it. It was like a Star Party that is nothing to do with ‘David tried but I didn’t want to. I the Chamber approach in a specially the old Labour Party. Tony Blair think he was hoping that I might convened party committee, with may have many faults but I am join up with Roy in some fourth changes in Bob Maclennan throwing the prepared to ask whether we party. I did not want to discuss it. first stone. After that I don’t think could have a better Labour leader I wanted to keep my head clear to the Labour David and I spoke to each other than he is now.’ decide which way to go. I didn’t Party and again for many years.’ So where are the Liberal want to compromise the possibil- All involved in the Alliance in Democrats in the political spec- ity of bringing others with me attributes the early ’80s try to pinpoint why trum of today? ‘It’s a difficult into any new venture.’ it did not quite break through. question but to me the essential When he and the rest of the them in Apart from the frequently essence of what the Lib Dems are ‘Gang’ formed the SDP, did he acknowledged political effect of is a party that gives priority to the see the SDP as filling a gap in great the Falklands victory, Bill Rodg- public services and the will to pay alliance with the Liberal Party measure ers also blames the Darlington for them, is concerned about the or as standing on its own? ‘I saw by-election that followed Simon elimination of poverty and greed it as two parties in parallel until to the suc- Hughes’ win at Bermondsey. ‘We – in fact is concerned about the there was natural convergence. should have won that too but we liberal nature of our society and That’s why I said at our launch cess of had a candidate who was not up its quality. It’s not really about left, that our two parties should divide to the spotlight of a by-election right or centre. It’s about what the seats equally. That went down the Liberal and the press took full advantage you believe in.’ very badly with Social Demo- Demo- of it. If we had won, it might have We concluded with the issue crats like David Owen and Mike made a huge difference. In gen- of the day – Iraq. Bill Rodgers Thomas, who wanted to fight all crats. eral we also underestimated the sees himself as more of a hawk the seats, but equally badly with strength of Labour voters’ loyalty than the party as a whole but, most of the Liberal Party. That’s to their party.’ like most other people, is relieved why I had no choice but to play After the 1983 election Rodg- to see a relatively quick and suc- the hard man in holding the line. ers saw an eventual merger of the cessful end to the hostilities. He I was very tough. In the SDP we Liberals and the SDP as right does not see the unilateral action knew what we were doing. We and inevitable. ‘On the night of by Britain and the US as setting a had worked it out carefully and the 1987 election I remember precedent for future action. ‘Each we were startled to find that the saying on late-night television occasion has to be looked at care- Liberals hadn’t done the same.’ that merger must now come as fully and separately’, he says. Getting used to the Liberal quickly as possible. In the event Having suffered a stroke a way doing things obviously we took too long. We had a lot few years ago, after three and a caused Bill Rodgers some prob- of problems in the SDP with half years as a firm and successful lems, but his determination to our 60/40 split vote. We were leader of the party in the Lords, see the negotiations through not able to deliver to the Liberal he has had to withdraw from very successfully apparently had the Party as we should have done and active politics. Nevertheless he effect of convincing David Owen that put things back initially for still attends the Lords, and the that he was a man more after his the merged party, but after that remarkable recovery he has made own heart than Roy Jenkins or I think our joint party has been suggests that he still has plenty Shirley Williams. Owen was to be a remarkable achievement. A lot more to contribute to life in proved dramatically wrong a few of credit goes to Paddy Ashdown some capacity. He may have had years later. for our climb back. I think few to play the hard man occasionally ‘Do you remember those dif- people around the world would but his heart is still firmly in the ficult discussions between the have expected our result in ’97, right place. parties about defence in 1985?’ whereas now, wherever you go, Bill Rodgers asks. ‘I had had a we are totally recognised as a A shorter version of this interview was lot of experience of defence significant third party. We’ve even first published in Liberal Democrat issues and when we had that got PR after all those years of News in May 2003. joint commission to decide Liberal campaigning.’ the Alliance’s approach to the Like Roy Jenkins, Bill Rodg- 1 See Journal of Liberal History 38 replacement of Polaris by Trident ers has welcomed the changes in (spring 2003), pp. 6–10.

24 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 fundamentally. It was the most important election in his lifetime REPORTS in terms of changing the nature of elections through the use of opinion polls and press confer- The Liberal Party and general elections ences and with the presence of competitive television due to since 1945 the arrival of ITV. Until then the BBC had not ensured that it Evening meeting report, February 2003, with David maintained its neutrality when it Butler and Neil Stockley reported on campaigns. The year 1959 also marked a change in Report by David Cloke general election research. In 1959 Butler began his series of inter- views with almost all the people ebruary’s meeting after the as Butler himself mused, this at the centre of the political bat- AGM, ably chaired by the explains his life-long interest in tle. His work now stretches to six FLiberal Democrats’ Direc- elections. yards of interview notes, includ- tor of Campaigns and Elections, The first party conference The first ing rather electric interviews Chris Rennard, provided two Butler attended was the Liberal with party leaders. Extracts from quite different perspectives on Assembly in Hastings in October party con- these notes were a key feature of the Liberal Party’s approach to 1949. At that period he had a the remainder of his talk, though campaigning in general elections. sense of talking to people who ference he acknowledged that their ‘off Taken together, they marked the had been brilliant young men in Butler the record’ status made it difficult gradual development of party 1906, or who were the sons of to put all that was said into the organisation and campaigning those brilliant young men, and attended public domain. during general elections and also who were looking back fondly to According to Butler, Herbert highlighted common themes and that time. The 1950 general elec- was the Harris (who ran the Liber- problems. David Butler, through tion was the first that he watched als’ 1959 campaign) regarded both his direct personal experi- closely and, in his view, was a Liberal the 1959 election as a success. ence and also through interviews turning point in Liberal his- Assembly Its twin purposes had been to with most, if not all, the key play- tory. The party felt that it should project Jo Grimond and the case ers of the period, provided illumi- make a big effort and so fielded in Hastings for a stronger opposition than nating vignettes of the campaigns. 475 candidates, resulting in 350 Labour was capable of. There He decided not to cover the lost deposits. The chant that the in October had been a full canvass in half a Alliance years because of the ‘Liberal candidate lost his deposit’ dozen rural seats and the number large number of notes made and very much got through to the 1949. At of full-time agents had risen because it was ‘a confused time’. electorate. As indicated in Butler’s that period from eighteen in 1955 to thirty Neil Stockley, a former Director useful handout, the party’s total in 1959. However, the Torquay of Policy charged with produc- vote actually rose compared to he had a conference had been an absolute ing the party’s 1997 manifesto, 1945, though this was entirely disaster and was seen as a sham- investigated the Liberal Party’s due to the substantial increase sense of bles by the press. It was also a manifestos and their effectiveness in candidates, and the vote per snag that Grimond sat for such as campaigning tools. candidate fell from 18.6 per cent talking to a distant constituency. At this David Butler, described by to 11.6 per cent, the lowest figure people who time the party was being run on Lord Rennard as the foremost in the post-war era. Perhaps not £24,000 a year. walking encyclopaedia of Brit- surprisingly, the number of candi- had been Butler then reported on a ish politics, started by announc- dates in the 1951 and 1955 gen- number of interviews with Jo ing that he went back to the last eral elections fell to 109 and 110 brilliant Grimond. His strategy had been time but one when the Liberals respectively. As Butler pointed to persuade people of a liberal brought down a government. In out, with the party receiving young men inclination that Liberal votes October 1924 his grandfather barely over 2 per cent of the vote, in 1906, or would be effective, if only for was the Liberal candidate for the prevailing assumption was their impact on the other par- London University. However, that it was the end of the road for who were ties. Grimond felt that this was as he was on a lecture tour in the Liberals and that they should easier to do when it was clear America when the general elec- turn into a debating society. the sons of which of the other parties was tion was called, and was unable going to win. Another prob- to get back, his daughter, Butler’s those bril- lem was that many in the party mother, ran the campaign on A new world liant young expected it to behave in every behalf of her father in the months Then in 1959, according to respect as if it were a major before Butler himself. Perhaps, Butler, the world changed men. party – which took up a lot of

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 25 REPORT: THE LIBERAL PARTY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1945 time, energy and money, most of However, some in the campaign Butler situations and he didn’t believe which was wasted. During the had wanted Thorpe to declare they could go much further on subsequent Orpington period, that a Liberal government was had noted the basis of the style and appeals Butler stated that Grimond’s aim possible. It was felt that, by failing projected during the February had been to make the party more to do so, Thorpe allowed it to be at the campaign. serious intellectually. He had inferred that the party was try- John Pardoe shared Steel’s argued, however, that there were ing to achieve a balance of power time that view that journalists had seen the not enough brains in the new situation, which was not, in fact, Thorpe use of hovercraft as gimmicky recruits. the case. and had failed to report on the Speaking to Grimond in 1966 Speaking to Thorpe in April was a ‘very substance of Thorpe’s speeches. – when the party budget had 1974 Butler learned that he had He was critical of Thorpe’s lead- risen to £106,000 a year – Butler believed in the largest possible complacent ership during the inter-election learned that he was of the view front and that fielding over 500 period: Thorpe was an organisa- that the Liberals had no option candidates was a major achieve- and secure tion man, yet needed to be giv- but to fight a two-handed fight, ment (it was the largest number man … ing speeches on ideas. Pardoe had which was extremely difficult. since 1950). He felt that there also believed in a full slate of can- This, Butler maintained, was to were advantages to fighting the very sure didates, which would enhance be a common theme through to campaign from Barnstaple, with the national vote, although some the Chard speech in 1992. much better television footage of his own candidates had not been aware of arising from walkabouts in his the consequences of fighting in own constituency than Wilson role.’ central Glasgow and similar con- The Thorpe leadership could achieve in strange territory. stituencies. In 1969 Butler spoke to Pratap Butler had noted at the time that A ‘backroom boy’ speak- Chitnis, the head of the Liberal Thorpe was a ‘very complacent ing during the 1979 campaign Party Organisation. Chitnis and secure man … very sure of reported that the committee at reported that all the MPs were his own role.’ the centre certainly influenced agreed that Jeremy Thorpe was a Interviewing David Steel after day-to-day tactics but had not disaster and that there were sug- the two 1974 general elections, dealt with larger strategy matters. gestions that Byers should lead Butler learned that Steel was of Steel did not have a press officer the party from outside, with only the view that the Liberals, as the accompanying him and the cen- a chairman in the Commons. begetter of the coalition idea, tral advisers could only contact He had argued that the Liberals should have been publicised more him via Archy Kirkwood. At the needed an intellectual as leader and that Wilson should have been centre the people who counted who could formulate ideas and attacked for refusing to take part were Gryff Evans and Geoff rally people behind him. Chitnis in a government of national unity. Tordoff: they dealt with crises felt that since 1966 the Liberals He also felt that hovercraft and as they arose and with the last- had been in the wrong posi- helicopters had been used too minute increase in candidates. tion and with the wrong leader. much and that they had been Elaborate plans drawn up in the Thorpe was seen as an ‘organisa- seen as gimmicky, especially by preceding year had all more or tion man’, thinking about life the BBC, whose coverage was less collapsed, but, despite two- peerages and the like and not a cause of genuine grievance thirds fewer staff than in 1974, about policy: Richard Wainwright amongst party members. Steel most people had felt that the would have been much better. felt that there had been a shortage campaign was more efficient. Butler’s discussions with Lord of political direction during the Speaking about the 1979 Avebury in 1974 revealed that it second 1974 election. The expen- campaign, Richard Holme had was felt that the February 1974 sive TV link to Thorpe’s North said that Steel was to have been election was very much Thorpe’s Devon constituency had been projected as the candidate for own campaign. Thorpe had allo- of limited value this time, being Liberalism: the leader was the cated campaign tasks to Avebury, largely devoted to his daily press candidate in virtually every Byers, Lloyd of Kilgerran and conference. constituency. Holme claimed Beaumont, but after this very In the middle of campaign that they had followed through little had happened apart from for the October general elec- on that strategy. Despite little the briefing of candidates: they tion, Butler’s colleague Dennis movement in the polls early on, did not meet formally during the Kavanagh spoke to the former morale in the constituencies had course of the campaign. Thorpe MP Arthur Holt, who had done remained high. decided the main campaign much for the party after he left tactics on his own and managed the Commons. He felt that Lib- the campaign very smoothly. eral plans were going much as Ashdown’s inheritance Avebury did not believe that expected despite the fact that he Turning to the post-Alliance things could have been done bet- did not know what was going period, Butler reported that, at a ter within the available budget. on. The party had failed to create seminar before the 1992 election,

26 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE LIBERAL PARTY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1945

Paddy Ashdown had said that he that he had been afraid to tell statement of their campaign was astonished when he took him how well he was doing at themes and help answer the over the leadership quite how that point. The messages they question ‘Why vote for us?’ If a decayed the party was. He had were trying to get through were campaign was a war, they might acknowledged that this could doing so and undecided voters be seen as providing the ammu- not be remedied quickly and that were coming over. He felt that nition. For the opposition party, the forthcoming election was it had been very important that the theme was essentially ‘it’s not remotely winnable: instead, he had managed to avoid ques- time for a change’ and the mani- he had a long-term goal. The tions on hung parliaments as festo sets out what changes it will party had by then built up its a result of his Chard speech in make and why it will be better. finances and had a firm base of 1992: the party could say its own The governing party’s theme is around 10 per cent amongst the thing and target its own voters, always ‘we deserve more time’, electorate. It was impressive that not be knocked off-message by with its manifesto promising it had not been more squeezed Conservatives or Labour. They ‘more of the same’. in by-elections. Ashdown had had done well because they had At no stage did the post- stressed the balancing act he had front-loaded their expenditure, war Liberal Party have any real had to undertake, illustrating this investing in their key seats over chance of becoming the gov- with an opinion poll that had eighteen months. Holme had ernment or even the opposi- shown that 29 per cent of Liberal said that they had stuck to their tion. But it still needed a way of Democrat supporters had wanted campaign war book and got appealing to the electorate. Like the party to join a coalition with good coverage. By 2001, the all third parties, its basic theme the Conservatives and the same Liberal Democrats were so much was ‘the government has failed number had wanted one with more professional, according to but you can’t trust the others Labour. He had consistently Chris Rennard, that they did In sum- either’ or ‘a plague on both their stressed the importance of get- not need to import a full-time houses’. In more positive terms, ting the Conservatives out and, campaign manager. However, he mary, it sought greater political influ- in Butler’s view, quite recklessly noted that it was a limitation that ence, either to act as a vehicle for stated that he would be prepared Charles Kennedy was the only Butler change, or to act as a brake on to force a second general election really big-hitter. the excesses of the major par- if either of the parties refused to In summary, Butler declared declared ties, or a combination of both. accept his conditions for a four- that he would not have dreamed, that he Therefore, Stockley suggested, year deal. except in the first flush of the the role of the manifesto was to Interviewed after the 1992 Alliance, that he would live to would show voters the difference that election, Ashdown said that the see the Liberal Party with fifty having more Liberal MPs would campaign had been technically MPs, almost as many as it had in not have make. However, he argued that the best he had seen or heard 1929. The party aspirations men- the experience of the years about. There had been some tioned to him down the years dreamed, before 1945 showed that the backbiting about him being on came true in 1997 and 2001, except in party needed a clear strategy and television too much, but this had where the campaigns had made a theme that the electorate could been unavoidable as the press a quantum leap forward from the first understand and relate to. This would not listen to any other the rather random operations had to be backed by clear poli- spokesman. He felt, however, that noted earlier. In part this could flush of cies that were distinctive, popular the Liberal rallies had been over- not have been done without the and relevant to the campaign. hyped. Meanwhile, Des Wilson new technologies, and all the the Alli- He then backed this up with reported that he had been sur- parties had moved in this direc- ance, that a number of case studies from prised that the interventionist tion. However, most informed 1945 to 1974. Ashdown had stood back during observers had rated the Liberal he would The first was the 1945 mani- the election and kept to his deal Democrats’ central campaign the festo, which, Stockley claimed, not to interfere. The party had best in 2001 and this, Butler felt, live to see was essentially a socialist blue- shown great discipline and there was thanks to Chris Rennard. print for Britain, with a bold had been no problems: the cam- the Liberal tone and strong commitments to paign had come through with Party with social security and full employ- clarity. Wilson had been very The role of the manifesto ment. It was a radical document, proud of his ‘My Vote’ slogan. Neil Stockley started by discuss- fifty MPs, very much of its time and based eavily In 1997 Ashdown had ing the role that the manifestos h on the Beveridge Report. reported that he knew that he played in British election cam- almost as However, the party was not was going to do very well the paigns. Few people, apart from united on its strategy – to recruit week before the election. Rich- party activists, interest groups many as dissident Conservatives who did ard Holme, who, according to and journalists in the elite media it had in not believe that Churchill and Ashdown, had been brilliant at read them. But, for all parties, his colleagues could be trusted running the campaign, had said manifestos provide an accessible 1929. to implement the Beveridge

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 27 REPORT: THE LIBERAL PARTY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1945 proposals. Indeed, the leader, Sir in 1964 to gain more influence for the showed that in general the Archibald Sinclair, fought the Liberal Party. electorate was more concerned election on free trade and ‘indi- ‘The Times’ Stockley showed how Britain with cost-of-living issues and vidualist’ values. Not surprisingly in the early 1960s seemed a more any successes largely came about the Liberal campaign failed, credited conducive environment for a because of disenchantment with not least because, with so few protest vote strategy. Its mood the Conservatives and, to a lesser candidates, the party’s attempt the party was very much that of a stagnant, extent, with Labour. to be the agent of change was with having more anxious society. The Lib- Did that mean producing a not credible. Labour had now erals charged the major parties detailed manifesto was a waste assumed that mantle. the best with ignoring the real prob- of time? No. Stockley pointed The next example was 1955, lems that Britain faced because out that the Liberal manifestos when the party faced very similar policy pro- they were too bogged down in of the period usually attracted problems but in a very different dogma. Labour was too compla- favourable media comment. context. With just six MPs, the gramme. cent and too dominated by trade (For example, in 1964 The Times party could not claim to be a unions and the Tory Government credited the party with having contender for government. So its too hidebound to modernise the best policy programme.) campaign theme was very much Britain. This may have helped build the ‘a plague on both their houses’: The Liberals were convinced party’s credibility and its ‘classless’ the Liberals promised to act as a that disillusioned voters would and ‘moderate’ image. Indeed, in heck c on the other parties, which, support their policies and ran 1964, the Liberals scored their it argued, were too class-based a very policy-based campaign best electoral swings in London, to promote the national interest. aimed at ‘new progressive’ voters. Kent, Surrey and Sussex and But this was difficult to sustain Stockley recounted how their trebled their vote amongst the in a more prosperous, tranquil 1964 manifesto promised greater professional upper and upper time. The advent of ‘Butskellism’ use of technology in industry, middle classes and the white- – the broad political consensus employee participation in com- collar occupational groups. And about using demand manage- pany decisions, cuts in income they picked up three seats in the ment to keep employment levels tax, higher spending on educa- Scottish Highlands and did very up while gradually freeing up tion (a theme that continues well in the English regions. One the economy – left the middle today) and the pursuit of mem- of the Party’s main planks was a ground very crowded. To Stock- bership of the EEC. More than range of development policies ley, the Liberal manifesto, Crisis before, Liberal candidates picked for those parts of the country Unresolved, was the worst docu- up on the manifesto themes. that were left out of post-war ment of its type he had came (Stockley added that from today’s economic growth. In other across: it was hard to define what perspective the document words policy messages, if not the it meant in practice, it had few sounded very corporatist, with manifesto itself, may have helped original ideas and was scared to its talk of a ‘national plan for eco- the Liberals to win seats. depart from the consensus. What nomic growth’ supported by an the 1955 campaign showed, he centralised incomes policy.) argued, was that the protest vote Although the Liberals won Liberal high point: 1974 strategy could only work if one 11.2 per cent of the vote and February 1974 was the Liberal or both of the major parties was returned nine MPs in 1964, Party’s most successful post-war very unpopular or perceived as Stockley did not believe that campaign. The election was tai- ‘extremist’ or irrelevant. the manifesto and the campaign lor-made for a third-party protest that grew from it were a suc- vote strategy. Having presided cess, at least in the way that over a deteriorating economic Grimond – the policy Grimond intended them to be. and industrial situation, Edward impresario With Harold Wilson promising Heath’s Conservative Govern- The party’s problems with strate- ‘the white heat of technology’ ment was very unpopular. Locked gies and messages seemed to be and the Conservatives trying in a bitter dispute with the min- solved in the Grimond years. By to join the EEC, the Liberal ers over incomes policy, Heath 1964, Grimond, whom Stockley message was not unique by the called a snap election to win a dubbed a ‘policy impresario’, time the campaign started. The fresh mandate. But a divided wanted the Liberals to cam- other parties – especially Labour Labour Party had begun its first paign as agents of change. He – seemed to have captured the lurch to the left. For the Liberals, had a clear long-term strategy: ‘new progressives’. The Liberal Jeremy Thorpe attacked the sec- to instigate a realignment of the Party was unclear exactly who tional stances of the major parties left, with the Liberals at the heart (or where) these voters were and and called for national unity and of a new grouping that would so any appeal to them was based an end to confrontation. embrace the progressive elements on what the strategists thought Stockley showed how the in Britain. In the interim it was they were interested in. Stockley party’s manifesto played a major

28 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

-ontinuing role in reinforcing these themes. c challenges facing Lib importance of having a credible, To keep inflation in check, it eral and Liberal Democrat cam- effective communicator as leader called for a statutory wages paigns. A great deal had changed cannot be overstated; neither can and prices policy and a special with the advent of television the need for a distinctive, relevant surcharge on employers. The and the internet. The constant and clear campaign message. And manifesto also reprised familiar difficulties were the need to it seems to have been only in policies from the Grimond era, overcome the fatal ‘wasted vote’ very recent times that Lib Dem such as employee participation argument and the Liberals’ sheer campaigns have assembled all the in companies, to help smooth lack of resources compared pieces of this multi-dimensional over workplace disharmony. The to the funding, personnel and jigsaw and given the party its elite media, such as the Financial technology available to the Con- strongest voice. Times, praised the Liberal pro- servative and Labour parties. The gramme. As well as having an appealing theme, Thorpe and his party were able to pick up and run with a credible alternative programme. During the course The Fall of the Lloyd George Coalition of the campaign Liberal support trebled, reaching over 20 per cent Evening meeting (joint with the Conservative History in some polls. In addition to a certain Group), July 2003, with Margaret Macmillan, Andrew amount of luck, the Liberal Thorpe, John Barnes and Stuart Ball Party at last seemed to have its policy and its strategic houses in Report by Graham Lippiatt order. But Stockley concluded by pointing out two major iro- t is always fascinating to hear saw to it that he emerged as the nies. When Wilson called a new historians talk about history. only candidate who could keep election for October 1974, the Introducing the meeting, the the Coalition together, keep the Liberals largely re-used their I Conservative MP for Mid Nor- increasingly influential Labour February manifesto. With a folk, Keith Simpson, who is also Party on board and convince the strong showing in February and Chairman of the Conservative backbenchers that he was the still achieving more than 20 per History Group, reminded us that man who could win the war. cent support in the polls, they Arthur Balfour is reputed to have If the influence of Andrew were now much more relevant said that ‘history does not repeat Bonar Law was crucial to the rise than at any time for a generation. itself, historians repeat each of Lloyd George, it was equally Yet the Liberal manifesto still other’. What we were about to central to his fall from office six offered no answer to the most hear, however, was four different years later. In October 1922 the important question the party Far from interpretations of the reasons for Conservatives met at the Carl- would face: with whom and on the downfall of the last Liberal ton Club to decide whether the what terms would the party take offering prime minister. party should continue to sup- part in a coalition? (Or, on what David Lloyd George became port the Coalition. With Bonar basis would it decide?) a radical prime minister in December Law’s backing they voted to pull Second, the Liberals had now 1916. There had been a Lib- out of the government. Lloyd succeeded in striking a popular departure, eral-Conservative coalition in George resigned three hours chord. They had some distinctive the Liber- office under Asquith since May after the vote, and, at the general policy ammunition with which 1915, but doubts over the pros- election that followed soon after, to fight their campaign. But they als were ecution of the First World War the Conservatives won a major- were really promising to main- produced dissatisfaction on both ity of over 100 seats. Bonar Law tain the economic status quo appealing Liberal and Unionist benches. became prime minister. Neither and preserve the post-war con- As A. J. P. Taylor pointed out, Lloyd George nor the Liberal sensus. Far from offering a radi- to ‘small-c ‘Bonar Law could destroy the Party were ever to return to cal departure, the Liberals were conserva- [Asquith] Coalition. What would office again. appealing to ‘small-c conserva- be its successor?’1 There was no As the chairman explained, it tism’ in an increasingly anxious tism’ in an longer enough support among had been hoped to hold this joint electorate. And, he asked, could the Tories to sustain an Asquith meeting at the Carlton Club itself anyone say that the policies they increas- government but nor was there but they were unable to make a offered to tackle inflation and sufficient support among Liberal room available. In any event, it right the economy, were really ingly rebels to put in an administra- would not have been the actual ‘liberal’? anxious tion led by Austen Chamberlain building in which the famous The meeting provided a lively or Bonar Law. Lloyd George meeting took place, so what and interesting canvass of the electorate.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 29 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

better location for our seminar than the Lloyd George Room at the National Liberal Club? Our first speaker was Marga- ret Macmillan, Professor of His- tory at the University of Toronto and author of the prize-win- ning book about the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Peacemak- ers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War. Professor Macmillan opened by making some remarks about the uses of history and its potential to act as a key to understanding the present and to raise interest- ing parallels and questions. The period at the end of the First World War, Professor Macmillan believed, was vital to understand if we are to make sense of the world today. Her intention was therefore to describe the interna- tional situation between the end of the war and October 1922 and so set the context for the fall of the Coalition. certain what was going to hap- From left: Andrew just cynicism or an effort by pen next. This made for a very Thorpe, Margaret Lloyd George and friends to Why did the Coalition fall? dangerous but also a very excit- Macmillan, Keith hold on to power. It was picking Simpson MP, But first, in asking why the Coa- ing period. There was also an Stuart Ball, John up on a more general attitude lition failed, the easy answer was optimism that the world could Barnes (Photo: – one that cut through all sec- that coalitions usually do. They be turning into a better place and Martin Ball) tions of society and from right to have been put together by people that the tremendous sacrifices of left across the political spectrum in disparate groupings for their the First World War must mean – that new structures and institu- own purposes and at a certain something. tions were needed to address the point they run out of steam. These pressures at first con- problems of the post-war world, Professor Macmillan identified solidated and sustained the economically, socially and in the various factors that made Lloyd George Coalition. Just as international affairs. the Coalition work in the first Woodrow Wilson was acclaimed There was also a very strong place and that then contributed in Europe for trying to build a feeling that David Lloyd George to its failure. The first thing was new type of international rela- was the man who could do it. the times themselves. It is dif- tions, domestically there was a He was the man who had won ficult from the perspective of feeling that perhaps a new type the war, something that was rec- the present day to imagine what of politics could be emerging. ognised and appreciated across it must have been like to live in This was based on more than a the whole of society. He was those days at the end of the Great fear of Bolshevism or revolution; perceived as someone who had War. It was a time when people it was based on a feeling that the introduced new ways of doing in Europe, in Britain and to a war had meant something and things, new styles of administra- lesser extent in North America that ‘something’ included the fact tion – he ran a great deal out felt that the very foundations of that the old ways of doing things of his own office, including key their world had been shaken. As did not work. Lloyd George and areas of foreign policy – and peo- Bolshevism spread from Russia some of those close to him in the ple believed he was going to use and appeared to be taking root Coalition sensed this themselves this new approach to be the man elsewhere, as empires fell and and there was some discussion to win the peace. It was both this political, economic and social about forming a new centre belief in the stature and personal- structures were turned upside party. Indeed, there was talk of ity of Lloyd George, and the fit -his down, there was a feeling that the t both before the coupon elec between his approach and style world was in a process of being tion of 1918 and again in 1921. and the needs of the times, which - on remade, cut adrift from its moor- Professor Macmillan thought w the Coalition the 1918 elec ings, and no one was entirely that this represented more than tion and sustained it through the

30 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION immediate aftermath of the war. Lloyd George was widely seen Thorpe quoted from the book In the longer run, however, the as the man who had encour- Mr Lloyd George and Liberalism by same factors would serve to pull aged the Greek policy of seek- J. M. Robertson, an Asquithian the Coalition apart and cause it ing a presence in what became Liberal, published in 1923: ‘Lib- and Lloyd George to fall. modern Turkey and when that eral leaders are to be chosen for As the Paris Peace Conference went wrong, in particular over right sagacity, for right judgment, failed to settle some of the major the Chanak crisis, he was blamed for self-control, for rectitude, problems in Europe and within for it. for political science and these international relations, there set He tried to bring Germany qualifications Mr George lacks. in a sense of disillusionment. The and Soviet Russia back into the To lack them, when all is said, is new ways of doing things were system of states, but his failure to lack the character needed in a not working either. Professor to make progress on this at the political leader. And in a compre- Macmillan’s view was that the Genoa Conference of Febru- hensive sense it may justly be said Conference and the resulting ary 1922 was seen by many as that there is an insurmountable Treaty of Versailles attempted to evidence that the Coalition was objection to him as a leader, at shape a world which at that time not working. Lloyd George’s least for Liberals. With Conserva- simply could not be shaped. The personality was increasingly tives indeed, it is otherwise.’ international situation did not seen as autocratic rather than Many Liberals were delighted lend itself to the construction radical and he also seemed to be to see Lloyd George brought of a lasting peace. There were running out of steam, tired and down in October 1922, yet para- too many unresolved issues. The unwilling to appear in the House doxically the fall of the Coalition new states emerging in central of Commons. So, in conclusion, presented the Liberal Party with and eastern Europe, often in Professor Macmillan’s view was a huge and ultimately insuper- conflict with one another, were that the factors that had helped Many Lib- able problem. What Thorpe very difficult to accommodate in Lloyd George in the first place then suggested was that, in many the European system. The new – the idea that there was a new erals were ways, it might have been better Soviet Union showed very little world order and he was the man if fusion between the Coalition interest in participating in the to shape it – were by 1922 all delighted Liberals and the Conservative normal system of states. Ger- seen as working against him, and Party taken place, as some had many was highly resentful about caused the Coalition to fall apart. to see hoped would happen in 1920. the way in which it lost the war Lloyd This would have left the remain- and could not come to terms ing Liberals to plot their own with any peace settlement. In Impact on the Liberals George course, independent of the taint Professor Macmillan’s opinion, The next speaker was Andrew both of Lloyd George and of the Treaty of Versailles was not Thorpe, senior lecturer in his- brought coalitionism, which in reality as harsh as it has been painted tory at Exeter University and followed it after 1922. Thorpe – either later or as it was at the an authority on British politics down in argued that the fall of the Coali- time by J. M. Keynes. But that between the wars. Thorpe’s focus October tion has been seen as bringing was not reflected in contempo- was on the impact of the fall the Liberal Party real benefits. rary feeling, and what people of the Coalition on the Liberal 1922, yet These included a strengthen- feel, and what they think as a Party and its development over ing of personnel, stronger party result, is perhaps more important the following years. The Coali- paradoxi- organisation, better policy and politically than the truth. tion has been seen by many strategy. His own view, however, As the early 1920s wore on, Liberals, both at the time and cally the was that, on balance, the Liberal there continued to be problems since, as a rather dark period in fall of the Party did not benefit from reun- and Lloyd George did not seem the history of British liberalism, ion post-1922. to be able to deal with them. unable to be forgotten or, for Coalition As regards personnel, apart In a way he brought this on many, forgiven. The manner of from Lloyd George himself, most himself. He conducted a very the formation of the Coalition in presented of the Coalition Liberals who personal sort of diplomacy. He December 1916, the decision to came back to the party were loved going to conferences and fight a general election in 1918 as the Liberal fairly undistinguished. The other his personal success and failure a coalition, and the continuance Party with prominent Coalition Liberal was, was identified very much with of the Coalition through four of course, Churchill, but he lost the success or failure of these years of peacetime, during which a huge and his seat in Dundee in 1922, was international events. In particular, the split in the Liberal Party was out of Parliament for two years Lloyd George failed to settle the intensified and consolidated – all ultimately and then returned as a Conserva- reparations issue, the question of these factors created a situa- tive, being made Chancellor of of how much Germany should tion in which Liberals felt deeply insuper- the Exchequer by Baldwin. pay in compensation for the war. ill at ease and this discomfort able prob- Although he was a towering Also unresolved was the question took the form of disappoint- figure, Lloyd George himself was of Turkey and the Middle East. ment with Lloyd George himself. lem. such a controversial character

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 31 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

that, even after he became leader Baldwin and the Tories to attack on to the legislative agenda in of the reunited Liberals in 1926, the Liberals as irresponsibly radi- 1930–31 and there was a return many leading personalities in cal, making promises to reduce to office as part of the National the party like Grey and Maclean, unemployment which could not Government when it was first mostly with an Asquithian back- be delivered. formed. But these achievements ground, hurried to support the Thorpe’s analysis of the Lib- were, to Thorpe, ephemeral. Liberal Council with the aim of eral position in the 1920s is of The return of the Lloyd George getting rid of him. a stance that was increasingly Liberals in 1922–23 forced the In terms of party organisa- misconceived. The Liberal Party Liberals to put off the day of tion, the return of Lloyd George was, from 1924, the third party reckoning and the need to come brought one huge benefit, the in British politics – but a third to terms with third-party status. hat Lloyd George Fund. This is the party which still very much pos- T thinking did not occur until bind that the Asquithians could sessed heartland areas. There is a a generation later, in the 1950s, not get out of. Asquith himself case for saying that the strategy and from that point onward the was desperate not to reunite of the party should have been to party effectively repositioned -tself with Lloyd George and many of consolidate those areas. Instead, it Echoing i to create a new type of poli his supporters were also deter- continued to believe itself to be Harold Wil- tics and a new way forward. mined to resist reunion, but the a potential party of government Thorpe ended by reminding party was very short of funds – an outlook that may not have son’s quo- us that the fall of the Coalition and had no obvious way of rais- been the best way forward for it had not been the responsibility ing extra money, so the Lloyd – and the return of Lloyd George tation that of the Liberal Party. It was the George Fund proved irresistible. contributed to that ministerial decision of the Conservatives to However the use of the fund mentality. the Labour end it. Yet it was the Liberals who soon became problematic. Firstly, The final problem the return Party was were at the mercy of the fall-out Lloyd George retained personal of Lloyd George represented for from it. control of the money and was the Liberals was one of image. a moral chary about dispensing funds. In Although, in Thorpe’s view, too addition, the existence of this vast much may often be made about crusade or The Carlton Club meeting treasure chest disinclined Liberals the importance of image in poli- It was then the turn of John on the ground from doing the tics, it was evidently the case that it was noth- Barnes, editor of the Conservative fundraising needed to develop by 1922 Lloyd George had an ing, Thorpe History Journal and co-author, the organisation and its electoral image problem. There was a clear with Keith Middlemas, of the capacity. This was in contrast sense that both the Lloyd George felt that 1969 biography of Stanley Bald- with the Labour and Conserva- Coalition and the prime minister win. Barnes also started with tive Parties at this time. had become sleazy and were not Liberals in a reference to historiography. When looking at policy there to be trusted. Echoing Harold According to Ambrose Bierce, is no doubt that Lloyd George Wilson’s quotation that the the 1920s God cannot change the past, brought dynamism to a party Labour Party was a moral crusade looked on which is why he connives at which desperately needed it, or it was nothing, Thorpe felt that the existence of historians. Like and one result was the various Liberals in the 1920s looked on their party Macmillan and Thorpe, Barnes ‘coloured books’ of the mid and their party in the same way as a sought to recreate a picture of late 1920s. But at the same time moral, uplifting movement. The in the same what was happening in politics there were other ideas around reputation of Lloyd George was in the 1920s, as people thought in the party which would have damaging to that portrayal, as he way as about the massive changes that developed without reunion, was unable to present himself as a moral, had happened in the world and and some of the policies which a credible leader of a party with a tried to canalise them into the were introduced under Lloyd moral purpose. uplifting normal channels of party politics. George’s influence may not have In Thorpe’s view, the collapse It was important to remember been as appropriate for the times of the Coalition brought benefits move- that everything was thought to as were thought. The forward- to the Liberal Party in the very be up for grabs: the Liberal Party looking policy on unemploy- short term: reunification, more ment. The was still recruiting new Young ment that formed the core of money, policy ferment and a reputation Liberals; the party may have been the Liberal platform in the 1929 more dynamic leadership. As a declining in a relative way, but in election was an exciting, proto- result there was some achieve- of Lloyd absolute terms there were more Keynesian initiative, but whether ment over the next ten years. Liberal voters in 1929 than there it brought much benefit to the Twice the Liberals held the bal- George was had been before the First World Liberals in terms of votes at that ance of power in Parliament, in War, or in the early 1920s. election, or the consolidation 1924 and 1929–31. They adopted damaging But it was right for the Con- of Liberal support is, according a daring and innovative eco- to that por- servatives and Liberals to be wor- to Thorpe, very much open to nomic policy at the end of the ried about the electoral role of question. It certainly enabled 1920s. They got electoral reform trayal. the working class, as there were

32 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION

little-known event at the end of July, when most of the Coalition Liberals failed to vote in favour of a duty on fabric grants, the first great test of the Safeguard- ing of Industries Act, and the first test of the compromise that had been reached around the issue of tariff reform. But if the Coalition Liberals would not even vote for that measure, what did the protectionist Tories have to gain from remaining any longer in the Coalition? These four events taken together were fatal to the sur- vival of the Coalition. However, nothing happens by accident, and it must not be forgotten that the downfall of the govern- ment was engineered – and by the ‘second eleven’. These were men with their political futures few seats where the middle class Andrew Thorpe, social-reform, tariff-reform- still ahead of them who desper- amounted to more than a fifth Margaret ing caucus. However Barnes ately wanted to be rid of Lloyd of the electorate. Barnes saw Macmillan and re-emphasised that in the early Keith Simpson George. They believed that they two answers to this problem for MP (Photo: Martin summer of 1922, the Coalition would go down to defeat at the non-Labour politicians. On the Ball) appeared very secure. Even after next election, tarred by what one hand, there was the solution the failure at Genoa there was was seen as an autocratic and which Lloyd George had sought really very little sign of trouble. sleazy government. They were to cobble together in 1918: to Austen Chamberlain had routed fearful that Labour would make unite the more progressive face the diehards in two debates in headway and they needed a pro- of Toryism, the kind of people April and yet within months his gressive answer, a moral answer who made up the Unionist own leadership of the Conserva- and a challenging answer to Social Reform Group before tive Party was in question. the onset of socialism, and they 1914, with his own (supposedly) So what went wrong? Barnes thought that Lloyd George had progressive Liberals. In the early identified four factors. By far the become a hobble around their years of the Coalition, that recipe most important was the assassina- ankles, rather than the great had certain attractions. But the tion of Sir Henry Wilson and the saviour that he had seemed in first thing that went wrong was revival of violence and civil war 1918. This permeated to Cabinet an onset of panic at the eco- in Ireland. It was in the aftermath level and to the debate in the nomic slump, which led to a of the debate on that issue in July Tory party about whether there move away from social reform 1922 that Baldwin and Amery should be an immediate election. and towards retrenchment, epito- (neighbours in Eaton Square) got Curzon and Baldwin became mised by the Geddes committee together and decided to give the more important, along with less on national expenditure and the government some weeks to see well-remembered figures such ‘Geddes axe’. From that moment if it could get its act together on as Boscawen and Peel. Curzon is onward the progressive voices Ireland, and build on Church- reputed to have said, ‘When you and tariff reformers in the Con- ill’s brilliant summing up in the begin to hear the death watch servative Party began to suspect debate during which he said that beetle in the rafters, then the end that the Coalition was no longer if the Irish could not settle their of the house is nigh.’ It was. the answer to containing the ris- affairs then the British would Barnes identified Stanley ing tide of organised labour. It is help them to do so. Ireland is a Baldwin as the key figure, as he no accident that Leo Amery was very important theme in the his- was able to act as a link between one of the chief conspirators in tory of the Coalition. Second, the junior ministers and Cabinet bringing down the Lloyd George and following close afterwards, colleagues. Baldwin’s reaction was Coalition: he was probably the there was the honours scandal. both moral and constitutional. most thoughtful of the younger Next, the diehards linked their He had his policy concerns over tariff reformers, a man who fortunes to Lord Salisbury, prob- Ireland and was, Barnes main- hoped to enlist recruits from the ably the most prominent Union- tained, a tariff reformer. He was trade unions behind a broadly ist peer. Finally, there occurred a looking for a constructive answer

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 33 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION to socialism but he had a personal upshot of the meeting was that as that leader and thus that, if revulsion to the sleaze that was they wanted to go to the country Chamberlain and Birkenhead increasingly taking over the Coa- as an independent party and they would not cooperate, another lition and he had worries about wanted a Conservative as prime figure had to be identified. A matters of constitutional principle, minister. They acknowledged crucial part of the strategy was such as Lloyd George’s presiden- that coalition might be inevitable therefore to encourage Bonar tial style and the way he appeared but, if so, they wanted it on their Law, who was hesitant to come to be neglecting Parliament. After terms. back and show open disloyalty to the Chanak crisis, Baldwin came It was at this stage that Austen the leadership, out of retirement. back from holiday in France to a Chamberlain badly misplayed his A succession of emissaries was Cabinet meeting on 1 October hand. He took things personally, despatched to try to tempt him and to a government that did not felt it was a matter of honour to and he finally allowed himself know whether war was about to continue to support the govern- to be persuaded to come to the break out or not. Baldwin gained ment as he had pledged to do, Carlton Club for the meeting. the impression that he was enter- talked about betrayal and failed It is not clear whether he had ing an engineered international to take a strategic view of the made up his mind what to say, crisis, one that would allow the longer term interests of the Con- but for the rest the presence of an Coalition to go into a khaki elec- servative Party. He took what the alternative leader was sufficient. tion. At first, Baldwin thought that junior ministers and the back- In the end, Bonar Law made a he might resign and walk away benchers were saying very much rather confused speech. For the from it; but then the dissident as an ultimatum and felt that all whole of the first part of it no ministers begin to meet, Baldwin their criticisms of the govern- one knew which way he was was seized by a mood of resolu- ment and of Lloyd George were going to jump, but then he came tion and the junior ministerial actually attacks on him. In that down very firmly on Baldwin’s and Cabinet dissidents began to view he was egged on by his evil side. Baldwin’s own speech was coalesce around him. Baldwin sat genius Birkenhead, who took the ‘The Peacemaker’ described by Barnes as one of the down with Sir Samuel Hoare and view that he knew the electorate – David Low on most memorable eight minutes J. C. C. Davidson to go though better than the Tory dissenters the Coalition’s that have ever been delivered. As Vachers Parliamentary compan- and wanted them to do their Irish policy, The a hatchet job on Lloyd George ion, picking out the names of worst, feeling that they could Star, 1922. Lloyd it could not have been surpassed. George holds out eighty Conservative MPs, chosen never form or lead a government. symbols of peace, But the work that Baldwin had not for their views but for their Baldwin knew he could not but is backed up done before the event was even reputations. Those MPs were bring down the Coalition, even by the threat of more important. It was Bonar then brought together. Sources backed by the body of opinion armed force. Low Law’s presence and speech that conflict about how many actually in the party, without there being always portrayed swayed the day. In the view of the Coalition as a met: one indicates thirty-five but an alternative prime minister. two-headed ass the dissenters, if Bonar Law had Hoare himself (probably based on He also knew that he was not (here sitting on not come to the Carlton Club a diary) says seventy-four. But the prominent enough to be seen top of the tank). and made his speech, they would have lost, the Coalition would have endured and Lloyd George would have remained prime minister.

Role of the Conservative grassroots The last speaker was Stuart Ball, Reader in History at Leicester University and writer and com- mentator on the Conservative Party. Ball began by describing the fall of the Lloyd George Coalition as, without doubt, one of the most decisive events of modern British political history. It is one of the most dramatic and one of the most humanly enthralling as well. Ball drew attention to the work of a number of historians who have looked at the downfall of

34 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION the Coalition. In particular, he Baldwin’s were numbered and it is they meeting in October 1922, a large identified a pioneering study who worked to persuade the number (possibly a majority) of published in 1973 by Michael own speech leadership to catch up with that Conservative MPs had already Kinnear called The Fall of Lloyd opinion on the ground. The publicly or privately committed George. Yet despite this wealth of was one of decline in support for the Coali- themselves against the Coalition. historical assessment, there are tion in many areas, particularly The vote at the meeting can be still neglected aspects of the fall the most in safe seats in the Conservative anticipated as a foregone conclu- of the Coalition and it was on memorable heartlands in southern England sion and the emphasis in some one of these – in Ball’s view the and the Midlands, brought con- studies on the influence of the most important of the under- eight min- siderable pressure to bear on speeches may be exaggerated. appreciated areas, the role of the Conservative MPs and prospec- MPs went into the meeting not Conservative grassroots – that utes that tive parliamentary candidates to just with their minds made up he chose to focus in his talk. By adjust their position. Under this but with commitments already grassroots Ball said he meant the have ever pressure, they sought to distance made to the people who mat- rank and file members in the been deliv- themselves from the Coalition tered in their constituencies and constituencies and the country – a coalition that was failing and to their chances of being re- – not the Parliamentary party, ered. As a in increasing trouble. elected. It was this pressure from or the backbenchers. The other The clearest method for doing the constituencies that opened up speakers had covered thoroughly hatchet job this was the promise, made some- cracks at the very base of the edi- the background issues to the fall times privately to constituency fice of the Coalition. The pressure of the government but the actual on Lloyd executive committees and some- was being applied even before the mechanism through which the George it times in public at constituency summer of 1922 and the cracks Coalition was ended was revolt meetings, that when the election widened and travelled upwards, within the Conservative Party, a could not came the MP or candidate would undermining the whole structure. revolt which not only swept away stand as a Conservative pure and Ball then went on to talk Lloyd George but, in an extraor- have been simple. This was a movement that about the causes of the hostility dinarily unprecedented manner, built up momentum throughout that the Conservative grassroots swept away the Conservative surpassed. 1922. J. C. C. Davidson (Bonar felt towards the Coalition and leadership as well. It was almost But the Law’s former Parliamentary Pri- to examine what motivated the as if the first intention of the dis- vate Secretary) was one example unusual degree of dissidence and senters was to remove Austen work that of this in his Hemel Hempstead rebellion among the normally Chamberlain, and it was simply seat. Like Bonar Law, Davidson docile and deferential Tory rank as a consequence of this that Baldwin was not an out-and-out oppo- and file. The first element he Lloyd George was also removed. nent of the Coalition in the identified was the importance of Lloyd George, of course, was had done months leading up to October what he described as ‘economy’. not present at the Carlton Club; before the 1922. But he was already under This was an issue linked to the it was Austen Chamberlain pressure in his constituency by economy and in particular to the who called the meeting, Austen event was January 1922. The minute book collapse of the post-war boom in Chamberlain who handled it and of one of the Ladies’ Organisa- 1920: the combination of rising Austen Chamberlain who lost it. even more tions shows that he was asked if prices and heavy taxation that All Lloyd George could do was he was prepared to stand as an seriously squeezed two impor- sit and wait until a white-faced important. independent Unionist at the next tant groups for the Conservative Sir Philip Sassoon rushed from election. At this stage Davidson Party: the middle classes, espe- the Carlton Club to Downing hedged but, after being urged cially the professional classes in Street to break the news that it to answer definitively at several the towns and suburbs, and those was all over. other meetings during the year, who owned land in agricul- Ball felt that it was essential at a gathering in September he tural areas. But what the word to look beyond the actions of informed his membership that ‘economy’ particularly meant the more visible players – the he would stand as an independ- in this period was the very high elite players at Cabinet, junior ent Conservative at the next levels of taxation – both Imperial ministerial or backbench level election – an announcement that taxation to the national excheq- – and to examine the role of was received with great applause. uer and local rates – which had the Conservative rank and file Davidson was just one of risen massively as a result of the and the immense influence he many under similar pressure and First World War and which were believed they had wielded both this is confirmed by Kinnear’s now affecting an increasingly over the parliamentary party analysis of the pronouncements large number of people. The and over Central Office and the of Conservative politicians in the ‘economy’ people were seeking machinery of the Conserva- press and by Stuart Ball’s exami- was a cutback in government tive Party in the country. It was nation of constituency associa- spending in order to reduce taxa- the rank and file who realised tion minute books. Well before tion in response to the depres- that the days of the Coalition the calling of the Carlton Club sion that was hitting the country.

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 35 REPORT: THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION There was vocal criticism of the 1913 Act, the question of con- The Con- cleverly by Stanley Baldwin ballooning of central govern- tracting in and contracting out, twice in 1930 in the two party ment and of bureaucracy, of the political levy – all bound up servative meetings he called in June and controls and wartime red tape, of with the issue of the political role October of that year. Chamber- the massive increase in the size of of the trade unions. Again the grassroots lain’s over-confidence led to his the civil service and the greater government had promised to do own downfall and then to the fall responsibilities that had been something about this and again it did mat- of the Coalition. But Chamber- handed out to local government. had let the Conservatives down. ter. If they lain also had a defensive reason This volatile mixture of eco- There was also the question of for calling the meeting and for nomic hard times and complaints Ireland, where the government had no calling it when he did. In a few about government restrictiveness had swung from ‘taking murder weeks’ time, the Conservative and interference was stirred up by the throat to shaking mur- influence, Party (National Union) annual by Lord Rothermere, the owner der by the hand’ in the phrase conference was due to meet. It of the Daily Mail. Rothermere used by Unionists in this period. why would was evident even to Chamberlain mounted his own campaign, the However, in Ball’s view, because Chamber- that the conference would either Anti-Waste League, and stood the position of Ulster had been overwhelmingly and publicly candidates in by-elections, win- safeguarded, with its own parlia- lain have reject the Coalition in a way ning two Conservative seats. ment, the issue of Ireland had lost that would make it impossible This sent a shiver through the resonance for many rank and file needed to for him to carry on leading the Conservative Party from top to Conservatives. party, or would shatter the party bottom. Combined with this was To sum up, Ball reiterated take the from top to bottom. The defen- the depression that agriculture, that, while the anti-coalition gamble of sive reason Chamberlain had for especially arable farming ,went pressure from the rank and file calling the Carlton Club meet- through in the 1920s. The Lloyd upon MPs and candidates varied the Carlton ing was to pre-empt and bounce George Coalition had brought in across the country, it was most the National Union conference. a major measure, the 1920 Agri- pressing in the Tory heartlands Club meet- Chamberlain wanted Conserva- culture Act, that looked as if it in the South, the Midlands and tive MPs to back the leadership, would greatly benefit the farm- the suburbs. It was strengthened ing as a back the Coalition and agree to ers, but the government then by the emerging role of women means to fight a quick general election as found that it was too expensive Conservative members as women Coalition MPs, with the result and it became one of the vic- gained the vote and began to prevent the that the National Union con- tims of the Geddes axe. So the play an increasing part in con- ference would have been post- Conservatives got some of the stituency political activity. The National poned. This move proved that ‘economy’ they were seeking but other critical element in the fall the Conservative grassroots did ironically at the expense of their of the Coalition was the role of Union con- matter. If they had no influence, own supporters, as subsidies for the National Union centrally, ference why would Chamberlain have farmers were axed. the representative institution of needed to take the gamble of the On top of this catalogue of the Conservative rank and file. It from taking Carlton Club meeting as a means discontent and of government was the National Union, under to prevent the National Union failure was heaped the rise of the chairmanship of Sir George place? conference from taking place? Labour, as evidenced in by-elec- Younger, which prevented the Overall, the meeting heard tions and local government Conservatives from pressing for a four different interpretations of elections. The growth of Labour general election in January 1922 the Carlton Club meeting, its led the Conservative rank and because the issue of House of impact and the reasons for the file to demand two things that Lords reform had not been set- fall of the Lloyd George Coali- the Lloyd George government tled. When Birkenhead attacked tion. In this joint event with the had promised but was manifestly Younger as the cabin boy trying Conservative History Group the o refusing to deliver. The first was t steer the ship, he made Younger emphasis was upon the role of House of Lords reform: revisiting the hero of the rank and file and Conservatives, and an important the 1911 Parliament Act, which the loss of support for the leader- element which was missing from had always been said to be only a ship in the National Union was the analysis and which should temporary measure, and restor- a critical factor in the eventual be addressed in a future meeting ing some powers to the House of downfall of the Coalition. or Journal article was the role of Lords. Conservatives wanted this In conclusion, Ball reminded Liberals in the fall of what turned desperately because they were us that it was well known that out to be the last Liberal prime frightened by the prospect of a the Carlton Club meeting was minister. Labour majority in the Com- called by Austen Chamberlain as mons with no constitutional an offensive move. He intended 1 ‘Politics in the First World War’ check upon it. The second, and to ambush his critics, to isolate (1959) reproduced in From the Boer War to the Cold War, Essays linked, issue for Tories was the and expose them. It was a tactic on 20th Century Europe (Penguin reform of trade union law: the used more effectively and more Books, 1996)

36 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 food and drink had been con- sumed. REVIEWS So how reliable is Paddy’s tes- timony? This will be an impor- tant question for future historians Demise of the ‘project’ of the period, and his version may be challenged when we read Paddy Ashdown: The Ashdown Diaries: Volume Two the recollections of Blair, Brown, Campbell et al. Andrew Rawns- 1997–1999 (Allen Lane, 2001) ley’s Servants of the people (2000) Reviewed by Alan Leaman already provides a subtly different perspective on many of the same events. very so often – roughly politician’s thoughts as they hap- Paddy’s volume contains once in a generation – the pened; they have that smack of lengthy verbatim accounts of Esea of British electoral pol- realism – and sincerity – that is conversations between Ashdown itics parts and we catch a glimpse often missing from the carefully and Blair. How accurate are they? of a better land. The Tories take prepared memoir. They contain My estimation is: very. No one a tumble. The progressives get the titbits and pen portraits that has so far seriously challenged their turn. Reformers celebrate. enliven the political process any of his account. But, again, 1906. 1945. 1997. The dates have – and are all the better for that. the most important thing is what become a cliché. But we know One of the interesting sub-plots they tell us of how Paddy himself them so well chiefly because here is Tony Blair’s growing con- approached his task, and how he the list is so short. The twenti- cern about the situation in Iraq, felt that others responded. eth century was a Conservative well before the second George Looking back from the van- century. Bush was even running for the tage point of 2003, of course, This second volume of the White House. Another is the 1997 seems a big wide world Ashdown diaries is devoted to emerging race to succeed Ash- away. It is already difficult to the idea that the next century down to the Lib Dem leadership. re-imagine the extraordinary doesn’t have to be like that – that Of course diaries are flawed; excitement that Labour’s vic- progressives can alter the terms that is part of the point. Ashdown tory generated. Or the effect of of trade of British politics and had the rather endearing view the leap in Liberal Democrat establish a position of dominance that almost anyone he spoke representation. The tantalising for themselves. It is a sustained with had agreed with him by prospect of a thorough-going argument in favour of the greater the end of the conversation. So co-operation between Labour he can, as we now say, inadvert- and the Liberal Democrats that is ently mislead his readers. Like all almost certainly necessary if this humans, he can remember things is ever to happen. differently from others who were So here is the story of the with him at the time. So what? political party that Ashdown The important thing is to know led through his last two years as what it felt like to be there, play- leader, and which consistently ing such a pivotal role at the top failed to rise to the significance of politics. of the occasion. Plus the best Paddy dictated his diary insight we have yet into the entries on to tape almost every character and qualities of our day during the eleven years Prime Minister – our charming, of his leadership. While I was talented, elusive and somehow working for him, I was hardly never-quite-settled Prime Min- conscious of this ritual, which ister. And, above all, the story usually took place, I understood, of how two political leaders, late at night – though sometimes presented with their once-in-a- more quickly after special events. generation opportunity, failed to Occasionally some of us were deliver the goods. asked to read through extracts, Diaries are an exciting most often detailed accounts of source of political history. I love particularly important meetings. them. Even though this volume It was quite an efficient way of takes around 500 pages to get telling us what had happened, through two years, it still makes who had said what, even (though for a cracking read. These are a this was less interesting) what

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 37 REVIEWS modernisation of Britain’s insti- It also Ashdown risked frightening If Paddy put himself in a tutions, even of a new type of his colleagues before he could weaker position, it may have politics itself – not just changing becomes deliver the deal. been because he spent too much the style, but the substance as Second, many allege that the time and energy on the detail well. fairly obvi- Lib Dems were obliged to tem- of his discussions with Blair, The atmosphere today could per their convictions and to hold and not enough on winning the hardly be more different. For ous that back on legitimate criticism of public argument for the new many, the story after six years is Tony Blair the new government during type of politics that he wanted. one of disappointment rather this period. There is precious The behind-the-scenes stuff is than opportunity. Did people himself little evidence for this either. obviously important. But it only really believe that a referendum Indeed, Ashdown recounts many works these days if supported by on the euro was just around the never really examples where the opposite an out-in-the-open campaign corner? Or that PR for West- was the case – and where he to build wider consent. The minster was a real prospect? And appre- defended the party resolutely ‘project’ was over-dependent was there ever a serious chance ciated against Blair’s complaints. There on people at the top; there was of the two parties forming a are other instances where the a wider constituency of support coalition government, even after exactly Lib Dems simply didn’t know for Lib-Labbery in both parties Labour won with such a large what they were doing, so got and beyond which was never majority? what Ash- themselves into a mess that was properly mobilised. So it is natural for people to all their own fault. But, even in this context, ask whether the attempt to bring down was And, third, there was always it is still worth marking the the two parties closer together saying to the nagging fear that a closer many dividends that this short after 1997 was ever sensible. identification with Labour could period brought – both for Should Ashdown have opted him. This do the Lib Dems electoral harm. the Lib Dems and their wider for a quieter life? And, if the Yet all the evidence points in the policy objectives. Scotland Ashdown version of this story is is where opposite direction; constructive and Wales have their devolu- accurate, was he was being led a opposition was good electoral tion settlements, and the fact merry dance by Blair or simply the bigger politics. Ashdown tells of his of co-operation between the misreading the signals? problems pleasure when his party captured parties at Westminster helped Rereading the story today, a Sheffield City Council from pave the way for coalitions in number of themes emerge with lay. It Labour in 1999. Who runs Shef- Edinburgh and Cardiff. Thanks greater clarity. First, there’s no field now? to Ashdown’s insistence on PR, doubt from this account that would be But it also becomes fairly a dozen or so Liberal Democrats Ashdown’s party behaved pretty obvious from all the conversa- are members of the European badly. Its gratitude to him for wrong to tions recorded here that Tony Parliament who otherwise delivering unprecedented elec- accuse the Blair himself never really appre- would not be there. Indeed, it is toral success endured just about ciated exactly what Ashdown now widely accepted wisdom as long as it took for the new Prime Min- was saying to him. This is where that all new political institu- Parliamentary Party to assemble the bigger problems lay. It tions should embrace a form of at Westminster. And party com- ister of bad would be wrong to accuse the proportional voting. Above all, mittees subsequently went into Prime Minister of bad faith; the Ashdown was able to ensure that emotional spasms at the least faith; the real charge appears to be poor his party prospered, and that he provocation. real charge understanding. could hand it over in August Three excuses have been Time and again decisions 1999 in robust health and with offered for this behaviour, none appears were allowed to drift. But mainly a better sense of its own identity of which is convincing. Many because Blair hadn’t grasped the than it had enjoyed for years. MPs and others say that Ash- to be poor significance of what was said to Who can honestly argue that an down never told them what him, or because he just came alternative strategy would have was going on, and therefore under- with a mindset that couldn’t enabled him to do as well? that they could not be held standing. take it on board. It was Ashdown Some say, of course, that this responsible for his strategy. Yet, himself who generated all the book simply records the actions according to the account in the momentum behind ‘the project’. of an older man in a hurry. In diaries, Paddy was telling almost Once he left the leadership of two senses they are right; in the everyone he met. Not all the the Lib Dems, and with nothing one they mean, they are wrong. tactical details, certainly; but all or no one to maintain the initia- Looking again through the dia- the strategic objectives were laid tive, Blair quickly lost interest. ries, it becomes utterly clear just out for everyone to see. If there For the Prime Minister, this was how keen Ashdown was to leave was a fault, that was precisely it. probably always an optional extra his post. He mentions this first By running his ambitions up the – a ‘nice to have’. For Ashdown, in May 1997, just days after the flagpole so often and so volubly, it was a core objective. election. So this was no personal

38 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REVIEWS quest for position, the most party at Westminster – Ashdown birth of their first child at the usual accusation; all the evidence was ideally prepared for the even end of 1852. She refused to have points in another direction. more interesting job of presiding a physician present in part as a Rather, these were the actions over the squabbling factions of ‘protest against wicked customs’ of a leader who knew he didn’t Bosnia-Herzegovina. that denied professional status to have much more time at the female midwives. top, and who also knew that, the Alan Leaman was political adviser, Perhaps it was this back- rhythms of politics being what speechwriter and spokesman for ground that is the clue to they are, if this was ever going to Paddy Ashdown from 1988–93. answering the fascinating ques- happen, it would have to happen He was Liberal Democrat Director of tion of what made Josephine – quickly. The window was always Strategy and Planning in the run-up from the privileged upper middle about to close and, after this brief to the 1997 election, when he also class, deeply religious, modest in period, it duly did. was a Parliamentary candidate. He manner, delicate in health – take Still, we can certainly see why now works for a financial services on the establishment of the day – after eleven years of leading his trade association on behalf of ‘fallen women’. What courage it must have taken for a woman who initially felt unable even to voice the word prostitution to stand up in public ‘The world is different because she lived’ to describe and denounce the What cour- degrading treatment enforced by Jane Jordan: Josephine Butler (John Murray, 2001) the Contagious Diseases Acts on age it working-class women who could Reviewed by Paddy Beck must have not prove their virtue. Josephine had been helping taken for a prostitutes, whom she called hy did I previously mother came from a Methodist ‘outcasts’, and engaging with know so little about and Moravian Brethren back- woman who European women about the Wthis woman and her ground, and ensured that all her iniquities of the regulated pros- achievements? I asked myself children received a good edu- initially titution system on the continent as I read this book. The gaps in cation incorporating a strong felt unable when the three Contagious Dis- my knowledge have certainly moral sense that recognised and eases Acts were passed between been filled in by Dr Jane Jordan abhorred injustice. The fam- even to 1864 and 1869. These Acts in this extremely interesting ily were deeply religious and, covered eighteen British towns and informative biography of although Josephine continued to voice the that had nearby army camps or Josephine Butler – a woman attend an Anglican church, she naval ports. They were partly described by Millicent Fawcett, considered herself a Wesleyan word pros- modelled on the European sys- founder of the Fawcett Society, both by upbringing and by incli- titution to tem of regulated prostitution as ‘the most distinguished woman nation. In 1847 Josephine visited and were designed to control the of the nineteenth century’. Ireland. What she saw there was stand up in spread of sexually transmitted Josephine Butler was born to haunt her for the rest of her disease. Women believed to be Josephine Grey, in Northum- life although she suppressed this public to prostitutes were not only forced berland 1828, into a large family publicly for another forty years. to register as such but were with strong Whig, Liberal and In 1852 Josephine married describe subjected to fortnightly inter- Methodist connections. Earl George Butler, Public Exam- and nal examination to ensure they Grey (Prime Minister 1831–34) iner in the Schools at Oxford were disease free. If women were was her cousin. Her father, University. From the outset of denounce found to be diseased, they were John Grey, was both a Liberal their courtship George made detained in ‘lock’ hospitals for up activist and a political confi- clear his concept of marriage the degrad- to nine months. The purpose of dant of Earl Grey until he had as ‘a perfectly equal union, the Acts was in part – to quote to abstain from active politics with absolute freedom on both ing treat- Austin Bruce, Liberal Home Sec- when appointed the manager sides for personal initiative in ment retary in 1872 – to allow men to of Greenwich Hospital Estates, thought and action and for ‘sin with impunity’. Northumberland, in 1833. Jane individual development’ and enforced Perhaps the most harrowing Jordan recounts some delight- this he maintained through- part of this book is the descrip- ful family anecdotes about the out the following thirty-seven by the Con- tion of what these Acts meant Grey family’s continuing Lib- years. From the start, he and in practice. Women could be eral allegiance – her younger Josephine studied together and tagious labelled prostitutes on the word sister, Hatty, when asked her continually discussed the issues Diseases of policemen or magistrates name used to add that she was of the day. Josephine’s nascent with no further proof required. ‘a good fig’ (a good Whig). Her ‘feminism’ is apparent from the Acts. They were forced to undergo

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 39 REVIEWS examination even when preg- of consent in Britain – twelve nant or just after childbirth. If years old. This she regarded not they refused examination they only as abhorrent but as lead- were imprisoned in conditions ing directly to the trafficking even worse than the dreaded to mainland Europe of large ‘lock’ hospitals. Many of the numbers of girls we would now women were illiterate – putting regard as children. Josephine their cross on forms they did not was pan-European. Not only understand and which had not did she have extensive family been explained. Consequently links around the continent but Josephine campaigned more she founded a European fed- against the violation of indi- eration of societies dedicated to vidual rights than on the basis abolishing the state regulation of any medical violation. First of prostitution. Jane Jordan cov- she published a book called The ers Josephine’s travels and both Constitution Violated. Then she the successes and tribulations concentrated on getting the Acts she and her European federa- repealed: this meant tackling tion encountered. But she does parliament. not mention that the federa- From birth Josephine’s natural tion still exists under the name allies were the Liberals. She con- ‘International Abolitionist Fed- tinued to have close links with eration’ based in Copenhagen. many Liberal families especially This organisation continues to when the Ladies National Asso- campaign for the abolition of ciation for the Repeal of the the state regulation of prostitu- Contagious Diseases Acts (the tion – rather than the abolition that Josephine’s writing clearly LNA) was formed in 1869. The of prostitution per se, as many shows that she put her role as four Priestman sisters, Quakers, think – and for equity of treat- wife and mother above that of a were among her closest allies. ment to both sexes. Neither does political activist. However, on the One, Elizabeth, was married she mention that there is still an evidence of this book, I am not to John Bright MP and their active Josephine Butler Society sure that I agree this was always daughter Helen Bright Clark that is a direct descendent of her the case – particularly not in the was to become a leading figure campaigning groups, and which last few years of George’s life. in the LNA. The Radical MP continues to fight for much the Certainly their eldest son, also for Halifax, James Stansfield, was same causes. George, would have contested to sacrifice a promising political Dr Jordan provides many Jordan’s view – as can be demon- career through his unwaver- insights into Josephine’s char- strated by the arrangements he ing support of Josephine and acter. Passionate, independent made for his mother’s very small, the LNA. However some of the and very strong willed in public, private funeral and – later – for contradictions within the Lib- Josephine’s doubts, religious her memorial window in Liver- eral Party and its ambivalence turmoil and often despair were pool Cathedral. towards women’s issues – par- not generally known outside her Nevertheless this remarkable ticularly its attitude to women’s closest confidantes and her hus- woman should be remembered suffrage – first became evident band. Her ardent speeches, often as someone who changed the through the fight over the repeal to working men, were renowned. course of events. As Prof. James of the Contagious Diseases Acts. ‘Two pence, gentlemen, is the Stuart said in a tribute after her A rival Liberal candidate and price in England of a poor wom- death, ‘The world is different supporter of repeal, Dr Langley, an’s honour. Under the Conta- because she lived’. But perhaps was put up to oppose a Liberal gious Diseases Acts these girls are not yet different enough: many arch-supporter of the Acts, Sir no longer women but only bits of the issues she campaigned on Henry Storks, at the Colchester of numbered, inspected and tick- remain with us. by-election in 1870. Josephine eted human flesh flung by Gov- She fought against the traf- and the ladies of the LNA ernment into the public market.’ ficking of young girls for sexual campaigned vigorously against That Josephine was fully sup- purposes. She fought for equality Storks. This split in Liberal ranks ported by her husband George, of treatment between men and resulted in a Conservative vic- an ordained clergyman and women in sexual matters and tory. The tactic was to be used headmaster of Liverpool College, for the right of women to make frequently during the fight over is perhaps as astonishing as Jose- their own decisions and own woman’s suffrage. phine’s own career. Jane Jordan their own bodies. The whole Another issue that greatly dis- is careful to delineate George’s terrible business of trafficking, turbed Josephine was the low age ungrudging support and to insist

40 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 REVIEWS especially within Europe, has Like all biographies there of the Victorian era who, by the resurfaced over the last few years are some sections that are more time Mary was born in 1847, had to the extent that an Inspec- interesting than others. None- already achieved cabinet office. tor in the Metropolitan Vice theless I would strongly rec- Like it or not, Mary was destined Squad recently said that it is fast ommend this book as both an to a life surrounded by politics at becoming more profitable and enjoyable read and a fascinating the highest level. less risky than drug trafficking. delve into the more murky and There were three main The dramatic recent growth less well-known areas of Victo- thoughts with which I of HIV/Aids as a gender issue rian Britain. approached this book. Natu- in sub-Saharan Africa, where rally it would contain the his- 60% of the people infected are Paddy Beck has been a local coun- tory of the dutiful daughter in a women, is partly attributable to a cillor, agent and parliamentary privileged Victorian family. I also cultural tradition where women candidate. She is a member of the looked forward to the insight cannot say no. As Peter Piot, head Josephine Butler Society and of the into female political activism of UNAIDS, said at that organi- Women Liberal Democrats’ Execu- promised on the dustjacket and sation’s annual conference: ‘The tive. She represented the National hoped in addition for a few side- face of Aids is becoming the face Union of Women at the UN Con- lights on the life and career of the of young women’. The fight ference Against Racism in Durban, Grand Old Man. must go on. 2001. Sheila Gooddie gives the impression of being most com- fortable with the family life. The introduction, setting the scene from the Great Exhibition ‘Not So Much A Question of Greatness’ onwards, and the first chapter with Mary listening devot- Sheila Gooddie: Mary Gladstone: A Gentle Rebel (John edly to her father’s Midlothian Wiley & Sons, 2003) speeches, might be skipped Mary’s by the impatient reader with Reviewed by Tony Little father was some knowledge of the era, but when the book gets going we get full details of family life he dustjacket describes Lady Palmerston – or the covert an extraor- among the elite. I almost wrote Mary Gladstone as ‘a messenger such as Mrs O’Shea dinary ‘typical family life’ but, while woman at the heart of intriguing on behalf of her lover T Mary’s upbringing was con- politics nearly half a century Charles Stewart Parnell. Political mixture of ventional, it would be hard to before women had the vote’, women were, naturally, faithful assert that the Gladstone fam- silently carrying the implication confidantes of their menfolk and political ily was typical. Mary’s father that, without the vote, Victorian a trusted few were left to manage was an extraordinary mixture women had no place in poli- local campaigns in the absence endeavour, of political endeavour, literary tics. This was never true but we of their husband or brother who literary tastes, religious controversy and are only gradually rediscover- was down in Westminster. But a physical energy whose surplus ing what that place was, and were there other more opera- tastes, reli- expended itself in long walks and it is good to see a commercial tional roles open to the right tree felling. He had proposed to publisher finding space for a woman? gious con- her mother Catherine Glynne in biography of a woman whose The Gladstones were a a letter containing a (just about importance relates principally to recently rich family, but the troversy grammatically correct) sentence her family’s political position. money earned in trade by Mary and a phys- of 141 words in eighteen clauses For some women, their place Gladstone’s grandfather, Sir John, and sub-clauses.1 Catherine in Victorian politics was, as might was invested in political oppor- ical energy was both very different from be expected, merely decorative, tunities and a place for the family and well suited to her husband. the little bit of colour seated among the ruling elite. Sir John whose Graceful but full of fun, forget- quietly among the black frock himself played a prominent part ful, impulsive and unpunctual, coats on the platform. For oth- in the politics of Liverpool as a surplus she achieved an independent life ers, such as Josephine Butler, it friend and supporter of Canning expended with the charities she promoted was campaigning in the front line and Huskisson. Mary’s paternal and yet was fully her husband’s on unpopular women’s issues. uncles stood for parliament, as itself in confidante, supportive of his Among the aristocracy, it was did her brothers. Her father, ambitions. They married in a often participation in the fam- W. E. Gladstone, forced to aban- long walks joint ceremony with Catherine’s ily business – the hostess who don his clerical vocation, was younger sister Mary who mar- used entertainment as part of of course the ‘People’s William’, and tree ried George, Lord Lyttelton. The political man-management like the dominant Liberal politician felling. Lyttletons had twelve children

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 41 REVIEWS and the two families remained her father and the one who did, Lothian and ceded the Leeds seat close, with the cousins regularly Arthur Balfour professed himself in favour of his son Herbert. This in each other’s company and in love with her cousin, May created a vacancy in the official among Mary’s closest friends. Lyttelton, who died in 1875. secretarial team that supported The Gladstones occupied a vari- Others paid suit to Mary, includ- Gladstone when he assumed the ety of houses in London to suit ing Tennyson’s son Hallam, but premiership for the second time his career but stayed in Cather- she took a long time to recover – a vacancy filled by Mary. Mary ine’s family home of Hawarden from the shock of Balfour’s rejec- created her own office space in Castle to such an extent that, tion. By way of sublimation she 10 Downing Street and worked while they did not own it, built friendships with the much as part of a team of five. Since Hawarden Castle became organ- older and married Burne-Jones, she was the only woman on the ised around them. Ruskin and Lord Acton. team, this caused concern to Mrs Whether it was the high Gladstone about the propriety standards set by their parents or of her unchaperoned meetings. ‘Von Moltke’ whether it was parental selfish- Gooddie quotes Sir Henry Pon- Mary was the fifth of eight chil- ness which required the family sonby as estimating that Glad- dren. By the time she was three, to stay at home as unpaid sec- stone and his secretaries wrote she had already suffered the loss retaries, none of the Gladstone about 25,000 letters a year. of an elder sister and the family children married young. Helen, Here, where Gooddie could worried about her health, par- the youngest sister, did not marry have located the heart of her ticularly her eyesight. Both for at all but escaped the family book, we are hindered by her her good and for the recupera- home, with Mary’s assistance in apparent inexperience in politi- tion of her parents, it was decided overcoming the strong objec- cal history. Colleagues clearly saw that they would take a holiday tions of their mother, to become Mary as having the ear of her in Italy. Perhaps this was Mary’s a pioneer female academic at father. She had the man-manage- biggest contribution to British Newnham College, Cambridge. ment skills her parents neglected politics, for it was on this holiday Ordinarily, organisation of the in their focus on higher things, that Gladstone visited political household would have been soothing bruised egos and placat- prisoners in jail in Naples and his Catherine Gladstone’s duty but ing irate ministers. She served as indignation, expressed in a public it was one to which she was ill- a channel to Gladstone for Rose- letter to his mentor Lord Aber- suited by either temperament or bery and Acton in particular. deen, helped pave the way for his inclination and the role devolved eventual entry into the Liberal gradually on to Mary. Mary’s government of 1859. superior administrative skills In the shorter term, his period earned her the nickname ‘von out of office in the mid-1850s Moltke’, after the Prussian field allowed him to be an indulgent marshal responsible for the Ger- father to his family. In sharp man success in the Franco-Prus- contrast to, say, the Chamberlain sian War. family, the Gladstone children After his defeat in the 1874 were both allowed to argue election, Gladstone gave up the with and contradict their par- leadership of the Liberal Party ents. Unlike her brothers, Mary but did not retire from politics, did not go to school but was making a gradual comeback to well read, drawing on the fam- the front line, particularly after ily library for works as varied the agitation over the Bulgarian as Shelley’s poetry and Butler’s atrocities of 1876. On his ‘retire- Analogy of Religion, and showed ment’, he decided not to employ a passionate interest in art and a secretary and relied on his music. In 1865 she was presented children to undertake the role. at court but one gains an impres- While this would have been seen sion that she preferred the time as good training for sons destined she spent in the ladies’ gallery to a life in politics, the involve- of the House of Commons to ment of the daughters and espe- the time spent at the balls and cially of Mary was much more entertainments by which young unusual. women of the time met suitable marriage partners. While Mary appears to have made friends Her own office readily, few young men meas- In 1880, W. E. Gladstone was ured up to the standard set by elected for both Leeds and Mid-

42 Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 ARCHIVES Principally, she acted for her marrying a man nine years One gains subject, being defined in rela- father in ecclesiastical appoint- her junior, Harry Drew, the tion to Gladstone, and it is pleas- ments – a subject in which he curate at the parish church of an impres- antly surprising to find that this probably took more interest Hawarden. She married as she one is not. With the Grand Old than any other premier and in always intended: for love rather sion that Man shooed off into his ‘Temple which she was able to rely on the than position. The shock over of Peace’ the rest of the fam- assistance of her friendship with the age difference and relative she pre- ily suddenly come to life. The Henry Scott Holland. poverty of her husband appeared ferred the glimpses thus granted are not In many ways, Gladstone’s to horrify her cousins and her always comfortable. The incon- government of 1880–85 was the maid more than her parents, for time she veniences portrayed range from most frustrating of his periods whom a clergyman had much the minor, such as the degree as Prime Minister – its achieve- to recommend as a suitor. The spent in of organisation required for ments modest compared to the wedding, in February 1886, was travel in Victorian Europe, to the scale of its majority. Gladstone’s fitted in around the Home Rule the ladies’ always present risk of premature colleagues regularly threatened crisis and, although initially she gallery of death, even among such well- to resign and Gladstone himself remained with the family, the cosseted families, in childhood was apparently always on the chance of Harry running the the House and childbirth. verge of retirement. To what parish of Buckley allowed the Mary Gladstone wrote of extent did Mary’s diplomatic creation of a separate household, of Com- her planned biography of her skills prevent matters deteriorat- albeit one only a few miles from mother, ‘it was not so much a ing even further? Sheila Gooddie Hawarden. Unfortunately this mons to question of greatness as of unu- apparently does not ask herself was at the expense of Helen’s the time sualness, distinctiveness’ that were what difference Mary made; for career, as she left Cambridge to needed for a biography. As Sheila her the achievement of a female take over the care of her parents. spent at Gooddie concludes, this is as true working at No. 10 is enough in Despite her age and a number of Mary as of Catherine. The itself, and we are left with little of miscarriages, Mary was balls and Mary portrayed in this biography clear impression of Mary’s impact blessed with a daughter. Harry was obviously bright, perceptive ‘at the heart of politics’. Rather Drew remained at Buckley until entertain- and passionate in her politics. It she focuses on the passage of the 1905 and then became rector ments. would have been nice to have well-known events of the second of Hawarden where he died in heard from her more directly government and on the pass- 1910. Mary survived until New than Sheila Gooddie allows. ing comments of Mary on these Year’s Day in 1928 and in her last events or, more naturally, on the few years contributed articles to Tony Little is Chair of the Liberal devastating impact on the family Nineteenth Century on her father’s Democrat History Group. of the assassination of Lord Fred- library, published her reminis- erick Cavendish, the husband of cences of Acton and wrote a 1 P. Magnus, Gladstone (John Mur- her close friend Lucy Lyttelton. biography of her mother. ray, 1954), p. 38. The letter is quoted in Magnus. In 1886, at the age of 39, One is used to Victorian Mary surprised the family by biographies, whoever their

catalogued. They are stored in some 400 boxes and include cor- respondence, MS notes, memo- randa and reports, committee papers, speech transcripts, news ARCHIVES cuttings, publications, campaign material, photographs, cartoons, video and cassette recordings. These cover David Owen’s polit- The David Owen Papers at Special ical career from his early Labour Collections and Archives, University of Party membership until his resig- nation from the House of Com- Liverpool Library mons in 1992. The main body by Maureen Watry of records date from c.1962–92, although the collection also con- tains some earlier material relat- n July 1996 the Rt Hon the his papers were transferred to the ing to David Owen’s family life Lord Owen CH was installed University Library. and education. Ias the Chancellor of the Uni- Over a period of two years The papers are arranged in versity of Liverpool. At that time the papers were sorted and four groups, broadly reflecting

Journal of Liberal History 41 Winter 2003 43 A Liberal Democrat History Group Evening Meeting WINSTON CHURCHILL – LIBERAL POLITICIAN It is often forgotten that Winston Churchill served in four different governments as a Liberal minister, between 1905 and 1922. Indeed, the year 2004 sees the centenary of his joining the Liberal Party, when he crossed the floor of the Commons in protest at the Conservatives’ lurch away from free trade. This meeting will examine Churchill’s Liberal legacy.

Speakers: Keith Robbins (former Vice Chancellor of the University of Wales at Lampeter and author of Churchill) and Paul Addison (Director of the Centre for Second World War Studies and author of Churchill on the Home Front 1900–1945).

7.00 p.m., Monday 2 February (following the History Group AGM, at 6.30 p.m.) Lady Violet Room, National Liberal Club. 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1

the chronological structure of as member of Opposition: for Plymouth: constituency The majority of materials David Owen’s life and work: Shadow Energy spokesman papers; General correspond- in the David Owen papers (1979–81); Speeches: general; ence; Day files; Policy: pri- are available for consultation Personal and Family Articles: general; Day files; vate and reference papers; by researchers, but some files Papers, D 709/1: a small Diaries; David Owen’s publi- Speeches; Articles; David are closed or only available section that includes: Cor- cations; Photographs and car- Owen publications; Diaries; with permission from the respondence; General papers; toons; Personal policy papers Photographs and cartoons; donor. Photographs. and general correspondence; Audio-visual material; SDP Researchers visiting Spe- News cuttings and publica- newspapers and publications; cial Collections and Archives Labour Party Papers tions; Papers on leaving the News cuttings collection; are able to take advantage of 1960–81, D 709/2: cov- Labour Party. SDP: general and historical the Reading Room reference ers a wide range of material reference material; Papers collection and the University including correspondence, SDP Papers 1981–92: D on the winding down of the Library’s general collections speech transcripts, articles, 709/3: Papers on the for- SDP. which, taken together, pro- memoranda and reports, mation and launch of the vide a broad range of printed campaign material, news cut- SDP; Committee papers; Papers relating to inde- materials that complement tings, and photographs: Early Policy records; Council and pendent organisations: subjects covered in the David Labour Party membership: Conference papers; Elec- D709/4: Independent Com- Owen Papers. related papers (1962–66); tion and campaign material; mission on Disarmament Enquiries about access Labour MP for Plymouth: Publicity and fund raising and Security Issues; World to the David Owen Papers constituency papers (1966– records; Regional organi- Security Trust; Independent should be directed to Dr 81); Papers as Minister for sation records; Associated Commission on International Maureen Watry, Head of the Navy (1968–70); Papers groups and organisations; Humanitarian Issues. Special Collections and as member of Opposition: Parliamentary business Archives, Sydney Jones Shadow Defence spokesman papers; Personnel and general The full finding aid for Library, University of and defence issues (1970–73); administration papers; Papers the David Owen Papers is Liverpool, PO Box 123, Papers as member of Opposi- relating to the SDP/Liberal available under the head- Liverpool L69 3DA; tion: Children Bill (1974); Alliance; Papers relating to ing ‘Access’ at: http:// tel: 0151 794 2696; fax: Papers as Minister of Health the SDP and Liberal Party sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/ 0151 794 2681; email: (1974–76); Papers as Foreign merger and the re-establish- Oweb/index.html. [email protected] Secretary (1977–79); Papers ment of the SDP; SDP MP