For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 88 / Autumn 2015 / £10.00 Liberal Democrat history

Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y

Coalition and the Liberal Democrats Adrian Slade Coalition and the deluge Interviews with Nick Clegg and former ministers Stephen Tall, Nick Harvey, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach, David Howarth Why did it go wrong? Robert Hazell, Peter Waller, Jonathan Oates, William Wallace, Matthew Hanney Managing the coalition Craig Johnson, Caron Lindsay, Jim Wallace, David Dutton The impacts of coalition and Comparing coalitions John Curtice, Michael Steed, Mark Pack The 2015 election campaign and its outcome Liberal Democrat History Group New from the Liberal Democrat History Group British Liberal Leaders Leaders of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats since 1828 Duncan Brack, Robert Ingham & Tony Little (eds.)

As the governing party of peace and reform, and then as the third party striving to keep the flame of freedom alive, the Liberal Party, the SDP and the Liberal Democrats have played a crucial role in the shaping of contemporary British society.

This book is the story of those parties’ leaders, from Earl Grey, who led the Whigs through the Great Reform Act of 1832, to Nick Clegg, the first Liberal leader to enter government for more than sixty years. Chapters written by experts in Liberal history cover such towering political figures as Palmerston, Gladstone, Asquith and Lloyd George; those, such as Sinclair, Clement Davies and Grimond, who led the party during its darkest hours; and those who led its revival, including David Steel, Roy Jenkins and Paddy Ashdown. Interviews with recent leaders are included, along with analytical frameworks by which they may be judged and exclusive interviews with former leaders themselves.

‘The leaders profiled in this book led the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats through the best of times and the worst of times. Some reformed the constitution, led the assault on privilege and laid the foundations of the modern welfare state. Others kept the flame of Liberalism burning when it was all but extinguished. I am humbled to follow in their footsteps and learn from their experiences.’ Tim Farron MP, Leader of the Liberal Democrats

‘Political leaders matter. They embody a party’s present, while also shaping its future. This is particularly important in the values-based Liberal tradition. The essays in this book provide a fascinating guide to what it took to be a Liberal leader across two centuries of tumultuous change.’ Martin Kettle, Associate Editor, The Guardian

British Liberal Leaders will be launched at the Liberal Democrat History Group’s fringe meeting at the Liberal Democrats’ autumn conference in Bournemouth, on Sunday 20 September (see back page).

British Liberal Leaders is available at a special discounted price to subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History: £20.00 instead of the normal £25.00. Copies can be purchased: • At the History Group’s stand at the Liberal Democrat conference (see back page); or • Via our website, www.liberalhistory.org.uk; or • By sending a cheque (made out to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN (add £3 P&P).

2 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 Journal of Liberal History Issue 88: Autumn 2015 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 Coalition and the Liberal Democrats 4 Editor: Duncan Brack Duncan Brack introduces this special issue of the Journal Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Coalition and the deluge 6 Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Adrian Slade interviews Nick Clegg and ten other former Liberal Democrat Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, ministers on their experiences of the 2010–15 coalition York Membery Why did it go wrong? 32 Patrons Stephen Tall, Nick Harvey, John Pugh and Matthew Huntbach offer their Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; analyses of why the coalition experiment ended so disastrously for the Liberal Professor John Vincent Democrats; David Howarth reviews Seldon and Finn, The Coalition Effect 2010–2015 Editorial Board Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Ian Cawood; Dr Matt Cole; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; Managing the coalition 46 Prof. Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; How did the coalition work as a government? And how was the party itself Dr Alison Holmes; Dr J. Graham Jones; Dr Tudor Jones; managed? Contributions from Robert Hazell and Peter Waller, Jonathan Tony Little; Michael Meadowcroft; Dr Mark Pack; Dr Ian Oates, William Wallace and Matthew Hanney Packer; Dr John Powell; Jaime Reynolds; Prof. Andrew Russell; Dr Iain Sharpe; Dr Michael Steed The impacts of coalition 58 Editorial/Correspondence The coalition and Liberal Democrat members, by Craig Johnson; the impact on the party in Scotland, by Caron Lindsay Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. The 2015 election campaign and its outcome 64 Contributions should be sent to: John Curtice and Michael Steed analyse the election result, and Mark Pack Duncan Brack (Editor) looks at what happened to the party’s campaigning machine 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN email: [email protected] Comparing coalitions 76 All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. All Jim Wallace compares the coalition with the Scottish experience of 1999–2007; rights reserved. David Dutton draws parallels from history Advertisements Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please contact the Editor.

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Or send a cheque (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to: Liberal Democrat History Group Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating email: [email protected] to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal of Liberal History and other Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone occasional publications. Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues c/o 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN of the Journal, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: Printed by Kall-Kwik, www.liberalhistory.org.uk. 18 Colville Road, London W3 8BL Subscribers’ code for discounted sales from the History Group online shop: mbr001. September 2015 Chair: Tony Little Honorary President: Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 3 coalition and the liberal democrats Duncan Brack introduces this special issue of the Journal of Liberal History, devoted to the impact of the coalition government of 2010–15 on the Liberal Democrats and of the Liberal Democrats on the coalition.

elcome to this spe- support has fallen back not to the the rapid formation of an effective cial issue of the Journal level of 1970 (the last election at majority government. And fur- Wof Liberal History (and, which the number of Liberal MPs thermore, no one bounced Lib- incidentally, the longest issue we was in single figures) but to the Lib- eral Democrats into coalition. The have ever published). eral nadir of the mid 1950s. highly democratic process the party If the history of the Liberal For the remainder of the issue, followed in agreeing the deal helps Democrats since the party’s for- Phil Cow- we invited a wide range of con- to explain why the Liberal Demo- mation in 1988 can be likened to a ley used the tributors (mostly, though not crats avoided the disastrous splits so roller-coaster ride – from the lows entirely, drawn from within the characteristic of Liberal history in of 1989, fourth placed behind the term ‘zug- Liberal Democrats) to write about the early twentieth century – and Greens in the European elections, any topic of their choosing of rel- also why it was the Conservative and of 2006 and 2007, when suc- zwang’ to evance to the impact of the coali- parliamentary party that was more cessive leaders were forced out of tion on the party and of the party prone than Liberal Democrat MPs office, to the highs of 1997, with a describe the on the coalition. Their thoughts to rebellion in Parliament. doubling in the number of seats, are gathered under four headings: The second reason behind the and of 2005, and the highest num- predicament overviews of why the coalition 2015 catastrophe was the perfor- ber of seats won by a third party experiment ended so disastrously; mance of the Liberal Democrats in since 1923 – then the period from the Liberal aspects of how the coalition worked coalition: could the party have run 2010 to 2015 has encapsulated even in practice; reviews of some of the things better? Here our contribu- more dramatic swings in fortune Democrats impacts on the party; and com- tors differ widely in their views, over just five years. The collapse parisons of the coalition with other and this will be the contested from 2010, when the Liberal Demo- found them- experiences. ground for much debate and discus- crats gained their highest share of So what went wrong? How did sion in the future. the vote in any election so far (23.0 selves in in the party crash so disastrously from I share the views of those who per cent, the second highest total 2010 to 2015? Between them our think the party made serious mis- enjoyed by a Liberal party since May 2010. A contributors identify four reasons. takes – a series of decisions and 1929) to the catastrophic 7.9 per cent term used The first was simply the deci- actions that in the end almost of 2015 represents the largest fall sion to enter into coalition with the entirely submerged the Liberal suffered by any party at any Brit- in chess, Conservative Party, the historic Democrats’ identity and led vot- ish election ever (leaving aside the enemy of the Liberal Democrats and ers to conclude that the party had unusual elections of 1918 and 1931, ‘zugzwang’ its predecessor parties. Probably, simply made itself irrelevant and when Liberal factions fought each this was the main factor underlying that the coalition was in reality a other). And in between, of course, describes the scale of the defeat in 2015 – but Conservative government (a view Liberals participated in national none of our contributors argue that which voters may well be reassess- government for the first time since the posi- it was the wrong thing to do. ing now, but rather too late for the 1945, in the first coalition to be In the meeting organised by the Liberal Democrats!). formed in peacetime since 1931. tion where Liberal Democrat History Group The first mistake lay in the allo- This five-year period is there- in July (to be reported in full in the cation of government departments. fore a prime candidate for study and a player has winter issue of the Journal), Pro- Although one can follow the logic analysis – and indeed will be the fessor Phil Cowley used the term behind the responsibilities the five subject of many books and articles to make a ‘zugzwang’ to describe the predica- Liberal Democrat cabinet minis- to come over the next few years. ment the Liberal Democrats found ters ended up with, with the ben- This issue of the Journal of Liberal move (since themselves in in May 2010. A term efit of hindsight it was a mistake History aims to offer raw material used in chess, ‘zugzwang’ describes for the party not to have control of for the political scientists and histo- it’s their the position where a player has to any major spending department, rians writing those analyses. make a move (since it’s their turn) such as education or transport. One The core of the issue is provided turn) but but every possible option open to Lib Dem cabinet minister mainly by the interviews with Nick Clegg every pos- them worsens their position. After appeared in public to defend spend- and ten other former ministers, the 2010 election had resulted in a ing cuts and another was largely on their experiences of coalition, sible option hung parliament, Liberal Demo- invisible outside Scotland. Consti- conducted by Adrian Slade (our crats knew that coalition with the tutional reform and climate change most sincere thanks go to Adrian open to Tories was a highly risky choice; are important issues for the party for his hard work in this respect). but every alternative (a confidence but are much less salient to the gen- To accompany this, we asked John them wors- and supply arrangement, or no deal eral public. And although many Curtice and Michael Steed to ana- at all – there was never a realustic Liberal Democrat junior minis- lyse the 2015 election result in ens their prospect of coalition with Labour) ters had real achievements to their detail; their findings show how looked worse – and the finan- credit, they were usually not obvi- in most of the country the party’s position. cial situation seemed to require ous to the electorate.

4 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the liberal democrats Duncan Brack introduces this special issue of the Journal of Liberal History, devoted to the impact of the coalition government of 2010–15 on the Liberal Democrats and of the Liberal Democrats on the coalition.

More importantly, the Liberal in going overboard, during the The party media’s focus on the likelihood of a Democrats forfeited voters’ trust, first nine months, in proving that hung parliament and another coali- above all by the tuition fees epi- it could work. Obviously it was made seri- tion, the Liberal Democrats clearly sode, a disaster from start to finish. important to demonstrate that a had to give some indication of what Having had the argument within coalition, unfamiliar as it was to the ous mistakes they were likely to do, and could the party, fought an election with electorate, could deliver effective not realisically be anything other phased abolition of fees in the man- government, but the Liberal Dem- – a series than even-handed. In any case, ifesto, and forced all its parliamen- ocrats did this so impressively well probably by then the party’s fate tary candidates to sign a pledge that – once again – they submerged of decisions was sealed – and it wasn’t as though opposing any increase in them, the their identity. Everyone remembers there were many near-misses which worst possible thing that ministers the ‘Rose Garden’ press conference, and actions could perhaps have been saved: could have done was to scrap all of and the picture of the two lead- that in the only four Liberal Democrat seats that and sign up to a rise in fees. It ers entering Number 10 with Nick were lost by less than 2,000 votes; did not matter that the commit- Clegg’s hand on Cameron’s back. end almost most were lost by far more. ment to abolish tuition fees was not But the impression of unity, of an The fourth factor was entirely an election priority: it symbolised indivisible whole, was underlined entirely sub- outside the party’s control: the fact the Liberal Democrats in the minds time and time again. At the Liberal that the overriding issue in the elec- of the electorate. Although I accept, Democrat conference in September merged the tion became whether the country as several of our contributors argue, 2010, Clegg claimed that the coali- could risk what seemed likely to be that most of the damage to the par- tion was ‘more than the sum of our Liberal Dem- a weak Labour government at the ty’s standing had been done before parts’, and in March the following mercy of the SNP. Again, however, the vote on tuition fees in Decem- year he was captured on micro- ocrats’ iden- this helped to marginalise the posi- ber 2010, it helped to create the phone joking with Cameron that tion of the Liberal Democrats. image, which was never shaken off, ‘If we keep doing this we won’t find tity and led The remaining question hang- that the Liberal Democrats in gen- anything to bloody disagree on in ing over the coalition is: was it eral –and Nick Clegg in particular the bloody TV debate’. voters to con- worth it? Did the party achieve – had abandoned their own beliefs Of course, this went into sharp enough to make the electoral set- simply to get into power . reverse after the 2011 local, Scot- clude that back of 2015 justifiable? We do not This image was reinforced by tish and Welsh elections, and the have space, in this issue, to review Liberal Democrat agreement to a AV referendum disaster but – again the party individual policy areas, but we aim series of high-profile Tory policies with hindsight – by then it was too to run a series of articles analysing – most notably, reform of the NHS, late. In the first twelve months of had simply issues in detail in future issues. One the introduction of the so-called the coalition the Liberal Democrats made itself can argue, however – and some ‘bedroom tax’ and the lowering fell from 23 per cent to 9 per cent in of our contributors touch on this of the top rate of income tax to 45 the opinion polls, and essentially irrelevant – that the 2010–15 experience has pence; and, more generally, sign- never recovered thereafter. helped at least to create an image of ing up to the austerity programme, The third contributory reason and that the coalition as a form of government despite fighting the 2010 election behind the 2015 catastrophe was the that can work, and work effectively on a very different message. Poli- election campaign itself: could the coalition was – a rather different image than that cies like these were what the elec- party have fought the election more prevailing in 2010. What happened torate expected from the Tories, effectively? Certainly many party in reality a to the Liberal Democrats as a result not the Liberal Democrats, leaving activists – including several of of it, however, is likely to deter any voters with the impression that the our contributors – found the cam- Conservative other party from signing up to coa- party had no real influence within paign deeply uninspiring, focusing lition in the near future. the coalition. Although there were mainly on what difference the Lib- government. These are matters of specula- genuine Liberal Democrat achieve- eral Democrats could make to the tion; but what we offer in this issue ments in coalition – same-sex mar- other two main parties, giving the of the Journal is the story – or, more riage, the pupil premium, the Green Tories a heart and Labour a brain, accurately, many stories – of what Investment Bank, to name a few cutting less than the Tories and happened during those five years of – none of these resonated strongly borrowing less than Labour, and coalition government. I hope you with significant numbers of voters. so on. This seemed to convey two enjoy reading them. Probably the only economic policy messages: the Liberal Democrats the electorate liked and recognised were desperate to get into power, Duncan Brack is the Editor of the Jour- as Liberal Democrat – the raising and didn’t much mind with whom; nal of Liberal History. During the coa- of the income tax threshold – was and the party didn’t stand for any- lition years, he was special adviser to coopted by the Tories anyway. thing by itself. To an extent, how- Chris Huhne, 2010–12, and Vice Chair The other way in which the ever, the party did not have much of the Liberal Democrats’ Federal Policy party mishandled coalition was choice in its approach: given the Committee, 2012 to date.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 5 InC the immediateO aftermathALI of the 2015 generalT electionI AdrianON Slade interviewed ANick CleggN and ten otherD Liberal DemocratT Hex-ministers,E nine of whomD he hadE interviewedLUG for Liberal Democrat News Ein 2011, to assess and compare their original hopes for coalition with their views now.

ery few Liberals alive today were adults during VChurchill’s wartime coa- lition and none are old enough to remember Lloyd George’s coalition or the political arrangements of the ’20s and ’30s. We can ignore the ‘Lib–Lab Pact’, which was a quali- fied agreement to support rather than a full coalition. So the political experience of the last five years has been unique for MPs, journalists and the public alike. Partly because it was so new, coalition has cre- ated plenty of controversy and it will inevitably attract a good deal more in the political analysis still to come, even though it may no longer be the political pattern of future government that it looked like being before the surprise return of a majority Tory government on the ex-ministers I have interviewed for all Liberal Democrats? Was the 7 May 2015. this time around for agreeing in sacrifice of party independence for a In 2011, a year after the forma- principle, before the election, to let partnership in government worth- tion of the Conservative–Liberal me talk to them afterwards what- while or was it the issues of the coa- Democrat coalition in 2010, the edi- ever the result. lition itself? These were just some of tor of Liberal Democrat News, Deir- Where applicable, these new the questions to which I was seek- dre Razzall, gave me the chance interviews are prefaced by short ing answers. to interview for the paper Deputy excerpts from my interviews of Because political events moved Prime Minister Nick Clegg and 2010 and/or 2011. Inevitably some so fast after 7 May – and to reflect eleven of the Liberal Democrat of the comments from the inter- the potential impact that the return secretaries or ministers of state viewees will have been coloured by of a Conservative majority govern- appointed in 2010. I had also inter- their own or the party’s results – in ment, the cataclysmic loss of Liberal viewed Nick Clegg in September of other words, by the public’s final Democrat seats and the resulting that year. verdict on the coalition. The elec- leadership election may have had Contrary to many original pre- tion was not an easy experience for on some of their answers – with the dictions, the coalition did conclude any Liberal Democrat, but I have exception of Nick Clegg, the order its full five years in office without aimed for the objective view. What that follows indicates the order in falling apart, so I am grateful to the were relationships between the two which the interviews were con- Journal of Liberal History for support- parties in government really like? ducted. I believe this analysis also ing me in the idea of revisiting most What rewards and achievements, deserves just one view of the coali- of those original interviewees, and if any, were there? What were their tion and its unpredicted electoral also one later secretary of state, Ed greatest frustrations? Comparing outcome from an informed out- Davey, to gauge their reaction to their original hopes for the coalition sider. That is why I invited Chris national coalition in practice. I am with 2015, could they explain why Huhne to fill that role with a final also grateful to Nick Clegg and all the election result was so disastrous ‘postscript’ interview.

6 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 InC the immediateO aftermathALI of the 2015 generalT electionI AdrianON Slade interviewed ANick CleggN and ten otherD Liberal DemocratT Hex-ministers,E nine of whomD he hadE interviewedLUG for Liberal Democrat News Ein 2011, to assess and compare their original hopes for coalition with their views now.

Nick Clegg Leader of the Liberal Democrats 2007–15; Deputy Prime Minister 2010–15; MP for distribution for the graduate. We Sheffield Hallam since 2005 would have been in a better posi- tion if we had taken more time to How it looked to him then have five years. We have to hold explain the dilemma.’ (September 2010) our nerve. The prize is not now. We He and the whole cabinet had ‘As Liberal Democrat leader and have to look ahead to 2015 when invested a lot of political capital deputy prime minister, I am in a we can say, “You may not have in economic recovery. Weren’t his very strong position to see that Lib- liked the coalition before and may hopes in very real danger of biting eral Democrat policies and values have disagreed with what we had the dust? are effected in what we do. In a coa- to do to restore the economy but ‘There is no doubt that things lition where we are simply not in now your children have got jobs to have deteriorated in Europe and the a position to implement the whole go to, you have a pupil premium, world, and it’s having an unforgiv- of our manifesto, any more than fairer taxes, a pension guarantee, a ing effect on us here too. That is not the Conservatives are. So there is greener economy, a reformed form Liberal to say we are powerless. There are a degree of compromise and, at of politics, restored civil liberties things we can do and are doing, for times, restraint, which means that ….” I think that would be a record Democrats example, to make it easier for peo- neither I, nor indeed David Cam- that people would say “OK they ple to grow businesses and employ eron, can or should speak out with took a risk for the benefit of the get the flak people. And then there is investment unbridled gusto exclusively on country and it paid off.” ’ for the long term – rail transport, behalf of our parties because we are for the bad renewable energy and the extra bor- trying to keep the balance and it is rowing we are allowing local author- a delicate balance. I am learning all (September 2011) things and ities to boost house building. But it the time, and I suspect David Cam- ‘Autumn to May [2010–11] was a does not do it all by next week.’ eron is too’. gruelling and unforgiving period no credit for ‘We are in very different terri- where we were being vilified and tory now and the media don’t yet blamed for everything unpopular, the good … and how it looks now (2 recognise it.’ not credited with anything popu- June 2015) ‘Liberal Democrats get the flak lar, and aggressively targeted by things partly It was Nick Clegg’s first interview for the bad things and no credit for our opponents, generally and per- since the electoral disasters of 7 the good things partly because, sonally. I always knew we would because, May. The time was 9.15 am, just unfortunately, this tends to hap- be attacked from left and right but three hours after the news broke pen to smaller parties in coali- it was remorseless, and particularly unfortu- that Charles Kennedy had died. tions around the world. No, it’s painful over the tuition fees issue. We both had some difficulty in get- not always endemic but there is a ‘In retrospect we should have nately, this ting down to business. Nick Clegg pattern. The second thing is that taken more time. Remember that tends to had already suffered more than his Labour have become enveloped in politically we were completely fair share of shocks. Now here was a mass fit of bile towards us, and isolated as a party. Both the other happen to another very personal one, for both that is reflected in parts of the press. parties wanted to raise fees. Also of us, and he would soon be in the We know that in the first few years the other alternatives would have smaller par- House of Commons paying his of this government we are going meant taking money away from, tribute to Charles. Luckily there to have to do unpopular things, perhaps, pensioners, the pupil pre- ties in coali- was still time for us to move on. which will overshadow a lot of our mium, or early years education. achievements.’ If you believe in social mobil- tions around Results ‘Selling coalition to the public ity it is important that you invest During those twenty-four hours and the media will not be easy. We in younger children and a fair the world. after the polls closed on 7 May, he

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 7 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers had just held his Sheffield seat but Conservative candidates were seri- Trust had otherwise been surrounded ously underwhelming, compared to But hadn’t issues like tuition fees by disaster as all but seven of his the popular Liberal Democrat MPs and the NHS reforms undermined colleagues lost their seats. It must they defeated, but the sheer weight trust in the party among large key have come as a terrible body blow of campaigning emails, telephone What we had groups of former Lib Dem support- after all he had done over the last calls and direct mail, targeted at ers such as teachers, students and five years. How had he coped with undecided voters, was overwhelm- to contend health workers? those two or three days after the ing our local campaigns, whether ‘There is actually not much evi- results were declared? or not the Conservatives had any with from the dence that we are thought to be any ‘Well I think that, like every- viable local infrastructure. In our more or less trustworthy than any body else, I am actually still cop- post mortem we may need to ask outset was other party’ – he cited instances ing. It is not something you can ourselves whether the days of our where the Tory and Labour parties compartmentalise. The reflections kind of local campaigning are now that we were were equally open to accusations and reverberations will continue being seriously challenged.’ so remorse- on trust. ‘All political parties are for a very long time. Like every- So why was the electorate appar- mistrusted and even now we [the one else I was braced for a difficult ently so unresponsive to everything lessly deni- Lib Dems] are still seen, according election night but I was completely that the Lib Dems had achieved in to the polls, as more likely to have shocked when that exit poll came government over the last five years? grated from our heart in the right place. Now, out. I couldn’t believe it. It seemed Furthermore, the message of Lib the fundamental structural problem at odds with everything we had Dem moderation of what the Tories right and left, the Liberal Democrats need to face found and been told. Our campaign might have done seemed to have is that we are a smaller party in a was felt to be among the best the fallen on deaf ears. Why was that? day in day Whitehall system that is not used to party had ever fought and there was ‘Well, that’s the ten-million- dealing with smaller parties, in an high morale and optimism around. dollar question. I don’t think poli- out for half electoral system that doesn’t recog- What I did feel in the final week ticians should ever really expect nise the support of smaller parties, was that it was as if the exam ques- people to vote for them out of a decade, as with a press that is indifferent at tion had changed, with the exam- gratitude, but the galling thing is best or implacably hostile at worst, iner replacing the question you are that there now seems to be far more a party that with far less money than our major answering with another quite dif- willingness to recognise our brave opponents and with no vested ferent question. We had started off contribution in government than was weak interest to defend us. So, when we with the fairly conventional right– there ever was before or during the came under pressure – like on tui- left argument between Tory and election itself.’ and had lost tion fees – we didn’t have voices Labour, to which we could present who answered back on our behalf. the Liberal Democrats as the plau- Hindsight its heart and sible alternative, but by the end it And 16,500 of those who had felt soul. This was Regrets had become an argument about fear the result was unfair to the Liberal Given what had happened to him – fear of Miliband and Alex Sal- Democrats had joined the party never true, and the party at the election, had he mond – which really got under the after the election? any regrets about having gone into English skin. That, combined with ‘Yes. Certainly from the press indeed quite coalition and, given the basinful the Nationalist fervour in Scotland, point of view there is a generosity of disappointments he had suffered had a dramatic effect that was very with hindsight, which I suppose is the opposite, over the five-year parliament, did much harder to counter.’ better late than never but it would he harbour any resentments about So what, before 7 May, had he have been more useful at the time. but it did the way the Tories had treated the privately thought the result might My view has long been – and I know Liberal Democrats? He thought be? ‘I expected a difficult night some people will say it was about huge damage long and hard. but I thought it would be perfectly this decision or that decision, about ‘I obviously turn over and over achievable to be in the mid-thirties tuition fees, the NHS or whatever so that, when and over what we could have done or on a good day hold more seats. – that in the long term ordinary differently … but I come back to That would have been quite a loss people don’t follow or make deci- people were what I said earlier. I think people but perhaps a reasonable one in the sions on every twist and turn in the make very, very big judgements … circumstances.’ Westminster village. They make big frightened as Surveying the rubble, I don’t hon- judgements about what is best for estly believe that tweaking here Incumbency them and their families and broad- they were on or there would have achieved very A lot of faith had been put into brush decisions about the political much for us. There was a funda- in the value of incumbency. That parties. What we had to contend 7 May, they mental judgement we had to make hadn’t happened, had it? with from the outset was that we didn’t want as to whether or not we should go ‘No, it didn’t and in our post were so remorselessly denigrated into coalition in 2010. Given the mortem we need to ask ourselves from right and left, day in day out to turn to a situation in the country then I can’t whether the power of incum- for half a decade, as a party that was imagine any circumstance in which bency was diminished because we weak and had lost its heart and soul. party that I would have recommended that were in coalition and/or because This was never true, indeed quite we didn’t. The country desperately of the huge amounts of money the opposite, but it did huge damage had been por- needed it. I cleaved to the view, not being spent by the Tories centrally so that, when people were fright- unreasonably I think, that in the on effectively parachuting tar- ened as they were on 7 May, they trayed in this end, if you are seen to do something geted campaigns into people’s liv- didn’t want to turn to a party that for the country that needed to be ing rooms. Some of the winning had been portrayed in this way.’ way. done you would get some reward

8 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers for it. That is clearly not the case Surveying because both were in the Labour Achievements but it wasn’t irrational to think so.’ Party’s 2010 manifesto. Where we If he had his time again would he He recalled similar disappoint- the rub- had been expecting them to take have played the coalition negotia- ment after the 2010 general elec- some sort of lead on both issues, tions differently in any way? No, tion, although not on such a large ble, I don’t they then refused to go along with he was clearly proud of the num- scale. At that time, many Liberal either, preferring to continue to ber of important Liberal Democrat Democrats felt aggrieved because, honestly snipe at the Liberal Democrats. policies that the Tories had been despite ‘Cleggmania’ and other persuaded to accept. He picked positive pointers to the contrary, believe that Resentments out a number of principles and key the party had lost seats when they ‘You asked me earlier whether I proposals from the 2010 Liberal had expected it to gain more. In tweaking felt resentful about the Tories in Democrat manifesto as examples that instance, the analysis of many here or there coalition. I don’t believe you can incorporated into legislation. party members had been that voters go into politics and hold grudges ‘It was clearly a remarkable ran away from the party because ‘it would have or resentments. Life is too short. achievement. What I think is a had no experience of government’. But, in the same way I was aston- different question is whether we After leaving the room to achieved ished by the behaviour of the could and should have presented take a telephone call he returned Tories during the AV referendum, the coalition and its policies in a clearly incensed by the memory of very much I was really dismayed by the way different way at the time, and I the failure of the 2011 AV referen- in which the Labour Party spent can accept there is a debate about dum, which he described as ‘the for us. There five years almost wilfully deni- that. You have got to remember second big moment’. As it hap- grating the Liberal Democrats at that the whole concept of coali- pened it was also the next subject I was a fun- every turn – and in the most loopy tion was very new to people at that wanted to raise. language, almost as if, accord- time and given the breathless media damental ing to Ed Miliband, we were some hysteria about the coalition that AV disaster kind of collaborators who had preceded the 2010 election I felt, Was the marked failure of the AV judgement committed some primeval sin. in that first year against a continu- referendum and the attempt to And yet those very same people are ing background of press vilification reform the House of Lords down to we had to now beginning to wake up to the and prediction of the coalition’s a matter of timing? reality of a majority Conservative early demise, we had to demon- ‘The timing made a very big make as to government that they had accused strate that it worked. I accept that difference. It would have been us of ‘propping up’, with some now after that we needed to differentiate much better if the referendum had whether even publicly recognising what we ourselves and in a speech I gave in been held later, but at the time or not we did and how much we restrained the National Liberal Club in 2011, there was a clamour of expecta- the Tories.’ after those disastrous local election tion that it would be held quickly should go On the five previous occasions results, I signalled that we would and almost an assumption that the I had interviewed Nick Clegg as now begin taking a more robust Liberal Democrats needed to do so into coali- party leader he had invariably approach.’ to prove their electoral virility and demonstrated a remarkable degree Despite all the frustrations he that if we hadn’t we would have tion in 2010. of resilience in the face of diffi- encountered, inside and outside betrayed every shred of our cred- culty but on this occasion some government, over those five years ibility on electoral reform. Clearly Given the bitter memories had clearly stayed he seemed to have managed to with hindsight we should not have with him. retain the loyalty of all his Liberal been stampeded into holding it in situation in Democrat ministers, of whom some the immediate wake of the high David Cameron – such as Steve Webb and Vincent point of the economic crisis and the the country In an attempt to introduce a more Cable – had remained in the same difficulties over tuition fees and the positive note I reminded him of office for the full parliament. How NHS but we were committed to it.’ then I can’t the good working relationship he had he managed that and, if he had And the Tories were pretty claimed he had had with David to pick the two Liberal Democrat unhelpful? ‘Unhelpful is putting it imagine any Cameron in the early years. Had policy contributions most likely to mildly. They were totally unscru- that relationship persisted?’ last, what would they be? pulous. It was a real low point. circumstance ‘It persisted throughout. Much ‘I am not a historian but when They not only deployed very spe- though I lament what happened you look at the history of the party, cious arguments against AV but in which I to us at the hands of the Conserva- when pressure has turned into dis- also went for the jugular person- would have tives at the election, I am not going aster that is when we have split. I ally. Cameron and Osborne could to rewrite history. In 2010 he was was determined that this should have stopped them but they chose recom- right to recognise the need for a not happen this time. I don’t think not to. That they would fight hard coalition. We both recognised what we now face a generational set- was no surprise, but their willing- mended that needed to be done for the coun- back and I do believe that, under ness to use the record of their own try and both of us tried to conduct a new leader, we will soon return government as an argument against we didn’t. ourselves in a grown up way. The to rude health. I like to think that reform was surprising even by their so-called mateyness of the Rose one of the reasons we haven’t split is standards. And don’t forget, on the Garden was never there. We both because I felt that, as leader, it was other side of the coin, how lamen- knew we had a job to do and we up to me to accept the criticisms, table the Labour Party was. We had just swallowed our pride and got on crossfire and the brickbats, to listen put AV and House of Lords reform with it. It would be graceless of me to colleagues and make quite sure in the coalition agreement in part now to pretend otherwise.’ on a regular basis that they knew

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 9 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers what I was doing and why I was One of the down and giving way to a much virtually swept everyone aside doing it. I also regarded many of more visceral form of identity and by the way has delivered this them as friends. reasons that politics about us and them, differ- utterly disproportionate result. ‘As for their achievements I ent tribes, different communities, And two, in the south there was a believe one of the most lasting will Liberalism is different nations: the antithesis of widespread reaction against that be Steve Webb’s reforms on pen- what Liberals believe. We don’t and a fear of a government consist- sions. I have told him that, if he struggling in believe that individuals should be ing of Labour and the Nationalists. wasn’t so infuriatingly modest, he defined by their tribe but liberated You can add to that the caricature would already have statues erected our country, to be what we want to be. perception that the Liberal Demo- to him around the country! But ‘So we are witnessing a creep- crats were weak and powerless to I am also very proud of what we as it is across ing transformation of British poli- stop it. That is why people decided have achieved for poorer children Europe, is tics where the categories we have to play it safe and, when it comes to in secondary and primary schools traditionally used in the dim and voting, the Conservative Party has with free childcare and the pupil that the old distant past no longer apply. Instead always been the safe party to turn premium. Of course there was the new politics you can see in to. Safety is what it stands for.’ also Danny Alexander’s tenure in distinctions movements like the SNP and other Finally I suggested that he had the Treasury and the delivery of resurgent movements in Europe are been very widely respected for the tax reform; Lynne Featherstone’s – between the politics that divide people one courage he had shown in taking work on equal marriage and inter- against another and vociferously the Liberal Democrats into coali- national aid; and the greater prior- right and promote the cause of one group tion and had been almost as widely ity for mental health that Norman rather than another. That is the respected for what he had done Lamb and I have been able to left, market very opposite of the tolerance, and since. Nevertheless he was leaving a achieve. There are many things.’ compassion, and evidence-based huge gap in the political spectrum, and state, approach taken by Liberal Demo- particularly over Europe. What Referendums crats. That is why Liberalism is was his greatest regret about the last And yet the UK still didn’t feel like bosses and increasingly under threat and ironi- five years? a more Liberal country, I suggested, cally also why it is most needed.’ ‘Exactly what we talked about citing as one example the increasing workers, the – that, despite the party provid- use of referendums instead of repre- A final reflection ing a huge service to the country at sentative democracy to solve issues. north and Four years ago he had high hopes a time of unprecedented post-war In the fifty years before 2010 we had that the Liberal Democrats would crisis, we were not able to convert had only four referendums – one the south, defy the experience of other minor- that into electoral success. It shows on Europe in 1975, one on inde- the private ity parties in coalition in Europe that doing the right thing does pendence for Scotland in 1979 and and emerge with credit at the end not always equate with doing the two on devolution to Scotland and sector and of its term. It had not happened, popular thing. I am only 48 and I Wales in 1997; yet there had been had it? The electors had opted for shall continue to enjoy being MP two in this parliament – AV and, the public majority party rule. In concluding, for Sheffield Hallam but I have also most notably, independence for I wanted to hear again his main rea- been lucky enough to be Deputy Scotland – and a third, on Europe, sector, etc. – son as to why not. Prime Minister. I have learned a lot was in prospect in 2017. The suc- ‘I think there were two main in the job. My only personal regret cessful ‘No’ vote in Scotland had are breaking reasons. One, north of the border, is that I won’t be able to make full triggered the biggest surge of was the Nationalist fervour that use of the experience!’ nationalism that the UK had ever down and seen and now there was a real dan- ger that the referendum planned giving way for 2017 could lead to the UK’s exit from Europe. This was not what I to a much Lord (Tom) McNally recognised as Liberal representa- Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords 2005–13); Minister of State for tive democracy and yet it seemed more visceral Justice 2010–13 that was the way politics was going. How did it look to him? form of iden- How it looked to him then … He was now in his third eco- ‘I don’t think it is the mechanism (July 2011) nomic crisis, this time as a minis- of referendums that changes the tity politics Tom McNally was a young Labour ter of state under Kenneth Clarke. temper of a country – but what the about us and Party official when Harold Wil- ‘I told the prime minister that, if Scottish referendum, and possibly son’s government had to devalue he’d lined up his cabinet and asked also the European referendum, will them … the the pound in 1967. He ran Prime me who I would most like to work do is lift the lid on a very worrying Minister Jim Callaghan’s cabinet with, I would have said Ken. We trend, and that is the trend towards antithesis of office for three years from 1976, have known each other for forty identity politics. One of the reasons while the economy went into melt- years. He is sometimes described as that Liberalism is struggling in our what Liberals down and the country was saved a closet Liberal. He is not. He is an country, as it is across Europe, is from disaster by the formation of old-fashioned one-nation Tory.’ that the old distinctions – between believe. the Lib–Lab Pact and a bail out Clarke and McNally would right and left, market and state, from the IMF. He was a late con- seem to have been the ideal combi- bosses and workers, the north and vert to the SDP in 1981 and an early nation of party ‘big beasts’ to push the south, the private sector and the convert to merger with the Liberal through ‘liberal’ prison reform, public sector, etc. – are breaking Party in 1988. but they were disappointed that

10 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers many of their proposals had been thought the incumbent argument weakened by David Cameron. ‘We would see us through and I didn’t have had to make some concessions believe the exit poll. I also believe to the bang-them-up-and-throw- we ran a good campaign with the away-the-key lobby, but the central right messages and that Nick Clegg thrust of the legislation is still there was an outstanding candidate.’ – a rehabilitation agenda to tackle In support of his own com- some fundamental issues of a very mitment to going into coalition, large prison population, over half he cited a ‘marvellous quote from of whom reoffend. Machiavelli’ – ‘The prince who ‘But it’s very difficult to battle walks away from power walks against popular press hysteria about away from the power to do good.’ any kind of reform, never facing up He saw himself as still in politics to to the fact that putting more peo- do good. ‘You can’t pick and choose ple in prison for longer and longer when you get power, and you is very costly and self-defeating. can’t choose how you get power. I We are going to try and reform remain absolutely convinced that in the prison system so prisoners get 2010 we were right to step up to the more education, training and work. plate in a national crisis. We are going to do more for drug ‘I don’t think it will take too dependents and the problem of long for people to start fully appre- drugs in prison. We are going to ciating just what an effect we had look at post-prison support.’ on the Conservatives in preventing Nevertheless, the 50 per cent some of their nastier ideas.’ sentence discount for early guilty He and Shirley Williams were pleading went, some sentences the only two Liberal Democrats Tory ministers like him? ‘No. becoming longer or mandatory, and with previous experience in a gov- He was the last of a generation.’ the bill even gained the approval of ernment required to work with They had worked well together Michael Howard. The end of any another party. How had the recent and introduced a number of lib- prospect of real liberal reform? Con–Lib Dem coalition compared eral penal reforms but also a con- ‘No. The 50 per cent discount in effectiveness with that of the troversial cut in legal aid which, in would have reduced the need for Lib–Lab Pact of 1976–78? retrospect, he regretted as ‘one of victims to testify and saved court ‘It was infinitely more effective, a number of mistakes the coalition costs but a number of judges and in that the junior partner had real made in those early days.’ penal reformers thought it was too influence and was better prepared But its financial approach was generous. So the one-third dis- than the Liberal Party of ’76, but I not another of them. He had learnt count remains. The big gain is the also don’t resile from the fact that his lesson on that in the 1974–79 intention to end indeterminate ’76–78 was also an effective period Labour government. ‘In those early sentencing. of government in which the Liberal days I told Nick Clegg and David ‘I hope that at the end of this Party restrained some of the more Cameron that in ’74 Labour had parliament we shall be able to say loony tunes in the Labour Party.’ not faced up to the enormity of the that having Liberal Democrats in But at the end of it the Lib- crisis and that, if we were going to government has meant that, for eral Party suffered a similar drop do so now, they shouldn’t make the the first time in thirty years, issues in its vote? Wasn’t that a parallel? same mistake. They had to go hard, in the criminal justice system have ‘Yes but it was not as bad. And, if fast and deep. I think the Keynes- been looked at in a different, more you are going to be prepared to ians now being wise are wrong. It humane and civilised way, and that take part in government, experi- had to be done.’ has produced results.’ ence across Europe shows that the McNally has wide experience of minority party will not necessarily communication and the media. The get much credit.’ initial press hostility to the idea of … and how it looks now (12 But what did the Liberal Demo- coalition and the subsequent cyni- May 2015) crats do wrong in the last five years cism about it was drummed into the Within seconds Tom McNally was to get so little of the credit that was public over the five years, even if telling me that a month before the going? ‘Whether we can find the predictions of its collapse died down. election he had predicted that the alchemy to be in government, share Why did that never get better? Tories would get at least 35 per responsibility as a junior partner and ‘Partly because papers such as cent of the vote and 320 seats or get the credit I am not sure. I was The Guardian, which could have more and that Labour would get always against open warfare. I think been helpful, refused to be; and 30 per cent and around 220 seats. people will look back at the coali- partly because the media have ‘Because of the 8 per cent poll rat- tion government as one of the more always preferred biff-baff between ing, I expected Liberal Democrat cohesive and collegiate governments two parties to multi-party politics. losses – but what I got completely and the fact that we were punished ‘If I had to give advice now wrong was that I thought the Lib- for it doesn’t take away its merits.’ to Nick Clegg’s successor …’. He eral Democrats and the SNP would We turned back to his time as paused. ‘He did tend to cut himself each get between thirty and thirty- Minister of State for Justice under off from what had gone before. In a five seats. Like Paddy Ashdown, I Ken Clarke. Were there any other way he had to learn his Liberalism.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 11 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

I don’t think he had any historic ‘A combination of all three. The third issue the party under- feeling for the party although he There is no doubt that tuition fees estimated was the weakening of the was a fast learner. Only once, for remained in a totemic way a sign of local government base. ‘We lost so example, did he assemble former our betrayal. We could have pre- much through that.’ leaders around the same table … it sented the argument more robustly. Did these results mean that the was very difficult to find experi- Here was a policy initiated by the whole concept of coalition, includ- enced people around him. I think Labour Party, followed by the even ing possibly the future prospect for the Lib Dems in government were more draconian Browne report, PR, was tarnished by the return of weak on communication.’ which was supported by both one-party government? If so, what Ken Clarke was sidelined as a Labour and the Conservatives and was the future for a party of eight minister in 2012 and Tom McNally which we made more massively or, to put it another way, what was decided to resign in 2013. Was that more supportive of poorer stu- the party now for? because of what they were trying to dents, and yet we took all the stick ‘The Liberal Democrats are a do or for some other rearrangement because of the £9,000. It was toxic party of government. They now reason? and I suspect it will remain with us have the opportunity to re-estab- ‘Oh no, the problem with Ken for a long time. lish themselves as a left-of-centre was that Tory polling showed NHS funding would always be party of conscience and reform, but Labour policies were being seen a difficult problem for all parties, they should not start apologising as increasingly close to ours. I and the debate had debilitated the for the coalition. I believe it will remember Chris Grayling [Clarke’s Liberal Democrats, but he added not be long before the contribution successor] saying quite frankly ‘I think if you got David Cameron of the Lib Dems to good govern- that, although he was no swivel- alone he would say he made a mis- ment will become more recognised eyed right-winger, he had been take in letting Andrew Lansley and that we will make a remarkably brought in to buff up the Conserv- get on with his package for several quick recovery at local level and in atives as the party of law and order. years.’ the next European elections.’ He wanted to outflank the Labour Party and it is a long time since they have stood up for any civilised I don’t think legal reform.’ Had the five-year parliament that the Sir Nick Harvey worked and would it continue? Minister of State for the Armed Forces 2010–12; MP for North Devon 1992–2015 ‘The Tories won’t be in a hurry to simple deci- change it. The alternative in the last How it looked to him then … ‘We do have forces fit for pur- five years would have been constant sion to go (July 2011) pose but there is a debate about instability and speculation about into coali- Many people who knew Nick Har- what that purpose might be. When disagreements and imminent new vey before he became MP nearly we conducted the strategic defence elections. Why would they want tion made twenty years ago, remember him review last year, we were invited to that this time? This is a government as being on the more radical wing choose between three different pos- with a majority of just twelve.’ this inevita- of the party. Did he still see himself tures: ‘Vigilant’, which effectively The Liberal Democrats are left that way? would have meant drawing back with only eight MPs but there are ble at all but ‘More or less, yes. What you within our own homeland; ‘Com- still around 100 peers in the Lords. might call the ‘Orange Book wing’ mitted’ which would mean ramp- What effect would they have? I do think wasn’t there years ago and perhaps ing up internationally and trying to ‘If we are “the last men stand- gives us a different reference point, sustain a completely comprehensive ing”, as it were, we have a duty and that pretty but I think I still come from the British force; or ‘Adaptable’ – the responsibility to put forward Lib- same bit of the jungle. I was never option we chose – which was to eral values in a strong and coher- well every- an out and out hardliner but, yes, I maximise flexibility and the abil- ent way – on issues like the Human think I am still a quiet radical. ity to do certain things, even if we Rights Act and emasculation of thing that ‘The decisions I have to grap- would usually have to rely on oth- the BBC and defence of European ple with now are not all that party ers to act with us.’ membership. There will be a real happened political. There isn’t a huge divide. So, even after all these years, Liberal agenda to be defended and Obviously we disagree on Trident, did Britain still see itself as a world the House of Lords must be the thereafter and there were huge disagreements policeman? ‘I don’t think we are place to do it. The Tories’ savaging on Iraq but that is not current busi- a world policeman, but we are of Lords reform has come back to contributed ness. Different perspectives on prepared to take on constabulary bite them. They will no longer have to it. To say Europe also surface from time tasks,’ said Nick. This did not, in his an automatic majority.’ to time but … reluctantly we all view, include going into Syria or Looking back over the five years that it was accepted that cuts had to be made.’ any other Middle Eastern country of coalition, what in the end had He talked regularly with Liam where there had been no regional or been most damaging to the Liberal bungled Fox and, as the only minister of UN call for Britain to do so. Democrats in the election – the fact state in the department, quite often The decision to make no deci- of going into coalition with the would be a found himself deputising for him. sion on the replacement of Trident Tories originally, tuition fees and With more cuts still being made, until after the next general elec- NHS reform, or the failure of the gross under- were Britain’s armed forces ‘fit for tion was in the coalition agreement. party to communicate its successes purpose’ and, if so, what was that Nick Harvey has never favoured a effectively? statement. purpose? like-for-like replacement but did

12 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers the ‘no decision now’ decision make conceding things to them that we Conservatives when they were it more, or less, difficult to budget? never should have done.’ doing things we didn’t like. We ‘At this stage neither. The ulti- For instance? ‘I still don’t under- allowed business as usual far too mate cost will fall within the stand how, having fought the much and we got carried along. defence budget but the big expend- election basically agreeing with On student fees we should have iture, if we were to replace with a Labour’s view of the economy, we seen that was going to be politi- like-for-like, would not start until so easily backed the Tory view of cally disastrous. Other than that I 2016. However that means the mil- the economy and set about going do believe Lib Dem ministers genu- itary community must soon start along with those draconian cuts inely did do good things, and that to debate the opportunity cost of of 2010 with quite such relish. The we did stop a lot of things, but we putting all the money into a system tuition fees saga, nuclear energy, also let too much through.’ that theologically is there not to you name them, we seem to have We turned back to his time as a be used.’ conceded on all these issues in that minister and his working relation- period of the pink hue of the Rose ship with his very right-of-centre Garden. That was a terrible mis- secretary of state, Liam Fox. How … and how it looks now (13 take. At the tail end of the parlia- had the ‘radical’ Nick Harvey May 2015) ment, so desperate were we to show squared that, particularly over cuts It was Nick Harvey’s last day in his clear water between the Liberal and issues like the bombing of Libya? imposingly comfortable parliamen- Democrats and the Conservatives, ‘It was uncomfortable but, aside tary office on the fifth floor of Port- we ended up looking rather petu- from Trident and European defence cullis House. He was surrounded lant and childish, and that did us no cooperation, there weren’t gaping by boxes and piles of paper but he good either. We so misadvised our- chasms between us. Neither Fox nor was kind enough to see me face to selves about achieving great things Philip Hammond were easy to deal face because the next day he would on some of our own policies that with, although I had a perfectly rea- be back in Devon, leaving London we were far too willing to give way sonable relationship with both. On behind. on other issues.’ Libya, surprisingly, Liam Fox was He accepted my commisera- Not even achieving on the econ- far from enthusiastic about it, nor tions very graciously before we omy? He paused. ‘… We raised the indeed were most of the senior staff got down to business. Had he ever tax threshold. That was good but at the Ministry of Defence. He was expected his or the Liberal Demo- the Tories claimed it for themselves one of the most dove-ish members crats’ national results to turn out and I am not convinced that we of the cabinet on the issue. The deci- the way they did? got any credit for it. The European sion was taken in Downing Street ‘I had realised from our poll ministers with experience of vari- after pressure from Sarkosy.’ standing that the election would ous coalitions who came to talk to Was the MOD usually hawkish be difficult and the thought that I us in the autumn of 2010 all said “If in its views, particularly on cuts? might lose narrowly had occurred you are in coalition and you don’t ‘No, less so than one might think. to me but I had been swept along agree with something, don’t agree The calibre there is very high. They with the general feeling in the party to it.” It was all too late by then understood the need for cuts, and that incumbency might protect so, if the upshot of the recipe I am had already accepted the 2010 stra- thirty or so of us and that I had a offering is a government that does tegic review which set out cuts in pretty good chance of being one of less, I think that would be a good the immediate term, but there was them. We had managed to convince thing. Governments try to do far the pollsters and most of the media too much. It would have forced accordingly. I never anticipated more devolution and less central the tsunami that hit us. Perhaps we government.’ should have done.’ So the coalition had not been Was it the going into coalition a success? ‘I don’t think the coali- with the Tories, a particular issue or tion was a success. If I had been group of issues, or the party’s fail- elected, I had imagined going to a ure to communicate its successes pretty bloody meeting last Satur- that most undermined Liberal day [9 May 2015] where Nick and his Democrat support on 7 May? team would be trying to propel us ‘I don’t think that the simple into another coalition of some sort decision to go into coalition made and where there would have been a this inevitable at all but I do think number of MPs, including myself, that pretty well everything that saying “Not on your nelly!” There happened thereafter contributed to would then have been further dif- it. To say that it was bungled would ficulties with some of the peers and be a gross understatement.’ the Federal Executive before it even Did he say ‘gross’, I wondered? got to a special conference. That Yes, he did. ‘Profound mistakes would have been so whichever party were made. The relationship was being talked to, but the results with the Conservatives was all made all those decisions irrelevant.’ wrong. We nuzzled up to them So what would he have done far too closely, sending out all the differently? ‘I would have been far wrong messages on so many issues, more willing to say “No” to the

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 13 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers always the understanding that they decided they found this unprec- would be restored by 2020.’ edented choice of parties on offer Under Fox, Nick Harvey had too confusing and they just wanted been given ‘the dirty jobs, like tricky one majority party to get on with bouts with Jeremy Paxman and oth- it, and that party had to be the ers, but Philip Hammond always Conservatives? wanted to do everything himself’. ‘That could very well be.’ So, after a year of ‘media blackout’ So did that mean coalition was as he put it, he was sidelined from his rejected for the future? If so, where job in a Clegg reshuffle. did that leave the future for PR Looking back had he and other and for the Liberal Democrats? ‘I Liberal Democrat ministers been don’t think people will be giving fully able to be themselves in gov- much thought to PR. The Tories ernment, or had they always felt will clearly not be for it, and once subservient to the Conservatives? Labour have a new leader they ‘You might get a different perspec- won’t be either, But I was quite tive from people like Vince [Cable] interested in [Green MP] Caro- or Ed Davey. Never underesti- line Lucas’s suggestion that, in the mate the power of a secretary of absence of PR, the progressive par- state, but the truth is we were never ties should be considering some really able to be ourselves. We were kind of electoral pact. I realise that just part of the realpolitik.’ some people would have the hee- Had the media and the public bie-jeebies about that but we now ever really understood what coali- have a hell of a mountain to climb tion was about? ‘Not really. I can’t and a hell of a lot of candidates to tell you how many people said to find. It may be that some division the parliament’s total revenues. So me that they couldn’t understand of seats between Labour, Lib Dem we are adding financial account- why we went in with the Tories – and Green is something we should ability as well devolving spending and then, quite illogically it seemed consider.’ powers, while retaining Scotland to me, they said they were going to A radical suggestion but possibly within the UK.’ vote Conservative.’ not one that would be popular with What would he like to do to Perhaps, I suggested, that was Liberal Democrats. improve attitudes and banking because the majority of electors practices to the benefit of Scotland? ‘There was clearly something very badly broken about the exist- ing banking arrangements but we have now set out a pretty rigor- Michael Moore ous set of proposals on the bonus Secretary of State for Scotland 2010–13; MP for Tweeddale, Ettrick & Lauderdale issue, taxation and codes of con- 1997–2005, Berwickshire, Roxburgh & Selkirk 2005–15 duct, which I think will tackle some of the worst excesses. What I Scotland then … (March 2011) discussion, not just to Scottish have been at pains to do alongside His principal responsibility at the issues. He described the cabinet that is to highlight the importance time was to develop and pilot the meetings as ‘focused and contribu- of the financial services sector to Scotland bill through parliament tory to the development of policy’ Scotland. It provides thousands of and its committees. and he praised the chairmanship Scottish jobs and we want to see it ‘It’s demanding and very of David Cameron. ‘He encour- continue to prosper and grow. rewarding,’ he says. ‘We have a ages discussion. He listens. It’s an ‘As you would expect, Alex relatively small set up here, primar- important place for information Salmond and I have had various ily for administering elections and sharing. Of course a lot of the other forms of communication over the overseeing the constitutional settle- significant work is done in cabinet Scotland bill, one to one, by cor- ment, but now we have this crucial sub-committees. respondence and through the press. bill which has had to go through ‘Without the pressure exercised Clearly we are not looking to sat- every development and consulta- by Nick Clegg and Danny Alex- isfy a Nationalist agenda but despite tion processes both here and in the ander in negotiating the coalition his criticism of our proposals he Scottish parliament. agreement there would have been has yet to produce an alternative ‘I spend as much time as I can no firm commitment to legislate plan of his own. The three parties talking to cabinet colleagues about the Scotland bill, but it was clear in the Scottish parliament therefore this and all the other issues that that it needed additional pressure had no difficulty in supporting our affect Scotland. Chris Huhne’s deci- from me to persuade the Treasury view rather than theirs.’ sions on energy and climate change to devolve the right to raise half are particularly important to us, as of Scotland’s income tax revenue. are Vince’s on business and skills.’ That is huge. It is 15 per cent of the … and Scotland now (22 May The Scottish Secretary is a full whole Scottish budget. Add it to 2015) member of the cabinet with the other existing tax-raising powers Like Nick Harvey, who had recap- right to contribute to every cabinet and it comes close to one-third of tured and held former Liberal leader

14 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

Jeremy Thorpe’s old seat for twenty- that there would be a referendum, voted against it. Should we have three years, for eighteen years we earned the right to be more firm come up with a different policy? Michael Moore had won the seat about the powers that would be Well …’ formerly held by David Steel. Now devolved. It took a few months of ‘The other two things that both were among the many Lib- persuasion but we retained control became part of the anti-govern- eral Democrat losers, and Michael of the process.’ ment motif in Scotland against us Moore, like Nick Harvey, was sadly Michael Moore stood down as were around welfare reform – the dismantling his life. ‘It’s a mixture Secretary of State for Scotland in bedroom tax and sanctions. I got of grisly tasks like making everyone the autumn of 2012, but not until very fed up with the simplistic jus- redundant, including my wife, and the Edinburgh Agreement – about tification going around that were hearing about some people just not There was the handling of the single-question one million over-occupied houses going out because they are so upset, referendum – had been settled with in the country and one million but I am not quite doing that.’ a residual Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP. under-occupied and that somehow What did he think most con- anger about ‘I just couldn’t see how anything people should be moved from one tributed to the disastrous results other than a single question ref- to the other. That might have made – going into coalition with the the coali- erendum had any chance of being an interesting challenge in a public Conservatives, the rise of the SNP accepted if it went the wrong way debate, but as beginning, middle or other issues? tion across for Scotland.’ And yet, when the and end of a policy it was bloody ‘All the above. There was a referendum was actually held and hopeless. And as for sanctions, a residual anger about the coali- the country, lost by the Yes campaign, the result commercial banker I know, of all tion across the country, compli- seemed to light the touch paper people, summarised my feelings cated by the rise of the Scots Nats complicated of a further surge in SNP support very well: “How can we live in a particularly affecting our Scot- which carried through to 7 May. society where we can coerce people tish seats. That played as much by the rise Why was that? into work by starving them?”’ against the Labour Party as against ‘I am happy to join you in the I suggested the election result us but, as Vince Cable confirmed of the Scots luxury of the benefit of hindsight might mean that the whole concept when I spoke to him in Twicken- but, if you had made that statement of coalition between parties in the ham not long before polling day, it Nats … That the day before the referendum, you UK was now rejected by the elec- also began to play on the Lib Dem would not have found one person in torate and possibly permanently and Tory wavering vote south of played as the country who thought that was tarnished? He admitted that the the border. I knew my fate before going to happen as a result. Part Liberal Democrats, having been in I went to my count but watching much against of the reason it did was because, coalition with Labour during the the English results and people like unlike the Unionists who split first four years of the Scottish par- Vince and David Laws falling I the Labour apart after the campaign and went liament, had lost seats at subsequent thought “This is terrible.” ’ Party as their own ways, the SNP carried elections but that he had wrongly In 2011, when we had last on campaigning, managing to keep predicted the result of every sin- talked, he was Secretary of State against us under their banner all those dif- gle national election he had ever for Scotland, heavily involved with ferent tribes and sub-factions that fought. Despite the difficulties processing the new Scotland bill but, as Vince make up Nationalism.’ encountered he saw a future for and setting up the coming referen- Lack of counter-campaigning coalition and a further fragmenta- dum. Given the subsequent explo- Cable con- might have been a factor, but surely tion of the parties. sion of SNP support, had he any coalition policies and attitudes had A referendum on Europe was regrets about the powers the bill firmed when been more responsible for creat- coming in 2017. The SNP wanted had devolved or the posing of a sin- ing that support? ‘On the one hand Scotland to remain in Europe. If gle question referendum? I spoke to there was the economy and the there was a joint cross-party cam- ‘I am as relaxed today about mess we inherited. The austerity paign for a Yes would he be happy what we did as I was at the time. him in Twick- measures that were so necessary to to see the SNP being part of it? ‘Of We cannot get away from the fact get us back on some kind of even course I would. All of us who want that the SNP already had a man- enham not keel made us very easy targets. The to see the country remain in Europe date. They had won a majority in second part was in that in doing should be seeking common cause.’ the Scottish parliament. If the par- long before that we got some things horribly But did he see Labour or the Tories ties in Westminster had chosen to wrong, for instance tuition fees. seeking common cause with the be obstructive and ignore that, and polling day, We knew that before we did it. SNP? He wasn’t sure but he very not granted a referendum, I am in Nick said to us cabinet ministers at much hoped they would because he absolutely no doubt that Scotland it also began one of our Monday meetings that believed that if the Yes campaign would have organised its own refer- to play on Vince was in charge of the policy was fractured it could easily fail. endum and by now Scotland would and that he [Nick] was “not going Looking to the future for the be on course for independence.’ the Lib Dem to exercise his opt out as deputy Liberal Democrats now that they Had he met with obstruction prime minister because he deserves were electorally on the floor, what from Downing Street and other and Tory my support”, so it kind of cascaded lessons did he think they should Tories to stop what he was doing? from there. The cabinet ministers learn from the experiences of the ‘Some of the Tories were very wavering went along with that, as did all the last five years? ‘That the campaign- gung-ho against the SNP and, of other ministers and before long you ing has to be on a permanent foot- course, Salmond was pushing for vote south of had nearly a third of the parliamen- ing. That should be one lesson for everything from the beginning. tary party in support. In the end us. We need to know our own But by being generous in agreeing the border. another third abstained and a third minds, maintain our identity and

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 15 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers have the policies that match what ‘There will always be a need for accordingly. Year on year pensions we believe. If it is a choice between a Liberal voice. You only have to will rise above inflation.’ Norman Lamb and Tim Farron look at what the Tories are doing Steve Webb was also involved in for the leadership that will happen already on human rights, Europe other decisions of the department because they are both good Liberals and welfare to know that we will such as benefits. ‘The difficult job and good campaigners.’ be needed. Even The Guardian now of finding savings, followed by the We closed with a brief discus- claims to recognise that! But per- The big comprehensive spending review, sion as to whether the British public haps we will need to wait half a did bind us together but it is also and the media would ever learn to generation or even a whole gen- crunch points understood that as the only Lib- appreciate minority party involve- eration until we are all minority eral Democrat in the village I have ment in coalition. If they didn’t, parties and somebody finally rec- were the a special role. I see IDS’s special what would be the future for the ognises that PR is the only way we advisers once a week and I also have Liberal Democrats as an effective are going to have a fair reflection of emergency to report back to our own parlia- force in politics? politics in parliament.’ budget of mentary party.’ 2010 and the … and how it looks now (22 first com- May 2015) Steve Webb Steve Webb was the only Lib- Minister of State for Work and Pensions 2010–15; MP for Northavon 1997–2010, prehensive eral Democrat minister of state to Thornbury & Yate 2010–15 remain in the same post for the full spending five years. He is also the longest How it looked to him then … to recognise that working lives serving Minister for Pensions ever. (May 2011) will have to be longer. Partly that’s review that In the thirteen years that preceded Against the background of the AV about reducing the numbers stop- him there had been ten different campaign and disappointing local ping work well before pension followed … ministers. So, although he deeply election results, did he believe age, by making it easier to work regrets the loss of his seat, he is ‘not that the compromises required beyond, and by outlawing the the worst yet embittered’ because he retains of coalition could still be made practice of making people redun- the satisfaction of having achieved to work positively for the Liberal dant when they get to 65, but it is time of year change and improvement in office Democrats? mainly about the pension age itself. while also earning, he believes, the ‘Yes. Remember what the alter- It would rise to 65 for women by was pre- respect of the pensions industry. native is, and was: almost certainly 2018 and 66 for men and women in Had he seriously expected what Tory majority rule. Clearly this 2020, probably to be followed by a conference had happened? ‘No, I didn’t. If I coalition is a big improvement but further rise and a reduction in the when George thought people had spent four weeks we have just got to demonstrate qualifying period for a full state lying to us I think I would have been that better. pension to thirty years. Osborne, and rather cross but I don’t think they ‘Half the problem is the pub- ‘We want to ensure that peo- did. There were straws in the wind lic’s apparent inability to under- ple also have an income from pri- it was always of what swung them in the end like stand what coalition is about, They vate sources, so from next year, the SNP and fear of Miliband and expected the Tories to do what they with the help of a number of large George we are saw some fragmenting of do, they did not expect the Liberal and smaller companies, we shall be our vote to Labour and the Greens Democrats to do the same thing. enrolling into workplace pensions Osborne, but afterwards I had a number of ‘After seventy years of major- schemes around ten million peo- them say to me that they would ity rule they are just not used to the ple who don’t currently have them. would come never have done it if they thought idea of nobody having a mandate, They will put in a small contribu- the Tories were going to win.’ He and it will affect the way future tion, initially just 1 per cent of sal- up with some also believed that some previous Lib election campaigns are conducted. ary and, rising to 3 per cent, so will Dem voters had voted Conserva- People will legitimately ask more the company and the taxpayer.’ new populist tive because they wanted the coali- questions about priorities if there Compulsory enrolment? ‘Yes, tion but ‘they couldn’t vote Lib Dem were to be no majority. Elections but with the freedom to opt out. welfare cut. because they didn’t like Miliband’. will become more about values and We shall return every three years So the fact of being in coalition less about shopping lists of policies. to all who have, to try and persuade In the end was not the principal reason for Policies change but values don’t.’ them to rejoin. So, if we can get the catastrophic results? ‘Only par- In his ministerial patch he was millions more people saving that we would tially. My view, and I think it prob- pleased with the way the state pen- will be all the better for their old trade nasty ably applies elsewhere too, is that sion reform was going, describing age, and will help affordability.’ there was a set of Tories prepared its future structure as clearly hav- Meanwhile the coalition stand Tory stuff for to vote Lib Dem in 2001 and 2005 ing Lib Dem roots. ‘It’s akin to a on the Liberal Democrat ‘triple because they did not see Tony Blair citizen’s pension, it’s flat rate and it’s lock’ commitment to an earnings nice Lib Dem as too horrific and the future gov- above the poverty line, so I am very link for pensions was ‘delivered’. ernment of the country was clearly proud to have helped to get it to the ‘The “triple lock” means that from stuff to talk not at stake. In 2010 they began to starting gate.’ now we look at the increase in earn- drift away because they didn’t want But, how was an adequate state ings, consumer prices and 2.5 per about at our Gordon Brown and in 2015 they pension for all going to be afford- cent. We take the biggest number definitely didn’t want Ed Miliband. able? ‘First we are going to have of those three and raise the pension conference. That has got little to do with being

16 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

credited for that? ‘Probably not. In future of pensions, which came to the pensions world perhaps but I was the inclusion that ‘opt in’ was not not a Secretary of State … When going to work. Legislation for the I won the Spectator Minister of the first ‘opt out’ scheme went through Year award last year, someone wrote in the last government. What we on Facebook “Who?” ’ did was improve it and in its pre- He had worked under Iain Dun- sent form it has been a stunning can-Smith for his five years. Ideo- success. Over the five years, five logically they must have been very million people joined the scheme different and yet the good working and 90 per cent of participants have relationship he had claimed they stayed with it, the majority from had in 2011 appeared to have sur- the younger age groups.’ vived well. How was that? He was Pension annuity reform and the effusive. right to take lump sums had been ‘Partly because he is a gracious, another policy implemented under generous and loyal man and partly Steve Webb. ‘It was a genuine coa- because he was particularly inter- lition move with a strong Liberal ested in welfare and not particu- approach. Labour would never have larly interested in pensions and I done it. We needed to guarantee the was probably more the other way state pension first, which we did, round. He was interested in reform, but I had been banging on about not just cuts, although they had to annuities for a long time and even- be made – reforms that would give tually the Treasury moved. No, we extra money to poor people. If I looked into the notion that every- had had to work under a slash-and- one might blow all their money in in coalition. Indeed I had quite a lot burn minister, I would have been one go. For tax reasons we doubted of people telling me that they liked gone within six months. As long as that that is going to happen. The the coalition and also what I was IDS felt comfortable with what I people we are talking about are doing in Pensions. was doing he increasingly trusted clearly more frugal than that.’ ‘Where the coalition had an me to get on with it.’ If the election results had been effect was in the fragmentation of There had been no quid pro different he would have been part the anti-Tory vote. That is when quo between himself and Duncan- of the team negotiating any coali- the ‘broken promises’, tuition Smith in swopping tricky pension tion agreement that might have fees and so on began to count. For concessions for tricky benefit con- arisen. Would he have been whole- example, I had a Green standing cessions. He clearly felt that most of hearted about striking a new deal against me for the first time. The the ‘nasty’ decisions about welfare and would he have been willing to coalition was in favour of frack- cuts had originated with George be part of it? ing. If we had been in opposition Osborne rather than Iain Duncan- ‘In principle yes I would but, we would probably not have been, Smith. So how much had he him- because we would probably have but I had to argue for it. The Green self been involved with welfare been a smaller party, we would took away a vital 1,500 of my votes.’ decisions in Work and Pensions? have wanted to exact a pretty big When we met in 2011 he had ‘The big crunch points were price. A few policies here and there warned of the difficulties of com- the emergency budget of 2010 and would not have been enough. We municating how coalition worked the first comprehensive spend- would have wanted something that and the Lib Dem contribution to it. ing review that followed. IDS was made people go ‘Woo’ and that Did the average elector ever man- keen that all of us in his depart- might have been a tough ask but, if age to absorb what was Lib Dem ment should be on board at that we had come up with something, I policy and what was not, and did it early stage. To that extent I was would have been up for it.’ actually matter? involved, but the worst time of year And what would have been his ‘At the margins. A few people was pre-conference when George personal priorities in any negotia- knew that we “did the tax spend”. Osborne, and it was always George tion? ‘The front of our manifesto And quite a few people told me Osborne, would come up with might not have been entirely my afterwards that they thought we some new populist welfare cut. In choice of issues but that would have had been unfairly treated, so there the end we would trade nasty Tory had to be our starting point. I think, was some recognition that we had stuff for nice Lib Dem stuff to talk for me, the Tory idea that you can done the mature thing and moder- about at our conference.’ ask people down the scale to pay the ated the Tories. But beyond that How comfortable had he felt price of £12 billion worth of wel- … It didn’t matter a huge amount. about asking some companies in fare cuts while not asking the rich There were still things we had to effect to subsidise the state pension to pay any more in tax would have support that we didn’t like.’ by implementing a private, com- been one of my red lines.’ In his own patch at Pensions, pulsory top-up scheme for young In summary he believed the he had managed to achieve Tory employees which they could later coalition had worked and that it acceptance of quite a number of Lib opt out of if they wished to? was right to go into it but he also Dem reforms such as the ‘triple lock’ ‘This was a policy with a fif- believed that the turnaround on that had become government policy. teen-year genesis that included tuition fees had considerably dam- Had he or the party been sufficiently Adair Turner’s commission into the aged trust in the party. So how did

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 17 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers he now see the future for the Lib- voice. The difficulty for us is the eral Democrats? scale of the defeat. We are no longer ‘We had a very nice note from second in a lot of places and in some David Steel remembering the days not even third. We will need time.’ “when there were six of us”. How much time, I wondered? ‘As a party we do know what ‘In the past it might have been dec- it is like to have a rough time. We ades but people are now much more do have good principles and we are volatile and tribal than they were, community campaigners. There so you have to hope that you can will always be a need for a Liberal catch the public mood.’

Paul Burstow Minister of State for Health 2010–12; MP for Sutton & Cheam 1997–2015

How it looked to him then … policy of any willing provider. (May 2011) Also we had a very clear view Now playing a key role in the that we wanted to see more front- development of that service most line autonomy and devolution to dear to every elector’s heart, frontline staff so the idea that, as the National Health Service, he long-term devolutionists and advo- remained remarkably calm about cates of reform, Liberal Democrats his year to date. The storm of pro- should feel uncomfortable with that test over the NHS did not quite I think would be surprising.’ ‘A combination of reasons. match that over tuition fees, but But in the event things had not Partly due to the scale and intensity why had Secretary of State Andrew quite turned out as planned. ‘What of the Conservative campaign: they Lansley’s original proposals come became clear was that in the detail were massively better resourced in for relatively little critical com- of the bill there were concerns and spent even more in Sutton ment from Paul Burstow or Nick about the drafting of the competi- than they did in Carshalton. But Clegg when they were originally tion proposals and their implemen- also the fact that our party cam- published in 2010?’ tation. There was a strong view paign was positioned as part of the ‘There was actually at the time that we had allowed competition to same question that the Conserva- remarkable unanimity about the become a goal in itself rather than tives were asking. They were say- principles in the White Paper: the a means to an end in the interests ing “Who should run the country?” idea that we should seek to ensure of patients. I think what Nick and based on the message “Be afraid of that the NHS really did place I have managed to get put into the Ed Miliband and the SNP”, while patients and carers at its heart, in legislation has rebalanced that and we were saying that we would be deciding not just about their own put it right.’ the moderating force. That gave care but also about how the system Had the Liberal Democrat inter- people enough reason to vote ran; the idea that we needed to see vention at the spring conference Conservative.’ more autonomy so that frontline helped to improve the bill, and if so, Was he then saying that there staff could exercise clinical judg- how? ‘The motion I actually tabled was an electoral disadvantage in ments and make decisions about provided the opportunity for mem- claiming to be the moderating how best to develop services to bers to have their say and the lead- force? ‘It reinforced the Tory nar- meet local needs; the idea that we ership accepted the amendments. rative that you had to vote for should devolve more power in the That is how it happened although them in order to avoid having system so that there would be more already in the mythology of the chaos. In other words it was not integration across health and social party that is beginning to be for- a counter to the Tory narrative; care; or, indeed, the idea that we gotten. It gave Nick his mandate, it played to it and the response could have any qualified provider as it were, to go back and negotiate on the doorsteps was that people providing services. That was in our changes.’ kept saying they had to think of own manifesto. So there was a good the national picture. We may have deal of unanimity. fought the best campaign locally ‘The difficulties arose, when the … and how it looks now (26 that we have ever fought, but we bill set out the proposals in detail.’ May 2015) had been heavily outspent and Was he happy, for example, with Once again I was sadly talking to in the end we could not fight the the idea that the management of a Liberal Democrat who had been Tory tsunami.’ general practice should be in the expected by most people to retain Looking back to his long history hands of GPs and that there should his seat but then didn’t. In ‘fortress of successfully fighting the Tories be more competition in the provi- Sutton’, that long-standing bastion in Sutton had he been concerned or sion of services? of Liberalism in London, Tom Brake content about the 2010 agreement ‘As a party we had just fought had survived in Carshalton but in to go into coalition with the Tories, a general election on a clear mani- the other constituency Paul Burstow and how happy was he to be part of festo commitment to extend the had been defeated. Why was that? it as a minister?’

18 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

‘My answer to that is that I don’t of quarters. Did he feel that he had likely to have. My personal view know what the counterfactual been able to make much Liberal was that to prove our point and would have looked like. If we had Democrat impact on his more con- value as participants in coalition we opted out of coalition, we would troversial plans? needed another five years and that, been accused of cowardice for not ‘The proposals changed quite a if that possibility arose again, we taking an opportunity to put for- bit from the way they had first been should not run away from it.’ ward our ideas. No, I supported set out. For example, we won the So following the electoral dis- the decision we took then and was setting up of the health and wellbe- aster that turned out, what lessons broadly satisfied by the agreement ing boards, which brought health should the Liberal Democrats learn itself, and I welcomed the oppor- and social care together for the first and what should they now do to tunity to put into law some of the time in one body. We had public prove their point and relevance? things I believed in and had cam- health returned to local authori- ‘We have to focus on rebuilding paigned about. And that is what I ties, a good Liberal Democrat idea. our local government base where have done.’ And then we had a series of con- so much of our old strength came As party chief whip he had been cessions we brokered as part of the from in the early ’90s. We also have privy to the progress of the nego- final package of the bill, not least to look to our colleagues in the tiations at the time. Would he have the changing of emphasis on com- Lords to give us effective leadership contemplated a deal to go in with petition so that it should not be an on all the major issues that are now the Labour Party had that possibil- end in itself but one there solely as a going to hit them. We need to get ity been on the table? servant of the patients’ interests. To back to campaigning on issues that ‘It never was a counterfactual. some extent that whole part of the matter to us.’ There was no prospect of a viable bill that was about competition was What had done the most dam- deal partly because of the num- watered down. The legislation was age to the party in those five years bers and partly because the Labour better for that.’ – the fact of going into coalition, Party had no appetite for it even Looking back, he believed that or particular issues like tuition fees within their own negotiating the Liberal Democrat legacy of this and NHS reforms, the handling team.’ time was the health and wellbe- of the coalition, or was it none of When he became Minister for ing boards, ‘which Labour would these things? ‘I think what did the Health it must have been a daunting have kept and built on’; the fact most damage was the fear that there task being asked to implement the that public health was now seen as a would be some sort of coalition Tory proposals for the NHS that local authority responsibility; and between Labour and Nicola Stur- the Tory secretary of state Andrew the watering down of competition geon’s SNP. That was the determi- Lansley had been working on for requirements as a solution to prob- nant. There were some issues like the previous four or five years. lems. ‘But the biggest legacy of all tuition fees which mattered a lot How had he reconciled that? is not the Health & Social Care Act, to some people but it was the over- ‘That period between May and it is the Care Act of 2014, which arching fear of the possible alter- July 2010 was pretty frenetic as we My personal is much more a Liberal Democrat native to the Tories that was the tried to introduce some of our own measure.’ deciding factor.’ proposals such as the scrapping of view was Paul Burstow ceased to be a So it was fear of the SNP more the SHAs. The civil servants had minister in 2012 but continued to than anything else, even if they had already done a lot of work on how that to prove build on his interest in residential no MPs outside Scotland? ‘Yes. You they would implement Lansley’s care and the development of mental are not talking rationality here. It plans, many of which had been set our point health services. I wondered to what is about emotion and not wanting out in the Tory manifesto. Our extent his perspective of the coali- that combination of parties to gov- own proposals had not been so and value as tion had changed after he left office. ern the country.’ detailed and the civil servants had ‘I had stopped being a decision Despite all the predictions the done no previous work on imple- participants maker so I decided to become an electorate had plumped deliberately menting or incorporating them implementer of the things I was for a majority Conservative gov- within the Tory plans. I would add in coalition most interested in. I set up commis- ernment defying almost every poll that at that stage there was also no sions with groups like Demos and finding, including those suggest- special adviser support for me in the we needed Centre Forum to look at residential ing that 40 per cent of the elector- department. We had to manage on care and mental health, and those ate actually liked and approved of our own.’ another five reports have proved influential on the coalition. What did that mean He claimed that he got on ‘quite government thinking and wider for the concept of coalition in the well’ with Andrew Lansley, reveal- years and policy thinking.’ future? ing that Lansley had been a member that, if that If the election results had proved ‘If it had been possible to vote of the SDP in the 1980s, although to be different and he had had the for the coalition on the ballot paper, he did not know him at the time. possibility chance to become a minister in I think large numbers might have He was ‘a man with a mission’ but another coalition involving the taken that option. I think strate- he had left Paul Burstow to get on arose again, Liberal Democrats, would he have gies that now try to take us away with his particular responsibili- said yes or no? ‘I think it is unlikely from the coalition would do noth- ties, which included social care and we should that I would have been offered ing but damage to our credibility. mental health. Health again, so it would have We should not now start apologis- Over the next year some of not run away depended on all sorts of thing. For ing for having had the temerity to Lansley’s proposals had come in example how big a party we were go into government. That would for heavy criticism from a number from it. and how much influence we were do nothing but damage to our

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 19 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers credibility as a party. The Liberal Europe and the break up of the UK. She was confident that the bill Democrats did a lot of good things What should the remaining Liberal would ultimately go through with and many will be remembered.’ Democrat MPs be doing to help to support on all sides (and later she And had he any additional pri- prevent that happening? ‘Getting proved to be absolutely right). orities for the party’s recovery in out of parliament and leading the Slightly surprisingly, Lynne did not London? ‘Concentrate on rebuild- campaign in the country,’ was his seem to have been unduly stifled ing our local government base and unhesitating response. by coalition government and there campaign on issues, particularly in Finally was he optimistic about was plenty more that she wanted to next year’s GLA elections where we the party’s ability to recover and do: for example, banning discrimi- can increase our share of the vote. would he want to be part of that nation against old people in public By then the Tories will have had to recovery? ‘I am old enough to services, particularly in hospitals do something about the deficit and remember that ‘dead parrot’ period and social care. will be becoming unpopular. We of 1987–89 when we featured in need to use the areas where we have asterisks in opinion polls, and yet been strongest in the past to rekin- two years later, in 1990, we won the … and how it looks now (5 dle that sense of grass-roots activ- Eastbourne by-election and that is June 2015) ism. We also need to make full use when the growth began. As for my Lynne Featherstone was one of only of our strength in the Lords.’ future, I shall certainly be helping six Liberal Democrat MPs who I suggested that the two great- – but two and a half weeks after 7 served as ministers for the full five est dangers for the country over the May is too soon to decide exactly years of the coalition. At the Home next five years were an exit from what I will want to be doing.’ Office, her record on women’s and same-sex issues is likely to stand the test of time, as is her record on dis- ability at the Department for Inter- national Development (DFID). Lynne Featherstone When she first stood in Horn- Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Equalities, Home Office, 2010–12; Parliamentary sey and Wood Green in 1997 she Under-Secretary of State for International Development 2012–14; Minister of State, finished in third place, 26,000 votes Home Office 2014–15; MP for Hornsey & Wood Green 2005–15; ennobled, 2015 behind Labour. In 2000 she managed to find time to redesign theJournal of How it looked to her then … ‘Funnily enough … (long pause) Liberal History for Duncan Brack; her (May 2011) … no. Of course there was a dis- excellent design remains unchanged ‘I am a Home Office minister as cussion beforehand but you can’t today. In 2001 she came second in well being Minister for Equalities: do anything in government with- Hornsey and Wood Green, reduc- I have women, LGBT, the Equality out the support of your secretary ing the Labour majority to 10,614. Act and the Equality Commission, of state and I have had nothing but In 2005 she won the seat with a but I also have domestic violence, support from Theresa May.’ And majority of 2,395, retaining it with international gender-based vio- from David Cameron too? ‘Yes, the a majority of 6,875 in 2010. Even lence, hate crime, prostitution, whole cabinet has to sign off, and with that record and every Liberal missing people, wheel clamping … David Cameron stepped forward Democrat in London rooting for her I could go on. It’s a very extensive at his conference to say that he sup- on 7 May, she was swept away by a portfolio but people know me most ported it. It has always been Liberal Labour majority of 11,058. Did she for equalities. Democrat policy, but I couldn’t feel a strong sense of injustice? ‘They are issues that you can be be doing if it wasn’t backed by the passionate about. They are about other side of the coalition equally.’ people’s lives.’ But it was clearly going to meet Two weeks earlier the Protec- strong opposition from certain tion of Freedoms Act, which she quarters. ‘I would defend to the was closely involved in construct- death the right of those who disa- ing, received royal assent. Did she gree to voice their disagreement, feel content with the Act as it had whether from a religious basis or been passed? ‘I think it is a great just from people in society who first step. There should be lots of feel it is odd or strange or such a other freedom bills – the more we change from tradition; but society can roll back on civil liberties and moves on. This is a great inequal- the surveillance society the better, ity. Obviously, if we were going to but this Act is a very good start.’ force religious organisations to con- The day after this interview duct services against their doctrinal President Obama came out in practices, you would understand; favour of same-sex marriage, a but we are not. I respect other peo- cause on which she has already ple’s views too and I think that spent a lot of time preparing a when two people love each other bill. The consultation process was and are willing to commit publicly already in hand. Had it been diffi- in a traditional state marriage we cult to get coalition agreement on should be able to rejoice with them the principle? whether they are gay or straight.’

20 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

‘Only in the sense that the vot- On the day visceral hatred of the Tories that of support, she herself had decided ing system is rubbish. Politics is like had been the deciding issue. Why to stand down from the Home that. There is an injustice in that the we went into had the Liberal Democrats got so Office in anticipation of the com- Liberal Democrats were always the little credit for the good things the ing reshuffle. If asked, she wanted good guys in this coalition. If you coalition, party had done in government? to go to DFID. ‘I felt I had sewn look at what the coalition deliv- ‘Obviously the media are not, up the same-sex marriage bill. ered and pick out all the bits you all 26,000 of and never have been, very help- I had nurtured it mothered it, like you will find that they were all ful in getting our message across. gone to fight its battles so many at Lib Dem instigation. But we did those previ- Indeed that is probably origin of times when it very nearly fell know before we went in that third our long-standing own rule of “If from grace. Incidentally I had also parties going into coalition get it ous Labour you do something, put it on a leaf- introduced, among other things, in the neck. Apart from the eleven voters who let and put it through someone’s a highly popular ban on clamp- who voted against it at the special door” being the best way to get ing cars on private property. So conference I don’t think there was had turned our message across because no one by the time of the reshuffle, I felt anyone who thought we should else was going to help us. It is still I had done all I could at the Home not go into coalition. To have the to us over true today. Just one instance – I Office, although I followed the opportunity to have power and not went through that whole process of bill all the way through, sitting take it and deliver on it would have three elec- bringing forward the bill on same- alongside Maria Miller during the been insane. The sense of injustice sex marriage without The Guardian report on the consultation.’ is that we end up with the Tories tions wrote mentioning me once.’ What particularly did she becoming a majority govern- We turned back to those first feel she had achieved for women ment and us becoming a very little to tell me two years as a minister in the Home achieved during her time at the minority party, but that is the way Office. What did she think had been Home Office? ‘Part of my portfolio the voting system works, and that is in no uncer- her most significant achievement in was violence against women. Dur- undoubtedly unjust.’ government during that time? ing that period I was approached by So if she had to attribute blame tain terms ‘Everyone would say same-sex Nimco Ali, who had set up Daugh- for the disaster would it be mostly marriage. It wasn’t on the agenda. ters of Eve, an anti–FGM cam- going into coalition with the Tories that I was It wasn’t in the coalition agree- paigning grouping of young girls. or perhaps, in her own area, to ment or the main manifestos. I just Basically she took me by the collar Labour’s relentless denigration of the spawn of did it. Scotland followed and now and shook me, soon persuading me the Liberal Democrats over the pre- Ireland has had its own referen- that this was an important, equality vious five years? the devil … dum. It’s a piece of work of which issue about women’s rights. But the ‘On the day we went into coali- Neverthe- I am inordinately proud. It makes Home Office was not really set up tion, all 26,000 of those previous me very emotional and also gets to deal with it; DFID was, so, when Labour voters who had turned to less many of me invited to a lot of gay wed- I went there, I set out to make it a us over three elections wrote to tell dings. But the campaign to end major issue worldwide, and there- me in no uncertain terms that I was them contin- female genital mutilation (FGM) fore help the UK too.’ the spawn of the devil and that it also ranked very highly because it Justine Greening was her Tory was unforgivable of me to have put ued to love was not on the agenda. Now it most secretary of state. How had she the Tories into government. Nev- certainly is, and structurally so, so got on with her? ‘I think I man- ertheless many of them continued me for what I am optimistic that it can’t be dis- aged to put the agenda for women to love me for what I was doing in missed. Less well known but just at the top. In 2010 David Cam- government, be it same-sex mar- I was doing as important to me when I went to eron had given me the additional riage, international development, the Department for International role of being the UK’s ministe- female genital mutilation, or dis- in govern- Development was disability in the rial champion against violence ability campaigning. Then many developing world.’ against women. I don’t think Jus- told me that they were voting ment, be it Four years ago she had told to tine was necessarily interested in Labour with a heavy heart because me that Theresa May and David the FMG issue initially, but in so they wanted to keep the Conserva- same-sex Cameron had both been supportive far as it helped to define the gov- tives out. Well, as I told 15,000 of of her determined efforts to pro- ernment’s position, neither she nor them in my last email after the elec- marriage, duce a bill on same-sex marriage. David Cameron wanted all the tion, they now have a majority Was that still her recollection? credit for pursuing it to go to the Conservative government instead. international Initially she was hesitant – ‘You Liberal Democrats, so she became If ever there was lesson in voting develop- will have to wait for my book,’ she supportive. for what you believe in ….’ told me – but she soon conceded ‘I was left to get on with the A lot of polling had been done ment, female briefly that, despite some hostility issue behind the scenes but I did locally in the run-up, all showing on the Tory backbenches, they had manage to get Nick Clegg involved the Featherstone ratings as high genital muti- been supportive. ‘Theresa was one and I was particularly grateful to or on a par with Tim Farron and of the unsung heroes of same-sex the London Evening Standard for Norman Lamb, but she was facing lation, or marriage. Without her support it helping us to raise the profile.’ Labour. Yes, there had been a man- might have been strangled at birth, I wondered whether the Tory tra from Labour about the evils of disability and the prime minister was help- backbenchers, with their normal voting for tuition fees, the Health ful as well.’ Enough said for the prejudices about foreigners and the and Social Care Act, the bedroom campaigning. moment. UK spending money overseas, had tax and zero hours contracts, but Before the legislation finally been obstructive about what DFID they were lightning rods. It was the went through, with a wide range was trying to do. She agreed that

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 21 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers they, and the Daily Mail, had grum- Labour had not become the govern- detail. That is inevitable, and not bled about money being wasted, ment overall. Why not? for airing in public’ – but they but all three major parties were ‘London seems to be very dif- were ‘completely agreed on the committed in their manifestos to a ferent from the rest of the coun- core of the economic strategy and target expenditure of 0.7 per cent try. Simon and I saw huge Labour to tackling the deficit quickly and and that the argument that, if you surges here in last year’s council deeply’. didn’t want terrorism, you sup- elections. I have really no idea why What I ‘Delaying would have meant ported economies overseas was Labour did better, although it was more cuts for more people for a persuasive one. She also gave partly because the Green surge fear most longer and wasted more money on Greening’s predecessor Andrew didn’t happen in London and nor interest. Mitchell credit for putting DFID did UKIP do particularly well.’ is a lurch ‘We never ruled out raising VAT on a firmer financial footing. She came back to the ‘visceral’ to 20 per cent. None of us wanted When she returned to the Home hatred of the Tories with which the towards to but, when you have to deliver, Office in the autumn of 2014 as a Liberal Democrats had also become excessive you have to decide the balance minister of state, in place of Nor- branded by association. In her seat, between taxation and spending man Baker, Theresa May was fear of the SNP had not been a par- constraint on cuts and, if you decide to raise sig- ‘pleased to see me and gave me a ticular factor but the fear of the nificant funds, there are only three hug.’ Although she had taken over Tories was. When she supported government taxes you can go to – income tax, Baker’s responsibilities, there was the coalition originally she knew national insurance and VAT.’ now little time left to carry forward she might be risking her seat, but spending. We When would he able to say ‘We his policies on drugs, which some there was still a Liberal Democrat did it. We stuck to our principles. people had found too controversial. base left upon which to build. did what had And it worked’? In those last six months, crime pre- ‘Does the party have a role for ‘In time for the next general vention became her principal con- the future? Yes, it is a very impor- to be done election when, I believe, the Lib- cern. ‘I think I maintained a Liberal tant role – to put back that abil- eral Democrat contribution will be voice on drugs but there was no ity to vote for a Liberal voice. The in the last properly recognised at the polls, as time for new legislation. I became a challenge is how to combine the it was in Scotland in 2003 after an safe pair of hands.’ passion of Liberalism and its com- parliament; equally turbulent and unpopular In conclusion I wanted to be mitment to social justice, human first eighteen months in coalition quite clear where she thought the rights, internationalism and the there is no (with Labour). main reason for the electoral dis- environment with our grass-roots aster on 7 May lay. She and Simon campaigning. If we can get that doubt more Hughes had both been fighting right we are on the up.’ … and how it looks now (7 Labour and both had lost, and yet to be done, June 2015) but the thing He had just returned from two weeks’ holiday, and I thought he I fear is that was back in the Highlands on a lan- dline when I rang him at the agreed Sir Danny Alexander the Tories time. He wasn’t. He was on a Chief Secretary to the Treasury 2010–15; MP for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch & mobile and walking down Victoria Strathspey 2005–15 will go way Street in central London – a noisy place and not ideal – but, despite the How it looked to him then … negotiations? ‘Our core argument beyond what traffic and then a requested break to (March 2011) in the election was for firmer action talk to Tom McNally whom he had He had not expected to be chief sec- to tackle the deficit than Labour is necessary, just bumped into, we managed to retary, but he had prepared for and was proposing and we were specific achieve an interview. led the coalition negotiations so the about our cuts, but we also said that and that will He had obviously been upset by notion of coalition had surprised timing should be determined by the his result but apparently not totally him less than most Liberal Demo- economic reality. I think that judg- affect public surprised. ‘For me defeat was prob- crats. ‘I had always thought a hung ment was right and it was one we ably less of a surprise than it was for parliament was a very real pos- fully shared. services, the many of my colleagues. I remember sibility. But likely? Probably not. ‘The biggest single gain for the saying to Nick (Clegg), two days Moving to the Treasury after just Liberal Democrats has been the welfare sys- after we formed the government, eighteen days was undoubtedly the inclusion of the raising of the tax ‘You realise that you might just big change but, having been Nick’s allowance threshold. That has gone tem and the have cost me my seat.’ chief of staff, it was a process I was from the front of our manifesto schools sys- ‘The Tories were extremely familiar with. I had been involved to the front line of the govern- unpopular in Scotland,’ he with setting political priorities and ment’s tax strategy. The second big tem, the very reminded me. ‘The idea of a Scot- had written the manifesto, setting gain has been the emphasis on the tish Liberal Democrat MP going out costs and priorities. The Treas- green economy. For example, in things we into a senior position in gov- ury is full of fantastic officials and the budget we announced an earlier ernment with them was always high-flying economists. What is start and tripling of the funds for never would going to be hard, and with the needed is ministers who can make the Green Investment Bank.’ later rise of the SNP in Scotland the right political judgments.’ He disagreed with George have allowed the trend became almost irresist- The two most significant ‘gives Osborne ‘quite a lot’ – ‘There is ible. In other constituencies in and takes’ on both sides in the plenty of debate between us about to happen. the south with big majorities, like

22 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

‘I don’t really know and I am not other issues were not perhaps scru- going to rush to judgement. The tinised as carefully as they might truth is, though, that our position have been, but again many other was weakened by being in coali- issues were resolved later between tion, in the sense that many of those Paul Burstow and Andrew Lans- voters who had supported us in the ley including the introduction of past as protest voters had left us many of our own ideas.’ and, when it came to countering He believed that, except in a few the threat of a Labour–SNP combi- constituencies, the issues of tuition nation, we did not have the support fees and the NHS had not in the end to resist that message.’ played a big part in determining the I reminded him that in 2011 he election result, although the party had expected, a little optimistically had perhaps failed to take account I thought at the time, that the party of their importance to some voters. would see electoral reward in 2015 So we returned to fear of a Labour– for what it had done, but that hadn’t SNP government as the deciding happened. factor in England, even though the ‘No. In the end people’s fear SNP had no remit there. of a marauding band of Scottish ‘That was definitely the mes- Nationalists gaining control of a sage that gripped the imagination Labour government just proved too of people in England, to a much much.’ greater extent than I thought it I wondered, looking back over would. I wasn’t as aware as perhaps the last five years, whether his I should have been of the effect of feeling was one of satisfaction or the referendum result in creating David Laws in Yeovil, the results frustration. fear of the break up of the United must have come as a much bigger ‘Immense pride and satisfaction Kingdom. The fact that these peo- shock. I had expected us to hold in what we did, and great frustra- ple might be in charge of the UK at least thirty of our seats. I think tion that it was not recognised by was an abomination.’ the opinion pollsters have a lot to the electorate. It is quite interesting He then told me that since answer for. If people had thought to see the way people have joined the election he had not been on that a Tory overall majority was the party since the election almost ‘Osborne watch’. Probably the on the cards they would have as though it was an act of remorse.’ worst thing he could have done, voted for us.’ Possibly, I suggested, many of he believed, was obsess about what I suggested that, after all he had them were people who did not vote others were doing from day to day. done for the party and the country Liberal Democrat but then felt the But he must have had some resid- in helping to restore the economy, need to say they were sorry that ual fears about what the Treasury he must have felt a sense of unfair- they hadn’t? might be going to do next without ness about what had happened. ‘Yes. I think there was a lot of any Liberal Democrat presence? ‘I am not sure there is any point that, a lot of that. We put our coun- ‘Yes. I think what I fear most is a in complaining. It is what it is and try above our party and it is a bet- lurch towards excessive constraint in a democracy you have to put up ter country as a result, and I think on government spending. We did with that. I think it is rough jus- that over the next five years people what had to be done in the last par- tice for the party, given what we will see how very different a Tory liament; there is no doubt more contributed, but mainly I feel an majority is from a coalition.’ to be done, but the thing I fear is immense pride in what we did.’ Danny Alexander had been that the Tories will go way beyond But what had happened in Scot- a leading member of the Liberal what is necessary, and that will land, with an almost complete wipe Democrat coalition negotiating affect public services, the welfare out of Liberal Democrat MPs, must team. Why was it that the team system and the schools system, the have come as a terrible blow to appeared not at the time to have very things we never would have them all? recognised that issues like tui- allowed to happen. And that could ‘Of course, of course. The fact tion fees and NHS reform were also damage the recovery because that we were swept away on an as potentially toxic as they later it abandons economic balance in almost invincible national tide was turned out to be? favour of a myopic, one-golf-club quite different from losing our ‘Tuition fees were recognised approach.’ seats because of indolence or lack of in the agreement in the sense The electorate could not have application or whatever.’ that there was an opt-out agreed been said to have endorsed coalition I suggested that nobody could within it allowing Liberal Demo- in any way and, with the Liberal have done more than he had to crats to abstain in parliament. We Democrats now reduced to eight emphasise the Liberal Democrat hadn’t yet had the Browne report. MPs, did he think there was any policies in government, particu- Our position was in effect resolved future for a minority ex-coalition larly on tax, and yet the electorate in discussion of the detail later on. party, or indeed for coalition as a had given them almost no obvious On NHS reform we focused our form of government, or even for credit and the number of Liberal attention on the issues where dif- PR as a reformed electoral system? Democrat seats had dropped like a ferences between our two parties ‘I think there is a great future stone. Why was that? were greatest. That meant that for our party. Within a catastrophic

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 23 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers result there are many constituen- only change things by going into In 2009 Vince Cable and Nick cies where we hold strong second government. If that is not your aim Clegg had cautioned the Liberal places. There are a lot of voters you have no purpose.’ Meanwhile Democrat conference about hold- who regret voting for other par- he pointed out that the 100 Liberal ing or abolishing tuition fees. Had ties. But I think, more importantly Democrats in the House of Lords he had a rather raw deal on the for the country, there is a real need could have a considerable influence issue? for a Liberal voice whether it is on the present government. ‘It was no secret. I wrote about on Europe, human rights or the On a different note, did he fear this. We needed to be realistic. Uni- economy. We have a Conservative for Scotland and the Union and versities must be properly funded government and most of the candi- did he plan to do anything about it and have fair funding for students. dates for the Labour leadership are himself? With all the problems of impend- conservatives with a small ‘c’. You ‘I fear for Scotland because it ing cuts, it was clearly not going to hardly ever hear people like Andy is extremely unhealthy and illib- be possible to maintain our com- Burnham or Yvette Cooper talk- eral for Scotland to be a one-party mitment. It wasn’t easy, but I think ing about civil liberties or human state, and that must be changed. I we now have a realistic policy that rights. There is a desperate need to don’t actually think that Scotland I quite often ensures properly funded universi- put a Liberal counterpoint to that will ever vote to leave the United ties … and (in total) actually gives approach. Kingdom but you can’t be certain, met with them more money. ‘We are not going to see PR in and I shall be doing what I can to ‘Economic growth is already the next five years, but it’s impos- make sure it doesn’t happen. I won’t George beginning to come from rebalanc- sible to forecast about coalition. be standing for the Scottish parlia- ing the economy, in practice from Labour doesn’t seem capable of ment, and I am also not going to the Osborne on the private sector, particularly winning a majority next time House of Lords by the way. I am small-scale companies, and from around. I would hope, though, too young for that. But I don’t want a one-to-one exports and manufacturing, which that, if the opportunity for coali- to close off the possibility of elected in the years under Labour were in tion came up for us as party in 2020 office altogether.’ basis, but decline. We are helping all busi- or 2025, we would take it again … On that encouraging note we nesses by investing in apprentice- having, of course, learned the les- closed so that he could get on with part of my ships, and reducing regulation.’ sons. Liberalism is a philosophy that catching his train. Why hadn’t the government wants to change things. You can problem was done more to regulate and reorgan- ise the banks? ‘We’ve done quite a that I found lot actually. The banking levy, for example, is permanent and is going I disagreed to raise far more than Labour’s one- Sir Vince Cable with Danny off bonus tax. Bank regulations, for Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 2010–15; MP for Twickenham example on requirements to hold 1997–2015 more than capital, are much tougher than they were … but I don’t deny that there How it looked to him then … visiting this country on bona fide I disagreed are still really serious problems.’ (April 2011) business or as students. Inevitably ‘It is more difficult exchanging there had to be some compromise, with George forthright freedom of expression but I am able to defend what we have … and how it looks now (11 in opposition for the frustrations done. And in most areas in which I Osborne. June 2015) of coalition government, and of have been involved in discussion – With such a high national and course there is a collective disci- macro policy, public spending, tax, Danny would local reputation behind him Vince pline to observe, but that is only the growth agenda – I don’t feel fun- Cable had seemed – forgive the pun right. What we are learning is how damentally ill at ease with the direc- always – invincible. His defeat in Twick- to maintain our sense of identity tion in which we are going. enham was one of the biggest sur- within a coherent government. I ‘I believe cabinet meetings are repeat the prises of election night. He was think a lot of people around the a constructive forum for debate. obviously thrown by it but also world admire the government for People looking in now are pleas- Treasury surprisingly philosophical. He had being very determined, particu- antly surprised at what they call seen the signs in a local poll con- larly over the public finances, but the revival of cabinet government. line. Osborne ducted a year before and he clearly the issue for Liberal Democrats is Under Blair and Brown I believe it did not think that the Liberal to signal our own identity and val- was much more prime ministerial.’ was a highly Democrat election campaign had ues and that we are making a major How did he get on with George intelligent improved his chances. input.’ Osborne? ‘We have a good profes- ‘I think our national campaign Were some cabinet decisions sional relationship. We are not per- guy and on was abysmal. It was embarrass- exasperating? ‘That’s not the word sonal mates and don’t aspire to be, ingly bad. Whatever hope we had, I would use. I would not have gone but that is not the point. Economi- occasions expired during those three weeks.’ into the government if I hadn’t cally we have the two key depart- So had that been the principal accepted that compromises have to ments of government. It’s crucial was willing reason for the disastrous national be made. For example, there were that we work and communicate results of 7 May? Or was it going clearly different perspectives on well together, and we do. It’s busi- to do a trade, into coalition with the Tories, spe- immigration. I made a very strong ness-like and professional. No more cific issues, or fear of Labour and case for a liberal approach to people nor less.’ as it were. the SNP?

24 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

campaign as on the fear factor of was grateful for my support during Labour and the SNP. Was that what that first year when the government he meant? ‘No, I think the Labour– was at its weakest, but as time went SNP fear factor was decisive, but on it became clear that our views the failure of our own campaign were very different. I was support- was that it didn’t answer it.’ ing fiscal austerity because it was an He had lost by a relatively small emergency; he was doing it because margin, but included in that had he wanted a smaller state.’ been a rise in the Labour vote that Had he, George Osborne he had previously squeezed over and Danny Alexander often met a long period. Why did that rise together outside cabinet? ‘No. happen? I quite often met with George ‘We met a lot of it on the door- Osborne on a one-to-one basis, but step. It was the very predictable part of my problem was that I found “Why did you go into coalition I disagreed with Danny more than with the Tories?” – tuition fees, I disagreed with George Osborne. bedroom tax, all those things. Danny would always repeat the When you actually talked to peo- Treasury line. Osborne was a highly ple face to face, you could explain intelligent guy and on occasions all this and they accepted it, but was willing to do a trade, as it were. we could never talk to everybody. For example I was able to set up the Even then some of them did not feel Business Bank in return for agree- the need to vote tactically because ing to his whacky proposal about we “had a big majority”.’ workers shares for rights, which Compared with the resources never actually went anywhere.’ ‘There were different elements. available to him, was the extra Generally he had been free to get We knew from last year’s election money spent by the Tories locally on with his department – ‘I think results and from the survey con- another deciding factor? ‘It was that was David Cameron’s style’. ducted in our constituency that the a very big factor. We could have He had had to deal with advice party’s position locally was quite topped up our own campaign from a number of senior civil serv- weak; that the party’s approval by spending money putting out ants and economists; I wondered level was very, very negative, quite national leaflets which didn’t men- whether he had found them helpful toxic in fact; that Nick (Clegg) was tion the constituency, but that or obstructive. His first, preferred extremely unpopular, almost as wasn’t adding any value. It was reaction was to tell me how well he unpopular as Miliband; and, prob- just turning people off, whereas worked with the five or more Tory ably also true of other parts of the the Tories were sending out end- ministers he had within his depart- country, that as the sitting MP I less stuff featuring David Cam- ment. Over the five years his single had a very high recognition and eron, who was seen as a plus factor. Liberal Democrat ministers had approval rate. Because of the way the spend- been Ed Davey, followed by Nor- ‘That was the background. In ing limits operated they were man Lamb, Jo Swinson and Jenny the run-up to the election I think unconstrained.’ Willott. And he was proud of all his we had a very poor national cam- In 2011, when we had last ministers’ achievements. paign with no clear message. The talked, he had clearly understood ‘We did lots of really big things. one thing we seemed to be trying the constraints and compromises of The industrial strategy was a big to tell people was that there was coalition early on and had believed success, as was the setting up of the bound to be a coalition, come what that many people around the world Business Bank and Green Invest- may, which of course was nonsense. were actually admiring the govern- ment Bank. The science-based We did almost nothing to address ment for being determined, partic- catapult network was an important the possibility of a Conservative ularly as far as public finances were breakthrough in terms of practi- government. Basically all we had concerned. Did he still feel that was cal support for innovation. We was a very good local campaign. I the correct view and that that was made ourselves a lot of enemies but had a certain amount of credibil- how it continued for the five years? we reformed university finance ity as an individual but that had to ‘Yes I do. Even among people in a way that made them now sus- be weighed against a very negative who didn’t vote for us locally we tainable. We put through a lot of position for the party and the party found a lot of people who liked the progressive legislation – flexible leader in particular. We could still coalition and what it had done, but working, shared parental leave, have won if it hadn’t been for a very they didn’t like Miliband and the executive pay, small business lend- successful national Tory campaign, SNP so that was why they were ing, women on boards of compa- not based on the local Tories but on going to vote Tory. There was a lot nies and more. It was a long list and daily targeted personal letters from of pro-coalition feedback.’ a big record.’ Cameron on issues, and emails and Again in 2011 he had told me that Many of the Vickers Commis- telephone calls warning of the dan- he and George Osborne, while not sion recommendations on banking gers of Labour and the SNP, if you being mates, worked well together. that he strongly favoured in 2011 voted Lib Dem.’ Did they continue to do so? had also now been implemented. He seemed to be putting as much ‘The relationship became pro- He and George Osborne had both blame on the Liberal Democrat gressively more distant. I think he compromised in achieving ‘the

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 25 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers biggest structural reform of bank- certainly unlikely to happen again to make sure the Tories do not ing of any major industrial coun- for some years. And what was the entrench their hegemony. try.’ So why was it that during the future for an ex-coalition minor- I suggested that the most impor- election there had still been a feel- ity party that had been reduced to tant issue facing the country over ing that not enough had been done eight MPs? next eighteen months was going to about bankers? ‘I think coalition has a future. be the referendum on Europe. What ‘I don’t think enough had been After all this government only has role should the Liberal Democrats done. We had done a fair amount a majority of twelve. We could well be playing helping to make sure but despite all our efforts it was be back to minority government in that the country voted to stay in? difficult for small businesses to get five years time.’ ‘I don’t think we should be too lending. We kept on running up I think we He was reluctant to give his prominent. We are known to be against new banking scandals. It views about the future of the Lib- very pro-Europe. There is a slight gradually became apparent to me – were the eral Democrats but, as a piece of danger of coming across as Euro- I don’t know whether it did to the advice, he was willingly to reveal zealots, which will turn people Tories – that the banking sector greenest that although he preferred Nor- off. I would like to see people like was just too big and was rotten to government man Lamb as an individual he Frances O’Grady and some senior the core.’ thought what he called ‘the Farron people from business at the fore- Five year ago David Cameron ever … but approach’ of going back to basics front of the campaign, but the one had talked about ‘the greenest gov- of building up the grass roots and person who is critical is Cameron ernment ever’. Theoretically a the narrative getting more councillors was the himself. It’s his show and having a combination in coalition of Con- best way of proceeding. His own sceptic saying he is now in favour of servatives and Liberal Democrats was not sup- ‘personal prejudice’ was that the staying in will decide the issue.’ could have been, but even with party should be trying to work Was that the way it would go? the Green investment Bank it had ported by the more openly with the Labour Party ‘Yes’. seemed to me that the expansion of renewables and reduction of green side of emissions was much slower than it should have been. Was that a wrong the media, impression? Edward Davey ‘No doubt more could have because we been done but I think our record Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 2010–12; was creditable. As well as the were in with Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 2012–15; MP for Kingston & Green Investment Bank, we now Surbiton 1997–2015 have the biggest offshore wind the Tories. industry in the world, by a very And there (15 June 2015) picture stuff. For example, some long way. That was done under Of course Ed Davey felt aggrieved people felt betrayed simply because Chris Huhne and Ed Davey who were some to have lost his seat after eighteen we had done a deal with the Tories also reformed the system of elec- years but he was far from downcast. ….’ tricity pricing that has given a failings … We were sitting in the constitu- Had that been a major factor in further push to renewables. The ency office of the Kingston Liberal his constituency? ‘No, not huge, reason why the public may have none of the Democrats and he felt certain that but in a slug of the population it thought progress had been slow is the Liberal Democrats in Kingston was. We had centre-left voters who because the government was actu- previous gov- & Surbiton and other key seats had thought we were left of the Labour ally quite divided. There were done as much as they possibly could Party. We went in with the Tories genuine problems.’ ernments to look after their constituents’ and they thought we were just Had he found that major- interests, and he was equally confi- beyond the pale. The second fac- ity of senior people in business had been dent that in the coalition they had tor was that we went in knowing understood climate change or done a really good job for the coun- we had to make some tough and were they eco-sceptical? ‘Most of very green, try. They had had to make some unpalatable decisions. Persuading those who mattered were pretty compromises but they had stuck our supporters that they were nec- aware. Indeed some were ahead and it was to their principles and delivered ‘a essary was never going to be easy, of the government. For instance, great deal for their voters and for and some of them took them as the car industry was planning ten the Liberal progressive politics’. evidence that we had moved to the or twenty years ahead for lower ‘Clearly that did not come across right, which wasn’t the case but it emission engines, and the aircraft Democrats as much as it should have done’, he fed that narrative. And, of course, industry was planning for the use who made admitted, ‘but these things happen. there was the big-picture issue of of lighter materials knowing they My biggest worry is not for myself tuition fees. For a slug of the pop- will be an issue in the future. The this one – I will earn more money, work less ulation getting over those three people who were quite disappoint- hard and see my family more – but things was too difficult. I think we ing were the green companies like green. But I came into politics to do things and could have handled tuition fees bet- Dong. They were happy to set up they are now under threat.’ ter and probably the overall nar- things like wind farms here but we had to Why had the Liberal Democrats rative better, but the other issues were reluctant to develop the Brit- failed so manifestly to persuade I don’t think we could have done ish supply chain.’ fight all the the electors of their value in gov- much more about.’ We returned to coalition and ernment? ‘There are many parts to So it had been a ‘triple its future, if there was one. It was way … that answer. There was the very big whammy’? ‘Yes. With the benefit

26 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers of hindsight – we were all so busy For example, there was the Liberal at the time it was difficult to think Democrat proposal for getting rid about everything – we should have of the default age of retirement at recognised all those problems and 65, under which employees could dealt with them more strategically be sacked. We managed to win that early on. Instead we relied on hav- one. Another was flexible paren- ing five years to recover from them tal leave, a policy I spent eighteen because we had to “show that the months creating, which was later coalition could work”. I am sure implemented by Norman Lamb that Nick and his team were think- and Jo Swinson.’ ing strategically and realised there As his next step had been to move was a problem, but they thought it to the Department of Energy and would go away and it didn’t.’ Climate Change, I wondered how Ed Davey was an unusual Lib- much environmental considerations eral Democrat minister, and pos- had featured in his discussions with sibly unusually lucky, in that he Vince Cable, and whether there been started off working under a Liberal any disagreements between them. Democrat secretary of state, Vince ‘No, we almost never disagreed. Cable, in Business Innovation and I was very privileged in that way, Skills, and later taken over from The environmental legislation we another Liberal Democrat secretary did deal with was mostly related to of state, Chris Huhne in Energy accounting and reporting.’ and Climate Change. In that sense When he took over from Chris had he had his own patch all the Huhne, did he feel in any way con- way through? strained by what Chris had initi- ‘Oh very much so. I was very ated or did he feel happy to take across the department. It had varied fortunate. There were a number over where he had left off? immensely according to which civil of ministers in Vince’s depart- ‘Probably the latter. The truth is servants were allotted to the policy. ment, but he gave me first choice that, if you take over from a minis- For example, he had had to fight as to what I wanted to do and then, ter, you don’t just rip up everything the department to get his commu- because he was busy with tuition he or she has done. All policies nity energy policy through; he had fees, banks and other issues, he and strategies take time to imple- lost the Swansea tidal lagoon bat- mostly let me get on with it. My ment. That is not to say that there tle; but he had eventually won the portfolio was actually huge. It cov- were not lots of things still to be argument over electricity demand ered Royal Mail and post offices, decided, particularly on issues such reduction, aimed at avoiding the employment legislation, consumer as electricity market reform. Chris need to build more power plants. law, competition law, corporate had done a great deal, but on my Pre-election David Cameron governance and trade policy. In a appointment David Cameron said, had talked about ‘voting blue to go way it was a portfolio made for me “You may want to look at all this green’ and, after the election, ‘the because I was a postgraduate econo- again.” Clearly the Tories didn’t greenest government ever’. His ear- mist who had made a study most of like it, but Chris had left me some lier ideas combined with Liberal those subjects. I had also worked in very good handover notes and we Democrat policies might have made business as a consultant specialising went ahead.’ it so and yet, I suggested, five years in postal industries. People forget He had obviously felt uncom- later there was a slight feeling of fail- that the privatisation of the Royal fortable about the Green Deal ure to deliver all that he and Chris Mail was the largest ever employee energy efficiency programme and Huhne had hoped for. He disagreed. share-ownership deal. That was needed to tell me about it. He had ‘I think we were the green- a Liberal Democrat policy, and it calculated from looking at the detail est government ever, by a coun- was a battle with the Treasury to of the proposal he inherited that try mile, but the narrative was not get it through. It was critical that it would not ‘wash its face’. Apart supported by the green side of the employees should have at least a 10 perhaps from being too ebullient media, because we were in with per cent share. Another battle we about it, that had been the fault the Tories. And there were some won was protecting the post offices not of Chris Huhne but of a junior failings. The reason why we were in people’s communities by separat- Tory minister and an overenthusi- the greenest government ever was ing them from Royal Mail.’ astic senior civil servant in charge because none of the previous gov- To what extent, in that role, had of developing the programme. He ernments had been very green, and he rubbed up against the Tories? went on to explain some of the fur- it was the Liberal Democrats who ‘In quite a lot of areas we saw eye ther detail but he then admitted that made this one green. But we had to eye, but employee legislation he had misjudged the revised ver- to fight all the way on, for exam- was the biggest problem. There sion of the deal. ‘It was a policy fail- ple, renewables, energy efficiency, was a conflict between things the ure on our part.’ railway transport investment and Liberal Democrats wanted to do, A failure which sounded as if green regulations. Eric Pickles which were in the coalition agree- it was attributable more to over- was the worst. He opposed almost ment, and things the Tories wanted enthusiasm by civil servants than everything whether on hous- to do, which weren’t and were to obstruction or incompetence. ing, planning, energy efficiency mostly very right wing and nasty. Apparently that was not a pattern or whatever. We won most of our

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 27 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers battles in DECC and a few in BIS the future for the Liberal Demo- agreement. With hindsight had the but elsewhere it was more difficult.’ crats in coalition of any kind agreement been the best they could He cited particularly the suc- was less bright. Had the past five have achieved at the time and did he cesses of more than trebling the years killed off the whole con- think it had worked in practice? output of renewable electricity, cept of coalition as a good form of ‘I think the agreement was leading the world by a long way government? pretty good but I think the main in offshore wind power and being ‘Well it hasn’t for me. I think problem was that it was only part of now in the top ten in solar power. If people should think much harder. what happened. First of all, it was he had to pick his greatest achieve- Is it good for government? I think it not fully implemented. For exam- ment, what would it be? is far better than single-party gov- ple, there was supposed to be a Coa- ‘Undoubtedly the European ernment. It is far more transparent. lition Committee. It never met and deals I did. In 2008 Blair and Mer- It prevents any one party going to was replaced by the ‘Quad’, which kel had agreed across the EU to an extreme. In fact, because every was not envisaged. what they called 2020 targets – 20 policy has to be agreed it is a much What were they? ‘The Com- per cent renewable energy, 20 per more evidence-based approach, mittee would have included Vince cent reduction in carbon emissions which is a good place for Liberal Cable and me. The ‘Quad’ didn’t!’ and 20 per cent energy efficiency by Democrats.’ The four who were members were 2020. We may yet achieve that, but I could see the reward for those David Cameron, Nick Clegg, what a lot of us realised was that we who were part of a coalition, but George Osborne and Danny Alex- had to start thinking about 2030 and what about the credit for a minority ander. He suspected that the idea beyond very soon. We needed a new party and its support from poten- of having the Quad rather than the agreement but there was no leader- tial voters? ‘Ah that is a different committee had come from the lead- ship in the EU and some opposition. question. The first is “Was it good ers, ‘because leaders tend to find So over two and a half years I set up government?” In this case it was. smaller groups more amenable and a Green Growth Group and spent Undoubtedly. The politics about it easy to manage’. a lot of time going around talking is that it has been an electoral disas- ‘But the second, more important to other countries in the EU and ter for the Liberal Democrats. But issue, was that as well as the agree- finally achieving agreement on 2030 we must be careful. It wasn’t the ment, there were the private talks targets. This could lead, at the Paris coalition that did for us. We always between Cameron and Clegg about summit later this year, to an inter- expected to lose some seats. It was personnel – i.e. about ministerial national agreement on targets.’ the unprecedented phenomenon of appointments. In the negotiating It was good to hear of real the Scots Nats and the fear that they team we didn’t know about those achievement in government but and Labour engendered.’ – maybe Danny did but we didn’t. So when I was rung up and offered Energy and Climate Change, I asked Nick if he realised that he and Cameron were offering me a poi- Chris Huhne soned chalice because of the nuclear Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 2010–12; MP for Eastleigh (power) issue and that by giving 2005–12 Vince BIS they were giving him the equally toxic issue of tuition fees to (15 June 2015) spending review when, apart from We met in his delightful eight- those departments that had been eenth-century flat in the City. He deliberately ring-fenced, like the was deliberately the last of my NHS and International Develop- interviewees. With the knowledge ment, we came out best from the of all I had learnt from Nick Clegg process. I think we had a lot of suc- and the nine other ex-ministers, cess. There were a lot of battles to I wanted to take advantage of his fight and I was criticised by a lot of three years out of Liberal Democrat Tories for being too tough. Indeed politics, but it was still right to start it was quite amusing that, when with his two as a secretary of state I went, a number were quoted in in the coalition. Had that felt like a the press as being relieved because position of real power or had he felt they thought things would be eas- endlessly constrained by Conserva- ier because I had been so difficult, tives or coalition obligations? but course they weren’t because in ‘No. I thought we were able reality they were in coalition and to do a lot actually. We got the they did not have a majority. So I first energy bill through and the don’t resile in any way from being White Paper for the second energy difficult because we had a lot of bill. We got the carbon budget negotiating strength.’ approved, we had some success He had been a principal mem- working with European allies on ber of the Liberal Democrat coa- the international climate nego- lition negotiating team and the tiations, and in general it was the obligations and restraints put on the time of the first comprehensive party were those established by the

28 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers deal with. In other words the Tories I think the Chris Rennard had understood ‘What a terrible, terrible mes- were offering us the two portfolios the risks of fighting on the wide sage! That’s like going into the pub most designed to call into question agreement front that had always failed the and saying I want the tonic water our integrity and ability to deliver.’ party in the 1980s and that had done or the soda water. People don’t go This sounded like a conspiracy was pretty so again in the last two elections. in for that. They go in for the gin theory so was he saying that they Chris recalled his own early experi- or the whisky, not the mixer. The should not have accepted those good but … ence of three times failing to win a best possible gloss on moderation is responsibilities, when they were seat in parliament and claimed that that it is dilution, moderating the both really good jobs? ‘No. I am it was only anyone who had had direct experi- others, but most British elections saying that the decisions were not ence of what he called ‘the cruelty are basically dominated by fear. joined up. If I had known during the part of what of the electoral system’ would have Most people who vote Tory do so negotiations that that was the way happened. known that the broad approach because they fear Labour and most we were going, we would have been would not work. In effect he was Labour voters fear the Tories. Put tougher on those issues in the agree- First of all, saying that, whatever the tempta- yourself in the shoes of the Labour ment, particularly on tuition fees tions might be, ‘fighting the air voter who thinks his benefits are where so many MPs had signed that it was not war’ on a broad front, rather than going to be cut. Or the Tory small petition and waved those placards.’ concentrating, might pick up votes businessman who thinks he is going Looking at the five year span fully imple- but it did not win seats. to be subjected to his taxes going now did he think that the coalition Experience in other countries up. What’s our message to them? had worked in practice as a govern- mented. For in Europe had also shown that We are going to cut benefits a little ment for the UK? ‘Yes I do. I think being a minority party in govern- bit less or the tax on his house won’t it was the right thing to do at the example, ment always led to a loss of seats. be so much! That is just the mixer time and there would have been He quoted ‘half’ as being the rule in the drink, not the message.’ some potentially very dire out- there was of thumb in Holland. In the UK the I warmed to his analysis but what comes if we hadn’t done what we Liberal Democrats had lost two- would he have done? Apart from did. Don’t forget that the very day supposed to thirds of their seats in 2015. quoting his own literature from after the general election there was ‘I think we ran a very bad cam- Eastleigh in 2010 he was not specific, the first very serious wobble on the be a Coali- paign,’ he continued. ‘I remem- except to say that it could have been financial markets for the Greeks, ber Nick telling me in 2010 that a green message, a message about and the governor of the Bank of tion Commit- he thought we had run a great education – primary schools, class England, Mervyn King, and the campaign. I don’t think we did. It sizes ‘or anything as long as it was permanent secretary of the Treas- tee. It never wasn’t targeted enough and we had clear, simple and positive’. ury, and Gus O’Donnell were all met and was not planned what we should be say- I told him, as almost everyone I telling us “Could you please final- ing or doing if he won the leader’s had interviewed had told me, that ise your agreement before the mar- replaced by debate, which of course he did. All the principal difference between kets reopen on Monday morning?” we heard afterwards was the hissing 2015 and previous elections had Well, of course, that was ridiculous. the ‘Quad’, of the air leaving the balloon. seemed to be the centrally initiated In Belgium, for example, forming ‘In my view John Sharkey was and precisely targeted bombard- a coalition sometimes takes weeks which was the wrong person to run that cam- ment of voters in Liberal Democrat or months, including a lot of long paign and even more wrong there- held seats – personal letters from lunches. It was absurd. Neverthe- not envis- fore as the choice to run the crown David Cameron, personal emails less we did achieve it by Tuesday! jewels of the agreement, the AV and direct mail on issues, and end- ‘We were very vulnerable. We aged … The referendum campaign. That was less telephone calls reminding them had a bigger deficit than Greece. It a disaster, but let’s come back to of the dangers of Labour and the was the right thing to do although I Committee 2015. I had warned [Guardian, 2014] SNP. Local campaigns had seemed don’t think we handled it very well that, if we had a mushy message in to count for almost nothing. How afterwards.’ would have the election, we would come out did he see that? It had not worked for Liberal with sod all. We needed one clear ‘It is a key point, and it is a Democrats on 7 May 2015, had it? included positive message, as we had done form of campaigning that avoids ‘No, it hadn’t but there were a lot in some previous elections – for the expenses rule because it does of reasons for that. The problem is Vince Cable example “1p on income tax for not mention the candidate, but let that there are too many explana- schools”. At least in 2010 we had the us remember what we got wrong tions, not too few. The difficulty and me. The tax threshold. You need one clear in the air war. The national cam- is working out which are the most ‘Quad’ didn’t! message to give people a reason to paign had no attractive message important. In retrospect some of justify voting for you when chal- and we were not targeting as we the problems were already appar- lenged in the pub. More schools. should have done. But you are abso- ent in 2010. That was the first elec- Something! But what did we have lutely right. The Tories developed tion result we had had for many this time?’ a new technique in this war. It was years when our share of the vote Would he not agree that there a bit like the Franco-Prussian war went up but our number of seats was one word in frequent use dur- when the Prussians turned up with went down. That was a real warn- ing the election, a word that I a new rifle that the French didn’t ing signal. It was partly a rebellion remembered describing in Liberal have. Every so often in the history by our impatient young campaign News in a similar context of possible of warfare one side in a war gets a team against the cautious targeted coalition in 1974 as ‘a bag of feath- technological advantage. What the approach of what I would call ers’? That word was ‘moderation’. Tories did this time was they found “Rennardism”.’ This produced a minor explosion. a way of using masses of money to

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 29 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers target swing voters ruthlessly. So handling of tuition fees and the AV The two big still clearly proving extremely dif- what has actually happened is that referendum. We could have done ficult to swallow – was in the eat- we now have a very small number both so much better. If you accept mistakes we ing. To continue the analogy for a of marginal seats. This means that that we made those mistakes, could moment, a few of the Liberal Dem- under the first past the post system we have recovered from them? The made were ocrat sanctioned ingredients proved you can reduce the number of peo- first rule in politics is ‘Never apolo- to be undercooked and verging ple who are uncertain about their gise. Never explain.’ On the other in that first on the toxic and a few were more vote to an even smaller number and hand when you have done some- unpalatable and indigestible, all of ignore the firm Tory and Labour thing as damaging to your brand as year were which meant that the many bet- voters entirely. What the Tories we did with tuition fees, then you ter tastes of other ingredients were did was a lot of telephone polling have to recover trust ….’ the handling never recognised. The reaction of beforehand to find out exactly who And trust had really been lost? of tuition the majority of voters on 7 May those swing voters were and what ‘Oh yes it was. Remember all par- 2015 was to pour their helping of they cared about. Hence all those ties can compromise and break fees and the the pudding into the waste bin for personal letters about these issues.’ some promises, but there are also fear of something worse. Or, I suggested, the dangers of promises so important to your base AV referen- The unhelpful issues, or ingre- a Labour–SNP government? He that you tamper with them at your dients, almost all the ex-ministers agreed and continued in the same peril. Let me give you an example. dum. We appeared to suggest with varying vein for a few minutes, repeating Cameron has broken lots of prom- degrees of anger or distaste, were ‘They spent a lot of money,’ and ises but the one promise he never could have coalition with the Tories, tuition then adding, ‘but this was not a broke was to say that he would pro- fees, NHS reform, the mismanaged badly resourced election for us and tect old people’s universal benefits. done both so AV referendum, Liberal Demo- one person particularly deserves He never did and he hasn’t.’ crat guilt by association with other credit for that – Ian Wriggles- On that issue he believed the much better. issues like the bedroom tax and, worth. He raised a lot of money. Liberal Democrats could have been however necessary they might If we had known how to spend it more courageous in insisting on the have been, cuts in public services. properly, we could have done the means testing of those who didn’t For example – in contrast to Nick same as the Tories and fought them. need benefits and enjoyed free Harvey – Chris Huhne and even Next time we can do that.’ travel and subsidised home heating. Tom McNally, Nick Clegg, Vince As we neared an end he came up Finally, what did he think Cable and Danny Alexander did with a gruesome calculation. ‘What was the future for the Liberal not see tuition fees as having made worries me is that we are down to Democrats? a crucial difference to the election a minority of people who switched He hoped that the party would results except, perhaps in certain their votes in a small minority of have some good by-elections in seats, and held to the positive view seats which changed hands. That is the next two years and do well about improved university funding probably an electorate of no more with them. If so, that would pro- and more access to universities for than 200,000 people. Which is vide the oxygen that could fuel a poorer students. On the other hand, probably what we had at the time of rebound. But the reverse of that Nick Clegg was as condemnatory the Great Reform Act.’ coin was what had killed off David as anyone about the lack of an all- Leaping forward nearly a cou- Owen’s rump SDP in 1989 – dis- party approach to AV. ple of centuries I wanted to know astrous third or fourth place by- Inevitably ex-ministerial reac- whether, if he had been party leader election results and a collapse of tions to coalition were also heavily in the second or third year of a coa- credibility. Despite that gloomy coloured by the election results that lition that he had willingly entered, prospect he was confident that the followed. Unsurprisingly stunned there was any one thing he would new party leader, whoever he was, by the number of Liberal Democrat have done at that stage to stem the would be able to avoid the pitfalls seats lost on 7 May 2015, including party’s decline? of extinction. their own, most of the ex-ministers ‘The two big mistakes we made Let us hope so. were very critical of the party’s were in that first year were the national campaign. There was a wide divergence of view as to what went wrong. While Nick Clegg, Danny Alex- ander, Michael Moore and Paul Conclusion: Adrian Slade Burstow put the blame on fear of a Labour–SNP government When you and your party have just Conservatives; all broadly accepted and the Tory local bombardment been through the nearest equiva- the terms of the agreement reached that went with it, Vince Cable, lent to political Armageddon it between the two parties in May Nick Harvey and Chris Huhne cannot be easy to be rational about 2010 and, with the one clear excep- were particularly scathing about the coalition that appears to have tion of Nick Harvey, almost all the ineffectiveness of the Liberal brought about your downfall. And believed – full-heartedly or rather Democrat campaign. Comments yet, even in retrospect, not one Lib- reluctantly – that the coalition had ranged from a relatively polite eral Democrat ex-coalition min- made a reasonably good job of what ‘weak and abysmal’ to ‘petu- ister retracted his or her original it set out to do. lant and childish’ and ‘terrible’, support for the decision to take The problem of the pudding and that was despite being better the party into a coalition with the carefully put together – and it is funded than in previous years.

30 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 coalition and the deluge: interviews with former ministers

Although he offered no very Vince Cable, All that said, the truth of the that he and David Cameron had clear solution to what he and others matter almost certainly is, and created. It was small comfort for blamed as a ‘lack of message’, Chris Nick Harvey every poll since 2010 has confirmed him to have retained his seat when Huhne may well have been right it, that the Liberal Democrats he had lost everything else: his job when he pointed out that, for once, and Chris starting losing a huge proportion as Deputy Prime Minister, almost the party was not totally bereft of of their normal floating or tacti- all his fellow MPs, no more oppor- central funds and that more could Huhne were cal voters almost from the first tunity to be in government, and have been done to counter the moment the party went into coa- probably also most of the hopes he relentless Tory Central Office poll- particu- lition with the Tories. The fact set out with when he first became ing, telephoning, emailing and that there was no alternative, the party leader in 2008. Inevitably he direct mail targeting of floating larly scath- fact that Labour had left the coun- is now on the rough end of criticism voters in Liberal Democrat con- ing about try in an economic mess, the fact from a few of his ministers, even if stituencies. Certainly many of the that Labour had neither the votes most of it is relatively gentle, and ministers I talked to felt that this the ineffec- nor the inclination to do any kind probably sharper criticism from had been one of the key factors in of deal of rescue with the Lib- some party members; but no min- their defeat. They simply could not tiveness of eral Democrats, the fact that Nick ister has reneged on the concept of compete with the scale of this kind Clegg and his party were doing it the coalition or criticised his deter- of campaigning. the Liberal in a crisis for the good of country mination to make it last the full What every MP facing a Tory as – all were ignored by the party’s five years. The fact that, during the his main opponent agreed was that Democrat natural supporters and some of its time of his joint coalition, the UK the message of fear of Miliband, the active members. A terrible sin had moved so well from economic cri- Labour Party and the SNP as a pos- campaign. been committed and the deser- sis to relative stability, on the way sible government was hammered tion of support quickly began. This also achieving significant changes home so hard that it drove most of Comments was then compounded about two in many areas of policy, will ulti- the Liberal Democrat voters who months later by the revelation to mately be noted by historians and had previously assured them of ranged from some of its core voters – the parents remembered. their seats to desert the party for of school children, the teachers and Characteristically Nick Clegg the Tories. No doubt this flight was a relatively many of those in the public ser- has accepted most of the blame for not helped by the loss of trust over vice professions – that, under their the party’s new dilemma. Let us tuition fees or the anger of tactical polite ‘weak agreement with Tories, the pre- now hope that the Liberal Demo- voters from Labour at collaboration cious Liberal Democrat pledge on crat recovery will ultimately prove with the Tories, but they were sub- and abysmal’ tuition fees was being abandoned. that he did not strive in vain. sidiary to the fear factor. to ‘petulant This ‘betrayal’ was enough to drive Ironically, according to Lynne away even more of the 2010 sup- Featherstone, a part reverse was hap- and childish’ port and, for all the fine achieve- Acknowledgements and pening to her and Simon Hughes ment of the Liberal Democrats in thanks in the two seats in London where and ‘terri- coalition, trust was lost and it never Nick Clegg, Tom McNally, Nick Liberal Democrats faced Labour. came back. Harvey, Michael Moore, Steve Although it was undoubtedly abet- ble’, and that In May 2010 Nick Clegg had Webb, Paul Burstow, Lynne Feath- ted by some of the other coalition been caught between the devil and erstone, Danny Alexander, Vince issues, hate and fear of a Tory major- was despite the deep blue sea. All the devil had Cable, Ed Davey, Chris Huhne, ity were enough to overthrow their to offer him was a party opt-out Duncan Brack, Mark Pack, Deir- significant local majorities. being better of government which would have dre Razzall, Hilary Muggridge, Even then, on the positive made the Liberal Democrats look Sue Slade and all the heads of office, side, there was a wide consen- funded than weak, indecisive and unwilling to researchers, parliamentary assis- sus that, despite all these issues be in politics to take any kind of tants and HQ staff who helped me and disappointments, the coali- in previous power. So he persuaded his party to arrange and, in difficult circum- tion had worked well in a number to plump instead for the deep blue stances, hold on to the interview of respects. On the whole, rela- years. sea of serious talks with the Tories, times we managed to achieve. tions between Liberal Democrat followed by a fixed five-year term and Conservative ministers in each of working with Tories across the Adrian Slade was the last President ministry had been good and much board. If the party conference of of the Liberal Party, from Septem- that was Liberal Democrat in origin 2009 had been more willing to ber 1987 to March 1988, and first joint had been achieved, particularly in listen to Vince Cable and Nick interim President, with Shirley Wil- the Treasury, Work and Pensions, Clegg’s warnings about the acute liams, of the newly merged Social & Business Innovation and Skills, difficulty of delivering on the tui- Liberal Democrats, from March to July Energy and Climate Change and in tion fee promise, life might have 1988. Between 1981 and 1986 he was the Home Office with Lynne Feath- been easier for him but conference the Liberal member for Richmond on erstone’s tireless work in bringing decided to dictate that crucial piece the Greater London Council and leader about the same-sex marriage bill of the 2010 manifesto and the MPs of the Liberal/SDP Alliance group. and her equally important fight in chose to sport pledge placards in He stood for parliament four times, International Development against support of it. three times in Putney (1966 and twice female genital mutilation. But most So it was hardly surprising that in 1974) and once in Wimbledon (1987) of that had appeared to go unno- my most poignant interview was polling the highest Liberal (or Liberal ticed by the public. Credit was in with Nick Clegg. He had had most Democrat) vote yet to be achieved in very short supply. to gain or lose from the coalition either constituency.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 31 WhateverWh the achievements of Liberaly Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment it ended disastrously g for theo party, with the wroncatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, Nickg Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong.

Decline and fall: how coalition killed the Lib Dems (almost) Stephen Tall t 10 pm on 7 May 2015, the accurately the 2010 poll had pre- the loss of our urban English seats Lib Dems experienced our dicted that the Lib Dems were des- where Labour was the challenger. Avery own ‘JFK moment’ tined to lose more seats than at any What was quite stunning – utterly, – we all remember where we were election since 1970. If anything, the compellingly, breathtakingly – when the BBC exit poll was psephologists were over-optimistic unforeseen – was the scale of our released showing the party scythed this time: in forecasting the party defeat at the hands of our Conserv- down from fifty-seven to just ten would reach double figures, they ative coalition partners in the sub- MPs. Some, like our campaign inflated our result by 25 per cent. urbs and rural areas we had thought chair Paddy Ashdown, refused to No one – not even the most pes- were our fortresses. None of us had admit the possibility, famously simistic, coalition-hating, Clegg- seen that coming. promising David Dimbleby that, if allergic, Orange Book-phobic Lib Thinking I could detect some it were accurate, ‘I will publicly eat Dem – had thought it would be kind of 1992-style Tory bounce- my hat on your programme’. Many that bad. The rout of all but one of back in the final few days of the more of us had an instant sinking our Scottish MPs by the SNP was campaign, I got in touch with a top feeling in our guts, recalling how not entirely unexpected. Nor was Lib Dem strategist to ask, ‘Should

32 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 WhateverWh the achievements of Liberaly Democrat did ministers in the coalition, the experiment it ended disastrously g for theo party, with the wroncatastrophic May 2015 general election. Stephen Tall, Nickg Harvey?, John Pugh, Matthew Huntbach and David Howarth offer their opinions of why it all went so badly wrong.

we be worried that Cameron’s It is worth challengers in most of the party’s badly as his predecessor Tory prime schedule is targeting so many Lib- held seats. minister, John Major. Meanwhile Dem-held seats? Do they actually taking a step Then two things happened. Labour, denuded of the instant sniff 300+ seats?’ No, I was assured, First, the global financial cri- unity conferred by its misplaced the Conservatives were ‘wast- back to make sis rocked the domestic political outrage at the ‘ConDem’ coalition, ing their time in Twickenham and scene. Cameron’s flimsy platform might well have descended into Yeovil’. Tell that to Vince Cable another obvi- of compassionate Conservatism Miliband v. Miliband civil war. and David Laws. In one top Lib – that through ‘sharing the pro- It would have been an ideal sce- Dem target, where the party ended ous point, ceeds of future growth’ it was pos- nario for the Lib Dems, the perfect up finishing third, I was told by a sible both to cut taxes and protect launch pad for further gains from highly experienced activist that but one public services – collapsed, and his both parties. ‘our canvassing goes back years. which is now party retreated to its right-wing, This may be just an alternative I thought it was robust. I still do. austerity comfort zone. The pub- reality based on nothing more than There were absolutely no signs of often forgot- lic looked on, nervously, at the idle speculation – but the tantalis- this, not even on the ground today.’ thought of the untested Cameron ing glimpse of what might have So how did it happen? What ten: the Lib and his even younger shadow chan- been is worth bearing in mind, caused the most disastrous elec- cellor, George Osborne, taking the not least because it is what the Lib tion result for the Lib Dems since Dems had helm at this moment of crisis. The Dem leadership had planned for. … well, pretty much since records Tories’ poll lead narrowed. One of Nick Clegg’s first decisions began? not expected Secondly, the first-ever tel- as party leader at the start of 2008 evised leaders’ debate between the was to commission what became ~ to be in gov- three main party leaders took place, known as ‘The Bones Report’ (after with the fresh-faced Clegg best- its author, Professor Chris Bones, a The answer is almost too obvious: ernment in ing both Cameron and Gordon Lib Dem activist and management our decision to enter into a coali- Brown. The Lib Dem poll surge it expert) into ‘how the Liberal Dem- tion government with the Con- 2010. sparked proved to be phosphores- ocrats’ internal organisation could servatives during the most severe cently flashy and brief. But even be built upon to double our number economic downturn in a century. the small ratings boost probably of MPs over the next two general However, it is worth taking a helped deprive the Conservatives of elections’. The implicit assumption step back to make another obvi- the majority they had expected to was that the party would grow, ous point, but one which is now be theirs, as well as saving a clutch rapidly but incrementally, for a fur- often forgotten: the Lib Dems had of Lib Dem seats – eight MPs won ther decade in opposition. not expected to be in government with majorities of less than 5 per in 2010. The widespread assump- cent over their Tory challenger – ~ tion had been (from the moment that might otherwise have been lost. Gordon Brown flunked ‘the elec- It is intriguing to pose the coun- As it was, the party was faced, on 7 tion that never was’ in October terfactual: what if the Conserva- May 2010, with the Hobson’s choice 2007) that David Cameron’s Con- tives had edged a victory in May of doing a deal with the Tories. servatives would triumph. In April 2010 and the coalition had never This was the only option available 2010, the Independent on Sunday been formed? Cameron would for which the numbers added up asked eight pollsters to predict the have had to have tried to keep his to more than the 323 MPs required result: all eight forecast an over- rebellious backbenchers in check for a bare majority and so offered a all Conservative majority. The Lib without the assistance of the hefty period of stable government. The Dems were widely seen to be on majority the Lib Dem bloc of alternative, most of us assumed (I the defensive against this blue tide; MPs afforded him. Chances are he still think correctly), was a minor- after all, the Tories were the nearest would have struggled at least as ity Tory administration forcing a

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 33 why did it go wrong? second cut-and-run election within warrant; it was our actions within who would not point to other poli- months and a resulting vicious the coalition. This debate matters cies – like infant free school meals, squeeze on the Lib Dems. because it has big implications for or same-sex marriage, or more However, few of us were under whether the party should consider apprenticeships – which were suc- any illusions as to quite how dan- coalition again. Is there something cessfully pushed by the Lib Dems gerous a Lib–Con pact might be to intrinsic about being a junior party in office. Or who would not high- the party’s electoral fortunes. As I in a Westminster coalition which light Conservative policies, such as wrote on the Liberal Democrat Voice means you have lost before you hire-and-fire at will or repeal of the website on the Saturday morning have started? Or is your fate in your The big- Human Rights Act or the proposed after the election: own hands – is it possible to make a ‘snoopers’ charter’, which the Lib success of it, if handled well? gest single Dems had vetoed. It is a creditable … many of our members, and The biggest single plummet in plummet litany, especially for a party with even more of our supporters, Lib Dem vote share occurred in just 9 per cent of MPs. would identify themselves as those first six months. Entering in Lib Dem The trouble was that the public ‘progressives’, a vague term which into the coalition with the Con- did not notice. At least they were can be reasonably translated as servatives was a toxic act for many vote share even-handed, ignoring not only ‘anti-Tory’. There is a very real 2010 Lib Dem voters, and our rat- our triumphs but also our disasters risk that by throwing in our ing plunged from 23 per cent in occurred in and treating both those imposters lot with Cameron, or even just May, to 13 per cent by the end of just the same. As the British Elec- appearing to, those progressive the year. The tuition fees U-turn those first tion Study, which has been exam- voters will desert the Lib Dems coincided with this, though did not ining how and why the public vote in favour of Labour, and that may in itself precipitate the collapse. It six months. as they do in every election since threaten many of the fifty-seven did, however, do longer-term repu- 1964, noted: ‘The Lib Dems did Lib Dem seats we now hold. tational damage to the party (and, Entering into not do so badly because they were of course, to Nick Clegg, whose blamed for the failings of the coali- Despite these fears, though, it was a infamous 2010 pledge to oppose any the coalition tion; rather, the majority of voters collective, almost unanimous, deci- increase spectacularly backfired). simply seem to have felt that they sion. No official count was taken What followed was a long- with the Con- were an irrelevant component of at the special Birmingham confer- drawn-out decline. This was the the last government.’ ence on 16 May, 2010, which sealed period in which the party found servatives Two examples suffice. Among the deal, but estimates in the hall, itself outnumbered by the Con- the 44 per cent of voters who where about 1,500 Lib Dem mem- servatives in government, out- was a toxic though the economy was getting bers debated the formation of the oppositioned by Labour on the better, just 19 per cent credited the coalition, suggested only about centre left, and outflanked by anti- act for many Lib Dems compared to 73 per cent fifty conference representatives establishment parties untainted by 2010 Lib who thought it was thanks to the voted against the motion endors- government office with more strik- Conservatives. Meanwhile, of the ing the agreement: the rest of the ingly populist messages (UKIP’s Dem voters, two-thirds of voters who thought hundreds eligible to vote were all anti-immigration dog whistle, the the NHS had got worse under the in favour. SNP’s pro-nationalism placebo, the and our rat- coalition, just 19 per cent held the Initial enthusiasm was under- Greens’ anti-austerity posturing). Lib Dems responsible while 69 standable. The Lib Dems had been Quite simply, we disappeared ing plunged per cent pinned the blame on the out of government for close on a from view, becoming seen as an Tories. century, and the prospect of our irrelevance as our support dwin- from 23 per Unfair? Mostly, yes. But like policies, approved by our confer- dled: a vicious spiral. By the time sailors complaining about the sea, ence, being implemented in gov- of the 2015 general election, and cent in May, it is pointless to wag our finger ernment by our ministers was a our doomed attempt to fight a first- at the voters. Moreover, I do not glistening one. What is perhaps past-the-post election on the basis to 13 per cent think I was the only Lib Dem who, more remarkable is that even with of being everyone’s second favour- as the coalition drew to a close, the benefit of hindsight, it appears ite party, we had been ruthlessly by the end of felt a nagging worry that while most of us would do it again. When squeezed down to just 8 per cent. our party’s successes were things Liberal Democrat Voice asked party the year. The which the Conservatives had lit- members in May 2015, ‘Knowing ~ tle trouble with, the Conservatives’ all you know now, would you have tuition fees successes (too-tight-too-soon aus- still gone in to a coalition with the Was it worth it? Let us look at the terity, over-harsh crackdowns on Conservatives back in 2010?’, 74 per profit-and-loss account, the deb- U-turn coin- social security such as the ‘bedroom cent said yes. its and credits of our record in cided with tax’, Andrew Lansley’s pointlessly government. expensive health reforms) were ~ The Lib Dems were not short this, though things we should have had no truck of achievements. There was not a with. At first glance that enthusiasm senior Lib Dem who was not able did not in Sure, our ministers did their appears odd, given we can date the to rehearse, when challenged ‘But best, and yes, the coalition was Lib Dems’ election catastrophe to what have you done?’, the line that itself pre- markedly less right wing, and in that point-of-no-return decision. three of our top four 2010 priorities some areas even quite liberal, com- For many members, though, it was – tax cuts for low earners, the Pupil cipitate the pared to full-blown Tory rule. not the signing of the coalition Premium, the Green Investment But – let us ask ourselves honestly deal which signed the party’s death Bank – had been delivered. Or collapse. – did we truly succeed in moving

34 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? the country in a sufficiently liberal The party’s Labour one’. This kind of split-the- On completing the coalition direction for enough people during difference positioning was unloved negotiations in 2010, William our five years in government given campaign by activists – who labelled it defen- Hague is said to have told his wife, the price we ended up paying? sive and unambitious – yet it was Ffion: ‘I think I’ve just killed the Because it was not just in May itself has the only realistic option avail- Liberal Democrats.’ 2015 that the Lib Dems were wiped able. I call it an option, but it was Well, perhaps. After all, we out. That was simply the culmina- been much not, not really. It was thrust on us were just 24,968 votes – the com- tion of five years of humiliating by the voters when they popped bined majorities of the eight rump defeats at every level of representa- criticised, in the ‘Cleggmania’ balloon in May Lib Dem MPs – away from being tive government. In the European 2010 and then torpedoed electoral wiped out. And, assuming the parliament, eleven of our twelve particular for reform by rejecting the Alternative Tories now move to implement the MEPs were defeated. In Scotland, Nick Clegg’s Vote a year later. long-overdue constituency bound- we lost twelve of the seventeen Those who denounced the strat- ary reforms (blocked by the Lib seats we were defending. (Wales, mantra that egy of liberal centrism were hiding Dems in 2012 in retaliation for the where we lost only one of our pre- from the truth that the party’s only Tories kiboshing of House of Lords vious six AMs, was a relative suc- the purpose route into government was in coali- reform), our notional number of cess.) Our local government base tion with one of the two main par- seats is a mere four. Just because we was hacked down year after year, of the Lib ties, either the right-leaning Tories feel we have hit rock bottom does from 3,944 councillors in 2010 to or left-leaning Labour. That inevita- not automatically guarantee things just 1,801 in 2015. Today we control Dems was to bly meant compromise, pegging the will now get better. six councils, down from twenty- Lib Dems as the party of moderate, But we have 18,000 new party five in 2010. Only in the unelected ‘bring a heart fair-minded pragmatism. We may members and we have a new leader, House of Lords has Lib Dem repre- not have wanted to place ourselves in Tim Farron. Which other politi- sentation grown. to a Conserv- the centre, but that is precisely where cal force in the next five years will For five years of restraining our circumstances put us. We had be making the case for being pro- the Conservatives at Westminster, ative govern- no choice but to make a virtue from immigration and pro-Europe, for plus a handful of policy advances, necessity. An appeal to radical liber- reforming our drugs laws and our the Lib Dems sacrificed decades of ment and alism – land value tax, proportional political system, for championing hard-won gains across the country. representation, a citizen’s income! – civil liberties and the environment, The opportunity cost of lost liberal a brain to a would merely have invited derision and for opposing inheritance-tax influence has been huge. given our necessarily constrained cuts which benefit only the wealth- Labour one’. record in coalition and that we iest and tax-credits cuts which hurt ~ This kind of would have been unable to explain the working poor? how such manifesto promises could For five years the Lib Dems were Was there anything the party could split-the- plausibly be delivered. the opposition to the Conserva- have done to staunch the losses we Ultimately, the 2015 general tives within the coalition. Now suffered in May 2015? I am doubt- difference election simply was not about us. that is done, and with Labour clue- ful. We were, I believe, destined for It was not a change election, but a less about how to respond to their heavy defeat the moment we joined positioning fear election. The spectre of Prime defeat, it looks like the Lib Dems the coalition. Too Tory for our pro- Minister Miliband in hock to the will be the only effective national gressive voters, not Tory enough for was unloved SNP appears to have persuaded opposition to the Conservatives in our small-c conservative voters. The enough voters to put to one side this parliament as well. We are not voters who remained – pragmatic, by activists – their doubts about the Conserva- dead yet. rational liberals (many of whom tives, to hold onto nurse for fear of have since swelled the ranks of the who labelled something worse. Former Lib Dem Stephen Tall was co-editor of the Lib- party as new members) – are too MP Jeremy Browne was surely eral Democrat Voice website from 2007 thinly spread to win us many seats. it defensive right when he said: ‘If the coalition to 2015. He edited the 2013 publica- Maybe it would be different was on the ballot paper, it would tion, Coalition and Beyond: Liberal under proportional representation and unambi- win in May’. But it was not, so the Reforms for the Next Decade and (our 8 per cent of the vote would only logical choice for those voters is a research associate at the think tank yield us around fifty MPs), but tious – yet anxious to avoid a change of gov- Centre Forum. Stephen was a councillor first past the post is what the vot- ernment was to vote Conservative. for eight years in Oxford, 2000–08. ers chose in 2011. And for as long it was the as we have it, a third party looking only realis- to be the moderating force in what seems to be a close election will get tic option flattened by the inevitable pincer From the Rose Garden to the compost heap movement. Even our MPs’ much- available. Nick Harvey vaunted local incumbency is not, it turns out, a magic wand. he Liberal Democrats’ a post-mortem exercise and to let The party’s campaign itself has cataclysm on 7 May 2015 people get things off their chest – been much criticised, in particu- Tdemands analysis and brought roughly half the defeated lar for Nick Clegg’s mantra that reflection, and will be subjected to MPs together for the first time since the purpose of the Lib Dems was both for many years. A ‘gathering the election. There was a unani- to ‘bring a heart to a Conserva- of the fallen’ at the start of July – mous view that we had ‘fought tive government and a brain to a organised by the Whips’ Office as the wrong campaign’ (but fought

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 35 why did it go wrong? it rather well). But there were as We were far got the T-shirt. Now let’s tell you scenarios. The ‘big offer’ on the Fri- many disparate views of what the about our plans for the next five day lunchtime was far from spon- ‘right campaign’ would have been too keen in years …’ and to have listed four or taneous: it had been well rehearsed as there were people in the room. five distinctive, radical and above and was carefully choreographed. What was striking, however, the early all new ideas. I had no magic recipe, The coalition negotiations in was that despite our appalling elec- but promising five (unspecified) the heady days following the 2010 tion outcome – following disas- days to bills sold our environmentalism election were conducted in three trous rounds of local elections, short; we abandoned our cutting parts. Firstly – and most publicly calamitous European elections, and show that edge on education (Michael Gove – was policy: two teams, led by the loss of a third of our member- had set a shocking agenda – might William Hague and Danny Alex- ship and two-thirds of our popu- the world we not have recovered our initia- ander, assisted by policy gurus Oli- lar support – there also remained a doesn’t end tive, for example in the deplorably ver Letwin and David Laws, spent unanimous view that we had done underdeveloped space of 14–19 hours hammering out a policy pro- the right thing in the crisis condi- if you get a education?); admirable propos- spectus for the coalition, which tions of May 2010 in entering into als on mental health had a narrow was duly presented to the nation coalition with the Conservatives. hung parlia- appeal on the NHS; new economic as the foundation block of the new So where did it all go wrong? thinking and something striking government. On the Lib Dem side Following my involuntary exit ment and to on either civil liberties or interna- there was consultation over its con- from government in September tionalism might have made for a tents and buy-in from parliamen- 2012, I wrote a pamphlet, After the prove that more interesting pitch. And if there tarians, key party committees and Rose Garden, later published by the had been a hung parliament, they even a special party conference. Institute for Government, explor- coalition would have made a good prospec- All this served the party leader- ing from a partisan Lib Dem per- tus for negotiations. ship well when the going later got spective what I perceived had gone could work. Perhaps we kidded ourselves all rocky, because there was a sense of wrong from the ‘inside’ and, draw- along that the advantages of incum- shared ownership of the decision to ing on my experiences, aiming to It was far too bency could overcome awful poll go into coalition. promote a debate about our expec- ratings – after all it hadn’t helped The second part of the negotia- tations if we ever engaged in any cosy and vot- longstanding councillors. Then tion focused on coalition machin- future coalition negotiation. we convinced the media; and then ery – the way disputes, which Before describing my conclu- ers perceived between us, I wonder whether we would inevitably arise, would be sions, let me offer a view of the and the media rattled the pollsters resolved. On our side, Jim Wallace election catastrophe. I filled an that we had into making some allowance for it brought to bear his experiences advisory role on Paddy Ashdown’s sold our souls in their analyses, if only on the gut of two coalitions in Scotland and election ‘wheelhouse’ – represent- instinct that we had bucked head- Andrew Stunell contributed his ing the interests of MPs and candi- to the Tories. line figures before? wisdom gained working for the dates. I felt throughout – and said Looking back over the five Association of Liberal Democrat to Paddy, Ryan Coetzee and Olly By contrast, years, we were far too keen in the Councillors and helping council Grender – that they were seek- early days to show that the world groups to form coalition admin- ing an organisational solution to a in the final doesn’t end if you get a hung par- istrations. The principal idea was political problem. The party’s best liament and to prove that coali- a ‘Coalition Committee’ as the political brains spent hours por- phase, when tion could work. It was far too Star Chamber to resolve disputes. ing over micro-detail of how many cosy and voters perceived that we Interestingly it rarely met. Instead doors had been knocked on in we were had sold our souls to the Tories. By the more informal ‘Quad’ (PM, which seats; baffling, as this could contrast, in the final phase, when DPM, chancellor and chief secre- have been done by good ground belatedly we were belatedly trying to dem- tary to the Treasury) was used for organisers. onstrate ‘clear water’, we looked this purpose. It tangled with some Our problem was our political trying to almost childishly petulant, undo- thorny issues, but appears to have platform, congratulating ourselves ing any advantage which serving been largely harmonious, reflect- on our achievements in coalition demonstrate in government might have done to ing perhaps some similarities in and producing a worthy but dull our fortunes. Like everyone else at outlook between the participants. manifesto whose message seemed ‘clear water’, the July post-mortem, I still believe But backbenchers and the wider to be ‘steady as she goes’ and ‘more that we were right to go into coali- membership of both coalition par- of the same’. My view throughout we looked tion. But much of the political han- ties might question the extent to was that we looked (and indeed almost child- dling – from start to finish – was which it protected wider political were) far too keen to serve in little short of disastrous, and that equities. another coalition which, given the ishly petu- accounts for our current plight. The third part of the negotiation damage to our political position – almost unremarked upon at the that the first had inflicted, seemed lant … time, beyond the fact that the Lib positively kamikaze. But question- Coalition negotiations Dems had some cabinet posts – was ing this starting point seemed to Things started to go wrong from referred to colloquially as ‘bums on be perceived as disloyalty to the before the word ‘go’, not least seats’. For the Lib Dems this meant leadership team, though in truth because the Conservatives were so which – and how many – govern- we had long passed the point of no much better prepared for the hung ment posts would be filled by Lib- return on that. parliament scenario than we were. eral Democrats, and who would fill My suggestion was to say: ‘Coa- They had foreseen the outcome them. This was dealt with entirely lition? Nah: been there, done that, months ahead and war-gamed the on a one-to-one basis between

36 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong?

David Cameron and Nick Clegg. strengthen our position and save my personal cost two years later. But, as was clear from the moment valuable time. In short, in a two-party coalition of Cameron’s ‘big offer’ to the Lib where we essential to its viability, Dems at lunchtime the day after we must have roughly a quarter of polling, the Tories knew what they Governing with the the posts. wanted from this part of the nego- Conservatives As we lick our wounds and sur- tiation far more clearly than did the Many Lib Dems greeted the 2010 vey the wreckage of our fortunes Lib Dems. negotiation as a triumph – rejoic- from the political wilderness, the Compounding this difficulty, in ing that key Lib Dem policies were [The Con- excitement of forming Britain’s contrast to the policy agenda, we to be enacted in government, and first peacetime coalition in almost Lib Dems had no internal discus- by Lib Dem ministers, for the first servatives] a century seems a distant memory sion about what we wanted here. time in eighty years. For myself, now. We are all older and wiser. We This struck me as rather odd. In the I was more sceptical. When our drove a hard can take some quiet satisfaction in British political culture party lead- negotiators reported back, my political the progress made in stabilising the ers choose who holds what post, but immediate thought was that agree- economy, reforming aspects of wel- it was surely a matter of collective ing to Lib Dem MPs abstaining on agenda and fare, improving the lot of pension- interest what number and nature of student fees and nuclear energy ers and sustaining overseas aid. We posts we expected. But it seemed was a hostage to fortune. It was too often can point to our signature achieve- to be thought either unseemly or – in practical impact – capitula- ment of raising the threshold and tempting providence to dare discuss tion, giving to the Conservatives we hadn’t taking millions out of income tax; ‘bums on seats’ and instead we sent a majority on these issues which stimulating the creation of two Nick Clegg – who had served only they had not won. I also looked at enough million apprenticeships; guaran- one term in the Commons and had the policy prospectus drawn up teeing a healthy annual rise in state very limited familiarity with the and could only see enough to fill political fire- pensions; the pupil premium pay- Lords – into battle entirely alone, the early part of the parliament, ing extra money to help children with no support, and no indication and I wondered whether as five power in the from disadvantaged backgrounds; from his colleagues as to what we years rolled out we would ever saving the post office network; cre- wanted. I was astonished that we again be in so strong a position to right places ating the Green Investment Bank had not deployed a heavyweight bargain. And I looked at the ‘bums and the Business Bank and other team to haggle over posts, numbers on seats’ in astonishment and dis- to stop them. hobby horses. and operational questions. may. I simply couldn’t believe how But being in government with Once these mechanical issues few posts we had secured: seven- Some of the the Conservatives was not the had been agreed – at breakneck teen ministers (one unpaid), three sweetness and harmony suggested speed and with inadequate collec- whips in the Commons, and three time they by the rose-garden scenes of May tive forethought – there was really whips in the Lords (two unpaid). truly set out 2010. They drove a hard politi- no way of unpicking them. We had We held just 23 posts out of 122 in cal agenda and too often we hadn’t waited eighty years for a peacetime the government. to ‘shaft’ us enough political firepower in the coalition but, in a matter of hours My assumption was that the right places to stop them. Some or at most days, on critical points Conservative starting point would and took rel- of the time they truly set out to the pass had been sold. There was be a divvy-up pro rata to Com- ‘shaft’ us and took relish in doing no political incentive for David mons seat numbers (Lib Dems ish in doing so (and throughout they were plan- Cameron to agree later to revisit getting roughly one-sixth of the ning a ‘stealth’ election strategy to any of these issues and concede posts), whereas the Lib Dem start- so … At destroy us). At other times they just more than we had agreed at the ing point would be a divvy-up pro conducted government as though outset. The window of opportunity rata to votes (Lib Dems getting other times we weren’t there and assumed we for fundamental renegotiation had roughly one-third of the posts), would go along with it. Too often, gone for five years. We could only and we would haggle to a midway they just we did. learn from experience and form a point – Lib Dems getting roughly much more detailed shopping list one-quarter of the posts. But the conducted for any future negotiation. Conservatives cannily recognised Recommendations for any With fifty years of political pro- that over five years, giving a bit government future coalition gress reversed in one parliamen- of initial ground on policy was Framing my recommendations in tary cycle, it looks a daunting task a price worth paying for getting as though my Institute for Government pam- to rebuild our lost political capital plenty of their best bums onto the phlet, I was hugely encouraged by to the point that we would be rel- key seats. Bitter experience proved we weren’t the degree of colleagues’ support evant to a hung parliament follow- them right. We must never make there and for them: such as each department ing any future general election. But this mistake again! In any future having a Lib Dem deputy secretary if that proves overly pessimistic, negotiation we must demand abso- assumed we of state armed with a veto – akin to then inevitably much of the hag- lutely that we appoint at least one the one Nick Clegg cleverly secured gling in the days after the elec- minister in every department (if the would go for himself as deputy prime minis- tion would again focus on policy. talent pool in the Commons were ter. Indeed the big wins of the 2010 So, establishing well in advance small, we are blessed with talented along with it. coalition must be consolidated – in our clear ‘demand’ over govern- peers) and three paid whips in each particular that ‘DPM veto’ (receiv- ment machinery and positions, House. Those seven or eight extra Too often, we ing contemporaneously, and hav- then making this demand clearly posts would have made a huge dif- ing to approve, prime ministerial understood from the outset, would ference, as I was to discover to did. papers); the balanced ‘Quad’; the

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 37 why did it go wrong? deputy prime minister’s chairing of is needed: perhaps backbench They need our votes to get any- the Home [domestic] Affairs cabi- funds for all parties, and front- thing through parliament. With net committee; and a Lib Dem chief bench funds only for those in proper working arrangements, secretary to the Treasury. opposition. they also need our assent to all sig- Secondly, we must have a min- • We must move beyond the nificant executive actions. ister at every department (twenty- nonsense of one party’s press Of course, deals have to be two in the current structure of team trying to gag the other struck which will sometimes result government, though we favour party: the solution is for Lib in one or other party going through merging departments), plus three Dem ministers to answer to the lobbies holding their noses. government whips in each House. the DPM press team and not to The larger party will inevitably get Add a couple of junior ministers Number Ten’s. its way more; its greater numbers to support Lib Dem secretaries of • The Coalition Committee mean it will set the agenda more state, and we would still only total should actually meet regularly of the time. Lib Dems must accept thirty: roughly a quarter of the and handle routine tensions that, and the underlying demo- government. This is entirely rea- inevitable in any partnership – cratic legitimacy derived from sonable in a two-party coalition if only referring up to the ‘Quad’ winning more votes. our participation makes the whole intractable problems they are Willingness to serve in any coa- thing viable, and peers can always Politically, unable to resolve. lition entails willingness to com- fill posts if Commons numbers are • The smaller party in a coali- promise in the national interest, and limited. the greatest tion must not be silenced in an acceptance that we will not get We shouldn’t accept backwa- parliament on the basis that the our own way all of the time. But we ter cabinet posts. We can reason- lesson Lib- larger partner ‘speaks for’ it. must ensure that we have reliable ably demand one great office of If ministers from the smaller machinery to provide an effective state (Foreign & Commonwealth eral Demo- party wish to make a separate veto on all occasions. We must be Office, Treasury or Home Office); front-bench statement, trans- ready to use it on a daily basis. And one of the politically sexy ‘hot crats must parency demands that they we must have greater collective potato’ departments (Education, must always be able to do so. ownership of that veto. Health, or Work & Pensions), and learn is to • Any future coalition should And all Lib Dem MPs and peers, fight to the death to get it; one focus on running the country prominent frontbencher or loyal ‘hard-edged’ department (Busi- …‘just say well, implementing policy, foot soldier, must be able to look ness, Innovation & Skills; Defence; dialogue with parliament and themselves in the mirror as they Energy; Communities & Local no’. It is dif- nation, devolving power, and brush their teeth before bed, con- Government); and one ‘softer’ ser- so reducing the flow of new fident that the sound sleep of the vice department (Environment, ficult for the legislation. righteous awaits them because Food & Rural Affairs; Transport; smaller party nothing they have been asked to do Culture, Media & Sport; Justice; that day has been an abandonment International Development). The in a coalition Conclusion of the liberal and democratic values final Lib Dem cabinet minister Politically, the greatest lesson Lib- that drew them into public service pretty much has to be chief secre- to make the eral Democrats must learn is to in the first place. tary to the Treasury. heed the words of Nancy Reagan The coalition party not head- larger one and ‘just say no’. It is difficult for Nick Harvey was Liberal Democrat ing any department must get first the smaller party in a coalition to MP for North Devon from 1992 to 2015 choice of the next portfolio in it. do things make the larger one do things it and Minister of State for Defence from And in every department, which- doesn’t want to. But the reverse 2010 to 2012. He served as party defence ever party does not have the sec- it doesn’t should not be true: it should be rel- spokesman from 2006, having previously retary of state should provide the atively simple to stop them doing covered Transport, Trade & Industry, deputy secretary of state – Lib want to. But things we don’t want them to do. Health, and Culture Media & Sport. Dems should make this a deal- breaker in any future negotiation. the reverse Further recommendations include: should not • Every Lib Dem minister must Coalition history – our follies and our fortune be true: it have a special adviser to sup- John Pugh port them, and cabinet minis- ters at least two. should be rel- • The Lib Dem minister in every atively sim- here is a scene in The God- inheritor of Danny Alexander’s job department must be able to: father where Michael Cor- at the Treasury, compared David serve on the department’s ple to stop Tleone, calm and collected Cameron awaiting the results to board; bring in chosen outsid- at the christening of his nephew, Michael Corleone, as one by one his ers to conduct reviews and fill them doing waits to hear the news that his plans former coalition allies were wiped appointments; and commis- have worked. Across the country off the electoral map. sion work from officials on things we in various places, rivals and erst- Shortly after the election, at their own policy initiatives while colleagues are being gunned Lib Dem HQ, I attended a post- across the department’s work. don’t want down and eliminated on his orders. mortem to hear from defeated col- • A completely new approach to At a gathering of Conservatives leagues about what went wrong. Short and Cranborne funding them to do. after the 2015 election, Greg Hands, Good points were made about the

38 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? nightmare scenario we had faced had anything to do with the major The coalition Knowing the strength of support – the polls showing a stalemate achievements or goals of the coali- we had off the back of our resolute between Miliband and Cameron, tion. The blunders we made were government defence of public services, they the fear of Scottish leverage, the utterly de trop and born of political immediately brought forward resource and intelligence of the inexperience and hubris. was not a legislation on educational and Tory ground and air war, the weak- This was manifest from the health services that was designed ness of ours, etc. Any change in very beginning, when people with bad govern- to antagonise many of those who any of those variables and the result previous experience of coalitions worked within them and possibly would not have been so bad. and pacts within a British context ment and alarm those who used them. They However, one thing the defeated (Steel, Williams, etc.), whether very consciously acted, as Oliver MPs omitted to mention was that at parliamentary level, regional was, in its Letwin put it, before their political we had not just started to lose in level or council level, were either own terms, capital was used up. In luring us 2015. We had lost badly – very ignored or kept on the margins and into the health and social care bill badly – and consistently through- advice sought instead from selected successful; (never in the coalition agreement) out the coalition years. Without the continental sources and special and creating misconceived havoc Scottish factor, an appalling night advisors. but practi- in our most cherished British insti- might perhaps just have been a very Insufficient challenge was built tution, they successfully cemented bad night. But with our poll ratings into the new system. Had it been cally none of an image of the Lib Dems as Tory- at their worst level for decades, it there, it might have been pointed lite. We let them, and initially, to was perhaps odd that MPs thought out that, given the tribalism of the strategic some sections of the party, associ- they might somehow be immune British politics, the choreography ating the party with pro-market from the decline in support that had of coalition had to look right. It blunders we health ‘reforms’ did not seem to be affected our MEPs, our councillors, had to look like a business arrange- a problem. our by-election candidates – the ment not a rose garden ‘love in’. made that so Forcing an early response to the rest of the party. It might have been noticed that Browne review of university fund- Perhaps, trapped in the West- encumbering so many of our small badly dam- ing – a move which in the end made minster bubble, we could not see parliamentary party with junior a negligible contribution to defi- the tsunami coming, consoled ministerial positions is a great way aged the cit reduction – Osborne, through by the trappings of power, errant of tying up some of our best tal- pressure on Alexander and others, party polling and irrational opti- ent in the minutiae of government party had invited us to trash our own repu- mism. Lured in by the courtesies of – while ensuring good behaviour tation. We took up the invitation. the House, many did not see their from those hoping for ministerial anything Much has been made of the ‘fool- ‘honourable friends’ (for so we were preferment. to do with ishness’ of our tuition fees pledge taught to refer to our Tory coali- The Tories, in offering us so but, having made it and had our tion colleagues) as their mortal ene- many baubles of office, made our the major leader iconically filmed on West- mies – parts of the most successful party more manageable and poten- minster Bridge berating previous political killing machine the coun- tially acquiescent. It suited the achieve- politicians for broken promises, it try has seen. The Corleone analogy Tories to inveigle us into the tribal is hard to find a better instance of works here. politics of Westminster, to embrace ments or kamikaze politics. Post-2009 and It is said that, after the coalition us, to school us in the old ways of the expenses saga, where trust was negotiations were concluded, Wil- government – and before long, goals of the simply the major political issue, we liam Hague went home and told colleagues were jumping up and chose to appear faithless rather than his wife he had just killed off the down in the chamber asking on- coalition. stand up to Osborne. Liberals. I do not know if he did say message whips’ questions, ignoring That the AV referendum shortly that, but I do not think he was cor- sane amendments from opposition The blunders after became a plebiscite on Clegg rect. The coalition per se was not sources, and churning out centrally and coalition fell nicely for the the cause of the electoral disaster drafted press releases of depressing we made Tories, as did the sheer ineptitude that overtook us. That resulted for vacuity. of the Yes campaign and the people the greater part because the parlia- In a nutshell we needed to show were utterly chosen to run it. mentary party made a succession from the word go that coalition was By that time, too, we had agreed of strategic blunders which, look- a new way of doing politics and we de trop and to prioritise oddly the inevitable ing back now, still appear stagger- did not. We failed. It was as though cuts in spending, by reducing capi- ingly naïve – almost reckless – in traditional Westminster politics born of polit- tal expenditure and foolishly mak- their disregard of mature political was temporarily being led by a new ical inexpe- ing sure that local government calculation. political-amalgam party. Politics working over-rigidly on an annual It is often said that heroically in Westminster was still tribal; we rience and financial cycle bore the major brunt we sacrificed party interest in order had just gone off and aligned with of the first tranche of cuts. With to secure the good of the coun- the Tory side. It suited the Tories. hubris. some sleight-of-hand redistribution try – and that is how the coalition It suited Labour. It did not suit us, to largely Tory areas mixed in, we parliamentary party would like however, but we guilelessly let it allowed a narrative of unfairness to be remembered. The coalition happen. to blossom and ensured our rapid government was not a bad govern- Having got the ground rules in demise in many cities. ment and was, in its own terms, place, the Tories’ next move was Casually we dismissed the successful; but practically none to undermine elements of our core resulting wipeouts in Liverpool of the strategic blunders we made vote and our biggest asset, which and Manchester – the undoing that so badly damaged the party at that stage was Nick Clegg. of decades of graft – as mid-term

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 39 why did it go wrong? blues and moved on, unfazed. Our Much has reform – but for the intervention conclude by telling us that it was relative failure in council elections of the Lords – nearly went into the electorate that got it all wrong are compared even with the Tories was been made election with our only constitu- more likely to be delusionary. deemed inevitable. After all, every- tional gains being individual voter thing was as normal in Westminster of the ‘fool- registration and boundary changes John Pugh was leader of the Lib Dem – save that a party once routinely that helped the Tories. group on the hung Sefton Council before graced with by-election victors was ishness’ of History is supposed to be writ- entering parliament in 2001. He led that instead shored up with knighthoods ten by the victors but there are group through successive elections, turn- and privy counsellors. As the Lib our tuition not many victors left in the party ing them from the smallest group to the Dem benches came more and more to contest the narrative. I cannot largest. He was elected to parliament to to resemble Camelot, hard politi- fees pledge prove that, but for the follies of the join the largest post-war cohort of Lib- cal realities receded. Belatedly we but, hav- early coalition years, outcomes in eral Democrat MPs and now survives as recognised our potential clout and 2015 would have been different. a member of the smallest group. He was embraced differentiation as some- ing made it What I can do is to defy anyone backbench co-chair on health during the thing more than the odd spat in to explain how such blindingly coalition, but resigned as result of dif- cabinet, but by then people inside and had our obvious errors could possibly have ferences over policy. He is currently the and outside the party had a very helped and to gently point out party’s education spokesman. unclear sense of what the party was leader iconi- that the alternative accounts that about. Given this, our campaign pose as cally filmed the honest broker for the next gov- ernment looked doomed and even on Westmin- risible as a campaign strategy. Ryan Coalition: a difficult situation made worse Coetzee, whose gifts turned out to ster Bridge be sub-Napoleonic, had schooled Matthew Huntbach us to ram home our mantra of ‘a berating stronger economy – fairer society’. he February 1974 general would demand. The impression There is, however, scarcely a politi- previous election marks the point at was given that, if a general election cal party in the world that claims politicians Twhich it could no longer ever did leave the Liberal Demo- to campaign for the opposite. We be assumed that British politics was crats holding the balance of power, could not get people to ‘get’ any- purely Labour versus Conservative. they would have effectively ‘won’ more who we were. for broken Although the electoral system sav- the election. They may when they see Tory promises, agely discriminated against the Lib- This is counter to the experience rule untrammelled. They may eral Party, its huge growth in votes both of Liberal Democrats in local when they count and begin to it is hard to meant it could not be written off as government in the UK and third appreciate some of the blessings of a historical relic and established it parties in other countries. Holding coalition government. They may find a bet- as the main opposition to the Con- the balance of power often turns when we rediscover our voice. servatives in a significant propor- out to be a miserable experience, in From a historian’s point of view ter instance tion of the country. It was also the which you get the blame for any- it would be only fair to say that I election where the Ulster Unionists thing unpleasant but none of the struggle to be dispassionate. As a of kamikaze formally broke their links with the credit for anything that works well. philosopher, I have concerns any- Conservative Party and the SNP A good example is the Green Party way about the objectivity of his- politics … and Plaid Cymru won enough seats in Ireland which formed a coalition tory; perhaps there are only ever that they could no longer be dis- with Fianna Fáil in 2007 and was ‘histories’. Whenever I look back I we chose missed as fringe elements. almost wiped out in the 2009 local feel again the anger and bewilder- Ever since then the possibility of elections and 2011 general elec- ment I felt over some of the crass to appear a ‘hung parliament’ has been a topic tion. The collapse in support for decision-making in the first two for discussion in general elections. the New Zealand First party in the years – the decisions that wounded faithless It was usually discussed as if the 1999 New Zealand general election the party without improving the Liberal Party, or Liberal Democrats was similar. economy. Damage was inflicted rather than as it became, would have a power- Small parties which are able to do which was wholly and utterly ful position as ‘kingmaker’, free well in balance-of-power situations unnecessary. stand up to to choose with which of the two tend to be those with committed In my more charitable moments Osborne. main parties it would form a coali- supporters who have a narrow inter- I tend to see such errors as stem- tion (often vulgarly put as ‘jump est in certain issues. They do well ming from inexperience, too trust- into bed with’), and able to dictate because their supporters are unlikely ing a nature, overconfidence in the the terms of that coalition. So the to desert them and are easily satisfied rationality and fairness of the great Liberal Democrat leader would so long as their particular interests British public. In darker moods I be subject to questions on which are dealt with. The classic example see hubris, the influence of ‘class’, party he preferred and what con- was the National Religious Party in a clumsy misguided attempt by ditions he would ask for, but that Israel. The UK Liberal Democrats the party leadership to remould was almost never balanced by the are the opposite of that sort of party, a party they could not love and Labour and Conservative leaders with much transient support and barely understood. But I still gasp being asked about their willingness very few voting for it on strict ideo- at the thought that, after five years to form a coalition with the Lib- logical grounds or because of sup- in government, we as a party of eral Democrats and the terms they port for a particular policy issue.

40 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong?

A junior coalition partner in one, which it could not. The assurance that the coalition gov- always faces the problem that when economic situation meant it would ernment would be stable; but pub- it agrees with the senior partner its be denounced as irresponsible if it lically acknowledging that their contribution is ignored. When it had not allowed a stable govern- weakness meant it would be a gov- disagrees and tries to force through ment to be formed, and Labour ernment mostly Conservative in its own ideas, there are two pos- and Conservative would have policy would have done this just as sibilities. If it alone supports an joined forces in the election, as well, if not better. idea, it faces being denounced for they did in the 2011 Alternative As with many things, what hap- playing politics – causing dam- Vote referendum, urging voters to pened at the start dominated how age to force through something denounce the Liberal Democrats people saw it for ever afterwards. which has little popular support. If for the crime of existing and so The ‘Rose Garden’ image of David the idea is supported by the oppo- denying the country a stable two- Clegg and Nick Cameron hold- sition, it needs to look for moral party system. ing hands was what stuck in peo- support from the opposition to Most of all, the presence of ple’s minds. For a while, the Liberal prove it is not acting irresponsibly MPs from other small parties and Democrats appeared to push the or selfishly. However, the opposi- the distortion of the electoral sys- By overem- idea that the coalition was not just tion is more likely to want to draw tem meant a coalition with the half but actually three-quarters supporters of that policy to itself Conservatives was the only viable phasising Liberal Democrat. The inaccuracies and profit from the small party option, a Labour–Lib Dem coali- here are deliberate; the point is that being unable to succeed, and so to tion would not have had a major- and exag- human memory often constructs denounce it rather than offer sup- ity. From Labour’s point of view, false images to fit in with conclu- port. The obvious example is the allowing the Conservative–Lib gerating the sions it has already drawn. The ‘75 Liberal Democrats’ position on Dem coalition to happen and then per cent of our manifesto imple- tuition fees. There was no way the benefitting from the inevitable power the mented’ message was well meant, Conservatives would have agreed collapse of Liberal Democrat sup- but few saw that it did not mean the to the tax increases necessary to pay port was a far better option than party had in same as ‘75 per cent of the govern- for the Liberal Democrats’ origi- attempting to form an unstable ment’s policies are ours’. People saw nal policy, yet the Liberal Demo- coalition with the Liberal Demo- the coalition, it as the Liberal Democrats support- crats were denounced for ‘breaking crats, especially as they knew the ing the coalition not out of neces- their pledge’ on it. Here, as with economic situation meant that any its leadership sity but out of direct support for most issues they received no out- incoming government would have its mostly Conservative policies. It side support or acknowledgement to make unpopular decisions. The and national was damaging also to trumpet the for the compromise they reached, distortions of the electoral system, 75 per cent figure, which arose from which saved universities from the which gave the Conservatives over image-mak- one brief analysis, when another large-scale cuts endured by further five times as many MPs as the Lib- ers caused it analysis gave 40 per cent. education colleges with a system eral Democrats even though they Given that having a coalition which, in terms of money passing had barely one and a half times as huge dam- was a novelty, and the coalition through hands, was little different many votes, meant that the result- existed only because of the Liberal from a graduate tax. ing government was bound to be age. The real- Democrats, and only the Liberal Following the 2010 general Conservative in its main thrust. Democrats talked about it posi- election the Liberal Democrats The Liberal Democrats had no ity is that tively (Conservatives, of course, were in just about the worst situ- effective power they could use to resenting it for denying them a ation a small party could be in. get their way. Under these circum- the Liberal majority), it was hardly surpris- After a big rise in the opinion stances, they needed to take an ing that people identified the word polls attributed to ‘Cleggma- extremely defensive position. The Democrats’ ‘coalition’ primarily with the Lib- nia’, the party did unexpectedly party’s national leadership made eral Democrats, so assumed that badly in its actual vote share. The sure it did the opposite. influence in what came out of the coalition situation seen in previous gen- By overemphasising and exag- government was essentially what eral elections, where its support gerating the power the party had the coalition the Liberal Democrats were about. had steadily risen as the campaign in the coalition, its leadership and Opponents of the government progressed, had not happened. national image-makers caused it would be no assiduously used the word ‘coali- Instead its support peaked early huge damage. The reality is that tion’ where previously they would then declined, with (as seen again the Liberal Democrats’ influence more than a have used ‘government’ and took in 2015) an embarrassing ‘I’ll eat in the coalition would be no more delight in using the phrase ‘coa- my hat if that’s true’ response from than a swinging of the balance swinging of lition policies’ to describe poli- senior figures when the first exit towards the more moderate wing the balance cies which the Liberal Democrats polls came out. If the party had of the Conservatives. And that was would have fought against inter- done unexpectedly well, it could relative given that in many ways towards the nally and accepted only reluctantly have used the threat of doing bet- the Conservatives had become far as part of the general compromise. ter in an ensuing early general more right wing than when they more moder- The emphasis that the Liberal Dem- election to force its way. It was were last in government, with the ocrat leadership put on boasting clear, however, that it had failed extinction of the old Tory ‘wets’. ate wing of about being ‘in government’ helped to meet expectations and would Yet the image that was put out support this notion. most likely be the biggest loser in was that the coalition was almost the Conserv- By exaggerating and boasting an early general election, even if it an equal partnership. The Lib- about the power and influence they could afford to campaign properly eral Democrats needed to provide atives. had in a government whose policies

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 41 why did it go wrong? very much reflected its five-to-one becoming a ‘party of government’, revival was to be a voice for the Conservative–LibDem balance, with this meaning a shift to the voiceless. Starting with its histori- the Liberal Democrats gave the Given that economic right. The most eloquent cal survival in remote parts of the impression that either they were case for this was an article in the UK whose population felt neither much more right wing than their having a coa- New Statesman written by Richard the Conservative Party nor the supporters supposed, or that they Reeves on the eve of the 2012 party Labour Party knew or cared about were rather pathetic, overawed and lition was a conference.1 He dismissed many their particular issues, it built sup- so too easily satisfied by the minor of those who had voted previously port among the less-well-off in concessions they were given by the novelty, and for the Liberal Democrats as ‘bor- southern, small-town and rural Conservatives. rowed from Labour’ and suggested England who might once have People who had voted Lib- the coalition that the party should abandon them been Labour voters but felt alien- eral Democrat because they were and seek new voters. Reeves had ated from a Labour Party which against what the Conservatives existed only worked as ‘director of strategy’ for seemed completely urban based. stood for, and saw the Liberal because of Nick Clegg for two years prior to It then achieved success in urban Democrats as the main opposition writing the article. Clegg made no areas, where Labour had been to the Conservatives where they the Liberal effort to disassociate himself from dominant, among people who felt lived, felt betrayed. People who its sentiments, and made disparag- Labour had taken their support voted Liberal Democrat because Democrats, ing remarks about those unhappy for granted. This bedrock of sup- they were against what the Con- with this direction in an interview port for the Liberal Democrats was servatives stood for, but lived in and only in The Independent newspaper at that thrown away during the time of a Labour-dominated area and felt time. Reeves’ remarks were deeply the coalition in the belief that there that Labour had become tired and the Liberal insulting to those who had spent was an untapped source of support complacent and the Liberal Demo- decades building up support for the from people who liked the eco- crats offered a fresh way forward, Democrats party, with many of those votes nomics of the Conservative Party, felt betrayed. ‘borrowed from Labour’ deriv- but wanted something with a little A common line among some talked about ing from activity as long ago as the more of a liberal attitude on social who had gained influence in the 1970s Liberal revival and remaining issues, and had hitherto disregarded Liberal Democrats was that this it positively there since, not won over in 2010 as the Liberal Democrats as ‘not seri- did not matter. Was it not bad that he claimed. ous’. However, if there was such a the Liberal Democrats were over- … it was Activists who might have been source, joining the coalition and reliant on those voting for it as a willing to defend as necessary promoting the image of the Liberal ‘protest party’, and would it not be hardly sur- compromises the positions taken Democrats as this sort of party did better if the Liberal Democrats had by the party in government that not tap it. more voting for it because they sup- prising that were upsetting long-term support- The underlying theme in the ported its ideology? Those pushing people iden- ers were undermined by a lead- 2015 general election was dissatis- this line tended to have an ideology ership unwilling to join in with faction with British politics. The they thought the Liberal Demo- tified the that defence. The notion that they SNP was successful in tapping this crats should adopt, or that it was were what those leading the party in Scotland; the obvious inadequa- always the underlying ideology word ‘coa- secretly wanted in the first place cies of UKIP and the Green Party (hence they liked to call it some- was allowed to grow. Again, the meant they were not so successful thing like ‘classical liberalism’ or lition’ pri- tuition fees policy is an example. in England. Most parties of protest ‘nineteenth-century liberalism’) of Instead of putting out the message are not liberal in instinct – that is the Liberal Democrats and needed to marily with that the compromise reached was often why they fail, and it is why be enforced to make the party more because the Conservatives would it is best that they do. A liberal distinctive. It was a ‘small state’ ide- the Liberal not agree to the Liberal Democrats’ party of protest is a rare thing. Pro- ology, incorporating much of what ideal, the leadership suggested it test means challenging established the previous generation of Liberal Democrats, was a ‘mistake’ to have adopted power, which in the twenty-first Democrats called ‘Thatcherism’. our original policy and hinted century has moved from the state This was a turnaround from times in so assumed that it was all the fault of naïve to big corporate business. The sur- the past when it tended to be those party members for pushing it. This vival of the Liberal Party as a relic on the left of the Liberal Party who that what boosted the party’s attackers who of the old pre-socialist left revived argued for a more distinctive ideo- argued that the Liberal Democrats by local enthusiasts meant it was logical approach, and those on the came out of were untrustworthy because they well placed to take on this chal- right who argued for pragmatism. had campaigned on a policy they lenge. Yet the Liberal Democrats The coalition was not the time the coalition never really believed in. Attempt- during the time of the coalition to engage in factional argument in government ing to put the blame on party mem- seemed determined to throw away the party. Activists who tended to bers ignored the fact that it was a that role as well. the left would be the most discom- was essen- decision of the party’s leadership Much of the rhetoric coming fited by the fact of the coalition and to highlight this policy in the elec- from the top of the party during the policies that were emerging tially what tion campaign, and it was this high- the time of the coalition put across from it, and so needed reassurance lighting with a ‘pledge’ to vote the idea that it was ashamed of its that there was still a place for them the Liberal against tuition fee rises which made old role of being a party of protest. in the party. The message from the it particularly difficult when the It ignored the fact that the elec- top was often the opposite. The Democrats party had to compromise on it. toral system meant that local activ- idea was put across that the party An important role of the Lib- ists had passed through a brutal had fundamentally changed in were about. eral Party in its twentieth-century ‘survival of the fittest’ process. Far

42 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? from being unrealistic dreamers party’s public relations at the top. Finn sug- the result of which presumably sur- as was sometimes suggested, those The coalition was always going to prised them as much as it surprised who had survived and prospered be a difficult situation for the Lib- gests that its victors. were those who had a good feel for eral Democrats, but this made it The book is divided into three what works to win votes. Temper- much worse. … Liberal parts. The first examines the con- ing feelings of protest and detach- (Note, it has been suggested that stitutional and institutional aspects ment from conventional politics the author of this article is mak- Democrat of the coalition; the second looks into support for a party which was ing these points in ‘hindsight’. In thematically at a number of policy pragmatic on policy and humble fact these are points he was mak- secretaries of areas; and the third encompasses its in accepting that it had no right to ing throughout the time of the political effects, principally on the anyone’s vote (a big distinguishing coalition in comments on Liberal state could main parties but also on the media factor from Labour) was their job Democrat Voice. See, for example, have been and includes a very useful contribu- and they were good at it. http://www.libdemvoice.org/ tion from John Curtice on elections This pragmatism meant that opinion-agreeing-with-nick-25352. deployed in and referendums. most active members could under- html#comment-184883 where the For students of Liberal history, stand the argument for forming the main point made here was made at departments the central chapters will be two by coalition in 2010, so there was lit- the time of the 2011 Liberal Demo- Mike Finn himself, on the coali- tle outright opposition to it within crat party conference.) better suited tion agreement in the institutional the party. However, the overselling part of the book and, especially, of the coalition, the attempt to use Matthew Huntbach joined the Lib- to promoting on the consequences for the Lib- it to push a permanent shift to the eral Party as a university student in the eral Democrats in the political part. economic right by some who had 1970s. He was an active campaigner in the distinc- Some of the other contributions plenty of funding but little practi- various parts of the country, standing for are distinctly less useful, since they cal political experience, and the local elections first in his home county of tiveness of seem to forget that the government domination of the party’s national Sussex, and later in the London Bor- was indeed a coalition rather than a image and strategy by a leadership ough of Lewisham where he was a Lib- the party … Conservative administration. One which was disconnected from the eral Democrat councillor 1994–2006, can, however, gain much from, party’s activist base led to many and leader of the council opposition The problem for example, Howard Glennerst- serious mistakes being made in 1998–2004. He is an academic in com- er’s clear account of the coalition’s party tactics and presentation. Fail- puter science at Queen Mary University with that health reforms and Nicholas Tim- ing to understand how some of the of London and at Beijing University of mins’ admirable chapter on social lines used would be misinterpreted, Posts and Telecommunications. suggestion, security and pensions policy. Peter and failing to learn the lessons from however, Riddell’s chapter on ‘The coali- Ireland and New Zealand on how 1 Richard Reeves, ‘The Case for a tion and the executive’ is notably small parties are often damaged by Truly Liberal Party’, New Statesman, was not just well informed (and notably positive coalitions, suggested a considerable 19 Sept. 2012. about how the coalition functioned naivety among those directing the that Clegg within Whitehall). Much is also to be learned, in a was too little different way, from Martin Lough- lin and Cal Viney’s chapter on ‘The interested in coalition and the constitution’. It The Liberal Democrats in coalition: owners gives an account of unremitting distinctive- hostility to the Liberal Democrats’ of all and nothing attempts at constitutional reform, ness, but also which the authors characterise as Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (eds.), The Coalition Effect an illegitimate attempt by a minor- 2010–2015 (Cambridge University Press, 2015) that he was ity party to impose its agenda on an Review by David Howarth unwilling nation. Admittedly, the uninterested AV referendum and House of Lords reform were total failures, but nly when a historical existence of ‘Britain’ itself, are still in civil liber- their assessment of the one Liberal period is over can we very much in train. One perhaps ties and con- Democrat success, the Fixed Term Otruly understand it. The paradoxical merit, however, of The Parliaments Act, is based on a mis- Owl of Minerva, as Hegel said, Coalition Effect 2010–2015, a collec- stitutional understanding. They adopt Vernon takes flight only at dusk. And so tion of essays organised and edited Bogdanor’s criticism that, contrary any attempt to understand recent by Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn, issues … to the populist spirit of the age, political events, events whose con- is that it was completed and pub- the Act introduces a system under sequences are still being worked lished just before the end of events which parliaments make new gov- through, is inevitably not so much it describes, which means that its ernments rather than the electorate an exercise in history as an inter- assessments are free from any of in general elections. But that fails to vention in the politics it describes. the dubious benefits of hindsight. understand both the arrangements That applies without qualification It stands as a document of what a before the Act and those under it. to the Conservative–Liberal Dem- group of eminent scholars and com- During the twentieth century, the ocrat coalition of 2010–2015, whose mentators thought were the impor- political composition of the British effects on every party in British tant features of the coalition era just government changed several times politics, and indeed on the political before the general election of 2015, in the course of a parliamentary

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 43 why did it go wrong?

the party in the end kept, such as the party’s liberalism would have the pupil premium and raising the emerged much more clearly had it income tax threshold, the party had taken the Home Office or the Min- let the public down on what its own istry of Justice. The problem with voters regarded as its unique sell- that suggestion, however, was not ing points, in particular abolishing just that Clegg was too little inter- tuition fees. ested in distinctiveness, but also One might question, however, that he was uninterested in civil whether Finn is right on a related liberties and constitutional issues, point. He identifies as crucial the habitually referring in this review- U-turn on nuclear power. It seems er’s hearing to the former as ‘tra- unlikely that nuclear power was ditional’ – as if preserving them anywhere near as significant for was similar to supporting Morris the Liberal Democrat electorate as Dancing – and to the latter as ‘legal fees. At the time Chris Huhne, the niceties’. Secretary of State for Energy and Finn also identifies as a seri- Climate Change, expressed sur- ous problem the growing distance prise at how just little resistance or between the party in government, objection it had generated. One can particularly Clegg, and the party make a case instead, looking at the in the country. Finn explains the detail of the party’s opinion poll process by which, as he puts it, rating decline in 2010, for saying Clegg came to despise his own that the issue that almost rivalled party. Of course, for much of the tuition fees in its negative effect was party that feeling was mutual, economic fairness, from the point with serious consequences for the at which Nick Clegg was seen to party’s capacity to campaign. The slap George Osborne on the back biggest puzzle, however, is how after a budget that reduced income Clegg survived as leader. His fail- tax for the wealthy and cut benefits ure was complete at the point the for the poor. AV referendum was lost in 2011, More generally Finn argues but no challenge to his leadership term. Whether the new govern- that Nick Clegg’s central mistake occurred until 2014, at which point ment called an election was not was to give very low priority in the failure of the parliamentary automatic but entirely a matter the early years to maintaining the party to act doomed the attempt for them. In 1940, for obvious rea- party’s distinctiveness, prefer- almost as soon as it started. Finn’s sons, no election ensued, but even ring instead to show that ‘coalition explanation for the failure of the in 1931 an internal debate raged works’ by ‘owning’ every coalition 2014 coup was lack of a convinc- about whether to call an election – a policy. Once the public had fixed ing new leader – Vince Cable was debate that caused the first of that in its mind that the Liberal Demo- implicated in the fees debacle and decade’s many Liberal splits. The crats were merely an appendage to Tim Farron was unwilling at that difference under the Fixed Term the Conservatives, later attempts stage to move – together with a Parliaments Act is that the decision at differentiation looked insincere prevailing mood of fatalism both whether to call a new election lies or contrived. Consequently, even in the parliamentary party and not with the government but with policies that really were distinc- in the party at large. Finn is right parliament. tively Liberal Democrat, such as the that both factors were important. The failures over AV and the increase in the income tax thresh- The parliamentary party failed to House of Lords also feature in Mike old, could not be convincingly act because no one would lead it Finn’s chapter on the coalition and claimed for the party. By ‘owning’ into action and those who might the Liberal Democrats. He makes it everything it ended up ‘owning’ have led it feared that if they tried the centrepiece of what he calls the nothing. no one would follow them; and government’s second phase, from Finn suggests, as others have, the degree of fatalism was so great 2011 to 2013. He pays more atten- that the party might have done that in some quarters it amounted tion, however, to the catastrophic better had it chosen to dominate to a feeling that the party needed first phase, 2010 to 2011, concentrat- specific ministries rather than dot- to do penance for its sins. But one ing in particular on the tuition fees ting single ministers around many wonders what new information debacle. Finn points out that the departments. But he adds that, will come to light in the coming party never recovered from the loss even within that strategy, Liberal years about other possible factors of support it suffered in 2010–11 and Democrat secretaries of state could affecting the parliamentary party, that subsequent policy successes in have been deployed in depart- including the power of patronage, taxation, schools policy and even ments better suited to promoting especially promises of peerages, economic policy failed to offset the distinctiveness of the party. and gullibility, particularly about the loss of trust and credibility that That might be unfair in the case private polling arranged to make happened early on. He argues con- of the Department of Energy and the position of sitting MPs look far vincingly that although the party Climate Change, where Liberal better than it really was. hierarchy might claim that the par- Democrats USPs were at stake, but Finn’s conclusion (for which ty’s manifesto had stressed promises it is certainly a plausible idea that he relies on a recent article in this

44 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 why did it go wrong? journal by the current reviewer) of itself as a party built above It looks even more right now. David Howarth is Professor of Law is that Clegg’s desire to present all on values. He describes the Whether it will still look right and Public Policy at the University the Liberal Democrats as a relia- ‘coalition effect’ on the Lib- when the Owl of Minerva at of Cambridge and served as Liberal ble coalition partner and thus as eral Democrats as ‘devastat- last takes off remains to be seen, Democrat MP for Cambridge from a ‘party of government’ under- ing’. That looked right in April but the old bird’s wings are 2005 to 2010. mined the party’s definition 2015 when this book came out. already twitching.

Which Way Back? The Liberal Democrats and the 2015 election in its historical context One-day conference, Birmingham, Saturday 28 November

10.00am – 4.00pm University of Birmingham Campus B15 2TT (accessible from the University train station) The Liberal Democrat–Conservative coalition government of 2010–15 was the first peacetime British coalition since the 1930s. Whatever the Liberal Democrats may have achieved in government, their electoral reward was the most catastrophic in the history of the party or its predecessors.

This one-day conference, organised by the Journal of Liberal History and the University of Birmingham, will examine the key issues the Liberal Democrats faced as partners in the coalition government and the party’s performance during the 2015 general election.

The conference will feature opening and concluding addresses and three panel sessions, looking at: • Campaigning – what messages were the Liberal Democrats trying to communicate during their period in office and during the general election; how was this done and how effectively? • Policy and ideological direction – getting Liberal Democrat policy implemented in government, the relationship with the Conservatives and how this played during the election. • Parliamentary strategy – keeping the parliamentary party together, 2010–15; how the Liberal Democrat presence at Westminster was used to reinforce the wider messages the party was seeking to promote to the public and inside the government. Confirmed speakers include Martin Horwood (MP for Cheltenham, 2005–15), Peter Sloman (author of The Liberal Party and the Economy 1929–64) and Andy Denham.

Registration £20 (students and unwaged £15). Payment will be taken on the day, but please register in advance – send your details to: Matt Cole 134 Haunch Lane, Birmingham B13 0PY [email protected]; 07762 176 035

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 45 HowMa did the coalition workn as a government?agi Robert Hazell andn Peter Wallerg review its internalt workingsh ande effectiveness, c while Jonathano Oatesali and William Wallacet reflecti on aspectson of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed.

The Lib Dems and the workings of government: success or failure? Professor Robert Hazell and Peter Waller he Constitution Unit at detail not so much at the political I was not at all sure how the UCL carries out research success – or otherwise – of the coa- coalition would work or even into a wide range of politi- lition but at how it was operating in whether it would work. But it T 1 cal issues, largely focused on West- practice. has been far better than anyone minster and Whitehall and the links So what did we learn from that would have expected. between the two. Immediately research? The first thing to say is after the 2010 election, we were that the vast majority of those we One Tory minister commented to given permission by the then cabi- interviewed thought that the coali- us: net secretary to interview in depth tion was working well. This was the a wide range of Whitehall offi- general verdict not only of ministers Team work is stronger because cials, ministers and special advisers from both coalition parties but also of the coalition. The fact that to consider how the coalition was from Whitehall officials and various we had to discuss what we operating in practice. We were very third parties. One comment from a wanted to do, what the other well placed, therefore, to look in senior official was typical: party wished to do – or indeed

46 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 HowMa did the coalition workn as a government?agi Robert Hazell andn Peter Wallerg review its internalt workingsh ande effectiveness, c while Jonathano Oatesali and William Wallacet reflecti on aspectson of how Liberal Democrats functioned as part of it, and Matthew Hanney analyses how the party itself was managed.

whether there were other One aspect before their narrow party Lib Dems, it is tempting to think options – made it much better. interests. that we must have been deceiving of that which • The fact that there was a coali- ourselves in painting such a posi- And a Lib Dem minister told us: tion meant that Whitehall had tive picture of the coalition’s first has been to change many of its inter- twenty months. But we do not The team of ministers in our nal rules and practices – and think that we were deceived. The department works together well little com- in practice this meant moving first two years of the coalition were on a day-to-day basis in a con- back towards a more rational by any standards a period of con- structive spirit … the good rela- mented on form of decision-making. Sofa siderable success. The programme tionship is at the heart of how it government and pre-cooked for government – which our work is all working. – but which deals were replaced by more suggested contained more Lib Dem stands to the formal committee discus- manifesto commitments than were As we dug deeper into the reasons sions and much bending over drawn from the Tory manifesto – why the story was so positive, we Liberal Dem- backwards to ensure that the was a very ambitious document but isolated a number of factors: perspectives of both parties in almost all its proposals had been • Prior expectations – especially ocrats’ credit the coalition were recognised. implemented by 2012. Government from civil servants – of the The fact that the programme was as crisis-free as governments coalition were that it would – is the fact for government was a detailed, ever can be and there was a good be unstable, fractious and con- practical document and had degree of respect amongst both stantly slowed down by inter- that the Lib replaced the woolly aspirations parties for each other and their role nal disputes. Many officials of the typical party manifestos, in making the coalition work. The had lived through the infight- Dem min- gave Whitehall much greater fact that the 2015 voters re-elected ing of the Labour govern- clarity from the new govern- the majority coalition partner to ment, especially between the isters, and ment than they had been used govern on its own suggested they Blairites and the Brownites, to. Special machinery was set were far from dissatisfied with the and assumed a coalition would cabinet min- up to resolve disputes between performance of the government in be even worse. The fact that the parties but in practice sel- the preceding five years. it was harmonious came as an isters in par- dom had to be used. One aspect of that which has enormous relief. • The coalition felt, both in been little commented on – but • Both political partners felt ticular, were Whitehall and Westminster, which stands to the Liberal Demo- proud of their role in forming more ‘grown-up’ in that it was crats’ credit – is the fact that the Lib the coalition and were deter- clearly of impossible to claim, as single- Dem ministers, and cabinet min- mined to make it a success. The equal calibre party governments often do, isters in particular, were clearly of Tories were delighted to have that there was only one pos- equal calibre to their Tory part- found a way back into govern- to their Tory sible answer to any question. ners. Yet this was certainly not ment even though they lacked The principle of collective a given. As in most professions a majority; and were clearly partners. responsibility remained so that – and politics is a legitimate pro- patting themselves on the back decisions, once taken, were fession in this context – the cream at their magnanimity in shar- supported by both parties. But tends to rise to the top so it might ing power. The Lib Dems were no one was pretending that be expected that the most capable delighted simply to be in gov- there had not had to be com- and ambitious politicians would ernment, and they were deter- promises in reaching an agreed be found in the parties most likely mined to show that a coalition position. to be in government. For a small was a perfectly viable basis Our research was concluded at the party to have people of sufficient for exercising political power. beginning of 2012, less than two calibre to fill twenty-three min- Both parties could claim with years into the new government. So isterial posts, including five cabi- good cause that they were writing now in 2015, in the after- net ministers, was thus a genuine putting the national interest math of a nightmare election for the stretch. But at no point in the five

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 47 managing the coalition years of the coalition was it argued First, was the original decision The prob- Tories rather successfully presented in Whitehall, the media or else- to spread the Lib Dem ministerial themselves as still being very much where that the Lib Dems lacked the allocation thinly the right one? lem that cre- in power but on many fronts being necessary talent. Looking back, it Conventional academic wisdom held back by a failure by the Lib seems already that a team includ- from across many democracies ated for the Dems to agree to anything they ing Clegg, Cable, Huhne, Davey, is that the junior coalition part- were proposing. The obvious Lib Alexander, Laws and Webb will be ner does badly in the subsequent Lib Dems, Dem successes seemed to date back seen as something of a golden age election. But could the Lib Dems’ to much earlier in the parliament, for the party. chances of success have been however, and there was no similar sense of a So starting from that benign improved by taking all the min- Lib Dem agenda being obstructed picture at the end of 2011, why did isterial seats in a limited number was that by the Tories – apart from the high- it all go so horribly wrong in 2015, of departments, rather than hav- profile examples of the AV ref- with all but Clegg of that genera- ing a single minister in almost all they came erendum defeat, and withdrawal tion of leaders swept away by the departments? Under this scenario increasingly of the plans for Lords reform fol- electorate? Well, from the admit- Nick Clegg might have become lowing a major rebellion by Tory tedly narrow perspective of our Home Secretary or Education Sec- to be seen backbenchers. focus on Whitehall, it arguably retary, and the department clearly But generating new policy ideas never did go wrong. Against so identified as a Lib Dem depart- as ‘in office in government is never easy, and it many of the expectations of the ment. The Lib Dems would have was particularly difficult for the Lib political commentariat in 2010, the been able to point to achieve- but not in Dems, given how thinly stretched coalition survived for a full five- ments in that area as clear Lib Dem they were across all government year term, and would have done achievements, making it harder for power’. The departments. Outnumbered by the so even without the backing of the Tories in 2015 to present most Tories by a ratio of five to one, they the Fixed Term Parliaments Act successful Lib Dem ideas as Tory Tories rather were forced to devote far more of of 2011. There were no great sto- achievements. their time and energy to blocking ries of chaos in Whitehall or of the Second, did the Lib Dems give successfully or modifying Tory policies than ministerial corridors degenerating up on government – and start cam- to generating their own. There is a into trench warfare. Liberal Dem- paigning for 2015 – too soon? It was presented long list of Tory policies that they ocrat ministers maintained com- certainly predictable from day one managed to moderate, but which mendable discipline. When there of the coalition that at some point themselves inevitably remained hidden from were stories of ministerial splits, the two parties involved would the electorate; and it is very diffi- they were mainly ‘blue on blue’, move from emphasising their abil- as still being cult to claim credit for something as demonstrated by the tensions ity to cooperate constructively that has not happened. between Ken Clarke and Theresa towards wanting to demonstrate to very much Moreover, the Lib Dems were May, or later the very public spat the electorate the issues on which in power arguably a victim of the coalition’s between Theresa May and Michael they disagreed. So there was bound overall success. By 2015, the per- Gove. to come a point where the two par- but on many ception – at least in England – was So most of the explanations ties would be reluctant to make that the country had been effec- of the 2015 election result lie else- decisions unless they were una- fronts being tively managed by the govern- where. The most obvious White- voidable, preferring to use points ment and was recovering steadily hall-focused example, which of disagreement as potential distin- held back by from the earlier recession. There we did cover to a degree in our guishing features between them in was no sense of the chaos and con- research, was the great student fees an election campaign. a failure by stant crisis that had characterised disaster, which led one of our inter- With the benefit of hindsight, the final few years of the previous viewees to say: however, that point arrived much the Lib Dems Labour government, during which earlier in the parliament than we Gordon Brown had been repeat- Whether or not it was the right had anticipated. By 2011–12, the to agree to edly attacked by his own cabinet decision we came to in the end programme for government had colleagues and ministers. The Lib is almost irrelevant. You know, largely been implemented and it anything Dems might ironically have done we broke a pledge, we’re hated was expected that there would be better in the 2015 election if there for it. another negotiation and a new pro- they were had been more internal strife in gramme announced for the second government so that the country But, as the comment makes clear, it half of the parliament, sometime proposing. was much keener for a change of was the pre-election pledge that did in 2012. Some attempts were made government overall and the Tories the damage, not the handling of the in that direction, but the two par- more vulnerable as a result. issue when in government – though ties never managed to recreate the This leads to our final assess- the Lib Dem failure to identify and momentum that had been given ment. In 2010, the Lib Dems had stick to a single narrative for the by the original programme for in reality only two choices, first to final decision undoubtedly exacer- government. Instead both parties form a coalition with the Tories bated the position.2 began increasingly to focus on their and second to let the Tories form But there are two Whitehall- points of difference more than their a minority government and to focused questions which it is worth common ground. seek to bring it down at a later raising in relation to the internal The problem that created for point. (We continue to believe workings of the coalition as they the Lib Dems, however, was that that a Labour–Lib Dem coalition might have had some impact on the they came increasingly to be seen was never a credible option at the 2015 outcome even if marginal. as ‘in office but not in power’.3 The time.)

48 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition

It was entirely predictable – and Imbalances of power: building a functioning was of course widely predicted – that the decision to enter the coali- coalition tion would lead to a bad result for the Jonathan Oates party in 2015, even if no one quite predicted how bad that outcome n Tuesday 12 May 2010, civil service had dealt with ‘Dep- might be. But there is little point in Nick Clegg and David uty Prime Ministers’ before – most a serious political party not seeking OCameron posed on the recently John Prescott and Michael power and little reason to think that doorstep of No. 10, co-leaders of Heseltine: they had been depart- the long-term outcome for the party the first peacetime coalition in sev- mental ministers and the title would have been any better had they enty years. For the first time in ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ a mere declined Cameron’s offer and waited half a century the government’s (if politically important) courtesy. for another opportunity. majority was dependent on two The role of Deputy Prime Minister So the decision to enter the coa- leaders in government, not one. in a coalition was a different affair. lition was entirely justified even if Notwithstanding the disparity in Every significant decision over the the result was to reduce the party parliamentary representation – 307 next five years would have to be to a level of Westminster represen- Conservative seats versus 57 Lib- jointly agreed by both leaders. Yet tation they have not had for fifty eral Democrat, the government’s there was a staggering failure to years. The Lib Dems were part of majority was now a binary matter. understand this, represented most five years of a coherent and com- If either of the parties did not agree starkly by the huge disparity in offi- petent government and can point to a policy, the government did not cial and political fire power in their to achievements that were distinc- have a majority for it. respective offices. tively Lib Dem achievements. The Yet behind the famous black Later that day, or the following, judgement of the electorate was door of No. 10, the institutions of the DPM got his first civil servant. harsh; the judgement of history government seemed almost oblivi- Sir Gus O’Donnell, then cabinet may prove kinder. The Lib Dems ous to this fact or to the respective secretary, seconded his principal strength of support for the parties private secretary to head up the Professor Robert Hazell is Profes- were part of in the country, where – of the total then non-existent Deputy Prime sor of Government and the Constitu- votes cast for the coalition parties – Minister’s Office. He was a highly tion at University College London, and five years of the Liberal Democrats had attracted able and dedicated civil serv- Director of the Constitution Unit in the 40 per cent and the Conservatives ant, who over the next few years School of Public Policy. The Unit has a coherent 60 per cent. worked with exceptional profes- published detailed reports on every aspect Despite briefings to the national sionalism and determination to of Britain’s constitutional reform pro- and compe- media about the preparedness of support the Deputy Prime Min- gramme. In 2011 he led a research team, tent govern- Whitehall for a hung parliament, ister, but he was in his early thir- including Peter Waller and Ben Yong, to no real thought had been given ties and massively outranked by his study how the UK’s new coalition gov- ment and even to such a mundane matter as No. 10 counterpart, the 50-year- ernment worked. Their book, The Pol- where the Deputy Prime Minister old Jeremy Heywood. Jeremy held itics of Coalition (Hart Publishing), can point would be located, let alone how his permanent secretary rank in the was published in June 2012. The same office would be staffed or how the Prime Minister’s Office and was a team then produced Special Advisers: to achieve- machinery of government would notable survivor of the inner cir- Who they are, what they do, and adapt. The truth is that for much of cle of previous administrations. He why they matter in 2014. ments that the civil service (but by no means had been Gordon Brown’s perma- all), the view seemed to be – as little nent secretary before taking on the Peter Waller left the civil service in 2008, were distinc- as possible. role for Cameron. He had also been having worked on a wide range of eco- As the door was pulled shut principal private secretary to Prime nomic issues over thirty years, largely at tively Lib behind the two party leaders, the Minister Tony Blair and before that the DTI. Peter was heavily involved in No. 10 operation hummed effi- to Tory chancellors of the excheq- the coalition government project, and the Dem achieve- ciently and immediately into uer, Norman Lamont and Kenneth project on special advisers, both of which action in support of the leader of Clarke. He was (of course) to go on led to published books to which he was a ments. The the Conservative Party. Mean- to be cabinet secretary – in short he significant contributor. while, his coalition counterpart was the Whitehall insiders’ insider. judgement was hastily ushered upstairs to You did not have to be an expert 1 Our research was published in one of the Downing Street state- in the politics of the civil service to a book, The Politics of Coalition, of the elec- rooms; with him, his then chief know that this imbalance between by Robert Hazell and Ben Yong torate was of staff (soon to be Scotland Sec- the PM and the DPM’s offices was (Hart Publishing, 2012): http:// retary), Danny Alexander and a massively to the DPM’s disadvan- www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ harsh; the few members of party staff. There tage and that of effective coalition constitution-unit-news/080612 were no telephones, no computers, working. 2 Though a single narrative would judgement no support whatsoever – just a cup Over the next few months we never have been easy when the party of tea and a polite but bewildered became increasingly frustrated MPs managed to vote in three differ- of history welcome. by the lack of institutional sup- ent blocks in the Commons vote. Perhaps the problem was that, port for the DPM, which left our 3 A quote originally from Nor- may prove prior to 2010, the term ‘Deputy small team of special advisers not man Lamont about the Major Prime Minister’ had been used in only covering the whole gamut of government. kinder. a wholly different context. The government departments but also

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 49 managing the coalition having to do the jobs of officials office if the coalition was to func- the first year of the coalition. The who had not yet been appointed. tion effectively. The most urgent responsibility for those decisions It is worth remembering that at requirement was to appoint a senior is entirely with those of us who this stage the Deputy Prime Min- Whitehall insider to head up Nick’s were involved in making them. ister’s Office had a total of four spe- operation. We needed an opera- What is clear, however, is that the cial advisers responsible for policy, tor who could command not only environment in which they were who had to cover decisions across the respect of Whitehall depart- taken could hardly have been less every government department, as ments but also, where necessary, auspicious. well as supporting the DPM with their fear and who would have the It is difficult to know why the his specific responsibilities on con- weight to win the staff resources civil service was so insufficiently stitutional reform. Despite the we needed. Securing agreement prepared for the operation of a deluge of media attention, at the to this appointment and a broader coalition government. We took outset, the DPM had no civil ser- strengthening of the operation advantage of the knowledge and vice media team, no visits staff, and was a painful and drawn-out pro- experience of Jim Wallace, the for- only one special adviser supporting cess that ran through to the late mer Liberal Democrat deputy first him directly on media. No. 10 had Despite brief- autumn. One of the early chal- minister of Scotland (later advo- a whole press office that answered lenges was that no one would ever cate general and deputy leader of to the PM. ings to the say no to a proposal – it took me a the House of Lords) who provided These problems were only com- short while to realise that this did invaluable insight to our team prior pounded by the fact that the Liberal national not mean yes. But before long I had to the formation of the coalition Democrats immediately lost their appreciated that if I was to get any- and as a minister throughout the ‘Short money’ allocation, which media about thing done I had to understand the government. Whitehall could also had provided substantial financial TV programme Yes Minister as a have learnt much about coalitions support for the party’s parliamen- the prepar- documentary rather than a comedy. from their counterparts in Edin- tary policy team. Consequently, Inevitably, the pressure on both burgh and Cardiff, but such experi- we were stuck between a rock and edness of political and permanent civil serv- ence was, it seems, rather airily and a hard place, shut out of access to ants caused by the lack of staff sometimes disparagingly dismissed. the funds available to opposition Whitehall for resource, coupled with the desire Instead the preparation for the parties and denied proper political amongst some of the senior civil post-election period was focused support and access to civil service a hung par- service to avoid ‘a rival to No. 10’, on the role the civil service would information. created the worst possible circum- play in coalition negotiations (a job By the time I became Nick liament, no stances in which to take the criti- that the parties rightly decided was Clegg’s chief of staff in August, a cal decisions required at the start of one for them). As a result the actual modest civil service staff had been real thought the coalition. The special advisers job of the civil service – how it assembled. That it was too small had been and permanent civil servants who would support an elected coalition for the task was obvious but by no manned Nick’s office, did an amaz- administration – was damagingly means the biggest problem. It had given even to ing job and it is only due to their neglected and never really resolved. become clear by then that large huge dedication and the absurdly All this is not intended as a criti- parts of the civil service had hardly such a mun- long hours that they worked, that cism of individual civil servants. adapted to coalition at all and the coalition was able to function With a very few exceptions, the showed no signs of ever doing so. dane mat- at all. vast majority of people I worked Some senior civil servants appeared By January of 2011, we had sub- with were not only highly able, but incapable of understanding that if ter as where stantially strengthened the DPMO also extraordinarily hard work- a decision did not have clearance with a widely respected director ing and committed to delivering from both parties in government the Deputy general appointed to oversee the for the coalition. I do not write that it was not a decision. Some depart- operation, a beefed up and highly to spare anyone’s blushes or to sof- ments sought to obstruct access to Prime Min- able private office in place and the ten the criticism. I do so because information, sometimes with the establishment of a research and it is true and because, in the main, support of their secretaries of state. ister would analysis unit and a media team. Our the failure was one of institutional Decisions were announced that had political staff, however remained inertia and conservatism not of not been cleared. On one memora- be located, highly stretched and it was not individual will. The more I came to ble occasion, while discussing the until October of 2011, after a Her- see of the institution of the civil ser- infamous Beecroft ‘fire-at-will’ let alone culean struggle aided by a very vice, the more I realised how much proposals, a senior civil servant how his helpful report from the Institute for less it was than the sum of its parts. responded to my suggestion that Government, that we gained agree- I hope that the lessons of the last we drop further discussion – given office would ment for the appointment of a num- parliament lead to much better sup- there was no prospect of the pro- ber of multi-departmental special port for any future coalition from posal being agreed by the Deputy be staffed advisers. Whilst this eased the bur- its outset. But whether in support of Prime Minister – by saying: ‘Quite den a little, by then, the political die a coalition or a single party admin- frankly the Deputy Prime Minister or how the had probably been cast. istration, it is also critical that the does not have a veto’. I had to point Of course, even with a properly senior civil service (often aided by out to him gently that this Deputy machinery of resourced office and a political staff ministers) stops resisting necessary, Prime Minister very definitely did. who were not stretched beyond the radical and much overdue reform. It was clear to us early on that government laws of physics, there is no guaran- Only when it embraces reform will we urgently needed to strengthen tee that we would have made bet- the institution become as excel- the official and political side of our would adapt. ter or even different decisions in lent, effective and innovative as so

50 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition many of the brilliant individuals it deputy director of communications at It had through papers, and lost their abil- employs. 10 Downing Street and prior to that ity to strike a balance between coa- the Liberal Democrats’ director of elec- become lition and Conservative messages. Jonathan Oates was chief of staff to the tion communications for the 2010 general We wrestled with that balance, Deputy Prime Minister from August election. He was ennobled in the 2015 clear by then of course, having to ask Lib Dem 2010 to May 2015. He was previously dissolution honours. peers to support compromises that that large we had struck, painfully, behind the scenes. We also maintained the parts of the same party whips from our time in opposition, to hold our inde- A view from the edge: managing coalition civil service pendently minded group together; had hardly the Conservatives imitated us two in departments without full ministerial years later, as they discovered the representation adapted to difficulties of explaining coalition compromises to partisan peers. William Wallace coalition Neither Westminster nor ords ministers play sec- in my life as I did between 2010 and Whitehall adapted at all will- ondary roles in any govern- 2015. When you have got your head at all and ingly to coalition. In the Lords the Lment; ‘ministers in the Lords round the statement you have to Labour group was aggressively Whips Office’, who act as spokes- make at twenty-four hours’ notice, showed no tribal, bitterly convinced through- men for two to three departments and the draft paper you received on out the first year that we could not and are formally also whips, risk Friday afternoon and have to nego- signs of ever hold together, doing their utmost being marginal to policy-making, tiate with Conservative colleagues to prevent us from deviating an even in a single-party government. on Monday morning, there’s the doing so. inch from the duty ‘to speak for So my view of coalition was from journalist who phones you late the government’ as a whole, and the edge of government, work- at night and the outraged Lib Some senior protesting on any occasion that a ing my way in by demonstrating to Dem activist (and old friend) who distinct Liberal Democrat perspec- senior Conservatives that disputes demands that you explain why you civil servants tive was spelt out alongside the could be settled by talking to me have conceded to a Conservative Conservative view. We managed more easily than by carrying eve- proposal. In opposition you can appeared to develop a dual system, with Lib- rything up to the ‘Quad’. I started think; in government, you cope. eral Democrat ministers giving the in 2010 in the Foreign Office, my Since managing coalition means incapable of government line and nominated field of professional expertise, extra work and extra meetings, understand- backbench spokesmen giving a dif- where I was treated as a member of it became clear to Lindsay Nor- ferentiated party line. Backbench the ministerial team from the out- thover and me, after a few weeks ing that if rebellions were a tactic we could set; but I also covered the Ministry in office, that we could not cope use occasionally – at the risk of of Defence and, after a brief attach- with the pressures of Lords busi- a decision provoking Conservative rebel- ment to Education, the police and ness, learning our briefs, trying to lions against measures we had won; counter-terrorism aspects of the get upstream in the policy-making did not have though of course there was no way Home Office (the ‘national secu- process in the departments to which we could control our backbench- rity agenda’). When the mid-term we were attached, and keeping in clearance ers in the last resort! I learned over reshuffle came in 2012, I had just touch with our Liberal ministerial time how to modulate the way I put been made Lords spokesman for colleagues and the rest of our peers’ from both the coalition line across when at the the Cabinet Office – the only peer group. We asked for an additional despatch box or on the media, to attending their ministerial meet- two spokesmen, and gained one in parties in convey different degrees of enthusi- ings, so responsible for managing Sue Garden. Coalition formation asm or reservation. all the CO’s business (civil service had put Commons appointments government Learning coalition inside gov- management, the third sector, and first, so the three of us were unpaid, ernment was also painful, within political and constitutional reform) as were several of our Conservative it was not a a structure unused to institutional through the Lords. Nick Clegg Lords colleagues. compromises. Whitehall expected complimented me on how well I The best immediate decision decision. most incoming Liberal Democrats was coping, and asked me to carry our Lords group took was to main- to behave as junior ministers under on without a Commons minister tain our separate whips’ office when their secretaries of state – and most from now on in either the FCO we lost our opposition funding; secretaries of state wanted to take or the MoD. I said I could in no many of us made voluntary con- credit for everything positive that way manage to be the only Liberal tributions to keep it going in the came out of their department. Nick Democrat presence in three depart- early months, before we shaped a Harvey in Defence was clear from ments effectively, and recom- system of monthly contributions the outset that he was the Lib Dem mended that Sue Garden succeed from group members to fund it. minister, and fought to be shown me in Defence, given her familiar- The Conservatives closed their departmental papers across the ity with forces’ welfare and RAF party whips office and relied on the board. Jeremy Browne accepted his issues. Government Whips Office for sup- role as a junior FCO minister with- Government is high-pressure, port – but discovered that they had out understanding that his role was seven days a week; and coalition to struggle over weekends to keep also to safeguard Lib Dem interests, government increases the pres- in contact with their backbench- plunged into visits to Latin Amer- sure. I have never worked as hard ers at the same time as reading ica and Asia, and did not follow

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 51 managing the coalition papers on Europe and the Middle is the Conservative Party, with the The unsta- Danny Alexander sitting round East – the two most contentious Prime Minister wavering in the our kitchen table in Wandsworth areas between the parties on foreign middle, was both a problem and an ble coalition discussing how we prevent such a policy. It took me, as a marginal opportunity. With some Conserva- fiasco happening again. I learned player of uncertain status with- tive ministers we could work and that is the from this that using the media out an FCO private office, several exchange information easily, even to signal to your partners can be months to gain access to the drafts establish relations of friendship and Conserva- helpful; a Conservative colleague on the proposed EU bill, by which mutual trust. With others, active phoned me shortly after I had been time they were already in a shape suspicion of their intentions was tive Party, on TV, to discuss how to get out of that was difficult to challenge. the only sensible approach, even the hole the PM had dug. It didn’t Chris Huhne had nominated me when (like Michael Gove) person- with the hurt that he and other Conserva- for the Cabinet Sub-Committee on ally charming; Lindsay Northover Prime Min- tives learned that I had come close EU Affairs, which helped my cred- warned us all from the outset to be to resigning over this – only a mar- ibility and standing with officials wary of attempts to charm us while ister waver- ginal resignation, but nevertheless and Conservative ministers; an pressing forward with initiatives one that they understood would early visit to Brussels, during which which we could not accept. ing in the have registered Liberal Democrat the president of the Commission Coalition also requires active disapproval of the PM’s behaviour. addressed me as ‘Professor Wallace’ coordination. We failed to achieve middle, was The coalition agreement had in front of several Conservative this throughout the first year, with included, at Conservative insist- ministers, also helped (I had taught only occasional meetings of Liberal both a prob- ence, a commitment to exam- him twenty years earlier). It helped Democrat ministers. I went into ine the ‘balance of competences’ me further within the FCO that one cabinet committee meeting lem and an between the UK and the EU, Helen, my wife, had trained many with a clear sense of what our ‘side’ across a wide range of policy areas. of its senior officials when they first wanted to get across, only to have opportunity. They expected that a call for evi- entered the civil service, had taught that position undermined by a Lib dence from businesses, professional senior politicians and officials in Dem colleague uncritically reading With some associations and other stakehold- several other EU countries, and was out the departmental brief. After a ers would provide an agenda for recognised as one of the leading year we instituted regular weekly Conserva- repatriating powers from Brussels experts on European politics; there meetings – the cost of yet another to Westminster. I was the Liberal was one wonderful occasion when hour blocked out in our calendars tive minis- Democrat, with two Conserva- I was asked to phone the Finnish more than compensated for by the tive colleagues, on the ‘Ministerial prime minister (whom we had both chance to compare notes and share ters we could Star Chamber’ that oversaw a pro- taught) on behalf of No. 10. Nick tactics. We also learned in the first work and cess that produced some thirty-two Clegg strengthened my position year how crucial our Spads were: papers, in four groups, over two further by taking me with him on glancing through papers that might exchange years. The evidence that flowed visits to Paris and Berlin. not have crossed our desks, alert- in was overwhelmingly in favour William Hague was a collegiate ing us to policy initiatives before informa- of maintaining the current bal- secretary of state, who conducted we had heard about them, marking ance, even in a few cases of giv- his weekly meetings as an open their Conservative opposite num- tion easily, ing Brussels greater powers. No. discussion, in which I could flag bers as they advised their ministers. 10 responded by doing its best to up areas that our party found dif- We needed more than the handful even estab- bury the exercise, delaying the ficult. Theresa May was a tougher who, like the three of us as Lords publication of each group until the minister to deal with, but open to spokesmen, were stretched across lish relations day after parliament had risen for argument. I learned to place myself two to three departments each – the summer or for Christmas, and in her meetings directly in her line and gained useful reinforcements in of friend- doing its best to stop any of us brief- of sight, so that I could catch her the 2012 reshuffle. ing the domestic press. eye easily when I wanted to disa- Cameron’s mishandling of the ship and The officials who supported us gree; Lynne Featherstone often sat European Council meeting in were effectively professional and out of view at the side. Liam Fox December 2011 was a major cri- mutual trust. neutral throughout a politically was far easier to deal with than sis within the coalition – not only charged process, in which the paper Philip Hammond, his MoD suc- because Europe was one of the most With oth- on the free movement of people cessor, a loner who treated all his sensitive sources of disagreement. was delayed by over six months as junior ministers with disdain; The Prime Minister represents ers, active we fought Theresa May’s Spads to when Sue Garden succeeded me as the UK at these; but in a coalition suspicion of allow the document to reflect the Lords spokesman, it took her nearly he should have the wit to consult, evidence, and the first draft of the two months to get in to meet him. and the diplomatic skills to avoid their inten- paper on civil justice attempted When he transferred to the FCO excessively irritating his continen- a strong Eurosceptic tone unsup- he cancelled the weekly ministerial tal counterparts. Monica Allen, tions was the ported by any of the legal authori- meetings, to the dismay of Conser- our international affairs Spad, ties who had contributed. Lib Dem vatives as well as myself; I met him briefed me initially; Nick Clegg only sensible Spads watched my back in other only three times in his nine months then persuaded me, against my ini- departments effectively, and Helen as Foreign Secretary, though I con- tial inclinations as a bitterly dis- approach … provided expert advice; I circulated tinued to meet David Lidington, pleased but junior player, to go on a critical memo around Whitehall the Europe minister, every week, television to voice our unease with before each negotiating meeting, and other junior ministers fre- Cameron’s behaviour; and Helen at the cost of several lost weekends, quently. The unstable coalition that and I ended the weekend with to spell out the areas where drafts

52 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition were not following the evidence on defence, in particular on the told us was how difficult it is for submitted. So the Conservatives Trident review. That was a dispir- the smaller partner in a coalition were left without an agenda for iting experience: I met with inde- to avoid that fate. In the fifth year repatriation. But the Liberal Dem- cision and unwillingness to play we should have paid more atten- ocrats did not attempt to counter multi-party politics. ‘We’re still tion to spelling out the underlying Conservative efforts to keep the discussing that’, or ‘the shadow differences between the coali- outcome out of the press; it was cabinet can’t agree’ were two of tion partners – in the hope that a not until the middle of the election the responses I got to suggestions largely hostile media might help campaign that The Observer devoted that Labour might like to give sup- us to get that message across. We a full page to the story. port to positions Liberal Democrats were locked in for too long to the There was no such formal pro- were pressing. mindset that we had to prove that cess to manage differences on Mid- We should have been spelling coalition can work, rather than dle Eastern policy. William Hague out the distinctiveness of the Lib- demonstrating how two differ- was robust on Israel–Palestine, eral Democrat philosophy that lay ent parties can negotiate. But the spelling out that the spread of set- behind the policies we were press- weight of scepticism from so much tlements across the West Bank ing – but that’s not easy to do in of the media, as well as the Labour would soon make a two-state nego- government, outside of party con- opposition, even after four years of tiation impossible. His colleagues ference speeches. Cameron him- coalition, still held us back. pursued closer political and com- self, and his No. 10 office, gave the mercial relations with the Sunni coalition little sense of direction. William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Gulf states, pushing arms sales and He seemed to be concerned with Saltaire) was a government whip and inviting further investment in the party management, letting oth- spokesman in the Lords from 2010 to UK. The National Security Coun- ers compete in defining the direc- 2015; from 2012 to 2015 he was the only cil spent more time in the coali- tion of policy. The hard truth may Liberal Democrat in the FCO and deal- tion’s first three years discussing be the message that we heard from ing with the departmental business of ‘Gulf strategy’ than European strat- our continental Liberal counter- the Cabinet Office. He was professor egy. Nick Clegg asked an informal parts, when after the first year we on international relations at the Lon- group of MPs and peers to review were invited to a seminar on how, don School of Economics until 2005; and policy towards Iran to provide as the junior partner in a coalition, had earlier led the manifesto drafting him with advice; we met a range to avoid getting most of the blame group for both the 1979 and 1997 general of outside experts, and recom- and little of the credit. What they elections. mended that we should press for a more positive approach. Cameron later moved policy towards a more Israel-friendly approach, while Cameron maintaining an uncritical alliance How did the Liberal Democrats remain with the Gulf monarchies, accept- himself, and ing the Bahraini offer to pay for the united in the 2010–2015 parliament? And expansion of the British naval base his No. 10 were they right to? and agreeing to investigate (and potentially ban) the British affili- office, gave Matthew Hanney ates of the Muslim Brotherhood in response to a request from a Gulf the coalition hen the Liberal Dem- the final eight consecutive quar- prince. Saeeda Warsi’s resignation ocrats entered the coa- ters.3 Aside from the occasional was a response to that shift. But little sense Wlition government in squall from semi-detached peers, for Liberal Democrats, without a May 2015 predictions abounded and the ham-fisted and short- minister in Defence and with only of direction. that the party would not, and lived attempted coup against Nick myself monitoring developments indeed could not, last the course.1 Clegg’s leadership after the 2014 from within the FCO, our influ- He seemed to Many expected the party to split, elections, there was little open dis- ence was limited. or at least see a wave of high profile sent across the party over the five Could we have done more? be concerned defections. The precedents of 1886, years. Despite consistently poor Undoubtedly we could have played 1916 and 1931 offered historical bal- mid-term election results, there harder on occasions, and briefed with party last to this expectation. In short, was no serious attempt to suggest the press more aggressively. I cul- the expected strains of delivering leaving the coalition, and staying tivated some journalists for back- manage- significant austerity in conjunction in the government remained the ground briefings; but most weren’t ment, let- with the pressures junior parties in clear view of the party through- interested in the arcane policy areas coalition inevitably face, especially out.4 There were five main reasons I worked in. The balance between ting others in FPTP electoral systems, threat- this happened: the collective nature keeping the coalition together and ened to pull the party asunder. of the decision to enter govern- demonstrating our distinctiveness compete in Yet the Liberal Democrats ment, the economic circumstances was never easy to strike; both press entered the 2015 general election as of 2010, the policy achievements in and Labour were always looking defining the a united party. Over the five years government, the belief during the for signs that the coalition might no parliamentarian had defected to parliament that the 2015 election fail. I also tried to brief Miliband’s direction of another party;2 and whilst mem- could see a successful defence of a advisers from time to time about bership fell in the first few years majority of the constituencies, and coalition policies on Europe and policy. of the parliament, it increased for Nick Clegg’s leadership style.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 53 managing the coalition

The first, and most significant it would be wise to have a special coalition with the Conservatives, factor, was the collective decision- conference anyway. from Labour and had taken diffi- making process that the party This was a crucial decision. And cult and often unpopular decisions engaged in before it entered the one for which those who pushed to clear up the financial mess their coalition. As leader and party presi- for it should take a considerable Labour predecessors left. dent, Nick Clegg and Ros Scott amount of credit. Equally impor- The party’s support for the fiscal ensured that this process not only tant was the decision that confer- mandate was tested twice at confer- adhered to the party’s then agreed ence debate the coalition agreement ence. The first time was at autumn procedure – the so called ‘triple- on a take it or leave it basis with conference 2012 when an amend- lock’ – but went beyond it. tricky issues, most notably tuition ment calling for the party to quit The background to this lay fees, being addressed in amend- the coalition’s agreed fiscal mandate with the choice of the negotiating ments to the motion for debate was overwhelmingly defeated.10 team of Danny Alexander, David rather than the agreement itself.6 The second time was a more closely Laws, Andrew Stunell and Chris The party After a full debate, with opponents contested vote with Nick Clegg Huhne. Whilst they regrettably of the agreement given a fair chance himself summating a motion and lacked demographic diversity, they had collec- to make their case – with rather seeing off amendments from the did represent a cross-section of the memorable props in Linda Jack’s Social Liberal Forum which sought party’s ideological spectrum. They tively agreed case7 – the special conference gave to unpick, albeit it with more also had between them experience an overwhelming endorsement8 of nuance than the amendment a year of negotiating the Labour–Liberal to enter the the coalition agreement. This rep- earlier, the fiscal mandate. The vote Democrat coalition in Scotland, resented a collective ‘dipping of was closer than previously, but numerous local government agree- government the hands in the blood’. The party still represented a clear win for the ments and extensive private-sector had collectively agreed to enter the leadership.11 negotiating experience. Despite the with all the government with all the inevita- So when this issue was put to eccentric suggestion from David ble challenges, trials and tribula- the test at conference the result was Steel that this team were ‘new and inevitable tions that would follow. This meant clear. The reasons for this can be younger colleagues who he [Clegg] that over the following five years, debated elsewhere, but the coali- could dominate’,5 this was not the challenges, nobody could sensibly or legiti- tion was notably more flexible in case. It was a negotiating team mately suggest that the decision had its approach to the fiscal mandate selected with careful consideration trials and been imposed from on high. It had than either its supporters or crit- given to ensuring it would be cred- not and the party knew that. ics would allow at the time – and ible to the wider party. tribulations The party also, albeit perhaps this was probably most evident in As David Laws has narrated in less overwhelmingly, accepted the the reversing of cuts to infrastruc- 22 Days in May, over the course of that would argument that the country faced ture spending. Whatever the rea- the five days after the 2010 general follow. This an economic crisis which required son for its support, as long as the election the party leadership and a stable government overseeing a party believed that the coalition negotiating team met extensively meant that programme of fiscal consolidation. government’s economic and fiscal not just with MPs and the Federal The brief version of this argument policy was broadly correct (whilst Executive, but also with peers and over the was that the books needed balanc- acknowledging that it could never representatives of the parliamen- ing and needed balancing as fairly inevitably be purely Liberal Demo- tary parties in Scotland, Wales following as possible, and the Liberal Demo- crat) it would make little sense for and Europe. The views expressed crats being – and remaining – in the party to fracture, or to seek new in these meetings were listened five years, government was the best way to leadership. to carefully and, where possible, guarantee this. The strong grip the Throughout the five years of woven into the coalition agree- nobody could executive holds versus the legisla- the coalition government there ment. And indeed, as David Laws ture on the budgetary process in were clear and identifiable Liberal articulates, the need to secure the sensibly or the UK9 meant that the influence Democrat policy wins. It can be support of the wider party was used Liberal Democrats wielded through argued that these were outweighed as leverage during negotiations, legitimately the so-called ‘quad’ budget nego- by obviously objectionable poli- most notably in relation to electoral tiation process was keenly felt, and cies, especially on welfare, but the reform. suggest that significantly greater than anything policy wins were indisputably hap- The result of this extensive that could have been achieved via pening. Some, such as increasing internal conversation was that the decision confidence and supply. the tax threshold and delivering when the proposed agreement was That the wider party was will- the pupil premium, were flagship put to a vote, only one member had been ing to agree to the tough choices policies which went from the front of the FE, David Rendel, voted imposed that implementing austerity page of the party’s manifesto to against, and no MP did (though a entailed would not have surprised become government policy. These few, including Charles Kennedy, from on any student of Liberal Democrats policies benefited millions across abstained.) Under the ‘triple-lock’ in local government. In authorities the country: to paraphrase an old procedure this was more than suf- high. It had across the country, from London slogan, everybody knew somebody ficient a mandate. However there boroughs such as Islington, Cam- who benefited from the tax thresh- was consensus amongst the collec- not and the den, Brent, Lambeth and South- old change. And every school gov- tive leadership of the party – the wark, to cities such as Liverpool, ernor, doubtless well-represented officers of the Federal Confer- party knew Leeds, Newcastle, Sheffield and in Liberal Democrat ranks, knew ence Committee, the FE and both Birmingham, Liberal Democrats the difference the pupil premium Ros Scott and Nick Clegg – that that. had taken power, sometimes also in made to their own school.12 Liberal

54 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 managing the coalition

Democrats could, and did, take then being able to make it happen Throughout that the line could be held, then pride in these policies. by talking directly to a party col- there would have been a more And just as important was deliv- league who is the responsible min- the five years determined attempt to rock the ering on issues that might, perhaps ister is of considerable importance. boat. After all, self-preservation is unfairly, be described as more niche Inevitably, and reasonably, of the coali- the most powerful of both human issues, such as equal marriage, end- given the result of the 2015 general and political instincts. ing child detention for immigration election, there has been no short- tion govern- Perhaps the most overlooked purposes, and legislating for 0.7 per age of critics of the campaign the reason why the Liberal Democrats cent of GDP to be spent on interna- party ran. However, in the years ment there remained together is the leader- tional development. Knowing that running up to the election, MPs, ship and party management skills Liberal Democrats were making key-seat candidates and their teams, were clear of Nick Clegg. Whilst he doubt- a difference in areas that the party and indeed the media, believed and identifi- less made mistakes – perhaps the had campaigned on for decades that the strategy constructed and greatest was on the so-called ‘secret persuaded many that remaining implemented by Ryan Coetzee and able Liberal courts’ issue – he also got a lot right. in government was worth it. And, Paddy Ashdown gave the party a He committed significantly more importantly, this remained true decent shot of being strongly com- Democrat time to party management than throughout the parliament. An exit petitive in forty to fifty seats and any other party leader in govern- from the government after the 2014 of holding approximately thirty policy wins. ment. This is as it absolutely should elections would have seen Jo Swin- seats – and with them, potentially be in a party with such strong inter- son’s important work on shared the balance of power nationally. It can be nal democracy as the Liberal Dem- parental leave stopped by Conserv- Polling by both the party and Lord ocrats, but nonetheless the list of his ative ministers who fought tooth Ashcroft broadly bore this view argued that engagements is impressive. He was and nail against it. out, as did, crucially, both the East- one of the most regular attendees at In short, this might be described leigh by-election and local elections these were the Commons parliamentary party as the Alex Cole-Hamilton expla- in those constituencies. meetings, went regularly to the nation. He said after his defeat in Ultimately, this belief was outweighed Lords parliamentary party meet- the 2011 Scottish parliament elec- incorrect, and the results and polls ings, held monthly conference calls tions that ‘if my defeat tonight is gave the party false hope. How- by obviously with fellow leaders in Scotland, part payment so that no child will ever, it is reasonable to suggest that Wales, Europe and London, spoke spend another night in a deten- without the dramatic change in the objection- at countless conference fringes and tion centre then I accept it, with political landscape – on both sides receptions and spoke at numer- all my heart.’13 So compelling an of the border – brought about by able policies, ous fundraising events for key- argument was this that Nick Clegg the Scottish referendum, the party’s especially on seat candidates, as well as more ad quoted it in his 2011 autumn con- strategy might have proved rela- hoc personal touches such as many ference speech14 and again in his tively successful. This of course can welfare, but hand-written letters to members on 2015 resignation speech, fram- never be proved either way. The appropriate occasions and congrat- ing the wider argument as ‘we key point remains that the party’s the policy ulatory calls to council by-election will never know how many lives candidates in the seats where there winners. we changed for the better because was a reasonable prospect of suc- wins were After the disastrous local we had the courage to step up cess bought into the plan that Ryan election results of 2011, he was at a time of crisis. But we have Coetzee, Paddy Ashdown and the indisputably particularly assiduous in his com- done something that cannot be ‘wheelhouse’ proposed and imple- munications with party’s local undone. Because there can be no mented.17 They may have been happening. government base. He went to the doubt that we leave government wrong to do so, but that they did annual local government confer- with Britain a far stronger, fairer, was a huge factor in keeping the ence and met often with the Liberal greener and more liberal coun- party united. Democrat LGA executive; indeed, try than it was five years ago.’15 An Whilst Lib Dem HQ did have so regular were his trips to Local often overlooked element to policy some control of finances, which Government House that the Con- wins for the Liberal Democrats, at may have encouraged such buy in, servative leader of the LGA found it least in regards to the continued this was relatively limited and the easier to speak with him than with support that the leadership and support most candidates gave was David Cameron. A similar pattern government enjoyed from MPs, largely genuine rather than feigned emerged in the devolved adminis- were constituency-specific wins or bought. This was also certainly trations where Conservative rep- that the coalition delivered. Both true for the campaign run for the resentatives suffered the repeated Nick Clegg and Danny Alexan- European elections in 2014 when frustration of finding their Lib- der were diligent, especially in the idea, if not the precise execu- eral Democrat counterparts better the second half of the parliament, tion, of running an aggressively informed on the actions of the UK in trying to meet these. The most pro-European campaign was gen- government, even in areas with obvious of these were road projects erally very positively received by Conservative ministers. such as the A303, A1 and King- candidates and the wider party. The scale of this commitment erswell bypass. It would be easy, Only a few of the critics of the would have been in vain if it were and understandable, to deride these electoral strategy can honestly a set of tick box exercises, but Nick as ‘pork barrelling’. But when you claim to have expressed their con- Clegg was adroit at listening – have been campaigning for years16 cerns before polling day. The fact with his customary good humour for a policy that would improve remains that, had there not been – to what members across the the lives of those you represent, a reasonable degree of confidence party said and then acting on it.18

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 55 managing the coalition

Numerous changes to government Perhaps the means that the hard questions and which consistently showed very policy, and the presentation of it, conversations that need to happen strong support for remaining in coa- stemmed from such conversations. most over- are free to be held in good faith and lition: http://www.libdemvoice.org/ These actions helped pull the party without rancour. category/ldv-members-poll. together by ensuring it had a stake looked rea- Finally, it is important to con- 5 http://www.theguardian.com/com- in government, as well as generat- sider that the electorate view politi- mentisfree/2015/may/11/nick-clegg- ing goodwill that could be called son why cal parties over the long term, not liberal-democrats-disaster-coalition. upon in tougher times. just one electoral cycle. For many 6 The text of the motion the Special the Liberal years the Liberal Democrats, and its Conference passed is here: http:// Democrats predecessor parties, were viewed, www.libdems.org.uk/special_con- Were the Liberal Democrats however unfairly, as not really ference_passes_building_a_fairer_ right to have been so united? remained being up to the tough job of gov- britain_in_government. This is an infinitely harder question erning. Fine to be given control of 7 Pink handcuffs! to answer, especially for those inti- together is local authorities, but not to play 8 Estimates vary as there was no need mately involved with the coalition in the Westminster big league (as for a count, but of the approximately government. But given the 2015 the leader- many voters saw it.) Such a view of 1,500 in the hall certainly no more general election result, it is a ques- the Liberal Democrats provided an than 50, and quite possibly fewer than tion that merits examination. The ship and inevitable glass ceiling on electoral 20, voted against the agreement. facile answer is that the result could performance in general elections. 9 Especially compared to say the US for not have been worse, so any alter- party man- The competency test that the example, for more see here: http:// native strategy – be it a change of electorate applies might be more blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ leader or exit from the government agement that of Justice Stewart’s ‘I know it budgeting-in-the-uk-is-highly- – could hardly have delivered an when I see it’ rather than a scientific transparent-but-that-does-not- inferior result. This is an easy posi- skills of Nick formula. But it is a hugely impor- mean-that-budget-decisions-are- tion to take, but for three reasons it tant test. After the last five years carefully-scrutinized-nor-that-the- is incorrect. Clegg. Whilst the Liberal Democrats are now right-policy-judgements-are-made/. The first is that there is no clear equipped to pass it. Had the party 10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ evidence that, once the collec- he doubt- broken ranks and turned in on uk-politics-19699655. tive decision to enter government itself then the public may well have 11 http://www.theguardian. had been taken and the subsequent less made taken an extremely dim view, not com/politics/2013/sep/16/ policy choices made, anything mistakes – just in 2015 but in any future gen- nick-clegg-lib-dems-austerity. else would have made a signifi- eral elections when it looked possi- 12 In England, and Kirsty Williams cant improvement to the party’s perhaps the ble we might form part of the next and her team also forced Labour in electoral standing. Nick Clegg administration. budget negotiations to deliver an was widely thought to have run greatest was So, perhaps not surprisingly, I equivalent in Wales. a competent election campaign, am in no doubt the party made the 13 https://twitter.com/Alex4Central/ performed well in the debates and on the so- right collective choice to hold its status/66336714939047936. indeed secured endorsements of nerve for five years. It was not easy 14 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ one form or another from almost called ‘secret and the price certainly was a high politics/liberaldemocrats/8778863/ every national newspaper. How- one, higher than almost anybody Lib-Dem-conference-2011-Nick- ever, the electoral consequences of courts’ issue expected and higher than the party Cleggs-speech-in-full.html. the unholy alliance of Scottish and deserved. It is wrong to suggest 15 http://www.libdems.org.uk/a-mes- English nationalism, stoked by the – he also got there was no alternative; there was, sage-from-nick-clegg-to-liberal- SNP and Tories, was liable to sweep but it was not one that would have democrat-members. away any Liberal Democrat leader, a lot right. He served the party well. 16 Or, as an extreme example, Alan campaign and message.19 Beith’s forty-year campaign to The second is that for the sur- committed Matthew Hanney was an adviser to improve the A1 which finally came to vival of political parties – especially Nick Clegg between 2006 and 2015. fruition under the coalition. smaller liberal parties – it is divi- significantly 17 For more on this, see http://www. sion, defections and splits which 1 Inter alia, http://www.theguardian. theguardian.com/politics/2015/ can prove fatal rather than poor more time to com/commentisfree/2010/may/03/ feb/17/inside-nick-clegg-lib-dem- electoral results per se.20 The Lib- party man- lib-dem-tory-coalition. general-election-campaign. eral Democrats in the aftermath of 2 Matthew Oakeshott left the party 18 For example, on tax incremental the 2015 general election are prov- agement 2014 to describe himself as a ‘non- financing, the need for city deals not ing a robust, and indeed grow- party Social Democrat’; perhaps the to be contingent on directly elected ing, party which held a relatively than any most senior Liberal Democrat to mayors and the timing of police and amicable leadership contest (cer- defect directly to another party was crime commissioner elections. tainly compared with Labour’s!) other party Richard Grayson (former Director 19 As argued further by Ryan Coetzee and showed a willingness to col- of Policy under Charles Kennedy here, http://www.theguardian.com/ lectively retain ownership of its leader in and parliamentary candidate), who commentisfree/2015/may/22/liberal- record in government. Tim Farron defected to Labour in 2013. democrats-opposition-labour-gov- has taken office without the stain government. 3 http://www.libdemvoice.org/45455- ernment. of disloyalty and inherits a party 45435.html. 20 For example recently the Australian that knows it can hang together in 4 The best, though imperfect meas- Democrats, Irish Progressive Demo- the toughest of times. The lack of ure of this, being the regular Liberal crats, and historically the splits in the bloodletting in the last parliament Democrat Voice members’ polling, Liberal Party of 1916 and 1931.

56 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Dadabhai Naoroji know he was very interested in pacifism. Any information, oral history Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) was an Indian nationalist and Liberal submissions, location of papers or references most welcome. Dr Yury member for Central Finsbury, 1892–95 – the first Asian to be elected Boshyk, [email protected]; or Dr Cheryl Brook, [email protected]. to the House of Commons. This research for a PhD at Harvard aims to produce both a biography of Naoroji and a volume of his selected Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935 correspondence, to be published by OUP India in 2013. The current Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an phase concentrates on Naoroji’s links with a range of British progressive understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include organisations and individuals, particularly in his later career. Suggestions personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of for archival sources very welcome. Dinyar Patel; [email protected] the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a or 07775 753 724. Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected].

The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper Four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis Strutt was Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and A four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis, attempting to Nottingham; in 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston rebalance the existing Anglo-centric focus. Considering Scottish and Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a Welsh reactions and the development of parallel Home Rule movements, friend of Jeremy Bentham and a supporter of free trade and reform, along with how the crisis impacted on political parties across the UK. and held government office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Sources include newspapers, private papers, Hansard. Naomi Lloyd-Jones; and Commissioner of Railways. Any information, location of papers or [email protected]. references welcome. Brian Smith; [email protected]. Beyond Westminster: Grassroots Liberalism 1910–1929 Charles Day Rose (1847–1913) A study of the Liberal Party at its grassroots during the period in which it Charles Day Rose, a partner in the City banking firm of Morton Rose, went from being the party of government to the third party of politics. was Liberal MP for Newmarket 1903–10 and 1910–13. Living at Hardwick This research will use a wide range of sources, including surviving House on the banks of the Thames in Oxfordshire, he may have been Liberal Party constituency minute books and local press to contextualise the model for Mr Toad in Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows. the national decline of the party with the reality of the situation on Rose died just before the First World War after being taken up for a the ground. The thesis will focus on three geographic regions (Home spin in an aeroplane, leading the coroner to observe that’ airoplaning’ Counties, Midlands and the North West) in order to explore the situation should clearly be left to ‘the young, the vigorous and the robust’. Any the Liberals found themselves in nationally. Research for University of documentary information bearing on any aspect of his multifarious life Leicester. Supervisor: Dr Stuart Ball. Gavin Freeman ; [email protected]. would be of interest. Dr Michael Redley, 10 Norman Avenue, Henley on Thames, Oxfordshire, RG9 1SG; [email protected]. The Liberal Party’s political communication, 1945–2002 Research on the Liberal party and Lib Dems’ political communication. The emergence of the ‘public service ethos’ Any information welcome (including testimonies) about electoral Aims to analyse how self-interest and patronage was challenged by the campaigns and strategies. Cynthia Boyer, CUFR Champollion, Place de advent of impartial inspectorates, public servants and local authorities Verdun, 81 000 Albi, France; +33 5 63 48 19 77; [email protected]. in provincial Britain in the mid 19th century. Much work has been done on the emergence of a ‘liberal culture’ in the central civil service in The Liberal Party in Wales, 1966–1988 Whitehall, but much work needs to be done on the motives, behaviour Aims to follow the development of the party from the general election and mentalities of the newly reformed guardians of the poor, sanitary of 1966 to the time of the merger with the SDP. PhD research at Cardiff inspectors, factory and mines inspectors, education authorities, prison University. Nick Alderton; [email protected]. warders and the police. Ian Cawood, Newman University Colllege, Birmingham; [email protected]. Policy position and leadership strategy within the Liberal Democrats This thesis will be a study of the political positioning and leadership Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933) strategy of the Liberal Democrats. Consideration of the role of I am currently writing a biography of Sir Edward Grey, and I am keen to equidistance; development of policy from the point of merger; the discover any letters or other documents relating to him that may be in influence and leadership strategies of each leader from Ashdown to private hands. Thomas Otte, University of East Anglia; [email protected]. Clegg; and electoral strategy from 1988 to 2015 will form the basis of the work. Any material relating to leadership election campaigns, election The life of Professor Reginald W Revans, 1907–2003 campaigns, internal party groups (for example the Social Liberal Forum) Any information anyone has on Revans’ Liberal Party involvement would or policy documents from 1987 and merger talks onwards would be be most welcome. We are particularly keen to know when he joined the greatly welcomed. Personal insights and recollections also sought. party and any involvement he may have had in campaigning issues. We Samuel Barratt; [email protected].

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 57 WhatTh were the impactse of coalition i on mthe Liberal Democrats?pac Craig Johnson analysests Liberal Democrat of members’ attitudes to cthe coalitiono government,ali and Caron Lindsayt considersi theon impacts of coalition on the Liberal Democrats in Scotland.

The coalition and Liberal Democrat members Craig Johnson

arty members and activists Democrats, this raises an important Nick Clegg and activists as if they were irrel- are vital to a political party’s question: what did party members speaking to evancies. The argument was that Pfunctions, and what party make of the coalition government’s Liberal Democrat the local context was not as impor- members think about key political record and the Liberal Democrats’ activists after tant as it once was, and instead issues is important for understand- role within it? To answer this ques- the 2012 Budget attention should be focused pre- ing political parties more broadly. tion, this article first highlights the announcement dominantly on the national cam- More specifically, members and importance of members and activists (photo: Liberal paigns and analysis of the parties activists have particular importance to the Liberal Democrats, and then Democrats) in that context. There is good rea- for the Liberal Democrats, both in presents survey data from Liberal son for such a view. Although the terms of campaigning and contrib- Democrat members. It concludes Liberal Democrats have enjoyed a uting to party policy.1 with a brief assessment of member- bump in their membership since The Liberal Democrats’ experi- ship attitudes, and what this might the 2015 general election, more ence since 2010 has been a turbu- mean for future support for Liberal generally party membership has lent one. On the one hand, they Democrat involvement in coalition been falling in representative have implemented their policies in with other parties. democracies for quite some time.2 national government. On the other, It could be asked why national they have lost many of their elected party elites should pay any atten- representatives, including forty- The importance of members tion to members and activists at nine MPs and over 1,000 local coun- and activists all. After all, it can be expensive cillors. Given the importance of It was formerly commonplace to to maintain a national network members and activists to the Liberal discuss political party members of local parties; and members and

58 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 WhatTh were the impactse of coalition i on mthe Liberal Democrats?pac Craig Johnson analysests Liberal Democrat of members’ attitudes to cthe coalitiono government,ali and Caron Lindsayt considersi theon impacts of coalition on the Liberal Democrats in Scotland.

activists might hold more radical was easily passed by the Liberal Democrats’ reputation nationally, views than you wish to present to Democrat special conference that but also of leaving the party with- the electorate.3 Time and money convened after the 2010 general out its former breadth and depth could be better spent elsewhere election. This is not so surprising. of activism and financial contribu- than keeping them happy. A Conservative–Liberal Demo- tions from its members. However, in recent years this crat coalition was the only realistic The most comprehensive collec- analysis has been repeatedly chal- outcome that delivered a working tion of data on Liberal Democrat lenged by a revisionist literature. majority in the House of Com- members’ attitudes has been by the In short, the argument runs that mons, and it allowed the Liberal website, Liberal Democrat Voice. As party members provide candidates No matter Democrats, for the first time since well as being independent of the for local, sub-national and national the party’s inception, to imple- party, it is the most accessed web- elections, they provide democratic how difficult ment nationally a series of policies site specifically about the Liberal legitimacy to parties in communi- long argued for by its membership. Democrats. They conduct surveys ties, and they provide parties with the party’s For example, at the time of writing of their Liberal Democrat mem- the resources and labour to actu- there are fixed-term parliaments, ber readership on a regular basis. ally win elections.4 Each of these prospects increased thresholds for paying Whilst the surveys are not wholly points applies strongly to the Lib- income tax, a Green Investment representative, participants are eral Democrats. In the absence of became, fol- Bank, and same-sex marriage. At checked against the Liberal Demo- national media attention, winning the same time, the Liberal Demo- crats’ database to ensure that non- votes and seats in local campaigns lowing the crats were able to scrap or prevent party members cannot take part. has been essential to the party’s change of changes in legislation. The Human Of course, this means that the sur- electoral advance and to estab- Rights Act remains, whilst identity veys ignore any former members lishing itself as a credible political policy on tui- cards are gone and the maximum who have left the party, and who party. Whilst the party has profes- detention without trial has been would potentially have more nega- sionalised in recent years,5 members tion fees, halved.7 Liberal Democrat members tive opinions. It is also possible, and and activists continue to influence have been able to influence govern- perhaps likely, that respondents are party policy and strategy more local elec- ment policy more than ever before, overwhelmingly made up of com- than in the Labour and Conserva- and at the same time the party has mitted activists, rather than the tive parties. tion defeats contributed to showing that coa- broader membership. However, Particularly in the 2015 cam- lition government in Britain can the surveys’ good response rates paign, the Liberal Democrats’ tar- or European function. and regularity make them a very geted electoral strategy relied on However, the decision to enter useful resource for getting a broad the long hours and hard work of parliament coalition was not an easy one for understanding of Liberal Democrat members and activists, as well as members and activists to support. membership opinion.10 non-member volunteers.6 Without election Many had spent their political life Figure 1 shows Liberal Demo- them, the dismal return of eight opposing what the Conservatives crat members’ attitudes to coalition MPs might have been even fewer. defeats, stood for. And whatever the Lib- with the Conservatives. Through- That they campaigned so vigor- eral Democrats’ achievements in out the entire coalition, support ously seems to denote resilience and members government once in coalition, they was never lower than 74 per cent (in a commitment to the party. How- failed to make an impact on vot- October 2012 following the block- ever, a declining membership and a appear to ers’ perceptions. The party’s inter- ing of House of Lords reform) and fall in local electoral representation have sup- nal polling showed that fewer than generally hovered around 80 per suggests otherwise. This raises an 3 per cent of voters credited them cent. No matter how difficult the important question. What did Lib- ported the with delivering ‘a lot’ of their poli- party’s prospects became, follow- eral Democrat members and activ- cies.8 Between 2010 and 2014 the ing the change of policy on tuition ists make of the coalition? party’s par- party’s membership fell by 35 per fees, local election defeats or Euro- cent, and coincided with the loss pean parliament election defeats, ticipation of over 1,000 local councillors.9 members appear to have supported Membership attitudes to the Whilst this could have been a lot the party’s participation in coali- coalition in coalition worse, it represents a stark decline tion throughout. The decision to enter government in membership. This had the effect Support was also found for the in coalition with the Conservatives throughout. not only of damaging the Liberal coalition government’s record

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 59 the impacts of coalition

the Liberal Democrats. Through- out the course of the parliament, the party needed to find a balance between unity and distinctiveness.11 Whilst this is the case for coali- tions in any democracy, the Liberal Democrats were in a particularly tricky position. Participating in the first full Westminster coali- tion in the post-war period, the party needed to show that coalition need not lead to political instabil- ity. It can be argued they did this successfully. However, in doing so they struggled to then present them- selves as an entity distinct from the Conservatives. The coalition agreement document provided lit- tle of electoral value to the Liberal Democrats. As Tim Bale observes in a quote that should be repeated to any smaller coalition party in a future hung parliament, the coali- tion agreement shows ‘what hap- pens when vegetarians negotiate with carnivores’.12 Where the Lib- eral Democrats tried to differen- tiate from the Conservatives on policy, such as on the bedroom tax, it looked not like distinctive- ness but hypocrisy. On a number of issues, they left themselves open to the question of ‘where was this at the start of the parliament’? More broadly, the party in gov- ernment became known for what it was against rather than what it was for. Finally, what are the thoughts of the Liberal Democrat membership on future coalitions? Should the party sufficiently recover its elec- toral position in the future, it will need membership support to join in any coalition. Liberal Democrat Voice also conducted a survey of party members after the 2015 general election. Seventy-four per cent still thought it the right decision for the Liberal Democrats to go into coali- tion. This gives hope to the party (see Figure 2), although this did electorate’s opinion was disap- leadership that, should they get see a decline over the course of proving as well. back into a position to enter coali- the parliament. Again, support This is shown in more detail in tion at some point in the future, fell as House of Lords reform was Figure 3, where there was clear dis- they may still be able to rely on blocked by the Conservatives. agreement amongst party members their membership for support. And the Liberal Democrats’ naive over whether the Liberal Demo- handling of the Alternative Vote crats had influence in government. referendum was another blow to During the second half of 2012 Conclusion political reform that appeared to (once again, when House of Lords Members and activists form the cause unrest in the membership. reform was blocked), respondents foundation of the Liberal Demo- More broadly, if Liberal Demo- that felt that the Liberal Demo- crats. Without them, policy is not crat members are suggesting dis- crats lacked influence in govern- formed, elections are not won, approval of the government’s ment were in the majority. Having and the party loses any presence it record, it is not surprising that the influence was a difficult task for has in communities. The Liberal

60 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the impacts of coalition

Democrats now face a mammoth 4 Alistair Clark, ‘The Continued Rele- [Liberal Scotland, with just five MSPs, the task to rebuild their support across vance of Local Parties in Representa- Scottish Liberal Democrats had the country, and members and tive Democracies’, Politics, 24 (2004). Democrat persuaded an SNP government activists will be vital if they are 5 Elizabeth Evans, and Emma Sander- with an overall majority to change to have any chance of succeeding. son-Nash, ‘From Sandals to Suits: members’] policy by increasing college places, This article suggests that the party Professionalisation, Coalition and and providing free school meals and elite still have the party member- the Liberal Democrats’, British Journal support for childcare for the poorest children. ship generally on side. Throughout of Politics and International Relations, 13 In the current Scottish parliament, the parliament, Liberal Democrat (2011). the coali- our record of delivery on civil lib- members proved to be remarkably 6 Justin Fisher, Edward Fieldhouse, erties has been particularly strong resilient, maintaining their com- and David Cutts, ‘Members Are Not tion’s record with justice spokesperson Alison mitment to the party’s participation the Only Fruit: Volunteer Activity and its par- McInnes forcing policy U-turns on in coalition, despite successive elec- in British Political Parties at the 2010 stop and search and armed police. toral defeats and criticism from all General Election’, British Journal of ty’s influ- The party is now campaigning sides. However, their support for Politics and International Relations, 16 against SNP plans for a hugely the coalition’s record and its party’s (2014). ence within intrusive ID database. influence within it is more debata- 7 Mark Pack, ‘What Have the Lib While Liberal Democrat ideas ble, and provides clues to where the Dems Done in Government?’, it is more are being enacted, the Scottish party struggled with the electorate http://www.markpack.org.uk/ Liberal Democrats are at their more broadly. libdem-infographic/. debatable, lowest ever ebb. The comparison 8 Ryan Coetzee, ‘Causes and Impli- between 2010 and 2015 is painful. Craig Johnson is an ESRC-supported cations of the 2015 General Elec- and pro- We have gone from eleven MPs to PhD student in Politics at Newcastle tion Result’, http://inside-politics. one, wiped out in our Borders and University. His PhD focuses on com- org/2015/05/23/causes-and-impli- vides clues Highlands heartlands, and are left petition and cooperation between the cations-of-the-liberal-democrats- hanging on to our stronghold in Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. 2015-election-result/. to where the Orkney & Shetland by fewer than 9 Craig Johnson, ‘The Importance of 1,000 votes. We are in second place 1 David Cutts, ‘Local Elections as a Local Parties and Incumbency to the party strug- in just nine seats. It is important to “Stepping Stone”: Does Winning Electoral Prospects of the Liberal note, though, that in several seats, Council Seats Boost the Liberal Democrats’, Politics, 34 (2014). gled with most notably East Dunbartonshire Democrats’ Performance in General 10 Anthony Wells, ‘On That Poll of Lib and Gordon, the party attracted Elections?’, Political Studies, 62 (2014). Dem Members’, http://ukpollingre- the elector- more votes than in 2010. 2 Ingrid van Biezen, Peter Mair, and port.co.uk/blog/archives/6059. ate more The general election result was Thomas Poguntke, ‘Going, Going… 11 Libby McEnhill, ‘Unity and Distinc- just the latest in a series of defeats Gone? The Decline of Party Mem- tiveness in UK Coalition Govern- broadly. that have reduced the party’s capac- bership in Contemporary Europe’, ment: Lessons for Junior Partners’, ity. The disaster started in 2011 European Journal of Political Research, 51 Political Quarterly, 86 (2015). when we lost two-thirds of our (2012). 12 Tim Bale, ‘The Black Widow Effect: MSPs. This was followed by our 3 John D. May, ‘Opinion Structure of Why Britain’s Conservative–Liberal local government base being more Political Parties: The Special Law of Democrat Coalition Might Have an than halved in the following year. Curvilinear Disparity’, Political Stud- Unhappy Ending’, Journal of Liberal We went into that 2012 council ies, 21 (1973). History 76 (Autumn 2012). election with 152 councillors and in administration in places such as Aberdeen, Aberdeenshire, Edin- burgh, East Dunbartonshire, Fife, East Lothian, Dundee, Perth and The impact of coalition on the Scottish party Kinross, the Borders, and High- land; we emerged with just seventy Caron Lindsay councillors. In 2014, we lost our MEP, George Lyon. few weeks ago, in the wake one of the things that Michael The die appears to have been of our catastrophic election Moore in particular contributed cast in the first year of the coali- Adefeat, someone who is not to the process as one of the Liberal tion. Working with the Conserva- a Liberal Democrat pointed out to Democrat representatives. Full tives, still not forgiven for the me the irony that there was now federalism of course requires the havoc they wrought in Scotland a consensus around many Liberal cooperation of the other countries in the 1980s, was always going to Democrat ideas at the same time as in the United Kingdom but this is be a risk. The Rose Garden scenes, we had suffered our biggest defeat a step forward. aimed at showing a deeply sceptical in half a century. Why were we not It was not just that we were country that coalition government reaping the benefits? making the weather in establish- could work, looked far too cosy. It is certainly true that the ing the consensus on the constitu- In 1999, when the Scottish Liberal Smith Commission’s recommenda- tion; at Holyrood and Westminster, Democrats went into coalition with tions, drawn up after the indepen- the Liberal Democrats were setting Labour, Jim Wallace and Donald dence referendum, if implemented the agenda. At UK level our ideas Dewar acted with more profession- properly, lay the foundations for on mental health, education and alism and less exuberance, backed a federal state and that this was childcare were highly regarded. In up with solid protocols to cover

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 61 the impacts of coalition issues not in the coalition agree- had a mandate for a referendum on but this was the most important: if ment. In 2015, the fact that the independence which dominated people do not know what you stand Scottish Liberal Democrats had Scottish politics for the following for and what your values are, why prevented the introduction of tui- three years. Had the Liberal Demo- should they vote for you? Both Lib- tion fees in Scotland counted for crats and Labour been able to save eral Democrats and Labour have nothing as the party was punished just four seats between them, that suffered from a lack of connec- for not keeping the promise it had referendum would most likely not tion and clarity on that point and made on the same issue south of have happened. You could be for- this explains the situation in which the border. The rise in VAT, which given for thinking that our cata- both parties find themselves. Back we had campaigned against, and strophic result in 2011 might have in 2008, Ross Finnie identified this immediate cuts, only reinforced the been avoided if we had not been in during his leadership campaign: ‘betrayal’ narrative used against us coalition at Westminster. I am not so effectively by our opponents. so sure. My concern, however, is that, The Scottish Liberal Demo- Our star had been waning for against the background of a crats were acutely aware of the some time. We had gone into the fatally wounded New Labour challenges raised by the coalition. 2007 election campaign with a Government, a SNP Govern- Then-leader, Tavish Scott, was manifesto containing some radi- ment failing to deliver on key barely able to contain his impa- cal and reforming ideas on cli- promises and the Conservatives tience with the decisions being mate change, young people and showing little sign of a Cameron taken south of the border. A bad- the economy; yet our campaign bounce, the Liberal Democrats tempered interview with the Sun- seemed to concentrate on oppos- are not making progress in elec- day Herald’s Tom Gordon, during ing a referendum on independence toral terms …. the run up to the Scottish parlia- at all costs, and, other than that, all The party has made a num- ment election in 2011, hit the nail the media covered was our plan for ber of effective attacks on the on the head: extra PE lessons in school. We then SNP Government but we have gave the appearance of not even failed to connect with the voters But his fate is not his own; Nick trying to enter coalition negotia- as to why they should turn to the Clegg has determined it for him In 1999, tions with the SNP, which many Liberal Democrats.2 by joining the Tories and per- in the party saw as an opportunity forming a brazen U-turn on tui- when the missed. Had we taken Ross’s advice in 2008, tion fees. Our voice during the 2007–11 we may not have found ourselves In this election, Scott is try- Scottish Lib- parliament was not distinctive quite so vulnerable in 2011. Instead, ing to convince voters Lib Dems enough. Being the third voice say- we repeated this mistake in this here are different from those in eral Demo- ing ‘No’ to the SNP did not help year’s general election, and must England because of his party’s crats went our image and identity. We were not in next year’s Holyrood elec- structure. ‘It’s all we can do. often seen as truculent and intransi- tion. We have to have that strong What else can I do on it?’ he says. into coalition gent, opposing the government for narrative which shows what we are ‘It’s tough. It’s difficult.’1 the sake of it. One particular issue for: if we cannot inspire with that, with Labour, was on minimum alcohol pricing we will find it harder to get people It was not just that the SNP took where we did not follow the evi- to listen to the bass notes, where nine of our eleven constituencies Jim Wallace dence when we had the opportu- we hold the SNP to account for its in 2011 and that we had lost two of nity to show that we could be both many failings. our five list seats, it is that we were and Donald constructive and original. Like- If we had not gone into coali- wiped out everywhere else. In my wise, when the SNP government tion with the Conservatives at UK home seat of Livingston (which Dewar acted released the Lockerbie bomber level, we may have held our own in became Almond Valley for 2011), Abdelbasset Ali al-Megrahi, we 2011 in Scotland and, had a minor- fourth place in 2007 meant a rela- with more could have supported them. There ity Conservative government tively comfortable holding of our was certainly a significant view in called a second election in 2010, deposit. Four years later, we could professional- the party that we should have done. would have done comparatively barely manage 2 per cent. The By 2011, people had forgotten that well in Scotland where Conserva- number of seats in which we were ism and less we were responsible for such land- tive arguments about stable and in second place fell and we even mark policies as free university tui- strong government would not have came fourth in Argyll & Bute, a exuberance, tion, free personal care and free eye had as much traction. I still think seat we then held at Westminster and dental checks between 1999 and that Labour would have been as and had held until 2007 at Holy- backed up 2007. There was not enough resid- badly hit at Holyrood, and the SNP rood. This means that rebuilding with solid ual good will towards us to insulate would have gained seats from them. our parliamentary strength could us from the inevitable hit we would They may not have had a majority, take longer, with no capacity even protocols to take on entering coalition with the though. Denying the SNP a refer- to build up list votes in these former Tories. endum for the second parliament in areas of strength. The contraction cover issues Coupled with that, the party succession in those circumstances of the party and its ability to fight had failed to articulate a compel- may well have seen us punished future elections was profoundly not in the ling narrative behind our poli- this year, but not to the same brutal affected by the loss of so many cies. There are so many lessons the extent. However, if a second gen- MSPs. coalition national party could and should eral election in 2010 had resulted in The SNP won an overall major- have learned from the experience a Conservative majority govern- ity of four in that 2011 election and agreement. of the Scottish Liberal Democrats ment, which was the most likely

62 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the impacts of coalition outcome, demand for a referendum factionalising and febrile the debate The party been a long time since there has may have reached fever pitch by and political atmosphere became, been a packed Liberal Democrat this year. Moore’s reasoned, moderate tone had failed meeting in Coatbridge, but that is The Scottish political land- and forensic grasp of detail would exactly what happened recently at scape has been transformed in the have been a definite asset. to articulate a manifesto roadshow, part of Wil- past five years, but that is not all The catastrophe of 2011 was lie Rennie’s ‘democratic listening the fault of the coalition. ‘Yes’ may repeated and intensified in this a compel- exercise’.4 have lost the referendum, but they year’s general election. Outside The judgement of the electorate captured a lot of hearts while doing the eleven formerly held seats, we ling narra- on the Scottish Liberal Democrats so. The future of the United King- failed to retain a single deposit. In has been severe in recent years. dom has never looked so bleak. Edinburgh South, a seat where we tive behind The coalition was always going to Part of our party’s demise was had come within 316 votes of win- our policies. have a major impact on our for- due, not to the coalition, but to ning in 2010, we managed a paltry tunes. Even if you give the Scot- the fact that our distinctive, much 3.7 per cent and fifth place behind There are so tish parliament an unprecedented more optimistic voice just was not the Greens. However, there is a big level of power and do lots of good heard. The Liberal Democrats were contrast between the results for the many lessons things, the very act of working never really welcome in the ‘Bet- Liberal Democrats and Labour. with the Tories is never going to go ter Together’ campaign and were It had become abundantly the national down well in Scotland. We made increasingly marginalised as the clear during the referendum that, some major strategic errors early referendum approached. While in those seats in central Scot- party could on which cost us dearly. However, ‘Yes’ was all about emotion, ‘Better land where Labour had altitude- we were vulnerable even before the Together’ was all about facts with sickness-inducing majorities that and should coalition. We were already mean- nothing to grab the heartstrings they did not have to work for, dering backwards. The coalition at all. A better pro-UK campaign they had no campaign infrastruc- have learned accelerated and intensified that should have pushed the ‘Yes’ vote ture. Those MPs were swept away process. well under 40 per cent. and replaced by SNP MPs with from the The Sunday after the election, The decision, in October 2013, equally high majorities, won on 200 Liberal Democrat members to bring in Alistair Carmichael to the back of a stellar-quality air experience met in an Edinburgh hotel to dis- replace Michael Moore as Secretary war. The message discipline of the cuss what had happened. It could of State for Scotland was presented SNP was rock solid. Even though of the Scot- have been an angry, bitter meet- as a response to the need for more of Nicola Sturgeon struggled on spe- ing, but, in fact, everyone was a political bruiser to deal with the cific policies in leaders’ debates, tish Liberal determined and up for the fight. If rough and tumble of the campaign. it did not seen to matter as her Democrats we can articulate a gut-grabbing Moore had spent three years being a ‘Stronger Scotland’ message gal- message of good old-fashioned much-needed voice of moderation vanised those who had voted Yes but this was liberal hope, we should be able to and reason and had even been com- while the fragmented No vote did recover. A new federal leader who pared to James Bond and praised not. However, in contrast, the Lib- the most specialises in gut-grabbing will as the saviour of the union by John eral Democrats remain relatively help. The first test is less than eight Rentoul: close seconds in most of our for- important: months away. merly held seats, but particularly Salmond has been underesti- in places like Edinburgh West and if people do Caron Lindsay joined the SDP at the mated before, although support East Dunbartonshire, because of age of 16 in 1983. She is now Editor of for independence in opinion the strength of their local cam- not know Liberal Democrat Voice and Treasurer of polls has rarely exceeded one- paigns and infrastructure. the Scottish Liberal Democrats. third of the electorate. But These footholds are helpful, but what you he may have met his match in the Holyrood elections, we have 1 http://www.herald- in Moore, as skilful in judg- to maximise our core vote every- stand for and scotland.com/news/ ing the politics of Whitehall as where. The advent of almost 1,000 politics/interview-with-tavish-scott- he is the mood of Scotland. It new members all over the country what your why-would-i-pay-attention-to-the- may be that, after the referen- will help with that, but we should party-in-london-1.1096685 dum, Moore will be counted the be under no illusions about the mas- values are, 2 http://www.scotsman.com/news/ most successful Liberal Demo- sive task we have ahead of us. why should ross-finnie-launches-lib-dem-leader- crat in the Cabinet, and, even, Frustration with the coalition ship-campaign-1-1082134 the man who saved the United meant that our membership fell they vote for 3 http://www.independent.co.uk/ Kingdom.3 from around 4,500 around the time voices/comment/the-man-who- of the 2010 general election to just you? saved-the-union-lib-dem-michael- Carmichael’s impact was never as over 4,165 by the end of 2010, and moore-is-westminsters-answer-to- strong. He never fully recovered then to a nadir of just 2,700. We had james-bond-8280480.html after an early debate loss to Nicola a modest recovery from 2013, but 4 http://www.libdemvoice.org/ren- Sturgeon and it was noticeable that the influx of new members since nie-scottish-liberal-democrats-are- the secretary of state was not as the general election leaves us with listening-46052.html visible as he should have been dur- just under 4,000 members at the ing the referendum. In fact, it was end of June 2015. However, their Danny Alexander who seemed geographic spread means that we to be the most prominent Liberal will be able to revive local par- Democrat. Given how fractious, ties in some derelict areas. It has

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 63 The 2015 Election campaign and its outcome The result of the 2015 election was a catastrophe for the Liberal Democrats: a collapse from 23.0 per cent of the vote and 57 MPs in 2010 to just 7.9 per cent and 8 MPs in 2015. John Curtice and Michael Steed analyse the results in detail, while Mark Pack looks at what happened to the Liberal Democrats’ campaigning machine.

The Liberal Democrats and the 2015 election John Curtice

he portents had not been elected in the first place because Yet there was always reason to encouraging for a long of their personal popularity and believe that these hopes rested on Ttime. No sooner was the that of the party locally, and not weak foundations. There was after ink dry on the coalition agreement because of the party’s national mes- all a very simple arithmetical prob- than support for the party began to sage and appeal. So whatever these lem with the suggestion that the fall away in the polls – only to drop MPs’ voters may have thought of party’s vote would hold up better further as it became apparent in the the party’s role and performance in where it was already strong. The 8 autumn of 2010 that the party was the coalition, there was every rea- per cent of the Britain-wide vote to to do an about-turn on its policy of son to anticipate that they would which the polls were pointing as the abolishing university tuition fees. remain loyal to their local MP, and election campaign approached rep- Even a subsequent apology from thereby enable many of those MPs resented as much as a 16-point drop Nick Clegg for that decision failed to defend their seat against the tide. in the party’s support as compared to bring about any reversal of for- Indeed the party had already man- with what it had achieved 2010. But tune. Rather, support fell back yet aged to retain its seat in Eastleigh in no fewer than 170 constituen- further in the spring of 2014 after in a by-election fought in rather cies the party did not win as much Mr Clegg took on the UKIP leader, difficult circumstances. Mean- 7 May 2015: as 16 per cent of the vote five years Nigel Farage, in broadcast debate – while, the economy was looking Vince Cable ago – and thus it was impossible and was widely judged by the audi- up, the tax cuts that the party had loses his seat in that the party’s vote could fall by as ence to have lost. promised had been made, and that Twickenham, much as 16 points in these constitu- Nevertheless, the party surely would eventually persuade one of 48 Liberal encies. Consequently, somewhere remained hopeful. After all, many some voters that the party did not Democrat losses the party’s vote must be falling of its MPs had only ever been deserve a kicking after all. on the night by more than 16 points – and that

64 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 The 2015 Election campaign and its outcome The result of the 2015 election was a catastrophe for the Liberal Democrats: a collapse from 23.0 per cent of the vote and 57 MPs in 2010 to just 7.9 per cent and 8 MPs in 2015. John Curtice and Michael Steed analyse the results in detail, while Mark Pack looks at what happened to the Liberal Democrats’ campaigning machine.

somewhere had to be places where Leaving when it came to the party’s abil- Not that the local popularity of the party’s vote was relatively ity to win seats. Hopes that the those Liberal Democrat MPs who strong. Meanwhile, as regards the aside the local popularity of individual MPs were trying to defend their seats possibility of an increase in that 8 might mean that there would be did not make any difference. Of per cent vote, there was an obvious unusual cir- still be twenty, maybe even thirty the fifty-seven incumbents, forty- risk that, however much the party Liberal Democrat parliamentar- six were standing again, while the tried to persuade voters otherwise, cumstances ians, in the new House of Com- remaining eleven had opted to any credit for economic improve- mons came to naught. The party leave the Commons voluntarily (or ment and tax cuts would be given created by was left with just eight – again the in one case had been expelled from to the Conservatives rather than lowest tally since 1970. While this the party). In those forty-six seats, their junior coalition partners. The the elec- was perhaps just enough to avoid a the party’s share of the vote fell on Conservatives had, after all, long toral pacts revival of the old jibe that all of its average by 14.3 points, a little less been associated in voters’ minds MPs could be fitted into one taxi, than the average nationwide drop. with a wish to put more money in and party it is not enough to require the pay- Elsewhere, where the party had voters’ pockets, whereas for the ment of more than two fares. The previously won over 28 per cent Liberal Democrats it was a rela- divisions at tally was certainly insufficient to of the vote, the party’s vote fell on tively recent rallying cry. stop the party also being displaced average by no less than 22.1 points In the event, 8 per cent was the 1918 and for the first time as the third party – with the average drop in the indeed all that the party was found in seats, albeit not to UKIP but to eleven seats where the incumbent to have achieved when the ballot 1931 general the Scottish National Party, who, stood down (21.8 points) little dif- boxes were opened. This repre- following a dramatic advance ferent from the drop in those seats sented its lowest share of the vote elections, north of the border, secured no less where the party had performed at any general election since 1970 – than fifty-six of Scotland’s fifty- relatively well in 2010 but had not that is, at any time since the party the drop in nine seats. In short, just one short come first (22.1 points). In short, all had re-established itself (in 1974) as stint as a party of power had not that the undoubted local popular- a party capable of fighting more or the party’s only cost the party all the fruits of ity of incumbent Liberal Democrat less every seat in the country and in nearly forty years of electoral pro- MPs did was to compensate them so doing consistently win around share of the gress, but also its hitherto undis- for the otherwise remorseless ten- a fifth or so of the vote. Leaving puted position as the third party of dency for the party’s vote to fall aside the unusual circumstances vote was British politics. more heavily where it had previ- created by the electoral pacts and Not least of the reasons for the ously been strongest. Still, in the party divisions at the 1918 and 1931 the biggest failure to retain more than a hand- absence of that pattern, at least four general elections, the drop in the ever to have ful of seats was that arithmetical of the eight MPs who did man- party’s share of the vote was the problem that the party had stead- age to retain their seats would have biggest ever to have been suffered been suf- fastly ignored. As Table 1 shows, failed to do so. by any party at a UK election. The the stronger the Liberal Democrats So the party had not been wrong retreat was almost as much in evi- fered by any were locally, the more the party’s to put some faith in the popular- dence in Scotland (7.6 per cent of vote fell. On average the party’s ity of their incumbent MPs. It was the vote, down 11 points on 2010) as party at a UK vote only fell by 10.4 points in those just that it badly overestimated the it was in England and Wales (8.1 per 170 seats where the party won less likely dividend it would bring at cent, down 16 points), making it the election. than 16 per cent of the vote in 2010. a time when support for the party only party to experience much the Indeed, it fell a little less than aver- nationally was leeching away. same fate on both sides of the bor- age in those seats where the party Furthermore, it was, as we might der. At the same time, the party lost won less than 22 per cent last time anticipate, a somewhat variable to UKIP the position as the third around. In contrast, although pro- dividend. At one end of the spec- most popular party in British poli- portionately a somewhat smaller trum, in eleven of the seats being tics. Such an outcome can only be drop,1 at nearly 20 points the drop defended by a Liberal Democrat regarded as a calamitous reverse. was well above average in those MP, the party’s vote fell by less than And it was one in which there seats where the party had won over 10 points; at the other end, in seven was apparently no silver lining 28 per cent of the vote in 2010.2 seats, it fell by more than 20 points.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 65 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

Table 1. Change in Liberal Democrat share of the vote since 2010 by Liberal Democrat share of (–15.3),8 even though in other seats the vote in 2010 where the Liberal Democrats had Liberal Democrat % share of the Mean change in Liberal Democrat (No. of constituencies) previously been relatively strong vote 2010 % share of the vote 2010–15 (that is winning over 28 per cent of the vote but either not coming first Less than 16% –10.4 (170) or where the incumbent was not 16–22% –14.4 (179) standing again), the party’s support 22–28% –17.8 (121) fell more heavily where its principal More than 28% –19.8 (161) competitor (that is the party that won the seat in 2010) was Labour (–24.4) rather than the Conserva- All seats –15.4 (631) tives (–21.2).9 So the coalition did deliver a bit of a dividend in some Such wide variation suggests that drop suffered by Jo Swinson in East seats at least. some MPs were a lot more person- Dunbartonshire, the lowest drop In fact, it was not just third- ally popular locally than others. anywhere in the country, was a placed Conservative supporters One consideration though that marked exception to this tendency.) who appear to have voted tacti- we should bear in mind is that some In short, even when it comes to cally. So also, seemingly, did a few incumbent MPs had been in Par- the ability of individual MPs to in seats where their party had been liament for longer than others and withstand the outgoing tide, vot- second in 2010, but where in each thus had had longer to develop a ers’ largely adverse reactions to the case the Conservatives’ hold on sec- personal vote.3 Indeed, those who party’s role in the coalition still ond place was relatively tenuous. In were first elected in 2010 would not sometimes seems to have made a four seats being defended by a Lib- have previously had the opportu- difference. eral Democrat incumbent in which nity at all to enhance their personal Still, that role might have been a second-placed Conservative had popularity by demonstrating that expected to be beneficial in some been less than 10 points ahead of they were an effective local MP. circumstances at least – where the Labour in 2010, Conservative sup- However, these new MPs may have party was trying to fend off a chal- port fell on average by no less than been able to develop a new personal lenge locally from Labour. In these 9.2 points, while the Liberal Dem- vote during the last five years, in circumstances, third-placed Con- ocrat tally fell by just 8.0 points. which case we would expect the servative supporters might now The decision to vote tactically in drop in their support to be espe- be expected to be more willing these seats seems to have been an cially low. That is indeed what than they had been previously to astute one. In the three of these we find. The eight MPs who were vote tactically for the local Liberal four located in England, Labour defending their seats for the first Democrat incumbent in order to mounted an unusually strong chal- time saw their vote fall on average try and keep Labour out. Of this lenge locally, increasing its vote on by just 9.0 points, well below the there is indeed some sign. On aver- average by no less than 13.5 points, average drop of –15.4 points suf- age Conservative support fell by though in the fourth constituency fered by their more long-standing 5.8 points in seats being defended (Argyll), it was the SNP that moved colleagues.4 by an incumbent Liberal Democrat strongly ahead, in line with the dra- However, the fate of these MP against a Labour challenge,6 matic movement to the nationalists newer MPs also appears to have a far worse performance than the throughout Scotland. And while in reflected how closely they were Conservative average of a 1.0 point the event it is not clear that tactical associated with the coalition. The increase in support, or indeed voting by third-placed Conserva- four who were relatively frequent the 0.6 point average increase in tive supporters enabled the Liberal rebels in the division lobbies on Tory support seats where a Liberal Democrats to retain any seats they average experienced a remarkably Democrat incumbent was trying would otherwise have lost, it did small drop in support of just 4.4 to hold their seat against a second- help save two (Leeds North West points; in contrast, the four who placed Conservative challenger. and Nick Clegg’s seat in Sheffield were more loyal to the coalition In contrast, the average increase Hallam) of the four seats in which saw their vote fall on average by in Labour’s vote in these Liberal previously second-placed Con- as much as 13.7 points, only a little Democrat/Labour contests was, at servatives appear to have voted less than that suffered by those MPs 1.4 points, in line with the 1.5 point tactically.10 who had been in the Commons increase in Labour’s share of the But if the formation of the before 2010.5 That said, being a vote overall, and only a little below coalition with the Conserva- regular rebel proved less helpful to the 3.1 average increase it secured tives opened up the prospect of more long-standing MPs, though where a Liberal Democrat incum- winning tactical support from the drop in support amongst bent was under challenge locally Conservative supporters, it also those who had been backbench- from the Conservatives.7 Thanks to seemingly potentially put at risk ers throughout the 2010–15 parlia- this apparent tactical switching by the not insubstantial support that ment and who had been a regular third-placed Conservative support- the party had previously garnered rebel (–14.2 points) was rather less ers, on average Liberal Democrat from third-placed Labour support- than suffered on average by those incumbents facing a Labour chal- ers in many a seat in recent years. MPs who had at some point at least lenge endured a somewhat smaller Yet, perhaps surprisingly, there served in the coalition as a min- drop in their support (–12.8) than is little sign that this tactical sup- ister (–16.1 points). (The 2.4 point did those facing a Conservative one port unwound. If it had done we

66 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome should find that Labour did par- increased by 2.1 points in those the party was associated in vot- ticularly well in seats where it was seats that were being defended by a ers’ minds with the fiscal and eco- previously placed third. Yet, as we Liberal Democrat incumbent and The fate of nomic record of the coalition; for have already noted, in those seats where the Conservatives them- most that was simply Conservative being defended by a Liberal Dem- selves started off second to the Lib- these newer territory. ocrat incumbent where Labour eral Democrats and more than 10 On the other hand, the one started off in third place, the aver- points ahead of Labour – that is MPs also coalition decision that did appear age increase in Labour support (3.1 just a point or so above the national to be associated with the Liberal points) was only a little above that average increase in Conserva- appears Democrats in the public mind is, across Britain as a whole (1.5 points). tive support. The one exception to of course, the decision to allow Equally, if we look at those seats this observation is the south-west, to have tuition fees to increase to up to where the Liberal Democrats won where the Conservative increase in £9,000. That decision might have 28 per cent or more of the vote in support in such seats averaged no reflected been expected to have caused the 2010 but still came second to the less than 4.0 points. However, the how closely party particular difficulty in seats Conservatives, that is seats where Liberal Democrats might well still with relatively large numbers of typically the party’s vote fell espe- have suffered what was a notable they were students. Of this there is some sign, cially heavily in 2015, Labour again wipeout in what had long been one at least in those seats where the did not do especially well. True, at of the party’s areas of traditional associated party had previously been rela- 4.3 points the average increase in strength (it had not been unrepre- tively strong, and thus where it may Labour support in such seats was sented in the region since the 1958 with the coa- well have been particularly success- nearly 3 points above the Britain- Torrington by-election) even if ful in winning support from stu- wide average (though only a point the Conservative challenge had lition. The dents. Amongst those seats where above that for England and Wales not been rather stronger there than the party won over 28 per cent of alone). But the 3.8 point average elsewhere. four who the vote in 2010 and which were not increase in Conservative support The Conservatives did not only being defended by an incumbent was also nearly 3 points above that take many a previously Liberal were rela- MP, the party’s vote fell on average party’s Britain-wide average (+1.0) Democrat seat, but they also appear by 24.0 points in seats where more – and 2.6 points above the England to have taken most of the credit for tively fre- than 9 per cent of 16–74 years olds and Wales average of 1.2 points. In the economic recovery. Certainly were recorded by the 2011 census other words, Labour did no better the Conservative performance quent rebels as being in full-time education – in these seats than the Conserva- was stronger the more buoyant the compared with 20.6 points where tives. It appears that despite five economy locally. Conservative in the divi- that proportion was less than 6 per years of coalition with the Con- support increased on average by cent. A similar, though smaller gap servatives, some voters were still 2.8 points in those seats where the sion lobbies (a drop of 17.7 points versus one of willing to back the Liberal Demo- unemployment count represented on average 19.3 points) is also evident in those crats as a means of trying to ensure less than 1 per cent of the electorate, seats where the party won between that the Conservatives did not win whereas it fell back by 1.1 points experienced 22 per cent and 28 per cent of the locally. where it represented more than 2.5 vote last time. Not that having a In the event, however, this time per cent of all those registered to a remark- large student population neces- around it was usually the Con- vote. In contrast, Liberal Demo- sarily made it impossible for an servatives who did win locally. The crat support fell away rather more ably small incumbent Liberal Democrat MP Liberal Democrats lost no less than in places with relatively low unem- to do relatively well – indeed on twenty-seven seats to their coali- ployment (–17.4) than where there drop in sup- average the drop in party support tion partners, compared with just was relatively high unemployment in seats with relatively large num- twelve to Labour, a pattern that (–14.2). True, this inverse relation- port of just bers of students that were being doubtless made the pill of cata- ship disappears once we take into defended by an incumbent was, at strophic defeat particularly bitter account the strength of the Liberal 4.4 points; –14.0 points, slightly less than that to swallow. Indeed, winning those Democrats locally – unemploy- in those with relatively few (–15.4 twenty-seven seats was vital to the ment was typically low in places in contrast, points). However, as it happens Conservatives’ ability to secure an where the Liberal Democrats had many of the instances where the overall majority this time around previously been strong – but the the four who party did relatively well in such cir- and thereby avoid the need to form party’s apparent inability to claim cumstances were places where the a second coalition. However, these the credit for a locally buoyant were more party apparently profited from tac- losses to the Conservatives were economy certainly did nothing tical voting by Conservative sup- simply the remorseless consequence to help it defend its existing seats. loyal to the porters, and this may have helped of the fact that the Conservatives Mind you, the party also did not coalition saw mask any the loss of student sup- started off second in most Liberal especially take the blame for the port in these instances. Democrat seats and were thus well impact of the public spending cuts their vote One seat where the presence of a placed to profit from the collapse in either. Whereas Conservative per- relatively large number of students Liberal Democrat support. Despite formance was typically weaker fall on aver- would seem to have contributed to the fact that the Conservatives in constituencies with a relatively the local MP’s difficulties is Bris- focused much of their campaign- large public sector workforce, the age by as tol West, where the 29.2 point drop ing effort in Liberal Democrat seats size of the public sector seems to in Stephen Williams’ support was in particular, the party did not do have made little or no difference much as 13.7 the biggest suffered by any incum- especially well in such seats. On to Liberal Democrat fortunes. bent MP. But the result in Bris- average, Conservative support In short, there is little sign that points … tol West was notable for another

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 67 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome reason – it also represented by far supposition. On the other hand, well decide not to stand again in the largest increase in support (23.1 there is little sign that support for five years’ time, thereby putting at points) for the Greens anywhere. UKIP, which actually displaced risk any personal popularity they Although exceptional, the Bristol the Liberal Democrats as the third may still have. In any event there West result reflected a wider pat- party in votes, came at the Liberal It was the will inevitably be a question mark tern whereby it was the Liberal Democrats’ particular expense. Not over whether all the local parties in Democrats who suffered most from that nobody switched from Liberal Liberal Dem- these seats will have the resilience the Greens’ unprecedented success Democrat to UKIP, despite the fact required to recover from defeat and in winning nearly 4 per cent of the that the parties might be thought to ocrats who rebuild their position locally dur- Britain-wide vote. For a start, the represent very different ideological ing the course of this parliament. Greens typically performed best in outlooks, but simply that Liberal suffered Junior coalition partners often seats where the Liberal Democrats Democrat voters were not espe- suffer at the polls, though the expe- have performed best in the past. On cially likely to do so. most from rience of the party after eight years average the party won 5.2 per cent Of course the question that the Greens’ of coalition with Labour in the of the vote in seats in which the now faces the party is where it goes Scottish Parliament between 1999 Liberal Democrats won more than from here. Recovery will certainly unprec- and 2007 suggests that heavy losses 28 per cent of the vote last time, not be easy. For not only has it lost are not inevitable. But it did not representing on average an increase votes, seats, power and parliamen- edented help that having acquired a meas- of 4.1 points in those seats that the tary position, but also one of its ure of power at Westminster for the Greens also contested in 2010. The signal achievements of recent years, success in first time in over sixty years, the equivalent figures in seats where that is to buck the first-past-the- party immediately did an about- the Liberal Democrats won less post electoral system by developing winning turn on what many had come to than 16 per cent of the vote in 2010 bridgeheads of local strength. That regard as one of its unique selling were just 2.9 per cent and 1.8 points success was reflected in a measure nearly 4 per points, the abolition of tuition fees, respectively. At the same time, in of how the party’s percentage share and then engaged in a seemingly those seats where the Liberal Dem- if the vote varied from constitu- cent of the futile attempt to claim a coat of ocrats were previously relatively ency to constituency that is known tax cuts and economic competence strong, the stronger the Green as the standard deviation. Since Britain-wide that was always going to fit more advance the worse the Liberal 1992 that measure has consistently easily on their coalition partners’ Democrats did. In those seats where been between 10 and 11 points. But vote … shoulders. In any event the party the Liberal Democrats won over 28 as we have seen, at this election the has paid a heavy price for its five per cent of the vote in 2010, support party’s support fell most heavily the Greens years in office. It now faces a severe for the party dropped on average by in places where it was previously test of its resilience and of its abil- 16.1 points in seats where the Green strongest. The bridgeheads have typically ity to regain voters’ trust and confi- performance represented less than been heavily eroded. As a result performed dence in what is now a much more a 2 point increase on the party’s the standard deviation of Liberal crowded electoral marketplace. vote in 2010, but by as much as 24.6 Democrat support has fallen back best in seats Whether it can pass that test will points where it represented more to 8.4, similar to the level of the determine whether it ever gets a than a 6 point increase.11 In con- 1970s and 1980s when, for example, where the second chance to show that it is up trast, Labour actually performed even as much as 26 per cent of the to the challenge of being a party in relatively well where the Greens vote left the then SDP–Liberal Alli- Liberal power. advanced most, while there is lit- ance with just twenty-three seats. tle discernible relationship between Unless those bridgeheads can be Democrats John Curtice is Professor of Politics, Green performance and that of the rebuilt, converting any future gains Strathclyde University. Conservatives. in votes into seats in the House of have per- The initial rise in support for the Commons will prove to be very 1 The 10.4 point average drop in seats Greens coincided with the further difficult. formed best where the party won less than 16 per decline in Liberal Democrat sup- Indeed apart from retaining cent in 2010 represents 80 per cent of port in the run up to the European just eight seats, there are now only in the past the 12.9 per cent of the vote that the elections in spring 2014 we men- sixty-three seats in which the party party won in those seats in 2010. The tioned earlier. That coincidence, is in second place, fewer than at … In con- equivalent proportion for those seats together with survey evidence as to any time since 1970. Of these no where the party won between 16 per where the Greens were acquiring less than forty-six are constituen- trast, Labour cent and 22 per cent in 2010 is 77 per their support, strongly suggested cies that are currently held by the cent, in those where it won between that the Greens were profiting in Conservatives, suggesting that actually 22 per cent and 28 per cent, 72 per particular from the Liberal Demo- rebuilding the party’s parliamen- performed cent and in those where it won more crats’ difficulties. The relative liber- tary strength will be especially dif- than 28 per cent, only 52 per cent. alism of the Greens on social issues ficult while David Cameron’s party relatively Even if we leave aside those constitu- and the relatively high concern is relatively popular. Meanwhile, encies where an incumbent Liberal about the environment amongst the seats in which the party now well where Democrat MP was trying to defend many Liberal Democrats suggests looks truly competitive are few and their seat, the loss of support in the the two parties are always likely to far between – there are just sixteen the Greens seats where the party won more than do relatively well amongst similar that it lost by less than 10 percent- 28 per cent is still no more than 63 per voters and in similar places. And age points. In all but one case, these advanced cent. the pattern of the actual election are all seats that were lost this time 2 This pattern also largely accounts for results lends further weight to that by an incumbent MP who may most. the somewhat lower level of support

68 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

in Scotland, where the party won less It did not in some of these seats at least (most while the 14.2 point drop in Labour than 16 per cent of the vote in nearly notably East Dunbartonshire), the support was also relatively high given two-thirds of all seats in 2010. Once help that … Liberal Democrats would appear to that the party was relatively weak we take into account the prior level have profited from anti-SNP tacti- there in 2010. The Liberal Democrat of Liberal Democrat support, there is the party cal switching by previously second- vote fell by just 3.3 points. no systematic evidence that the aver- placed Labour supporters as well as 9 At 28.6 points, the collapse in the age drop in support north of the bor- immediately lower-placed Conservative ones. Liberal Democrat vote in seats where der was lower than that in England 8 This pattern is particularly evident in the party was previously relatively and Wales. did an about- Scotland where the Liberal Democrat strong and started off second to 3 I am grateful to Michael Steed for vote fell on average by just 9.7 points Labour was typically particularly drawing this point to my attention. turn on in seats being defended by a Liberal marked in Scotland. In these circum- 4 Note that this calculation excludes what many Democrat incumbent against a nomi- stances the Liberal Democrats appear Eastleigh, where the incumbent MP nal challenge from Labour, but in to have been the loser from the appar- first won the seat in a by-election had come to practice one from the SNP. Here the ent willingness of some voters to vote held between 2010 and 2015. Here Conservative vote dropped on aver- tactically against the SNP. In partic- any personal vote gained by the new regard as one age by as much as 6.5 points, perhaps ular, the 30.3 point drop in the party’s incumbent might have been counter- because the party’s voters were even vote in Edinburgh South, together balanced by the loss of the previous of its unique more willing vote tactically against with a 4.1 point drop in Conservative MP’s personal vote. Indeed at 20.7 the SNP than their counterparts support, may well have been instru- points the drop in the Liberal Demo- selling in England were against Labour. mental in enabling Labour to retain crat vote was relatively high in this This willingness even seems to have the one seat it still won in Scotland. seat. points, the extended to the one Liberal-Demo- 10 Apart from Argyll, which the SNP 5 A rebel is defined as an MP who crat-held seat where the SNP were captured, the party also still lost out voted differently from the majority abolition of already second in 2010, even though (to Labour) in Cambridge. of Liberal Democrat MPs in at least in this instance the seat was not being 11 In making this calculation, the Green 2 per cent of all those divisions in tuition fees, defended by the incumbent MP (i.e. performance is measured by the par- which the MP participated between Gordon, where the SNP leader, Alex ty’s share of the vote in 2015 in those 2010 and 2015. Data from www.pub- and then Salmond, was standing). Here the seats that the Greens did not contest licwhip.org.uk. Conservative vote fell by 7.0 points in 2010. 6 Though in practice in Scotland, engaged where 40 per cent of these seats were located, the challenge came from the in a seem- SNP, the apparent consequences of ingly futile which for the pattern of tactical vot- 2015: disaster – or darkness before dawn? ing north of the border are examined attempt to Michael Steed in subsequent endnotes. 7 In practice these measures of Labour claim a coat nyone with the slight- the party hard in votes and seats performance are very different on the est awareness of the Lib- – straightaway at the 1977 county two sides of the Anglo-Scottish bor- of tax cuts Aeral Party’s history knew council elections and in by-elec- der. In England and Wales, Labour’s that entering any form of coalition tions. Following some fifteen vote actually increased on average and eco- (or national working agreement) months of electoral purgatory, by no less than 11.5 points in seats with another party involved serious David Steel took the party out of where the party was challenging a nomic com- electoral risk. If the 1918–22 Lloyd the Pact and after nearly a year of Liberal Democrat incumbent, well George coalition was in such differ- rebuilding in opposition, he was above its performance across all seats petence that ent circumstances as to be ignored, able to lead it to a better outcome in England and Wales and in seats the harmful electoral impact of the in 1979 than the results and polls where the Conservatives started off was always 1931 coalition was clear, if effec- of a year earlier had predicted – in second place to a Liberal Democrat tively spread over two elections though with some loss in both votes incumbent (an average increase of going to fit (1931 and 1935). The party, and its and seats.2 That post-Pact recov- 4.4 points). In Scotland, in contrast, leader in government, Sir Her- ery period, rather than the form of Labour’s vote fell on average by 13.6 more eas- bert Samuel, was given temporary the agreement and the party with points in Liberal Democrat/Labour importance. However, as Baldwin’s which it was made, is arguably the contests, though this is somewhat ily on their biographers nicely put it, ‘Liber- most significant difference to the less than the 17.7 point drop Labour coalition als were flattered, cajoled and bul- 2010–15 experience (see below). suffered across Scotland as a whole. lied, and finally taken for a ride, at The Liberal Democrats fought However, once we take into account partners’ the end of which they knew neither the May 2015 election, as it had the fact that, like the Liberal Demo- where they were nor where they had defended itself throughout the pre- crats, Scottish Labour’s vote fell shoulders … begun.’1 The party dropped from 59 vious five years, on its effective- more heavily in seats where the party seats in 1929 to just 21 in 1935. ness in coalition and the prospect was previously strongest (and given The 1931–32 National Govern- of forming another one. The popu- Labour was relatively weak in many ment, the 1977–78 Lib-Lab Pact lar verdict on this message broke of these Liberal Democrat/Labour and the 2010–15 Cameron–Clegg records for the scale of a party’s loss, seats), Labour’s performance was in coalition were all both a response as John Curtice explores in the pre- fact typically rather worse than it was to a national economic crisis and ceding article, and produced, on in other seats with comparable lev- to the absence of an overall Com- any conceivable basis of compari- els of Labour support in 2010. Thus, mons majority. The Pact also hit son, the worst Liberal result since

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 69 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

1970. It was as if the adhesion of Democrats almost everywhere, 29 of these seats (2015 vote 2.1 per SDP voters from the Alliance years, was bucked by Paul Tyler’s good cent, drop 7.5), London for a fifth and the steady growth of local result in Cornwall & West Plym- (2.6 per cent, drop 8.7), with the rest strength for more than four dec- outh. These exceptions offered in Wales (2.4 per cent, drop 8.3) or ades, had never happened. hope and comfort, in the evidence other, mostly old-industrial, parts My own analysis, extending that a strong candidate, a local gov- of England (3.5 per cent, drop 8.1). further back, shows that it was ernment base or a regional Liberal The hint that Scottish votes held up much worse than that. Although tradition could withstand national better effectively evaporates when the party has now two more MPs unpopularity and provide a plat- we compare numerical like with than in 1970, the party’s vote in the form for recovery. The 2015 results, like. The really significant find- seats fought was much higher then. far from that, indicate in their ings are (I) the party did a lot bet- Of the 618 British seats, people had detail that not only is the party less ter in some, but not all, held seats, the chance in 1970 to vote Liberal in popular than at any time since the and (II) in the four-fifths of the only 328. In these seats the Liberal We have to early 1950s, it is in as bad a position country where it was neither very vote was 13.7 per cent, and in the for winning back seats. strong nor very weak, there is only vast majority where direct compar- go back to To see just how and why, we one solitary case of a drop of under ison can be made between 1970 and have to be careful how we meas- ten points. Outside held seats, once 2015, the vote was lower this year, the early ure performance. This is discussed allowing for prior strength, the loss usually by around 3–4 points. In systematically by Curtice (see espe- of ground really was quite extraor- 2015, the party lost deposits in over 1950s to cially table 1); as the drop in the dinarily uniform.7 half the country by polling under Liberal Democrat vote share in 2015 Not only is such even change 5 per cent; in 1970 the Liberal share find a level was greater than the party’s 2010 historically most unusual for Lib- had been lower than 5 per cent in starting point in many seats, the eral performance, it was not how only seven seats. of popular traditional measure of percentage voters were otherwise behaving in We have to go back to the early point change in share necessarily 2015. English and Scottish Labour 1950s to find a level of popular Lib- Liberal sup- appears non-uniform. (This hap- performed poles apart, and indeed eral support as low as it was on 7 pened, incidentally, with the meas- Labour gained some ground from May 2015. Direct seat-by-seat com- port as low ure of swing to Labour in the 1997 the Conservatives in London whilst parison with 1950 and 1959 shows landslide – it had to be smaller in losing ground in old-industrial, that Liberal support was clearly as it was on the areas where the Conservatives small-town, mixed and rural pro- higher in both years than it was in were very weak.4) Let us explore vincial England. The national 2015. Only in 1951 and 1955 was the 7 May 2015. what that means for identifying Tory advance did not extend to party as unpopular as it was this where the Liberal Democrats did the Liverpool city region,8 where year.3 No wonder the actual 2010– Direct seat- less badly. Cameron lost both his sitting MPs, 15 drop in support, from 24 per cent by-seat com- On the normal measure, the including a junior minister; his to 8 per cent, was hard to believe or party held its ground best in the must be the first UK government to anticipate, despite the spot-on parison with tiny number of seats where the vote in history not to have anyone from predictions of the polls. share fell by less than 5 points. Of this part of England on its Com- The most striking feature of 1950 and these eight ‘good’ performances, mons benches. In contrast Con- this loss was just how remorselessly six were in Scotland and just two servatives fared better in Wales Britain-wide and uniform it was. 1959 shows in England – apparent evidence of than in England;9 Cameron holds No region, no type of constituency a better Scottish performance. Yet areas in south-west Wales not won and almost no tactical situation was that Lib- the more significant distinction is in living memory.10 Both the UKIP exempt from the national rejec- that six were in held seats, and just and Green advances were mark- tion of the party by the majority eral support two were not – and of course from edly uneven according to type of of those who had voted for it five 1964 to 2015, the party has done constituency. years earlier. was clearly better in winning seats in Scotland. For Liberals, so long the party No calamity like this has ever As for the ‘best’ result in a non-held of local campaigners and regional hit British Liberals before. The higher in seat, it was in Glasgow East, where diversity, the experience of such 1970 result was bad nationally, yet the vote share dropped by only 4.3, a relentless uniformity is totally between 1966 and 1970 the vote still both years to 0.75 per cent! new – the failure to anticipate this shot up by over ten points in four The point is reinforced if we behaviour helps to account for the seats, each with a strong local coun- than it was examine the 80 seats where the failure to foresee how many seats cillor candidate (Birmingham, Liv- vote share dropped by less than would be lost for the vote share that erpool, Rochdale and Southport), in 2015. Only ten points. With one exception,5 was so accurately predicted. As for while in North Devon Jeremy in 1951 and all these cases fall into one of two the variation that occurred, clearly Thorpe saved the seat he would lost categories. The party stemmed its we must examine held seats. Table on the national swing by increas- 1955 was loss to under ten points in 12 out of 1 shows these broken down by type ing his share slightly. In 1951, the its 57 held seats, the vote dropping of incumbency, in my judgement party’s worst ever result, a hand- the party as in that dozen from 40.2 per cent to the main reason why some votes ful of the 109 seats fought still put 34.4 per cent.6 At the opposite end dropped less than others. up their share (notably Honiton, unpopular of the scale, the same cut-off point Even without an incumbent, the North Dorset and Orkney). The picks out 67 seats in weak Liberal credibility (and greater campaign- 1989 European Parliament disaster, as it was this Democrat areas, where the average ing resources) of having won in when the Greens polled better than vote dropped from 10.6 per cent to 2010 produced a benefit. The 15.8 the newly merged Social & Liberal year. 2.5 per cent. Scotland accounts for drop in all 57 held seats compares

70 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome favourably with the 57 non-held Table 1 Impact of incumbency on Lib Dem fortunes in 2015 seats which had the highest vote 2015 Challenger share in 2010 (over 31.3 per cent) Nature of Conservative Labour SNP All then. In this latter 57 (many for- incumbency merly held, with strong local gov- ernment bases or a historic Liberal No incumbent 22.8 (6) 31.3 (2) 8.2 (2) 21.6 (10) tradition), the drop was a massive standing 24.7 on average, and only five man- MP 1st elected 13.9 (4) 7.6 (4) 2.8 (1) 9.8 (9) aged to do better than the held-seat 2010 standing 11 average. Conversely, only seven Pre-2010 MP 15.7 (19) 17.1 (8) 12.9 (8) 15.4 (36) of the held seats saw a drop as big standing as 24.7; in all but two of these (both All LD held seats 17.3 (31) 16.4 (14) 11.1 (11) 15.8 (57) ministers) the MP stood down. So across the board, the party’s vote The figure for each category is the mean percentage point drop in the Liberal Democrat share of the vote, with dropped by 9 points less where it the number of seats in brackets. Ceredigion (Plaid challenger) is included in the final column only. Eastleigh had won in 2010 than in the strong- and Portsmouth South (complex incumbency) are included in the bottom row only. est seats not won then. Most of the best results were government policies. Looking for- the party had come to believe that achieved by MPs newly elected in ward to 2020, we cannot predict it had found a formula to get round 2010, who had used the five years to whether Scottish political devel- the massive obstacle of the single- dig in locally. Other causes of vari- opments will help or hinder Lib- member (uninominal) electoral ation are fully explored by Cur- eral fortunes, but the implications system. There was always a flaw in tice, with a clear interaction with of what we have established about the assumption that it could seek to incumbency, as Liberal Democrat both held seats and incumbency exercise power at Westminster on ministers were naturally drawn for the party’s chances of winning this basis. Winning in a uninomi- from those already elected before more seats then is grim indeed. nal contest meant normally squeez- 2010, while consequently the newer Leaving aside the likely dam- ing someone else’s vote; but power MPs, as backbenchers, had more aging effect of boundary change,15 could only mean working with chance of distancing themselves by the party will no longer have these another party, which would neces- rebelling. But even though Liberal advantages in the seats it has just sarily offend some squeezed voters. Democrat ministers appear to have lost. Most of those defeated in 2015 Any choice made by the party in paid some penalty for their associa- had served several terms and will 2010 would almost certainly have tion with government, all but two not stand again. One has only to lost it a good chunk of its voters and performed better than the average scan the 2015 results in seats lost some of its seats. candidate in the strongest non-held in 2010 like Chesterfield, Her- The actual choice made was not seats.12 eford, Richmond Park, Rochdale only with which partner to work, The other distinction in table 1 or Romsey to see how much the but what message to send about the is the Scottish factor. This reflected party’s vote can plummet in such party’s achievements and future the much more limited losses in a cases. If we take the seats, on pre- relevance. Ignoring the evidence few seats where there was clearly sent boundaries, where the 2015 that the party depended for repre- tactical voting by voters of the vote still looks a good base, we find sentation on building up pockets three non-separatist parties against that all those within 15 per cent of of support in geographically con- the SNP – especially against the victory have now lost the advan- centrated groups, the leadership former SNP leader in Gordon (at tage of being held, and mostly that chose to pitch its appeal nationwide 3.3 by far the lowest drop result of incumbency. Even if we extend in terms of its impact on the coun- for a non-incumbent) and in mid- the range to 20 per cent, which try’s economic policy. There was a dle-class urban areas. Such tacti- gives us 42 ‘winnables’, only in two total mismatch between that mes- cal voting meant that 2010 Liberal is the party’s apparent strength not sage and the localism of its attempt Democrat voters deserted in record bolstered by these inevitably wan- to hold seats on a uninominal basis. numbers where another party had ing assets.16 Yet the faith of enough of its MPs that advantage.13 If we compare like However, the extent and that they knew how to buck the situation with like, there is very lit- extraordinary uniformity of the harsh logic of the uninominal sys- tle evidence that 2010 Liberal Dem- 2015 debacle, in the wider context tem was shown in their decision ocrat voters deserted differentially of the new British political land- that, rather than using their lev- north and south of the border.14 scape, does offer a glimmer of hope erage in 2010 to seek an advance Put together, Scottish tacti- in another form. towards a more proportional sys- cal voting and new incumbency With the adoption of the com- tem, the party would go for tweak- explain almost all the better results munity politics strategy in 1970, the ing the existing system with the achieved by Liberal Democrat MPs; evidence of the 1980s that Liber- alternative vote.17 the only two who managed, outside als had firmer local bases than the So can we conclude other than those situations, to stem the drop SDP, the growth of systematic tar- that a coalition is fatal poison to a to under ten points were Tim Far- geting in the 1990s, the doubling Liberal party in Britain? Curtice’s ron in Westmorland and Andrew in Commons seats in 1997 despite evidence shows the lack of any George in St Ives, both well-known a slippage in votes and the holding electoral dividend from the party’s and both having successfully dis- of around fifty to sixty seats at each contribution to the coalition gov- tanced themselves from some of the following three elections, ernment’s economic achievement.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 71 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

Table 2 Liberal Democrat votes (%) in 2010, at by-elections and in 2015 averaged 5.5; during the Pact period Date By-election in: 2010 2011–14 2015 it was 10.1; the post-Pact rate was 6.0, while in 1979 it was 4.4. Jan 2011 Oldham East & Saddleworth 31.6 32.0 12.9 3 Most seats fought in 1951 or 1955 can May 2011 Leicester South 26.9 22.5 4.6 be compared directly with a near Mar 2011 – Mar 2012 Four other seats 14.0 4.2 2.5 equivalent seat in 2015, with three- Nov 2012 Manchester Central 26.6 9.4 4.1 cornered fights in the 1950s and multi-cornered ones in 2015. The Nov 2012 Five other seats 18.9 6.6 3.6 majority of 1951–2015 comparisons Feb 2013 Eastleigh 46.5 32.1 25.8 show the 2015 vote higher, while the May 2013 – 2014 Six seats 18.1 2.7 3.0 majority of 1955–2015 comparisons show the 1955 vote higher. 4 See John Curtice & Michael Steed in He does pick up signs of heavier time to convince its voters. It hints David Butler & Dennis Kavanagh, losses due to its neglect of its higher that if Clegg had followed Steel’s The British General Election of 1997, p. education constituency. My inter- 1978 example and left the coalition 302. pretation differs a little on this a year or six months before the elec- 5 Montgomeryshire at 8.6. This could point; the timeline of the party’s tion, more seats could have been indicate that the weakness of the 2010 loss suggests that the damage done saved. The party needed an exit incumbent depressed the vote then. by the fees U-turn (though real strategy. Montgomery was one of just three enough) may be exaggerated. The party asked to be judged seats where the party’s traditional The opinion polls recorded a on its national message, and was so vote enabled it to hold the seat in 1951 clear drop in support in autumn judged. That message did not fit its and 1955; the other two, then called 2010, associated with that issue. localism, its community bases, its Cardigan and Orkney & Zetland, In turn this was confirmed by the historic role in regions where it had elected Liberal Democrat MPs in widespread losses at the 2011 dis- maintained credibility as the main 2015. trict elections, and anecdotal evi- anti-Tory party or the priorities of 6 Westmorland & Lonsdale was the dence from many who went out on particular groups of its supporters. only one of these twelve best perfor- the doorstep then. Yet the further The 2015 election outcome demon- mances where the seat was saved. The losses in district seats in 2015, when strated conclusively that the party other seven re-elected MPs experi- the seats won in 2011 (despite the did not know how to play the uni- enced on average (16.2) as bad a drop student fees issue) came up again, nominal system. as the MPs who lost; they are back in shows that there was a further loss British politics has changed, the Commons due to the party’s prior of support as that issue should have becoming more national (whether strength in their seat, or to the weak- faded. It is instructive to examine British, English or Scottish) and ness of their opponents. the party’s by-election track record distinctly multi-party. The Con- 7 Two individual campaigns or candi- to pursue the evidence, as shown in servatives now benefit from a more dates in stronger areas stand out for table 2, where results in seats with favourable distribution of their what, in this general context, was a less than a quarter of the vote in vote,18 and have been able to win an really good result with small drops 2010 are grouped together. overall majority of seats on 36.9 per – Bosworth (11.0) and Maidstone & This shows that the 2015 level cent of the vote. Britain no longer The Weald (11.9). The second of these of support sank below the vote in has a balanced two-party system. two candidates was seen as close to most by-elections; the haemor- The lesson for the Liberal Clegg, the other as associated with rhage of Liberal Democrat votes Democrats could not be clearer. his Social Liberal Forum critics. became greater as the five years Attempting to build on the basis of 8 These are the 15 seats in Merseyside went by. However, by the last clus- localising support to beat the uni- metropolitan county, together with ter, starting with South Shields in nominal hurdle has ended in disas- four adjacent ones in Cheshire and May 2013, the drop had already ter. The deck has been cleared for Lancashire. Esther McVey, Minister reached its 2015 level. Although the party to rebuild by looking for of State for Employment, lost her seat opinion polls showed that Clegg’s national messages which make stra- in Wirral West. This sharp regional challenge to Farage in the 2014 tegic political sense. Conservative slump helped John European elections failed, the par- Pugh hold Southport despite suffer- ty’s by-election performance was Michael Steed wrote (or co-wrote with ing a more than typical drop in the no worse after than before that John Curtice) the analytical appendix Liberal Democrat vote. Next door event (or the bad result in the Euro to the Nuffield series of general-election the once safe Tory seat of Crosby, election). studies 1964–2005. and stood as a Lib- won by Shirley Williams in 1981 and Interpretation of this interest- eral parliamentary candidate seven times now disguised as ‘Sefton Central’, ing pattern needs to be melded between 1967 and 1983. has turned into a safe Labour seat. with evidence of the motivation of 9 I can find no precedent for this; the former Liberal voters that election 1 Keith Middlemas & John Barnes, traditional (Butler) swing was 1.1 to surveys may reveal. Table 2 sug- Baldwin: A Biography (London, 1969), Labour in England but 0.3 to Con- gests that the massive scale of rejec- p. 641. servatives in Wales. tion of the party in 2014–15 was 2 See Journal of Liberal History 60 10 The Gower peninsula has a Con- caused not so much by the decision (Autumn 2008) p. 25 for full details; servative MP for the first time since itself to form the coalition or by during the 1974–79 Parliament, a Tory took one of the two Glam- the fees debacle as by a failure over the pre-Pact by-election loss rate organshire seats in 1852; western

72 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

Carmarthenshire acquired a Con- building up support in distinct, iden- The les- As I set out in ‘The Liberal servative MP in 2010 for the first tifiable communities. Democrat approach to campaign- time since a Tory took one of the two 16 Montgomeryshire and Oxford West son for the ing’,1 from the 1970s through to Carmarthenshire seats in 1880. & Abingdon. Enlarging the net to 2005 the Liberal Democrats became 11 In addition to those mentioned in include all seats within 25 per cent of Liberal progressively better at turning notes 5 and 7, Oxford West & Abing- victory in 2015 adds three more non- votes into seats at Westminster don and Watford. held seats – Bosworth, Maidstone Democrats elections. This is best illustrated by 12 The two were Bristol West (29.2 and Newton Abbott. the party’s seats to vote share ratio. drop), where the local Green surge 17 The Electoral Reform Society calcu- could not With about 650 seats in parlia- clearly damaged Stephen Williams lates that with AV there would have be clearer. ment2 but only a maximum of 100 badly, and Berwickshire, Rox- been nine, not eight, Liberal Demo- per cent of voters to be won, a pro- burgh & Selkirk (26.7), where tactical crat MPs elected in 2015; see its The Attempt- portional result would mean a ratio unionist voters seem to have decided 2015 General Election Report p. 34. My of around 6.5:1. The party has never that the Conservative had the better estimate is a little larger, some 12–15 ing to build got close to that, but from the early chance of blocking the SNP; or per- seats. ERS also calculates that with 1970s its predecessors’ results, and haps Michael Moore paid a special AV, the 36.9 per cent first-preference on the basis then the Liberal Democrats’, con- penalty for his role in office. vote would have given the Conserva- sistently improved, rising from a 13 In addition to Berwickshire, notably tives double the overall Commons of localis- low of 0.7 to 2.9 by 2005. To put Edinburgh North & Leith (29.3 drop), majority they actually secured. flesh on that ratio, had the party Edinburgh South (30.7) and Glasgow 18 It has often been misleadingly ing support still been at 0.7 in 2005, it would North (28.6). claimed that Labour was advantaged, have won fifteen seats, not the 14 As the registered electorate in Scot- and the Conservatives disadvan- to beat the sixty-two it actually secured. This land rose in 2014 (referendum effect) taged, by the constituency bounda- was not trivial progress. and turnout rose sharply in 2015 (in ries. That encouraged the coalition uninomi- However, after the 2005 peak contrast to the rest of Britain), actual government to change the rules in a things slipped back in 2010 before numbers of Liberal Democrat votes way that will probably slightly help nal hurdle plummeting in 2015, returning the cast in Scottish constituencies could the Conservatives in 2020. But the ratio to its pre-merger levels. be higher in 2015 despite the drop in big advantage for Labour prior to has ended As I wrote of the 2010 slippage vote share. 2015 was that the distribution of its for the Journal in 2014,3 the 2010 15 This assumed harmful effect does not vote helped it to win more seats than in disaster. seats to votes ratio made it the then predict that new boundaries will be the Tories at an equal level of sup- The deck has worst for the party since 1992: a drawn with a view to harming Lib- port. The dramatic voting changes poor reflection on the campaign eral Democrats. The reality is that in 2015 have now handed that advan- been cleared machine’s ability to turn national the new, mathematically rigid, rules tage to the Conservatives, without vote share into actual seats. For (voted through by Liberal Democrat any boundary change. This effect is for the party pessimists this was the result of MPs in 2010) will necessarily make intrinsic to the uninominal system. the Conservatives in 2005 hav- both for more artificial boundaries That makes the feasible coalition for to rebuild ing largely cottoned on to how to and for more frequent disturbance, radical electoral reform potentially do intensive target seat campaign- both more easily handled by par- greater and more realisable than it has by looking ing, and by 2010 Labour doing so ties with more national resources been at any time since the early twen- too, leaving the Liberal Democrats’ and a national or class appeal, while tieth century. for national ability to outperform the national undermining the Liberal capacity for picture in selected constituencies messages hugely reduced. For optimists, there were specific mistakes in 2010 which make which could be remedied in the future. One was the weakening 8 per cent but only 8 MPs: the death of strategic of the focus on target seats in the heady wake of Nick Clegg’s first the fabled Liberal Democrat grassroots political TV debate victory and the result- ing poll surge. Another was that the campaigning machine? sense. party called several seats wrongly Mark Pack in the last few days before poll- ing day, misdirecting resources as here were two elements – inside and outside the party – and a result. For example, a great deal in the disaster that was the also because in the past the party of effort was directed to Oxford T2015 general election result had consistently won more seats East on polling day, which Labour for the Liberal Democrats: just 8 than the percentage of the vote it held on to by a significant margin – per cent of the vote and also just secured. 4,581 votes – whereas, had the effort eight MPs. Many of the other arti- Indeed, up until the 2005 gen- been directed instead to neighbour- cles in this edition of the Journal of eral election, the Liberal Democrats ing Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal History explain the 8 per cent had been starting to learn to live Evan Harris would not have ended vote share. However, the fact that with the bias that first past the post up losing by just 176 votes. even such a low vote as 8 per cent (FPTP) imposes on smaller parties The party’s own official review turned into only eight MPs also who do not have a very strong geo- into the 2010 general election, needs explanation, both because it graphic concentration in one part chaired by James Gurling,4 was a was well below prior expectations of the country. relatively low-key affair. Some of

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 73 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

Table 1: Liberal, Alliance and Liberal Democrat general election performance photography brought a little IT Election Seats won % share of the vote Seats:votes ratio relief. VPBs were possible due to 1970 6 8 0.8 the party’s migration, as recom- 1974 Feb 14 20 0.7 mended by the Gurling review, to 1974 Oct 13 19 0.7 a new web-based electoral data- 1979 11 14 0.8 base, called Connect. Supplied to the party by the American firm 1983 23 26 0.9 NGPVAN, Connect was based on 1987 22 23 0.9 the same technology as used by the 1992 19 18 1.1 2008 and 2012 Obama presidential 1997 46 17 2.7 campaigns (and the Canadian Lib- erals).9 In addition to investing in 2001 52 19 2.8 Connect, the party also commis- 2005 62 22 2.9 sioned micro-targeting research to 2010 57 23 2.5 score uncanvassed voters on their likelihood of being Liberal Demo- 2015 8 8 1.0 crat, Conservative or Labour in order to prioritise canvassing and to the causes of the party’s failure to programme. The process was far allow the more accurate targeting win more seats in 2010 it ascribed more ruthless than in previous par- of campaigning such as direct mail to specific one-off factors such as liaments, with the party willing to otherwise uncanvassed voters. the failure of the party’s immigra- to withdraw support even from Although Connect had a severe tion message and the old ‘you can’t seats held by long-standing Liberal slow-down on polling day in 2015, win’ argument (both of these fac- Democrat MPs6 – something that resulting in some features being tors came through strongly in the had been a bone of contention in scaled back, even in the midst of the party’s post-election private poll- some previous parliaments where, post-election dismay there has been ing). It made many detailed recom- regardless of the constituency cam- no call to abandon it or blame it mendations, and some significant paigning performance of an MP, from the result. Rather VPBs, scor- organisational ones – particularly the party would always end up ing and Connect were to varying that the party should change its putting in outside support to sort degrees successful. computer database software for things out. Unsuccessful, however, was fighting elections. In addition, the Those seats that made it through the party’s constituency polling. increasing emphasis in the Labour the process received, despite the This had been inaccurate in places Party on the virtues of canvassing party’s low poll ratings throughout in 2010 (see above) and was even rubbed off on the Liberal Demo- the parliament, generously funded more so in 2015, leading the party crats, with a switch from view- support thanks to the efficacy of to believe it would return far more ing canvassing as a data-gathering the party’s fundraising operation. than eight MPs and hence to Paddy opportunity, where a virtue is It was a regular feature of the quar- Ashdown’s promise on live TV on made of talking to each person terly donation figures published by election night to eat his hat if the for as little time a possible, to an the Electoral Commission for the exit poll prediction of the party attempt to get into longer conversa- party’s fundraising from individu- winning just ten seats turned out tions about issues.5 als to be more successful than that to be right. That so many public It was hoped that these organisa- of Labour. pollsters got their polls wrong too tional improvements, plus the fact They also received more provides some cover for the party’s of being in coalition government effective targeting of volunteer error, and indeed some of the criti- giving a completely different spin resources than in previous par- cisms of the party’s polling meth- to the ‘you can’t win’ argument, liaments.7 This was partly due to odology (such as question order) do would allow the party to regain its a widespread understanding in not stack up as a similar method- local campaigning edge. However, the party of how few seats were ology was followed by other, suc- given the 2015 result, those hopes truly winnable in 2015 and there- cessful pollsters.10 More likely, the were not only not met but the seats fore a greater willingness on the problem with the polling was that to votes ratio crashed catastrophi- part of volunteers to travel to help it was asking about one sort of elec- cally. What went wrong? elsewhere.8 It was also due to the tion but the public decided to vote During the 2010–15 parliament, increasing use of telephone can- in a different sort. That is, the poll- the Liberal Democrats certainly vassing via an easy-to-use web ing accurately captured how people put in a considerable effort to tar- system (called VPBs, or Virtual would vote if they were not think- get campaigning activity at win- Phone Banks). VPBs made it easy ing about who would be prime nable Westminster constituencies. for people to help a seat without minister (such as if it was a foregone This included a ‘Dragon’s Den’ having to travel to it, and replaced conclusion); however once worry- style application process for sup- the previous reliance on printing ing about the prime minister came port, whereby constituency teams and posting back and forth paper into consideration, they switched had to make the case that their seat canvass sheets, which had been a away from the Liberal Democrats was winnable and their applications rather cumbersome mechanism to other parties. were assessed with the assistance of even when the arrival of the fax That would fit with a broader an extensive constituency polling machine and later digital scanning/ pattern of the party doing best

74 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

(1997, 2001, 2005) when the name of many years now14 and are spread- as the equivalent Conservative the prime minister after polling day ing to other parties, but the Liberal campaigning was. is little doubted and doing worst Democrats almost never carried The lessons for the future, then, (1992, 2010, 2015) when there is out A/B split testing except for are twofold. Wider political cir- real doubt over who will be prime online campaigning and the party’s cumstances – not only the party’s minister. This change in voter per- campaigning tactics changed lit- overall popularity but also the spective also helps explain why tle from ten years previously. More degree to which the election result the hoped for Liberal Democrat broadly, the party’s development of is seen as a forgone conclusion – incumbency boost was muted: the campaign tactics had in many areas matter, as do regulatory issues the more people worried about who the stalled. party cannot unilaterally influ- prime minister was, the less their The final factor is one, how- ence. Nevertheless, in addition to love of their MP mattered. Hence ever, also outside the party’s direct pushing for the revival of mean- the strong polling results for the control: the death of constituency ingful constituency expense limits, party’s MPs during the parliament11 election expense limits. Although there are other factors under the were not enough to save most of campaigning in constituencies in party’s control which can be altered them.12 the months running up to polling ahead of 2020, including a revised Three other factors, however, day is nominally tightly controlled approach to polling and a reinvig- contributed to the party’s dreadful by constituency expense limits, oration of campaigning tactics, seats to votes ratio aside from the there is very large scope for cam- fuelled by a belief in testing and strategic political landscape. One paigning to be done that is targeted experimentation. was the abortive attempted major at swing voters in marginal seats restructuring of staff at party HQ but which does not count against Dr Mark Pack worked at party HQ in 2012. It produced some positive the local limit. A mailshot from from 2000 to 2009, heading up the party’s results, with the turnaround in the David Cameron, for example, to online operation for the 2001 and 2005 party’s membership figures start- soft Lib Dem voters in a Lib Dem general elections. He is author of 101 ing following the renewed focus MP’s seat did not need to count Ways To Win An Election and the on membership services. However against the constituency limit. As party’s election law manual, as well as the attempt to change the cam- a result, the Tories were able to co-author of the party’s general election paign staffing structure was very spend millions of pounds extra on agents’ handbook. controversial. The idea was to ‘national’ campaigning in Liberal move from primarily geographi- Democrat-held seats, outgunning The author would like to thank Neil cally based staff to skills-based the Liberal Democrat campaigns Fawcett and Ed Maxfield for their com- staff, but the handling of the axing and undermining the party’s tra- ments on an earlier draft of this piece. of the geographically based posts ditional incumbency advantage.15 led to widespread protests through This regulatory death played into 1 Journal of Liberal History 83 (Summer the party. The eventual structure the hands of the Conservatives not 2014). that emerged was very similar to only because of the parties’ rela- 2 The number has varied with bound- the pre-restructure one, but with tive finances but also because the ary reviews and devolution. During a greater emphasis on monitor- key messages to such swing vot- the period in Table 1, the Liberals, ing performance standards13 than ers for Tories were national ones then Alliance and subsequently Lib- on collaboration with seats, and (be afraid of Ed Miliband in hock eral Democrats contested nearly with those staff with geographic to the SNP), yet for the Lib Dems every seat, with a few exceptions responsibilities covering huge areas were local ones (praise for the local such as the Speaker’s constituency and so spending very considerable MP). Therefore even when the Lib- and, in 1997, Tatton. amounts of time travelling. Moreo- eral Democrats spent money on 3 Journal of Liberal History, 83 (Summer ver, there was widespread bad feel- ‘national’ campaigning in key seats, 2014). ing – and some rather complicated it was not as effective for the party concluded on page 83 wrinkles, to cater for particular personality clashes and differences. This contributed to a significant Liberal Democrat History Group online cadre of highly skilled and expe- Website rienced staff deciding to move on See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of our activities and publications, guides to archive sources, from party employment, often also research resources, and a growing number of pages on the history of the party. (Please note that we are dropping out of voluntary party ciurrently upgrading our website, and there may be some delay in making all content available.) activity too. A second factor was that, despite Email the attempt to move to a more Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest skills-based structure, the party way to find out what we’re doing. Fill in the form at: http://bit.ly/LDHGemail. did very little in the way of testing out alternative campaign tactics in Facebook page the field, such as by splitting voters News of the latest meeting and publications, and a discussion forum: into two different groups and try- www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup. ing a different direct mail design on each. In the US, such A/B split- Twitter test field experiments have been the A daily posting of Liberal events on this day in history. Follow us at: LibHistoryToday. norm for political campaigners for

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 75 TheCom Liberal Democrat – Conservative coalitionpa of 2010–15 wasr not of coursei then only coalitiong the Liberal Democratsc oor the Liberalali Party has ever participatedt in. Jim Wallaceions compares the UK coalition with the party’s experience in coalition in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, while David Dutton draws parallels from history.

Reflections on two coalitions Jim Wallace

hen I was asked to However, the Journal of Liberal His- Jim Wallace and areas, there was reasonable compat- serve as Advocate Gen- tory is as good a place as any to try Scottish Labour ibility between our respective par- eral for Scotland in and commit some of these thoughts leader Donald ties, a coalition was widely seen as W 2 the coalition government formed to paper. Dewar agree the more likely than not. in May 2010, it was to be my sec- The biggest difference in cir- first coalition in By contrast, whilst polls dur- ond experience of coalition, hav- cumstances probably relates to Scotland, in 1999 ing the 2010 campaign pointed to ing been deputy first minister in the creation of the coalition. In a parliament where no one party the Labour–Lib Dem government Scotland, in 1999, there was some would command a majority, such formed after the first election to expectation that the outcome expectations had been confounded the Scottish parliament.1 Indeed, would be a Labour–Lib Dem coa- in the past. Moreover, there did one of the main reasons for my lition. That did not make it a cer- not appear to be any natural politi- appointment was that I had expe- tainty, as I was always prepared to cal affinity between the Liberal rience of having been in coalition walk away from an agreement if Democrats and the Conserva- government. I have often been the terms were not acceptable. But tive Party. Intuitively, a coalition asked to compare and contrast the given that the PR system used for between these two parties seemed two experiences. This is never as the election was not expected to less likely than not. Consequently, easy as it sounds, not least because produce a majority outcome, and in both public and party eyes, there of differences in circumstances. given that in a number of policy were more difficulties in 2010 in

76 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 TheCom Liberal Democrat – Conservative coalitionpa of 2010–15 wasr not of coursei then only coalitiong the Liberal Democratsc oor the Liberalali Party has ever participatedt in. Jim Wallaceions compares the UK coalition with the party’s experience in coalition in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, while David Dutton draws parallels from history.

achieving if not legitimacy, then at policies besides is a tribute to the reflected that the Lib Dem view had least acceptance. negotiating team. prevailed. If the background was different, What we possibly lacked was Moreover, we were assisted in there was a ready comparison in the a good-going row, and a threat to establishing a separate identity by preparations made by the party in break off the talks. Admittedly, the futile efforts of the SNP oppo- the run-up to the election. Based on the circumstances were again very sition to drive wedges between the work done by Philip Goldenberg I do wonder different. In 1999, I did not have coalition parties. Initially, they for Paddy Ashdown before the 1992 to negotiate against a background often used their Opposition Days election, Scottish Liberal Demo- whether a of international financial turmoil to debate issues reserved to West- crats had prepared well for coali- and turbulent markets (a coalition minster where the two parties were tion talks. I had asked David Laws row or two for a devolved administration was not in agreement. As our coali- to distil our manifesto into a pos- never going to trouble the mar- tion agreement did not extend to sible programme for coalition gov- over a signifi- kets). Walking away was an option reserved issues, I insisted that there ernment; whilst preparatory work in 2010, but the downside was could not be a government line, in 2010 by Andrew Stunell and cant policy immense. and we often responded by tabling Danny Alexander ensured that the But more generally, I do won- a coalition amendment which negotiating team entered talks hav- issue, such der whether a row or two over a acknowledged the respective posi- ing given careful thought as to our as we had in significant policy issue, such as we tions of the two coalition parties – coalition goals. had in Scotland over university tui- and our contributors to the debate The contrast was with our Scotland over tion fees and personal care for the could articulate a distinctive Lib respective opposite numbers. In elderly (from which we emerged Dem line. 1999, the Labour Party had given university successful), or landing a big pol- This is not to underestimate precious little thought as to what icy prize such as STV for Scot- the 2010 achievement of policies a coalition government might do. tuition fees tish local government elections, to such as the minimum income tax Donald Dewar’s opening pitch to which Labour was considered to be threshold, the pupil premium or the me was that two Lib Dems should and personal instinctively opposed, would have green policies which are now being join his cabinet and, with a couple been helpful in raising the profile unstitched on a daily basis. I know of junior ministers, we would, to care for the of a battling junior coalition part- just how much effort was put in all intents and purposes, be a con- ner. Indeed, because the tuition fees by ministerial colleagues to secure tinuing Westminster Labour gov- elderly … or issue was not resolved by the part- these; but they were all delivered ernment in Scotland. Interestingly, nership agreement in Scotland and without a major public fall-out, and they do not seem to learn, as UK landing a big was remitted to an inquiry chaired so became more difficult to badge as Labour’s attitude in 2010 did not by Andrew Cubie, that tension was distinctively Liberal Democrat. seem all that different! policy prize evident from the outset. Work- Another difference between However, it was evident from ing relations were good, but there Scottish government and UK gov- the speech which David Cameron … would was not what, after 2010, has some- ernment is scale. After all, prior made on the day after the 2010 times been described as a ‘Rose to devolution, the Scottish Office election that the Tories had been have been Garden phase’. And that lack of was one government department as diligent as we had in making helpful in honeymoon period was not always among many. This led to shorter preparations for the eventuality of to our advantage. In the Hamil- lines of communication, which a ‘hung parliament’. I believe this raising the ton South Westminster by-election undoubtedly facilitated quicker was the experience of our negoti- in September 1999, our candidate decision-making. One of my frus- ating team, when they got down profile of a came sixth behind the Hamilton trations as a minister in charge of a to serious discussions. That we Accies FC Supporters candidate! bill in the Lords was the need for a achieved a coalition agreement battling jun- But once the Cubie committee had lengthy paper chase before I could which incorporated the key pledges reported and ministers (Nicol Ste- accept an amendment which was from the front page of our mani- ior coalition phen, in particular) had worked self-evidently sensible. The theory festo together with a referendum on out implementation, it was gen- is that it is that which secures col- voting reform and other cherished partner. erally accepted that the outcome lective responsibility – fair enough,

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 77 comparing coalitions

but there must be a more efficient and officials, understood and could Commons ministers) to meet coa- way of doing it! act upon. lition peers (of both parties) to try Coalition government also But, as already alluded to, the and identify legislative solutions. requires its own structures and primary responsibility on resolv- Important in these efforts was processes. The UK civil service is ing difficulties lay at the door of the role of special advisers (Spads). instinctively uncomfortable about departmental ministers. It was Writing a piece for the Institute for these. It is a system which has essential that junior ministers were Government on the first anniver- increasingly been built around a the Lib Dem eyes and ears through- sary of the coalition, I said, prime minister, who is the source of out their respective departments. all authority. The need to be sensi- In turn, that required Conserva- My experience of coalition tive to and even accommodate the tive secretaries of state to recognise government in Scotland under- views of two parties in government that their Lib Dem junior ministers scores the importance of these is more challenging than taking the had a legitimate role in represent- advisers. They provided a vital cue straight from the top. ing the party’s interests across the channel of communication with On the day of the Rose Gar- board, and not just within their the backbenches and the wider den, Oliver Letwin and I – and our allocated departmental portfolio. party, both to explain decisions, respective teams – sat in a room Whether or not this worked very and to inform decision-making in Downing Street, trying to fill much depended on personalities.4 with the knowledge of what our in some of the gaps in the primary But where it did work, it ensured MSPs would wear. coalition agreement which the that a policy could command sup- negotiations were never going to port across the coalition. Where At that time (May 2011), I do not be able to cover. I remember being it did not, a good deal of time was Whilst think as much use had been made of quite pleased with a compromise taken up in protracted negotiation special advisers as could have been, which I thought had diluted the and dispute resolution. [the Quad] but their role undoubtedly devel- Tories’ more punitive proposals on As already noted, the scale of oped. I am not in a position to judge knife crime. Oliver thought he had government and the pressured undoubt- their engagement with Commons’ better check out the wording with environment of Whitehall are dif- backbenchers, but in the Lords, the newly appointed justice secre- ferent from the situation in Scot- edly made Elizabeth Plummer5 performed a tary, Ken Clarke. He returned say- land. My workload as deputy first sterling job in keeping Lords min- ing, ‘Ken doesn’t think it’s liberal minister was very substantial; but it demands on isters, and the wider ministerial enough!’ would have been physically impos- team, aware of what our backbench One issue which we did attempt sible for Nick Clegg to have main- the PM, DPM, peers were thinking and what to grapple with that day was a tained the scaled-up overview of would carry and what needed more dispute resolution process. In the whole of government which I chancellor work and attention. Scotland, I sometimes became could do in Scotland. That Nick and chief From a ministerial perspective, exasperated by the number and was able to cover as much as he did as well as Elizabeth, I was fortunate nature of the issues which would is a great testament to his resilience secretary to benefit from the advice and hard quickly escalate to first min- and capacity for work. But it did work of Tim Colbourne and Ver- ister–deputy first minister for underline the important role of Lib … I believe ity Harding when taking the justice resolution.3 I reckoned that with Dem ministers in their respective and security bill through the Lords, considerably extra pressures on the departments. Some commentators that it was and the patience, wisdom and per- prime minister and deputy prime have argued that we should have severance of Matt Sanders and, minister, some filtering process focused on three or four depart- more effec- again, Tim Colbourne, as we navi- was needed. We proposed a Coali- ments; but the nature of our politi- gated the tricky waters of giving tion Committee to which any dis- cal culture is that government as a tive in reach- substance to the Leveson proposals putes that could not be resolved whole is held accountable, and we on the press. This latter cross-party at departmental level could be need a handle on what is going on ing decisions exercise involved not only contact referred. Only if that committee in each department. with our own party colleagues, could not broker a solution would Negotiations were not exclu- which were Conservative ministers and their the prime minister and deputy sively within government. Many advisers, and departmental officials, prime minister be called in. The of the real challenges of coalition, the ‘last but also the Labour Party and the committee never, to my knowl- both at Holyrood and at West- important interested lobby groups. edge, met. Instead the ‘Quad’ minster, were the need to get our word’, than They each fulfilled, in an exem- emerged. Whilst it undoubtedly backbenchers on board. I do not plary way, the role which falls to a made demands on the PM, DPM, think it was ever recognised just a compro- Spad of keeping relevant colleagues chancellor and chief secretary (and how much interaction there was at mise ham- in the loop, passing on intelligence did not remove the need for bilat- Westminster between minsters (of about who was thinking what, and erals between David Cameron and both parties) and backbenchers to mered out at testing waters with those the minis- Nick Clegg) I believe that it was try and satisfy specific concerns. ter has to deal with, so that ministe- more effective in reaching deci- Both as a minister who had to take a lower min- rial time is well used. sions which were the ‘last word’, some contentious bills through the than a compromise hammered out Lords, and latterly as the leader of isterial level at a lower ministerial level could our Lib Dem group in the Lords, I Concluding reflection have been. Viewed from within was aware of just how much time could have I joined the Scottish Liberal Party government, Quad decisions had a and effort was made by ministers in 1972 after reading Russell John- finality, which everyone, ministers of both coalition parties (including been. ston’s pamphlet, To Be A Liberal,

78 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 comparing coalitions because I readily identified with the What I partic- Welsh Assembly government from of coalition government. That was principles and values which Rus- 2000 to 2003, and at Westminster, my experience in both Scotland and sell so clearly articulated. We did ularly resent was parliamentary under secretary of Westminster. On the Monday fol- not even have eight MPs, and so I state for Wales from 2012 until May lowing the heavy defeat of the AV did not entertain a realistic expec- is a view that 2015. referendum and disastrous results in tation of becoming an MP, let alone 2 Even then, there was still hostility Scotland and local government, com- a minister in a Scottish parliament whilst it is to the very idea of Lib Dems in gov- mentators were predicting stormy (although the ambition of a Scottish ernment; to the extent that my wife relationships between coalition min- parliament within a federal United perfectly stopped buying daily newspapers as isters. My Westminster office was Kingdom undoubtedly motivated acceptable she thought that exposing our chil- next door to that of my ‘opposite me) or a minister in a United King- dren to some of the abusive attacks on number’ in the coalition, the attor- dom government. I count it a privi- for Labour, their father was a form of child abuse! ney general, Dominic Grieve. Hav- lege, almost beyond belief, to have 3 On my final night in office as DFM, ing heard me return to my room, done both. What I particularly Conservative Jack McConnell and I literally Dominic knocked on the door and resent is a view that whilst it is per- resorted to a Thesaurus to find word- said, ‘Come and have a drink, you’ll fectly acceptable for Labour, Con- or even SNP ing acceptable to both parties on the be needing one!’ servative or even SNP politicians to issue of third-party rights of appeal 5 Because special advisers were techni- aspire to government office, there politicians in planning decisions for a White cally assigned to cabinet ministers, is something unseemly about a Lib- Paper which had to go to the printer Elizabeth was appointed as a Spad eral Democrat wishing to do so. If to aspire to the following morning. to the (Conservative) leader of the you are in politics, it must surely be 4 One can never underestimate the House of Lords, albeit she worked for to do something – to put into prac- government importance of personalities and Tom McNally and subsequently me tice your principles; not take them relationships in oiling the wheels as deputy leader of the House. home every night to polish up from office, there the comfort zone of opposition. That is why I believe that we is something were right on both occasions – on acceptable terms – to have unseemly Something about coalitions? Historical gone into coalition government. Undoubtedly there were things about a Lib- reflections on the Liberal Democrat that we could have done better; but experience of government 2010–15 I firmly believe that on both occa- eral Demo- sions we left government with the crat wishing David Dutton country in a better place than when we went into power. to do so. istorians are likely to soil our hands with the responsibili- debate for some time to ties of sharing power. We must be Jim Wallace (Lord Wallace of Tanker- come the origins of the bold enough to deploy the coalition H 1 ness) was MP for Orkney & Shetland Liberal Democrats’ decision to case positively.’ This represented a from 1983 to 2001, and MSP for Ork- enter a coalition government with clear repudiation of the ‘long-haul’ ney from 1999 to 2007. He led the Scot- the Conservatives in 2010 and also, strategy of earlier decades – that tish Liberal Democrats from 1992 to as many would see it, the shared the Liberal dawn would eventu- 2005. Following the first election to the origins of the party’s disastrous ally come without the need to con- Scottish parliament in 1999, he became performance in the general election taminate the party’s ideological deputy first minister and minister of of 2015. One possible starting point purity. By ‘simply pretending to be justice in the newly established Scottish must be the election to the party an alternative government in exile executive. He was later (2003–5) min- leadership of David Steel as long we would continue to fail’.2 Partici- ister for enterprise and lifelong learn- ago as 1976. Though Steel’s own pation in a Conservative–Liberal ing. On three occasions he assumed the natural inclinations were towards Democrat coalition between 2010 role of acting first minister. He stood the political left and a possible rea- and 2015 must be seen as the fulfil- down as Scottish party leader and dep- lignment with Labour, he made it ment of Steel’s strategy. uty first minister in 2005. Lord Wal- a clear objective of his campaign Yet the electoral denouement lace was introduced into the House of to succeed Jeremy Thorpe that the of 2015 can only raise uncomfort- Lords in 2007 and appointed advocate broader issue of coalition must be able questions for Liberal Demo- general for Scotland in the 2010 coali- addressed head on. Interviewed crats about coalitions in general. tion government. In 2013, he was elected by The Guardian within weeks of Granted the rise of the SNP (fifty- leader of the Liberal Democrat peers and becoming leader, Steel insisted six MPs from 4.7 per cent of the appointed deputy leader of the House that Liberals had to ‘start by get- vote) and UKIP (just one MP but of Lords. He was re-elected as Lib ting a toe-hold on power which 12.6 per cent of the vote), 2015 was Dem leader in the Lords after the 2015 must mean some form of coalition’. the first general election in the Lib- election. Then, in a well-received speech to eral Democrat/Liberal Party’s his- the party conference in Septem- tory in which it could not claim 1 I am sometimes told that my expe- ber, Steel stressed that if the Lib- even third place in the electorate’s rience is unique, but, of course, my eral Party wished to move from the preferences. Historians must neces- Lords colleague, Baroness Jenny periphery to the centre of the elec- sarily turn to the past for guidance. Randerson, was minister for culture, toral argument, ‘we must not give Contrary to the popular saying, sport and the Welsh language in the the impression of being afraid to history does not repeat itself; but it

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 79 comparing coalitions does offer informative and reveal- Coalitions Party itself survived the upheaval. decision to go into government; ing parallels and similarities. Indeed, it remained in broad con- the Federal Executive voted 27 to Coalitions and more informal and more trol of the overall direction of the 1 in favour; and only a handful of inter-party arrangements were less government. The real damage to the more than 1,500 delegates at the alien to the norm in the history of informal the party, culminating in the cata- special conference called to con- twentieth-century Britain than is strophic electoral outcome of 1918, sider the coalition deal withheld sometimes supposed. Formal coa- inter-party derived from the later split between their support. Moreover, there was litions existed between 1915 and the supporters of Asquith and those surprisingly little pressure within 1922 and again between 1940 and arrange- of Lloyd George. the party hierarchy to pull out from 1945. On both occasions they rep- Similarly, after the entry of the the coalition over the years that resented a natural response to the ments were party into Churchill’s coalition in followed. demands of war and the need to less alien to May 1940, many Liberals worried A second, and altogether more repress domestic differences in the about their loss of an independent significant, group comprised face of a graver external threat. A the norm in identity, fearing that their leader, those voters who accepted the less broadly based coalition was Archibald Sinclair, had fallen broad proposition of coalition, formed in 1931 and lasted until the history of almost totally under the prime but regarded themselves as ideo- 1940. In addition, more informal minister’s masterful spell. Again, logically closer to Labour than to arrangements sustained a Liberal twentieth- the subsequent general election in the Conservatives. A dilemma of government, which had lost its par- 1945 saw the party badly mauled, choice had been inherent in Lib- liamentary majority, between 1910 century Brit- with just twelve MPs returned eral politics for several decades, and 1915, two minority Labour to parliament. But it is doubtful ever since in fact the party fell into governments in 1924 and between ain than is whether membership of the war- third-party status, but the arith- 1929 and 1931, and a Labour gov- time coalition was the critical fac- metical outcomes of the British ernment which had been reduced to sometimes tor. Quite simply, the Liberal Party electoral system had largely kept minority status in 1977–8. seemed irrelevant to the political it at a theoretical level. Back in At first sight the formal coali- supposed. debate of the time, notwithstand- 1926, Keynes argued that, forced tions might seem to offer the most ing the fact that individual Liberals, to make the choice, Liberals would relevant comparisons with what Formal coali- most notably Keynes and Beve- divide into those who would happened after 2010. In each case ridge, had helped shape that debate. vote Conservative and those who Liberals, in their willingness to tions existed More relevant, then, to the experi- would back Labour.6 Now the share power with other parties, ence of 2010–15 are earlier periods choice had had to be made. Many were responding to a national crisis, between in which Liberals were damaged leading Liberal Democrats shared albeit that of 2010 fell short of Euro- 1915 and 1922 by the decision to sustain minority a preference for Labour. Figures pean war. But in terms of impact governments in power. In this short such as Vince Cable and Paddy on the party, these earlier coali- and again essay, the example of the minority Ashdown missed no opportunity tions provide less exact parallels. Labour administration of 1924 will to stress that they had spent their The actual creation of a coalition in between be used to illustrate the author’s political lives fighting the Tories 1915 and again in 1940 was broadly argument. and that sharing power with them accepted. Indeed, both wars ended 1940 and Broadly speaking, the Liberal did not come easily. But the practi- with a widespread belief that coali- Democrats’ decision to join the cal realities of 2010 – not least that tion had been a successful innova- 1945. coalition in 2010 seems to have a Liberal Democrat–Labour coali- tion in the practice of government. alienated three distinct groups tion would not have commanded It is true that it is easy enough to within the party’s support base. a parliamentary majority – forced find contemporary assessments that The first, and probably the small- them to abandon their preferences Asquith’s acceptance of Conserva- est, consisted of those for whom and work in the national interest. tives into his government would ideological purity remained all- For some Liberal Democrat vot- result in catastrophic consequences important – those, in other words, ers, however, it seems that this was for Liberalism. ‘Among Liberal who had never accepted the strat- a step too far. Their support was intellectuals’, reported the Manches- egy propounded by David Steel lost, at least when it came to the ter Guardian, ‘there is a melancholy and followed in differing ways by 2015 election. Yet this argument feeling, very frankly expressed, his successors, that coalition was a should not be exaggerated. The that this is probably the end of the necessary step in the party’s evolu- logic that such voters would now Liberal party for many years to tion. Such voters believed, how- shift their allegiance to Labour come.’3 John Simon had already ever unrealistically, that the party is only partially sustained by the warned that a coalition would be could eventually prevail under its evidence of what happened. Inner- ‘the grave of Liberalism’.4 Charles own colours, even in a first-past- city seats such as Bermondsey did Hobhouse was now ready to agree. the-post electoral system, and that see significant swings to Labour, ‘Nothing will persuade me’, he the differences between Liberal but in the swathe of lost constitu- wrote, ‘that this is not the end of Democrats and the other main par- encies in the Southwest, the Con- the Liberal party as we have known ties were too profound for coalition servatives were the overwhelming it.’5 But while Asquith may be legit- to be an acceptable option. Among beneficiaries of Liberal defec- imately criticised for shrouding the MPs, party activists and members, tion. Furthermore, preliminary whole process of coalition-making this sort of thinking was almost research suggests that Labour was in an unnecessary veil of secrecy, entirely absent in 2010. All the singularly unsuccessful in attract- leaving many of his followers party’s MPs, except Charles Ken- ing erstwhile Liberal Democrat bewildered and upset, the Liberal nedy who abstained, supported the voters in those key marginals

80 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 comparing coalitions that it needed to win to have any been fought specifically on the the Labour wain over the rough chance of forming a government. issue of protection and had left roads of Parliament for two to three The third element may be the the combined Liberal and Labour years, goaded along, and at the end most important in explaining parties holding a clear ‘free-trade of the journey, when there is no the disaster that befell the party majority’. Asquith believed that further use for them, they are to be in 2015. Ever since the beginning Labour, as the larger of these two slaughtered. That is the Labour idea of the Liberal revival in the mid- parties, now had the right to form of cooperation.’9 In fact, Ramsay 1950s, the party has drawn heavily a government. He argued that, if MacDonald’s long-term strategy of upon the support of floating and a Labour government was ever to Ramsay Mac- seeking to destroy Liberalism as a protest voters. Such citizens tend be tried, ‘it could hardly be tried necessary precondition of his own either to be inherently antagonis- under safer conditions’. Yet, like Donald’s party’s further advance was as ruth- tic to the parties of government, Nick Clegg in the early days of the less, and in purely party terms as thereby giving rise to the ‘none 2010 coalition, Asquith overesti- long-term justified, as the Conservatives’ deci- of the above’ vote, or incurably mated the strength of his party’s strategy of sion in the 2015 general election to fickle in their allegiance, with- position. ‘It is we,’ he insisted, ‘if target Liberal Democrat seats as the drawing their support when their we really understand our business, seeking to most promising route to winning (usually unrealistic) expecta- who control the situation.’8 Clegg, a Commons majority. Many Lib- tions of government performance however, at least had the advantage destroy Lib- eral Democrats felt that Clegg had remain unfulfilled. Liberal Dem- of a formal coalition agreement. As been as naïve as Asquith before him ocrat partisans have sometimes Labour took office at the beginning eralism as in seemingly embracing the coali- been reluctant to acknowledge of 1924, no vestige of an agreement tion with enthusiasm rather than the importance of such voters in existed with the Liberals on the a necessary as a slightly distasteful necessity. their party’s success. The belief in content of the new government’s The bonhomie of the rose garden a solid phalanx of committed ‘Lib- programme. In particular, no effort precondition press conference on 12 May jarred eral opinion’ is obviously more had been made to secure a promise with many. Figures such as Vince gratifying. Yet the evidence for of electoral reform, which percep- of his own Cable sought, by contrast, to main- their importance is strong. It has tive Liberals already recognised as tain a certain distance from their been shown that, over the general pivotal to their chances of revival party’s fur- new Tory colleagues. But Clegg elections between 1959 and 1979, in British electoral politics. In 2010 seems to have felt the need to dispel less than 50 per cent of those who Clegg at least won a commitment ther advance the prevailing sentiment, not least voted Liberal at one election con- that the coalition government in the world’s markets, that hung firmed this preference at the next. would hold a referendum on the was as ruth- parliaments were bound to lead The corresponding figures for Alternative Vote. But AV proved to weak, divided and ineffectual both Labour and the Conserva- a difficult proposition to sell to the less, and in governments. tives were around 75 per cent. electorate, lacking the compelling, purely party Also instructive are the reac- Even more revealingly, just 2 per if somewhat questionable, simplic- tions of prominent Conservatives cent of the electorate gave the Lib- ity of earlier campaigns in which terms as jus- to the Liberal–Labour alignment erals consistent support in each of Liberals had equated PR with ‘fair which installed Labour in office. the four general elections of the votes’. tified, as the Austen Chamberlain, former party 1970s.7 Similarly, a striking fea- Yet the Liberal position in 1924 leader and future foreign secretary, ture of the years of Liberal revival was almost as constrained as that Conserva- offered the most eloquent commen- was the party’s ability to secure which Clegg and his party accepted tary. Speaking on 21 January 1924 record swings in by-elections, usu- nearly a century later in a five-year, tives’ deci- in the no-confidence debate which ally at the expense of the incum- fixed-term parliament, with an formally brought down Baldwin’s bent government, performances agreed policy programme which sion in the government, Chamberlain warned which the party found it difficult involved the abandonment of key that Asquith had: to replicate at subsequent general manifesto pledges, including that 2015 general elections. None of this suggests on university tuition fees. Asquith’s taken his choice and he has by a strong and reliable core Liberal Liberals were not in a position to election to that choice constituted his own vote. But, by entering government assess the individual policies of the immortality. He will go down in 2010, the Liberal Democrats Labour government on their mer- target Lib- to history as the last Prime Min- largely forfeited their claims to the its. Only the positive support of ister of a Liberal administration. electorate’s anti-establishment and the Parliamentary Liberal Party eral Demo- He has sung the swan-song of protest votes. It was their misfor- could ensure Labour’s survival. the Liberal Party. When next tune in 2015 that UKIP and, north Even abstention would involve crat seats the country is called upon for of the border, the SNP were well the government’s defeat and pos- as the most a decision, if it wants a Social- placed to fill the resulting void. sibly another general election ist Government it will vote for After the general election of which the Liberals, for financial promis- a Socialist; if it does not want 1923, as after that of 2010, the Lib- reasons, were keen to avoid. As the a Socialist Government it will eral Party made a conscious deci- period of Labour government pro- ing route to vote for a Unionist. It will not sion to install a minority party in ceeded, Liberals seemed surprised vote again for those who dena- office. In 1923 Labour was not even that Labour insisted on behaving winning a tured its mandate and betrayed the largest party, but their Con- in a partisan manner, showing lit- its trust.10 servative opponents (like Labour tle gratitude for Liberal support. In Commons in 2010) had indubitably lost the Lloyd George’s memorable words, The situation in 2010 was signifi- general election. That of 1923 had ‘Liberals are to be the oxen to drag majority. cantly different, but Chamberlain

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 81 comparing coalitions at least understood that, by com- ‘arrangement’ as to turn in large 1 D. Steel, A House Divided: The Lib– ing down on one side of the funda- numbers to the Conservatives? Lab Pact and the Future of British Politics mental political divide, the Liberals The party’s poll rating was poor (London, 1980), p. 25. were likely to lose a section of their from the first year of the coalition 2 Ibid., p. 16. electoral support. Indeed, writ- onwards. Observers expected the 3 Manchester Guardian, 20 May 1915. ing to Samuel Hoare a week later, actual outcome in 2015 to be some- 4 C. Addison, Four and a Half Years, vol. he suggested that two-thirds of what better than opinion polls sug- 1 (London, 1934), p. 35. the Liberal Party was now Labour gested; in fact it was worse. Liberal 5 University of Newcastle, Runciman in all but name and that the Con- Democrats argued that loyalty to MSS 136, Hobhouse to Runciman 28 servatives should strive to absorb well-regarded sitting MPs would May 1915. the remainder.11 The evidence outweigh national trends; it didn’t. 6 S. Lee and M. Beech (eds.), The Cam- from the general election of 1924, The party held on to Chris Huh- eron–Clegg Government (Basingstoke, with three-quarters of Liberal MPs ne’s old seat of Eastleigh in the by- 2011), p. 5. going down to defeat, is compli- election of February 2013, when 7 J. Curtice in V. Bogdanor (ed.), Lib- cated by a significant reduction in anger at the ‘betrayal’ over tui- eral Party Politics (Oxford, 1983), p. the number of the party’s candi- tion fees was still relatively fresh in 102. dates, but does point to a marked the electorate’s mind, but lost it by 8 C. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal drop in its underlying electoral over 9,000 votes just over two years Party: The Road back to Power (Basing- support. later. The debate over this latest stoke, 2010), pp. 94–5. Rather than explaining what strange death of Liberal England 9 J. Campbell, Lloyd George: The Goat happened between 2010 and 2015, (and Wales and Scotland) may well in the Wilderness 1922–1931 (London, history can do no more than offer run and run. 1977), pp. 94–5. interesting lines of enquiry and 10 D. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gen- discussion. Important questions David Dutton is currently researching tleman in Politics (Bolton, 1985), p. 215. remain to be answered. Were the career of Percy Molteno, Liberal MP 11 University of Birmingham, Cham- Liberal Democrat voters, as has for Dumfriesshire, 1906–18. His vote in berlain MSS, AC25/4/19, Chamber- been suggested, so frightened by the recent general election failed to halt lain to Hoare 28 January 1924. the prospect of a Labour–SNP the SNP landslide in Scotland. Important notice for Journal of Liberal History subscribers Discounted prices for books and booklets Subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History enjoy discounted prices (usually a 20 per cent reduction) for the books and booklets published by the Liberal Democrat History Group.

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82 Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 New from the Liberal Democrat History Group Liberalism The ideas that built the Liberal Democrats The political ideology of the Liberal Democrats draws on the philosophies of two reformist traditions, liberalism and social democracy, and possesses a distinctive approach to concepts such as freedom, equality and social justice.

This booklet is an accessible guide to the key ideas underlying Liberal Democrat beliefs, including entries on environmentalism, internationalism, the rule of law and community politics, together with contemporary and historic currents of thought, including social and economic liberalism, social democracy, Keynesianism, radicalism and more. Essential reading for every thinking Liberal. Liberal Thinkers is available at a special discounted price for subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History: £5.00 instead of the normal £6.00. Copies can be purchased:

• At the History Group’s stand at the Liberal Democrat conference (see back page); or • Via our website, www.liberalhistory.org.uk; or • By sending a cheque (made out to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN (add £1.00 P&P).

8 per cent but also only 8 MPs: the death of the fabled Liberal Democrat grassroots campaigning machine? concluded from page 75 4 In his role as chair of the party’s fewer councillors in 2015 than movers over to Connect. 13 The value of the key perfor- Campaigns and Communications in 2010, the total volunteer base 10 For details on this, see Mark mance indicator (KPI) frame- Committee (CCC). He discussed available was smaller. Hard data Pack, ‘What went wrong with work used to monitor seat his review at the Liberal Demo- is not yet available as to whether the Liberal Democrat poll- progress and help determine crat History Group’s fringe meet- the net result of fewer volun- ing and key seat intelligence?’, allocation of resources is thrown ing at the autumn 2010 party teers used better was more or less revised August 2015: http:// into severe doubt by the 2015 conference. See the meeting activity in key seats. www.markpack.org.uk/132249/ results as seats which were con- report at http://www.markpack. 8 The contrast with 2010 was what-went-wrong-with-the- sistently rated as performing in org.uk/16887/the-2010-election- especially notable, when the liberal-democrat-polling-and- the top tier on the KPIs ended up in-historical-perspective/. Cleggmania poll surge resulted key-seat-intelligence/. being lost heavily. 5 One cause for this renewed in more activists thinking their 11 For example, see the research by 14 On which the seminal work is emphasis on canvassing – and own seat was winnable and so Phil Cowley and Rosie Camp- Donald P. Green and Alan S. canvassing, moreover, as more damaging the party’s attempt to bell, using polling data from July Gerber, Get Out the Vote: How to than just brief data-gathering target efforts. 2013: http://www.totalpolitics. Increase Voter Turnout (Brookings conversations – was the Obama 9 A small number of local par- com/opinion/416802/polling- Institution, 2004). 2008 election campaign which ties continued to use the pre- not-love-actually.thtml. 15 For more details on this see Mark was a high-profile example, vious database system EARS, 12 Another factor was the num- Pack, ‘Constituency expense widely reported in Britain, of which had bid for the new party ber of Liberal Democrat MPs limits are dying off in the UK, the resurgence of doorstep can- contract but lost out to Con- retiring in 2015. See http:// but neither politicians nor the vassing in the United States. nect. This number of local par- nottspolitics.org/2014/07/29/ regulator will act’, March 2015: 6 Although there was some con- ties declined steadily during the lib-dem-incumbent-mp-retire- http://www.markpack.org. troversy over whether such deci- parliament, and the central par- ments-could-cost-the-party- uk/130283/internet-speeds-up- sions were made soon enough. ty’s influence on the target seats four-seats-in-2015-before-any- the-killing-off-of-expense-con- 7 With lower membership and operation helped push any slow votes-are-cast/. trols-in-marginal-seats/.

Journal of Liberal History 88 Autumn 2015 83 A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting liberal leaders and leadership Party leaders matter: they embody a party’s present, while also shaping its future. This is particularly important in the values-based Liberal tradition.

A total of twenty-five individuals led the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats between Earl Grey’s assumption of the leadership of the Whig opposition in 1828 and Nick Clegg’s resignation in 2015. What did it take to be a Liberal leader across these two centuries of tumultuous change? Who was a good leader and who was a bad one?

Join us to launch our new book, British Liberal Leaders (see page 2), and discuss the challenges of leading the Liberals, with Sir Simon Hughes (MP for Bermondsey, 1982–2015) and Lord Paul Tyler (MP for North Cornwall, 1974, 1992–2005). Chair: Sir Menzies Campbell (MP for North East Fife, 1987–2015, Leader of the Liberal Democrats 2006–07).

1300–1400, Sunday 20 September Deauville Suite, Trouville Hotel, Priory Road Bournemouth (no conference pass needed)

Liberal Democrat History Group at Lib Dem conference Visit the History Group’s stand in the exhibition in the Bournemouth International Centre – stand A13. There you can: • Take part in our annual Liberal history quiz. Exciting prizes to be won! • Chat to stand-holders about your interests in Liberal history. • Buy a copy of our latest booklet, Liberalism: The ideas that built the Liberal Democrats. £5 to Journal subscribers, £6 to everyone else. • Buy any of our others short booklets: Liberal Thinkers; Mothers of Liberty: Women who built British Liberalism; Liberal Leaders of the 19th Century and Liberal Leaders since 1900. Discounts for Journal subscribers. • Buy any of our books: British Liberal Leaders (see page 2); Peace, Re- form and Liberation: A History of Liberal Politics in Britain 1679–2011; Dictionary of Liberal Quotations; and Great Liberal Speeches. Sub- stantial discounts for Journal subscribers. • Renew your Journal subscription – all subs are now due for renewal (unless you subscribe by standing order).