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REPORT ON MISSISSAUGA TRAIN DERAILMENT AND EVACUATION

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EPY-.1E.DNESS CANADA PROTECTION CIVILE CANADh Iran Jackson, 2ième étage Jackson Build:nu, 2nd For rue Bank 122 Bank Street 122, (Ontario) Ottawa, Ontalo Ottawa I(1A 011‘16 MA OM 3 y/ie • FOREWORD

The following report has been drawn up from newspaper and magazine reports of the incident, from official logs and reports of government agencies involved, and from interviews with officials and experts who participated in the operation. The purpose is to provide an account of the actions taken in response to the threats posed, and to identify the existing and improvised emergency plans which were implemented. My thanks to the officials who vetted the four drafts that preceded this final version. This is presented as a working

document -- not a critique. It does not purport to be complete, as data from some of the participating agencies was not available at the time of its compilation. However, except in the area of volunteer services and other non-governmental input, the report provides a fairly comprehensive overview of the response. It is left to the emergency planning officials to review their respective emergency plans to determine whether they were adequate in terms of procedures, resources, manpower levels and expertise, and equipment. •

• REPORT ON MISSISSAUGA TRAIN DERAILMENT AND EVACUATION

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10

Mississauga, together with the City of Brampton and the Town of Caledon, constitute the Regional Municipality of Peel, with a total population of 437,000. Mississauga, which was formed in 1974, occupies the southern half of Peel Region and its 276,000 inhabitants are grouped in a cluster of communities separated by open spaces in relatively flat terrain. The inhabitants, mostly middle income, are young -- only 16 percent are over 45, and many are recent immigrants. The city has no built-up central core, nor slums. It is adjacent to Metropolitan Toronto, which lies to its North-east, and it has a number of cities neighbouring it to the West, forming the Regional Municipality of Halton. Lake Ontario provides its southern boundary, and Caledon, Brampton, and the Toronto International Airport are to the North. Within a twenty-five mile radius, the City of Mississauga is flanked by urban communities totalling more than 540,000 inhabitants to the West, 150,000 to the North, and 2,200,000 to the East. The Regional Municipality of Peel, which was incorporated on January 1st, 1974, provides the following services: Police, Water, Sewers, Welfare, Health, Waste Disposal, some Road services, and Financial planning; each of its three Municipalities provide the other services, including fire- fighting and engineering services.

Saturday, November 10th, was the beginning of a long week-end, Monday being a civic holiday. Cool late autumn weather prevailed without rain or snow or strong winds.

At 23:53.50 hrs, Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) train #54, consisting of 3 locomotives, 106 freight cars and a caboose, assembled in Windsor, Sarnia, and Chatham, and travelling through London to the Agincourt marshalling yards in Scarborough, was derailed in an industrial area in the middle of Mississauga at the Mavis Road level-crossing, 27 kilometers from downtown Toronto. The 9,050 tonne train %;ms 2 kilometers long. Thirty-nine cars were carrying dangerous commodities, and 23 were empty. (The order of the freight cars was in keeping with CTC regulations, i.e., at least five non-explosive cars following the locomotive, and five preceding the caboose. The remainder were in no set order.) The accident was attributed to an overheated journal bearing (hotbox) on the 33rd car, a tanker carrying toluene -- a flammable solvent. This resulted in the loss of a set of wheels at Burnhamthorpe level crossing, followed by a fire which ignited the liquid after the derailment, approximately four kilometers further east. A huge column of fire lit up the sky. Peel Police on duty at No. 11 Division (Dundas & Hurontario St.), and firefighters at Mississauga Fire Dept. Headquarters 1.6 kilometers away, noticed the flames, and immediately proceeded to the site to investigate. At 23:54.38 hrs, a Peel Police radio car reported to the communications room at the Peel Regional Police Headquarters, a large explosion and fire at Mavis Road. This was confirmed by a second police car at 23:56 hrs. The 9 Fire Stations in Mississauga were alerted by District Fire Chief Ross Kelly, and the first units arrived on the scene at 2356 hrs. (In 15 minutes, 55 firefighters were on the scene, and within the next half hour there were 110.) Eight pumpers, three ladder trucks and two rescue vans were deployed to contain the fire. A number of deluge gun nozzles were positioned approximately 18 meters - 2- from the flames. Initially, six 500 gallon per minute lines were used. The Halton-Mississauga Ambulance Control Centre was advised by one of its own ambulances of the disaster, and dispatched four ambulances to the site. Mavis Road was closed and by 2357 hrs, Police radio cars were already reporting having problems holding back sightseers.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11 (Remembrance Day)

At 0004 hrs, a Mississauga resident living at 1436 Freeport Drive, reported to Police Headquarters that two red hot train wheels had landed in his yard. At 0007 hrs, all units were instructed to keep vehicles away from the area. At 0009 hrs, a second violent explosion occurred, which blew a propane car to pieces, and caused considerable blast damage. The fireball and heavy debris travelled in a south-easterly direction. At approximately 0018 hrs, a third BLEVE ("Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion") in another propane tank car, hurled the car north-east 682 m. into an open area. The fire could be seen as far away as Niagara Falls and Peterborough. The front portion of the train had uncoupled itself when it derailed, the brake hose broke, and the train's brakes went on automatically, bringing it to an abrupt halt. The brake-hose valve on the 32nd car was closed by a crewman, which permitted the train engineer to release the air brakes and move the three locomotives, with 32 cars, away from the fire to safety in nearby Cooksville, 6.4 kilometers further on. Twenty-four cars had derailed. Of these, 22 were tank cars, 11 of which carried propane. Of the others, 3 contained styrene, 4 caustic soda, 3 toluene, 1 chlorine, and two boxcars contained insulation. All but one of the tank cars had lost their wheels and undercarriage on derailment. Ten propane cars were ruptured and burned, as well as the styrene and toluene cars. One propane car remained intact. The tank car containing 90 tonnes of liquid chlorine began to leak. (The remaining 64 cars were pulled back from the site some 18 hours later, as several had jumped the tracks.)

The CPR Despatcher's Office in London and in Agincourt were notified at the time of the derailment through the train radio system, and the CPR • emergency plan was immediately implemented. Its technical experts were alerted through 'telephone fan-out, and technical crews were instructed to converge on the accident site. The CPR procedures for "chemical emergencies" include calling local hospitals, police, fire , departments, the Environmental Protection Services of Environment Canada, Transportation Emergency Assistance Plan (TEAP), and the Canadian representative of the Bureau of Explosives, of the Association of American Railways. Mr. Nutkins, the Superintendent-in-Charge of the CPR Division, coordinated the CPR response. CPR derailment cranes were despatched from Toronto and Windsor.

At this time, Mississauga firefighters and ambulances, and Peel Region Police arrived at the disaster scene. Mississauga Fire Chief Gordon Bentley, on arrival at Fire Dept. Headquarters, alerted the Mayor, City Manager, Ministry of Environment (MOE), and TEAP in Niagara Falls. He also called up off-duty firefighters and requested the help of the safety officers of the local Gulf Oil Refinery and Ashland Oil Company. No. 11 Division units of the Peel Region Police were immediately dispatched to - 3--

• restrict entry of traffic to the site. The train manifest was obtained from the caboose car. As it was not very legible, Chief Bentley requested another copy from the CPR despatcher in Toronto. (This document identifies the types of cargo carried, and also outlines emergency procedures for derailments, explosions and fire.) The explosions had spewed wreckage 675 meters away, windows had been shattered in a 900 m. radius, and secondary fires set in sheds close to the tracks, and to buildings belonging to the Mississauga Parks and Recreation Department. A number of nearby factory and storage buildings were also damaged. A Peel Police patrolling duty Inspector, James Kimber, called in a description of the emergency to Peel Police Headquarters, and asked the radio-room sergeant to put the Peel Police Disaster Plan into action. This involved alerting the appropriate emergency agencies and technical experts. By 0008 hrs, both Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Ontario Provincial Police had offered assistance to the Peel Region Police. At 0012 hrs, a request was made for the Mobile Command trailer At 0019 hrs, Peel Regional Police Chief Doug Burrows was alerted, and picked up Deputy Chief Bill Teggart on his way to the fire.

The Halton-Mississauga Ambulance Service Dispatch Control Centre alerted the Metro Toronto Ambulance Service for help. Metro sent three emergency support units, including their emergency bus, and four ambulances -- which arrived at the site at 0035 hrs. By 0040 hrs, the Red Cross, St. John Ambulance, and Salvation Army had offered to assist. By 0100 hrs, Mr. Alan Duf fin, the Halton-Mississauga Chief Field Officer, and Mr. John Dean, General Manager, Metro Troonto Ambulance Services, had arrived on the site, • and a mobile command post was established to coordinate ambulance services. Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Port Credit Detachment personnel were on site from the onset. They were soon joined by members of the Downsview Detachment and assisted the Peel Regional Police Force. They also carried out the notification procedures contained in the OPP Disaster Procedure Manual. By 0315 hrs, a member of the OPP #5 District HQ was located at the Peel Region Command Post to coordinate OPP support which was drawn from 6 Districts.

The Peel Regional Police and the ambulance services established on- site emergency command posts just south of the site. Peel Region Command Post No. I was first established in a second floor office in the Domtar plant, located on Mavis Road, approximately .6 km. south of the derailment site. Superintendent Karl Barnhart was Officer-in-charge. The Peel Regional Chief of Police and his deputy arrived on the scene and assumed command at 0110 hrs. The first meeting included Police Chief Burrows, Deputy Fire Chief Art Warner, Chief Fire Inspector Cyril Hare. various CPR officials, two MOE representatives and some local chemists.

The Regional Municipality of Peel Peacetime Emergency Plan, the Emergency Fire Services Plan, the Spill Control Contingency Plan, as well as the applicable sections of the Toronto International Airport Disaster Plans and Emeràency Procedures, were implemented. Contact was made with TEAP's Regional Control Centres in Niagara Falls and in Sarnia. The Regional Office of EPS, Environment Canada, on being notified by the CPR despatcher of a • derailment involving "one tanker car of toluene", asked the Regional Atmospheric Environment Services to stand by. As further information on the derailment was provided, EPS in Ottawa was advised. Mississauga set up two fire command posts to cope with the emergency -- a fire control centre directed by Deputy Warner and Assistant Deputy John Hickey, and the headquarter's control centre where Chief Bentley coordinated efforts with his department and other emergency services and organizations which arrived to assist.

By 0100 hrs, the Mississauga Fire Department had three masterlines pumping water from hydrants on both sides of the train. The deluge guns pumping 2000 gallons per minute and the pumpers close to the fire were unmanned, except for periodic checks. The strategy was to cool the cars -- not to extinguish the flames, thereby allowing a "controlled burn" of the escaping gases to avoid possible explosions. When the Mississauga Parks and Recreation buildings and equipment close to the crash scene were damaged by the fragments from an exploding tank car, hydro lines were knocked down, cutting the current to the area. The Mississauga Municipal Services' ,fuel supply could no longer be used, as there was no electricity to activate the fuel pumps in the neighbouring Public Works yard. Brampton and Etobicoke Fire Departments maintained the disrupted supply, as well as backing up the Mississauga Fire Department with extra fire trucks, in keeping with the Emergency Fire Services Plan. Firefighters had to wear oxygen respirators to avoid the toxic fumes from the burning chemicals, and applied water and fog to the burning cars with deluge guns. Additional respirators were provided by the fire services of surrounding municipalities. The 284 firefighters from Mississauga and an undetermined number from surrounding Municipalities were involved. Ontario Hydro crews repaired the fallen high tension and secondary electric lines, thereby re-establishing electricity to the area.

At 0108 hrs, St. John's Ambulance and Mississauga Transit offered assistance.

At 0113 hrs, Bell Canada offered assistance.

At 0120 hrs, field representatives of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) were on site.

At 0130 hrs, a readable copy of the manifest was delivered by the West Toronto supervisor for CP Rail, and was checked against the serial numbers of the derailed cars -- this revealed that one of the cars contained chlorine. Chemical Engineers from CIL offered assistance. At 0147 hrs, Chief Burrows, after brief discussions with the Command Post members on the possible chlorine gas threat which would result from the explosion of neighbouring propane cars iupturing the chlorine tanker, and in consultation with Fire Chief Bentley at the Fire Control Headquarters, ordered the evacuation of the immediate danger zone. He arranged for notification of residents to evacuate. Police knocked On doors and used loud hailers to alert some 3500 residents who lived within 900 meters of the derailment, to evacuate. Superintendent Ken Sider was appointed on-scene commander. Superintendent Barnhart was put in charge of information control as press liaison officer. At 0134 hrs, Mayor Hazel McCallion was briefed by Police headquarters on the situation by phone.

At 0150 hrs, based on data from meteorologists and environmental scientists and technicians, Peel Regional Police Chief Douglas Burrows, gave • - 5 - the order to evacuate 8000 residents living immediately South and West of the derailment line (an area of approximately four city blocks in radiva of the site). Inspector J. Kimber was put in charge of the evacuation. At 0203 hrs, a Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) representative arrived at the site. At 0210 hrs, No. 11 Division Peel Police alerted Metro Police to help. On request, the Metro Toronto Police dispatched their sound trucks to assist in the evacuation notification to residents. Ambulance units were also utilized for this purpose. The Police Communication Centre made arrangements for the selection and establishment of evacuation centres for those who could not go and stay with friends and relatives in neighbouring municipalities. Mrs. Margaret Leslie, Chairman Mississauga Branch, Canadian Red Cross (CRC)Emergency Services, and the Salvation Army were alerted to arrange for the reception of the evacuees. Square One Shopping Centre, a covered shopping mall plaza next to the City Hall (2.4 kilometers NE of the site) was selected as the reception area. Mrs. Leslie contacted the Ontario Division CRC Emergency Services, which began to alert to "stand by" readiness, branches in adjacent areas. At 0457 hrs, the Peel Region Commissioner for Social Services, Mr. Jim Crozier, was alerted, as well as the Peel Health Unit. This was the beginning of a stage-by-stage evacuation of the City of Mississauga, based on the principle that those in the most immediate danger move first. The evacuation plan had been drafted by the Peel region authorities some 18 months earlier after a serious fire at a refinery tank farm which had involved some 5000 evacuees.

At 0200 St. John vehicles and personnel arrived at the site.

At 0215 hrs, the Provincial Ambulance Coordinating Centre sent a general call for ambulances in the surrounding area -- 139 ambulances and 300 ambulance workers arrived in the area within six hours, from as far as Niagara and Kingston (129 km. and 275 km. respectively). Twenty-seven other support vehicles were also provided, including the Metro Toronto Disaster Bus. Agencies supplying support vehicles included the Red Cross, TTC, Mississauga and Oakville Transit. At 0230 hrs, at the request of the Peel Region Police, the ambulances at the scene assisted in alerting the residents in the designated evacuation area and assisted in the evacuation of invalids. An ambulance also provided emergency medical services at the reception centre.

When the chlorine shipment was discovered, TEAP alerted CHLOREP (chlorine emergency plan) experts from the Chlorine Institute in the area. Five rail cars were burning some distance from the chlorine tank car. A Northwest wind was also blowing towards a residential area 1600 m. away. At 0216 hrs, Mr. Graham of the Ministry of Environment arrived at the Command Post. At 0220 hrs, CHLOREP teams -- notified by TEAP, arrived on the scene with their equipment from the Chlorine facilities plant of Canadian Industries Ltd. in Guelph and Markham. (They were replaced at 0700 hrs by Stu Greenwood and his team from Dow Chemical Company in Sarnia, which had also been alerted by TEAP.) These joined the CPR chemical emergency experts. It was impossible to take action to seal the chlorine tanker leak until the propane fires burnt themselves out. At 0230 hrs, • the Niagara Falls TEAP team arrived at the derailment site. At 0300 hrs, Metro Toronto Police Emergency Task Force Unit, despatched the Emergency Task Force Mobile Command Centre to the site with a provision of air masks. The mobile unit, with its communications, became part of Peel - 6-

Region Command Post No. 1.

At 0330 hrs, Peel Police asked the Salvation Army to provide a mobile canteen.

The firefighters continued to increase their water applications as more lines were added, and eventually 10 master streams were being applied through 13,000 feet of hose. Chief Bentley had contacted the Waterworks department to boost the water pressure.

At 0340 hrs, TEAP contacted CANUTEC, the Emergency Response/Information Centre of Transport Canada, for technical assistance and to locate equipment. (CANUTEC, like TEAP, provides cross-Canada access with 24-hour manning for assistance in transport of hazardous goods accidents.) MOE advised EPS of the latest developments. The Command Post warned the Mississauga, Queensway, and Etobicoke Hospitals regarding the threat of chlorine gas.

Contact was established with Atmospheric Environment Services (AES) of Environment Canada to get continuous reports on wind conditions. At 0350 hrs, a foam tender was despatched from Transport Canada's Toronto International Airport in answer to a request from Mississauga's Fire Chief. The Peel Region Industrial Waste group took water samples and warned the water treatment plant of chlorine readings.

At 0415 hrs, Peel Police Chief Douglas Burrows ordered the evacuation of a second area approximately 20.6 square kilometers -- bounded by ' Burnhamthorpe Road, Erindale Station Road, Queensway and Creeman Road. All Mississauga bus drivers were called to duty and public transit buses were used to shuttle people from the evacuated areas to the reception centres. Additional reception centres were opened to accommodatethe evacuees, and "s tand-by" branches of the Red Cross were activated on the basis of a branch to each new centre, and other volunteer organizations helped provide the emergency welfare services. Special police patrols were set up to watch for possible looters. Residents left on request by their own cars or transit buses. At the same time, police were stopping people from re-entering the evacuated area. By 0430 hrs, 35 members of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force had been deployed in the area.

At 0430 hrs, after a shift in wind direction, it was decided to move Peel Region Command Post No. 1. The Peel Police mobile command trailer, the ambulance, bus and fire headquarters were re-located on the north side of the tracks, about .8 km. from the crash site, next to the Bell Canada line-testing centre close to the corner of Mavis Road and Burnhamthorpe Road. (This post was operational at 0633 hrs.) The OPP mobile command headquarters trailer joined the other command trailers at the Bell Canada Centre. The Command Post subsequently expanded into the Bell Telephone Communications building itself, which considerably increased its emergency communications and meeting-room facilities.

At 0450 hrs, Ontario Ministry of the Environment officials, at the scene of the derailment, began alerting other Provincial officials, including the Solicitor-General. • - 7 - At 0454 hrs, Peel Police alerted the Chairman of Peel Region and the Mississauga Councillors, and at 0457, Chief Burrows alerted the Regional Councillors, Peel Region Social Services, and Mississauga City Engineers.

Chlorine gas was escaping. It was not, however, until much later that it was determined that most of the gas was being drawn up with the burning propane, whose flames rose several hundred feet into the air. (Out of 90 tonnes of chlorine, some 20 tonnes remained in the tanker when the fire column subsided, but the exact amount could not be determined at this time.)

At 0600 hrs, the Province, through the OPP (Peel Detachment) made a request to National Defence for respirators. Thirty-two Chemox respirators (oxygen masks) were obtained from Camp Borden and CFB Toronto. The OPP Deputy Commissioner Operations arrived on the scene at this time. The EPC RD was contacted by Allan D. Heath, the ADN of Occupational Safety in the Ministry of Labour, to assist in locating technical experts in the handling of PCBs, since it was thought that a PCB tank car was involved in the derailment. (The waybill information was not consistent with the location of cars in the train, so it was not possible to quickly determine if the PCB shipment was among the derailed cars.) The EPC RD located two officers with expertise in PCBs, but their services were not required when it was confirmed that no PCBs were present in the shipment. The PCB warning apparently came from the Police on the site.

• Solicitor-General Roy McMurtry, the Provincial Minister responsible for coordinating Provincial emergency measures, was notified of the derailment at 0600 hrs. The first four members of the Emergency Operations Control Group (EOCG) met at 0730 hrs. This included the Chairman of Peel Regional Council, Mr. Frank Bean, the Mayor of Mississauga, Mrs. Hazel McCallion, Peel Regional Police Chief Douglas Burrows, and Mississauga Fire Chief Gordon Bentley.

At 0600 hrs, the Ontario Division of the Red Cross had all nearby branches standing by.

At 0609 hrs, the OPP contacted CFB Toronto to request additional breathing devices. Twenty-seven Chemox units were located at CFB Borden and were dispatched to the disaster site with an OPP escort.

At 0620 hrs, the evacuated area was increased to include Queensway Avenue, Stillmeadow Road, Paisley Blvd., and Mavis Road. At 0630 hrs, three additional areas were evacuated due to shifting winds. At 0720 hrs, the evacuation was extended to Hurontario Street to the east, and by 0830 hrs, the area bounded by Burnhamthorpe Road to Hurontario Street (1110 Hwy), the Credit River, and the QEW was being evacuated. The Hospital Administrator of Mississauga General Hospital was advised to be prepared to evacuate.

At 0730 hrs, Metro Toronto's Mobile Command Unit was positioned next to No. 11 Division Police Station (corner Dundas Street and No. 10 Hwy) (Peel Region Command Post No. 3), and began implementing the procedures outlined in the Metro Toronto Police Emergency Planning Guide. (This guide incorporates the Police, Fire, Engineering Services, Medical Services, and - 8-

Welfare Disaster Plans.) Metro Police daily support over the next six days involved an average of 277 police per day, and 35 to 40 patrol cars and 21 mobile-sound trucks. The Metropolitan Toronto Auxiliary Police Force was mobilized and reported to Command Post No. 1, to support the activities of regular officers of both Metro and Peel Region Forces. By 1117 hrs, 125 Auxiliaries had reported. (At 0430 hrs on Nov 12, the Command Post No. 3 was moved to No. 12 Division Police Station at the corner of Dixie Road and Eglinton Avenue -- since it was expected that the chlorine car would explode. The Metro Mobile Command Unit was, accordingly, moved to the new site, and its communications were relayed through 22 Division to Metro's emergency network.)

At 0840 hrs, the North York Branch of the Red Cross sent a response team to the Square One reception centre to assist the Mississauga Branch, and set up a feeding post. By 0900 hrs, the four Metro Red Cross branches had also been called in to assist.

A Command headquarters was set up in the Ontario Division Red Cross offices in Toronto, where Brig. Gen. James F. Westhead, Ontario Emergency Services Chairman, supervised Red Cross operations and coordinated support roles by otherAgencies for 14 of the 16 reception centres which were eventually opened. The Ontario Division asked the North York Branch to resume responsibility for coordination at the Mavis Road command post. A North York Team set up a feeding station at 0915 hrs at the derailment site for the operational crews, and at 1200 hrs in the Bell Canada building, to provide meals on a regular basis for the EOCG and approximately 500 workers involved in the disaster response.

St. John Ambulance Corps established their own Control Centres, and their personnel were engaged in manning first-aid posts, caring for indigent evacuees, administering the two reception centres under their control, transporting handicapped evacuees, providing back-up to the Provincial Ambulance Service, distributing and collecting bedding, and arranging reliefs. The Salvation Army were involved in six reception areas, and looked after food services, clothing, and personal needs.

Staff Superintendent Jack Ward, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Chief of Metro Police, had the initial responsibility of coordinating the supply of personnel and equipment of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force to municipal and police authorities in Peel Region. A communications channel was cleared for use of radio *equipped mobile units operating in Mississauga, and dispatchers were assigned to coordinate the activities of officers using this frequency. By 1100 hrs, a mobile communications post was also established at the Westgate Plaza in Mississauga. Chief Harold Adamson, having been notified, assumed overall command responsibility for Metro Police's support role, and was in constant contact with his authorities, and with the Solicitor-General and the Mayors of Etobicoke and Mississauga. Mr. J.H. Pollard, Metro Coordinator of Emergency Planning, and Dr. G.W. Moss, Medical Officer of Health, City of Toronto, joined Chief Adamson at the scene of the derailment. Regular Force and Auxiliary Police of Metro were assigned duties related to traffic control, evacuation of residents from homes and hospitals, ambulance escorts, road blocks, property protection, and maintenance of communications links. Mr. Ray • Tomlinson, Metro Toronto Commissioner for Social Services, was also alerted at this time. - 9-

At 0730 hrs, Mr. Tom Cross, Director of Air Resources Branch, MOE, alerted the air sampling crews. The Contingency Planning Section of MOE was also alerted. At 0845 hrs, Mr. R. Graham, MOE Environmental Officer (Oakville), flew over the accident area with Police Chief Burrows and a police photographer.

At 0800 hrs, Major Herb Weber, Senior Staff Officer Operations, Central Region, at CFB Toronto, contacted the EPC RD and advised him of the Canadian Forces' participation. Further to the OPP request, an additional request had come from the Assistant Deputy Minister of Community and Social Services for blankets, sleeping bags, air mattresses, and food containers.

At 0830 hrs, Police Chief Burrows, in consultation with the members of the EOCG, issued a third evacuation order. This involved the evacuation of Mississauga General Hospital, Mississauga Extendicare Nursing Home, and Chelsey Park. A mobile communications unit was assigned to the ambulance service command post, to coordinate and communicate with the many ambulances involved in the hospital evacuation. There were 450 patients in the Hospital and 539 in the other two facilities. Two hundred and sixty-two of the hospital patients were discharged. The other patients were transferred to Toronto, and surrounding area hospitals and nursing homes. Evacuation of intensive care patients was given first priority. This operation started at 1006 hrs, and was coordinated by Inspector Lawson, Peel Regional Police Force, as the officer-in-charge of patient evacuation; by Mr. Armstrong, the Regional Ambulance Coordinator; by officials of the Institutional Division of the • Ministry of Health, and Health Services Consultant Branch, and was completed by 1315 hrs. The Ambulance Services Branch Communications Van arrived at the site by 0948 hrs. The Ambulance communications system was used to contact the hospitals, and the Ambulance.Disaster Plan was implemented, which involved identifying the recipient hospi tals,. availability of beds, etc. Hospital disaster plans and Ambulance district plans were also implemented, and the Ontario Medical Association arranged for specialists and medical volunteers to stand-by. The release of emergency health supplies from the Department of National Health and Welfare was also arranged. At 1540 hrs, the Solicitor-General, in consultation with the EOCG members and Hospital officials, then decided to evacuate the 280 patients in the Queensway General Hospital due to noticeable chlorine readings in the area. Eighty-eight were discharged, and by 1815 hrs, the others had been transferred to surrounding hospitals. (Some discharged patients could not go home since they lived in the evacuated area, or their families were gone for the weekend.) The hospital was completely evacuated, with 192 patients removed by ambulance and public transit buses. This was followed by the evacuation of 322 patients from three more nursing homes. The evacuation of the nursing homes was done with the assistance of the Toronto Transit Commission and Mississauga Transit.

Mr. Bob Frewin, Director of Information, MOE, arrived at the command post at 0925 hrs, and subsequently served as provincial government press liaison officer, and assisted in the preparation of press bulletins and organizing press conferences.

• Attorney-General/Solicitor-General Roy McMurtry arrived at the scene at 0928 hrs, and was briefed by the members of the EOCG on the situation. - 10 - • At 0940 hrs, the evacuation area was extended east to Camilla Road, and at 1110 hrs, to Cawthra Road, and at 1310 hrs, it was extended south to Lake Ontario.

The first mobile sampling unit of MOE (a van equipped with mass spectrometry and other sampling equipment), arrived at the command post at 1000 hrs, and was sent out to sample total hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen and sulphur dioxide. Shortly thereafter, two mobile air units, Taga 2000 and Taga 3000, began sampling of chlorine in the air.

Three computers provided by Dow Chemical Corporation, were programmed to constantly correlate data on weather, wind changes, types of buildings, population densities, and other factors in order to assist evacuation planning and decision making. At 1130 hrs, EPS Ontario Region, requested information on wind trajectory forecasts from Atmospheric Environment Services. The first wind trajectory results were supplied to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment about one hour and fifteen minutes later. (The computerized wind forecasts are made by the Canadian Meteorological Centre in Montreal, using a program which was implemented after the Three Mile Island nuclear incident last March, when the need for such a program was demonstrated.) AES also offered to supply accident site mini-sonde observations, and displayed mobile observing facilities at the command post for direct on- site measurement of vertical wind and temperature profiles. Short-term low-level wind and air stability forecasts were supplied at two to three hour intervals. From 1000 hrs onwards, EPS also had representatives at the disaster site. The EOCG was able to base its evacuation decisions on the information from these sources, and from the emergency response personnel from the Chlorine Institute.

At 1025 hrs, the Attorney-General, through the OPP, made a request to the Canadian Forces for 250 troops to assist the police. Lt-Col Smith, the Commanding Officer of the Lorne Scots (P.D.&H. Reg.), the local militia unit, assembled seventy members of his unit in Port Credit -- ready to assist if required. At 1420 hrs, the Solicitor-General advised Major Weber that the assignment of Canadian Forces personnel pursuant to Part XI of the National Defence Act (NDA) was no longer required. Since no authority had been received for militia involvement, the militia unit returned to the Brampton armouries.

At 1230 hrs, the first reception centre at Square One Shopping Centre was evacuated, involving the transfer of 1000 evacuees to the Sherway Gardens Mall in Etobicoke. At 1335 hrs, a further evacuation was carried out involving the entire area bounded by Burnhamthorpe Road (North), Cawthra Road (East), Lakeshore Road (South), and the Credit River (West), and at 1540 hrs, the area to be evacuated was widened to Dixie Road on the East, and Highway 22 in the West, and at 1725 hrs, further widened to Etobicoke Creek in the East. The evacuation area was expanded as unpredictable winds carried the threat - to other areas, necessitating the closing of the Sherway Gardens Reception Centre in Etobicoke at 1900 hrs. At 1845 hrs, a decision was made to extend the western boundary to Winston Churchill Blvd., and at 2016 hrs, the northern boundary was established at Burnhamthorpe Road, bringing to thirteen, the number of times the area had been expanded. • - 11 - The community was faced with the difficulty of housing thousands of people who were not able to be accommodated by friends and relatives, so several schools, shopping centres, and a giant convention centre were made available.

The main reception centre was re-located three times, and eleven smaller ones also set up, some of which were also closed and their evacuees moved, as the evacuation area was expanded. These reception centres, set up in the surrounding communities of Melton, Streetsville, Brampton and Oakville, included the following: Square One Shopping Centre in Mississauga (evacuated); Sherway Gardens in Etobicoke (also evacuated); the International Centre, Malton (housing 1200 evacuees); Streetsville Secondary School, Streetsville; Galaxy Club, Oakville; Sheridan College (2 campuses - Brampton and Oakville); Westwood Secondary School, Brampton; Morningstar Secondary School, Melton; Brampton Centennial Collegiate, Brampton; J.A. Turner Secondary School, Brampton, and W.J. Fenton Secondary School, Brampton. More than 600 volunteer helpers were provided by the Canadian Red Cross, St. John Ambulance, Salvation Army, Victorian Order of Nurses, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Service Clubs and Lodges, Humane Societies, Church groups, and other community organizations (126 agencies all told), and by private citizens to carry out registry and inquiry services, feeding, clothing and lodging services, and personal and administrative services of all kinds. In addition, many citizens in answer to radio requests, opened their homes to evacuees and their pets. • Thirty to forty thousand persons went through the reception centres, the others choosing to go directly to privately arranged temporary accommodation. (Evacuation centres served mainly as temporary way-stations for most evacuees.) More than enough food was provided free by neighbouring commercial establishments and the public, and collected by volunteer organizations. (According to the Red Cross, 125,000 meals were served, and refreshments and snacks, almost continuously.) The Police and Ontario Humane Society arranged for the feeding of pets left behind in the evacuation. At the request of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, the Red Cross, ànd St. John Ambulance, the Canadian Armed Forces provided 1499 sleeping bags, 823 air mattresses, 10,358 blankets, and 36 thermal-food containers (for hot food) for the reception centres. Health and Welfare Canada participated in coordinating emergency health and welfare requirements and remained on stand-by for further assistance. Drug depots were also set up to dispense free prescription drugs. Despite the large numbers evacuated, reception centers never had more than about 3000 persons on hand at any given time.

At 1900 hrs, on decision by the Mayor of Oakville and his Police Chief, and the administrators of the Oakville-Trafalgar Hospital and Oakville Extendicare Nursing Home, the 468 patients in these two institutions were evacuated to Hamilton and Burlington hospitals. Federal Emergency Health Services (EHS) equipment and supplies were used to expand these facilities. By midnight, this operation was completed. It was also decided that the Town of Oakville between Winston Churchill Blvd. on the East, Dundas Street on the North, and Maple Grove Avenue on the West, be evacuated.

• In 19 hours, three large active-treatment hospitals and six nursing homes, containing almost 2000 patients, had been evacuated without a single untoward event. (This included ten intensive care patients, and 62 patients who had to be moved twice.) This had been achieved with - 12 -

resources from Federal, Provincial and Municipal agencies, the facilities of approximately 25 hospitals and nursing homes, and ambulance and public transit services from 25 communities outside the evacuated area.

(Bell Telephone emergency crews responded to land line needs of reception centres and control centres, and these were established and changed as the need arose.)

At 1600 hrs, the amateur radio operators emergency network was activated for round-the-clock operations (Ontario Section - American Radio and Relay League (AFFL)). At 1900 hrs, they were asked by the Red Cross to assist in establishing communications between reception centres and Red Cross Headquarters, as telephone lines were completely jammed. Twelve stations were established, including a "net control" station which were manned by 175 operators on 6-8 hour shifts. There were two operators in each evacuation ' centre, and five at Red Cross Headquarters. (The network operations were carried on continuously (operators taking leave from their normal work to do so), and terminated at 2359 hrs Wednesday)). The COMSONT net, involving 60 stations, was also in operation, passing emergency messages between Municipalities throughout the Province, and with U.S. networks.

The EPC RD was in contact with the Director of Emergency Health and Welfare Services in Ottawa, as well as the ADM for the Ministry of Community and Social Services. He was also in touch with officials in the Ministries of the Solicitor-General, Labour, Health, and Natural Resources, and with Federal and Provincial Departments of the Environment, with Transport Canada, DND, the RCMP, the CTC, and with Metro Toronto and Peel Region officials, as well as EPC HQ and the PCO. He also responded to Media and public inquiries (including the 3 main Toronto newspapers and 6 radio and TV stations, including the CBC), and assisted several disaster research teams from Canadian and American universities.

At 1500 hrs, a number of RCMP officers reported to the Peel Regional Police which had overall police responsibility for the area. The evacuation area was patrolled by the 609 uniformed officers of the Peel Region Police Force (approximately 200 per shift), reinforced with Metro Toronto Police (95 per shift), OPP (65 per shift), and RCMP Police (52 per shift), Halton Regional Police, and C.P.R. Police (10 per shift), totalling approximately 500 officers on duty at any given time, to cordon off the area, to alert the residents (by door-to-door calls and by patrol cars equipped with bull horns or public address systems), to control traffic, man roadblocks, and to patrol the area using cruisers, as well as a helicopter equipped with floodlights for night patrol to prevent possible looting, and to assist in coordinating hospital evacuation and ensure order and security in reception centres. Police also processed some 50,000 telephone inquiries and assisted Humane Society representatives in feeding pets left behind by the evacuees. (Ontario law permits firefighters to remove people forcibly who are at risk, but the police do not have, in law, the same authority. However, the police were able to prevent access to the evacuated area, by roadblocks, etc.) The final authority for evacuation and re-entry rested with the Provincial Government. DND had a force of 250 on standby in London, to move in on Provincial request to support police action. Provincial Environment Ministry provided ten air pollution experts with air monitoring machines to measure toxic content. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) had - 13-

• issued a Notification to Shipping on the Great Lakes to stay clear of the area (at least two nautical miles offshore), due to the danger of chlorine gas. Air Traffic Control (ATC) restricted air traffic in a three mile (NM) radius of the derailment site, and prohibited flights below 2700 meters. (Two private planes and an OPP helicopter were allowed in the restricted air space to take photographs for emergency operations.)

Radio and TV coverage was given from the time of derailment, with round-the-clock operations during the following days -- providing information and serving as message transmission centres. Several stations implemented contingency plans for increased coverage and increased staffing. Toronto's CBC station suspended regular programming at 11 p.m., November 11, and for more than 12 hours, carried special news reports and also messages from families who had been separated. The CBC had four crews out in the field. Some radio stations set up live broadcasting adjacent to the , command compound and both Global and CFTO-TV brought in remote units for live telecast reports from the derailment site. The Mavis Truck Centre building opposite the Bell Telephone building was used by the media. Canadian Press (CP) rented a trailer also for media use, and positioned it beyond the police lines.

By day's end, approximately 2000 persons had been transported by ambulance from hospitals and nursing homes. A total of 240,000 residents of Mississauga had been evacuated by private cars and transit buses. Evacuees were mainly lodged with friends and relatives, at hotels within the entire • Metropolitan area, or in evacuation centres. (No more than 1500 persons stayed overnight in the reception centres.) The restricted area covered approximately 96 sq. km . (60 square miles). No serious injuries or mishaps were reported. The Fire Department had consolidated its hose lines and the equipment actually fighting the fire had been reduced to six pieces. Some 5000 gallons per minute were being directed on the wreckage to cool the tankers.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12

Commuter trains and highway traffic which normally went through the evacuated area, were re-routed. Highways in the area were closed by the OPP at 0600 hrs, including the Queen Elizabeth Way (QEW), No. 5 Dundas Street, Bloor Street, Burnhamthorpe Road, Lakeshore Blvd., and Hwy 427. Entry and egress to the Mississauga-Peel Regional area would be by No. 401 Hwy and Eglinton Avenue.

In keeping with expert advice, the decision was made to allow the propane fire to burn itself out, rather than have the flames extinguished. At 1000 hrs, there were still three or four propane cars on fire west of Mavis Road, some distance from the chlorine tanker. These fires were all under control. Procor Ltd. of Oakville, prepared a steel patch to cover the 68.5 centimeter hole in the ruptured tank car, in order to keep the chlorine under pressure in liquid while being transferred to tank cars. • Throughout the day, CF Rail rescue crane and crew was at work, removing the boxcars and tankerswhich had not derailed, and clearing up as much debris as possible without disturbing the chlorine tanker and the propane tankers - 14 - • surrounding it. The steel patch could not be used to seal the tanker because the tank had been deformed by extreme heat and stress.

Parts of Metro and Hamilton were put on alert as a precautionary measure. At 1200 hrs, the CBC erroneously reported that evacuation of Etobicoke residents had started. Advice from experts in the Chemical industry was relied on heavily by the emergency control centre. Several of these were provided by the companies involved, others by industry emergency response groups, e.g., TEAP, and others through Government emergency response agencies such as EPS and CANUTEC.

At 1545 hrs, the Assistant Deputy Solicitor-General confirmed that the Canadian Forces troops would not be requested to assist the police, as sufficient police reinforcements had been provided, but advised that there was an urgent need for additional air pack respirators. At 1625 hrs, the military advised that they had located 85 respirators and 65 boxes of spare cannisters in Halifax. These were airlifted to Downsview and were available at the disaster site by 0340 hrs on November 13th.

At 1610 hrs, the Attorney-General met with representatives of the MOE, Police Force, Fire Department and with Chemical Technicians to consider the problems of sealing the chlorine tanker and resulting risks involved to the community.

As soon as the large scale evacuation was ended, the detailed operation of the reception centres was stabilized. This was the beginning of the reception phase of the evacuation. Registration and Inquiry was continued, as well as the additional placement of evacuees from the centres to private homes. As a result, by late evening, reception centres had been reduced to eleven in number, 10 of which were under the supervision of the Red Cross and one by St. John Ambulance. These were: Centennial School, J.A. Turner School, Dolphin School, and Sheridan College in Brampton; Streetsville Secondary School, Vic Johnston Arena, 101 Legion Hall and Moore Lodge Hall in Streetsville; M & M Robinson School in Burlington; Sheridan College in Oakville and the International Centre, Dixon Road in Malton. The task of feeding was undertaken by the Salvation Army in many of the Centres as well as preparing hot food in the International Centre for distribution to other Centres. Feeding the emergency operational staff in the disaster area involved an average of 600 hot meals every 8 hours, plus hot and cold drinks and snacks needed continuously. This task was shared by the Red Cross and Salvation Army with some help from commercial food operators.

Throughout the night, all vehicles leaving the Peel Region evacuated area were stopped and searched by the Police in view of reported break and entry occurrences in the area.

(Police were also alerted to the breakout, at 2000 hrs, of 18 inmates from the Maplehurst Correctional Institution, a minimum security facility, in neighbouring Milton, Ontario.) • • -15 - TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13

The propane flames died out at 0230 hrs, and fire equipment at the scene was reduced to four pieces. Further attempts were made to seal the chlorine leak.

At 0810 hrs, three persons were arrested for breaking into 3 homes ($ 100,000 stolen property).

At 1100 hrs, Metro Toronto Ambulance Services began returning 154 patients to Queensway Hospital, and the Halton-Mississauga Ambulance Service began returning patients in Oakville. Municipal buses were also used for this operation. Service supervisors and coordinators had maintained location records on all patients to ensure their return to their respective institutions. Medical records had also accompanied each patient.

At 1200 hrs, the Canadian Forces troops in London were stood down.

At 1300 hrs, a meeting of the responsible officials was held at the Command Centre to decide whether it was safe for evacuees to return to their homes. New boundaries were set for the evacuated area as follows: Dundas Street (North), No. 10 Hwy (East), QEW (South), and Credit River • (West). At 1510 hrs, Solicitor-General Roy McMurtry announced the beginning of re-entry of evacuees into peripheral areas (Burnhamthorpe Road (North)), Cawthra Road (East), QEW (South), and Erin Mills Road (West). This was the beginning of the repatriation phase of the evacuation. This included the evacuated portions of Oakville. At 1600 hrs, arrangements were made by Halton Ambulance Services to return by ambulance and bus, 169 patients to the Oakville Extendicare and Sheridan Villa nursing homes. This was completed by 2040 hrs. At 2042 hrs, the boundaries of the restricted area were established as Burnhamthorpe Road (North), No. 10 Hwy (East), Lake Ontario (South), and Credit River (West). By late evening, 110,000 evacuees had returned home, and the number of reception areas reduced to six.

That evening in Ottawa, John Magee, Chairman of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee of the CTC, told the Commons Transport Committee that an overheated journal bearing had caused a tanker car's wheels to come off 2.4 km, before the train derailed. Transport Minister Donald Mazankowski announced that the CTC would hold a full public inquiry into the derailment beginning on December 4th. (The Minister subsequently advised that the matter would be the subject of an independent judicial enquiry.) • - 16 - • WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14

ool

As the reception centres closed down, National Defence began to gradually withdraw the material it had provided. The air packs were also returned to Halifax (being required for a naval exercise).

A 32 sq. km . area of Mississauga remained restricted, and the three main hospitals which had been evacuated, remained closed. The still- restricted zone was bounded by Burnhamthorpe Road (North), Hwy 10 (East), Lakeshore Blvd. (South), and Erin Mills Parkway (West).

In the morning, brisk winds slowed down the operation to seal the chlorine leak. Operations were temporarily suspended while alternate methods were examined. People in the Southwesterly direction were warned of a possible further evacuation. There were reports that chlorine was being detected in the air samples in Port Credit.

Arrangements were made by the Municipal and Provincial Government authorities and the CPR, to house as many people as possible in hotels. The Red Cross, through special registration arrangements with 13 hotels and with Mississauga transit buses, managed to empty all but bdo centres. St. John personnel took part in these operations and established a first aid post in the Royal York Hotel. As all hotels in the Metro area were booked, the International Centre and Sheridan College in Oakville were forced to remain open an extra night. Red Cross personnel were also despatched to the hotels to look after the personal needs of the evacuees, as many had few necessities with them, and were without money. CP Rail officials announced that they would open a claims office in Mississauga the following Monday to begin paying "reasoriable out-of-pocket expenses" of displaced residents. (A class-action lawsuit was considered by a number of evacuees for costs incurred and lost income.)

At 1045 hrs, the return of patients to the Oakville Hospital was commenced.

At 1200 hrs, a special meeting was called by the Solicitor- General, at which it was decided not to allow the remaining evacuees to return home for at least another night because of the difficulty experienced in capping the chlorine tanker. This was followed by a press conference. A request formulated at the meeting was also conveyed by Graham Scott, Deputy Minister of Environment, to the EPC Regional Director for transmittal to Ottawa, regarding the need for the presence of a senior federal official on the site; the attendance on-site of an outside scientific advisor; and additional backup crews. This request was transmitted to EPC HQ for urgent attention.

Commissioner John Magee and his technical advisor, Will Kovaskewich, Manager of CTC's Dangerous Commodities Assessment Division, flew from Ottawa to the derailment site in the evening. They conferred with the officials at the site and held a press conference.

The transfer of propane was completed, and the empty cars were purged and removed from the derailment scene by late evening. All • - 17 - remaining patients had been returned by ambulance and bus to the Oakville- Trafalgar Hospital and the Queensway Hospital without mishap between 1045 hrs and 2000 hrs.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15

At 0230 hrs, it was estimated that 20 to 45 kilos of chlorine was escaping each hour.

At 0815 hrs, the media reported that large pockets of chlorine gas had been found in the Credit River valley area, and all personnel on duty in the evacuated area were warned. By 0930 hrs; the report was discounted.

The steel patch could not be fitted tightly over the ruptured hole in the chlorine tanker. It was replaced by a neoprene air bag pressed over the aperture by a timber mat secured by chains, which eventually sealed the tanker. About 20 tonnes of liquid chlorine was estimated to remain in the tanker. A layer of ice, which had formed inside the tanker, added to the problem of emptying it. This was resolved by applying a liquid line below the ice and a vacuum line above it. Chlorine fumes were drawn from the tanker and pumped into a container of another chemical to neutralize them. It was also essential to draw • the gas off to lowerthe pressure on the patch. At 0410 hrs, the pumping was started. Radiography was applied to measure the levels in the tank car and tank truck during the pumping operation. At 0630 hrs, six firemen were removed to Queensway Hospital suffering from the effects of toxic fumes. By 1150 hrs, most of the chlorine had been pumped into trucks and transported to Toronto. In the process, one firefighter was hospitalized and seven others checked at the emergency clinic for inhalation of chlorine gas -- and subsequently declared to be in satisfactory condition.

Commissioner Magee and his technical advisor attended the meeting at the Peel Command Centre in the afternoon, and at the press conference which followed, Mr. McMurtry announced that the remaining 120,000 residents could not return that night and that there was no degree of certainty that the state of emergency would end the following day. It would depend on favourable wind conditions, i.e., north to south.

Four specialmedical centres were set up in Mississauga for people who had lost touch with their family doctors because of the emergency.

At 2200 hrs, the Provincial Headquarters of the St. John Ambulance Brigade issued a stand-down order to its members, having completed 11,763 hours of voluntary services in the past five days. This had involved 470 members from Provincial Headquarters, 5 Areas and 14 Corps, using 61 mobile units. They had served as ambulance drivers and attendants, nursing • assistants, registrars and missing persons investigators, kitchen help, baby sitters, guides, entertainers and couriers. - 18 - • FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16

Most of the caustic soda and toluene had leaked out in the ground, contaminating the soil in a wide area. The 14 tonnes of caustic soda which remained were drained by emergency crews during the early morning hours, using X-rays tomeasure the transferred liquid in the tank car and tank truck. While the transfer was in process, there was a delay in allowing remaining evacuees to return to their homes. Around noon, the Solicitor-General, Roy McMurtry, the Mayor of Mississauga, Hazel McCallion, Police Chief Burrows, and Peel Regional Chairman Frank Bean met with dozens of experts, including some from as far away as Sweden. At 1500 hrs, an announcement was made that 90,000 out of the remaining 120,000 evacuees would be allowed to return home, but six remaining tonnes of chlorine in the tanker meant that those closest to the site must wait. By late afternoon, another meeting had been convened by the Solicitor-General and Regional Police Chief, to decide the fate of roughly 33,000 who lived nearest to the disaster site. The borders of the restricted area were now Burnhamthorpe Road (North), #10 Hwy (East), QEW (South), and Credit River (West). At 1920 hrs, most of the chlorine having been safely neutralized, the Solicitor-General announced that all remaining evacuees could return to their homes. While CPR, under the supervision of the Canadian Transport Commission, removed wreckage, the chlorine tanker was not disturbed until the liquid chlorine had been completely removed and the empty car purged. At 1945 hrs, the City of Mississauga was re-opened. Police removed all roadblocks. Only the derailment site remained out of bounds. By late evening, re-entry was completed. At 2300 hrs, the International Centre was closed. By midnight, Metro Police, the OPP, and the RCMP personnel had completed their tour of duty in support of the Peel Regional Police. Forty-four charges had been laid by police during the six day evacuation, which corresponded to that of a single normal day. There had been no looting, or cases of rape.

Planning for the return of the remaining evacuated hospital and nursing home patients was completed, confirming location, transport arrangements, timing, etc.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17

At 0400 hrs, the Metro Toronto Police Force communications post was closed. The remaining evacuees still lodged in hotels also returned.

At 0700 hrs, return of remaining evacuated nursing home patients commenced. St. John personnel of the Halton-Peel Corps continued to assist the Provincial Ambulance Service in returning hospital patients, nursing home patients, and indigent evacuees to their hospitals or homes. By 1700 hrs, Chelsey Park and Extendicare Nursing Homes were totally re- occupied. • • - 19 - The Salvation Army ended its emergency feeding services with the serving of the noon meal. Division Command then stood down their JI participation which had involved 150 persons working in 3 shifts. They had assisted in 6 reception areas, served 20,600 meals, provided boxes of clothing and other necessities, and operated coffee canteens continuously by 7 mobile units, and provided counselling services, as required. The Salvation Army Band also helped keep up morale in the reception areas and at hospitals.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18

At 0800 hrs, the return of the patients to Mississauga Hospital commenced, and was completed by 1750 hrs.

The Red Cross emergency support operations were finally closed. Fourteen Branches had been involved, and approximately 300 Red Cross volunteers had participated in the operation. Nine thousand and fifty person had registered at the reception centres, 36,485 meals were served to evacuees, and over 36,000 to emergency services personnel.

At 1900 hrs, the AES disaster site atmospheric monitoring was stood down. By 2000 hrs, the majority of the staff of the Halton- • Mississauga Ambulance Service had returned to their homes.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19

At 0430 hrs, the chlorine car was iinàlly empty.

At 0710 hrs, the purging of the tanker started.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20

The last ambulance on stand-by at the disaster site was finally released by Mississauga Deputy Fire Chief Warren at 0730 hrs. Twenty- five Southern Ontario ambulance services had provided 159 ambulances, with a staff of 651 persons to transfer patients and provide emergency vehicles.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21

The last piece of fire equipment left the site at 1028 hrs on November 21st -- the Mississauga Fire Department having been on the • scene for 250 hrs and 33 minutes. Beside containing the fire, the fire- fighters had taken measures to contain the chlorine gas and accumulations of explosive vapours from the fire scene, maintained floodlighting during nine nights, covered chemical pools with foam and sand, attended - 20-

to the natural gas pipelines and service in the area, provided water protection for propane removal and purging of tanks, for cutting torch operations, for chlorine and caustic removal and neutralizing, provided material and manpower to assibt the chemical crews and provided fire- related advice to the command centres. Much of the equipment of the Fire Dept. had been used around the clock for six days, and suffered as well from the effects of the chemicals present.

On November 30th, the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Planning Advisory Board met under the chairmanship of Chief of Police Harold Adamson. The role played by Metro Toronto was reviewed and reported upon by the heads of services involved. A critique and de- briefing meeting was also being prepared by Peel Region Police, and several Agencies were preparing reports on their participation.

Interested Agencies from the United States and Europe were also sending representatives to collect first-hand information on how the response had been carried out.

COMMENTARY

Not a single fatality had occurred, despite the massive explosions, toxic gases, and large-scale evacuation.

The success of this large-scale operation was due to:

a) very professional pre-planning -- tested in a number of recent emergencies, including an air crash and a refinery tank farm fire, and expertise in improvising solutions to problems encountered which were not covered in.disaster planning manuals;

b) the fortuitous location of the accident -- which occurred in an industrial area in the city, relatively unpopulated, but having all necessary access roads, fire hydrants, and a Bell Telephone exchange 500 yards away;

c) very favourable atmospheric conditions -- moderate temperatures, favourable to outdodr activity, moderate winds, etc.;

d) the timing of the derailment -- midnight on the 1st day of a long week-end;

e) the extraordinary public response;

f) the efficiency of the police, fire and health services; • - 21 - g) the proximity of the emergency resources and services of large urban centres; and

h) the complete cooperation of the media in reliably informing the public continuously throughout the event.

Emergency Planning Canada (Ontario)

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HE 1783 .C2 R47 1979 Report on Mississauga train derailment and evacuation

DATE DUE SLIP

1 9 APR 2007

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