A Road Half Travelled: a temporal, case study analysis of inter-party co-operation in the British context, 1945-1999 Alan John Wager Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2017 1 Appendix A: Required statement of originality for inclusion in research degree theses I, Alan John Wager, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously published material is also acknowledged below. I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the electronic version of the thesis. I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this or any other university. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. Signature: Alan J Wager Date: 4/8/2017 2 Abstract This thesis looks at five case studies of attempted co-operation between British political parties. The objective is two-fold: to provide an explanatory framework to better understand instances of potential co- operation within the institutional context of British politics, and to build analytical narratives that shed light on the inter- and intra-party dynamics when co-operation between parties has been mooted in Westminster. It addresses a lacuna in the study of British Politics by providing a temporal comparison of understudied examples of attempted co-operation. This comparison inductively draws out what lessons can be learnt about why co-operation is attempted, and the factors that inhibit it. This framework suggests that these examples of mooted co-operation constitute disruptions of the majoritarian norms which inform the British Political Tradition. It does so through a historical institutionalist lens: the cultural norms of Westminster provide a strategic context, but elite political agents strategically interact with this institutional environment. This tradition is manifested through intra-party pressure against co-operation, and a belief that co-operation is electorally disadvantageous. Equally, actors’ interpretation of what is possible or desirable within the perceived constraints of Westminster party politics really matters. This suggests a role for situated agency and strategic leadership, captured through the concept of a disruption/defence of existing institutional equilibrium derived from heresthetics. This thesis contends that the discourse around co-operation holds a rhetorical and performative purpose beyond the success or failure of formal co-operation. Institutional context and memory create incentives for actors to either accentuate or downplay the effect of co-operation, but do not determine the shape and aims of co- operation. As a result, both culture and calculus are all-important to inter-party co-operation. 3 Acknowledgements Firstly, my thanks must go to Prof. Tim Bale. He has been a brilliant PhD supervisor: encouraging and inspirational; forensic and fair-minded; supportive and stimulating; good cop and bad (grammar) cop. Thanks also are due to William Goldsmith and Dr. Mark Stuart. Without their academic encouragement and guidance, I would not necessarily have been in a position to contemplate an endeavour of this kind. Whilst studying for this thesis I have been fortunate enough to conduct seminars with undergraduates at Queen Mary, and students have been consistently thought-provoking and engaging. Those who I taught alongside – Dr. Jack Brown, Luke Maynard, Karl Pike and Dr. Paul Sims – have provided support and humour along the way. The support and patience of my parents, Clive and Sue, and my sister Claire has been above and beyond. Thanks also to my friends, from SN and Henry Road, who have kept me sane throughout. This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council – grant number ES/J500124/1. Without their financial support this thesis would not have been possible. 4 Contents CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Theoretical Framework – the history and construction of two- party politics, and its attempted disruption 6 CHAPTER TWO: Churchill and the Liberal Party, June 1945-October 1951 37 CHAPTER THREE: Heath-Thorpe Negotiations and a ‘Government of National Unity’, February-October 1974 70 CHAPTER FOUR – The Formation of the Lib-Lab Pact, April 1976-March 1977 104 CHAPTER FIVE – The Formation of the Liberal-SDP Alliance, June 1979-October 1981 139 CHAPTER SIX – The Blair Ashdown Project and Lib-Lab Politics, 1992-1999 169 CHAPTER SEVEN – Roads Travelled and Routes Forward 201 5 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Theoretical Framework – the history and construction of two-party politics, and its attempted disruption ‘Atkins: It doesn’t work, Michael. One party governs, and one party opposes. That’s our system. That’s this building. Two sides of the house, two sides of the argument, facing off against each other: the gap between the government and opposition benches the precise length of two swords drawn. Their tips, touching. We are not built for co-operation, Michael. You get the chance, we try and stop you. We get the chance, you try and stop us. That’s our way.’ This House, Act 2, Scene 4 (Graham, 2013) ‘Third parties are like bees; once they have stung, they die’, Richard Hofstadter (1955: 97) The most striking fact of the coalition government in 2010 was that it was so unexpected. The political actors involved seemed to be unprepared for the realities of a hung parliament. For many academics and commentators, the frenetic five days in May prior to the announcement of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition were, as Philip Norton (2011: 243) put it, ‘largely a case of muddling through’. But as the dust settled on the coalition negotiations, and primary accounts began to emerge from key figures involved in negotiations, this was less clear-cut. George Osborne and David Laws had, years prior to the 2010 negotiations, discussed the Liberal Democrats’ key demand of electoral reform in the event of a hung parliament (Laws, 2011). As ‘Cleggmania’ surged during the short campaign, William Hague took some of the press pack aback by openly discussing the prospect of a Liberal-Conservative coalition, in the event of a hung parliament (Macintyre, Interview 2016). Upon completing negotiations, Hague recounts telling his wife ‘I think I’ve killed the Liberal Democrats’ – suggesting, if the Conservative Party were operating in blind uncertainty, it was with a surer eye for the future than their coalition partners (Parker, Financial Times, 25/3/2015). The widespread assumption that the political DNA of the Liberal Democrats made them inherently politically compatible with the Labour Party was found wanting, and the parliamentary arithmetic alone could not explain their entrance into coalition government. This led to some key questions. To what extent can, or do, politicians look back to the past, or attempt to forecast and redefine the future, when they think about co-operation across party lines? Were the negotiating priorities of both parties in some sense structurally determined, or explained solely by the strategic impulses of the leaders and elite politicians negotiating the deal? And did the fact co-operation was taking place in Westminster, where majority governments are normal, mean there were other informal rules in play, shaping negotiations? The contention of this thesis is that these questions are partially answerable by looking back to when co- operation has been tried before, and finding out whether there are some recurrent themes in the way co- operation is talked about, and approached, by political parties in British politics. 6 Immediate academic discussion of the coalition was right to point out that, in the post-1945 context, coalition government was untested (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2010; Lee, 2011; Hazell and Yong, 2012). However, inter-party co-operation between parties had been mooted, attempted and discussed more often than this would suggest. So, while the constitutional and governance implications of coalition were largely unknown, the party politics of inter-party co-operation had much more recent precedent from which to draw upon. In cross-national and comparative work on co-operation and coalition building ‘the sordid tales of bargaining failure are rarely told’ (Strøm, 1994: 112). This is also true in the study of British Politics: the five case studies analysed in this thesis shed light on what are all, to varying degrees, understudied examples of mooted co-operation between political parties in Britain. Reconstructing chronological analytical narratives within each chapter therefore has its own clear empirical and academic value. Each case brings with it fresh insight into the inter and intra-party dynamics that affected the direction of the parties involved. Each, therefore, fills a lacuna in the study of British politics. Some of these cases ended in formal agreement; others in failure. But this thesis proposes a new analytical lens of analysis, that goes beyond identifying formal agreement. Instead, it a framework that tries to understand the strategic goals actors have when they entertain the idea of co-operation, and their interaction with the institutional and organisational impediments that effect their ability to achieve these aims. Existing Literature and Case Study Selection The case studies analysed within this thesis are primarily flashpoints where inter-party co-operation was ultimately not formally pursued; or, when squared with the interpreted strategic objectives of at least some of the elite agents that initiated negotiations, co-operation fell short in the change it brought about in the structure of British party politics.