H».
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1972
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF GEORGE STANLEY MCGOVERN
Robert Edward Rosenthal
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 1979
Approved by Doctoral Committee
Graduate College Representative ii
ABSTRACT
This rhetorical analysis examined the 1972 Presi
dential campaign of George Stanley McGovern. Several
variations of dramatistic methodology were utilized to
criticize McGovern's campaign image. The analysis demon
strated that McGovern had become trapped by his "non
political" campaign image and by his moralistic rhetoric.
This resulted in a "paradox of purity," a rhetorical
problem which was the result of the candidate's failure
to comprehend and to use the inherent ambiguity of
language.
This study also classified the rhetoric of both
McGovern and Nixon during the campaign according to the
Weaverian liberal/conservative paradigm. It was found
that Nixon, the "Priest" of the present, generally argued
from circumstance, the argumentative form Weaver believed
to typify the political liberal. McGovern, the admonishing
"Prophet," was seen to be idealistic, basing his rhetorical
appeals in the fundamental righteousness of the American
people. Weaver argued that such arguments from genus are
typical of the political conservative.
McGovern’s greatest failure in his campaign rhetoric
was his inability to grasp the idea that language ambiguity
is the very essence of the democratic process. ■ 111
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The creation of a dissertation is an act of love.
It requires much of the individual student in terms of time and effort, taxing one's creativity and durability
to the limit. It also demands much from the student's
family and friends in terms of guidance, patience and understanding. In these next few paragraphs I would like to attempt to thank those individuals who have contributed to the completion of this dissertation.
My committee, Dr. Bernie Sternsher, Dr. Donald
Enholm, Dr. Jim Wilcox and Dr. Tom Rickey provided guidance when a strong hand was needed. A special thanks to Dr. and Mrs. Rickey, who accept graduate students into their home as if they were family. Dr.
Rickey was always willing to help, from improvements suggested in my scholarship to eliminating the "slice" from my golf swing.
Every doctoral fellow needs not only an advisor but also a person who will take the time to ease him into the world of academia. Luckily, I found one person who filled both roles, Dr. Raymond Yeager. He and Mrs.
Yeager have treated me as a son during my years at
Bowling Green and beyond. "Doc" has been the greatest iv
positive influence throughout my many years of education.
I have been grateful for his fatherly advice on all
matters, both during the writing of this document and
in my years in the classroom. I will treasure our friend
ship the rest of my life.
Even a doctoral student must have moments of relaxa
tion. On those golden summer evenings we became the
"Boys of Summer," the "Rickey's Raiders" softball team.
Together we maintained our sanity by becoming the best
ballclub on campus. In the inherent intensity of graduate
education, we gladly poured ourselves into the game,
relishing hits, RBI’s and home runs as if they were pub
lications. Thanks, Raiders.
Special thanks are due to a number of close friends:
To Ralph Carbone, Casey Stengel’s understudy, for long nights discussing rhetorical and argumentation theory
over his mother's wonderful care-packages of Italian
food; To Marty Feeney, the best shortstop in softball*
for all of those afternoons in the library spent musing
over rhetorical criticism while wondering if "Tableux
Vivants" was the name of a French pastry shop in Toledo.
To Norb and Jean Mills, the best dancers in all of
Northwest Ohio, for days of relief on the golf course and V evenings of plain fun at "Tony Paco's;" To Keith Semmel and John Williams for making the office an infinitely better place (not to work in, but in which to enjoy people); To Mark and Judy Rubright and Steve and Karen
Griesinger for being themselves; To all of the Forensic- types in Debate and in IE for a few moments on the moun tain-top; and to Fred Voss, for planning New Year's Eve on July ¿K, for letting me sit on his desk, and for being one of those individuals who make my life better.
Shakespeare expressed my sentiments when he noted, "I am wealthy in my friends."
Throughout my years of scholastic endeavors, my family has always supported me. My deepest appreciation to all of my aunts and uncles and cousins, especially to my aunts Mary and "Reg" and to my uncle Tony. This work belongs to them and to my other relatives as much as it does to me.
Thanks must also be given to my grandparents. They came to this country years ago to make a better life for themselves. It is only because of the courage and deter mination of August Rosenthal and William Gorski and the strength of my grandmothers, Emma and Mary, that our family has become part of American society. I
vi
There is no way I can adequately thank my wife, Rita.
Her encouragement during the course of this dissertation kept the work on course. Her understanding with my moods and my late hours changing our life-style and her com- . passion during those frustrating moments when writing is impossible were acts of love. The day we were married has been the happiest day of my life. Rita suffered as much as I did in the composing of this dissertation, and she deserves a great share in the credit for its completion.
Finally, my sincerest appreciation to my brother,
Gary, his wife, Donna, and my parents, Helen and Ed. My parents had a vision of a life for their children that included as much education as they could possibly receive.
They sacrificed personal luxuries in order to send both myself and my brother to the best possible universities.
I only hope .that in obtaining my degree I have somehow fulfilled one of their dreams.
Since I cannot possibly thank Rita, Helen and Ed for all they have meant to me, I dedicate this dissertation to them. I hope that sharing in this labor of love will somehow serve to express my sincerest gratitude. vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION...... 1
Justification...... 2,
Review of the Literature...... 6
The Primary Campaign...... 6
The Eagleton Affair...... 8
The Presidential Campaign...... 11
Methodological Considerations...... 21
The Definition of Rhetoric...... 24
The Nature of Man and Society...... 25
The Dramatization of Politics...... 26
The Critical Perspective...... 27
Individual Methodologies and Chapter Outlines...... 31
Preview of Chapter II...... 32
Preview of Chapter III...... 37
Preview of Chapter IV...... 46
Notes for Chapter I...... 48
CHAPTER II: THE EAGLETON AFFAIR...... -57
Historical Overview...... 58
Eagleton: Catharsis through Mortification...... 64 viii
Page
The Dilemma of George McGovern...... 91
The Resignation...... 112
Aftermath...... 122
Notes for Chapter II...... 127
CHAPTER III: MCGOVERN'S IMAGE AS A FUNCTION OF CAMPAIGN ISSUES: THE POLITICIZATION OF AN ANGRY PROPHET ...... 136
The Real Majority...... 137
Policy Issues...... 148
Economics...... 154
Vietnam...... 171
Personality Issues...... 192
Leadership Issues...... 209
Nixon''S Campaign Image...... 212
The Projected McGovern Image...... 215
Specific Failures of the McGovern Strategy...... 217
Summary of the McGovern Image...... 223
Notes for C hap ter III • • • • . . • • • •.... • • •. • • •.. • • • .231
CHAPTER IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...... 243
Analysis of the Methodological Approach...... 243
Definition of Rhetoric...... 243 ' ix
Page
The Nature of Man and Society...... 246
The Dramatization of Politics...... 249
The Critical Perspective...... 250
Conclusions Regarding McGovern's Rhetorical Approach to the Campaign...... 254
Notes for Chapter IV...... 262
A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 264 I CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
Robert F. Kennedy once referred to him as "the most decent man in the Senate."^ His roots run deep in the
2 fertile soil of rural South Dakota, an area in which the
spirit of populism survives even in a nation dominated by 3 the politics of metropolitan sprawl. In another, perhaps
more colorful era in the history of the United States, he
might have shared a speaker's platform with William Jen
nings Bryan. Like most populist presidential candidates
before him, he spoke of a return to the fundamental values
of American society. And like his political forefather,
George Stanley McGovern, the Democratic Party's "neo
populist" presidential candidate in 1972, lost the elec
tion by the second largest popular-vote landslide in the
history of the United States.
Why were McGovern's campaign appeals unsuccessful in
gaining voter approval at the polls? What factors in the
McGovern campaign image could have caused him to carry but
one state, the Commonwealth of Massachussetts, and the
District of Columbia? This dissertation examines the
McGovern campaign from a rhetorical perspective in an
effort to account for the tremendous defeat suffered by
the nominee of the Democratic Party in the 1972 election. page 2
Justification of the Study
This study may be justified for three reasons:
(1) the illumination of the rhetorical dimensions of a political campaign; (2) the study of a contemporary poli tical rhetor; (3) the refinements in the dramatistic methodological approach to rhetorical criticism,
(l) Illumination of the Rhetorical Dimensions of the
Campaign
"The Report of the Committee on the Advancement and
Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism" concluded that rheto rical critics may study the "suasory potential or persua sive effect" of many different phenomena:
So identified, rhetorical criticism may be applied to any human act, pro cess, product, or artifact which, in the critic's view, may formulate, sus tain or modify attention, perceptions, attitudes, or behavior. 6
The rhetorical critic may be seen as utilizing his insight to analyze and evaluate a situation that "needs and invites discourse capable of participating with the 7 situation and thereby altering its reality." Such broad boundaries easily include the criticism of a poli tical campaign, for in the months prior to the actual election day there are numerous instances of candidates positing different interpretations of various situations vying for public approval. Political campaign studies page 3
are of import to the field of rhetoric, and this particu
lar study may be cited as a partial answer to Chesebro's
plea that, "In speech-communication we may be some twenty
years late, but perhaps it is now appropriate to act as if
'we have direct business with politics,' as Karl Wallace,
noted."
Why has the McGovern campaign been selected for
particular scrutiny in this study? The presidential cam
paign of 1972 witnessed a rare clash of sharply opposed
personalities and issues. Indeed, "rarely had two candi- 9 dates given Americans sharper choices." Examination of
the rhetorical strategies involved in this campaign may
lead to both a greater understanding of the motivations
underlying the McGovern rhetoric and a further illumination
of the process by which voters' perceptions of the candi
dates operate as a function of the rhetorical strategies
employed by the combatants during the campaign. Addi
tionally, rhetorical analysis may yield something about
how we as Americans view ourselves and our society.
This particular election is of interest for another, more particular reason. Beginning with the nomination bid of Senator Eugene McCarthy in 1968, fresh, idealis
tic, college-aged youth began a strong first-hand in
volvement in the democratic process. McGovern rallied
these purveyors of the "New Politics" around his image page 4
as the anti-war, anti-establishment figure. His slogan,
"Come Home, America," was a call to simpler times - to an
age in which morality would seemingly play a key role in
the American scene. Thus the campaign of 1972 is of par
ticular interest to the rhetorical critic "because it Saw
the rise of and the demise of a rhetorical vision in the form of the ’New Politics.'"^
(2) Studying a Contemporary Political Rhetor
Even if the issues of 1972 were not responsible for
major polarizations within the electorate, the persona of
George McGovern, liberal Democrat, is of interest in this
election for two reasons. First, as Bormann explained,
"The rhetorical strategy which undergirded the McGovern
vision was an emphasis upon the drama of character.
Such an overt concentration upon the candidate's image merits scrutiny in and of itself. Was McGovern rejected by the electorate because his campaign emphasized the
character of the candidate as one of its major themes?
Second, as a direct result of this emphasis on
character by both McGovern and Nixon, "Both national parties as they presented themselves to the American people in 1972 had come, by no one's design, to reflect ■ 12 the wills and the personalities of the two candidates."
This total dominance over the national image of the Demo
cratic Party by its candidate for the presidency merits page 5
critical inquiry, especially in light of the traditionally
heterogeneous nature of the Democrats. How could the sym
bol of the prairie populist come to dominate the Democra
tic Party?
(3) Refinements in Methodology
Finally, this dissertation may be justified through
its utilization and development of the dramatistic approach to rhetorical criticism. As demonstrated in the
section of this chapter detailing methodological consi derations, this study combines parts of heretofore uncon nected dramatistic methodologies. These combinations aid
in further clarification and crystallization of the
McGovern campaign image, the nature of campaign rhetoric, and the methodologies themselves. In this light, the
specifics of the criticism are not as important as are the formal contributions the methodological approaches make to rhetorical theory.
The enduring contributions of cri ticism to rhetorical theory are the discovery of forms that permit and evoke participation, of processes that transcend argumentative contro versies and immediate situations, of transformations that restructure perceptions and create new perspec tives, or syntheses of substantive- stylistic strategems that form genres of rhetoric, and of archetypal forms of interaction. 13 page 6
This study is justified on both critical and theore tical grounds. It adds to our knowledge of the 1972 campaign through the analysis of the McGovern rhetoric.
It further contributes to the understanding of dramatism in general, and the methodologies utilized in particular, through the relationship between theory and practice.
Review of the Literature
A careful review of a wide variety of publications both in and out of the field of speech communication re veals three dissertations and nine journal articles that 14 • are relevant to this study. Apart from Winson's dis sertation, "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for Re-election in 197^»”1^ the other dissertations and the nine articles may be categorized under three headings: (1) The Primary Campaign; (2) The
Eagleton Affair; (3) The Presidential Campaign. Winson's study of McGovern's senatorial race in South Dakota in
1974 is not within the scope of this study.
(1) The Primary Campaign
Semlak's dissertationused a "Fantasy Theme Analysis" to further understanding of the McGovern image during his quest for the Democratic nomination for president in 1972«
He found that McGovern's image as projected by his campaign strategists was that of a "neo-populist," and that this image "chained-out" through the electorate in the many page 7 primary campaigns entered by the candidate.This argu ment receives attention in a later chapter of this Study as it is used to demonstrate in part the problems
McGovern encountered with his campaign image. Semlak concludes with the Democratic Nominating Convention of
1972« which is where the current study begins.
McMurray's dissertation focused on the role of the
"Equal Time Law" in the Humphrey-McGovern debates during the California primary.1^ Again, the primaries are not of the time-period under consideration in this study, thus the effects of the equal time provision in this particular primary battle are not important to this rhetorical analysis of the McGovern campaign.
Devlin concerned himself with the canvassing tech niques used by the McGovern forces in the Rhode Island 18 primary. The thesis of the article is that McGovern's
"strength as a campaigner came more from his interpersonal communication than from his stump speaking." In order to obtain this more personalized appeal while not over burdening the candidate himself, the McGovern staff utilized surrogates to make personal house-calls and telephone canvasses in many states that had primary elections. Devlin noted that, in general, the canvassing techniques were successful in informing voters about
McGovern. The author warned, however, that if voters page 8 already have knowledge of the candidate, the canvassing 20 technique's effects would be minimized. This was probably the reason for the ineffectiveness of this particular strategy during the later national campaign in which McGovern had become a nationally prominent figure.
Essentially, the literature analyzing the primary campaigns of McGovern aids in setting the scene for the critical inquiry into the presidential election that autumn. These works are utilized in later chapters for background information, demonstrating inconsistencies, consistencies, and trends in the McGovern campaign effort.
(2) The Eagleton Affair
There are two articles which examine the rhetorical aspects of the Eagleton scenario. Bormann used a
"Fantasy Theme" approach to analyze the tarnished McGovern image in the aftermath of the candidate's rhetorical bum bling of the affair. Bormann found that a
fantasy chained throughout the elec torate and the role that the McGovern persona played in the fantasy as it was participated in by large segments of the American public was one of an inconsistent, inept, untrustworthy and politically expedient politician ...the damage done to a rhetoric based on persona was considerable. 21
While this dissertation agrees with Bormann's con clusions, his analysis is limited to the Eagleton Affair.
This dissertation goes beyond this one problem to discuss page 9
other damaging scenarios which clouded the McGovern cam paign image. Indeed, the image itself was to be a focal point for discussion that autumn.
Patton examined the Eagleton scenario as a "rheto rical situation," contending that "the central exigence 22 of the campaign shifted to the issue of integrity."
He argued that Eagleton was chosen as McGovern’s running- mate largely because "Eagleton was perceived as a ’non- 23 controversial figure.’"
Patton also stated that the "shift to integrity as the crucial exigence occurred almost as soon as Eagleton .24 was recommended to the convention for nomination."
He found that it was viewed as "inconsistent" for McGovern, as the champion of reform, to hand-pick the party’s 25 nominee for Vice President.
The assumption that Patton has made is that the choice of Eagleton was the result of a logical, if some what "shady" procedure. What actually transpired was a series of telephone conversations with other, more 26 sought-after candidates for the position at hand.
Eagleton was only considered seriously for the post when the deadline for submitting a choice to the convention was but minutes away and none of the other possible nominees had responded favorably to the inquiries of the
McGovern staff. page 10
Patton attacked McGovern’s poor analysis of his audience, arguing that "the activist audience concep- 28 tualized by the McGovern Strategists" placed the presi dential candidate in a position from which he "clearly failed to perceive the import of the Midwestern world-view 29 which became personified in the Eagleton phenomenon."
Said global view held the character of the candidate as being more important than the issues of the campaign.
In a later chapter this study will agree with
Patton’s essential position that McGovern had misanalyzed his audience. The problem, though, is not that McGovern failed to emphasize character in the campaign, for he had raised it to the level of an issue to be presented before 30 the public in an overt fashion. Instead, McGovern's dilemma stemmed from his over-emphasis on character.
He was portrayed as the "neo-populist" candidate who was 31 "above" politics. A campaign based upon character must present a consistent image. The paradox was that McGovern had to make certain key political moves in order to be a serious national candidate, but his image either pro hibited him from making those moves or negated their effects. These arguments are expanded upon in later chapters.
Bormann and Patton demonstrated the broad impact of the Eagleton Affair upon the McGovern campaign image. 1
page 11
This dissertation goes beyond the scope of these articles
to demonstrate that the breakdown of the McGovern image
was due to a number of causes and that these other pro
blems would have been enough to scuttle the campaign
effort.
(3) The Presidential Campaign
The bulk of the articles are concerned with the
McGovern campaign itself or with facets of it. Trent
and Trent examined the traditional expectations of the
challenger, placing McGovern's lack of success at the
polls as a function of his failure to fulfill those 32 '• expectations. They declared that:
Unlike most successful challengers, McGovern (1) proposed specific solu tions to problems, (2) did not rep resent the middle ground of beliefs within the party he represented, (3) tried to change rather than reflect the electorate's values, (4) did not emphasize optimism in his speaking, and (5) did not delegate the making of personal attacks on his opponent. 33
This dissertation again goes beyond the scope of the
article under consideration. McGovern was specific in his proposed solutions to societal problems; he did not
represent the middle of the Democratic partyC he per
sonally attacked his opponent. These points are con
sidered in later chapters in an explanation not of the
fact that he did these things, but more importantly, page 12 why he chose such a radical strategy and the subsequent effects of that strategy upon his image. McGovern was driven by desires for the waging of a "perfect" campaign - an election in which specific programs are offered to the people, essentially making it a plebiscite.-^
The Trents portrayed McGovern as calling for radical changes in American values, citing his refrain from his acceptance speech, "Come Home, America," as evidence of such radical rhetoric. The Trents commented that the speech called for a total change in American values, yet
McGovern's campaign theme, based upon the spirit of
"coming home," actually represented a "rhetoric of restoration." The change was not toward uncharted waters; it was a beacon to lead the nation to a safe return to familiar shores through the reaffirmation of traditional
American values. McGovern wished to bring forth the good that was inherent in the American people. The candidate had set the tone for his campaign when he stated, "I want the country to find - not necessarily a new set of values - but a way to square our practices '■3 5 with the nation's enduring principles."-^
McGovern’s campaign appeared to be the reincarnation of the populist politics of an earlier era. Some felt that "McGovern's campaign will be old-fashioned, searching back to the founding fathers for mottoes (sic) with which page 13 to face the future."'’ The prestigious British journal,
The Economist, editorialized that in September there "was a flavour of real prairie populism" in the McGovern cam paign. The Senator was not so much concerned with radically changing American values as he was with getting us to come to grips with our national heritage.
Thus while it is agreed that McGovern was not a can didate in the mold of a Dwight Eisenhower, a Richard
Nixon, or a Lyndon Johnson, he was a candidate in the tradition of a Robert La Follett or a William Jennings
Bryan; he was a candidate in the populist tradition, mixing morals and politics in his campaign appeals. One of the concerns articulated in the third chapter of this work is that as McGovern attempted to utilize the stra tegy of a different, more conservative political per spective he fell into a "no-win" situation. He was per ceived as a reformer and a moralist, and any deviation from that position in order to garner additional votes could and eventually would shake the confidence of those supporters who had followed him because he seemed to be a populist candidate.
Linkugel and Coday, while noting that McGovern
"seemed to understand women’s issues as defined by 38 feminists," argued that "women's issues, as set forth by contemporary feminists, were hot sufficiently important page 14 enough to female voters in 1972 to affect the outcome of 39 the election." This may well have been due to the over riding concern for the resolution of the Vietnam conflict, an issue of global concern. It may also have been a result of McGovern's emphasis on personal morality during his campaign, a strategy noted earlier and expanded upon in the third chapter. ,
Linkugel and Coday, while concerned primarily with the female electorate and women's issues in 1972, do present a manifestation of one of McGovern's primary political problems, that being faulty audience analysis.
In Chapter Three it is suggested that McGovern’s entire campaign strategy was designed to reach an audience that simply did not exist in numbers sufficient enough to carry a presidential election.
Part of the responsibility for this faulty analysis may lay in Smith's claim that, "During the campaign dis- ■ organization continued to plague McGovern's speech writing 40 staff." Smith's brief mention of McGovern's speech staff was merely one facet of the overall problem of campaign mismanagement: "...no one coordinated the ideas of the campaign, the themes of the campaign, the tele vision of the campaign, the travels of the campaign."
"'George McGovern,' said Gary Hart (campaign chariman),
'just doesn't understand organization. He has an page 15
inordinate inclination to take every phone call. It flows 4? from South Dakota politics."
Black's article, "Electing Time," views the 1972 43 presidential election through the metaphor of time. 44 While characterizing Nixon as "the man for no seasons,"
a figure without personal history, Black defined McGovern
as a neo-populist who typically "projected a strong sense
of place and local tradition. He was, of course, the
prairie man in his flat, unhurried twang, his simple sen- 45 tences, his confidence in his own rectitude."
According to Black, McGovern's fatal flaw was 46 "insincerity" in his approach to the Eagleton situation.
He remarked that many "true believers" were turned away when their prophet made what were seen as political moves
that were not in keeping with his image. Consequently,
McGovern's basis for support among the electorate dwindled.
But was that support sufficient to win the election prior to the Eagleton scenario? It is argued later that perhaps McGovern’s fatal flaw was that he had misanalyzed his audience; that the target of his appeals was either
too small to vote him into office or did not exist out
side of the mind of the candidate. Expansion of the scope
of analysis through the utilization of different drama- tistic methodologies adds insight into the McGovern image page 16 and further explains the reasons for the Nixon landslide that November.
Simons, Chesebro and Orr criticized McGovern’s role within the "Peace Movement," concluding, among other things, that "McGovern's lopsided defeat also constituted a repudiation by the American people of ’The Movement’ 47 upon which his candidacy was built."
"The Movement" referred to by the authors is ad mittedly a lose-knit faction they describe as "that amor phous array of 'peaceniks,' student activists, civil rights and black power advocates, feminists, radical intellectuals, environmentalists, Hippies, Yippies, and 48 many others..." The authors align these disparate groups because they seem to have
found common cause in their opposi tion to America's prevailing norms, values, and practices, and in their willingness to work outside esta blished institutional frameworks for societal and political change. 49
While "The Movement" was tenuously linked togather by the authors, its association with the McGovern campaign was even more ephemeral. The authors presented McGovern as the spokesman for "The Movement," precisely because McGovern
"personified so much what 'The Movement' stood for.
It is at this point that the links between McGovern and "The Movement" are questionable. Simons, Chesebro and page 17
Orr placed McGovern as spokesman for the social group based upon his verbal association with it and the media’s references to McGovern as being the candidate of "The
Movement." However, it is questionable whether the mem bers of "The Movement" ever officially joined the McGovern camp, indeed, McGovern's association with the "new life style," anti-war groups was made primarily by the press.
McGovern identified himself with 'The Movement' in May, 1972...While popular magazines often recognized the McGovern/'Movement' association prior to the 1972 Democratic Conven tion, the association became a de fining characteristic following the convention...Televised coverage of the convention persistently under scored McGovern’ s ideological and popular alignment with 'The Move ment • as well.51
Based upon McGovern's own association with "The
Movement," a rhetorical definition concurred with by the press, the authors concluded that this social group was 52 repudiated when McGovern lost the election. In their conclusions, Simons, et al., suggested several "conjec tures" arising from their analysis:
(1) For a number of reasons, move ments that enter the electoral fray are not well suited to the task of winning the plurality required of the Presidential aspirant; (2) Par ticipation in electoral politics undermines a protest movement's rationale for using confrontational tactics; (3) Even if a protest move ment's candidate is elected, he is page 18
unlikely to implement its program for change once he is in office; and (4) A movement is likely to sever the relationship between its strategies and ideology - means and end - when seriously competing in a Presidential campaign. 53
The major assumption made by the authors is that
"The Movement" had actually entered the Presidential race behind McGovern. Evidence was given that McGovern had linked himself to the anti-war cause and that the media had emphasized that theme, characterizing McGovern as their spokesman. But nowhere in the article do the authors demonstrate that "The Movement" actively entered the election by backing McGovern. And even if it were true that some members of "The Movement" were with
McGovern's delegates at the convention, there is evidence that the candidate lost some of this meager support that they had given to him after he had mishandled the Eagleton 54 Affair. While attempting to focus upon the perspective of "The Movement" regarding this campaign, the authors linked those social groups to McGovern through the rhetoric of the candidate and of the press, and not through the perspective of "The Movement." Both the links and the conjectures of the authors are apparently based upon some questionable assumptions. It Was McGovern who was rejected by the electorate. Any implication beyond that statement of fact was questionable. page 19
Finally, Fisher viewed the campaign of 1972 as pre
senting two versions of the great American myth: the materialistic version, as embodied in Richard Nixon, and the moralistic impulse, represented by George McGovern.
To Fisher, Nixon's victory suggested a corresponding vic tory for materialism in that he felt that it demonstrated that Americans currently see themselves in a materialistic paradigm, dangerously repudiating the moralistic side of their nature. In other words, Fisher contended that the election results indicated a change in the character of the American people.
In this case, Fisher's characterization of the elec tion is a bit too apocalyptic. This may not have been a watershed election in the sense of determining the nation's morality. For one thing, Fisher assumed that all of the people who voted for Nixon voted for the Republican can didate (in a positive sense) and not against McGovern.
The author characterizes the election results as, "The ■ ^6 overwhelming endorsement of Nixon..." The simplicity of this viewpoint is not supported by this study. Indeed,
Black "played-down" the dialectical nature of this campaign when he noted that:
There is an irregular rhythm even to the public's persuasibility, and periods of feverish believing and disbelieving alternate in our his tory with periods of privacy and page 20
quiet. We have been, through this campaign, on the downward curve of such a fluctuation. This is a rhetorical resting-time. 57
It appeared that the American people were simply-
exhausted from the changes of the sixties and wished to
rest. This does not demonstrate that Americans had repu
diated their moralistic impulse, but rather that they
wished to take time to recover from the marathon of
change of the previous decade.
The literature previously presented may embody some
interesting criticism of the McGovern campaign, but it
does not concern itself with the analysis of the McGovern
campaign image. This dissertation breaks the image into
several areas, demonstrating how it appears as a function
of both political scenarios and campaign issues. This
study also demonstrates how a campaign image may itself
become an issue in the election.
The research centers around the motivations behind
the McGovern rhetorical strategies. In particular, it
demonstrates how different strategic perspectives lead
to different definitions of political scenarios and cam paign issues, and how these in turn combine into that nebulous set of generalizations that comprise the image
of a candidate during a national campaign. page 21 / ■ Methodological Considerations
In a 1976 essay, Chesebro analyzed five different rhetorical conceptions of politics and the place of sym- ■ ^8 bols in each. Working under the assumption that,
"Symbol using and symbol-management have traditionally been viewed as potent instruments in the acquisition and 59 exercise of political power," Chesebro examined the con ceptualization of symbols in the Machiavellian, Iconic,
Ritualistic, Confirmational and Dramatistic approaches to the study of politics.
In the Machiavellian conception of politics th d nt of v . '"'''re thei-jdetormxnant cpf power if force.,.-. ; symbolssareiconceived,rin this approach, to be decisively divorced from and irre levant to political acts whenever forced physical compliance is employed as a means -of controlling and governing qthers...Inrppactice, the approach ulti mately ^diminishes, if not completely dismisses, the imports of symbols, in political•assessments...Bluntly put, such -analyses assume that symbols are ornaments or symptoms of previously secured power. 60
The Machiavellian approach does not lend itself to the study of an American Presidential campaign, for an election is based upon freedom-of-choice. Democratic consent is the determinant of political power, not "forced ..il physical compliance." ' T f ' '■ O-' . if . . The Iconic approach too considers "power and symbols to be discrete factors...Symbols thus possess social
• i page 22
meaning but are mere reflections of, and cues to, poten
tial power manipulations.Symbols so constituted
"are typically cast as pictorial representations of
physical force which reinforce or alter attitudes, beliefs, and actions."62
Chesebro believes that the Iconic approach may be
best used by the critic "in order to reveal inobvious
rhetorical forces operating within a political system."
Such "forces" may include military parades, government
monuments, and the national flag. The emphasis of this
dissertation does not include consideration of the iconic
function of political symbolization. We are herein con
cerned with McGovern's rhetorical strategies, considering
these strategies to be more than a "mere relection of,
and cues to, political power manipulations."
The third perspective, Ritual, "emphasizes the often
redundant and apparently superficial nature of political 64 acts." Politicians are seen as manipulating signs to
create symbols, and "these symbolic manipulations are generally treated by scholars of political communication
as redundant distractions which conceal substantive
social problems and issues."Ritualistic assessments
reveal the ways in which the power relationships are to 66 be perceived functionally." In the third chapter the
Ritualistic perspective is combined with a Dramatist ic page 2.3
approach to analyze how a non-traditional candidate
attempted to deal with the ritualistic hurdles of the
presidential campaign trail.
The fourth approach Chesebro delineates, the Confir-
mational perspective, requires that
critics initially identify the appa rent or understood intentions and purposes of particular political agents and institutions, and then attempt to determine or to measure the degree to which the symbols associated with particular policies and tactics have reinforced or al tered electoral endorsements...In this view, for example, a national election is cast by the critic as an opportunity for voters to con firm or disconfirm existent autho rities. 67
This is a critical perspective which is not neCes- 68 sarily exclusive from the Dramatistic approach. For
example, an election may be seen as confirming or dis-
confirming a particular agent, purpose, or group of acts.
This position is incorporated into the Dramatistic per
spective utilized in the third chapter.
The final conceptualization of politics is the Dra matistic approach. Here politics is viewed as "a totally
symbolic construct defined, sustained, and altered by the 69 way in which people use and are used by symbols." This is the basic theoretical construct which is the groundwork
for the methodological approaches used in this dissertation. page 24
Like most theoretical perspectives, "A symbolic con ception of politics is grounded in a series of assumptions regarding the nature of reality, language, and the indivi- 70 dual." Some of these assumptions are self-explanatory, while others require additional theoretical support. To-x gether, these assumptions form the basic critical perspec tive for Dramatistic analysis. The foundation common to the methodological perspectives used in later chapters will be presented below. Specific grounding will be demonstrated as each methodology is introduced indivi dually later in this chapter.
(1) The Definition of Rhetoric
Rhetoric is
rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that \ is wholly realistic, and is contin- ' ually born anew; the use of lan guage as a symbolic means of in- ducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols. 71
This definition allows the critic the freedom to examine the rhetorical aspects of phenomena other than written and oral discourse. The scope of rhetoric may be seen as being all that has meaning. "Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is 72 'meaning,' there is persuasion." This definition allows the critic to study all types of symbolic forms. page 25
(2) The Nature of Man and Society
Basic reality is...cast as a form less and meaningless mass: human needs generate selective percep tions and ultimately organize and structure the basic reality in which people operate. 73
It is in this way that man symbolically molds order
out of chaos. Indeed, "the vocabulary...is a way of
sizing up reality."' As societies become more complex,
the symbol system becomes even more important.
In complex cultures, the symbol sys tem may be the only tool which tran scends the limits of culturally di verse life-styles, classes, organi zational hierarchies, and unique personalities. Thus, the symbols system may ultimately provide the common features creating and sus taining the social and political community. 75
Due to this cultural emphasis on symbols, the utili
zation and management of language and other symbolic
forms becomes essential to the political process. Poli
ticians naturally seek to manipulate various political
scenes in their favor; they obviously do so through the
use of language. The motivation of an action by a poli
tical actor may be ascertained by an examination of the
symbolic choices he has made, for language is "the critical moment at which human motives take form."^ A rhetorical analysis of campaign rhetoric may thus make judgments as
to the motivations of appropriate political actors. page 26
(3) The Dramatization of Politics
In light of the symbolic nature of man and society,
Dramatism offers an excellent critical perspective from which to approach politics.
Dramatism is a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human motives is via a methodo logical inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their func tions. 77
In this dissertation a political campaign is analyzed, the ultimate in democratic action. Burke noted that "any study of human relations in terms of action could to that extent be called ’dramatisticHence, study of the actor McGovern in the action of the political scene or scenes of a campaign for the presidency easily lends it self to dramatistic criticism.
Additionally, Merelmen has argued that, "First and most fundamental, all drama is concerned with conveyance 79 of impressions to a group of auditors." Certainly, political actors are ultimately judged by the electorate
(auditors) on the impressions they convey (their campaign image).
Of course, like any actor confronted with an audience, a politician may or may not convey positive impressions to the electorate. Although political actors may attempt page 27 to persuade their audiences of particular interpretations of themselves, the issues, and other events of the cam paign, "in drama, outcome does not equal input." An actor
cannot guarantee what his act will mean or what roles will be assigned to him and others as a result of his action. The factors that deter mine these consequences are outside the scope of any individual actor and do not bear a precise relation ship to the physical forces mobi lized or the real nature of the elements employed. 80
When the rhetorical presentation of image is success ful, the candidate is usually elected. This dissertation
Is concerned with why the McGovern rhetoric failed to build a positive image for the candidate. In essence, then, this study traces the rhetorical reasons for the defeat of George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election.
(4) The Critical Perspective
The critical perspective detailed below entails a brief preliminary explanation. It consists of multiple aspects of dramatism; individual methodological approaches to dramatistic analysis which serve to demonstrate the flexibility of the parent theory and the interrelation ship of the particular methods of rhetorical criticism.
The unique combination of critical points of departure utilized under the "critic-as-artist" paradigm enables page 28
this dissertation to gain new rhetorical insights into
political campaigns in general and McGovern’s search for
the Presidency in particular. Brockriede added Insight
to this perspective when he noted that:
If a critic accepts the fundamental premise that each rhetorical act or process is unique,; that dimensions interrelate In a way to create a unity never acheived in the past or in the future, then he commits him self to a search for a new way to select, structure, and weigh dimen sions for each new act he criticizes. 81
The operationalization of this paradigm within this
dissertation may be witnessed in the combination of the
Ritualistic, Confirmational and Dramatistic critical
points of departure.
The Definition of Rhetorical Criticism
This critical perspective is not necessarily a
recent phenomenon. Indeed, Thonssen and Baird fore
shadowed such a critical approach When they noted that
"a rhetorical judgment embraces all the knowedge in the 82 critic’s possession; it draws upon his total resources."
For a critic to accomplish the task of opening up an arti
fact he must allow his creativity to surface. This drama
tistic approach to criticism provides such creative' "room."
If the critic must indeed draw upon all of his know ledge, then he must also realize that he is inextricably bound by his own set of scenic experiences: page 29
The critic, historian or not, is controlled and influenced by his or her immediate culture; critics offer rhetorical assertions about what they selectively perceive something to be, and what relative value and role they believe an event fulfills within a society. 83
Thus the critic does not create the ultimate inter
pretation of a phenomenon. Truth being relative, the
critic presents arguments supporting his interpretation;
good criticism Is then based upon sound arguments. In
this light, the critic must realize the relativity of
his value judgments. This admonishes the rhetorical
critic to focus on experience itself, setting aside com- 84 parisons with the "objective world." This is a function
of the principle of selective perception discussed above.
This perception of criticism lends itself to the
"critic-as-artist" paradigm. "The 'critic-artist’ is a
rhetor who, by taking audience into account, phrases his insights, analyses, and judgments in a way that orders or reorders, the rhetorical event."85 The "critic-artist" conception requires that "mind and experience must be drawn on creatively to form coherent views of the pheno- 86 mena of discourse." Because he is limited by his scene, the critic must operate as an artist, and while objectivity maybe important, he must inevitably yield to the observation that he above all is a rhetor, interested page 30
in methodically ordering or reordering rhetorical pheno
mena in order to make it more meaningful to his audience.
The definition of rhetorical criticism under which
this present study is undertaken had been carefully chosen
to allow for the creative "room" necessary when adopting
the "critic-artist" paradigm. For the purposes of this
study, rhetorical criticism will be operationally defined
as "an interpretive activity involving the application of
representational/constitutive schemas to rhetorical
On phenomena." ' Using this framework, "any characterization
of an object is necessarily a characterization in terms
of an observer's taken-for-granted schema (critical con ceptions in this case)."88
This definition of rhetorical criticism allows for
the use of different variations of the dramatistic per
spective. If the critic is scenically bound and charac
terizes phenomena according to "taken-for-granted
schema," then it would appear to be best if a number of variations were used in order to concentrate the criticism upon obtaining new and/or additional explanations and
evaluations of the artifact(s) under consideration.
Such a definition of rhetorical criticism allows for a blending of variations of the dramatistic perspective which are suggested when the "critic-artist" immerses himself into his pool of information. Scott and Brock page 31 noted that "fresh concepts and strategies, as well as different combinations of the old, must evolve if the go critic is to do his work well." 7 It Is hoped that the combination of dramatistic methodological variations outlined below and in subsequent chapters will add not only to our knowledge of the McGovern rhetoric but also contribute to the evolution of dramatistic theory and criticism.
Individual Methodologies and Chapter Outline
This dissertation considers the rhetorical dimensions of the presidential campaign of George Stanley McGovern from July through November of 1972 (from the winning of the nomination through the day of the election). Addi tional information from beyond this time-frame will be presented when necessary for a greater understanding of the phenomena under discussion.
The nature of the methodological approach to this study allows for the combination of various dramatistic variations of critical inquiry in the attempt to further the analytical and evaluative understanding of the rhe torical aspects of the McGovern campaign. The remainder of this dissertation is divided into three chapters as follows: page 32
Chapter II: "The Eagleton Affair"
This chapter is concerned with the explanations, strategies, and motivations of Thomas Eagleton and George
McGovern as these political actors attempted to advance different definitions of the scene in which they found themselves. The chapter is divided into two sections.
The first part concerns the rhetorical approach of Eagle ton, the doomed vice-presidential nominee. The methodo logical perspective utilized is that of Burke's "Inter locking Moments." From Order through Guilt to Victimage and Redemption:
Here are the steps In the Iron Law of History That welds Order and Sacrifice:
Order leads to Guilt (for who can keep commandments) Guilt needs Redemption (for who would not be saved) Redemption needs Redeemer (which is to say, a Victim)
Order Through Guilt To Victimage (hence: Cult of the Kill). 90
The lack of "order" is the imbalance caused to the campaign by the Eagleton Affair. Because man is "rotten 91 with perfection," he is motivated to return to a state of "order." To this end, a victim must be established to either function as a scapegoat or to mortify himself.
"The 'scapegoat' becomes another kind of 'representative,' page 33 92 in serving as the symbolic vessel of certain burdens."
The scapegoat is the "'vessel’ of certain Unwanted evils,
the sacrificial animal upon whose back the burden of 93 these evils is ritualistica.lly located." ■ On the other hand, a victim who mortifies himself demonstrates "a
scrupulous and deliberate clamping of limitations upon the self."9^
In this section concerning Eagleton’s perspectives the scapegoating attempts by both McGovern and the press of the Eagleton nomination will be noted. In addition, this part analyzes Eagleton’s own mortification while acting out his part in the scenario.
The second portion of this chapter analyzes McGovern’s rhetorical approach to the problem of Eagleton’s continued candidacy. Bennett's observations on, "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics," are combined with the afore mentioned Burkean pattern of secular redemption through 95 1 victimage. This serves to demonstrate similarities in the modes of critical inquiry as well as shedding light upon the McGovern strategy concerning the scenario.
Attempting to understand the nature of political scenarios, it is first
critical to note the difference between an event and its meaning. We do not respond to events poli tically or analytically, we respond to their meanings. An event may 'hap pen,' but its meaning is constructed. 96 page 34
Burke has provided the theoretical grounding for this proposition on the nature of symbolic reality:
Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must develop voca bularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, func tion as a deflection of reality. In sofar as the vocabulary meets the needs of reflection, we can say that it has the necessary scope. In its selectivity, it is a reduction. Its scope and reduction become a deflec tion when the given terminology or calculus is not suited to the sub ject matter which it is designed to calculate. 97
The objects for our examination, then, are the various rhetorical interpretations of the Eagleton
"events." Analysis of the structuring of the events by the McGovern rhetoric enables the critic to observe the public reaction to said structure, thus allowing the critic to make judgments as to the success or failure of the McGovern version of the scenario. "Success or failure in this profession (politics) has to do with the politi cian’s ability to locate the most universally satisfying definition for potentially alienating events."9® This is due to the observation that:
Stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning...Any given situation de rives its character from the entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it. And differences in our ways of sizing up an objective situ ation are expressed subjectively as differences in our assignment of motive, 99 page 35
Thus the candidate may offer an interpretation of a
given political event, hoping that his definition becomes
accepted by the electorate. In doing so, the political :
actor presents his audience with a framework with which to
interpret the unfolding scene. This is possible because:
Since no two things or acts or situations are exactly alike, you cannot apply the same term to both of them without thereby introducing a certain margin of ambiguity, an ambiguity as great as the difference between the two subjects that are given the identical title. 100
The point to be made here is that our symbol system
allows us to define scenes similarly when they are differ
ent and differently when they are quite similar. Indeed,
"it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations
take place; in fact, without such areas, it would be 101 impossible." Duncan further noted this critical value
of language ambiguity which allows for subtle or overt
changes in meaning: "...themes and plots in social drama may be studied by noting moments of transformation as well
as fixed moments of belief in the drama of social hier
archy.
A political event occurs, and political actors rush
to give it meaning. Certain times in each scenario are periods of transformation in which the ongoing action may be redefined. Such instances maybe likened to a single page 36
frame on a movie reel. The action stops, and new politi
cal information enters the frame:
At these points, past definitions become renegotiable and ongoing events effectively become frozen in the public perspective. During these periods, the public awaits (or actively seeks) satisfactory interpretations of the new event configuration. 103
It is at these "frozen" points that transformations may occur. These transformations "are not ’illusions,’ but citable realities. The structural relations involved 104 are observable realities."
From this perspective, political scenarios may be viewed as being both finite and infinite. They are part of an ongoing process yet they are, at times, static enough to have their meanings redefined. It is at this transformational stage that the rhetorical critic may focus upon the rush to give meaning to the events studied.
The utilization of the concept of redemption through victimage in connection with the political scenario per spective allows for an analysis of the transformation of
(a) the candidates' definitions of the scenario, and (b) the images of the candidates themselves. The major re search questions then are: (1) What were the original rhetorical strategies of the two candidates concerning the Eagleton Affair? (2) What transformations did these page 3?
strategies undergo? (3) What were the motivations of
the candidates that lay behind the individual rhetorical
approaches to the scenario? (4) What was the effect of
the outcome of the Affair upon the image of each candi
date?
Chapter III; "McGovern's Image as a Function of
Campaign Issues"
This chapter examines McGovern's campaign image as
a function of the issues of the 1972 election. The dis
cussion is organized around Bennett's categorizations of personal, policy, and leadership concerns,
The chapter begins with an historical-descriptive account of the makeup of the electorate for the 1972 election and a look at the targeted audience for the
McGovern campaign. Then the analysis attempts to examine how a non-traditional candidate such as McGovern con cerned himself with the traditional expectations of cam paign discourse. The conclusion of the chapter contains some judgments concerning the perceived McGovern image resulting from the issues of the campaign.
According to Duncan:
Ceremonies, rites, and ritual drama are the most formalized types of social drama. They must be performed in certain ways because the effi ciency of their appeal depends on their form of expression. 106 page 38
It is the perception of the electorate which determines the impact of the candidate’s image in relationship to campaign rituals. "For most people, it is how a role is played, not critical discussion of the social principles involved in the role, which determines the success of a leader."10?
In political life, certain ceremonies and rituals are an integral part of the campaign for office. Poli tical actors kiss babies, shake hands, eat strange ethnic foods and visit Ideal "shrines" in order to im press people through their adherence to ritual. It is how the role of candidate is played that is important.
Thus the political actor must keep his image consistent with the scenic configurations of the campaign if his candidacy is to be viewed by the electorate as being legitimate. As Burke commented, "It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be con- 108 sistent with the nature of the scene."
People come to expect certain behaviors in certain political situations. They have "traditional" perspec tives of leadership which all those seeking office must attempt to meet. Indeed, as Boulding has reminded us, such perceptions are an inherent part of our political system: page 39
It is the object of what might be called the paraphenalia of democra tic organizations: the elections, the rules of order, the parliamen tary procedure, etc., to establish what might be called an image of conventional leadership. 109
The rhetorical problem faced by McGovern was how should an issue-oriented, non-traditional candidate handle the ritualistic demands of the national campaign? A man with liberal views and thus liberal solutions to problems» a man with a different type of political image; McGovern seemed unable to exploit the scenic dimensions of campaign ritual. Edelmen suggested that
a leader who is regarded as the epi tome of his times is necessarily an artful exponent of the quality of setting. Such officials may somewhat arouse controversy, but this leader ship style involves careful rationing of controversial issues to a number sufficient to maintain the impression of aggressiveness if it is fashion able, while lavashing militancy al most entirely upon issues for which it is not needed in the sense that the battle is already won. 110
In essence, this is the function of ritualistic pledges for reform; it points to the value of language ambiguity discussed earlier in this chapter. The campaign ritual is established in the minds of the electorate When the candidate can communicate an image to them that demonstrates: page 4o
(a) that they are doing some fami liar social activity (they should be interpreted as 'the candidates'), (b) that they are doing it in a routine or predictable fashion, (c) that the participants and observers, therefore, can respond properly to the situation by assuming familiar roles, and (d) that the ensuing be haviors in the situation can be un derstood best through the use of particular categories of interpre tation. Ill
Bennett has operationalized the study of campaign ritual through the establishment of three "rules" govern ing the symbolization of policy concerns in campaigns.
These rules form the basis for our criticism of the policy, personal, and leadership issues. , .
1. The selectivity rule; through which focused, but potentially volatile appeals are constructed for homogeneous audiences. 112
In observance of the selectivity rule the campaigner is concerned with appeals to immediate, isolated audiences.
Burke has referred to this aspect of political rhetoric as "secular prayer." This is the highly stylized rhetoric based upon the value of language ambiguity in which par ticular audiences are singled out and messages are tailered for their needs; "it is the normally prayerful use of language, to sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too 113 sharply pointed." Burke has articulated the utiliza tion of language ambiguity for the rhetor and its poten tial benefits; page 4l
The ambiguity of substance affords, as one might expect, a major resource of rhetoric...The most clear-sounding words can thus be used for the vaguest of reference...What handier linguistic resource could a rhetorician want than an ambiguity whereby he can say ’The state of affairs is substantially such- and-such,’ instead of having to say ’The state of affairs is and/or is not such-and-such'? 114
What the critic considers under this guideline are
rhetorical transformations made for immediate audiences,
for "it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations
take place; in fact, without such areas, it would be im- 115 possible." Although it is "easy to praise Athenians
in Athens," it is difficult to go before the American
Legion with a speech advocating amnesty for draft evaders.
In such cases, one becomes keenly aware of the value of
language ambiguity. "And the more drastic the measure
is in actuality, the more natural it would be for the politician to present it in a way that would allay fears 116 - and resentment." Essentially, the selectivity rule
tells the speaker how well he has adapted his rhetorical
strategies to his immediate audience.
2. The transition rule: through which these selective symboli zations are given 'transitional lines' or ’tag lines’ that make it difficult for opponents to take specific statements out of context and that allow candidates to advocate different, often con tradictory, policies to different audiences. II? page 42
This transition rule again is dependent upon trans formations constructed from Specific issue-oriented state ments to summary terms (in this case, "tag lines," or political slogans). Burke has noted this symbolic problem for a candidate when he argued that the candidate’s task is
to find some unitary principle from which all his major policies may consistently radiate. In brief, his problem is to find for himself and his party a ’substance’ or constitution of varying duration. And a slogan, as motive, serves here, either as an honestly ances tral title from which the specific policies may descend, or as a rhe torical misnomer that gives at least the appearance of substance. 118
These slogans must be sufficiently broad enough to allow diverse groups within the electorate to identify with the candidate. Yet the transition rule serves to but point to the unification of all the party's slogans in a campaign as we note in Bennett’s third rule.
3. The categorical generalization rule: through which the collection of spe cial policy appeals is summarized in broadly based appeals that allow the diverse constituencies in a candi dates following to apply different categories of reference in making satisfactory interpretations of the candidate's position on the issues. 119 page 43
The categorical generalization rule recognizes to the
fullest extent the value of language ambiguity. It is
based upon the tendancy of a campaign to revolve around a
single, significant symbol1
a significant symbol (an act which mobilizes multiple connotative re sponses) may unify others by esta blishing and reflecting a pattern of perceptions, a set of predispo sitions, values, and implied actions which transcend the diverse symbolic universes of audiences. 120
The campaign then focuses upon an overall concept,
an image, a "god-term," a symbolization of motive«
if the material situation itself contains vast conflicts of interests, he must keep all the corresponding voices vocal. Yet at the same time he must seek to find some over-all motive, or situation, as would be got in some slogan featuring a com mon goal or a common enemy. 121
Thus the categorical generalization rule uses the value of language ambiguity to transform specific policy issues into one broadly based, generalizable statement.
This represents a rhetor's attempt to interpret events for a vast audience through a reduction from complex to simple symbols. Such reductions require careful analysis in order to uncover the Underlying complexities they repre
sent.
In any term we can posit a world, in the sense that we can treat the world in terms of it, seeing all as page 44
emanations, near or far, of its light. Such reduction to a sim plicity being technically reduc tion to a summarizing title or 'God term,' when we confront a simplicity we must forthwith ask ourselves what complexities are subsumed beneath it. 122
One method with which to search for such complexities is Bennett's configuration of Condensation and Referential 123 Symbols and Direct and Masked Images. This critical approach assumes that the choice of the issue is as rhe torically important as the symbolic attempts to structure the issuei
the choice of a political issue is as central to the rhetoric of a situation as are particular sym bolic constructs and persuasion techniques. The rhetorical struc ture of such situations becomes a complex inter-action among specific symbolic tactics, the issue itself, and the relationship of issue and tactics to conditions in the sur rounding political context. 124
The choice of the issue implies that certain poli tical strategies are to be put into action. There are four elements which form political issues, and When con fronted with reductions it is possible to examine the complexities underneath with these distinctions:
Condensation Symbols: associate emotions, memories and vivid images with the sym bolized object. 125 page 45
Referential Symbols: are more concrete representations of the simple facts or features of a pheno menon. 126
Direct Images: are directly asso- ciated with the re ferents of political acts.
Masked Images: refer indirectly to other features of a political situation. 12?
Bennett argues that a major criterion for evaluation
of political issues and the resultant image concerning
the issues is the degree of control over the presentation
of the particular issue to the electorate by the candidate.
This is consistent with the dramatistic view that, "People
are persona...They attempt, through performance, to control 129 the impressions they communicate to others." When the person no longer controls his own image, problems result.
If the feedback from the followers destroys the image of the leader instead of merely modifying it, the process is likely to be self-defeating. The leader will cease to be respected or accepted. 130
Bennett concludes that the "most powerful political
Issues are composed of condensation symbols in configu- '131 ■ ■ . ■ rations that produce masked images." Although Gusfield has referred to these as "Status Issues," the third chapter demonstrates that condensation symbols actually produce status issues, which are "confrontations between opposed ■ 132 systems of moralities, cultures, and styles of life." page 46
The research questions suggested by this methodolo gical perspective are: (l) What was McGovern's target audience? (2) How did the policy, personal and leader ship issues of the campaign effect the McGovern campaign image? (3) What was the overall campaign image of
McGovern? (4) How did McGovern attempt to control the ritualistic functions of the campaign? (5) What was the underlying metaphor of the McGovern campaign?
Chapter IV: "Summary and Conclusions"
The final chapter is divided into two sections. The first part concerns itself with evaluating the methodolo gical approaches used in chapters two and three. This is accomplished by comparing the findings with the assump tions in this chapter to test for consistency of theory.
In addition, the criticism is classified according to the typography developed by Swanson in his article, "The Re quirements of Critical Justifications."'*'-^ This enables the critical methodology to be justified in terms of its contributions to dramatistic theory.
The second section of this chapter summarizes the
McGovern campaign image, concluding with some generali zations as to underlying metaphor and basis for argument.
This is accomplished by utilizing Richard Weaver's "Liber- al/Conservative" typology.^2* This typology is based upon the assumption that "the rhetorical content of the major page 47 premise which the speaker habitually uses is the key to 13 5 his primary view of existence." Argument from Genus
(from the nature of the thing) is generally to be regarded ") 3 A as conservative. Argument from circumstance ("the facts
standing around") is generally voiced by those whom Weaver would have considered liberals.This classification places McGovern in his rhetorical niche in relationship to the first premise of his arguments, thus enabling the • analysis to conclude with a judgment concerning McGovern’s motivating principle.
The election of 1972 presented one of the clearest choices Americans have had between two presidential can didates. Nixon, the Republican, won re-election by the second-widest margin in history. McGovern, the Democrat, had failed to convince even forty percent of the elec torate that he was a viable candidate. The remainder of this dissertation analyzes the factors in McGovern’s rhetorical strategies and..in his campaign image that re sulted in his staggering defeat that November. page 48
. Notes for Chapter I
1. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), p. 26.
2. The biographic information for this dissertation is taken from two sources: McGevern: A Biography writ ten prior to the campaign by Robert Sam Anson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), and George McGovern's autobiography, Grassroots: The Autobio graphy of George McGovern (New York: Random House, 1977).
3. Populism "means a deman for popular control of the government." James A. Burkhart and Frank J. Kendrick, ed., The New Politics: Mood or Movement? (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 25
4. According to Burkhart and Kendrick, "the new populism" attempts to purify democracy, transfer power from the power elites to the people, and consider "real issues" . (p. 25). Later chapters will demonstrate McGovern's "neo-populist" positions on these general principles.
5. White, p. 502. White presents the final election figures of the Associate Press to demonstrate the degree of the Nixon landslide: Nixon: 60.7 percent (40,167,319 votes); McGovern: 37-5 percent (29,168, 509 votes). McGovern won the electoral votes of only Massachussetts and the District of Columbia.
6. Thomas 0. Sloan, "The Report of the Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism," in Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, ed., The Prospect of Rhetoric (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 220.
7. Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy < 9-hd Rhetoric, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1968) , p. 6. In addition, Chesebro commented, "The Quarterly Journal of Speech implicitly legitimized the study of contemporary poli tical communication in 1948 by committing itself to the analysis of Presidential campaigns every four years." Jack W. Chesebro, "Political Communication," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 62, no. 3 (October, 1976), p. 289.
8. Chesebro, "Political Communication," p. 289-300. page 49
9« White, p. xxvii.
10. Ernest B. Bormann, "The Eagleton Affair: A Fantasy Theme Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59 (April, 1973), P- 144.
11. ibid, p. 144.
12. White, p. xxvi.
13. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," The Speech Teacher, Vol. 23, no. 1 (January, 197^), p. 12.
14. The literature reviewed (in terms of scholarly publications) included: Dissertation Abstracts International, The Quarterly Journal of Speech, the Central States' Speech J ournal, the Western Speech J ournal, the Southern Speech C ommuni cati on J ournal, Communication Quarterly, C ommuni cation Monographs and Philosophy and Rhetoric. Additional journals from other disciplines included: the American Academy of Political and Social Science Annals, the American Journal of Political Science, the American Journal of Psychology, the American Journal of Sociology, the American Political Science Review, American Politics Quarterly, The American Sociologist, American Studies, History Today, The Historian, the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, the J ournal of American History, the Journal of American Studies, the J ournal of Contemporary History, the J ournal of Current Social Issues, the J ournal of Modern History, Political Communication Bulletin, Political Quarterly, The Journal of Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Politics, Politics and Society, The Public Opinion Quarterly, and Psychology Today.
15- Jerry Lee Winson, "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for Re-election in 1974" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Nebraska, 1975)- l6. William D. Semlak, "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination" (Unpublished Doctoral ■ Dissertation, the University of Minnesota, 1973)» page 50
1?. LaDonna, Lyle Murray, "The Equal Time Law and the Free Flow of Communication: A Critical Study of the Humphrey-McGovern Debates" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Southern California, 1975).
18. L. Patrick Devlin, "The McGovern Canvass: A Study in Interpersonal Political Campaign," Central States' Speech Journal, Vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer, 1973), P* 83-90.
19. ibid, p. 83.
20. ibid, p. 90. '
21. Bormann, p. 159«
22. John H. Patton, "The Eagleton Phenomenon in the 1972 Presidential Campaign: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Paradox," Central States' Speech Journal, Vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter, 1973)» p. 286.
23. Ibid, p. 280.
24. ibid, p. 281.
25. ibid, p. 281.
26. Time, July 22, 1972, p. 22. The periodical listed the proposed Vice Presidential candidates in this order: Humphrey, Mondale, Ribicoff, Nelson (all senators), White (mayor of Boston), and Eagleton.
2?. With the nominee due to be announced by four p.m. in conjunction with party regulations, Eagleton was first contacted at three-thirty p.m. See White, p. 256-289.
28. Patton, p. 284.
29. ibid, p. 285.
30. As previously noted, the McGovern campaign staff had placed heavy emphasis upon the character of their candidate.
31. See Chapter III; see also Semlak's dissertation. page 51
32. Judith S. and Jimmie D. Trent, "The Rhetoric of the Challenger: George Stanley McGovern," Central States' Speech Journal, Vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1974), p. 11-18.
33 • ibid, p. 15.
34. This perfection motive is expanded upon in Chapters II and III of this dissertation.
35. George McGovern, "Interview," Life, July 7, 1972, p. 4l. "'Come Home America' was explicitly more than a withdrawal from Vietnam and, more equivocally perhaps, from the Cold War. It was also a retrieval of older values, a journey through time to the recovery of disused virtues." Edwin. Black, "Electing Time," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59» no. 2 (April, 1973), P- 127.
3,6. Hugh Sydney, "The Presidency," Time, July 24, 1972» p. 23.
37• The Economist, September 16, 1972, p. 50 •
38. Wil A. Linkugel and Dixie Lee Coday, "Nixon, McGovern, and the Female Electorate," Today's Speech, Vol. 21, no. 4 (Fall, 1973)» P- 30.
39. ibid, p. 31.
40. Carl R. Smith, "Contemporary Political Speech Writing," Southern Speech Communication Journal, Vol. 42 (Fall, 1976). p. 58.
41. White, p. 422.
42. ibid, p. 422.
43. Black, "Electing Time," p. 125-129.
44. ibid, p. 129.
45- ibid, p. 126.
46. ibid, p. 128.
47. ' Herbert W. Simons, James W. Chesebro and C. Jack . Orr, "A Movement Perspective of the 1972 Presidential Campaign," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), p. 179. page 52
48. Simons, Chesebro and Orr, p. l68.
49. ibid, p. 168.
5°. ibid, p. 168.
51. ibid, p. 168.
52. ibid, p. 179.
53. ibid, p. 179.
54. This argument is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II of this study.
55. Walter R . Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion of the American Dream," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), p.160-16?.
56. Ibid, p. 167.
57• Black, p. 129.
58. Chesebro, "Political Communication."
59- ibid, p. 289-
60. ibid, p. 291•
61. ibid, p. 294.
62. ibid, p. 294.
63. ibid, p. 294.
64. ibid, p. 295-
65. ibid, p. 295«
66. ibid, p. 296.
67. ibid, p. 296.
68. ibid, p. 300.
69. ibid, p. 298.
?0. ibid, p. 298. page 53
?1. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkelv: The University of California Press, 1969), p. 43.
72. ibid, p. 172.
73« Chesebro, p. 298.
74. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (New York: Vintage Press, 1957), p. 5.
75« Chesebro, p. 298-299«
76. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: World Publishing, 1962), p. 318.
77. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," in James E. Combs and Michael W. Mansfield, ed., Drama in Life: The Uses of Communication in Society (New York: Hastings House, 1976) , p. 7«
78. ibid, p. 11.
79. Richard M. Merelman, "The Dramaturgy of Politics," Drama in Life, p. 286.
80. Orrin Klapp, "Dramatic Encounters," Drama in Life, p. 273.
81. Wayne E. Brockriede, "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric," The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 54 (February, 1968), p. 12.
82. Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird and Waldo W. Braden, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 12.
83. Jack W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, "Contem porary Rhetorical Theory and Criticism: Dimensions of the New Rhetoric," Communication Monographs, Vol. 42, no.4 (November, 1975), p. 316. David L. Swanson advanced the assumption that "understanding the nature of rhetorical criticism must proceed from the assumption that individuals, including rhetorical critics as well as social scientists, work with the experience of objects rather than with objects them selves, unfiltered by experience." "A Reflective View of the Epistomology of Critical Inquiry," Communication Monographs, Vol 44, no. 3 (August, 1977) , p. 212. page 54
84. Swanson refers to this as the "reflexive attitude" (p. 210).
85. Sloan, p. 223. See also Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins, "Rhetoric, Society, and the Critical Re sponse," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 58, no. 4 (December, 1972;. The authors therein ad vance the position that "Values live in human beings; consequently, each honest effort at criti cism plumbs the depths of the critic’s understanding of his or herself" (p. 441).
86. Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspec tive (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1972), p. 125»
87. Swanson, p. 211..
88. ibid, p. 217.
89. Scott and Brock, p. 125»
90. Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Religion (Boston, 196!), p. 4-5.
91. Kenneth Burke, "Definition of Man," The Hudson Review, Vol. 16 (Winter, 1963-64), p. 507«
92. Burke, Philosophy, p. 23.
93- ibid, p. 34.
94. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 289•
95- W. Lance Bennett, "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 8, no. 1 (1975).
96. ibid, p. 23.
9?. Burke, Grammar, p. 59.
98. Bennett, p. 24.
99. Burke, Permanence, p. 35.
100. Burke, Grammar, p. xxi. page 55
101. Burke, Grammar, p. xxi.
102. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols in Society (New York: Oxford Press, 1968), p. 174.
103. Bennett, p. 30.
104. Burke, Grammar, p. 57»
105. W. Lance Bennett, "The Ritualistic and Pragmatic Bases of Political Campaign Discourse," The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 63, no. 3 (October, 1977)•
106. Duncan, p. 174.
107. ibid, p. 199-
108. Burke, Grammar, p. 3-
109. Kenneth Bouldihg, The Image (Ann Arbor: The Univer sity of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 102.
110. Murray Edelman, "Political Settings as Symbolism," Drama in Life, p. 254.
111. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 222.
112. ibid, p. 229.
113. Burke, Grammar, p. 393-
114. ibid, p. 51-52.
115. ibid, p. xxi.
116. ibid, p. 393.
H7- Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 229.
118. Burke, Grammar, p. 391«
119- Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 229.
120. Chesebro and Hamsher, "Contemporary," p. 325»
121. Burke, Grammar, p. 392.
122. ibid, p. 105. page 56
123. W. Lance Bennett, Patrician D. Harris, Janet Laskey, Alan H. Levitch, Saraha E. Monrad, "Deep and Surface Images in the Construction of Political Issues: The Case of Amnesty, ’’ The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 62, no. 2 (April, 1976), p. 109-126.
124. ibid, p. 109.
125. Burke refers to these as "dialectical terms." Rhetoric, p. 184. "Here are words that belong, not in the order of motion and perception, but rather in the order of action and idea. Here are words for principals and essence." For example, although buildings may be thought of as positive terms, their symbolic meaning refers to "ideas rather than to things" (p. I85). Thus, the idea of a building may be, for example, progress or civilization.
126. see Burke, Rhetoric, p. I83OI89.
127. Merelman argues that this has led to a favorite tactic of many politicians: "Unmasking" (exposing the opponent for what he "really is"). A favorite technique is to label the opponent as an extremist. Merelman, p. 291-292. Of course, such labelling is a use of masking images.
128. Bennett, et al., p. 122.
129. Drama in Life, p. xx.
130. Boulding, p. 101.
131. Bennett, et al., p. 111.
132. Gusfield, p. 248.
133- David L. Swanson, "The Requirements of Critical Justifications," Communication Monographs, Vol. W (November, 1972), p. 306-320.
134. Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henrey Regery Co., 1953)•
135. ibid, p. 55.
136. ibid, p. 56.
13?« ibid, p. 57-58. page 57
CHAPTER II«
THE EAGLETON AFFAIR
This has been a year of suprises. Most of the delegates in this hall did not expect to be the political pros of 1972. Most of us did not expect to nominate a man who began with only five per cent in the polls. Few expected our convention to be orderly and so productive. And surely, I did not expect to stand before you tonight as the Democratic nominee for the Vice Presidency of the United States. Thomas F. Eagleton1
Irony has its way of demonstrating the continuing
frailty of the human condition, even in our age of com
puterized sophistication. In politics the ironies may
be witnessed in the rhetorical definitions advanced by
the candidates as they cope with the events of the cam
paign. One of the best examples of such political irony
during the 1972 presidential election concerned the abor
tive candidacy for the office of Vice President by Sena
tor Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri.
It was ironic for Eagleton to speak of suprises as
he graciously accepted the Democratic nomination for the
Vice Presidency from the convention delegates. The next
four weeks were to be full of suprises as a virtual web of political intrigue was spun by Eagleton, McGovern, and the members of the press before an astounded electorate. At the page 58
conclusion of what has become known as the "Eagleton
Affair," both McGovern and Eagleton might have had cause
to reflect upon a highly prophetic moment from Eagleton’s
acceptance speech when the nominee surmised, "We are
learning to live with some of those suprises..
For organizational purposes, this chapter is divided
into four sections. Part One consists of a brief histo
rical overview of the events from July 14 through July
31, 1972 (from Eagleton’s nomination through his resig nation). Part Two examines the rhetorical approaches used by Eagleton in attempting to define the meaning of the affair, while Part Three contains an analysis of
McGovern’s rhetorical strategies concerning the scenario.
The final section examines the rhetorical definitions of the events as offered by both candidates at the resigna tion press conference.
Part One: Historical Overview
It should have been an easy convention for the
McGovern forces. After the Democratic primaries in Cali fornia and New York the nomination seemed secure and time could be allocated to details such as the acceptance speech and the choice of a running-mate. But is this early moment of triumph the party regulars attempted to push through their own version of "ABM": "Anybody But McGovern." At page 59
the June meeting of the Democratic Convention Credentials
Committee, a body controlled by the party regulars, the
old guard tried to out-flank the McGovern strategists,
passing a resolution that declared the results of the
California "winner-take-all" primary were not in accord
with the new, proportional representation rulings laid
down by McGovern’s own Reform Commission for the 1972
primaries. McGovern had initially wanted the propor
tional ruling prior to the convention, but having lost
his appeal he played by the rules of the old guard. Now
they were changing those rules after the game had been
played and McGovern had won. The resolution resulted in
McGovern obtaining only one-half of the delegates from
California, thus making the senator’s nomination more
difficult.
McGovern won those delegates back in a hard-fought
floor battle on the first evening of the convention, but
the toll it had taken on his campaign staff in terms of
effort was to have a direct bearing on the choice of a
running-mate for the new nominee. Gary Hart, McGovern's
campaign manager, described the importance of the Cali
fornia vote and the subsequent effort to regain those lost delegates: page 60
We went into the convention (July- 10) with only one real question - whether or not we could get our California delegates back...That question occupied almost all of our time after the credentials committee meeting in Washington (in June)...We spent a great deal of time on that...3
Due to the necessary obsession of the McGovern staff
with the California delegate challenge it was not until
Thursday morning, the day after the official nomination of
McGovern, that the senator's assistants assembled to seri
ously consider a Vice Presidential candidate. The meeting
dragged on into the afternoon: Kennedy, Ribicoff and Nel
son, all Democratic senators, spurned offers of the posi tion. Kevin White, then mayor of Boston, was tentatively
chosen and then quickly dropped from consideration when Zl he did not meet with Ted Kennedy's approval.
Attention was finally given to the name of Senator
Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri. Without researching the candidate, while ignoring "rumors" about problems with alchohol in Eagleton's past, McGovern and his staff de cided to telephone Eagleton with the nomination offer.
After all, it was approximately three-thirty in the after noon - one-half hour before the deadline for placing the nominee's name before the convention chairman.
That infamous telephone conversation between page 6l
McGovern, Frank Mankiewicz (a top McGovern aid) and
Eagleton was to become a later point of controversy.
While both McGovern and Eagleton were to remember similar details of the conversation, they were to quarrel over the meaning of certain key terms and phrases used during the phone call.
After receiving Eagleton's acceptance of the nomi nation, McGovern handed the phone to Mankiewicz, who was to check for possible problems with Eagleton concerning the nomination. Mankiewicz asked the senator if he had
"any skeletons rattling around in his closet," and Eagleton replied in the negative.^ As the Missourian later noted:
I remember the moment well, the room was filled with people cheer ing and I said simply 'no.' That was that. In my mind, I didn’t have any old skeletons. Skeletons are things where you have committed a crime...or something sinister like that. I did not then, nor do I feel now, that there is anything sinister about emotional fatigue. I was not concealing anything. I was consciously hiding nothing. I was not lying. 6
Thus when Eagleton was nominated on July 14, 1972, he appeared to be the perfectly balanced candidate for the second spot on the McGovern ticket: "He is Roman
Catholic where McGovern is Protestant, urban where page 62
McGovern is small-town, well-wired to labor where McGovern 'makes Meany see red."? Yet the "fit" between the two men
was nothing more than a lucky break. Eagleton’s past had
not been researched carefully. As a result of this over
sight, McGovern eventually found himself with a running- mate who was less than ideal.
What eventually transpired was the result of poor planning by the McGovern staff and the inherently inqui
sitive nature of the American press. In response to growing rumors in the media, the Democratic candidates
called a conference in South Dakota on July 25, 1972, where Eagleton shocked the nation, disclosing, "On three occasions in my life I have voluntarily gone into hospi- 8 tals as a result of nervous exhaustion and fatigue."
Of course, the McGovern people were appalled at the
Missouri senator's lack of candor with them at the con vention. It was later reported that the Presidential nominee’s staff was "incensed that Senator Eagleton had 9 not told them of his past problems before his nomination."
At the press conference McGovern announced that the decision had been made to retain Eagleton as a member of the ticket, much to the quiet anger of his staff. The
Presidential nominee steadfastly declared that he did not
"have the slightest doubt about the wisdom of my judgment page 63
in selecting him as my running mate, nor would I have any
hesitance at all trusting the United States Government in his hands."10
After the announcement Eagleton went on an extended
campaign trip to California, Hawaii, and Missouri while
McGovern remained in South Dakota. While in Honolulu,
Eagleton was attacked in a radio broadcast and subséquent
article by Washington Post syndicated columnist Jack
Anderson. The scribe claimed he had been presented with
evidence that Eagleton had been issued several citations
for driving under the influence of alchohol in his home
state of Missouri. These allegations were later demon
strated to be unfounded, and Anderson publicly apologized
to Eagleton on the July 30 edition of the CBS news program,
"Face the Nation.By that time, however, the question
of Eagleton*s continued candidacy had been answered.
On the evening of Monday, July 31, 1972, McGovern
and Eagleton appeared together on national television
and radio to announce that Eagleton would resign the nomi
nation as of August 1. The Eagleton candidacy had been
terminated, but its ramifications were to continue to
haunt the McGovern campaign throughout that autumn. The
remainder of this chapter concentrates on analyzing the
rhetorical definitions of the aforementioned events by
McGovern, Eagleton, and the media. page 64
Part Two: Eagleton - Catharsis Through Mortification
If there ever was a person who seemed "horn for
politics" it was Thomas F. Eagleton. A native son of St.
Louis, Missouri, Eagleton’s political successes had been
nothing short of astounding. He had begun his career as
the youngest elected prosecuting attorney in Missouri
history, then he became the state’s youngest-ever Attor- 12 ney General, then its youngest Lieutenant Governor.
In Eagleton’s 1968 race for the United States Senate he "edged GOP Congressman Thomas Curtis by 40,000 votes while Hubert Humphrey was losing the state by 22,000 to 13 Mr. Nixon." His political career had moved forward at such a meteoric rate that Eagleton had never stood for reelection at the conclusion of each term in office; he simply ran for and won a higher position.^
Thus the background in politics suggested that even as early as 1972 Eagleton might rise to national promi nence. Indeed, rumors that Eagleton might be considered for the second spot on the McGovern ticket had circulated among the delegates as they assembled for the convention.
Eagleton himself "had known for several days that his name was in play - the press had said so, friends had told him so and logic insisted that he was a natural balance for the McGovern ticket. page 65
On Thursday of convention week, the day the McGovern
staff would announce the choice of the nominee’s running- mate, Eagleton waited nervously by the telephone in his suite at the Ivanhoe Hotel on Miami Beach.Reminiscing later about that Thursday, Eagleton'would refer to it as his "Vigil Day."17
When word of the nomination had not reached the
Eagleton headquarters by noon, the senator felt disap pointed, believing that the choice had been made and that he had been passed over. The vigil gloomily continued, however, until three-thirty that afternoon, when McGovern telephoned to ask Eagleton to share the ticket with him.
As previously noted, the actual phone conversations be tween McGovern and Eagleton and Mankiewicz and Eagleton were to become a controversial portion of the entire affair.
After his vigil, Eagleton was understandably elated by McGovern’s offer of a spot on the ticket. "’I paused and it sounded like four seconds,' Eagleton recalled later,
’and I said, "Well, George before you change your mind, I 18 accept."”’ The Missourian was so ecstatic that the question of past mental disorders did not cross his mind during the few minutes spent on the telephone. As Eagle- ton later reflected: page 66
I wasn't thinking about this emo tional business and the periods in the hospital. The thought in my mind was that here I was talking to the Democratic nominee for Presi dent and he was asking me - Tom Who? - to be his running mate. 19
With the successful end of the vigil, bedlam reigned
in the Eagleton suite. It would have been incongruous
for either the senator or one of his staff to consider
past problems at this point.
In the instant mini-bedlam, privacy had evaporated, and with it any pos sibility of thoughtful reflection. Bizarre as had been the sequence of choice at the Doral (McGovern head quarters) , it would have been more bizarre for an Eagleton or anyone else to have lifted the phone in such a crowded and public room and said in the pandemonium, 'Listen,., you should know...Tom's been hospi talized three times for nervous breakdown.' In any event, as Eagle ton kept telling visitors months later, 'My health just wasn't on my mind, it wasn't on my mind, it was like a broken leg that healed.' 20
Thus the stage was set for the coming political drama. Eagleton, the soon-to-be-controversial Vice
Presidential nominee, had seemingly allowed ambition to dominate his thinking at a crucial moment. In the following weeks he was to fight for his political life as a result of that mistake. Yet at the termination of his candidacy it appeared as if Eagleton had gained something far more precious than the Democratic nomination for Vice President. page 67
Beginning with the July 25 press conference in which
Eagleton made the announcement of his three hospitaliza
tions it appeared as if the candidate's rhetorical stra
tegy was directed against "the enemy within," his own history of mental fatigue and depression. He began his
explanation by referring to himself as "an intense and Pl hard-fighting person. I sometimes push myself too far."
This tragic admission demonstrates Eagleton’s ini tial attempts at mortification. By placing blame for his condition upon himself he could do two things: (1) demonstrate that he had overcome his past frailties; and (2) shoulder all of the blame, thus relieving McGovern of any responsibility for nominating him.
In this sense, mortification may be operationally defined as "a scrupulous and deliberate clamping of limi tation upon the self."22 in the section of this chapter concerning the McGovern rhetoric, Eagleton’s role as scapegoat will be examined. At this point, however, it is necessary to examine Eagleton's attempts at catharsis through mortification. Burke has noted that these two modes of purgation are not necessarily unique. "Along with a search for the modes of vindication by victimage, look for a variant, in possible secularized equivalents of 'mortification.'"23 page 68
This mortification is a form of "symbolic suicide":
a more thoroughgoing way of obliter ating the substance of one's old identity - while, as we have said before, this symbolic suicide it self would be but one step in a process which was not completed until the substance of the aban doned identity had been replaced by the new substance of a new identity. 24
Eagleton then was attempting to redefine his self-
concept - to purge himself of his past. He was sacri
ficing his former self in the hopes of rejuvenating his political image in the wake of his disclosure. This Is a
form of "killing," for "the killing of something is the
changing of it." J Burke has argued that, "In the sacri
fice there is a kill; in the kill there is a sacrifice.
But one or the other of this pair may be stressed as the 2 ¿S ’essence' of the two." The position taken throughout this chapter is that Eagleton continually emphasized the concept of "kill" in his rhetorical approach to the crisis, while the press emphasized the notion of "sacrifice," and
McGovern originally emphasized the "kill" but changed his definition to "Sacrifice." These distinctions become more important as the analysis continues.
In the initial press conference, Eagleton continually attempted to demonstrate that he had learned to cope with the pressures of politics, symbolically committing suicide / ! j page 69 by "killing" his former self - the self that had been hospitalized for nervous exhaustion. As the candidate stated, he had learned things about his old self - weak nesses that he had been able to transform into strengths:
"So I believe and I have every confidence that at age 42
I’ve learned how to pace myself and learned how to measure 27 my own energies and know the limits of my own endurance." '
This emphasis on his rhetorical transformation through mortification even led the candidate to attempt some amateur philosophy:
One could ask and should ask well, in light of that history, have you learned anything, (sic) All of us live our lives, I guess, in the attempt to learn more about our selves...in many respects we are our own worst enemies and it took these experiences, these tough ex periences, for me to learn a little about myself. 28
Eagleton constantly attempted to demonstrate his
Competency for high office by magnifying the positive aspects of his illness, such as learning something about himself. He was then attempting to define himself as a different individual than the person who was forced into treatment for his mental disorder. The ambiguity of language allowed Eagleton to define a dibilitating cir cumstance as a personal triumph. Eagleton was taking the same set of "facts" and transforming them. page 70
Stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning...Any given situation de rives its character from the entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it. And differences in our ways of sizing up an objective situa tion are expressed subjectively as differences in our assignment of motive. 29
The transformation of image that Eagleton was at
tempting to achieve further demonstrates the value of language ambiguity, for "it is in the areas of ambiguity
that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, it would be impossible."-^ For example, when
Eagleton was questioned about the electroshock treatments he had received as part of the therapy provided for his ilnesses during two of his hospital visits, he responded in a manner designed to show that these were merely ordi nary measures: "At that time, it was part of the pre scribed treatment for one who is suffering from nervous exhaustion and fatigue and manifestations of depression."^
Thus extraordinary measures were depicted as everyday activities.
Eagleton had begun his campaign to remain on the ticket by attempting to demonstrate his catharsis through mortification. He had used the inherent ambiguity of language to magnify the positive aspects of his treat ments and to minimize their negative nature. He had page ?1 stressed the notion that the "old" Eagleton had been
"killed" - transformed - and had been replaced by the
"new," improved person.
After the South Dakota press conference both Eagle ton and McGovern attempted to ride through the publicity which they knew would follow in the immediate wake of the disclosure. Trying to present a positive image, Eagleton took to the campaign trail, making a swing through Cali fornia and Hawaii, finishing in Missouri. To his amaze ment the senator was continually hounded by reporters who made him defend himself seemingly at every turn. The can didate admitted that he had misanalyzed the situation from the onset, remarking that he "didn't think it was going to be this big."32 During those first few days after the disclosure Eagleton was tentative, indeed, al most apologetic, about remaining on the ticket. He told reporters in California on July 26 that he might resign
"if public opinion polls over the next 10 days or two weeks showed a strongly unfavorable response to his dis closures of mental illness."33
At this point Eagleton’s rhetorical strategy still appears to be a search for catharsis through mortifica tion. His struggle was with the spectre of his past mental disorders. Until July 27 this was his theme. On \ page ?2 that date the senator was to find another chance to re define the situation as the "enemy" in the scene shifted from his own past to the media. On that date Jack Ander son and the press began to unjustly scapegoat Eagleton.
Rumors of a drinking problem had followed Eagleton throughout most of his political career. In the July 25 press conference he had even begun with a vague reference to them: "In political campaigning it is part and parcel of the campaigning that there will be rumors about candi dates. Rumors have followed me during my political career..."3^ At that meeting, Eagleton adamantly responded to a reporter’s question concerning the rumors about alcho hol abuse:
Alchohol was not involved in any iota, in any way, shape or form whatsoever, I can assure you - categorically and without hesita tion, unequivocal - there's been no trace, no hint, not one iota of alchoholism as part of these rumors - as part of the actual facts. 35
Yet on July 27, Washington Post syndicated columnist
Jack Anderson told his Mutual Broadcast System radio audience that he was in possession of certain evidence that implicated the Vice Presidential candidate in several instances of citations for driving under the influence of 36 alchohol. Upon hearing reports of the commentary while page 73 campaigning in Hawaii, Eagleton immediately called a press conference, branding the report a "damnable lie."3?
Prior to the Anderson accusation Eagleton had felt that the proper method of atonement for past sins was to mortify himself, demonstrating a personal renaissance.
When Anderson raised the question of alchoholism, Eagle ton turned to a strategy of direct attack upon the accusor.
The senator was simultaneously convinced that he was going to remain as McGovern's running mate. The New York Times reported that Eagleton was "all the more determined after the Anderson business to remain on the ticket."^®
Now public opinion could be rallied around Eagleton as an unfairly beleagured individual; now there was a tangible exterior enemy: the press. But in the end it was not merely the Anderson commentary that hurt the chances for Eagleton to continue his candidacy; rather, it was the thematic attitude of the press toward his continuation on the ticket that tolled the bell for the nominee.
Prior to a discussion of the media it is necessary to delineate further the symbolic conception of the scapegoat. As Eagleton attempted to place emphasis upon the "kill" metaphor, the press thematically emphasized the notion of "sacrifice." In essence, they scapegoated page 74
Eagleton. A scapegoat is "the 'representative’ or
'vessel' of certain unwanted evils, the sacrificial
animal upon whose back the burden of these evils is ritualistically located."39
The press developed Eagleton as the "fatalistic"
sacrifice. Burke has defined the nature of this type
of scapegoat:
We may make him worthy by leading towards sacrifice fatalistically (as When we point the arrows of the plot that the audience comes to think of him as a marked man, and so prepares itself to relin quish him).
The theme of the press was important due to the extensive coverage that the affair received - a pre occupation by the press that neither Eagleton nor
McGovern had expected.
The amount of attention that the Eagleton statement drew last Wednes day from newspapers, radio and tele vision and the reaction by editorial writers, politicians and the general public, seem to have suprised both sides. 4l
This tremendous press coverage may well have been due to several media considerations, but the rationale that directly concerns this analysis has to do with the consideration that I
page 75
the period between the Democratic and Republican conventions is famous for being ’slow for news'...The or ganizational need to 'have a show' regardless of the amount of institu tionally recognized news items en courages newsworkers to hotly pur sue whatever is available. 43
Yet the problem was not limited to the amount of publicity the scenario received. The thematic attitude
of the press that Eagleton either must be or was to be
sacrificed resulted in a buildup of intolerable pressure on McGovern and led to the eventual dumping of Eagleton.
In the first chapter the proposition was advanced that political events happen and then participants in those events (and others) attempt to define them for the public. In order to place an event within the confines of a scene, newsworkers, like candidates, utilize under lying themes to add continuity to their reporting of an event or events. "A theme links one report to another over a period of days."^ Thus the press also provides definitions for events, and these may differ from the perspectives advanced by the individuals involved. The media can then structure an event thematically for the public.
In the Eagleton scenario the press provided the public with one version of the events at hand: page 76
Eagleton’s newly-won national atten tion, the discovery of his history of mental illness, and questions about his credibility provided the specific angles for the coverage, but one theme tied them together: Eagleton would be dropped as the Democratic vice-presidential nominee. 45
From the onset of the affair the media defined the
scene as relatively hopeless concerning Eagleton’s con
tinued candidacy. At one point, McGovern had telephoned
Eagleton, sharing the pressure he was feeling with the
Missourian by remarking that he had "thirty editorials 46 here in my hand which are against you." Among the newspapers which had called for Eagleton’s resignation were the Washington Post and The New York Times, two of
the more liberal newspapers in the nation - papers whose
support McGovern desperately needed if he was to be victorious in November. But Eagleton was applying a different sort of pressure to McGovern, to the press, and ultimately, to himself.
The nominee was not about to accept the judgment of the media without first attempting to redefine the scene to his favor. Eagleton chided the press - not in the fashion of Spiro Agnew, Nixon’s Vice President and hard-core, haughty, hatchet-man, but in his own style: page 77
If I had a particular disappoint ment, it would be the newspapers... I'm disappointed because several newspapers for which I have the highest regard would leap to con clusions so quickly and would be so relatively unsophisticated about emotional problems.. .Maybe I was wrong to think that the papers would look at it from my point of view. But I didn't think there was going to be this kind of over-reaction. 47 .
Eagleton referred to the ability to put one’s self in another person's shoes. He alluded to some sports writers' comprehension of what the quarterback of a foot ball team feels when he has had a bad day on the gridiron.
Concurrent with his expression of disappointment with the press, Eagleton praised what Agnew might have referred to as the "silent majority"» "Ironically, as it had turned out, the most sophisticated people about 48 this affair have been the men and women in the street.”
The strategy was simple: appeal to the masses "out there;" cast Eagleton in the role of the undeserving scapegoat. Eagleton, the fighter at this juncture, defiantly pronounced to newsworkers, "I'm going to stay 49 on the ticket. That's my firm, irrevocable intent."
Eagleton was attempting to redefine the scene so as to tilt the scales of public opinion in his favor. He had originally mortified himself, emphasizing the concept page ?8
of the "kill" concerning his former, mentally troubled
self. Now the attacks upon him by Anderson and the rest
of the press allowed Eagleton to put forth a new face.
The media had been characterizing him as the fatalistic
scapegoat, a definition which seemed to have taken the matter out of Eagleton’s hands. The nominee desperately wanted to control the definitions of the scenario, hence
he attacked those positing alternative interpretations
of the events, setting himself up as being motivated by
righteous indignation while refusing the role assigned
to him in the script written by the press.
In order to demonstrate further that he had taken up the gaunlet, Eagleton gave a rousing speech in Honolulu to the convention of the Retails Clerks International
Association, an organization which subsequently endorsed the McGovern - Eagleton ticket. During his speech
Eagleton invoked Harry Truman, a predecessor as a United States sena tor from Missouri and as a Democratic candidate for Vice President. 'I hope I have some small measure of the guts he possessed,' said Eagleton. The shouting delegates replied: 'Give ’em hell, Tom!’ It was an eloquent self-defense and a sniping attack on the Republican enemy. Eagleton: 'The people have understanding and compassion in their hearts. I'm a stronger, bet ter person that I was 72 hours ago. You have to come under a little adver sity to find out who your friends are.' 50 page 79
While Eagleton was attempting to demonstrate his
"fight" by chastizing the media, the press shifted its definition somewhat, interpreting the scenario as a developing battle between McGovern and Eagleton over the
second spot on the ticket. Eagleton and McGovern stead fastly maintained that there were no disagreements between the running-mates, yet the press took that to mean that there were differences between the two men over Eagleton remaining on the ticket.
Was McGovern trying to avoid the onus of firing his man? Or was it perhaps that Eagleton was having none of it? Eagleton seemed to suggest as much in his account of a Saturday telephone conversation with McGovern. McGovern, he said, had told him he 'had been under pressure' about Eagleton's candi ' dacy. Yet, Eagleton insisted three times in the course of the conversation he had wrung from McGovern the phrase 'that he's 1,000% for me.' 51
While the problems involved from Eagleton's per spective were quite complex, the press had developed the angle that McGovern and Eagleton were at odds with one another. At the same time many editorialists and others were advancing the theme that Eagleton had to be dumped from the ticket. The media was generating tremendous pressure as their definitions became the common inter pretation of the situation, and the political actors page 80 were at their manipulative mercy. Typical reporting of
the scenario advanced the dual themes. For example,
The New York Times reported the Saturday phone conver
sation mentioned above in the following manner»
Informed about a telephone report that Mr. McGovern had asked him to leave the ticket, the senator said at a cocktail party here» 'Far from it. Totally wrong. Two hundred per cent wrong. Two thousand per cent wrong.' 52
At first, Eagleton had appeared to be apologetic for his "sin of ommission." He had told the press that he had informed McGovern that, "If he at any time felt I'm 53 an embarassment I would abide by his judgment." Yet as time wore on and the criticism of the media grew it was noted that the embattled candidate, "at first shaken, gained strength through a hectic week of campaigning in California and Hawaii."^ That "strength" was a direct result of Eagleton’s aggressive tactics following the media coverage of the scenario.
Perhaps in an effort to convince the media of his abilities, perhaps as an effort to convince himself,
Eagleton continually alluded to his intestinal fortitude in interviews. His rhetorical strategy seemed to have shifted from that of complete mortification to initially reminding his audience of the extreme difficulty of his page 81 current situation and then demonstrating his ability to cope with the pressure he was facing. Again, he was emphasizing the metaphor of the "kill;" the transforma tion of Thomas F. Eagleton from emotionally weak to emotionally strong. This theme was typified in an in terview with Newsweek magazine in which Eagleton reported that he had convinced himself to see the problem through:
"Self, it won't be pleasant. It won’t be sweet. It won’t be easy, but it’s got to be done."^
The impression generated by this Interview is one of an embattled Eagleton fighting against all odds and still determined to win. He was not the willing scape goat, rather, he was the scrappy underdog. He was being unjustly haunted by a past that he had exorcized from his own mind.
It may look otherwise, but I haven’t been beset by fear and guilt these past twelve years...It wasn't a per petual wound. There was no perpe tual brooding. But occasionally the thought would pass through my mind that someday, somehow, some where somebody is going to know I was in Barnes and I presumed that many people would look unfavorably on that... But I've got to survive, I've got to surmount, and I've got to win. 56
This may sound like pious, self-ser ving tripe, but I feel in my own mind as much as I have ever felt anything in my life that I have whipped this thing. I have licked it. 57 page 82
This particular interview demonstrated the rhetorical
strategy of catharsis through mortification. Yet the can
didate appeared to be opening up his private life in
order to project a sense of control over the scene.
Eagleton must have believed that he would remain on the
ticket if he could only make the members of the press
and the electorate understand his emotions.
You just have to try to understand what that phone call (with McGovern’s offer of the nomination) meant to me. You have to understand me. I have made politics more than a career. It is my whole life's blood. I eat politics. I sleep it. I breather it. I'm all consumed by it. . . And so there I was, a guy whose entire life was politics, and I had become the Vice Presidential nomi nee. And furthermore, I had done it on my own. Heretofore, I had a very strong father to help...58
In a few phrases Eagleton had disclosed his burning desire for political office and his sense of personal accomplishment garnered by achieving the nomination on his own merit, as if it represented some rite of maturity which, having been accomplished, qualified one for entrance into adulthood. This metaphor was emphasized again during the interview:
I've taken the heat by myself and I haven't crumbled. I'm not being smugly complacent, but I think that I have come through a tough crucible, page 83
and I feel a helluva lot stronger as a result. I feel like a man. 59
It was apparent that Eagleton had undergone a catharsis in his own mind as a result of gaining the nomination. Perhaps the "kill" metaphor was then on two different levels for two different "audiences." On the most obvious plateau, Eagleton was attempting to convince the electorate that he no longer suffered from his mental illness. On a more personal level, it appeared that
Eagleton was proud of himself for having gained the nomination independent of his powerful father. He had
"killed" the image of his "father's son," having derived a sense of satisfaction from surviving political puberty.
Perhaps the most important "audience" for Eagleton was himself. He had obviously convinced himself that he could be successful in politics without the aid of his father. By fighting the theme of defeat advanced by the media, Eagleton may have been strengthening the image of manhood in his own mind. He may have had to prove to himself that both his father's son and his former, men tally "weak" self had been transformed into the new, tough man. Remaining on the ticket became his method of proof. The longer and harder he fought on, the more positive the evidence of his transformation. page 84
As the Eagleton affair wound down to its inevitable
close the senator continued to manifest signs that his
remaining on the ticket had become somewhat of a personal
obsession. The candidate had originally taken the "soft’’
approach that he might resign from the ticket if it had
appeared to be politically expedient. After the Anderson
allegations and with the continuing attacks of the press
Eagleton became adamant over his position as the nominee,
asserting that "he was going to fight on whether McGovern wanted him or not."6°
The day prior to Eagleton’s withdrawal from the
race, the senator appeared on the CBS network television
program, "Face the Nation." He still seemed determined
to carry on with the battle, repeatedly informing the
interviewers that he was remaining on the ticket. At
one point he even claimed himself as an asset to the
McGovern campaign effort.
Well, it’s my firm intention...to stay in the race...I think my can didacy meets with a favorable re sponse in the most important area of the world, so far as the elec tion’s concerned, the people...I intend to stay on. I think I'll add 1,2,3, or 4 percentage points to the ticket...I'm convinced... that I’ll add 1,2,3, or 4 percen tage points to the ticket. 6l page 85
Eagleton’s confidence in his transformation must
have been bouyed during the press conference by the
public apology of his number one detractor, Anderson,
who admitted that his source had given him misleading
information. To the senator from Missouri, it probably
seemed as if he had turned the corner. He had been vic
torious over an enemy who had falsly chastized him and a poll taken by Time magazine demonstrated that he was not necessarily a drag on the McGovern candidacy.Eagleton must have sensed ultimate vindication as he left the CBS
studios that Sunday, but any feelings of elation were to be short-lived.
While Eagleton was flashing what he had believed to be a winning smile on the CBS network, Jean Westwood and
Basil Patterson, ardent McGovern supporters and the new co-chairpersons of the Democratic Party, had appeared on the NBC interview program, "Meet the Press." The senator from Missouri heared about their presentation on the radio while driving home from the television studio. During the course of the NBC program Westwood and Patterson
"had dumped him publicly. Mrs. Westwood had phrased it as what 'a noble thing’ it would be if Eagleton quit the 64 ticket." The scapegoat theme, which until now had only been advanced by the press, was becoming the official line of the Democratic Party. page 86
The statements by these two national figures of his party had deflated Eagleton's balloon. Later it was to be reported that the comments from the chairpersons were first cleared through McGovern. ^-5 For the first time
Eagleton realized that his continued candidacy was in , jeapardy.66
Eagleton and McGovern met secretly that Sunday evening, with no official decision reached. It was agreed to meet the following night, Monday, July 31, when a final decision about Eagleton's continued pre sence on the ticket would be made.
The candidates met in the Marble Room of the Senate at the appointed hour. Eagleton later confided to news men that he had attempted to persuade McGovern one more time that the furor over his history of mental illness would shortly run its course.McGovern felt that
Eagleton’s problems had shifted the focus of the media away from the dominant issues of the campaign. "As the days went on, it became clear to me that Senator Eagleton's past medical history has literally dominated the news, it 68 has dominated the political dialogue of this country."
This was a rhetorical transformation for McGovern, and it ■ ' * fll'Uc'V ■ . ' -■ 1. . < | i i i ■ i „pi. -iV' metaphor. At this point, McGovern had decided to empha size the notion of "sacrifice," although his conception of Eagleton-as-scapegoat differed from that advanced by the members of the media. Eagleton’s resignation speech that evening was a combination of both prepared and extemporized address. He again accented the mortification theme, letting it be known that although he was resigning, "Literally thousands and thousands of people have phoned, telegrammed or writ ten to me and Senator McGovern urging me to press on."^9 Eagleton’s rationale for the decision was based upon giving up individual desires for the good of the party; of sacrificing the self for the collective good: I will not divide the Democratic party, which has already too many divisions...My personal feelings are secondary to the necessity to unify the Democratic party and to elect George McGovern as the next President of the United States. 70 Even though it appeared to be his political nadir, Eagleton had gained a certain personal satisfaction in . that he resigned with great dignity. He was congenial in his remarks, even offering to campaign for the new McGovern ticket. In an emotional, extemporized portion of his presentation, Eagleton even managed to praise McGovern's conduct during his time of travail: : page 88 No one could have been finer to me, more considerate, more gene rally concerned and interested in me as a person and in my welfare as a politician than the man that I am proud to call the next Presi dent of the United States, George McGovern. 71 In his conclusion, Eagleton appeared to have demon strated that he had defeated his internal enemy; that the pressure had finalized his transformation. As he proclaimed, "My conscience is clear, my spirits are high...This is definitely not my last press conference and Tom Eagleton is going to be around along, long time."?2 Indeed, in the aftermath of his resignation, Eagleton evidenced his personal renaissance» ’For seven days in a row, I was under the greatest pressure I’ve ever been in my life,' Eagleton told reporters, 'Being my own teacher, I give myself passing, indeed very high marks.' 73 Eagleton had come under heavy fire and had performed admirably under the circumstances. He had intentionally subjected himself to the greatest pressure of his public life and he had not cracked under the strain. Although he no longer possessed the nomination, Eagleton had demonstrated his catharsis to both the public, who now knew that he could withstand pressure without evincing page 89 signs of his former self, and to himself, in that he was not only "cured," hut was his "own man" at last. Although Eagleton did not immediately criticize McGovern's conduct during the campaign, his staff was less generous in their tolerance.7^ The New York Times reported that while the surface statements made by the candidates were calm, a virtual "guerilla war" was escalating between the two staffs. It appeared that "these two largely unseen forces have been crunching away at each other beneath the waves of public reaction."7-’ Eagleton had warned his staff to avoid chastizing McGovern's efforts, explaining to them, "I am not criti cal of anything in this experience in the past week."7^ But his campaign cohorts did not seem to heed Eagleton’s warning. One Eagleton associate told reporters that, "The Titanic was sinking and we were on the last lifeboat 77 leaving." ...members of Mr. Eagleton’s staff were less charitable toward Senator McGovern. One aide said that Mr. McGovern appeared to have pulled the rug out from under Mr. Eagleton just when the tide of public opinion was turning his way. 'I don’t know whether I want to see him in the White House or not,' another Eagle ton aide said of the Presidential nominee. 78 page 90 If Eagleton's aides were disappointed in McGovern's behavior, McGovern's assistants were even more unhappy about Eagleton's conduct during the entire period of his candidacy. After McGovern had made moves suggesting that he was reconsidering his original decision to keep his running-mate, one of the South Dakota Senator's associates complained that Eagleton "sure can't take a hint."79 The McGovern staff was basically "incensed that Senator Eagleton had not told them of his past 8 0 problems before his nomination." Gary Hart, McGovern's campaign chairman, thought that as the crisis progressed the two candidates' staffs "were beginning, at some 81 points, to work at cross purposes." It is understandable that each candidate's campaign staff would attempt to defend its candidate in such a difficult situation. The problem was that the staffs merely added fuel to the fire that resulted, in part, in the loss of McGovern's presidential bid. Eagleton's rhetorical strategies have been discussed. The analysis found that the Senator from Missouri had emphasized the metaphor of the "kill" in his appeals, defining himself as a "changed" man who had overcome his past. By mortifying himself, Eagleton could then take credit for this positive change. The crisis proved to page 91 be a victory for Eagleton, in that he had demonstrated catharsis through mortification, even though he did not remain on the ticket. But the entire affair was to be come a recurring nightmare for the McGovern campaign. Lost was McGovern's reputation as a politician somehow different from the ordinary - a politician who would not, like others, do anything to get elected. McGovern by this time had already antagonized many Americans by his stand on issues. For the first time, after Eagleton, he would incur not merely antagonism but - far worse in politics - contempt for incompetence. 82 Part Three» The Dilemma of George McGovern Right from the start there was a great deal of emo tional controversy surrounding the Eagleton Affair. The newly nominated candidates and party leaders were faced with an immediate, major political crisis. However, "the essence of a political issue is that, as stated, it On cannot be resolved." J Working with Bennett's generali zations it is possible to analyze McGovern's attempts to solve this dilemma: McGovern's rhetorical strategies had created an image of a statesman who would not do anything to insure his election. The Eagleton crisis was to lead to a response on the part of McGovern that appeared to be politically motivated, thus contradicting that image. McGovern's dilemma was that he had become trapped by his own image. page 92 Generalization A: If a political defi nition is to be successful or com pelling, its flexible structural ele ments must become disproportionately grand in scope as successive incre ments of information and action make the event more complex...the more complex the event, the more simple must be its container. 84 Burke has provided additional theoretical emphasis concerning the rhetorical approaches to the changing nature of events: Changes in the environmental struc ture will, of course, call forth changes in the particularities of taionalization, quite as we must employ different devices for salva tion if we fall into water than if we are sliding down a cliff. But the essentials of purpose and gra tification will not change. 85 Unfortunately, McGovern’s initial rhetorical re sponses to the evolving scenario were designed to give unqualified support to his running-mate. This was to have a dibilitating effect on later attempts to change the definition of the situation. At the press conference announcing Eagleton's history of nervous exhaustion, fatigue and depression, McGovern insisted upon expressing every confidence in the man he had chosen, stating that, "There is no one sounder in body, mind and spirit than nZ Tom Eagleton." Then came one of several statements which McGovern would later regret having made: page 93 I am fully satisfied that if I had known every detail that he told me this morning, which is exactly what he has just told you here now, he would still have beeniny choice for the vice presidency of the United States. 87 McGovern thus began his first rhetorical plunge into the Eagleton scenario using language that was too specific. His statements lacked the necessary ambiguity that was to be desperately needed as the affair moved forward. Even though Eagleton had previously exonerated McGovern from any blame for the situation by admitting that the presi dential nominee had not been told of the mental illness 88 problem prior to the nomination, it still would have been a wiser move for the Senator from South Dakota to postpone the final decision on Eagleton remaining on the ticket. Instead there had been a pouring-forth of very positive rhetoric. McGovern had said that the incident displayed "the candor and openness you’re going to get from Senator Eagleton and me. We have no secrets. We 89 have nothing to hide." ' It is painfully evident, then, that McGovern's original position did not realize the value of language ambiguity in constructing definitions for an event. "An event may 'happen,' but its meaning is constructed."9® By limiting his rhetoric to an immediate, specific, page 94 positive response McGovern placed certain limitations upon future definitions. The public would have certain expectations of the candidate who had the aura of being "above politics." Certain moves away from the initial pro-Eagleton stand were to be seen as being against every thing that the nominee stood for. In essence, McGovern would not be able to use the inherent ambiguity of lan guage to alter his definition of the Eagleton Affair when events made it necessary to do so, for "it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; 91 in fact, without such areas, it would be impossible."7 Thus, McGovern began his response to the Eagleton scenario by severly limiting the acceptibility of shifts in his definition of the flow of events. The day after the announcement, July 26, McGovern gave the campaign its most memorable statement, committing simultaneously one of the most devestating rhetorical 92 blunders ever made by a presidential candidate. Angered at a wire service report that he might reconsider his initial deci sion to keep Eagleton on the ticket, Mr. McGovern issued a statement today declaring: 'This is utterly untrue. I am 1,000 per cent for Tom Eagleton and have no intention of dropping him from the ticket. 93 page 95 McGovern's initial rhetorical response had been a gamble. He was attempting to use the disclosure tos (1) demonstrate that his campaign would be totally open and honest; and (2) provide the electorate with the notion that nothing was wrong - to minimize the impact of the disclosure by fully endorsing Eagleton’s continued candi dacy. It was a foolish gamble. The initial definition of the scenario was not well-received. The same day that Eagleton had been given the "1,000 percent" endorsement by McGovern, The New York Times carried a front-page story about powerful city councilman Matthew Troy Jr.'s telephone poll of regular Democrats which ran two-to-one 94 against McGovern's decision to retain Eagleton. At the same time Troy was reporting his poll results many of the nation's newspapers made editorial comments which were unfavorable to the McGovern-Eagleton ticket. The New York Post, The Chicago Tribune, Thé Washington Post, The New York Times and other major journals edi torialized that Eagleton should either resign or be dumped from the Democratic ticket. But McGovern's opening.rhetorical strategy was not geared for handling such adverse reactions. The candidate had been "trapped" by his position, and all he could do was to reiterate his support for his embattled colleague. page 96 As events began to change and the media began to advance their anti-Eagleton theme, McGovern’s definition could not handle the additional information and action. It must then be judged as being an ineffective response. "Effective political definitions depend on the defining agent's ability to locate and choose the most flexible 95 'container' for each fixed element." Yet the McGovern campaign strategists seemingly were continuing to stand by their original approach to the scene, even as that approach proved to be the path to ruin. In a particularly ludicrous attempt to add a positive note to the affair, McGovern campaign chairman Gary Hart proposed that, "President Nixon and Vice Presi dent Agnew join their Democratic challengers in making 96 detailed disclosures about their health." The following rationale was offered: if Senator Eagleton's health history was of importance to the voters 'I assume it's important in all candi dates' cases...' Mr. Hart said that Senator McGovern would be willing to make such information available to the public and that 'some reciprocity' by the Republicans would be in order. 97 The problem with the McGovern approach to the affair at the beginning was that the candidate did not appre ciate the impact of the situation. As previously noted, McGovern had been suprised by the amount of attention page 97 drawn by this particular campaign scenario. His faulty analysis of the situation led to statements such as Hart's, comments which were an attempt to define the scene in a positive manner but which were all too speci fic (or too humorous) to encompass the expanding scenario. Polsby and Wildavsky have noted that, "The swiftly changing nature of events makes it unwise for candidates to lay down all-embracing rules for campaigning which cannot meet special situations as they arise."7 The Eagleton crisis was to take a turn toward another course with the announcement of Anderson’s "driving while intoxi cated" allegation. Additional information was thus thrust into the scene, increasing its complexity. Action had to be taken in response to the allegations, and Eagleton fought Anderson's attack vigorously, as noted previously. McGovern's reaction to this information was to attempt to redefine his initial position regarding Eagleton's remaining on the ticket. Bennett has noted that one dimension along which events may vary is the succession of information and action which characterize unfolding political contests. At each new point along this dimension, we find the po tential for a new configuration of the political issue or event...99 In the McGovern camp the pressure was building con cerning the "dump Eagleton" theme initiated in newspapers page 98 throughout the nation. The Anderson information presen ted McGovern with the possible opportunity to redefine the scene, but his initial definition was so adamantly positive regarding his running-mate that as McGovern shifted his definition his attempts Were contradicted by his original stand. Motivated by his desire to be elected, and with his triumph, end the Vietnam War,1^ McGovern was caught in a political life-and-death struggle. Both he and Eagleton therefore advance different interpreta tions of the scenario after the Anderson announcement. The problem was that McGovern’s definition, despite his cautious approach to the change, was not consistent with his "nonpolitical" image. Burke has provided the theoretical explanation for McGovern's and Eagleton’s different interpretations of the new set of scenic configurations after the Anderson information was released. We discern situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are born. Our minds, as linguistic products, are composed of concepts which select certain relationships . as meaningful. Other groups may select other relationships as mean ingful. These relationships are not realities, they are interpreta tions of reality - hence different frameworks of interpretation will lead to different conclusions as to what reality is. 101 page 99 McGovern and Eagleton, of course, had experienced different circumstances during their lifetimes. While Eagleton was motivated by his desire to demonstrate his personal and public catnarsis, McGovern was motivated by his desire to win office and end the war. This motivation was to be the rationale behind McGovern's change of heart following the Anderson allegations. As late as July 27, McGovern had ordered his staff, many of whom were against Eagleton, not to comment on the situation. At this point McGovern was still firmly behind 102 his running-mate. But on the evening of July 28, after the Anderson disclosures, McGovern "table-hopped" at the dining hall which had been set-up for the working press at his South Dakota retreat. The first signal that McGovern was redefining the scene was when he repeatedly told reporters there that, "to a great extent it was now up to Senator Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri whether he 103 remained as his Democratic running mate." The press immediately grasped this as a definitional shift by McGovern. Senator McGovern repeated his theme too many times for most of those pre sent to think it was accidental... the Presidential nominee was trying to send a message to his Vice-Presi dential partner that he might be a detriment to the ticket. 104 page 100 Of course, there were some practical considerations besides the theoretical arguments about mental, illness and its cures. McGovern's greatest hardship at that time was his lack of campaign contributions. "McGovern's financial problems in the general election began almost immediately, when the Eagleton affair brought the whole campaign to a standstill for several weeks."10-5 Indeed, The New York Times found that, "Among other things, the McGovern campaign's fundraising operations are reported to have come to a virtual halt in the wake of Eagleton’s 106 disclosure." Charles Guggenheim, media advisor to McGovern, detailed the specific amount of money lost as a result of the Eagleton scenario: we came out of the convention with pledges of about $3 million, and then the Eagleton affair took place and none of that money came in. People reneged on their pledges, or they waited to see how that problem was resolved. 107 With little or no money available to spend on the campaign and with Anderson accusing Eagleton of alcho holism, the pressure on McGovern to dump Eagleton, already heavy from the editorialists across the nation, intensified greatly. McGovern later noted the way in which Anderson's commentary had changed the definition of the scenario: page 101 the Jack Anderson episode was funda mentally altering the situation. The allegations created sympathy for Eagleton as an embattled candidate fighting for his political life against false and perhaps even mali cious accusations...the Anderson accusations gave Eagleton an oppor tunity to seize the offensive and to capture the public's sympathy... Eventually he was telling reporters that he was on the national ticket to stay... But the pressure to ask for Tom's withdrawal continued to mount. 108 McGovern apparently realized that he had to respond to the shifting scene by changing his former definition. The picture of an embattled Eagleton fighting against all odds was enhanced by the media's aforementioned interpretation of a growing rift between the two Demo cratic nominees. Thus in a speech he delivered in Aber deen, South Dakota, McGovern penciled in a vague reference that the "jury was still out" concerning the decision to retain Eagleton on the ticket. I do not know how it will come out, but I do know that it gets darkest just before the stars come out. So I ask for your prayers and your patience for Senator Eagleton and me while we deliberate on the proper course ahead. 109 The "table-hopping" incident and the Aberdeen speech provided a signal to the press that McGovern was in the process of redefining the' scene. He had come to the page 102 conclusion that his initial definition, that of firmly supporting Eagleton’s continued candidacy in the hope of riding out the storm of adverse publicity, simply was not working. Unfortunately McGovern’s initial stand was to prove to be too narrow to allow for this shift of stra tegy. In essence, the candidate had violated the poli tical generalization that definitions should be broad enough so that they may be easily transformed. To the extent that these "containers" for the scene were not flexible, the change in definition by McGovern could be viewed as a purely political move by a candidate who had been nurturing the image that he was "not a man who simply picks up ideas to use just to win office."110 The shift was inevitably seen as a change within the image of the "man of principle": "Senator George McGovern appears to have undone much of his effort to establish an image as an unusually candid Presidential candidate... "HI The Democratic nominee declined on Tuesday even to consider Senator Eagleton’s offer to withdraw from the ticket...Three days later, he began orchestrating an attempt to persuade Mr. Eagleton to withdraw from the ticket. 112 This argumentation by the press as to McGovern’s image change was a direct result of the candidate’s original, inflexible definition of the scene: page 103 If flexible and abstract ’containers’ are not offered, new sequences of information and action may require modification of explanations to the point where past definitions may appear to have been arbitrary or even deceitful. 113 The scene had changed, and McGovern's strategies had to be modified to keep pace. But the candidate's original definitions proved to be Incapable of transfor mation. Generalization B: As information and action within a scenario escalate and flexible scenic terms become more gen eral or abstract, the political issue at stake is likely to become defined in terms that are increasingly distant from the elements in the original conflict. 114 Generalization C: Scenic perspectives dictate how bits of information fit together, which bits are more signi ficant than others, and which should be included in or excluded from a satisfactory conceptualization of the issue. 115 These two generalizations have been combined here because they are quite similar. The advent of Anderson’s participation in the Eagleton Affair allowed for the staffs of the principle actors to readjust their defini tions of the unfolding scene. The original definitions of the scenario by both candidates happened to be simple. Eagleton had humbly defended McGovern as having made the correct choice for a running-mate by defending himself. page 104 McGovern had expressed his total support for the Vice Presidential nominee. Then came the Anderson allegations regarding Eagleton's abuse of alchohol. Both candidates rushed to reinterpret the additional information. The expanding scenic configurations of action and information then influenced the rhetorical strategies of the actors. As noted previously, the Eagleton people responded vigorously to these allegations. The Senator from Missouri intensified his rhetoric, continually emphasizing his full determination to remain on the ticket. Eagleton aide Douglas Bennet summed-up how each candidate's staff saw the drunk driving charges: "We viewed it as an oppor- “i “I A tunity.. .They viewed it as another problem. The McGovern position then moved from one of full support of Eagleton to a more tentative position. Hart noted the effect of both the Anderson commentary and Eagleton's verbal pugnacity on the McGovern position: A whole new layer was added with the Anderson matter...Now Eagleton was fighting for his political life... And that might not have been in the best interest of the.McGovern cam paign. It was a question of what's best for getting George McGovern elected...They no longer needed our approval for him to defend himself. Then it was right and just. Now it was Eagleton defending Eagleton, no longer Eagleton protecting McGovern. 117 page 105 As a result of this expanding scene McGovern shifted his definition. "Such shifts of interpretation make for totally different pictures of reality, since they focus the attention upon different orders of relationship."11® In this case, McGovern had begun his inevitable shift from his original emphasis on the "kill" metaphor to an emphasis upon the concept of "sacrifice." This shift in metaphor appeared to disillusion many of McGovern’s more idealistic supporters. Men in politics are judged, often unfairly, by their pretensions; McGovern, having offered himself as a contrast to the practitioners of the Old Politics, suffered for having behaved like them in the Eagleton case. 'Now,' groaned one young volunteer, 'while we’re building our image the wrong way, Nixon can lie low and come out in September as the bright new face.' The McGovernites had counted on having it the other way round - on pitting McGovern the man of prin ciple against Mr. Nixon the man of politics. ’If McGovern becomes just another politician,’ one campaign topsider conceded during the victory celebrations at Miami Beach, ’he’s in trouble.' By that standard, a good many Democrats guessed in the ashy aftermath of the Eagleton affair that McGovern is in trouble right now. 119 The reordering of the relationship between Eagleton and McGovern began with the "table-hopping" incident. At that time, the key phrase had changed from McGovern's page 106 rhetorical viewpoint. Up until dinner on the evening of July 28, McGovern had held that Eagleton should decide for himself if he wished to remain on the ticket. That night McGovern’s phrase shifted, making it clear that now he believed that "to a great extent" the decision would be 120 m Eagleton's hands. McGovern's rationalization for the change in interpretation was rather weak. He had ex plained that he had supported Eagleton’s continued candi dacy heavily at first because "he had not wanted to offend the many people in the nation who had family members who 121 had suffered from mental illness." McGovern’s attempt to redefine the scene as one. of him fully supporting Eagleton's sanity while becoming tentative in his support of Eagleton's continued candi dacy was at best misunderstood by the press and by Eagleton. For example, McGovern informed the media on July 29 that he was "with Senator Eagleton all the way until he and I have had a chance to talk...And there may 1 22 not beany change then." • To the press, already stres sing the theme that Eagleton had to be dumped, this de velopment became a sign that McGovern was weakening in his original position. Perhaps it was to be such a sig nal, or perhaps McGovern was merely testing the waters of public opinion, for the Presidential candidate still page 107 insisted that he had not made up his mind that Eagleton had to he dumped. McGovern was attempting a more neutral stand, failing to realize that "speech in its essence is not neutral. Far from aiming at suspended judgment, the spontaneous speech of a people is loaded with judgments."123 McGovern was trying to shift the meaning of his earlier positive-comments by relating them to Eagleton*s mental stability rather than to his continuation on the ticket. This redefinition simply did not work. By the time McGovern had decided to dump Eagleton, the Senator from Missouri had managed to obtain a good deal of sympathetic support from the electorate. Eagle- ton’s private mail was running ten-to-one in favor of 1 24 his remaining on the ticket. McGovern's definitional shift appeared to throw him into the same anti-Eagleton bin with Anderson, and Eagleton was successfully defining that situation as being one of unjust accusation. Patrick Cadell, McGovern's pollster, described the outcome of the Eagleton scenario in terms of the sympathy it had generated for the Missouri Senator: By the fall campaign, the most popu lar person in the country was not the President, or Senator Kennedy, or Senator Humphrey, or Senator McGovern - but Senator Eagleton. And his popularity was derived from the fact that people felt he had gotten a raw deal. 125 page 108 McGovern's attempted transformation was not working. The original information concerning the Eagleton Crisis was that Eagleton had been hospitalized for a mental disorder which had subsequently been cured. At issue were Eagleton’s current abilities, his decision not to immediately inform McGovern of his past experiences prior to accepting the nomination, and McGovern's lack of thorough ness in checking the background of his ticket partner. The candidates responded to these issues by: (1) McGovern fully backing Eagleton and giving support to his position on the ticket and to his complete transformation from his mentally troubled self to his competent self (the "kill metaphor); (2) Eagleton protecting McGovern by admitting that the Presidential nominee had not known of the illness prior to Eagleton’s nomination, at the same time explaining his own behavior by defining the illness as being like "a broken leg that had been healed" (Eagleton’s mortification). Because it was something that could easily be forgotten in the excitement of the nomination, the past illness had been pictured as mundane; (3) McGovern's staff taking the blame for the original lack of investigation concerning Eagleton while scapegoating the California delegate chal lenge as taking away the time needed to search for a run ning-mate (the "legalistic" scapegoating of the Old Guard). page 109 After the Anderson information escalated the scenario to its political peak the intrigue became intensified. Time referred to the "almost Mafia-like atmosphere de- -I 2 A veloped amid the rustic charms of McGovern's retreat." The scenic constraints made McGovern's original definition ineffective. Eagleton*s hand was strengthened by his firery righteous indignation over the allegations of drunk driving, and was transformed into a sympathetic figure. When McGovern changed his definition, he was guilty of "pulling the rug out from under" his friend. Much worse, the move was labeled as being "political," a word that did not fit into the McGovern image. McGovern's original definition had been too narrow. Bennett has noted that: Successful definition of political situations are successful by virtue of the fact that the original points of conflict have been translated in to, or placed in context of, terms which mitigate or transform the ori ginal sense of the conflict. 12? Eagleton’s definition of the scene after the Ander son charges was that he was an underdog, unjustly be- leagured by his political enemies. This interpretation of the events was exerting sufficient "power" over the scene that McGovern’s redefinition of events appeared to add credence to the Eagleton rhetoric. page 110 Definitions become powerful (i.e. come to exercise increasing con trol over successive scenarios) in proportion to the degree to which they transform the origi nal terms of the political equa tion. 128 Even with McGovern’s attempts to generate the idea that the final decision on Eagleton had not yet been made, members of the press continued to prevail with the theme that the removal of Eagleton from the ticket was Inevitable. They reported that members of the McGovern staff had examined the procedures for replacing Eagleton if he were to resign. Indeed, this was a precautionary gesture on the part of the McGovern camp, but it was taken as another sign that McGovern would ask for and 129 receive Eagleton’s resignation. Then came Westwood and Patterson and their state ments on national television, explaining that Eagleton’s resignation would be a "noble thing." McGovern was said to have been consulted before the program on that comment, and had been said to have endorsed Westwood’s decision. In his autobiography, Grassroots, McGovern denied that he had agreed to Westwood's commentary. On Meet the Press earlier that day, Jean Westwood and Basil Patterson... said that Eagleton could best serve public interest by withdrawing from the ticket...The truth is that I page 111 never discussed the matter at all with Patterson and my only knowledge of Jean Westwood’s intentions came in a telephone call just before air time,..I asked her if she thought it was necessary to make the state ment. She hurriedly said yes...l30 Whatever the circumstances, the net effect of the commentary from the pro-McGovern party chairperson was to assure that Eagleton had finally received the message that many of his fellow Democrats thought that he should resign. On the evening of July 31» McGovern met with Eagle ton. Although an Eagleton aide later stated that the senator "felt that he might possibly persuade George 131 McGovern the person to change his mind," the decision had already been made. At a press conference following their meeting Eagleton and McGovern presented brief statements and answered questions concerning the resigna tion and the entire affair. Because this conference proved to be a final attempt to redefine the events of the Eagleton scenario to McGovern’s benefit, it repre sents another "frozen moment." The meeting was a last- ditch attempt to create the positive interpretation of the scene, and as such it will be treated in the following section of this chapter with an extension of a previous methodological perspective. page 112 Part Four; The Resignation The attempt here is to consider what should be the over-all terms for naming relationships and developments that, mutatis mutandis, are likely to figure in all human association. To this end, the stress is placed upon the motives of Guilt, Redemption, Hierarchy, and Victimage...132 In order to demonstrate the motivations inherent in the use of language during the resignation press con ference the methodology utilized in this section is an extension of an earlier tool derived from the Burkean secularization of the Christian pattern of original sin and sacrificial redeemer. Prior to the analysis is the text of the prepared statements offered at that time by both Eagleton and McGovern. The arguments presented by each candidate in the question and answer period of the meeting are used in the analysis as support for the assignment of motivations. McGovern Statement: Ladies and gentle men, Senator Eagleton and I will each open with a brief prepared statement and then we will be glad to respond to any questions you might have. Senator Eagleton and I have met this evening to discuss his Vice- Presidential candidacy. I have con sistently supported Senator Eagleton. He is a talented, able United States Senator whose ability will make him a prominent figure in American politics for many, many years. I am fully satisfied that his health is excellent. I page 113 I base that conclusion upon my conversations with his doctors and my close personal and political association with him. In the joint decision that we have reached tonight health was not a factor. But the public debate over Senator Eagleton’s past medical history con tinues to divert attention from the great national issues that need to be discussed. I have referred to the growing pressures to ask for Senator Eagleton’s withdrawal. We have also seen growing vocal support for his candidacy. Sena tor Eagleton and I agree that the para mount needs of the Democratic party and the nation in 1972 are unity and a full discussion of the real issues before the country. Continued debate between those who oppose his candidacy and those who favor It will serve to further divide the party and the nation. Therefore, we had jointly agreed that the best course is for Senator Eagleton to step aside. I can assure you that I welcome his strong help in this campaign. Eagleton Statement: As Senator McGovern has stated, he and I are jointly in agreement that I should withdraw as the Democratic candidate for Vice President. Needless to say, this was not an easy decision for Senator McGovern or for me. Literally thousands and thousands of people have phoned, telegrammed or written to me and Senator McGovern urging me to press on. But ladies and gentlemen, I will not divide the Democratic party, which has already too many divisions. Therefore, tomorrow morning I will write to the chairman of the Democratic party withdrawing my candidacy. page 114 My personal feelings are secondary to the necessity to unify the Democra tic party and to elect George McGovern as the next President of the United States. Thank you. Wait a minute. I’ve got more to say. Please he patient. The best is yet to come. My conscience is clear, and my spirits are high. I want to make this, to use Presi dent Nixon’s favorite term, ’crystal clear.’ This is definitely not my last press conference and Tom Eagleton is going to be around a long time. Wait a minute, two more sentences. I am for George McGovern and I'm going to continue working to see him elected President of the United States. Let me add, although it's not in the prepared statement. I wish to take the liberty of adding a personal sen tence to what I've just read. I said some time during the week that there used to be a TV show called 'That Was the Week That Was.' And this was a week that really was. No one could have been finer to me, more consider ate, more generally concerned and in terested in me as a person and in my welfare as a politician than the man that I'm proud to call the next Presi dent of the United States, George McGovern. 133 In the analysis of the definitions and motivations of McGovern and Eagleton as expressed in the resignation meeting the secularized Burkean religious pattern will be applied to the rhetorical transformations of the candi dates' positions. page 115 Basically, the pattern proclaims a principle of absolute 'guilt,’ matched be a principle that is de signed for the corresponding abso lute cancellation of such guilt. And this cancellation is contrived by victimage, by the choice of a sacrificial offering that is corres pondingly absolute in the perfection of its fitness. 134 Thus it is possible to witness the "guilt" of the campaign in terms of both McGovern’s failure to research adequately the history of his running-mate and Eagleton’s sin of ommission in not telling McGovern about his pro blems until some time after the nomination. But the candidates did not admit their "guilt" per se, nor, quite possibly, could they. Eagleton remained the victim - the perfect sacrifice that would purge the original sins noted above - but the guilt was shifted from the two candidates' sins to more secularly committed evils. The guilt, essentially, was that which kept the more important poli tical issues, such as the war in Vietnam, from being pub licly discussed. This was partially the fault of the campaign for keeping Eagleton on the ticket for so long, but the implied fault also belonged to the press for ig noring more fundamental issues in order to concentrate their coverage upon the Eagleton history of mental dis orders; in short, ignoring the present for the past. page 116 This is evident in McGovern's opening statement When he noted that "the public debate over Senator Eagleton’s past medical history continues to divert attention from the great national issues that need to be discussed." In the question-and-answer period, McGovern strongly continued to advance that theme: As the days went on it became clear to me that Senator Eagleton’s past medical history, not the state of his health today, which I think is excel- lent...but his past medical history has literally dominated the news...I would hope that this election would be decided on the record of the Nixon Administration vs. the alter native that I'll be offering in the months ahead...135 McGovern hinted at the role of the press in his definitional shift later as he attempted to place some of the blame upon the media. Ladies and gentlemen, look at the press, at the news, at the maga zines. This has been the issue that has blotted out all of the central questions before the nation. It’s not in the interest of this country at a time when we have so many cru cial challenges facing us that a major campaign of this kind gets off on a side issue such as the past medical history of one of the candi dates. 136 Thus the "guilt" was shared by McGovern, Eagleton, and the press. But McGovern felt that he had not com mitted any serious transgressions in nominating Eagleton. page 117 The candidate stated that he was "not so sure that we were in error in the checks that were made on Senator 137 Eagleton." Of course, Eagleton had earlier charac terized his ommission of the subject of his illness in the original telephone conversation as if it were "a , broken leg that had healed." In the opening statement the resigning candidate referred to the "thousands and thousands of people" who had expressed their desire to see him continue.1-^ Thus, McGovern and Eagleton were not simply accepting the guilt for the scenario. Instead, the sin became that of the media's over-exposure of the history of Eagleton at the expense of the pressing issues of the present campaign. Although the McGovern rhetoricians had now shifted the burden of guilt onto the shoulders of the media, they still needed a victim to offer; a cathartic sacrifice. In the Christ story, the sinless Victim dies for the guilt of the sinful masses. In the Eagleton scenario the McGovern strategy appeared to be one of demonstrating Eagleton's lack of "sin" ("I am fully satisfied that his health is excellent") in order to sacrifice the Vice Presidential nominee, thereby atoning for the "sins" of the media, which had erred by neglecting the "real" issues of the campaign (a "perfect" campaign being based on page 118 a clash of the issues, according to McGovern) while con centrating upon the past of one of the candidates. In order to return to a discussion of the issues, Eagleton had to be sacrificed for the sins of the press - thus his candidacy was terminated. Hence, insofar as the religious pattern is adequate to the 'cathar tic' needs of a human hierarchy... . • it would follow that the promoting of social cohesion through victi- mage is 'normal' and 'natural.' 139 But the McGovern version of Eagleton-as-scapegoat differed from that advanced by the media. The press viewed Eagleton as a fatalistic sacrifice, while McGovern characterized Eagleton as being the "perfect" sacrificej We may make him worthy by a subtle kind of poetic justice, in making the sacrificial vessel 'too good for this world,' hence of the high est value, hence the most perfect sacrifice. 140 Characteristically, McGovern had presented Eagleton to the public as being "without sin" in that he was mentally competent. McGovern had praised his running- mate greatly, attempting to make the resignation appear as if it were the price that the campaign had to pay in order to make the media concentrate upon the substantive issues which McGovern wished to discuss. page 119 In addition to the hoped-for catharsis stemming from Eagleton being dropped from the ticket, the arguments presented at the conference stressed the need to unite the Democratic party. The opening statements of both candidates referred to the need to halt debate over the Eagleton situation which would only "serve to further divide the party and the nation." The nomination was being sacrificed not only for the "guilt" of the press but also for the "guilt" of the Democrats - disunity. If Eagleton could make the supreme sacrifice for the party, could others not do likewise? Eagleton played his role of the "perfect" sacrifice well, returning to his original mortification strategy. By mortifying himself in his statement Eagleton had placed himself beneath his party and the election of McGovern. "Greater love no man has than to lay down his life for a friend." By sacrificing himself for the good of the body, Eagleton was imitating the Christ figure. As the Senator declared: "My personal feelings are secon dary to the necessity to unify the Democratic party and to elect George McGovern as the next President of the United States." Here he was limiting himself, in the process demonstrating a form of "other-orientation." Even later in the question session Eagleton responded to page 120 an inquiry concerning how he and McGovern had decided that he should resign: I then said to Senator McGovern that which I have repeated time and again ...namely, that if, despite whatever my belief was or desire, he felt that my continued candidacy would in any way be a handicap to the ticket, he should feel free to express himself. l4l Through this strategy Eagleton attempted to leave the ticket with a "touch of class." He was, certainly, an unwilling victim. But given the opportunity to demonstrate his good nature through mortification he came through the crisis as the "perfect" sacrifice. McGovern still had to smite inquiries as to why he had not fully checked into Eagleton's past prior to his nomination. Rather than admit the error of oversight, McGovern repeated the scapegoating of the politicians responsible for the California challenge. In essence, McGovern attempted to transform his adversaries within the party - the purveyours of the "Old Politics" - into "legalistic" scapegoats by making them "an offender against legal or moral justice so that (they 'deserve' what they get)."1^ Simultaneously McGovern was cautious not to lay the blame for the crisis upon Eagleton, thus upholding the image of the "perfect" scapegoat. Indeed, he even went page 121 so far as to mortify himself, relating to the media that any "blame" for an error in his camp concerning the Cali fornia challenge was his: we did think we had the nomination sewed up after the California pri mary and the time that we expected to use in preparation for the na tional convention was totally ab sorbed in the California challenge which threatened to rob us of the delegates that we had won in that all-important primary. And we didn’t have the time and the deliberation that were needed...That’s the kind of thing that happened as a consequence of the California challenge. 143 By scapegoating those responsible for the California challenge and by mortifying himself McGovern attempted to repair his damaged image and the image of the "New Poli tics" which he represented. This strategy was ineffective and McGovern was to be held responsible for the affair throughout that campaign. For the McGovern team, the motivation seemed to come down to the notion of perfection. The "perfect" campaign was one in which the issues became the basis upon which the election was won or lost - issues such as the war, the economy and education were paramount. The dumping of Eagleton was to allow the campaign to return to its proper perfection, at least from the McGovern page 122 perspective. "Individual acts...can be conceived...in l44 terms of a corresponding perfection.11 The perfect campaign, in this case, could only be achieved by the sacrifice of the perfect victim. But because of the principle of a ’perfect’ victim is so implicit in the very concept of victimage, and because men have so ’natural* or spontaneous a desire for a ’perfect’ view of their discomforts, they are eager to tell themselves of victims so thoroughgoing that the sacrifice of such offerings would bring about a correspondingly thoroughgoing cure. 145 McGovern was willing to make himself believe that the sacrifice of Eagleton’s candidacy would allow him to wage the "perfect" campaign. No longer would the press have the story of Eagleton’s past frailties to carry. He was correct. During the fall campaign the media rarely mentioned Thomas Eagleton. Instead, they concen trated on the flaws within McGovern’s image, many of which had first surfaced in the candidate’s handling of the Eagleton Affair. Aftermath There is no question that the Eagleton Affair had badly damaged the McGovern i#mage. Most of the commentary following the scenario appeared to dwell upon one of two themes: (1) McGovern’s lack of leadership ability; (2) the page 123 "politicizing" of the heretofore "nonpolitical" presiden tial candidate. McGovern's image itself had been developed too narrowly - it could not allow for the influx of new information which suggested that McGovern might have some political motivations. It was not only McGovern's initial pro-Eagleton stand which led to his downfall in this affair; it was also his image. Since image is a function of rhetoric, McGovern’s failure to recognize and utilize the inherent ambiguity of language had shattered his image. After working through the primaries "to establish an image as an unusually candid Presidential candidate,"^6 McGovern had conveyed the impression to the electorate that "he somehow was not a politician in the customary sense - that he was more open, more accessible, more attuned to issues and more idealistic than other „1*7 candidates. ' Unfortunately for McGovern, the actions taken during the crisis seemed to illustrate to many 148 voters "that he is, after all, a politician." Another problem in the aftermath of the affair was the damage to McGovern’s image as a leader - a part of the overall campaign image. To many voters it had appeared that the "issue in this whole sad Eagleton business is not only Senator Eagleton's health, but Sena „1^9 tor McGovern' s judgment. Doubts about the liberal page 124 Senator’s ability to govern "have grown with the Eagleton Affair. Mr. McGovern seemed to have been hasty and lack ing in judgment when making what could be the most impor tant choice of his career."1^° Newspapers such as The Wall Street J ournal chastized McGovern for his "indeci siveness" in dealing with the events of the Eagleton scenari• o. 15J1 McGovern’s leadership capabilities, already in doubt in some segments of the electorate (as will be demonstrated in the succeeding chapter) were given a severe blow by his conduct during the Eagleton Affair. This serves as a reminder of the idea that McGovern’s definitions were not well received by the voting public. The damage to the campaign image for McGovern was felt most on the campuses of our nation’s colleges and universities. Pat Cadell, McGovern's chief pollster, found that: Enthusiasm for McGovern certainly declined on a lot of campuses as a result of his dropping Eagleton for what looked like a political reason. They had thought he was different from other politicians. 152 Additional ramifications of the effect of the Eagleton Affair on the McGovern image will be dealt with in Chapter Pour. page 125 Although the results of the Eagleton scenario could 153 be termed to be but "one rock in the landslide," people vote on such phenomena. This was a particularly peculiar episode in a national campaign, and it was of particular importance in the 1972 election results. Senator Eagleton is at this writing still a United States Senator from Missouri. At the conclusion of the scenario he had obviously convinced his constituency of his sanity. More importantly, he had convinced himself that he could endure terrible pressure and not "crack." It is somewhat ironic that McGovern best summarized the Eagleton image as transformed by this ordeal: Few men or women in the history of American politics have been under more pressure than Senator Eagleton has during this past week, and he's held up well. He's maintained his poise. He's maintained his dignity, and I’m very proud of him. I'm proud of the way he’s conducted him self. 154 McGovern had expressed what the American public had felt concerning Eagleton. How the voters felt about McGovern, however, was a totally different matter. Indeed, his loss of credibility as a leader in the eyes of many people urged the media to concentrate upon this facet of his image rather than the "real" issues during some parts of the fall campaign. page 126 The strengths and weaknesses of the Eagleton and McGovern rhetorical strategies have been examined. Eagleton’s perspective has been characterized as being motivated by his desires to demonstrate both a public and a personal catharsis. His survival in politics to this day demonstrates the successful completion of his image transformation. McGovern’s concern for the issues moti vated the cathartic sacrifice of Eagleton's nomination. McGovern attempted to shift the guilt from himself and from Eagleton to the media's emphasis on the past medical history of Eagleton instead of their concentration upon the "real" issues of the campaign. Unlike Eagleton's definitions, McGovern's inter pretations of the scene were ineffective, leading to public questioning of his capacity to govern. "The ele ments of a political conflict underlying a definition of a situation may become apparent only when a scenario fails to achieve plausibility or flexibility."^35 McGovern's version of the scenario failed to achieve the flexibility necessary for it to become the dominant interpretation of the events which composed the scene. The political con flict which followed the affair was between McGovern and his shaken political image. As the candidate surmised in *1 ^6 Grassroots, "landslides begin With one rock." page 127 Notes for Chapter II y, Thomas F. Eagleton, "Acceptance Speech for Vice President," Vital Speeches, August 15, 1972, p. 642. 2. ibid, p. 642. 3. Ernest R. May and Janet Fraser, ed., Campaign '72: The Managers Speak (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-: versity Press, 1973), P« 141-142. v/f. For an in-depth, historical account of the "Eagleton Affair" see Theodore White, The Making of the Presi dent: 1972 (New York: Antheneum Publishers, 1973)• These historical notes are largely based upon his account. 5. White, p. 264. 6. Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 19- 7. Newsweek, July 24, 1972, p. 17« 8. "Excerpts from Eagleton News Parley," The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 9. The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 12. 10. "Excerpts from Eagleton News Parley," p. 13- 11. "Excerpts from Television Interview with Senator Eagleton by Three Newsmen," The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 13. 12. Newsweek, July 24, 1972, p. 29- 13. ibid, p. 20. 14. The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 24. 15. White, p. 263. 16. ibid, p. 263. I?. Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 18. 18. Newsweek, July 24, 1972, p. 28. page 128 19« Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 18. 20. White, p. 264-265. 21. The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 22. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), P« 2Ë9. 23. ibid, p. 289. 24. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York: Random House, 1957)» P« 3^. 25- Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, William Rueckert, ed. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 466. 26. Burke, Philosophy, p. 40. 27. The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 28. ibid, p. 12. 29. Burke, Permanence, p. 35- 30. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: World Publishing Co., 1962), p. xxi. 31. The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 32. Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 19. 33. The New York Times, July 27, 1972, p. 1. 34. The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 35. ibid, p. 12. 36. Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 15. 37. ibid, p. 15. 38. The New York Times, July 28, 1972, p. 1. 39- Burke, Philosophy, p. 3^- 40. ibid, p. 35« page 129 41. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. 42. David L. Altheide, "Mental Illness and the News: The Eagleton Story," Sociology and Social Research,' Vol. 61, no. 2, p. 138-155. 43. Altheide, p. 142. The author cites White, p. 275» for further documentation. Other reasons offered for the affair receiving massive media coverage include Eagleton’s relatively unknown stature with the national press corps and the factor that mental illness was "unique" as a political topic (p. 143- 145). 44. ibid, p. l4l. 45- ibid, p. 145. 46. White, p. 271. 47. Newsweek, August 7» 1972, p. 17* 48. ibid, p. 17. 49- Time, August 7, 1972, p. 13» 50. ibid, p. 13. 51• ibid, p. 13• 52. The New York Times, July 27, 1972, p. 1. 53. Time, August 7, 1972, p. 15- 54. ibid, p. 11. 55» Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 19« 56. ibid, p. 17 ■ 57- ibid, p. 18. 58. ibid, p. 19- 59. ibid, p. 19. 60. Time, August 7. 1972, p. page 130 61. "Excerpts from Television Interview with Senator Eagleton by Three Newsmen," p. 13. 62. ibid, p. 13. 63. Time, August 7, 1972, p. 12. The poll revealed that Eagleton’s announcement of his mental problems had no effect on the voting patterns of 76.7 percent of those questioned. Indeed, 3-8 percent of those responding felt that they would be more, likely to vote for McGovern after the announcement. A survey published by Newsweek that week also demonstrated that voters were beginning to sympathize with Eagleton, but not to the extent that the Time survey had indicated (68 percent). August 7, 1972, p. 13- 64. White, p. 272. 65. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. The paper reported that "Mr. McGovern is said to have cleared that move." White revealed that McGovern, in fact, did approve Westwood’s comments prior to the program (p. 272). 66. White, p. 272. 67. "Eagleton Withdraws from Race at the Request of McGovern," The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 24. 68. ibid, p. 24. 69. "Withdrawal," Vital Speeches, August 15, 1972, p. 643. 70. ibid, p. 643. 71. ibid, p. 643. 72. ibid, p. 643. 73• Time, August 14, 1972, p. 20. 74. "Candidates' Staffs Wage Below-Surface Struggle," The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 12. 75. ibid, p. 12. 76. Time, August 14, 1972, p. 20. page 131 77. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. 78. ibid, p. 20. 79- The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 12. 80. ibid, p. 12. 81. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. 82. White, p. 275- 83. W. Lance Bennett, "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 8, no. 1 (1975), P» 27. Bennett quotes Jouvenal for support: What makes a problem 'political' is precisely that its terms admit no solution properly so-called. There are, no doubt, some matters coming up for decision by public authori ties where the conditions to be met are somewhat complex, and where the finding of a solution is an intel lectual task. But such problems, capable of solution are quietly sol ved offstage by experts. What con stitutes 'a political problem' is the clashing of terms, that is, its unsolvability. Bertrand de Jouvenal, The Pure Theory of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 207. 84. Bennett, p. 38. 85- Burke, Permanence, p. 162. 86. The New York Times« July 26, 1972, p. 1. 87. George S. McGovern, Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern (New York: Random House, 1977/» p. 207. 88. The New York Times, July 26, 1972, p. 12. 89. ibid, p. 12. page 132 90. Bennett, p. 23. 91. Burke, Grammar, p. xxi. 92. White asserted that "it was possibly the most damaging single faux pas ever made by a Presi dential candidate" (p. 269-270). 93• The New York Times, July 27, 1972, p. 1. 94. ibid, p. 1; 32. 95- Bennett, p. 36. 96. The New York Times, July 27, 1972, p. 1. 97- ibid, p. 1. 98. Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "The Cam paign," Politics, 1972, Francis M. Carney and H. Frank Way, Jr., ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), P- 143. 99- Bennett, p. 29. 100. Campaign biographer Robert Sam Anson characterized the Vietnam conflict as McGovern’s "magnificent obsession." McGovern: A Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 101. Burke, Permanence, p. 35« 102. The New York Times, July 28, 1972, P- 12 I03. The New York Times, July 29, 1972, p. 1. 104. The New York Times, July 30, I972, P- 36 105- Heibert E. Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1976), p. 295. 106. The New York Times, July 29, 1972, p. 1. Hart stated that, "There was no question that it set back our . financing of the fall campaign by three or four weeks, and that proved to be a very difficult problem for us" (Campaign '72, p. 202). page 133 107. Campaign '72, p. 202. 108. Grassroots, p. 209. 109. ibid, p. 211. 110. "Size-Up of McGovern by a Student of the Presidency," U.S. News and World Report, July 31, 1972, p. 48. 111. "The McGovern Image," The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 12. 112. ibid, p. 12. 113. Bennett, p. 38. 114. ibid, p. 39. 115. ibid, p. 40. 116. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. 117. ibid, p. 20. 118. Burke, Permanence, p. 36. 119- Newsweek, August 14, 1972, p. 20. 120. "McGovern Indicates a Change in Position on Keeping Eagleton," The New York Times, July 29, 1972, p. 10. 121. ibid, p. 10. 122. The New York Times, July 30, 1972, p. 1. 123. Burke, Permanence, p. 176-177- 124. Newsweek, August 14, 1972, p. 20. 125- Campaign '72, p. 211. 126. Time, August 7, 1972, p. 13. 127. Bennett, p. 39« 128. ibid, p. 40. page 134 129» The New York Times, July 29, 1972, p. 10. 130. Grassroots, p. 212. 131. "Behind the Eagleton Withdrawal: Confusion and Doubt," The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 20. 132. Burke, Permanence, p. 274. 133» "McGovern, Eagleton Statements and News Parley," The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 25- 134. Burke, Permanence, p. 283-284. 135» The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 25. 136. ibid, p. 25. 137. ibid, p. 25. 138. ibid, p. 25. 139« Burke, Permanence, p. 284. 140. Burke, Philosophy, p. 35« 141. The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 25- 142. paraphrasing Burke, Philosophy, p. 35- 143» The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 25- 144. Burke, Permanence, p. 292. 145. ibid, p. 293. 146. James M. Naughton, "The McGovern Image," The New York Times, July 31, 1972, p. 12. 147. ibid, p. 12. 148. ibid, p. 12. 149. James Reston, "McGovern's Misjudgments," The New York Times, July 28, 1972, p. 31• 150. The Economist, Vol. 244, no. 6728, August 5, 1972, p. l¥? page 135 151. The Wall Street J ournal, August 2, 1972. 152. Campaign '72, p. 220. 153. Grassroots, p. 216. 154. The New York Times, August 1, 1972, p. 25. 155. Bennett, p. 39. 156. Grassroots, p. 216. page 136 CHAPTER III: MCGOVERN'S CAMPAIGN IMAGE AS A FUNCTION OF CAMPAIGN ISSUES: THE POLITIZATION OF AN ANGRY PROPHET The issues of 1972 alone will present voters with one of the clearest choices between candidates they have been offered since F.D.R. ran on his New Deal innova tions against Alf Landon in 1936. 1 After the Eagleton Affair had drawn to its inevi table close, McGovern attempted to "pick-up-the-pieces" of his shattered campaign, beginning to concentrate all of his efforts on defining the pressing issues of the day. After all, Eagleton’s candidacy had been sacrificed for the perfection of the campaign: this was to be an elec tion in which voters would make decisions based upon the position of the candidates on the issues. Accordingly, preparations were made and the senator and his staff feverishly attempted to stem the now visible erosions in the basic strength of the Democratic bulwark. This chapter examines McGovern's campaign image as a function of the issues of the 1972 election. The dis cussion is organized into five areas. The first section of the chapter analyzes the audience targeted for the McGovern and Nixon campaign appeals. In the case of the McGovern campaign, the strategy involved was based upon certain assumptions concerning the American electorate - assumptions which were, for the most part, unfounded. page 137 The second, third, and fourth sections of this chapter examine the McGovern image as a function of Bennett's categorizations of policy, personality and 2 leadership concerns. The conclusion of the chapter summarizes the elements which tarnished the McGovern neo-populist political image which had been carefully 3 polished in the primaries. Part One; The Real Majority It is a principle of Dramatism that "a leader who is regarded as the epitome of his times is necessarily 4 an artful exponent of the quality of setting." Any candidate running for President must carefully analyze his audience for the election, for in many cases audi ences are the political setting. A candidate must under stand: (l) the key issues in the public perspective; and (2) the definitions of those issues which will be accep table to the electorate. As with any Presidential candidate, McGovern had felt as if he had his finger on the pulse of the American electorate. He had interpreted its quickened pace as demonstrated in the anti-war riots and the restlessness concerning the nation's economy as evidence of a growing anger toward "business as usual." Based upon; this inter pretation of the American scene, McGovern had assumed that page 138 a new coalition was forming within the ranks of the people and that it was composed of young people, antiwar people, sub urbanites, farmers, blue-collar workers, blacks, Mexican-Americans - that is ready to react directly to a political leader and isn't waiting for any orders from party leaders, labor leaders, farm leaders, even church leaders. 5 This concept of a new political coalition, a combi nation of numerous and heretofore seperate voting blocks within American society, became the basic assumption of the McGovern rhetorical strategy that autumn. It was decided that McGovern was to play Moses to the imprisoned, the disenfranchised, the disgruntled; delivering them from a morally decaying society into the promised land. In essence, the McGovern camp believed that the old "New Deal" coalition of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was rapidly being replaced by a neo-populist coalition of the politi cally disenchanted. These diverse groups could be molded together to form a new "Change Coalition" by a candidate who would be the "artful exponent of the quality of setting." In the views of Senator McGovern ...and other of this wing of the Democratic party...power in the next decade will belong to a 'change coalition,' a collection of otherwise disparate social groups united by dissatisfaction page 139 with the status quo and by a com mitment to equalitarian, popular, or liberal changes. The McGovern presidential campaign...was predi cated on the assumption that this change coalition could attain suf ficient maturity to capture the presidency in 1972. 6 This Change Coalition was highly visible during the Democratic nominating convention in July. Equal partici pation for all groups within the party had been assured through the implementation of the McGovern Commission’s reformed rules for delegate selection - rules which were impemented through the establishment of a quota system for female, youth and minority participation in each state’s convention delegation. The rules changes had taken place just in time for the 1972 primary season, and McGovern the candidate had benefitted in those elections from the work of McGovern the reformer. The changes would have supposedly assured that the convention dele gates represented a cross-section of the American voting public. The result was something less than perfection« There was no quota system for Catho lics, or old people, or ethnic mino rities, or union members, or veterans or non-college graduates. The Wash ington Post reported that an astoni shing 45 per cent of the McGovern delegates had taken postgraduate work. Only about 4 per cent of the American voters have taken postgraduate work, and only about 11 per cent have fini shed a four-year college. 7 page 140 Additional demographic information demonstrates that the picture of this Change Coalition televised from the floor of the Democratic convention was being received in 8 homes which were "middle-aged, middle-class" and "white." While McGovern*s coalition at the convention was highly educated, only 62 percent of those voters "out there" had graduated from high school, and only 29 percent had 9 even some college background. While it was evident from the media that protests against the Vietnam conflict and other societal problems had occured with some frequency in the late sixties and early seventies (the American council of Education re ported that in April of 1972 fully 27 percent of all college campuses had witnessed some type of protest10), the vast, "silent majority" of voters were not social activists. These men and women were not part of the Change Coalition, nor did they desire membership in it. Newsweek columnist Stewart Alsop offered this composite sketch of the average member of the electorate in 1972; and his typical "John Doe" was probably closer to the character of the majority of voters than was McGovern's conception of a Change Coalition: Like most American voters, this voter has voted Democratic much more often than he has voted Re publican. He is...in his early page 141 40s...His wife votes the way he does...Our voter is probably a union man, or an ex-union man and a veteran...His family income is ...a bit more than $11,000. The chances are his name ends in a vowel. He doesn't really much like Nixon...He thinks more atten tion should be paid to his pro blems...But he couldn't afford to send his boys to postgraduate school to keep them from being drafted...He dislikes pot, women's lib, long-haired protesters and the sexual revolution. He thinks he's already paying too much sup port to 'a lot of lazy people on welfare.' He doesn't want his President to have to 'beg' from anyone, and in a hazy sort of way he wants America to remain 'No. 1 in the world.' 11 The McGovern vision of a new coalition of politi cally active groups in the society simply did not take into account that many members of the electorate were still at least somewhat ideologically part of the "old" coalition historically dated from F.D.R. Although tele vision cameras at the convention witnessed a seemingly "correct" demographic scene on the floor of the Miami Convention Center, the non-verbal message of apparent disenfranchisement was being received by the majority of these Democratic voters who had no visible quota repre senting them. The party of the trade unions, the Euro pean immigrants and the "little guy" was evolving into the party of the intellectuals and some powerful societal page 142 interest groups as the liberal wing of the party gained power. To many voters viewing the convention, the Democratic party appeared to have forgotten its political roots. This public perception resulted in the alienation of large segments of traditional Democratic voting strength. So much erosion was evident at the time of the convention that McGovern's chances for election may well have been incredibly slim prior to the Eagleton fiasco. Indeed, one prominent newspaper pointed to the convention as the cause of some of McGovern's image pro blem during the later campaign: "...the true source of Senator McGovern's present difficulties is that to win the nomination he had to campaign in a way guaranteed 12 to lose the election." As demonstrated later in this chapter, McGovern's major image problems occured after the convention period. In order to win the Democratic nomination, McGovern needed the support of the liberal wing of the party; those former backers of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy who were dissatisfied with centrist candidates. To obtain this support, McGovern had to "out-liberal" the other candidates in the primaries. Winning the nomination demonstrated that McGovern had a solid strategy for the primaries. The problem was that the general election page 143 demanded that the candidate position himself more in the center of the political spectrum (at least from the per spective of the voters). McGovern's liberal definitions of key issues had to be shifted to be more palatable to the political tastes of the larger, national audience. It will be argued later in this chapter that McGovern's failure to utilize the natural ambiguity of language in defining the issues was a major reason for his defeat in November. In line with the assumption that the Change Coali tion existed in sufficient numbers to guarantee a victory in November, McGovern conceptualized a dialectical image of the electorate. The campaign of 1972 became more than a contest between two individuals with different ideas and opinions as to where the nation could and/or should go. It became a war between ideological camps, characterized as an apocalyptic clash between the "new politics" and the "old politics." It was a referendum on the so-called cultural revolution that has been going on allegedly for four or five years in this country. It involved many, many facets - busing and de fense and welfare and all sorts of things - and a perception of whether this country was doing pretty well or teetering on the brink of failure. If there was going to be an election on something in this country, this was a pretty good thing to have an election on. 13 page 144 The basic assumption of the McGovern campaign that a Change Coalition existed in sufficient numbers to ensure victory in November was in error. In a survey conducted by Time and published in the August 28, 1972 issues, seventy-five percent of the voters questioned labeled themselves "moderate to conservative" while only fifteen 14 percent referred to themselves as being"liberal." The demographic information suggested that McGovern was wrong in his primary assumption. But beyond the demographics It was to become painfully obvious during the campaign that McGovern had misinterpreted the mood of the elec torate. Referring to the campaign of 1972 as "The Greedy Election,"^3 columnist Stewart Alsop argued that the mood of the nation had changed from the unabashed idealism exemplified in the Kennedy Administration to the "What can my country do for me?" selfishness of the Nixon years. The majority of people appeared to be tired of change; weary of the notion that America had become an evil giant; exhausted from a decade of reform that had occured with such speed that the time for adjustment was preciously all too brief. The public seemed to feel the need for assurance that this was still a decent nation; that their individual efforts of the past, many of which page 145 had been undertaken with patriotic fervor, were worth something in the present. The great mass of voters did not want to hear the Puritanic phrases of an admonishing, challenging prophet - they wished instead to hear the consoling words of a pharisee, and they were comforted by the high priest of the status quo, President Nixon. It was Nixon who gave those voters who had been excluded from the proportionalism of the McGovern coalition a name: "The New American Majority."1® In a radio broadcast, Nixon defined his audience as being those voters who had been alienated by the McGovern campaign. He went on to outline the basic credo of his New American Majority: each person should have more of the say in how he lives his own life, how he spends his paycheck, how he brings up his children. (The new majority also believed in) taking better care of those who truly cannot care for themselves...(Nixon did not think it was right to condemn young people) as insensitive and racist when they objected because they were shut out from jobs in poli tics or in industry because they don't fit into some numerical quota despite their ability. 1? Thus, the electorate was polarized around the ban ners of the Change Coalition and the New American Majo rity. It is appropriate to characterize the leaders of these groups - the Presidential candidates - as being page 146 McGovern the prophet and Nixon the priest. In this dra matistic characterization: The priests devote their efforts to maintaining the vestigal struc ture; the prophets seek new per spectives whereby this vestigal structure may be criticized and a new one established in its place. 18 The mood of the American electorate in 1972 favored the priestly office. McGovern's tragedy was that in severely limiting his audience he concurrently limited his rhetorical appeals. Even the makeup of the Democratic convention delegates who had nominated McGovern demonstrated that the candidate was bound by his own "pathetic fallacy": the tendancy to find our own moods in the things outside us. And the equivalent of this, in the intellectual plane, would be the tendancy to find our own pat terns of thought in the texture of events outside us. 19 By assuming that the mood of the electorate was susceptible to continued major societal changes, McGovern projected his own desires for reform as identical with the desire of the majority of the people; hence the "angry prophet" approach to the issues of the campaign: He was the preacher, calling for repentance. Dressed in white robe and bearing rod or staff, he might have been a minor prophet; dressed page 147 in starched black, he might have been a circuit-riding Wesleyan... Not only would he change the course in Vietnam, but he would 'also change those things in our national heritage which turned us astray, away from the truth that the people of Vietnam are, like us, the chil dren of God...So Christians have a responsibility to speak the ques tions of the spirit which ultimately determine the state of the material world.’ 20 McGovern had achieved the Democratic nomination by appealing to the liberal wing of the party. Because of this, McGovern was faced with a dilemma concerning the presentation of issues and his attenuating image during the autumn campaign: "How was he to persuade a majority of the people to elect him in November, without infuri- 21 ating the people who nominated him in July?" The scene had shifted from the state-by-state primary treadmill of isolated audiences and issues to the national campaign, and the audience for McGovern's rhetorical appeals had shifted with it to include those of the "great middle" who often do not vote in the primaries but who do vote in the national election. "It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts 22 and agents should be consistent with the scene." To successfully run for President in the general election McGovern’s rhetorical strategy had to have as its major page 148 concern the marketing of liberalism in the form of a prescription that the majority of the electorate might find palatable while retaining its potency. The remainder of this chapter details McGovern's attempts to accomplish this political balancing feat and the resulting harm to his political image which led to his massive defeat at the polls in November. Part Two: Policy Issues The two most important policy issues of the 1972 campaign for McGovern were the economy and the Vietnam 23 War. 7 McGovern's rhetorical strategies concerning these issues are examined below using Bennett's three rules for 24 the symbolization of policy conerns. These rules are discussed prior to their application. 1. The Selectivity Rule; through which focused, but potentially volatile appeals are constructed for homogeneous and isolated audiences. The value of language ambiguity has been discussed at length in previous chapters. One of the cnaracteristics of language is that it is possible to adapt general termi nology to specific audiences. Burke had noted this neces sary flexibility for rhetors arguing ideologies and/or political issues: page 149 For though a doctrine proclaims a universal scene that is the moti vation common to all men whatever their diversities, this 'substan tial' term must also have 'adjec tival' terms that adapt it to more restricted purposes. 25 Burke has referred to this aspect of political rhetoric as "secular prayer." This is the highly stylized rhetorical appeal based upon the value of language ambi guity in which individual audiences are approached with specific messages: "it is the normally prayerful use of language, to sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too 26 sharply pointed." The adjectives serve as "qualifiers" for the rhetorical appeal to a particular audience. Proper utilization of the selectivity rule enables the rhetor to "tailor" his message for a particular group of auditors without contradicting previous appeals before other audiences. What handier linguistic resource could a rhetorician want, than an ambiguity whereby he can say ’The state of affairs is substantially such-and-such,' instead of having to say 'The state of affairs is and/or is not such-and-such?'27 Thus, the selectivity rule allows for rhetorical transformations before specific audiences based upon the inherent ambiguity of language. A page 150 2. The Transition Rule: through which these selective symboli zations are given 'transitional lines' or 'tag lines' that make it difficult for opponents to take specific statements out of context and that allow candidates to advocate different, often con tradictory, policies to different audiences. "At the very point at which policy statements verge on specificity, ritualistic and pragmatic considerations 28 require that the message be rendered ambiguous." One method of providing for both ambiguity and a certain de gree of specificity is through the use of "tag lines," or slogans. These symbolizations are summary terms which characterize issues or entire campaigns. They allow for the transformation of specific issue-oriented statements into overall images. Burke noted that the candidate's task was to be able to find some unitary principle from which all his major policies may consistently radiate. In brief, his problem is to find for himself and his party a 'substance' or ’constitution' of varying duration. And a slogan, as motive, serves here, either as an honestly ances tral title from which the specific policies may descend, or as a rhe torical misnomer that gives at least the appearance of substance. 29 These slogans must be sufficiently broad enough to allow diverse groups within the electorate to identify page 151 with the candidate and the party while being simultaneously narrow enough so that they may not be manipulated by the opposition. 3- The Categorical Generalization Rules through which the collection of special policy appeals is summarized in broadly based appeals that allow diverse constituencies in a candi dates following to apply different categories of reference in making satisfactory interpretations of the candidate's position on the issues. The categorical generalization rule recognizes to the fullest extent the value of language ambiguity. It is based in the image-orientation of the campaign in that it is concerned with the overall campaign metaphor ad vanced by the candidate. Such underlying metaphors may be characterized as being "significant symbols": a significant symbol (an act which mobilizes multiple connotative re sponses) may unify others by esta blishing and reflecting a pattern of perceptions, a set of predispo sitions, values, and implied actions which transcend the diverse symbolic universes of audience. 30 Thus the categorical generalization rule recognizes the inherent value of language ambiguity in transforming specific policy issues and individual-issue slogans into one broadly-based, generalizable statement. This repre sents the candidate's attempt to interpret scenic page 152 configurations for a vast audience through a reduction from complex to simple symbolic categorizations. Such reductions can be analyzed in order to demonstrate the underlying complexities they represent. In any term we can posit a world, in the sense that we can treat the world in terms of it, seeing all as emanations, near or far, of its light. Such reduction to a simpli city being technically reduction to a summarizing title or 'God term,' when we confront a simplicity we must forthwith ask ourselves what complexities are subsumed beneath it. 31 Analysis of these reductions leads to an under standing of how the candidate made rhetorical transfor mations in an attempt to offer broad definitions for campaign issues to the general public. Ambiguity of language is central to the concept of rhetorical trans formation, for "it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, 32 it would be impossible." Bennett has argued that in a political campaign, "It is the act of paying obeisance to the issues, not 33 their detailed definition, that matters." Since rhe torical transformations may best take place when the language utilized to define issues is relatively ambi guous, specific issues positions are generally avoided * page 153 by the candidates. But McGovern, as a result of his cam paign image, made Specific policy committments as early in the 1972 presidential race as the primary season. This proved to be one of his major rhetorical problems when he had to adapt his positions on the major issues to the general electorate. According to American political tradition, Most issues in most campaigns dis play the following characteristics: (a) they are seldom defined to the degree necessary to debate clear policies or programs..., (b) they are generally linked to familiar characterizations of the candi dates and the parties rather than to conditions or causes that fall beyond the scope of the election, (c) they may be defined by the candidates in different terms for different audiences, (d) they are seldom defined in terms that will arouse controversy or that will risk damage to the candidate's public image, (e) they are often linked to claims about the personal qualities of the opponent or to propositions about leadership, and (f) they are usually restricted to a fairly small range of substantive concerns. 34 Throughout the remainder of this chapter the argu ment will be made that McGovern’s campaign violated many of these characteristics by offering precise definitions of specific issues, by ignoring the value of language ambiguity when speaking to different audiences, by page 154 breaking with the traditions of the Democratic party, by using controversial terminology in defining the policy, personality and leadership issues of the campaign and by failing to control its own rhetorical symbolism, allowing ! the Republicans to interpret McGovern's definitions to their advantage. Economics The Democratic candidates for office had made their political party the majority party since the Great Depres sion by characterizing themselves as the party of "the 3 5 little guys against the big guys."^^ In a meeting with Senator Humphrey late in August the former Vice Presi dent urged McGovern to concentrate on economic issues during the 1972 campaign. Humphrey reflected that in 1968 he , had wanted to talk about bread-and- butter issues, but had been harried to desperation by people who wanted him to talk about the war. Now the roles were reversed - George wanted to talk about the war, but people in I972 wanted to hear about bread- ; and-butter. 36 McGovern had agreed with Humphrey that economics was to be one of the major issues in the election. The two senators disagreed, however, on the interpretation of the phrase, "the little guys against the big guys." While Humphrey was the old-line Democratic liberal in the page 155 tradition of the "New Deal," McGovern was the candidate of the new liberal wing of the party, represented in power by the members of the Change Coalition at the nomi nating convention. While Humphrey believed that the "little guys" were the trade union members and the Euro pean immigrants who had been a major factor in past Democratic campaigns, McGovern viewed these groups as part of the "big guys" who were creating the problems in society. The sentiment of the labor unions toward the McGovern candidacy was as cool as was the candidate's attitude toward them. Early in the campaign the Executive Council of the nation's largest union, the AFL-CIO, under the leadership of George Meany, decided that they would remain neutral during the 1972 national election, concentrating on supporting local candidates. This unique move was made because the union feared that McGovern "owed nothing to labor." They had "questioned McGovern's vote" on right- to-work legislation, and they also "distrusted the life style of some McGovern followers.Several individual units of the AFL-CIO later endorsed the Democratic candi date, as did the liberal United Auto Workers union, but the lack of national endorsement from the parent union and the concurrent lack of national union donations hurt Mc Govern's already slender chances for victory in November. . page 156 In order to attempt to remedy this situation, McGovern flew to Washington, D.C. early in the campaign to demon strate support for the labor movement by voting to kill a Republican compromise on the minimum wage bill, an item of concern for unions. The Washington Post reported that the Democrats originally had a margin of victory that was greater than the official one-vote majority but had staged the close vote in order to dramatize McGovern’s role in the balloting.^ In a further effort to obtain union and other tra ditional Democratic support, McGovern\appointed Lawrence O'Brien, former party chairman and member of the "Kennedy Mafia," to a special liason post created on his staff to 39 7 attract party regulars. Although the results of these and other moves brought in some union support (and, more , . 40 . importantly, $878,828 in contributions ), the national position of the. AFL-CIO remained unchanged. Rather than lend support to McGovern, the national organization con centrated their efforts on the congrssional campaign. This undoubtedly was a backhanded victory for Nixon: "In one respect, labor's major contribution to Nixon • • ■■■■■ •• ' ■ 41 may have been in the funds it withheld from McGovern." McGovern's attempts at'redefining his position in relationship to labor were thus a failure for this strategy. page 157 The unions, who had been champions of reform in the past, were not considered to be an integral part of the Change Coalition, and it was this audience which most concerned the candidate. It was to the Change Coalition that McGovern had focused the appeal of his number one economic issue during the primaries, a $1,000 per-person allotment program. This Was to be a basic income level - $4,000 each year for a family unit of four - below which no American family would be allowed to fall. r McGovern had been influenced in his thinking by his economic advisors (Edwin Kuh, Robert Eisner, Lester Thurow, James Tobin, Marc Robert, Ray Fair and Gordon Weil). These men were considered to be "advance-guard liberals who favor a steady and perhaps wrenching move toward eco- 42 nomic equality." Again it is easy to witness McGovern’s pathetic fallacy. He had surrounded himself with economic advisors who thought as he did. The tragedy here was that neither McGovern nor his economic advisors could correctly interpret the mood of the electorate. The effect on the voting public of McGovern's ori ginal economic proposals had been mixed. Even living under wage-and-price controls imposed by the Nixon Admini stration, a Harris Survey reported on July 17 that Mc Govern's proposals were favored over Nixon's programs by page 158 thirty-five to thirty-four percent - certainly a slim 43 margin. And the combined package of income redistri bution and increased taxes on the upper-income groups hurt the efforts of the McGovern staff to collect money with which to run the campaign. McGovern's plans to raise taxes drastically on corporation profits and upper-middle and high incomes has so terrified investors that almost no big-money Wall Streeter has yet publicly contributed to his campaign. 44 Perhaps in response to the lack of support from upper-income groups, McGovern decided to present a major campaign address delineating his revised welfare and taxation policies to the New York Society of Security Analysts in New York City on August 29- The candidate began this attempted rhetorical transformation of his "$1,000 give-away" program with an attack on the Presi dent for not revealing future White House economic policy. McGovern then stressed that under his new proposals, "No American whose income comes from wages and salaries will . 45 pay one penny more in federal taxes than he does now." The greatest portion of funds for McGovern’s latest in come redistribution scheme would be gained through a revision of the capital gains tax structure. The candi date argued that: page 159 Money made by money should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men...and tax justice demands equal treatment for Americans who earn their living with a shovel or a slide rule and Americans who live on stock and property gains. 46 While raising money from increasing the capital gains tax and strategically cutting the defense budget, McGovern technically dropped his $1,000 per-person cash- grant program in favor of a proposal of cash incentives and food stamps for the poor. The key here is that Mc Govern had changed the specifics of the plan but he still kept the same $4,000 figure for a family of fours he proposed a National Income Insurance plan to provide (a) public service jobs for the em ployable on welfare, (b) a $4,000 floor, consisting of cash and food stamps, for a family of four on welfare, and (c) a shift of care for the aged, disabled and blind from welfare to the Social Security system. 4? The attempted transformation of this particular economic program was not a great success, for, as will be demonstrated later, the Republicans still controlled the "tag line" for the program. Later in the campaign McGovern found it necessary to pay for television time in a further effort to clarify his position on welfare, especially noting the transformation which had occured on Wall Street. page l60 At the beginning of that telecast McGovern echoed the words of Humphrey, depicting the election as "a funda mental struggle between the little people of America and the big rich of America, between the average working 48 man or woman and a powerful elite." Assailing "Nixo- nomics," McGovern questioned his audience: "How many of you can really say that your life has improved over the 49 last four years?" But the primary purpose of the presentation was to convince the electorate that McGovern had abandoned his cash give-away plan. The Wall Street speech had failed to adequately define the issue as having been transformed because the $1,000 "tag line" could still easily be attached to the proposal by the Republican opponent. Indeed, McGovern chastized the Republicans for their use of "scare tactics," citing a commercial distributed by the GOP claiming that McGovern would "put half the country on welfare.'"50 The candidate again pronounced that he had dropped his cash give-away program, and that, "The public relations men who produced that commercial and the candidate who is putting it on the air know it is a lie."^ Combining the selectivity and transition rules here it is evident that McGovern was faced with a major pro blem concerning his welfare proposals. McGovern's page l6l original economic policy statement - the give-away - was delivered on January 13, 1972, before a crowd of college students at Iowa State University. McGovern felt that college students were a major force within the Change Coalition. McGovern's attempted transformation of his original stand was presented on Wall Street, signifying not only a change in the policy but a shift toward the center of the political spectrum. The speech resulted in no great influx of money into the McGovern campaign coffers, but it may have alienated some liberal McGovern supporters. McGovern's attempted transformation had failed. The question remains as to why. McGovern's initial tactical error concerning his welfare proposals was that he allowed his own rhetorical strategy to be used against him. His failure to follow the transition and selectivity rules for campaign dis course resulted in his inability to control the defini tion of his policy. When discussing a controversial such as welfare reform, "The volatility of such statements can be reduced by affixing transitional lines or tag lines to them..."J By allowing the opposition to base their attacks on the $1,000 figure and then by continuing to use that figure - albeit under different particulars - McGovern continued to let the "tag line" be defined by the page 162 Republicans. Thus the opposition won the battle of the categorical generalization rule on this issue because they could still control the definition of McGovern's proposed program and subsequent public opinion by refer ring to the $1,000 figure. It is at this juncture that McGovern's lack of balance between the ritual and pragmatic factors of poli tical discourse becomes evident. McGovern had become too concerned with the pragmatics of the issue while disre garding the ritualistic considerations of the campaign. This specific articulation of economic policy simply did not "fit" the ritualistic considerations of simplicity and generality which are part of the presidential cam paign. The result was that McGovern's own rhetorical appeals were used against him. By articulating carefully conceived policies, McGovern violated the essence of the campaign ritual: Not only does the serious arti culation of political issues have no place in the ritualistic side of a campaign, there is little latitude for the development of systematic, focused, and unambi guous issue positions on the pragmatic end of things. 53 McGovern may well have delivered his transformation message on Wall Street in order to blunt the attacks on his sharp income redistribution proposals, but his page 163 consistency of phrasing arguments such as, "Money made by money should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men," in both his original speech and his recapitulation speech and his continued use of the specific $4,000 figure were major definitional blunders. The Republicans minimized the rhetorical effect of the attempted trans formation of policy through their control of the issue’s "significant symbol" - the $1,000 "tag line." Compounding the problem, McGovern attempted to appeal specifically to diverse audiences simultaneously. He had a public service job program for those poor with out jobs and he had monetary and food-stamp aid for those who could not work. For the lower-middle class McGovern gave assurances that the money to pay for these programs would not come out of its pocket in the form of increased income taxes. The wealthy would finally pay their fair tax share, but only on "unearned" income from capital gains. This specificity violated the idea that during a campaign political strategy dictates "the symbolization of issues so that they can be understood as compatible 54 with a broad range of audience dispositions." McGovern had not realized the value of language ambiguity in pre senting his proposal before a national audience. page 164 Again, McGovern's targeted audience - the Change Coalition - exacerbated the problem. The overall mood of the electorate was not altruistic. The lower-middle class voters could look at the McGovern economic redistribution package and wonder what was in it for them. In answering that question, they would notice that while their taxes were not going to be any higher, their benefits would not be any greater. The bulk of income redistribution was not going to effect the "New American Majority." Instead, it was going to those members of the lower classes who, while needing an income-sharing plan, were still perceived by many blue-collar workers as "those lazy people on welfare." The Republicans sensed this dissent within the tra ditional Democratic ranks and quickly set-out to capi talize upon it. As their convention opened in Miami on August 21, 1972, the tone for the campaign was set by chairman Dole,^^ who contrasted Nixon's belief in the sanctity of the American system with "the belief of George McGovern that what is radical is right and that things as they are - or ever have been - are always wrong. Throughout the Republican campaign that autumn the Nixon team of surrogate speakers, led by Vice President page I65 Spiro T. Agnew, attacked the McGovern economic vision, reporting that the election of McGovern would "bring the country to the brink of domestic chaos and international 57 rum." Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Elliott Richardson predicted additional welfare costs of up to thirty-six billion dollars under the McGovern proposals. The Republican attacks must have been successful, for even though Nixon’s own economic program was not well received 59 by the general public, McGovern's proposals were not accepted as adequate alternatives. The lack of support for McGovern’s economic proposals may be at least partially explained by noting that Mc Govern used referential symbols in his presentation of his economic programs while the Republicans turned McGovern's symbols into their own condensation symbols. The difference between these symbolic configurations is that: Condensation symbols associate emotions, memories, and vivid images with a symbolized object. Referential symbols tend to be less emotional and more concrete representations of the simple facts or features of a phenomenon. 60 While McGovern outlined his economic plans, Nixon surrogates attacked his ideas, not with counter-proposals but with vague generalities: page 166 If someone is setting fire to the house, you don’t waste time trying to decide whether he is a deliberate arsonist or just a fellow foolish with matches. You stop him before he burns the place down. 6l Meanwhile, Nixon was arguing that McGovern's program would increase taxes by $144 billion, warning that, "They would destroy the system which has made America No. 1 in Ap the world economically." In his speech accepting the Republican nomination, the priest of the present explained that the economic choice facing the American voter was between his policies and McGovern's proposals which "take a sharp detour to the left which would lead to a dead end Z o for the hopes of the American people." The utilization of such condensation symbols by the Republicans - the appeals to the belief of the voters in the myths of the system - served to produce masked images which negated the referential symbols of McGovern. This resulted in dulling the effect of the Democratic candi date's rhetorical appeals concerning economic policy. The voters were led to believe that McGovern was anti American because he argued that changes were needed in the system in order to insure the goal of economic equality. This became a powerful issue because of the masked images formed by the use of condensation symbols by the Republicans. "It is probably the case that the page 167 most powerful political issues are composed of condensa tion symbols in configurations that produce masked 64 images." The power of such masked images has been noted by Bennett: Masked Images serve primarily as vehicles for the transmission of deep political images. As such, it is important that the political actor maintain control of the message format, the choice of set tings in which messages will be delivered, and the points in time when the issue will be presented to and withdrawn from the audience. 65 McGovern failed to control his own message through the judicious use of language in the form of "tag lines." Having lost control of the basic format, the McGovern rhetorical appeals were at the mercy of the Republican rhetors who controlled the definition. Rather than present a counter-proposal, the Republicans abstracted McGovern’s referential symbols into several condensation symbols which served to produce unfavorable images re sulting in an effective masking of the meaning of the McGovern message. These masked images were essentially used by the Republicans as "gestures of differentiation." Such poli tical symbolism points "to the glorification or degrada tion of one group in opposition to others within the page 168 66 society." The Republicans claimed that by aiding (glorifying) the poorer classes the Democrats were de grading the other social groups within society who had previously "made it." The economic issues were thus reduced to what Gusfield has referred to as "status issues." Noting that "many public issues are confronta tions between opposed systems of moralities, culture, and 6 7 styles of life," Gusfield defined such status issues as being characterized by "the language of moral condemna- 68 tion." By noting how McGovern wished to change massively the economic balance within the status quo, the Republicans could turn their condensation symbols into a pictured confrontation between "work-a-day" and "welfare" life styles. Thus the election (in terms of economic choice) could be pictured as being between cultures rather than between two men with opposing viewpoints. Status issues indicate, by their resolution, the group, culture, or style of life to which government and society are publicly committed. ...We label these as status issues precisely because what is at issue is the position of the relevant groups in the status order of the society...posing conflicts between divergent styles of life. 69 Beyond the referential symbols utilized by McGovern for his income redistribution play lay deep-seeded hosti lities which were tapped by the Nixon condensation symbols. page 169 This allowed the campaign to he depicted by the Republi cans as a confrontation between those groups which had made economic and social advancements through several generations versus those who, for one reason or another, could not or would not do the same. Those who had fought for and attained a certain degree of status seemed to wish to deny others easy access to their societal level. A brief analysis of some of the political polls taken during the early stages of the campaign demonstrate the success of the Republican symbolizations. A Gallup Poll released on June 1? showed Nixon getting 43 percent of the vote, McGovern 30 percent, and Wallace (the con- 70 servative governor of Alabama) 19 percent. When Wallace officially dropped out of the race, Nixon gained five percentage points in his overall margin in a two-way race with McGovern.71 Nixon had picked-up additional conservative support due to the departure of Wallace from the race. Another interesting poll concerned the unions. The Democrats have traditionally been labeled as the party of the trade union movement during this century, but a Gallup Poll released on September 3, 1972, had union 72 members favoring Nixon by 49 to 40 percent.' Despite Nixon’s imposition of wage and price controls and the page 170 McGovern pro-labor vote on the minimum wage compromise, union membership favored Nixon. Although there are other reasons which definitely effected this poll, cer tainly the status-issue orientation of the Republican rhetoric contributed to the result. At least in terms of economics, the American voters appeared to have preferred the message of the priest over the admonitions of the prophet. The Republicans controlled the $1,000 slogan, thereby creating negative public impres sions of McGovern’s program. On the issue of McGovern's income-sharing proposals, the candidate’s major flaw was that he had failed to understand the nature of language ambiguity and its bene fits for the politician. McGovern's appeals were too specific for the ritualistic nature of the campaign. Trapped by his own rhetoric, McGovern could not control the public's interpretation of his own referential sym bols. The Republicans used ambiguous language to attack McGovern's proposals, but McGovern could not counter attack due to the specificity of his language choices. Economics was, however, McGovern's second-most important issue in 1972. His primary issue and that which had compelled him to run for the Presidency was the American effort in Vietnam. page 171 Vietnam The long war in what had once been French Indochina was still being waged in 1972. To end this war was McGovern's "magnificent obsession."73 His position on the issue was succinctly stated in the Democratic Platform for that election: If the war is not ended before the next Democratic Administra tion takes office, we pledge, as the first order of business, an immediate and complete with drawal of all U.S. forces in Indo-China...After the end of U.S. direct combat participation, military aide to the Saigon Government, and elsewhere in Indo-China, will be terminated. 74 The specificity of this policy statement in a poli tical party's platform was unusual. Again, the McGovern people had failed to recognize the value of language ambiguity. But the war was McGovern's major issue against Nixon in the 1972 campaign. It was on this issue that the angry prophet could appeal to the con science of the public with an eloquence based upon a personal belief in the secular and spiritual bankruptcy of the continuing war effort. It was his perception of the naked immorality of the war which drove McGovern to deliver some of his most powerful campaign oratory. He felt that he was the spokesman for the anti-war conscience page 172 of the nation, and by casting the continuing struggle in' Vietnam in the steel of zealous morality McGovern believed that he could hasten the end of the war. Burke has noted the value of stating arguments in moral terms: Morals, shaped by the forms and needs of action, become man’s most natural implement when ex horting to action...Morals are fists. An issue, raised to a plane of moral indignation, is wholly combative in its choice of means. From this point of view, the moral elements in our vocabulary are symbolic warfare. To the handling of complex, cul tural issues we bring the equip ment of the jungle. With the ’censorial appellatives’ of righteousness, one pardons or smites. 75 By making the war into a moral issue, McGovern raised emotions to a peak. To end the war, McGovern had, ironically, "declared" a moral war on the continuing American effort in Vietnam. The problem, of course, is that not everyone agreed with McGovern’s moralistic definitions of the conflict. McGovern’s rhetorical approach to the issue of Viet nam may be broken down into three basic categories: (1) his personification of the conflict as "Nixon’s War;" (2) his general sentiments toward the war itself; (3) the ques tion of amnesty for those men who had refused draft induction page 173 McGovern’s number one issue for the month of August, and, as some observers noted, for the entire campaign, was the "Nixon Administration’s attempt to obtain peace in Vietnam by the November 7 election." To McGovern, this was evidence of Nixon’s "politicization of the war."' Nixon was guilty of immorally perpetuating the Vietnam conflict in order to make it appear that he had nego tiated a settlement just prior to the election, thus assuring, it was felt by McGovern, a Republican victory. The platform for the Democratic Party for 1972 ad- 77 mitted a share in the blame for the problem in Vietnam. But McGovern ignored past Democratic responsibility and placed the blame for the continuation of the war from 78 1968 through 1972 on the Nixon Administration. Even before he had received the nomination, McGovern had told an audience on June 22, 1972, that Nixon was "running the war and peace talks to fit his own election time- 79 table." Nixon had been elected in 1968 with a "secret plan" for peace,. McGovern had argued, and the President had allowed the war to continue for four more years. McGovern appeared on national television on the evening of October 10 with his major policy address on the Vietnam War for the campaign. He began by stating that Vietnam policy constituted the "most important" and page 174 8 0 "fundamental" difference between Nixon and himself. While "Nixon regarded the Vietnam war ’as our finest hour,’ McGovern said, 'I regard it as the saddest chapter 81 in our history.’" The essence of the McGovern position was to accuse Nixon of failing to keep his promise made during the 1968 campaign that he would end the war. Nixon had the oppor tunity to withdraw U.S. troops, but had failed to do sos those who have had a chance for four years and could not produce peace should not be given another chance...Nixon has had his chance. He could not produce peace in four years. And we have every indica tion that he cannot produce peace in eight years. 82 Thus McGovern had portrayed the conflict as "Nixon's War." The incumbent was personified as playing politics with the lives of young American men by dragging his heels in living up to his promise to end the war. Even when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that peace was at hand in Vietnam, McGovern declared that the com- Q o ment constituted a "cruel political deception." J Later in the campaign, when it seemed that McGovern's commentary was justified because both Nixon and President Thieu of South Vietnam had rejected Kissinger’s negotiated settle ment with the North Vietnamese, McGovern appeared again on page 175 American television to appeal to the electorate: "...we must draw the painful conclusion that the events of recent weeks were not a path to peace but a detour around Elec- 84 tion Day." 1 The Nixonian argument for maintaining U.S. involve ment in the conflict was that American prisoners of war must first be released before a total withdrawal of mili tary forces could take place. The Democratic platform attempted to cast doubt upon this argument, asserting that, "With increasing lack of credibility, the Nixon Administration has sought to use the prisoners of war as an excuse for its policies." 9 Carrying that Democratic theme further, McGovern told an audience in Atlantic City on September 30 that Nixon, "will tell you that he has kept us there for three-and-one-half years to...get the prisoners out...Now that's a plain deceit, a plain falsehood. It was the language of moral indignation. McGovern was the righteous prophet chastizing the wicked priest. His criticisms of the American war effort, drenched in moral judgment, were his fists. These were powerful statements accusing Nixon of lying to the American public about why their sons were dying in a war he had promised to stop. They were also specific statements. Rather page 176 than suggesting that Nixon had bent the truth on Vietnam, McGovern labeled the President an outright liar. While that was "music to the ears" of the Change Coalition, and while McGovern may have been correct in his accusation, the specificity of his statements violated the established campaign ritual of speaking ambiguously. His specific attacks against the President alienated many members of the New American Majority, especially those who had served the nation during the Second World War and the Korean War. In addition, it was possible to comprehend how those fami lies who had sons fighting in Vietnam would be offended by McGovern's moralistic rhetoric. Moreover, the specificity of the McGovern rhetoric caused some members of the elec torate to believe that McGovern was in fact both besmirching the office of the Presidency and aiding the enemy. The Nixon strategy in the war had been gradually to withdraw American men from the front, replacing them with South Vietnamese soldiers. This policy, entitled "Vietna mí zation," came under heavy fire from the Democrats during the campaign. The McGovern-inspired platform cited the "hollowness of Vietnamization," arguing that, "The Saigon Government, despite massive U.S. support, is still not 87 viable." Again, McGovern took a position from the plat form and set it into language charged with morality: page 177 "conscience says to each of us that a wrong war is not made right because the color of the bodies has changed. 88 We are all created in the image of God." Vietnamization was morally wrong because the entire war had been morally wrong. Nixon’s policies constituted "a piece o’f political trickery and calculated deception 89 to save the President’s face and General Thieu's job." For McGovern, the slaughter continued because, "incredible as it seems, when all is said and done, our purpose in Vietnam now comes down to this - our policy makers want to save face-and they want to save the Saigon regime of Gene ral Thieu."9° Nixoh was immoral because he was sacrificing lives to save his credibility and to prop-up what McGovern had 91 characterized as the "corrupt dictatorship" in Vietnam. Thus“it had become Nixon's war. Through the use of morally loaded language McGovern had characterized Nixon as the reincarnation of the devil - an evil spirit that could only be exorcized by the election of the theologian of peace. McGovern attempted, then, to define Nixon as a "legalistic" scapegoat, worthy of defeat in the election because he had been "an offender against legal or moral 92 justice, so that he 'deserves' what he gets." It is evident from the election results that McGovern's simple page 178 interpretation of the war as being the sole responsibility of Nixon was not shared by the voting public. This attempt at scapegoating failed, and with this failure McGovern’s characterization of the conflict as "Nixon's War" appeared to many to be nothing more than the political equivalent of the "boy who cried, 'Wolf!'" The second of McGovern's rhetorical approaches to the war has been broadly delineated as "general senti ments" so as to set it apart from the personification strategy. In this area are included McGovern's own peace plan and the candidate's vision of a "New Internationalism" based upon peaceful coexistence with the Communist world. Arguing that, "we can restore our sense of purpose 93 and our character as a great nation" through an ending of the Vietnam War, McGovern presented a seven-point pro gram to ensure that, "America can begin to be America 94 again." The basic stages of the program were: 1. an immediate cessation of hosti lities and a withdrawal of all U.S. men and equipment within ninety days of his inauguration. 2. notification to the North Viet namese "that we now expect that they will accept their obligation under their own...proposal of 1971 - to return all prisoners of war and to account for all missing in action within ninety days." page 179 3. to send the Vice President to North Vietnam in order to speed the efforts to reclaim our prisoners of war. 4. the closing of U.S. bases in Thailand after the return of our POW’s and "a satisfactory accounting for any missing men." 5- inclusion of the Communists in a coalition government, with the U.S. joining "with other countries in repairing the wreckage left by this war." 6. expansion of Veteran's benefit programs for Vietnam veterans. 7- after the ending of hostilities and the return of the POW’s, a general amnesty would be declared for those who "chose jail or ex ile because they could not in conscience fight in this war." 95 The October 10 speech delineating McGovern's Vietnam policy had followed by five days another major foreign policy address, "A New internationalism," which was deli vered before the City Club of Cleveland. In that speech, McGovern had called for a "new internationalism," as opposed to the "naive prenuclear view" of the Nixon Admini stration. As McGovern had stated: Our preoccupation with a military balance leaves untouched the dead ly imbalances among population, resources and wealth - and they, too, endanger our lives. 96 page 180 In both of these foreign policy forays McGovern had lashed out at Nixon's policies, even criticizing Nixon's popular visits to the People's Republic of China and to the Soviet Union. How can we really argue that it is good to accomodate ourselves to a billion Russian and Chinese Commu nists - but that we must somehow fight to the bitter end against a tiny band of peasant guerillas in the jungles of little Vietnam? 98 In McGovern's moralistic rhetoric, the good that America could do was weighed against the evil that it was perpetrating in Vietnam. For example, money spent upon the war should have been spent for morally "correct" projects: Sixty billion of your taxes to kill human beings in Asia instead of protecting and improving human life in America...Sixty billion in the last four years - not to serve our ideals, but to save the face of our policy-makers. But the war was not only wrong because it had been a moral affront to the very decency of American citizens; it was not only wrong because Nixon had woven a web of deceit to cover our continued presence in Vietnam; it was wrong because of what it was doing to the spirit of the American people. It had been the cause of the moral decay within American society. In McGovern's mind, the war was page 181 the fundamental reason behind the divisions in our society- in 1972. It had polarized the nation. And the issue which demonstrated this polarization clearly to the Democratic candidate was the concern over amnesty for those who had refused military induction for reasons of conscience. This is the third basic area of McGovern's rhetorical strategy concerning Vietnam. McGovern had spoken to both the national convention of the American Legion (in Chicago on August 23) and the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (in Minneapolis on August 24). In both instances his speeches 100 were met with a "cool and silent reception." McGovern's presentation to the VFW had included several references to his position on amnesty, although they were not overt. The British publication, The Economist, commented on McGovern's efforts: "In vain Mr. McGovern declared that with every fibre of his being he loved his country, in vain he recalled his pride in his uniform."^! The audi ence sat on their hands for the majority of his speech because they remembered McGovern's call for amnesty for 102 Vietnam War draft resisters. In a later attempt to shift from his position on "unconditional amnesty" and yet remain true to his con science, McGovern suggested in his televised speech of page 182 October 10 that if he had resisted the draft and an amnesty was declared, I would volunteer for two years of public service on subsistence pay simply to demonstrate that my ob jection was not to serving the nation but to participation in a war I thought was morally wrong. 103 Again, McGovern’s attempted transformation was denied because he had initially taken a specific stand on an issue. The lack of language ambiguity in his ini tial statement made the transformation impossible to accomplish. Driven by his moral indignation concerning the war, McGovern’s rhetoric was simply too specific. The Vietnam War had not only polarized the electo rate in terms of morality and amnesty, it also had a demoralizing effect on the military. McGovern pleaded with one audience to realize this fact, challenging them to "ask the men who are quitting West Point and the other military academies. Ask the enlisted men who are marking time and counting the hours until their service 104 is over." McGovern's position was difficult for the members of the VFW and the Legion to comprehend. They had fought in a "righteous" war. How could the America of 1972 be so different from the America of their era - 1942? The audiences of veteran's groups and men who had page 183 served their nation in previous wars found McGovern’s attacks upon American conduct in the Vietnam War difficult to accept. The McGovern position was rooted in the concept of the immorality of that war. His attitude toward the con flict was that of Moses to the Golden Calf - it must he destroyed or it will destroy the nation. It was a fitting message for the members of the Change Coalition, but the average American demonstrated a suprising attitude toward the war in 1972, as an analysis of the polls will demon strate. By applying the "selectivity rule" to the polls it is possible to determine that McGovern’s audience analysis was poor, for by the autumn of 1972 the electo rate's opinion of Nixon's conduct concerning the war had changed. In March of 1972 there had been a distinct sentiment against Nixon's handling of the Vietnam situation. A Harris Survey reported on March 16 that fifty-three per cent of those polled thought that the President "has not told the American people the real truth" about Vietnam, although Nixon's rating on negotiating a settlement to the war was favored by fifty-three percent of the people.1®^ McGovern's personification of the conflict as "Nixon's War" constituted an attempt to woo those voters who be lieved that information was being hidden from them. page 184 Another Harris Survey in May reported some contra dictions within its findings. Although by a twenty per cent margin (51 percent to 31 percent) the voters ques tioned supported a status quo cease fire,10^ and fully eighty-eight percent believed that the war would still be around in November, fifty-nine percent felt that Nixon's mining of the Haiphong, North Vietnam harbor was a good idea. This figure is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the same study found that seventy-nine percent of those responding wanted an end to U.S. ground 107 and air involvment in the war. Although it appeared that the majority of the people wanted the war to end, the question of the method of withdrawal was not favorable to McGovern. In July the Harris Survey reported that those citizens polled agreed with Nixon's methods for ending the war by a margin of fifty-two to thirty-three percent over McGovern's pro- 108 posais. Perhaps the most devestating sign in the polls was evidenced in the Harris Survey released on September 11. This poll reported that fifty-five percent of those responding supported the continued bombing of North Viet nam, and sixty-four percent felt that Communists should 109 not be allowed in a coalition government for the South. All of these reported attitudes reflected the opposite page 185 position to McGovern'sj proposals to halt the bombing and the mining and to allow the Communists to be part of a coalition government in the South after the end of the conflict. Public opinion had shifted, it seems, from an atti tude which was strongly critical of Nixon's war effort to one of support for the incumbent. "Across our surveys in 1972, we consistently found that Nixon's biggest asset was that a clear plurality of voters perceived him as successfully de-escalating the war. "HO McGovern's con tinued strong anti-war rhetoric violated the dramatic principle "that the nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene. "Hl One set of scenic conditions will 'implement' and 'amplify' given ways and temperaments which, in other situations, would remain mere potentialities, unplanted seeds, 'mute inglorious Miltons.' 112 McGovern's poor audience analysis concerning the relative strength of the anti-war sentiment among the majority of American voters caused him to act in a manner that was not in step with the greatest number of voters. He continued to stress the immorality of the war and of the President who was deliberately, in McGovern's mind, continuing the war for personal political profit. But page 186 the scene had shifted, in that the audience was no longer persuaded by concentrated rhetoric on ending the war. Given these and similar findings it should be obvious that McGovern's 'principle error' in 1972 was not his 'overestimating the speed' of the 'drift toward anti-war opinion' ...It was more simply his empha sizing the Vietnam War rather than economic problems as the issue upon which the voters should base their voting decision. 113 The focus of the scene had shifted from.a concentra tion on the war to one more concerned with the domestic economy. Indeed, Nixon's lowest ratings in the polls were his statistics concerning his anti-inflation policies. Of course, McGovern's economic proposals, particularly his income redistribution plan, were also not popular with the electorate. McGovern’s problem with the selec tivity rule was that in defining his audience - in this case, the majority of the American people - as being against the war, he immediately assumed that they would agree with his proposals for ending that conflict. This again points to McGovern's "pathetic fallacy," as he tended to find his own moods in the scene outside himself. Application of the "transition rule" demonstrates that, once again, McGovern had allowed the Republicans to emphasize certain key "tag lines" which the public then page 187 accepted. "At every campaign stop he was hounded by ques tions about the 'three A's’: amnesty, acid, and abortion."11^ This was a "tag line" given to the McGovern programs by Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, one of the Republican surro gate speakers. The Republicans frequently criticized McGovern's use 115 of specific alternatives to Nixon's Vietnam policies. J Rather than use specific policies to challenge McGovern's alternatives, Nixon's surrogates used condensation sym bols, much as they had done in attacking McGovern's wel fare proposals. Referring to McGovern's defense policies, Agnew, in a typical example of the Republican strategy, called the Democratic candidate, "one of the greatest frauds ever to be considered as a presidential candidate by a major American party." Another typical attack upon McGovern's Vietnam policy came in an Agnew speech given on October 2 before the United Press International correspondents in Washington, D.C. In that presentation, the Vice President criticized McGovern's defense programs, concluding that, "Burning ambition coupled with the pros- 117 pect of defeat supersedes rationality." Perhaps the most damaging attacks against the Demo crats by the Republicans occurred that autumn under the sponsorship of the "Democrats for Nixon." In reality, page 188 the men who comprised that group were former conservative Democrats who had jumped to the Republican party. The most notable member of this arm of the "Committee to Re- Elect the President" (CREEP) was John Connally, former governor of Texas. Although other political broadcasts of this group will be discussed later, its first paid political television effort featured "Connally, attacking McGovern on his national defense views while identifying 1 1 o Nixon with Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson." This commercial demonstrates clearly the use of conden sation symbols by the Republicans. It is interesting to note that all of the Presidents mentioned in that commer cial had been Democrats. The ad was an attempt to get members of the "New American Majority" who were Democrats to view Nixon as being ideologically in line with the Democratic Presidents of the past forty years. Such television spots were typical of the Republican effort that autumn to change McGovern’s use of specifically defined policy alternatives (referential symbols) into several general condensation symbols which were then mani pulate into a negative image of the Democratic challenger. The government had been operating under a "war motive" based upon similar circumstances in America’s past. The members of the New American Majority were being persuaded page 189 that the individual sacrifice was for the common good.11^ McGovern, operating out of what may be labelled as a "peace motive," structured his rhetorical appeals upon the belief in the sanctity of the individual to judge morality. These juxtaposing views of the candidates were designed to appeal to different audiences, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. Again, McGovern’s problem stemmed from his misanalysis of the strength of the change coalition. While the majority of»individuals in the nation were accustomed to the Nixonian manipulation of language through the war motiveMcGovern confronted beliefs that had deep roots in his opting for a rhetoric of peace at all costs. McGovern had violated the ritua listic norms of campaign rhetoric, while Nixon had followed a familiar ritualistic pattern. One interesting statistic may serve to explain the lack of public support for the McGovern peace plan. On each Thursday of the Vietnam War the public had been told the number of American casualties for the previous week of fighting. On September 21, 1972, the report of the government showed that no Americans had died in combat 120 that past week. Nixon had been preceived previously by the electorate as slowing down the war effort, and how for the first time in many years no American soldier had page 190 been killed in Vietnam. Although McGovern had stressed that the policy of Vietnamization was nothing but a cruel substitution of the bodies of South Vietnamese soldiers for those of Americans, the public perception (as indicated in the aforementioned polls) demonstrated a strong belief in the soundness of Nixon’s plan for de- escalating the war. In one specific sub-issue of his Vietnam policy, McGovern appeared to present his own negative condensa tion symbol. His insistence that the Communists be allowed to take part in a coalition government in the South at the cessation of hostilities was diametrically opposed to the view of the majority of American citizens as indicated in the polls. The Republicans did not have to produce their own negative condensation symbols for this argument. For a certain percentage of the electorate McGovern’s own referential symbols became a great conden sation symbol - that McGovern would be "soft" on Commu nism, the mortal enemy of Capitalism. In terms of the "categorical generalization rule," it may be noted that the Republicans controlled the "tag lines," thus controlling the generalized version of the McGovern rhetorical position on the issues. The question of amnesty certainly had been transformed into a "status page 191 issue." The Republicans aided in its transformation in at least one obvious way - "CREEP" spent several thousand dollars on advertisements assailing McGovern's protection 121 of "draft dodgers." Thus as McGovern tried to heal the wounds of the nation after the cessation of the Ameri can war effort by calling an amnesty for those men who had refused military induction on the basis of conscience, the Republicans used the terminology, "draft dodger," to sym bolize these same individuals, casting their moralistic stands of principle in an unheroic mold. Once again, failure to control the slogans of the referential symbols became one of McGovern's major errors. This allowed the Republicans to press their own version of the transition phrases which they generalized into con densation symbols. These condensation symbols at least in part became a type of status issue which pitted the New American Majority against the Change Coalition. McGovern’s faulty analysis of his audience had led him to make yet another serious error. Although this chapter section has focused upon but two policy concerns of the McGovern campaign, his welfare and Vietnam proposals, it pointed to the problem the Democratic candidate had in controlling his own persua sive appeals. The next major area of this chapter, dealing page 192 with personality issues, further demonstrates McGovern's lack of skill in manipulating potentially devestating issues against the Nixon Administration into potent rhetorical weapons. Part Three: Personality Issues The vast proportion of the evils which affect and endanger this country, is not ascribable to phy sical or commercial causes, these may have their influence, but in the main the mischief is to be traced to a moral origin...'Tis much to be regretted that a great part of our fellow subjects, who might entertain or express an in terest in the remedy of such evils, are altogether ignorant of their existence. Yet I am not without hope that a healthy and vigorous public opinion has been permanently awakened to the discovery and cor rection of all these abuses. 122 The task for McGovern the political prophet was to awaken vigorous public opinion as to the evils of the Nixon Administration. His morality-laden view of the policy issues of the campaign have been discussed. Al though these concerns were heavily encumbered by McGovern's moralistic rhetorical strategy they do not reveal the full scope of his prophetic nature. It was in the personality issues of the campaign that McGovern fully revealed his almost biblical political theology. page 193 Once the candidate has demonstrated that he is con cerned with policy questions, he then could link these "policy concerns to claims about the personal deficiencies 123 of the other candidate or the party that he represents." This serves two functions in the campaign: (1) it attracts the support of those voters "for whom party and personal qualifications are important considerations in the voting 124 . choice," and (2) it "gives the election the appearance that serious choices are offered based on free and open disagreements between the candidates. Personality issues may take either offernsive or defensive formats. "Offensive formats tend to directly accuse an opponent of taking an irresponsible stand on an issue, or of exhibiting some undesireable personal trait. In the election of 1972, McGovern’s moralistic vision of politics lent itself to an all-out offensive against the perceived immoral character of the Nixon Administration. A greater understanding of McGovern’s morality- charged view of politics in general may be discerned through a brief examination of his personal history. The Democratic candidate was the son of a preacher from the Great Plains. Sundays in his youth were times of prayer, church services, and bible-study at home. Later in life McGovern was to discover that this simple moralistic faith page 194 was important not only on Sundays but throughout the rest of the week. Between 1945 and his entry into politics in 1953» George McGovern's discovery of the social gospel... gave a strong theme to sharp tran sitions in his life and put a last ing stamp on his character and ambition. 127 McGovern's deep belief in the social gospel was evi dent in his political image prior to the Eagleton Affair. He viewed himself as the reform candidate; a representa tive of the conscience of the people. McGovern's value system did not include the political expediency of a battle-wise contestant like Nixon. Instead, McGovern's ethical assumptions were based upon what were essentially religious convictions. "His values - candor, integrity, 128 hard work - are old-fashioned and Biblical." McGovern had implemented his moralistic philosophy of politics in previous electoral campaigns with mixed results. Probably the most notable example of his ehtical grounding occured in McGovern's unsuccessful campaign for the Senate of the United States against Karl Mundt, the conservative incumbent. The challenger's attacks against Mundt during that autumn had been based upon the Repub lican Senator's history of "playing ball" with big business and other effective anti-populist interest groups. To page 195 McGovern, the candidate of conscience, the presence of Mundt in the Senate represented a moral affront to the people of South Dakota and to the nation. McGovern's campaign against Mundt became a classic example of the prophet’s tendancy toward over-zealousness in the name of political ethics. In the deepest sense, Mundt offended McGovern's moral sensibilities. He became not merely an opponent, but a blot to be expunged. 'I don't know how he felt about me,' says McGovern, 'but I knew I hated his guts.' 129 Based upon his past, this moral theme carried McGovern into the 1972 presidential election. It had not changed over the years: McGovern was always the candidate of conscience; the prophet of political morality calling down the wrath of an angered populus upon the head of the wicked opponent. The opposition was forever playing the devil's disciple in the McGovern theology. It was always corrupted by years of political intrigue to the point where the opposition could no longer effectively represent the will of the people. "In George McGovern's mind the polarity was always of Good and Evil. He was a 130 virtuous man; he knew what was right and wrong." For McGovern and the other members of the Change Coalition, the election of 1972 represented a chance for page 196 a return to the moralistic tradition of a great people who for too long had been influenced by big business, big unions, big government and big military. This moral renaissance could be accomplished by defeating the per sonification of all societal ills - Richard Milhous Nixon. The President was McGovern's "legalistic scape goat" for societal perfection. Defeating the Republican would prove to be cathartic, for McGovern would bring ethics back into the White House. McGovern was angry with Nixon and with men like him whom he felt had led the nation astray from the paths of righteousness. "He was bitter at Richard Nixon, with a 131 bitterness of conviction." For McGovern, the people of America had been morally corrupted by their leadership in Washington. The simple solution, then, was to replace the leadership - in short, to repudiate the Nixon Admini stration and its policies. McGovern's scathing attacks on the lack of ethics in the Nixon regime demonstrated that bitterness. He cast Nixon as the head of "the most morally corrupt Administra- 132 tion in the history of the United States." Ultimately, the responsibility for that corruption in society lay in the White House, McGovern argued, for, "The president sets the moral tone of the nation, and this Administration page 197 133 reeks with permissiveness toward... corrupt interests." Nixon operated on an ethic of expediency, developed through years of political struggle. To McGovern, this political ethic was bankrupt, demonstrating that Nixon had "no constant principle except opportunism and mani- 134 pulation." This ethical conflict between McGovern and Nixon may be observed in their positions on the issues of 1972. McGovern made specific issue statements, attempting to cast his character as the candidate of the "new politics" the man who offered a real alternative to current policies Attacking Nixon's Administration as being unethical and immoral thus laid the groundwork for the McGovern com plaint that Nixon was vague on the issues. Of course, the immoral purveyour of the "old politics" would naturally shrink from a clear discussion of the important issues. McGovern was attempting to use campaign ritual to his advantage through this line of argument. As Bennett has noted: It is clearly in a candidate's in terest to translate the ritual forms for displaying personal vir tue and attacking one's opponent into carefully staged performances designed to capture the attention of the media and, in turn, the public. 135 page 198 Thus McGovern's speeches blasting the Nixon Admini stration’s handling of Vietnam, economics, and the cam paign itself were designed to demonstrate the distinc tions between the prophet and the priest in terms of moral virtue. Unfortunately for McGovern, such attention by the media can result in a negative campaign image, a point which will be discussed in greater detail later. As the campaign continued, McGovern's attacks on Nixon became stronger. He continually denounced the President for demonstrating "incompetence, favoritism, 1 Q A secrecy and corruption." To McGovern, Nixon was the classic example of the politician who would say anything and do anything in order to insure his own election. This is what McGovern had been fighting against most of his political career. As he told one audience, What we are seeing in this campaign is the manipulation of our hope by men who know how to get power and want to keep it, but do not know what it is for. In politics, there are some things more precious than victory. One of them is truth. But these men will say anything to win. 137 According to the McGovern rhetorical strategy, the nation was decaying morally because of our preoccupation with the war in Vietnam. This was the cause of America's economic and social strife. Nixon had not kept his page 199 promise to end the war, thus proving that his administra tion was morally bankrupt. This lack of ethics from the first citizen of the land had caused the entire popula tion to somehow lose moral consciousness. Nixon was leading the nation away from its traditional moral values, and the public had to be warned of this problem by the prophet. As McGovern told one reporter, "The country is going to pieces, if you can only make the people see what Richard Nixon is doing to them..." As evidenced in Chapter II, McGovern was again using the sacrificial image in order to purge society of its guilt. Nixon was the embodiment of "pure" evil and in that sense became McGovern's "legalistic scapegoat." Nixon had led the nation astray; he stood between the people of the United States and their perfected moral state. The simple solution to societal problems was to sacrifice that which was the obstacle. McGovern's use of this scapegoat principle was clearly delineated in his characterization of Nixon as the individual "legally" responsible for the moral decay of the nation. The most obvious moral condemnations from McGovern concerned not only Nixon's personal lack of ethics but also the scandal that will forever be known to history as the "Watergate Affair." The scandal would later cause page 200 the resignation or imprisonment of many members of the Nixon staff, including the President himself. But in the campaign of 1972, only the major Democratic candidates were directly linking the break-in at the Democratic Party's national headquarters to the White House. The Democrats attempted to demonstrate that either Nixon had had previous knowledge of the Watergate plot and had participated in the project or that the President was an incompetent administrator who did not know what was happening inside his own "Committee to Re-Elect the President." This constructed dilemma was voiced by vice presidential candidate Shriver when he declared to one audience that Nixon was either "guilty of immoral and 140 illegal acts" or impotent and "incompetent." Stressing the latter argument, Shriver asserted: "How can a man claim to know what's going on inside the Kremlin and not 141 know what's going on in his own committee?" ■ McGovern did not even grant the option that Nixon may not have had previous knowledge of the Watergate plan. He directly linked Nixon to the crime, telling an audience in Pennsylvania that Nixon had "no respect for constitutional 142 government and personal freedom." He continued to hammer away at Nixon, characterizing the President as a man who would not stop at the bugging of the Democratic page 201 Party but who would eventually violate freedom everywhere; "the kind of man who won’t hesitate to wiretap your union hall, or your law office, or your university, or your 143 church or even your home." To McGovern, Watergate represented the most obvious initial step toward the eventual suppression of indivi dual liberties. For the righteously indignant prophet, it was "but a single step from spying on the political opposition to suppressing that opposition and the imposing of a one-party state in which the people's precious liber- 144 ties are lost." Once again, McGovern characterized Nixon as the "legalistic scapegoat." Nixon was the "man at the top" - the leader in control of his own party. Members of his party had committed a crime. Since Nixon had been in charge, he must assume the guilt. For McGovern there was danger lurking behind the voting booth on November 7 - the danger that the nation would re-elect Nixon, thereby assuring a destruction of whatever moral fibre was left in the American character. The over zealous prophet even went as far as proclaiming to a group of auto workers in Lordstown, Ohio, that the Water gate break-in was "the kind of thing you expect under a person like Hitler. "1^-5 page 202 McGovern's emphasis upon the evil nature of the Nixon Administration was countered by his own attempt to picture himself as the candidate of moral righteousness, as he had done against Mundt. The election of McGovern would restore the United States to its rightful place as the trusted, ethical leader of the "free world." The candidate remarked to a St. Louis audience that he would "like to be remembered most of all for restoring the presidency to a moral leadership worthy of a great people." This was not to be the type of moral instruction that one received from religious clergy. McGovern wished instead to awaken the masses to the beauty within themselves: "Moral leadership does not tell people something they do not know; it asks them to look into their own souls for 147 the truth that is already there." 1 On the final day of the campaign, McGovern spoke on this theme in Philadelphia. He was a prophet crying in the wilderness - the next day he was to lose the election by one of the largest popular and electoral-vote margins in history. Yet on that last day of the campaign he was still the moralist attempting to exhort his audience to a higher calling. As he spoke, he characterized "the great enemies of our country" as being "doubt and hatred and . . 148 suspicion and fear." In order to defeat these and page 203 other enemies, he called for his audience to look ahead to an America that places its highest values, not simply on our wealth and our power, but on truth and justice. Let us try to influence the course of our fellow mortals around the world, not simply by the strength of our arms alone, but by the force of our example and by the power of our ideals. 14-9 At times McGovern had an almost poetic quality to his presentations. If the statements above seem a bit romantic it is only because the social prophet is also a dreamer. Again one is reminded of the faulty analysis of the audience by McGovern - of the "pathetic fallacy" of the dreamer to see his own values and ideas in others. The McGovern rhetorical presentations could stir the souls of members of the Change Coalition. But for the majority of voters this was something of a "greedy election." McGovern had become a political anachronism through his own rhetorical strategy. He had carried his moralism to extremes, being either "blind or indifferent to others' definitions"^0 Of the scene around him. McGovern the prophet was transformed by his "pathetic fallacy" into a type of Quixotic character: a man of independent will and idealistic purpose who goes to an extreme that society defines as villainous or foolish, though page 204 he is in his own eyes a crusader doing good. His determined ad herence to principle throws him out of joint with his times and leads him to the extreme neces sary to produce a villain or fool. 151 "His theme, always, undeviatingly, was Good against 152 Evil, Light against Darkness." It was this over-sim plified theme that made McGovern appear to be a Quixotic character. During the campaign it was possible to en vision him as "a plainclothes preacher with a disciplined obsession about war and a monumental confidence...in his own ability not only to govern but also to tame the cruelty of his fellow man."'*'33 But McGovern's "disciplined obsession" had become unruly. Nixon was blamed for the continuing war effort. McGovern's attacks against the President became increasingly bitter. As the war wound-down to the point where American soldiers were no longer dying in the jungles of Southeast Asia the American public perceived that Nixon was ending the U.S. troop committment in Vietnam. McGovern’s flaw was that his prophetic vision was too narrow; his Quixotic spirit had caused him to challenge windmills. McGovern simply could not detect the shift in public opinion regarding the American presence in Vietnam. page 205 Ultimately, it is the nature of the scene that creates political anachronisms. It is quite possible that McGovern was a candidate whose time had not yet come, but it is highly probable that McGovern was a can didate of the past. His candidacy was based in the tra ditional concept of prairie populism - a political con cept that is traditionally American. McGovern was, per haps, a candidate for another period in our history. "Sometimes when he talks there is a faint whiff of William 154 Jennings Bryan about him, of standing at the Lord's side." It was noted that McGovern had the "moralizing spirit of Woodrow Wilson. That spirit is not always a sound guide in public affairs, but it is as American as Avon, South 155 Dakota, and more old than new." Indeed, the McGovern campaign rhetoric intentionally attempted to link McGovern with the moralists of the past, and more importantly perhaps, with the Populist Movement. McGovern is also symbolized by his rhetoricians as standing against the forces of evil - the Karl Mundts, as capable of representing the forces of righteousness in battles against villains. Like the Populists McGovern is represented as standing against forces of power which threaten the common man. 156 page 206 This rhetorical vision of McGovern-as-populist may have been a major negative factor in the overall image of the Democratic candidate. His effusion of moralistic rhetoric may have been an attempt to conjure up the spirit of William Jennings Bryan, but in 1972 the preaching popu list was not the appropriate image for a presidential can didate. The American public did not yet consider the Watergate Affair as being all that important. What they did witness is the Nixon Administration’s winding-down of the Vietnam War. McGovern had misinterpreted the scene in the United States as being ripe for a rebirth of popu lism; instead, the American culture seemed to reflect a satisfaction with "business-as-usual," at least in terms of the image projected by the majority of the electorate. 157 As Black noted, it was a "rhetorical resting-time." This image problem lay in McGovern’s moral approach to politics. "In a strictly moral approach, where one's attitude toward the object is formed in advance, the range and quality of one’s observations are restricted by the attitude." 9 This "attitude" may be referred to as McGovern's "trained incapacity," a situation in which "one's very abilities can function as blindness."1-^ jn his campaign biography of McGovern, Anson prophetically declared that it was "one of McGovern's greatest strengths - page 207 and some would say, among his most glaring weaknesses - that on certain issues he does see politics in moral, almost apocalyptic terms.According to the concept of trained incapacity, this supposed strength may also serve as a major cause of "tunnel vision": The problems of existence do not have one fixed, unchanging charac ter, like the label on a bottle. They are open to many interpreta tions - and these interpretations in turn influence our selection of means. Hence the place of ’trained incapacities’ in the matter of means-selecting. One adopts mea sures in keeping with his past training - and the very soundness of this training may lead him to adopt the wrong measures. l6l McGovern's orientation toward politics had been filtered through his exposure to the social gospel at an earlier stage in his life. Although the presidential campaign of 1972 was a national effort, and thus different from the state-wide elections of the primary campaigns, McGovern brought with him his undeviating theme of "Good versus Evil." This in turn led him to select the moralis tic rhetorical strategy evidenced earlier in this chapter., McGovern's predisposition toward moralism thus became his solution to America’s problems. If the people could only be made to see what had happened to their ideals, then they would elect McGovern, assuring themselves of a page 208 renaissance of political and spiritual morality. In the business of means-selecting, instead of choosing the means with respect to the nature of the problem to be solved, one tends to state the problem in such a way that his par ticular attitude becomes the 'solu tion' for it. 162 McGovern’s moralistic rhetorical strategy was his major weapon against Nixon. He attempted to portray him self as the absolute standard of political purity in order to present his candidacy as a clear alternative to the expedient nature of Nxion, the typical politician. The nation needed strong moral leadership, the theme stated, and McGovern was the only candidate in 1972 who could guarantee that leadership. "It is a small step from this area of personal competition in campaign discourse to the general subject of leadership." J Indeed, it is natural to combine these two areas. Although McGovern had cast his campaign duel with Nixon in terms of moral leadership, it was poli tical leadership that became one of the most important issues in the 1972 election. The image the voters per ceived concerning various leadership skills in politics was different from the image of moral leadership in the McGovern political spectrum. The next section of this chapter examines the image of leadership projected through the rhetorical strategies of both Nixon and McGovern. page 209 Part Four: Leadership Issues "The phenomenon of leadership in a campaign evolves through action, through the display of skill or virtue, 164 and through the attribution of competence by the followers. This issue of leadership in a campaign may be viewed, then, as a conflict between the composite images of the candi dates. This section of the chapter contains an analysis of the McGovern campaign image as a function of the policy and personality issues of the 1972 campaign. "The political image is essentially an image of 165 roles." An election is really "a cultural drama on a grand scale,pitting opposing viewpoints and images against each other through the clash of individuals who represent political parties. The electorate observes the actors in their political roles and then chooses one actor over another on election day. This important func tion of the campaign goes beyond the discussion of issues to a point in which "campaign discourse also serves as the backdrop against which the public can work out its tensions and satisfy its needs for security, order, leadership, and control over the future. This constitutes, in effect, the "ritualistic" side of politics. Campaigns not only present issues to the voters, they also demonstrate certain leadership images page 210 based upon the presentation of those issues. "The same symbolic appeals that win or lose votes for the candidates also establish the election ritual itself. "168 jn presentation of issues, candidates are perceived by the electorate as fitting into certain roles. As the drama continues, these roles are either confirmed or changed in the individual mind of each member of the electorate. The image of the candidate as perceived by the elec torate generally plays an important part in any presiden tial election, but in 1972 image may well have been the most important "issue" of the election. In many ways candidate image is the mirror image of party identi fication in its impact on the vote, showing stability until 1972 when it jumped sharply to become the most influential factor in influ encing the vote. 169 Realizing that image is an important factor in poli tics in the United States, most candidates strive to develop a campaign image based upon the audience they wish to attract. The pragmatic development of leadership symbols is accom plished through the construc tion of performances in which realistic displays of action, skill, and virtue are offered to potential followers. 170 page 211 By demonstrating certain political images, a candidate is attempting to attract members of a certain type of audience For McGovern, this group was the Change Coalition; for Nixon, it was the New American Majority. Although cer tain audiences are always targeted by the candidates in their projection of leadership images, the battle for the center of the political spectrum is usually the point at which both candidates aim. In American political life this has most invariably manifested itself as an attempt to capture the center ground of our electo ral battlefield. The reason for this tropism toward the center is simple: that is where victory lies. 171 It has been previously argued that McGovern's tar geted audience was the Change Coalition. Any considera tion of his campaign leadership image must then be con sidered with that thought in mind. In defining his audi ence, McGovern subsequently defined the type of image he wished to project. The development of the composite McGovern image may be categorized into three main areas: (1) Nixon's image in the campaign (to serve as a point of comparison for McGovern’s image); (2) The image the McGovern rhetorical strategy had hoped to project; (3) The specific failures of the McGovern strategy concerning that hoped-for image. page 212 (1) Nixon's Campaign Image - "A common pragmatic symbolization of leadership is the practice of incumbents to blur the distinction between their image as candidate 172 and their image as public official." In the presiden tial election of 1972 this tendancy of incumbents to cloak themselves in the trappings of their offices was part of a two-tiered Republican strategy to retain the White House: The Republican campaign was based . primarily on two strategies: to stress the President's record and to represent him as competent and personally responsible, while keeping him personally off the campaign trail as much as possible; and secondly, to show McGovern as a radical challenger to the basic American institutions. 173 It is easy for an incumbent president to get ade quate media exposure. Nixon merely had to act "presiden tial" in order to demonstrate leadership ability through the press. Nixon could run on his record with few cam paign promises and fewer campaign appearances. In order to attack McGovern while seemingly remaining "above poli tics," Nixon could rely on two strategies. The first included the use of "surrogate speakers," such as Agnew, Dole, and Richardson. These individuals would attack McGovern's policies, turning his referential symbols into condensation symbols as discussed previously. page 213 The second tactic within the strategy which was used by Nixon to attack McGovern was the establishment of an organization entitled, "Democrats for Nixon." This group was headed by former Texas governor John B. Connally, a nominal Democrat who changed loyalties and joined the Republican Party shortly after the election. The negative media advertising against McGovern was mainly sponsored by this group. This allowed the distinction to be made that the Nixon campaign itself did not spend its advertising dol lars to criticize McGovern, but rather, to emphasize the positive accomplishments of the President, while disenchanted Democrats were attacking McGovern. 174 This two-tiered strategy allowed the President to transcend the rough-and-tumble of the political arena. Nixon could neatly avoid the sticky situations of the campaign by casting his image as that of the President running for re-election. In addition, because the Repub licans are the "minority party" in the United States, the image of Nixon as the President did not include reference to his party affiliation. This image of Nixon as the embodiment of the office of President was what his campaign coordinators wanted to project to the electorate, which may explain why there was little, if any, "coattail effect" in this election. As one of his advisors noted: page 214 We very definitely did not want Nixon to be perceived as the Re publican candidate for President, but as Richard Nixon running for re-election. We had to move away from that party affiliation in view of the low registration that we had. 175 Nixon was thus made to appear not as a candidate running for political office, but as the office itself running for electoral approval.' This is part of the hierarchical nature of society - a type of "pyrimidal magic" that is "inevitable in social relations," "whereby individuals, whether rightly or wrongly, become endowed 176 with the attributes of their office." McGovern, then, was not running against Nixon the man, nor was he campaigning against Nixon the Republican» he was running against the President of the United States. Utilizing this tactic, attacks against Nixon the political person could be made to appear to be attacks against the very office of the Presidency. If, as Charles Guggenheim, media advisor to McGovern has argued, "the Presidency is 177 looked upon by the American people in total awe," 11 then the electorate may not wish to hear disparaging remarks about the candidate associated with that office. By making violent verbal assaults against Nixon in the areas of personality and policy issues (such as the legalistic page 215 scapegoating of Nixon for the war and the lack of moral fibre in the country) McGovern may well have violated certain ritualistic expectations of the leadership image appropriate to the challenger. (2) The Projected McGovern Image - McGovern had won the Democratic nomination by concentrating his rhetorical appeals upon the conception of his candidacy as being somehow different from that of other politicians. As Guggenheim remarked just after the convention, "commodity 1*78 No. 1 is a non-political image." In order to accomplish the task of building a non-political image, the campaign in the primaries had put a premium upon the character of the candidate, raising it to the level of a major issue. "The stress on the personal character of a potential Democratic nominee was a strong strain in the McGovern 179 New Populist rhetorical vision." Once the decision had been made early in the primaries to emphasize McGovern’s moral tenacity, "the McGovern rhetoric focused on the creation of a public persona that portrayed Senator McGovern as a Man of Principle who 180 stood above the common politician." The heavy moral tones of his oratory were designed to demonstrate that McGovern did not act "as normal, shiftless politicians do, 1 O 1 but as a man of honor." page 2l6 McGovern's rhetorical approach to the campaign was essentially that of a prophet to his wayward people. The nation had sinned against humanity in Vietnam and was in need of redemption. McGovern, of course, was the messiah. As he sermonized, he could aid the electorate in helping each other: I believe that the greatest con tribution that America can now make to our fellow mortals is to heal our own great but very deeply troubled land. We must respond to that ancient command: Physician, cure thyself. 182 The McGovern rhetoric focused upon the issue of moral leadership in building its campaign image. The candidate's view of the Presidency reflected this rhetori cal approach to the election: The people want a President who will restore their trust in govern ment by trusting them. They want a leadership that will not set one standard for the powerful and one for those without power. They hun ger for that clarifying vision of national purpose that only a presi dent can provide - a President who will lift our eyes above the daily entanglements to a more distant horizon. 183 Again, the paragraph above demonstrates McGovern's "pathetic fallacy," as he spoke of his conceptualization of the Presidency as if it were that of the "people." The page 217 issue of leadership for McGovern was based upon his almost biblical image of the president-as-prophet. While Nixon's rhetorical strategy was designed to demonstrate his "pro- fessionalism, the toughness, the competence in office," the McGovern rhetoric focused not upon the Democrat's decision-making abilities but emphasized his ethical character; the McGovern rhetoric did not stress the can didate's capabilities to govern but instead noted his capacities for setting sweeping national goals for moral conduct. It has been argued earlier that in the election of 1972 McGovern may be characterized as the prophet while Nixon functioned in the role of the priest. It appears that the nation chose the priest in this election, re jecting the moral approach to politics. But that conclu sion assumes that the McGovern image remained intact as it was conceived by the candidate and his staff. There are several reasons as to why this assumption is in error. These are examined in the following section of this chapter. (3) Specific Failures of the McGovern Strategy - There were two specific failures of the McGovern rhetorical strategy that developed during the months after he had achieved the Democratic nomination. The first failure page 218 concerned McGovern's unsuccuessful attempt to play to the political center. The Eagleton Affair was subject to analysis is Chap ter II. At this point it is necessary to recall that even senior aides at McGovern's national headqharters admitted that their candidate's image "had been scarred" by the scenario. As previously demonstrated, "a lot of the public viewed McGovern's dropping Eagleton as a 1 86 political move." When a candidate spends a great deal of time in order to foster a non-political image and then has his actions interpreted as being political, his image is bound to suffer. Beyond the politicizing of the McGovern image, the Eagleton scenario created another question of concern for the Democratic candidate. As New York Times columnist James Reston explained, "The issue in this whole sad Eagleton business is not only Senator Eagleton’s health, 187 but Senator McGovern's judgment." And the British journal, The Economist, echoed Reston's commentary: "Mr. McGovern seemed to have been hasty and lacking in judgment when making what could be the most important choice of , . .,188 his career." The point to be made here is that while McGovern's image as a non-political candidate suffered as a result of page 219 the Eagleton fiasco, so did his image as a decision-maker Since the "Committee to Re-Elect the President" had put a premium upon building Nixon's image as predicated upon his ability to make the difficult decisions of the Presi dency, McGovern not only lost ground with his own Change . . 189 Coalition but also looked bad to the other groups within the electorate. Nixon did not have to criticize McGovern for his decision to run and then not to run with Eagleton. Nixon just had to remain "presidential" in order to provide the obvious contrast in image. McGovern's attempted shift to a more moderate stand on the issues was also damaging to his non-political image. After the convention the problem for McGovern was to develop a message which would remain consistent with his ideals yet simultaneously obtain the votes of the' great majority of the electorate who were "unyoung, unpoor, and unblack," and who were, "middle-aged, middle- 190 class, middle-minded." As one columnist noted: Because Mr. McGovern won the nomi nation with so unusual a coalition of forces, and without so many components of the traditional Demo cratic alliance, his ability to unify the party becomes crucial if he is to stand a chance of defeating President Nixon. 191 page 220 The average Democrat did not stir when urged to join 192 with the Change Coalition. The majority of the elec torate, fifty-five percent, thought that McGovern was too liberal in his stands upon the issues. 77 In order to gain some votes from this political center, McGovern had to modify his rhetorical strategy, attempting to trans form his liberal policy stands so that they would not be offensive to the majority of voters. At the same time he did not wish to lose the support of the Change Coalition. For example, at the beginning of the campaign McGovern tried to stress "traditional Democratic bread-and-butter 194 íssues," but his income redistribution scheme was not an effective definition of the issue, as has been noted. It may have been this drive to obtain a portion of the centrist vote that led McGovern to promise aerospace engineers in Houston that, "No aerospace or defense job will be eliminated until a comparable civilian job has 195 been created in a full-employment, peace-time economy." Such a promise contradicted earlier McGovern rhetoric calling for major reductions in defense spending, thus it invited "suspicion and disbelief to pretend that huge cuts can be made in the defense and space industries with- 196 out economic dislocations." page 221 McGovern was now involved in a national campaign, with all of its demands. In order to make himself seem to be a candidate with wide appeal he had to attract the "middle-mind" of the majority of the electorate. To that end he shelved his "$1,000 per-person" welfare plan and shifted some of his other more extreme positions on the issues. This, of course, made him appear to be political, as his transformations were shabby. McGovern seemed to be shifting his beliefs in order to gain voter support. Mr. McGovern himself, as a presi dential candidate, is rapidly, even if unavoidably, becoming an establishment figure, a politician like all the rest, and losing the uncompromising independence that was his main asset. 197 McGovern was perceived by many members of both the Change Coalition and the New American Majority as shifting from his initial liberal positions. He was doing so in response to the political scene, attempting to transform his rhetorical strategy to the developing campaign situ ation. In shifting toward the center, McGovern "turned off those activists for special causes who had backed him earlier and now felt that he had compromised with their 198 ideals for the sake of political gain." McGovern had appealed to those members of the electorate who were attracted by a moralist candidate, but in order to be page 222 elected president the Democrat had to cut into the New American Majority which Nixon was carving out of the old Roosevelt coalition. The political situation demanded a shift to the center to expand the appeal of the candidate. Yet the McGovern rhetoric that por trayed the hero persona as a man of principle hindered such a shift. 199 The Republicans picked-up on this attempted trans formation of the McGovern image, portraying the Democrat in one televised advertisement (sponsored by the "Demo crats for Nixon") as a weathervane shifting in the poli tical wind. "Research indicated that among voters with a high exposure to television, the 'changing-stands' ad may have contributed to their views about McGovern's leader ship qualities."200 McGovern was thus trapped by his own image of the 201 moral, non-political candidate. This "paradox of purity" caught McGovern, the candidate of the Change Coalition, attempting to transform the issue positions that he had used to obtain the nomination. This was perceived by many as a political move on his part. Thus the non-poli tical image was tarnished. Members of both the Change Coalition and the New American Majority were "turned-off" by the McGovern rhetorical transformation. The result of page 223 these specific slips in image was that McGovern was not trusted by the majority of the American electorate in 1972, a terrible image irony for a candidate who had based his appeal upon his moral approach to politics. 202 This tragic image problem, exemplified at the polls, led Newsweek to the paradoxical conclusion that, "One is left with the startling impression that the public may see in George McGovern's personality simply a lesser 203 version of Richard Nixon himself." McGovern's sought-after image of the non-political, moral candidate was greatly damaged by his conduct during the Eagleton Affair and by his perceived shift on certain key issues in order to attract additional voter support. These and other previously mentioned ideas are brought together in the final section of this chapter in an analysis of McGovern's overall campaign image. Part Five: Summary of the McGovern Image 204 According to Nimmo, two types of considerations affect the politician's choice of dramatic mechanisms: (1) "Whether a politician can adapt his political style to certain performances"; (2) "The spectators to a dramatic performance are not a passive audience. Since they read meanings into the performance, their expectations help determine the expressions an actor uses to influence the page 224 205 audience's impressions of him." This final section will use this organizational format as the basis for analyzing McGovern’s image in the presidential campaign of 1972. Style in politics may be defined as ingratiation. "It is an attempt to gain favor by the hypnotic or sugges- 2 06 tive process of ’saying the right thing.’" In a given scene, a certain type may be more appropriate than another mode of ingratiation. In short, style must be flexible in order to be functional. Style is a constant meeting of obligations, a state-of-being- without-offense, a repeated doing of the ’right’ thing...For style (custom) is a complex schema of what-goes-with-what, carried through all the subtleties of manner and attitudes. 207 Each political actor has a style, and those actors who are most successful exhibit the most flexible styles. In addition, political style may obviously be defined in relationship to the audience the candidate seeks to per suade . We have previously discussed how McGovern's attempts at adaptation of his political style were seen as a shift from his image as a non-political candidate. In this sense, McGovern's political style may be characterized as page 225 being inflexible. As the prophet came down from the mountain he became tainted; his purity became soiled, and his image subsequently crumbled. McGovern had been trapped by his moralistic image, and that image evinced a style that was not readily adaptable to the varied audience of the national campaign. Attempts to change that style led to a tarnishing of the previously projected "pure" McGovern image. The paradox inherent in the McGovern rhetorical image was that while he could not change his rhetorical style (in the broad sense) he could also not win the election by retaining his original, moralistic format. McGovern's theme had been that he represented "good" and that his opponent stood for "evil." Yet "in political life, it is impossible to vote for the 'good' and against the 'bad.' 2 Qg What we are always voting for are complex bundles." McGovern's simplistic view of politics was not adaptable to the national campaign trail. McGovern had tediously built the image of a decent, moral statesman. That image now devoured him. His attempt to run a campaign based upon the issues brought a Republican manipulation of his referential symbols into emotionally-oriented condensation symbols which in turn became negative masking issues. These were actually nega tive status issues to be used against McGovern. Allowing page 226 Republicans to produce negative "tag lines" for his pro grams was one of McGovern’s failures, ultimately leading to the questioning of his ability to govern. "The failure to use the selectivity rule in conjunction with the tran sition rule can leave a candidate open to charges that 209 his candidacy is not a legitimate or credible one." That is precisely what happened to McGovern. Yet McGovern's dilemma was of his own making. His moralistic image had to be supported by a rigid political style. When he attempt to ingratiate himself to those voters who leaned more toward the political center, his style became a barrier to his transition, and his image suffered. Nimmo’s second category concerns the expectations of the audience. At the beginning of this chapter we defined the projected audience of the McGovern campaign as the Change coalition, demonstrating that this audience did not represent the majority of American voters. Instead, the New American Majority of Nixon appeared to constitute the area of political thought in which most Americans were represented. Earlier in this chapter it was also noted that McGovern’s welfare programs became a type of "status issue," pitting the Change Coalition against the New page 227 Majority. This concept may now be expanded in order to analyze the image the majority of the American public developed from the McGovern rhetoric. In politics there are such phenomena as "value images" which consist "of a 'posture* which in a sense summarizes an extremely complex network of alternatives 210 and situations." These "god terms" stem from the ritualistic considerations of the campaign - the "hidden meanings" inherent in the consideration of policy issues - and are significant because they reflect the actions of the political actor as he symbolizes the societal atti- 211 tude. Essentially, these value images may be thought of as a combination of status issues - a metaphor that repre sents the campaigner. Metaphor is important in the deve lopment of the electorate's perspective of the campaign: j "It is precisely through metaphor that our perspectives, 212 or analogical extensions, are made." Indeed, Burke argued that metaphor is that which gives purpose to life.2« To the extent that such images produce metaphors which are complimentary to the metaphors prevalent in the minds of the majority of the electorate, the resulting political image may be thought of as being positive. If page 228 the metaphors of the campaign do not coincide with the societal norm, then they are negative. McGovern's image was basically negative - his metaphor represented the struggle between two battling factions within society, those being the Change Coalition and the New American Majority, and McGovern's group was in the minority. McGovern's basic image was that of the prophet. He had attempted to advance the metaphor of McGovern-as- social-critic while casting Nixon as the priest of the status quo. The result was that McGovern was opposed by the majority of the electorate, not simply because his views were rejected...but because he was the symbol of a larger struggle between ascending and declining forces, a struggle manifesting itself in the Democratic party but reaching be yond that into society. 214 McGovern's candidacy was symbolic of the "new poli tics." But beyond that, he had become the symbol of a different way of life with different values. McGovern's moralistic rhetoric cast the shadow of guilt across America; a guilt that the majority of citizens did not want to bear. McGovern could be seen as heaping some shame on all the New American Majority held dear -the myths of patriotism and rugged individualism which were the cornerstones of the values of a generation of voters page 229 who had suffered through the Great Depression and fought the second world war. McGovern was, indeed, a part of that generation, but he had lost touch with it. McGovern told those of his generation that their values had to be changed; that their dreams, their metaphors for life had caused the ills of America. In essence, by attacking their metaphors McGovern was attacking the life-style of the New American Majority. This is why status issues became vivid value images during this campaign. Even if McGovern wished to wage his campaign upon the issues, 215 most voters perceived his candidacy as bein ideological, and most members of the electorate wanted no part of the prophet's ideology-laden message. The result was that McGovern's very candor may have hurt him, leading to his extremist image: McGovern's very honesty may count against him, tending to destroy confidence in his ability, and Nixon's adroitness and tergiver sation may inspire trust. That is, McGovern, already dismissed as an 'idealist,' is an uncertain, possibly dangerous, quantity, while Nixon is a known article. 216 The McGovern rhetorical strategy had been to portray the candidate as a political Moses who would lead Ameri cans to the promised land of moral righteousness. The majority of the electorate saw him as the radical leader page 230 of a political cult known as the Change Coalition. To the New American Majority, McGovern was not the prophet, but the messiah of the liberal interest groups which had been collected into the Change Coalition. Restricted by his moralistic style, McGovern’s image was not adaptable to the national political scene. The resulting image held by the majority of voters became a negative value image in which the metaphors of life for the average voter came under heavy criticism. McGovern’s candidacy was thus symbolic of the conflict between the value systems of the Change Coalition and the New Ameri can Majority. Voting against McGovern was considered a vote for the values of the past, which certainly is ironic for a candidate who had attempted to resurrect the image of the prairie populist. Although McGovern's moral view of politics was historical in nature, many voters perceived him as proposing radical liberal changes in society. In the election of 1972, America witnessed the vindication of the New American Majority through its denegration of the prophet of moral change. page 231 Notes for Chapter III 1. Time, July 17, 1972, p. 17- 2. W. Lance Bennett, "The Ritualistic and Pragmatic Bases of Political Campaign Discourse," The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 63, no. 3 (October, 1977), p. 219-23S. 3. U«S. News and World Report, July 31, 1972, p. 48. 4. Murray Edelman, "Political Settings as Symbolism," in James E. Combs and Michael W. Mansfield, ed., Drama in Life: The Uses of Communication in Society (New York: Hastings House, 1976), p. 254. 5. George McGovern, "Interview," Life, Vol 73, no. 1, July 7, 1972, p. 41. 6. Everett C. Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), P« 7• 7. Stewart Alsop, "McGovern's Dilemma," Newsweek, July 24, 1972, p. 88. 8. Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, "Demography is Destiny," in Francis M. Carney and H. Frank Way, Jr., ed., Politics, 1972 (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), P« 6. 9. ibid, p. 7- 10. Facts on File, 1972, p. 344. 11. Alsop, p. 88. 12. "McGovern as Scapegoat," The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1972, p. 10. 13. Ernest R. Mav and Janet Fraser, ed., Campaign '72 The Managers Speak (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 233. 14. Time, August 28, 1972, p. 15« page 232 15. Stewart Alsop, Newsweek, July 3, 1972, p. 26. 16. Nixon defined the concept of the New American Majority in a paid radio address on October 21, 1972. Facts on File, 1972, p. 845. 17- Facts, p. 845-846. 18. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change : An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 173. 19. ibid, p. 214. 20. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), P« 21. Alsop, July 24, 1972, p. 88. 22. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New,York: World Publishing Co., 1962), p. 3« 23. Time, August 28, 1972, p. 16. 24. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 229. 25. Burke, Grammar, p. 44. 26. ibid, p. 113. 27. ibid, p. 51-52. 28. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 231. 29. Burke, Grammar, p. 391» 30. Jack W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, "Contem porary Rhetorical Theory and Criticism: Dimensions of the New Rhetoric," Communication Monographs, Vol. 42, no. 4 (Nov., 1975), P- 325- 31. Burke, Grammar, p. 392. 32. ibid, p. xxi. 33- Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 223- 34. ibid, p. 220-221. page 233 35. White, p. 409. 36. ibid, p. 409. 37. The New York Times, July 14, 1972, p. 1. 38. The Washington Post, July 21, 1972 (quoted from Facts on File, 1972, p. 572). 39. The New York Times, July 21, 1972, p. 1. 40. Facts, p. 706. 41. ibid, p. 281. 42. Time, July 17, 1972, p. 6l. 43. Facts, p. 554. 44. Time, July 17, 1972, p. 60. 45. Facts, p. 677. 46. ibid, p. 678. 47. ibid, p. 678. 48. ibid, p. 846. 49. ibid, p. 846. 50. ibid, p. 846. 51. ibid, p. 846. 52. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 231. 53. ibid, p. 226. 54. ibid, p. 233- 55- Robert Dole, United States Senator from Kansas, was to be President Ford's Vice-Presidential candidate in the 1976 election. 56. Facts, p. 642. page 234 57. Facts, p. 642. 58. ibid, p. 642. 59« "Nearly three out of four graded his performance in these areas (inflation, unemployment, taxation and welfare) ’fair or poor.'" Newsweek, August 28, 1972, p. 17. 60. W. Lance Bennett, Patrician D. Harris, Janet H. Laskey, Alan H. Levitch, Sarah E. Monrad, "Deep and Surface Images in the Construction of Political Issues: The Case of Amnesty," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 62., no. 2 (April, 1976), p. 110. 61. Roñal Reagan, quoted in Facts, p. 642. 62. Acceptance Speech of Richard Nixon upon his nomina tion by the Republican Party in 1972, quoted in Facts, p. 642. 63. ibid, p. 642. 64. Bennett, et al., p. 111. 65. ibid, p. 122. 66. Joseph R. Gusfield, "A Dramatistic Theory of Status Politics," in Drama in Life, p. 247. 67. ibid, p. 248. 68. ibid, p. 254. 69. ibid, p. 248. 70. Facts, p. 504. 71. ibid, p. 590 (quoting a Harris Survey). 72. ibid, p. 701. 73. Robert Sam Anson, McGovern: A Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 149. 74. "The Democratic Platform," in Facts, p. 5^6. page 235 75- Burke, Permanence, p. 192. 76. The New York Times, August 3, 1972, p. 21 (quoting Frank Mankiewicz). 77• "The Democratic Party must share the responsibility for this tragic war. But, elected with a secret plan to end this war, Nixon's plan is still secret, and we - and the Vietnamese - have had four more years of fighting and death." "The Democratic Platform," in Facts, p. 546. 78. It should be noted that McGovern had earlier voted for the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution," a document which gave President Johnson and future Presidents the authority to commit American forces to combat situations without first seeking a declaration of war from Congress. ■79- Facts, p. 590« 80. McGovern's October 10, 1972 televised address on Vietnam, reported in Facts, p. 805. 81. ibid, p. 805. 82. ibid, p. 805- 83. White, p. 412. 84. Facts, p. 889. 85- ibid, p. 546. 86. ibid, p. 78I. 87. "Democratic Platform," Facts, p. 546. 88. McGovern's Vietnam Address, Facts, p. 805- 89. Facts, p. 300. 90. McGovern’s Vietnam Address, Facts, p. 805. 91. ibid, p. 805. page 236 92. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form; Studies in Symbolic Action (New York: Vintage Press, 1957), P- 35 93- McGovern's Vietnam Address, Facts, p. 805 94. ibid, p. 805. 95• ibid, p. 805• 96. George McGovern, "A New Internationalism," Facts, p. 804. 97• One example of the popularity of such trips was that the Gallup Poll reported a seven percent rise in Nixon's popularity rating following his trip to the People’s Republic of China. 98. McGovern's Vietnam Address, Facts, p. 805- 99. ibid, p. 805. 100. Facts, p. 647. 101. The Economist, September 9, 1972, p. 53-54. 102. ibid, p. 54. 103. McGovern's Vietnam Address, Facts, p. 805. 104. Facts, p. 679. 105. ibid, p. 210. 106. ibid, p. 360. 107. ibid, p. 508. 108. ibid, p. 554. 109. ibid, p. 782. 110. Frederick T. Stephen and Robert H. Teeter, Comment on 'A Maloritv Partv in Disarray.'" The American Political Science Review (Sept., 1976), p. 806. 111'. Burke, Grammar, p. 3- page 237 112. Burke, Grammar, p. 19« 113. Stephen and Teeter, p. 807. 114. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "The Revolt of the Masses," Commentary, Vol. 55 (Feb., 1973)» P- ¿0. 115- One example of the frequency of these attacks by one of Nixon's surrogates: When Melvin Laird referred to McGovern's proposed defense cuts as being based in "mythology," "it was the third time in recent weeks that Laird had used a Pentagon news conference as a forum to challenge McGovern's defense positions." Facts, p. 632. 116. ibid, p. 525. 117. ibid, p. 781. 118. ibid, p. 283- 119. "...under a war motive, you must so alter the dia lectic that individual sacrifice equals collective good." Burke, Grammar, p. 397. 120. White, p. 408. 121. Facts, p. 275. 122. Anthony Ashley Cooper, "Reply to the Address of the Lancashire Short-Time Central Committee," 1843, in Kenneth E. Carpenter, ed., British Labor Struggles: Contemporary Pamphlets, 1727-1850 (New York: Arnos Press, Í972), p. 6-7- 123. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 222. 124. ibid, p. 222. 125. ibid, p. 222. 126. ibid, p. 224. 127. The New York Times, July 13, 1972, 128. Newsweek, July 19, I972, p. 24. 129. Anson, p. 92-93- page 238 130. White, p. 148. 131. ibid, p. 417. 132. Newsweek, October 16, 1972, p. 29. 133- ibid, p. 29. 134. Facts, p. 781« 135- Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 227- 136. Facts, p. 847. 137. ibid, p. 890. 138. White, p. 418. 139- For a brief explanation of the Watergate break-in of June 17, 1972, see p. 392 in White. 140. Facts, p. 874. 141. ibid, p. 874. 142. ibid, p. 847. 143. ibid, p. 847. 144. ibid, p. 719- 145. ibid, p. 628. 146. ibid, p. 825. 147. ibid, p. 825. 148. ibid, p. 890. 149. ibid, p. 890. 150. Orrin Klapp, "Dramatic Encounters," in Drama in Life, p. 273. 151. ibid, p. 273. 152. White, p. 409. page 239 153 • The New York Times, July 13, 1972, p. 24. 154. Hugh Sidney, "The Presidency," Time, July 24, 1972, P- 23. 155- Life, Vol. 73, no. 3 (July 21, 1972), p. 38. 156. William D. Semlak, "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Minnesota, 1973), P- 53. 157. Edwin Black, "Electing Time," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April. 1973). p. 129. 158. Burke, Permanence, p. 176. 159. ibid, p. 7- 160. Anson, p. 93- 161. Burke, Permanence, p. 10. 162. ibid, p. 242-243. 163. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 223. 164. ibid, p. 227. 165. Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: The Univer- sity of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 103. 166. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 220. 167. ibid, p. 219-220. 168. ibid, p. 219. 169. American Political Science Quarterly, July, 1975, p. 238. 170. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 227-228. 171. Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenburg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 21. page 240 172. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 228. 173. Wil A. Linkugel and Dixie Lee Cody, "Nixon, McGovern, and the Female Electorate," Today's Speech, Vol. 21, no. 4 (Fall, 1973), p. 25. 174. Herbert Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1976)7 p. 282. 175. Campaign '72, p. 223. 176. Burke, Permanence, p. 279. 177- Campaign '72, p. 205« 178. Charles Guggenheim, McGovern media advisor, in The New York Times, July 14, 1972, p. 10. 179« Semlak, p. 63. 180. ibid, p. 6l. 181. ibid, p. 202. 182. George McGovern, quoted in Bernard T. Donahue, "The Political Use of Religious Symbolism: A Case Study of the 1972 Presidential Campaign," The Review of Politics, Vol. 37, no. 1 (Jan., 1975), p. 51. 183. ibid, p. 51» 184. Campaign 172, p. 197- 185. The New York Times, August 2, 1972, p. 1. 186. Campaign '72, p. 220. 187. The New York Times, July 28, 1972, p. 31- 188. The Economist, August 5, 1972, p. 14. 189. see Campaign '72, p. 220. 190. Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 21. 191. The New York Times, July 17, 1972, p. 1. page 24l 192. Charles Bartlett, "McGovern, Aids Risk Resounding Defeat by Ignoring Wishes of Party Loyalists," The Toledo Blade, September 9« 1972. 193- Facts, p. 782. See also, "A Majority Party in Disarray," p. 760. 194. "McGovern's Image: Is it Fading?" The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 1972. 195. ibid, 196. ibid* 197- The Economist, August 26, 1972, p. 14. 198. The Economist, October 28, 1972, p. 15- 199- Semlak, p. 198. 200. Thomas E. Patterson and Robert D. McClure, Political Advertising: Voter Reaction to Televised Political Commercials, Study no. 23 (Princeton, N.J.: Citizen's Research Foundation, 1973), P- 32ff. 201. Burke, Grammar, p. 35- 202. See Newsweek, August 28, 1972, p. 16-18. 203. ibid, p. 18. 204. Dan Nimmo, "The Drama, Illusion and Reality of Political Images," Drama in Life. 205. ibid, p. 261-262. 206. Burke, Permanence, p. 50. 207. ibid, p. 269 (footnote). 208. Boulding, p. 111. 209. Bennett, "Ritualistic," p. 196. 210. Boulding, p. 110. 211. Gusfield, p. 247. page 242 212. Burke, Permanence, p. 194. 213. ibid, p. 192. 214. Ladd and Hadley, p. 223. - 215. George D. Mendel, St. Louis University political scientist, quoted in Newsweek, November 6, 1972, p. 42. 216. Mary McCarthy, "Imagination, Anyone?" Newsweek, July 10, 1972, p. 24. page 243 CHAPTER IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Several aspects of dramatistic methodology have been utilized in order to analyze and explain McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign and his subsequent campaign image. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, the metho dologies themselves are examined in terms of the four 1 assumptions posited in the first chapter. The disser tation is thus critiqued in terms of its contributions to the field of rhetorical theory and criticism. Second, a summary of the McGovern image is presented. Basing the analysis on this image, conclusions are drawn concerning McGovern's rhetoric in the campaign through an analysis of the nature of his arguments. Part One: The Analysis of the Methodological Approach In the first chapter four assumptions were presented concerning the foundation common to all dramatistic rhe torical perspectives. These four assumptions serve as an organizational pattern for this methodological critique. A. The Definition of Rhetoric In Chapter I rhetoric was defined as "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in 2 beings that by nature respond to symbols." The methodo logical approach of this dissertation was consistent with this definition. page 244 In both Chapter II and Chapter III it was demon strated that one of the major problems for McGovern was that he did not take advantage of the inherent ambiguity of language. The candidate's specificity led him into the captivity of his own rhetorical strategy, both in his approaches to the Eagleton Affair and in the creation of his campaign image. McGovern's failure to recognize the benefits of language ambiguity, an inherent function of the symbolic nature of language, coupled with the Repub licans' subsequent manipulation of the McGovern referen tial symbols into emotionally-charged condensation sym bols led to the creation of a negative campaign image for McGovern in the minds of the majority of the elec torate. Use of Gusfield's "status issue" analysis demon strated that the Republican rhetors controlled the defi nitional "tag lines" concerning key McGovern policy alternatives. These slogans were transformed into nega tive condensation symbols, resulting in problems with McGovern's campaign image. Thus while McGovern had hoped to foster an image of himself as a moral, populist candi date, the Nixon rhetors continued to define McGovern's image as an ultraleftist radical. The persuasibility of the American electorate to such a rhetorical approach was page 245 demonstrated both in the polls prior to November and in the election results. In this light it is evident that Gusfield's gestures of cohesion and differentiation are symbolic means of inducing cooperation within society. These gestures are built upon, the symbols inherent within " styles-of-life," and are thus deeply rooted in certain segments of our society. While these gestures serve to unite groups, they also act as devisive influences. However, even in division, there is unity and therefore cooperation, for in not identifying with one life-style one implicitly demonstrates affinity for some alternative. The study of this election demonstrated the operationalization of this definition of rhetoric in the concept of Gusfield’s "status issues." It is easy to conclude, then, that such status issue rhetoric is a powerful persuasive device. Political campaigns should then be studied in order to view the symbolization of policy, personal, and leadership issues into status issues by the candidates. A note on Bennett's issue configuration: The division into policy, personal and leadership issues of campaign rhetoric is difficult due to the overlapping nature of the phenomena in question. Unfortunately, application of page 246 this schema tends to render a "cookie-cutter" approach to rhetorical criticism. It is only in combination with other dramatistic forms that this particular format may be of significant value. Indeed, it would appear from this study that policy and personal issues are important only insofar as they serve to develop the leadership phenomenon, which is really nothing more than a major part of the campaign image. B. The Nature of Man and Society This assumption was based upon two criteria. The first was that "symbols generate selective perceptions and ultimately organize and structure the basic reality 3 in which people operate." The use of Bennett’s concep tion of political scenarios and their definitions as being functions of the rhetorical approaches of the candi dates was demonstrated in the analysis of the Eagleton Affair. The event "happened," then both parties rushed to give it meaning. These meanings were actually "selec tive perceptions" by the candidates as they attempted to persuade members of the electorate of the validity of their definitions. This created a "reality" in which each candidate operated and attempted to convince others to accept. This structuring of reality implies an organi zing principle, or motivation. page 247 In the Eagleton scenario it was demonstrated that Eagleton and McGovern emphasized different organizing principles concerning the termination of Eagleton’s nomination. McGovern’s rhetoric stressed the concept of the "Kill," while Eagleton emphasized the idea that he was making a "Sacrifice." This is consistent with the dramatistic notion of scapegoating as delineated by Burke: "In the sacrifice there is a kill; in the kill there is a sacrifice. But one or the other of this pair may be stressed as the ’essence’ of the two."^ In the second chapter it was also noted that McGovern and the press conceived of different views of Eagleton-as-scapegoat. To the media, Eagleton was a "fatalistic" scapegoat3 - a "marked man" who was destined to lose his nomination from the moment of his disclosure of past mental disturbances. For McGovern, Eagleton represented the "most perfect sacrifice.The press had concentrated on the past frailties of Eagleton instead of the major issues of the campaign. Since a "perfect" cam paign is based upon the issues, McGovern reasoned that the "killing" of Eagleton would atone for the "sin" of the media, thus leading the press back to the coverage of the issues. Indeed, the broadly-believed definition of Eagleton was a fatalistic vision of the nominee-as-scapegoat page 248 as urged by the press. This definition pressured McGovern into the final decision to drop Eagleton from the ticket. The second criterion rests in the notion that "the symbols system may ultimately provide the common features creating and sustaining the social and political community."7 Again, Gusfield's "status issues" demonstrated the vali dity of this criterion. In attributing meaning to the 8 world, "language gives our species a ’moral sense.'" This moral sense leads to the creation of "rights" and "wrongs." In essence, this moral sense creates "correct" life styles and "incorrect" ones for segments of the society. Through the use of status issue analysis it was determined that the political community was sustaining itself through its definitions, but that these definitions were not common to everyone in 1972. In short, the differ entiation of society into the groups called the New Ameri can Majority and the Change Coalition demonstrated that social community is both united and sustained and divided by symbolic appeals, and that these persuasive appeals are based in whatever metaphor one group or the other sub scribed to. Thus the motivations of both the audience and the political actors were ascertained, as previously noted and summarized again later in this chapter. page 24-9 C. The Dramatization of Politics It has been argued that "all drama is concerned with 9 the conveyance of impression to a group of auditors," and that political rhetoric certainly falls under the scope of this definition of dramatism. Just as an actor cannot guarantee "what his act will mean or what roles will be assigned to him and others as a result of his action,"10 so too the political actor cannot guarantee that he will receive from the campaign what he puts into it. In the case, of McGovern's image, we found that his actions, while intentionally good, were perceived by the electorate as being "political" or "unethical." McGovern's rhetoric attempted to picture him as a moralist; as a non politician, but his actions in various circumstances during the campaign tarnished that image. This leads to the conclusion that moralists have no place in politics. Such a blanket statement based upon the study of one campaign is, of course, unfounded. The major McGovern problem was that his campaign image did not "chain-out" among a majority of the electorate. The Republican rhetors' use of McGovern's own symbols against him changed the meaning of the Democrat's message. This being the case, it is not possible to argue that the 1972 page 250 presidential election demonstrated that the American pub lic will not elect a candidate with a strong populist political image, for most of the electorate probably did not conceive of McGovern in that light. McGovern attempted to project a strong populist campaign image, but the con ceptualization of his candidacy held by most Americans was defined by the Republicans, who portrayed McGovern as a "wild-eyed" radical leftist. The McGovern campaign image was controlled by either outside events (such as the Eagleton scenario) over which he could have little control or by the Repub lican subversion of McGovern’s referential symbols into "tag lines" which became negative condensation symbols, in turn creating a negative McGovern campaign image. D. The Critical Perspective The "critic-artist" paradigm allowed for the use of aspects of a number of different dramatistic approaches in this analysis. While each individual concept was dramatistic in nature, this dissertation put them to gether in combinations which have been previously unknown. Analysis of the McGovern image as a function of the policy, personality and leadership issues of the campaign of 1972 did include several different perspectives which page 251 demonstrated to be interrelated. The three issues areas, as posited by Bennett, were constructed of referential symbols on specific issues. These became condensation symbols on two levels: (1) the specific issue was "con densed" by the judicious use of language ambiguity on the part of the Republicans into negative "tag lines" con cerning McGovern’s specific issue-stands; (2) these con densation symbols became masked images which were trans lated into status issues. These status issues became gestures of differentiation between social groups within the electorate, dividing that body into the New American Majority and the Change Coalition. These symbols were simultaneously gestures of cohesion, uniting the groups themselves; crystallizing public perceptions of value- systems inherent within the life styles of each of the groups. These gestures were then attributed to the campaign images of the candidates. The status issues were thus transformed into under lying metaphors within the campaign. They delineated the motivations of each of the actors and of their audiences. Such metaphors were crystallized into the campaign images of the candidates. These images in turn became gestures of differentiation around which the electorate would split, page 252 while simultaneously serving as gestures of cohesion around which members of either the Change Coalition or the New American Majority could rally. As an event happened, the candidates would rush to structure its definitions in their favor. Even if the even was staged, such as a campaign address, the candi dates obviously attempted to structure the perceptions of the event received by the electorate. These interpre tations, structured through the use of referential and condensation symbols, became the issues of the campaign. The major issues became status issues which involved underlying societal metaphors which became evident in the manifest perceptions of the image of the individual candidates and the image of the individual members of society in terms of what group within the electorate he or she perceived themselves to be a part of. This dissertation thus serves to confirm dramatistic theory, a useful function which is consistent with that of Swanson.’1'^ The second-order construction system, coupled with the critical stance in the fourth form serves to either confirm or to modify theory, as delineated below. According to Swanson, "second order construction systems" are typified by their emphasis on the actors' page 253 creation of meaning for their actions. "Such systems in sist the explanations of actions be founded in the process by which situated actors construct meanings for their 12 actions, and in the resultant meanings thus created." ; The analysis within previous chapters falls into this category, since it concentrated on the campaign and its attending scenarios and the rhetorical approaches toward the interpretations of campaign phenomena and image by the McGovern rhetoric. Swanson also defines what he calls the "critical stance" for the rhetorical critic, stating that an indivi dual taking such an approach "seeks ways of verifying his 13 conclusions as correct." "Such critics thus typically engage in discourse which is argumentative or demonstra tive (offerring verification for their conclusions) rather 14 than merely explicative." The argumentative nature of the analysis in past chapters serves to demonstrate that the "critical stance" was the position taken by this author. In this stance, second order construction systems were applied to rhetori cal phenomena in an effort to draw constructive conclu sions and then to verify those conclusions through logi cal argumentation based upon dramatistic theory. page 254 Such critical efforts fall within Swanson's "fourth form" which is created by taking "the critical stance toward a representational system regarded as of the second order. The variety of explanation employed,..is interpretation."1-® This study established conclusions concerning the motivations of the McGovern rhetoric and subsequent perspectives generated within the audience (the electorate). These perspectives were in turn given motivations by reducing the nature of the campaign to the level of status issues. ' This categorization, according to Swanson, enables this study to contribute to rhetorical theory through either confirmation or modification of some of its . assumptions. By establishing the rhetorical assumptions in the first chapter and then by demonstrating their vali dity throughout the work and drawing the aforementioned conclusions within this current chapter, this disserta tion has therefore served to confirm existing rhetorical thought in terms of the dramatistic perspective. Part Two: Conclusions Regarding McGovern's Rhetorical Approach to the Campaign It has been demonstrated that McGovern viewed him self as a populist, and that his rhetorical approaches page 255 to the campaign were heavily laden with the appropriate populist moralistic urgings. This image was not perceived by the majority of the electorate, as they viewed McGovern as either suffering from incompetence or from shifting stands on the issues. This problem of a strict moralis tic image projection in a political campaign and its attending catastrophic result has been labelled as "McGovern's Dilemma." Beyond the public perception lay the candidate's basic conceptualizations of the campaign. These basic beliefs of McGovern and Nixon were reflected in their ■rhetorical strategies. McGovern’s motivation appeared to be "messianic" - the nation needed to be delivered from the "sin" of Vietnam and from the unethical Nixon Admini stration. McGovern's use of highly moralistic rhetoric led to his characterization as a prophet. Nixon did not view politics in apocalyptic terms. Instead, he was the master of expediency; the spokesman for the status quo. This led to his characterization as the high priest of the present. This distinction, of course, is based upon viewing McGovern as a political liberal and Nixon as a conservative While modern political definitions of those terms suggest page 256 that the above characterizations are accurate, if one explores the argumentative efforts of these candidates further it is possible to understand more fundamental differences between the men. Weaver has argued that "the rhetorical content of the major premise which the speaker habitually uses is the 16 key to his primary view of existence." Indeed, Weaver believed that, "Our propositions in argument consist of assertions which reflect our reading of experience. They must say things that we know to be true according to 17 these necessary ways of knowing our world." Sproule has noted that, "Weaver’s construct suggests that a rhetor's use of terms will tell us much about his 18 internal invention, and, ultimately, his world view." The task for the critic, then, is to "identify the rhe- 19 tor's vision of order." It has been established throughout this dissertation that McGovern's view of politics was based upon his be lief in the social gospel. Indeed, he saw politics as a clash between good and evil, and he felt that he was always on the side of moral righteousness. During the course of the 1972 campaign, McGovern argued that he could bring America back to its basic values. McGovern, page 257 was arguing from genus - from the essence of the American people, which he felt consisted of certain moral beliefs. Arguments from genus are "arguments based on the nature 20 of the thing which is said to constitute the genus," in this case, morals. The major premise of the McGovern rhetoric always assumed the inherent morality of the American people. Weaver writes that "those who habitually argue from genus are in their personal philosophy idealists. To 21 them the idea of genus is a reflection of existence." In this analysis, McGovern may be characterized as the classical rhetorical conservative, an individual who sees the universe as a paradigm of essences, of which the phenomenology of the world is a sort of continuing approximation. He sees it as a set of definitions which are struggling to get themselves defined in the real world. 22 On the other side of the argumentative spectrum, Nixon, the politically expedient candidate, may be seen to have argued from circumstance. "This argument merely reads the circumstances - the 'facts standing around' - and accepts them as coercive, or allows them to dictate 23 the decision." Nixon knew that the majority of the electorate was not going to identify with the Change page 258 Coalition envisioned by McGovern, so he tailored his message to fit the group he named, "The New American Majority." Arguing from such "facts standing around," Nixon's rhetoric used status issues to create "gestures of differ entiation." These served to divide the populus which McGovern was attempting to unite. While McGovern called the electorate to come together based upon the fundamen tal moralism of the American spirit, Nixon divided the nation on economic grounds, arguing that McGovern was a threat to the life style of the new majority. Weaver concluded that, "By thus making present circumstances the overbearing consideration, it keeps from sight even the nexus of cause and effect...the argument from circum- 24 stance is the argument appropriate to the liberal." But by "liberal" Weaver did not mean "leftist," as Bliese has noted: "By ’liberal’ he does not mean one who identifies with the political left. Rather, he means one who identifies with the center, a 'middle-of-the- 25 roader.'" Nixon, the expedient politician, continually sought to persuade those of the great American "middle" through the use of arguments which were based upon economic circumstance. page 259 Thus in terms of the Weaverian classification of argument, Nixon may he characterized as the liberal, while McGovern may be seen as a rhetorical conservative. After the classification of the rhetors based upon the nature of their arguments, "The critic has the responsi bility to pass judgment as to whether the genus was validly applied - whether circumstances were validly classified."2^ In the case of McGovern, such an assessment can be made only with great difficulty and with some reserva tions. As noted previously, McGovern's image as under stood by the majority of American voters was not neces sarily that which he had projected, thus it is difficult to assert that the American people rejected the view of themselves as a moral people in the election of 1972. However, it'may be possible to conclude that a totally idealistic campaign will not win a presidential election. McGovern's misuse of language by being too specific tied him to an ideal that men in general - and especially men in politics - may aspire to but may not be able to reach. There must be a necessary ambiguity in politics, where even an idealist may use expedient measures McGovern was not incorrect in assuming that the American page 260 people had a strong moral tradition. However, McGovern's simplistic "Black and White" conceptualization of poli tics failed to detect the subtle shades of grey that the pragmatics of democratic politics inevitably entails. Language ambiguity is the very life-blood of the demo cratic process, for democracy thrives on compromise be tween opposing views, and compromise is dependent upon ambiguity. Perhaps McGovern’s greatest failure was his seeming inability to grasp that concept. Perhaps it is the reason why idealists tend to fail in the politics of a democracy such as ours. Although McGovern lost the election by an enormous margin, it is impossible to dismiss him to history as one of the faceless losers of the office of President. There would be a permanent residue of the McGovern campaign. Never again would the Pentagon's budget be accepted by the American people and their Congress as sacred. Never again would a President's right to make war abroad without consent of Congress go unquestioned. ...More than that. Like Stevenson and Goldwater, McGovern had intro duced a new generation of young people to politics. 2? This was the legacy of McGovern's campaign. His attempts at presidential politics were poor. He demon strated that an idealistic candidate with a "pure" image page 26l cannot make the necessary definitional transformations in his rhetorical approaches to the campaign; cannot under stand the shifting wind of public opinion; cannot win the political center, which is what the candidate who wishes election to the presidency must do to insure success. But beyond the negative, McGovern's campaign raised important questions - question that have had their effect upon the American people. The Watergate Affair that was to lead to the downfall of the Nixon Administration demon strated that the American people could be morally out raged. It was that spirit which McGovern had kept alive in the midst of the "greedy election" of 1972. page 262 Notes for Chapter IV 1. Chapter I, p. 15-20. 2. ibid, p. 15. 3. ibid, p. 16. 4. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York: Random House, 1957), p. ^0. 5. ibid, p. 35« 6. ibid, p. 35- 7. Chapter I, p. l6. 8. James E. Combs and Micheál W. Mansfield, ed., Drama in Life: The Uses of Communi cation in Society (New York: Hastings House, 1976), p. xviii. 9. Chapter I, p. l6. 10. ibid, p. 17. 11. David L. Swanson, "The Requirements of Critical Justi fications," Communication Monographs, Vol. 44 (Nov., 1977), p. 306-320. 12. ibid, p. 316. 13. ibid, p. 312. 14. ibid, p. 312. 15. ibid, p. 316. 16. Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henrey Gernery Co., 1953), P- 55- 17. Richard Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition, second ed., revised by Richard S. Beal ("New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 137« page 263 18. J. Michael Sproule, "Using Public Rhetoric to Assess Private Philosophy: Richard M. Weaver and Beyond," Southern Speech C ommuni cation J ournal, Vol. 44 (Spring, 1979), P- 304. 19- ibid, p. 305. 20. Weaver, Ethics, p. 56. 21. ibid, p. 56. 22. ibid, p. 112. 23. ibid, p. 57- 24. ibid, p. 57-58. 25. John R.E. Bliese, "Richard Weaver’s Axiology of Argument," Southern Speech C ommuni c ati on J ournal, Vol. 44 (Spring, 1979), P■ 282. 26. Sproule, p. 306. 27- Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New York: Antheneum Press, 1973), P- 457• page 264 A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander, Heibert E. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1976. Altheide, David L. "Mental Illness and the News: The Eagleton Story." Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 6l, no. 2, p. 138-155« .4. American Institute for Political Communication. The 1972 Presidential Campaign: Nixon Advertising-Mass Media Relationship. Washington, D.C. , 1974. ¿y. Anson, Robert Sam. McGovern: A Biography. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Bean, Louis Hyman. How to Predict the 1972 Elections. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972. Bennett, W. Lance. "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics." Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 8, no. 1, 1975, P- 23-42. ______. "The Ritualistic and Pragmatic Bases of Political Campaign Discourse." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 63, no. 3 (October, 1977), p. 219-238 Bennett, W. Lance, Patrician D. Harris, Janet Laskey, Alan H. Levitch and Sarah E. Monrad. "Deep and Surface Images in the Construction of Political Issues: The Case of Amnesty." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 62, no. 2 (April, 1976), p. 109-126. page 265 Bitzer, Lloyd F. "The Rhetorical Situation." Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 1, no. 1, 1968. Bitzer, Lloyd F. and Edwin Black, ed. The Prospect of Rhetoric. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971- Black, Edwin. "Electing Time." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), P- 125-129. Bliese, John R.E. "Richard Weaver's Axiology of Argument." Southern Speech Communication Journal, Vol. 44 (Spring, 1979), p. 275-288. Bormann, Ernest B. "The Eagleton Affair: A Fantasy Theme Analysis." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 59 no. 2 (April, 1973), p- 143-159- Boulding, Kenneth. The Image. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956. Brockriede, Wayne E. "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric." The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 54 (February, 1968). Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. New York: World Publishing, 1962. ______. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkely: The University of California Press, 1969- ______. "Definition of Man." The Hudson Review, Vol. 16 (Winter, 1963-64). page 266 Burke, Kenneth. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965 ______. Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. New York: Vintage Press, 1957 Burkhart, James A. and Frank J. Kendrick, ed. The New Politics: Mood or Movement? New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, I97I. Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring." The Speech Teacher, Vol. 23, no. 1 (January, 1974), p. 9-14. Carney, Francis M. and H. Frank Way, Jr. Politics, 1972. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971« Chesebro, Jack W. "Political Communication." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 62, no. 3 (October, 1976), p. 289-300. Chesebro, Jack W. and Caroline D. Hamsher. "Contem porary Rhetorical Theory and Criticism: Dimensions of the New Rhetoric." Communication Monographs, Vol. 42, no. 4 (November, 1975), P* 311-334. Chisolm, Shirley. The Good Fight. New York: Harper and Row, 1973- Combs, James E. and Michael W. Mansfield, ed. Drama in Life: The Uses of Communication in Society. New York: Hastings House, 1976. page 267 Crouse, Timothy. The Boys on the Bus. New York: Random House, 1973- Devlin, Patrick. "The McGovern Canvass: A Study in Interpersonal Campaign." C entral States' Speech J ournal, Vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer, 1973). 56- Donahue, Bernard F. "The Political Use of Religious Symbols: A Case Study of the 1972 Presidential Campaign." The Review of Politics. Vol. 37, no. 1 (January, 1975). Duncan, Hugh Dalziel. Symbols in Society. New York: Oxford Press, 1968. Eagleton, Thomas. "Acceptance Speech." Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 21 (August 15, 1972). Eagleton, Thomas and George McGovern. "Withdrawal." Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 21 (August 15, 1972). ¿fr Facts on File, 1972. Fisher, Walter R. "Reaffirmation and Subversion of the American Dream." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), p. I6O-I67. Galbraith, John Kenneth. "Case for George McGovern." Saturday Review, July 1, 1972, p. 23-27. Golembiewski, Robert T., Charles S. Bullock III and Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. The New Politics: Polarization or Utopia? New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. page 268 Hofstetter, C. Richard. Bias in the News: Network TV Coverage of the '72 Election Campaign. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976. Hyman, Sydney. Youth in Politics: Expectations and Realities. New York: Basic Books, 1972. Kirkpatrick, Jeanne. "The Revolt of the Masses." Commentary, Vol. 55, February, 1973- Ladd, Everett C., Jr., and Charles D. Hadley. Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s■ New York: W.W. Norton, 1975- LaDonna, Lyle Murray. "The Equal Time Law and the Free Flow of Communication: A Critical Study of the Humphrey-McGovern Debates." Unpublished Doctoral Disser tation, the University of Southern California, 1975« Linkugel, Wil A. and Dixie Lee Coday. "Nixon, McGovern, and the Female Electorate." Today's Speech, Vol. 21, no. If- (Fall, 1973). Lubell, Samuel. The Future While it Happened. New York: Norton Publishing Co., 1973- Manchester, William. The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973. page 269 ^é^May, Ernest R. and Janet Fraser, ed.. Campaign ' 72: The Managers Speak. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973- MacLaine, Shirley, ed. McGovern: The Man and His Beliefs. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972. ■)Hv[cGovern, George Stanley. A Time of War, A Time of Peace. New York: Random House, 1968. ------. Grassroots: The Autobio- graphy of George McGovern. New York: Random House, 1977• Y"------—- "Interview." Life, July 7. 1972. . "Recommendation for Vice President.” Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 21 (August 15, 1972). A------______. "The Democratic Candidate for President." Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 20 (August 1, 1972). ______"Toward an' End to Drug Abuse." Vital Speeches, Vol 38, no. 11 (March 15, 1972). ____ . War Against Want: America's Food for Peace Program. New York: Walker Publishing, 1964 Newsweek, June through November, 1972. page 270 Nimmo, Dan D. Candidates and Their Images: Concepts, Methods and Findings. California: Pacific Publishing, 1976. Nixon, Richard M. "The Situation in Vietnam." Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 15 (April 15, 1972). Patterson, Thomas E. and Robert D. McClure. Political Advertising: Voter Reaction to Televised Political Commercials. New Jersey: Citizen's Research Foundation, 1973- ^Patton, John H. "The Eagleton Phenomenon in the 1972 Presidential Campaign: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Paradox." C entral States' Speech J ournal, Vol. 24 (Winter, 1973), P- 278-287. Rasmussen, Karen. "Nixon and the Strategy of Avoidance." Central States' Speech Journal, Vol. 24 (Fall, 1973), p- 193-202. Rueckert, William, ed. Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1969- Scammon, Richard and Ben Wattenburg. The Real Majority. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1970« Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Case for George McGovern." New Republic, February 26, 1972, p. 15-17- page 271 Scott, Robert L. and Bernard L. Brock. Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective. New York: Harper and Rowe, 1972. Semlak, William D. "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for the 1972 Presiden tial Nomination." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Minnesota, 1973- Shriver, Sargent. "Acceptance Speech." Vital Speeches, Vol. 38, no. 21, August 15, 1972. Simons, Hubert W., James W. Chesebro and C. Jack Orr. "A Movement Perspective of the 1972 Presidential Campaign." The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), P- 168-179. Smith, Carl R. "Contemporary Political Speech Writing." Southern Speech C ommuni c at i on J ournal, Vol. 42 (Fall, 1976). J. Michael Sproule- "Using Public Rhetoric to Assess Private Philosophy: Richard M. Weaver and Beyond." Southern Speech Communication J ournal, Vol. 44 (Spring, 1979), P- 289-308. Stephen, Frederick T. and Robert M. Teeter. "Commen tary on 'A Majority Party in Disarray.'" The American Political Science Review, September, 1976. page 272 Swanson, David L. "A Reflective View of the Episto- mology of Critical Inquiry." C ommuni cati on Monographs, Vol. 44, no. 3 (August, 1977)» ______. "Political Information, Influence and Judgment in the 1972 Presidential Campaign." The Quarterly J ournal of Speech, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1973), p. 130-142. ______. "The Requirements of Critical Justifications." Communication Monographs, Vol. 44 (Novem ber, 1977), p. 306-320. The Economist, June through November, 1972. The New York Times, June through November, 1972. The Toledo.Blade, June through November, 1972. The Wall Street J ournal, June through November, 1972. The Washington Post, June through November, 1972. Thompson, Hunter S. Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail: 1972. San Francisco: Straight Arrow Publishing, 1973. Thonssen, Lester, A. Craig Baird and Waldo W. Braden. Speech Criticism. New York: The Ronald Press, 1948. Time, June through November, 1972. "tT'Trent, Jimmie D. and Judith S. "The Rhetoric of the Challenger: George Stanley McGovern." Central States' Speech J ournal, Vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1974), p. 11-18. page 273 U.S. News and World Report, June through November, 1972. Wander, Philip and Steven Jenkins. "Rhetoric, Society, and the Critical Response." The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 58» no. 4 (December, 1972). Weaver, Richard M. The Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago: Henrey Regnery Co., 1953« ______. Rhetoric and Composition, second edition, revised by Richard S. Beal. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19^7- White, Theodore. The Making of the President, 1972. New York: Bantan Books, 1973- Winson, Jerry Lee. "A Rhetorical Analysis of George Stanley McGovern's Campaign for Re-election in 197^-" Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Nebraska, 1975- ■ S’