MASTER'S THESIS M-1855

FRIEDERSDORF, May L. 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION COVERAGE BY DAVID S. BRODER OF THE WASHINGTON (D.C.) POST.

The American University, M.A., 1969 Journalism

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION COVERAGE m DAVID S. PROPER OF THE

WASHINGTON (D. C.) POST

by Max L. Friedersdorf

Submitted to the

Faculty of Arts and Sciences of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Master of Arts

Journalism

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman:

Dean of the College Date: /W y /% Pate:9na^^7. /f

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1969 LIBRARY The American University MAY 2 9 1969 Washington, D. C. WASHINGTON. D. C. 3 1 Ss- TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND M ETHOD...... 1

Journalistic criteria for excellence in political

re p o rtin g ...... 2

Broder's background and experience ...... 13

Purpose of the s tu d y ...... 15

n. THE PRIMARIES...... 17

New H am p sh ire...... 17

The events of March ...... 24

I n d i a n a ...... 30

O r e g o n ...... 39

C a lif o r n ia ...... 44

California A fterm ath ...... 47

m . THE CONVENTIONS...... 50

At M i a m i ...... 50

At C h ic a g o ...... 56

IV. THE CAMPAIGN...... t . . 63 With Humphrey ...... 63

With N ix o n ...... 69

With W allace ...... 74 Hi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

V. CONCLUSION ...... 78 Broder reflects ...... 79

E v alu atio n ...... 94

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 98 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND METHOD

A good newspaper reporter, John Cowles of The Minneapolis

Star and Tribune has observed, should know as much about his subject as a good college instructor knows in his specialty. ^

The good reporter, Cowles e^qplains, should "be as objective and as untiring in his pursuit of the truth as a scientist doing research 2 at a university. "

Acclaimed during the 1968 Presidential campaign year as political reporter and columnist who sought to apply such an approach to his work was David S. Broder of The Washington (D.C.) Post.

Newsweek described Broder as "a political reporter's political reporter, " ^ and Time reported that the Washington press corps view

Broder as "perhaps the nation's top political correspondent. " ^

James E. Gerald, The Social Responsibility of üm Press (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 115.

^Ibid.

^News item in Newsweek, A i^st 19, 1968, pp. 60, 61.

^News item in Time, August 16, 1968, p. 38. Educated at the University of Chicago where he was editor of the University of Chicago Maroon, Broder worked on the Congressional

Quarterly, The Washington Star and The New York Times before join­ ing The Post where he is given wide latitude in his political reporting efforts. ^ Broder's reputation is not based on a sensational string of scoops. Instead, he relies on trends to guide him for depth reports 6 and he is careful to understate rather than overstate developments.

Attention to Broder* s work, however, derived during the 1968 campaign from a delayed scoop involving his earlier speculation concerning the choice of former Maryland Governor Spiro T. Agnew as the Republican Vice Presidential choice. Broder was alone credited with suggesting Agnew might be the choice, one of the major political 7 surprises of the year.

Journalistic criteria for e^œellence in political reporting. In assuming the role as peer of American political journalists. Broder enters an area that has long been assessed as one in need of improve­ ment.

^Newsweek, op. cit., pp. 60, 61; Time, op. cit., p. 38.

®Ibid.

^Ibid. Newspaper reporting in depth and perceptive interpretative pieces represent a much-sought goal of American newspaper critics.

Neale Copple of the University of Nebraska has observed:

All this should indicate that the newspaper is in a perfect spot to cash in on what some call a cultural e^losion. If that is a bit much for a business whose professionals are trained in skepticism, then call it simply a growing hunger for more information. The question is, 'How do we satisfy that hunger?'

I believe, without reservation, the answer is reporting in depth.

It would be wonderful if, by simply believing it and saying it, the job would be done. But the newsmen who deal in depth and the students who are learning to do it know this is only lip-service. Depth is hard work. It is creative. It is demanding research. It is careful organization. And it is the most beautiful writing American journalists have ever produced. °

Broder* s type of depth and/or interpretative reporting has been

variously described.

Ben W. Gilbert, former city editor of The Washington Post,

once described depth reporting as a story "v4iich tells^the reader what 9 the fuss is all about. "

®Neale Copple, Depth Reporting, An Approach to Journalism (En^ewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Î564), p. 8. 9 Copple, op. cit., p. 16. A simpler definition was offered by R. L, Crowley, former managing editor of The St. Louis Post Dispatch, who said depth reporting is "of course, by definition, the opposite of surface reporting. " Interpretation as defined by Webster is "to explain, tell mean­ ing of; translate, elucidate. To construe in the light of an individual belief, ju(%ment of interest; as to interpret a contract. "

This definition was translated into a journalistic meaning by

Turner Catledge, former New York Times managing editor, who observed:

From his training and e^goerience, the able reporter knows what weight should be given each detail. He knows as well that his own opinions have no validity; if a reporter does not know his canon, the editor is there to see that he is made aware of it. ^2

Broder's performance must also be measured against the dangerous temptation of interpretative reporters who substitute their own opinion for honest interpretative conclusions.

Copple describes this malaise:

Yet, to many reporters. Interpretation means license to use their own opinion. These newsmen believe that they have become so expert in their fields that they may use opinion without attribu­ tion or qualification. It is difficult to reconcile this viewpoint in a world so complicated that persons spend an entire lifetime studying one small part of one subject. 12

10 Ibid. lljbid, p. 17. ^^Ibid, p. 18. 1 ^Copple, op. cit., p. 18. Recognition of the need for depth reporting has resulted in a staff reorganization at The Post which has permitted Broder to achieve his reputation as a thorough, behind-the-scenes political writer. 1^

The Post has reorganized its news staff into two units. One goes about the job of regular beat coverage and the other staff is permitted to go beyond the news for the story in depth. Thus, while the regular beat reporters give protection on spot news. Broder and the other depth reporters are allowed to develop and pursue the signifi- 15 cant developments behind the news.

Respected editors and newsmen throughout the country are

recognizing the need for staff organization like The Post, and for

reporters with Broder* s talents and the freedom to use them.

Barry Bingham, president and editor of The Louisville Courier-

Journal and The Louisville Times, states the need for this type of reporting "grows more insistent week by week, and the newspaper that 1A tries to ignore it will do so at the risk of its survival. "

It is not surprising that a reporter of Broder* s skül and

interpretative bent would eventually join The Post and do well there

^^Ibid, pp. 22, 23.

^^Ibid.

l®Copple, op. cit., p. 22. 6 because the paper has been among the first to advance the interpreta- 17 tlve role. As long ago as 1951, The Post's Alfred Friendly was advising the Associated Press Managing Editors that "the essence of the findings of these special topic studies was that AP must move steadily toward reporting of increasing depth and seriousness for an audience of grow- 18 ing education and sophistication* " Noted American journalists have long realized the difficulty confronting a political newsman attempting to interpret and report in depth and yet retain objectivity.

In a talk to the Association for Education in Journalism in 1952,

Arthur Hays Sulzberger, puMisher of The New York Times, remarked;

I do not think it possible to be strictly objective or to present the news without any bias. 1®

Sulzberger expressed the belief that it is impossible to give news without fear or favor, without regard to any party, sect or on interest involved.

I'^Ibid, p. 325.

l ^lbid.

1®Gerald, op. cit., p. 157

^^Ibid, p. 157. Sulzberger, however, did assert that journalists can aspire to these ideals of objectivity, and commented that only those writers who are aware that these Ideals are beyond their reach can ever truly 21 approach them.

Recalling the crisis years of World War II, Sulzberger noted:

The time had come vhen news had to be e>q)lained, when interpretation had to go hand in hand with the statement of fact itself, when the meaning of things that occurred had to be made clear if they were indeed to have meaning. And out of it all came this new approwh, something which in effect was the development of a new craft. 22

Another leading publisher of his day, James A. Linen, of Time magazine, commented about objectivity and journalistic duty:

As for utter objectivity, this is, in our opinion and in the opinion of an ever-increasing number of journalists, as impossible as it is undesirable. But we are often told that the function of journalism is simply to tell what happened, what the man said or did. No opinion, no judgments, just the facts. But if a newspaper or newsmagazine simply stacks up all the facts it can print on a story, is it fulfilling its responsibilities to its readers? I think not. This obsession with mere factuality, it seems to me, can lead to absurdity. Primarily, I believe, we at Time should be concerned with values, with the meaning of the world about us. I would say that we are committed to the proposition that a journalist must, to the best of his ability, tell the news fairly, and tell also what üie news means. We recognize, of course, that not all of our readers will agree with our findings, with our judgments; and we know that we might be, and often have been, wrong. But the responsibility is there. 22

^^Ibid, p. 158. ^^Ibid.

22(3erald, cit., p. 159. 8

The job of David Broder and his political columnist colleagues is viewed in a slightly different vein by J. Edward Gerald of the

University of Minnesota.

In his discussion of the objective news report, Gerald sees the newsman simply extending the range of his inquiry as events in the news become more complex.

Gerald sees the interpretative reporter as giving the public notice of other factors in the news situation than those visible in today's one small segment of news.

The role of the interpretative writer, Gerald observes, is to give perspective and meaning, bringing into focus more of the longer­ on run conditions in which the day's news events are embedded.

Gerald offers a note of caution to the interpretative reporter, commenting:

If the motive is to give the reader greater insight and a more balanced factual report, the objective principle is better served. K the motive is to mislead and to control, to persuade by giving a partial view of the facts, or to use a signed story as a substitute for d^ging out facts he could ^oss over in a clever statement of opinion, then he is as guilty of perjury in the court of public opinion now as he was when the problems of the country were simpler and when, because the people had a better chance to observe significant events for themselves, the coloring of news was less deceptive.

^^Ibid, p. 158. ^^Gerald, op. cit., p. 158.

^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid. 9

A. N. Whitehead sees the responsibility of the interpretative reporter as "an avid, ceaseless, sweating pursuit of facts, not as an 40 editor imagines them to be, but as they are. "

Thus, the ultimate journalistic sin, Gerald concludes, is the deceitful or hidden handling of opinion and interpretation in the guise of "news. "

Broder himself recognizes the dangers of political interpreta­ tion and commented after the 1968 campaign in a critique of the press coverE^e during the Presidential election:

The other reason that the press is so laggard in responding to criticisms of its performance is that most of us in journalism have not really taken a very reflective view of our own functions and responsibilities. We are in the habit of asking politicians and businessmen, labor leaders and generals to justify their actions and policies, but we do not often make the same demand of ourselves. 20

Observers of American journalism were voicing somewhat the same criticism a generation ago.

In 1936 a prominent French journalist, Raoul de Roussy

^^Ibid, p. 159.

2®0erald, op. cit., p. 166.

^Opavid S, Broder, "Views of the Press: Political Reporters in Presidential Politics, " The Washington Monthly, Volume One, Number One (February, 1969), pp. 20-33. 10 de Sales, cited as the weakness of modern American journalism the 31 lack of good interpretative reporting. de Sales' American contemporaries were no less harsh in their judgments. Lee Wood of The New York World-Telegram commented:

Political writers should be instructed to gather the news accurately and fairly, irrespective of party. Editors should call the shots as they see them without regard to party. The press owes a larger duty to the public than to any party. 22

And, Tom Wallace of The Louisville Times added:

Loyalty to a party label divorces a newspaper from its convic­ tions and makes it a lady of the evening. A newspaper should support policies and persons which, in its judgment, often unsound, deserve support. It will then save its soul, sometimes its face. Reporters should be instructed to write uncolored news. Editors should be uninstructed delegates. 23

Perhaps the most caustic assessment of political reporting from Washington was voiced in 1928 by Henry F. Pringle, veteran

New Yoik political writer, who said:

What the newspapers do with political writing is, in brief, to dignify rumors and dress them up as though they were facts. What chance, I submit, has the public of learning the truth about polit­ icians when the vaunted "Fourth Estate" permits itself to be ordered about like a valet ? The system has made of the American politician a privileged character, a man whose private life becomes

^^Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretative Reporting (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938), p, l7 .

^^MacDougall, op. cit., p. 432.

33Ibid. 11

sacrosanct and inviolate unless he is so clumsy as to be drawn into a lawsuit or arrested. The American politician could become intoxicated nightly, beat his wife, use snuff, write free verse or indulge in any other vice, I maintain, with slight danger of e3q>osure. Probably 75 percent of the news that comes from Washington is news that some politician desires to see in print. Whether it is true or false, propaganda or not, is seldom even a matter for slight reflection, 24

Marco Morrow commented in The Atlantic:

A free press is essential to a democracy. Without it democracy is impossible. The American press has done and still is doing great service to the American people. But a free press, like every other free thine^ is free to prostitute itself. And unfortunately at times it does. 25

The Baltimore Sun has written:

In no other business and in no other profession, save that of the pure scientist, is the premium on accuracy so hi^, the penalty of inaccuracy so prompt and the proportion of accuracy so great. 26

Complaints of newspaper inaccuracy have plagued political writers and some authorities cite the human weakness of faulty observa­ tion for the problem.

A pioneer in this field of psychology, Hugo Munsterberg, has written:

24 Ibid, p. 440.

^^Curtis D. MacDougall, Newsrcyni Protdems and Policies (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1Ô41), p. 51.

^®Ibid, p. 178. 12

Those experiments described from my classroom recommended at least mildness of judgment when we compare the newspaper reports with each other.

Since I saw that my own students do not know whether a point moves with the slowness of a snail or with the rapidity of an express train; whether there are 25 points or 200; whether a tone comes from a whistle, a gong or a violin; whether the moon is small as a pea or large as a man—I am not surprised any more when I read the reports of the papers. 27

Broder's talent for research, painstaking accuracy, restraint

and objectivity appear to be the répertoriai prototype that journalists of 30 years ago were predicting for our age.

In 1932, George Olds, managing editor of The Springfield (Mo.) News and Leader, wrote in Editor & Publisher that reporters of the 38 future would be superior.

Describing the type of reporter that newspapers of the future

would employ, Olda predicted "reporters will be a damned sight

better—better writers, better diggers—better skeptics and cynics,

And, Dr. Curtis D. MacDougall of Northwestern University

predicted that "specialization in newspaper work seems as inevitable as

^*^n?id, p. 179.

^^MacDougall, op. cit., p. 519.

^^Ibid, p. 520. 13 in scientific research, medicine, law, education and many other f ie ld s ." ^ hi 1936, Mark Ethridge, then general manager of The Louisville

Courier-Journal, made the following observation about reporters of the future:

& is no longer a simple work world in which we live; it is a con^lex world. America is coming of age politically, socially and economically. The flamboyant orator and florid writer who deal in mere words are giving way and must inevitably give way to the quiet men who speak from the depths of knowle^e and understanding. We are achieving a revolution by peaceful means— a revolution which is taking us into a new social order and a radically altered economy. It is only because we are 25 to 30 years behind the more civilized countries of the world that these things seem new to us; Its function of providing information and interpre­ tation that they seem strange or dangerous to us. hi the past we have looked upon change with suspicion; in the future, we must look upon it as the one immutable law of life and nature and try to guide it into such channels as will give us social justice, a greater measure of security and a more intelligent and a "more abundant" life. 41

Broder* s background and experience. Broder appears to be a singular example of this reporter prototype that Ethridge hoped for as

"quiet men who speak from the depths of knowledge and understanding. "

Tall and slender. Broder speaks with the measured and considered authority that is impressive with its knowledge and at the

^Ibid, p. 522. 41 Curtis D. MacDougall, Newsroom Problems and Policies (New York: The MacMillan Company, l94l), p.^20. 14 same time lacking in arrogance or conceit for a reporter on such familiar terms with the nation's leaders. Broder was born on September 11, 1929, at Chicago Heights,

Illinois. He completed his undergraduate work at the University of

Chicago in 1947 and obtained a master's degree in Political Science from the university in 1951. During his university days Broder was editor of The Maroon, worked in the public relations office and served as editor of The Hyde

Park Herald.

After graduation, Broder served in the United States Army from

1951-1953 and edited an Army newspaper while serving in Austria.

In September, 1953, Broder joined The Bloomington (HI.)

Pantagraph where he worked for two years as a general assignment reporter.

Broder came to Washington, D. C ., in November, 1955, to take a position with Congressional Quarterly where he remained four years as a political writer.

His arrival on the national news scene came in January, 1960, when he was hired by The Washington Star to augment its national election staff. 15

Broder covered both the Nixon and Kennedy Presidential cam paigns of 1960 and remained with The Star until the Spring of 1965 when he joined The New York Times.

He stayed with The Tim es' Washington bureau as a national political writer for 15 months before joining his present employer,

The Washington P ost in July, 1966,

His only rigid assignment with The Post is a Tuesday column and he has been spending much of his time on Capitol Hill honing his contacts for the 1970 Congressional elections. Broder is m arried to the former Ann Collar of Crawfordsville,

Indiana, They have four sons, aged 14, 11, 9 and 7, The family lives in Arlington, Virginia,

Purpose of the study. Broder was chosen for this thesis because of his reputation as one of the finest contemporary political writers on the national scene.

The objective of my study was to examine the work of a national political correspondent covering a Presidential election campaign.

By following Broder's reporting on every major event of the campaign, we examine his approach and judgments against the retro­ spect of immediate history.

The 1968 campaign is fresh and it is possible to look at Broder*s 16 reporting of the highly emotional events in an objective after-the-fact vein.

And, after reporting B roder's work during 1968, we attempt to judge his objectivity and his own summation of objectivity during the campaign.

Another purpose is to obtain from Broder an over-all estimate of what can be done to improve objectivity in reporting Presidential elections.

The methodology was to file all of Broder's colunms and news stories from January, 1968, through the election on November 5,

These columns and stories were then culled for the most significant observations and key interpretations and predictions made by Broder during the year.

These highlights are then presented in the light of actual events to illustrate the degree of Broder's accuracy, objectivity and inter­ pretative insights.

Broder was interviewed for his reflections on the campaign.

This paper's concluding chapter contains my own value judg­ ments on Broder's performance. CHAPTER n

THE PRIMARIES

Mr. Broder* s first major assignment in the 1968 Presidential year was covering the key primary elections in states where the major candidates were entered.

As the year opened, the major Republican candidates for the nomination were former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, of New

York; Governor George Homney, of Michigan; Governor Ronald

Reagan, of California, and Governor Nelson Rockefeller, of New York,

Early in 1968 the Incumbent President, Lyndon B. Johnson, of

Texas, was regarded as a candidate for re-election.

His only announced opposition was Senator Eugene McCarthy, of Minnesota.

New Hampshire. The New Hampshire primary on March 12 was the first major battle in the 1968 Presidential campaign.

Arrayed in the Republican contest were Mr. Nixon and

Governor Romney.

President Johnson chose not to enter the primary, and Senator

McCarthy was the only active candidate on the Democratic ticket. 18

The biggest surprise of the New Hampshire primary campaign was the withdrawal on March 1 of Ckxvernor Romney.

On M arch 5 B roder observed in a column about the Romney withdrawal that the reporters closest to the Governor were among the most surprised when he pulled out of the race. 42

Broder said that all of his past exqperiences in covering Romney since his first campaign in 1962 for Governor of Michigan gave no inkling of this action and reporters "thought it (withdrawing from the 43 Presidential race) was quite literally the last thing he would do."

Romney's withdrawal was an "epic misjudgment" by the press,

Broder observed, and wrote the mistake raises the question "of how good the press's judgment is.

In his examination of Mr. Nixron during the New Hampshire prim ary campaign, Broder exgpressed the opinion that the New

Hampshire prim ary represented another gamble in the political history of a man "w4io has figured in more premature political obituaries than

any other candidate in American history. "45

42 David S. Broder, "Reporters Closest to Romney Were Among Most Surprised, " The Washington Post, March 5, 1968, p. A13. ^^Ibid. 44%bid. ^®David S. Broder, "Nixon Stacks Chips High and Lets Them Ride," The Washington Post, March 10, 1968, pp. Bl, B3, 19

Broder also predicted that Nixon "is now no worse than a

50-50 bet to reach the finals against Lyndon B. Johnson.

For the first time during the Presidential year Broder examined the third party candidacy of former Governor George C,

Wallace, of Alabama.

Broder said that the Democratic viewpoint that Wallace was strictly a Republican problem was not valid and that Wallace was a distinct threat in the former Democratic solid South, and that Wallace was likely to draw votes away from President Johnson in the North 47 among conservative Democrats.

Regardless of Wallace’s performance in 1968, Broder predicted he would emerge with established personal organizations in virtually 48 every state, setting the stage for a further Presidential bid in 1972.

Broder also raised the possibility of Wallace’s candidacy throwing the Presidential election into the U. S. House of Representa­ tives.

This would force both major parties into a position of having to

^^Ibid.

^^David S. Broder, "Wallace Nightmare Haunting Political Bedfellows in Capital, " The Washington Post, February 13, 1968.

^^Ibid.

^®Ibid. 20 bargain with Wallace for electoral votes which "would be about as easy and as appetizing as bargaining with Ho Chi Minh.

On January 31, 1968, Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.) announced he would not oppose President Johnson for the Democratic

Presidential nomination.

Following this announcement Broder wrote a column examining the reasons behind Senator Kennedy's decision.

Broder said the decision was an especially difficult one for

Kennedy because of his extreme differences with President Johnson, and because of Kennedy's past record as a fighter for his principles, Broder wrote:

Having decided that discretion is, in this instance, the better part of valor, Kennedy has retained the option to run for President another year. It is conceivable that when that day comes, the Robert Kennedy who seeks the presidency may be not a worse man, as Jack Newfield suggests, but a wiser man, a more tolerant man or at least a man with a broader understanding of the human circumstances than the Robert Kennedy we have known until now. ^

^ Ibid.

^^David S, Broder, "RFK Won't Oppose LBJ Renomination, " The Washington Post, January 31, 1968,

®^David S. Broder, "Neck RFK Saved by Staying on Sidelines May Be His Own, " The Washington Post, February 6, 1968.

^^ibid. 21

Broder said that the major arguments considered by those opposing Kennedy's candidacy were (1) it would split the Democratic

Party; (2) his vdiole Vietnam position could be undercut by a statement or action by President Johnson or Ho Chi Minh's over which Kennedy had no control, and (3) he was unlikely to sweep the primaries against President Johnson and thus forfeit a future chance at the 54 nomination.

Governor Rockefeller backed Governor Romney against Nixon until Romney's unexqxected withdrawal. After that, Rockefeller was under increasing pressure from a group of liberal Republican

Senators, Congressmen and Governors to announce his candidacy.

But Rockefeller hesitated. He said he would accept a draft but stayed out of the New Hampshire primary. 55

With Romney* s withdrawal and Rockefeller e(%ing toward a declaration. Broder foresaw a change in tactics by GOP frontrunner

Nixon.

^^Ibtd.

^^David S. Broder, " 'Ready and Willing' Says Rockefeller, " The Washington Post, March 2, 1968.

^^David S. Broder, "It's Now a New Ball Game for GOP Contenders, " The Washington Post, March 3, 1968. 22

Broder anticipated that Nixon would move slightly to the right to solidify conservative opposition to Rockefeller. Broder also e je c te d Giovernor Reagan to become an in creasing facto r in the

Republican nomination maneuvering.

Broder proved correct on his prediction of increased conserva­ tive activity against Rockefeller and two days later was reporting that former Senator Barry Goldwater, of Arizona, was openly opposing

Rockefeller.

In another pre-New Hampshire primary column Broder explored the high incidence of ”microphonitis" among the leading Presidential 59 contenders.

Broder referred to the speaking problems of Senator Dirksen, a group of Congressmen appearing on a Republican State of the Union television show, Senator Kennedy, Senator McCarthy, Governor

Romney, President Johnson, and Governor Reagan. Broder observed that of all the hopefuls only Nixon had thus far escaped an embarrassing

^'^Ibid.

®®David S. Broder, "Goldwater Declares He Can't Back Rocky, " The Washington Post, March 5, 1968. eq ____ David S. Broder, "Dropping Other Shoe Subjects Nixon to Peril of Microphonitis, " The Washington Post, January 30, 1968. 23 or politically harmful quote. AO

Broder underrated McCarthy's chances in the New Hampshire primary and did not predict the strong showing that the Minnesota

Senator accomplished.

Broder referred to McCarthy's chances:

The same malaise has now overtaken Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn. ) in his bid to deny renomination to the President. McCarthy was regarded by the wisest heads in the Democratic Party as a fearsome threat to party unity and even to Mr. Johnson's political safety—until he began reciting Robert Lowell's poetry and quoting Thucydides, history to exquisitely bored audiences of dissenting Democrats. Suddenly, these same White House advisers decided that McCarthy was just the sort of easy opposition that would give the loyalist party organizations in the primary states the tune-up they needed for the real campaign ahead.

Broder also referred during the New Hampshire campaign to the "apparent failure of Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) to generate 62 popular support for his challenge to the President. "

On the day after the New Hampshire primary Broder saw the results as (1) indicating Johnson's popularity so weak that the GOP had an excellent chance to regain the White House; (2) Nixon scorii^ an

GOlbid. ^^Ibid.

®^David S. Broder, "RFK Won't Oppose LBJ Renomination, " The Washington Post, January 31, 1968. 24 impressive triumph greater than even his followers anticipated;

(3) McCarthy's performance indicating a strong feeling against the 63 war, and (4) Rockefeller's candidacy a certainty.

In the New Hampshire primary, Nixon beat potential rival

Rockefeller by a 7-to-l margin and garnered all eight delegate votes to the Republican National Convention. McCarthy won 42 percent of the

Democratic vote against the well organized write-in campaign that top

New Hampshire Democrats mounted for the President. McCarthy also 64 gained 19 of the 24 Democratic delegates to the National Convention.

Broder wrote "the major surprise was the strong showing of

McCarthy, who entered the race as a rank underdog and self-appointed fit spokesman from the growing number of Vietnam war critics. "

The events of March. Events moved swiftly after McCarthy's strong showing in New Hampshire and Nixon's sweep.

Within four days Senator Kennedy was announcing his candidacy before a press conference "heavy with history and drama as Kennedy,

®^David S. Broder, "Senator May Win 19 of 24 Delegates, " The Washington Post, March 13, 1968.

^ Ibid. G^ibid. 25 preceded by his wife Ethel and nine of their ten children, came into CO the television lights of the caucus room to make his announcement. "

With a pledge to change "the disastrous, divisive policies" of 67 President Johnson, Kennedy declared "I am in it to win. "

Broder observed that many Kennedy administration figures moved to support Senator Kennedy, but concluded there was scant enthusiasm and great apprehension across the broad spectrum of the

Democratic Party. BA

During the month Broder wrote his second colunm on the

Wallace candidacy and concluded that the Alabaman was already having a profound effect on events.

Broder eagxlained that the first national open housing law was near passage because conservatives like Senator Dirksen had withdrawn their opposition after reasoning there was little hope of appealing to the 69 backlash vote with Wallace in the race.

Rockefeller* s long shot chances at the GOP nomination were being kept alive, Broder observed, because some Republicans believed

®®David S. Broder, "Tm in It to Win, ' Senator Declares, " The Washington Post, March 17, 1968.

^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 69 David S. Broder, "Wallace's Deeds for Country Overlooked in 2-Party Uproar/ The Washington Post, March 14, 1968. 26 that Wallace was sure to sweep the South over any GOP candidate and

Rockefeller's vote-pulling effect in the populous Northeast would be 70 needed if the Republicans hoped to win.

Broder also detected an effect on the Kennedy and Johnson candidacies by the Alabaman. Broder saw Wallace weakening Johnson's chances by topping the President in the Southern States--normally

Johnson's strongest area—thus shifting support to Kennedy and/or

McCarthy because of the discounting of Johnson's Southern strength by Wallace.

Another political surprise occurred in March when Governor

Rockefeller called a press conference which Broder anticipated as "a 72 formal announcement of his presidential candidacy."

Rockefeller, however, used the press conference to decline the race for the presidency, and Broder explained the decision was based on soundings by Rockefeller's staff that he could not beat Nixon for the nomination.

*^^Ibid. '^^Ibid.

^^David S. Broder and Leroy F. Aarons, "Rockefeller Entry Set for Thursday," The Washington Post, March 20, 1968.

^^David S. Broder, "Why Rockefeller Bowed Out, " The Washington Post, March 22, 1968. 27

Broder believed that Rockefeller and his supporters had over- 74 rated his strength before a careful check.

Rockefeller also wanted to avoid a bitter struggle with the 75 conservatives which a primary campaign would likely produce.

Broder wrote that Rockefeller was particularly interested in avoiding a contest that would involve his divorce and rem arri% e 76 during 1964. Some supporters, however. Broder reported, believed that

Rockefeller had let himself be "bluffed out of a battle he could have won. Broder continued:

Whatever one calls it, the plain fact is that in 1968, as in 1960 and 1964, the Eastern, Liberal, urban-oriented wing of the Republican Party has lost the nomination struggle—through mis­ calculation and timidity, lack of skill, lack of discipline and lack of strength—to the candidate backed by the Congressional wing, the conservatives, the South and the traditional Republicans of the Midwest. 78

Broder commented:

Today Richard Nixon holds the Republican nomination within his grasp, and a prospect that would have seemed incomprehensible even ten days ago—that the Democratic Convention will hold more drama than the Republican—is now a virtual certainty. 79

74ibid. 7 5 ^ ^ 76g)id.

77ibid. 79ibid. 28

In assessing Rockefeller's declination, Broder was still

intrigued by Romney's failure, and wrote;

Just vdiy an Easterner (Rockefeller) who had won re-election by smaller margins in each successive campaign, who had been badly scarred by his role in the bitterest intra-party battle in a generation, and who had figured in a spectacular divorce and remarriage was regarded as a stronger candidate than a Middle W esterner (Romney) whose election m argins kept increasing, who had strong religious and geogr£g)hic ties to the conservative West and whose personal life was exemplary was never clear.

But Romney floundered and dropped out uneiTpectedly late^ - last month, giving the ^ckefeller enthusiasts the chance they had been waiting for,

Broder concluded that Rockefeller's drop out had handed the nomination to Nixon. 81

After Rockefeller's withdrawal. Broder reported that Governor

Reagan had stepped up his activities and had moved to set up a on Republican convention headquarters in Miami.

Broder commented that it was unusual for a non-candidate to open a permanent headquarters in the convention city almost five

months before convention time,

^ Ibid.

^^Ibid.

®^David S. Broder, "Miami Base To Be Set Up For Reagan, " The Washington Post, March 26, 1968.

®^Ibid. 29

The Reagan strategy. Broder anticipated, was to place the

Governor in a good bargainii^ position for the vice-presidency and a favorable position for the presidential nomination if a last-minute struggle developed between Rockefeller and Nixon.

The final political surprise of the month was the announcement on March 31 by President Johnson that he would not seek renomination.

Broder had reminded his readers that Johnson "has not announced his candidacy.

Only two days before the President's withdrawal, Broder was reporting from Milwaukee that the Johnson effort in preparation for the April 2 Wisconsin primary election was begun "too late. "

Johnson's decision not to run. Broder wrote, "threw the 87 American political scene into wild disarray. "

Broder expected Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to become 88 the administration's choice against Senators McCarthy and Kennedy.

^^Ibid. ®®David S. Broder and Leroy F. Aarons, "To Take Primary Route, " The Washington Post, March 16, 1968.

®®David S. Broder, "Wisconsin Labor Mired in Tardy LBJ Bid, " The Washington Post, March 30, 1968.

^^David S. Broder, "Administation's Supporters Now Looking to Humphrey," The Washington Post, April 1, 1968. ®®Ibid. 30

And, Broder reported there was disagreement in the Humphrey camp about whether he should become a candidate immediately. 89

Indiana. Immediately after the President's withdrawal it appeared that Senator Kennedy would move into the vacuum and assure Of) himself the nomination through a "high-speed blitz. "

Broder saw two unforeseen events immediately after the

Johnson announcement as giving Humphrey "breathing space and

maneuvering room. " 91

These were preliminary peace steps in Vietnam which deprived both Kennedy and McCarthy of their main issue against the administra­

tion, and the assassination in Memphis of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther

King which put a moratorium on campaigning by all major candidates.

Broder, however, saw Humphrey in need of at least three other

assets to gain the nomination:

First, and most important, he needs to update and improve the public impression of Hubert Humphrey. For many years, he has been type-cast as a radical reformer, a windy orator, and, most

^^Ibid.

^^David S. Broder, "The Shaping of an Image—With Deliberate Speed, " The Washington Post, April 13, 1968,

^^Ibid.

^2ibid. 31

recently, as Lyndon Johnson's lackey. When he ran for the Democratic nomination in 1960, he was short of money, short of votes, but most of all short of the ability to communicate to voters that he had been, by most objective standards, a harder-working, more productive Senator than his rival, John Kennedy.

It was too late for Humphrey to file his candidacy in the May 7

Indiana prim ary election which now pitted Senators McCarthy and

Kennedy in their first direct confrontation.

The third candidate for the presidency in the Indiana primary was hidiana Democratic Governor Roger Branigin, who was originally asked to enter by Humphrey as a stand-in for President Johnson.

With the withdrawal of Johnson, Governor Branigin decided to remain in the race as a favorite son. Soon Kennedy, McCarthy and

Governor Branigin were crisscrossing Indiana in a furious campaign.

In mid-April, with three weeks left to campaign for the Indiana prim ary. Broder speculated that Governor Branigin might put tm end to 94 the political axiom that "Kennedy's don't lose."

Recalling that former President Kennedy and his two brothers,

Robert and Ted, had run in 24 different elections since 1946 without a

^3%bid.

^^David S. Broder, "Branigin Buildup Threatens Axiom: Kennedys Don't Lose, " The Washington Post, April 15, 1968. 32 loss, Broder speculated that Robert Kennedy might be defeated in

Indiana.

Broder reasoned thusly: Robert Kennedy, on the other hand, has a knack for evoking active, intense, personal, emotional and sometimes almost irrational dislike. Like his brother, he has his passionate supporters; but unlike his brother, he has a way of really inflam­ ing the opposition. And it is a fact today that this opposition embraces many of those who in the past have decided Democratic nominations.

None of this argues that Robert Kennedy wUl ultimately lose. But he could. And in view of the folklore and the family record, that is remarkable in itself.

Twelve days later, on AprU 27, the polls showed Kennedy gaining ground, and Broder wrote from hidianapolis that Kennedy "has 97 moved into the favorite's role. "

Broder said the outcome was still uncertain, but Kennedy was outdrawing his opponents in the size of crowds by up to 10-to-l, and the private concensus of informed Indiana Democrats was that Kennedy 98 now enjoyed a lead of indeterminate size.

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 97 David S. Broder, "Kennedy Emerging as Indiana Favorite, " The Washington Post, April 27, 1968.

®®Ibid. 33

Broder also said of Indiana:

Like everything else about this primary, there is reason for caution and skepticism about this. The st^es are high in Indiana. But nothing else is very certain. 99

While the battle raged in Indiana, Broder perceived even deeper issues that he believed were at the very core of the 1968 campaign.

Broder designated these as the credibility crisis and the electoral college system.

He wrote:

What happens to Richard Nixon or Robert Kennedy or Eugene McCarthy or Hubert Humphrey is not irrelevant or inconsequential. But uhat is vital is whether the American people next November have lost or regained confidence in their elected leaders and the system by which they are chosen. ^92

He concluded:

A credibility crisis and quite possibly a crisis for the electoral college system—that is what we face this year. And that is why, whatever personal or partisan interests are involved, nothing is more important than meeting the challenge to our system of self- government and restoring the confidence in our capacity to make it work, 103

^^Ibtd.

l^^David S. Broder, "System of Self-Government Being Tested in '68 Election, " The Washington Post, April 23, 1968, ^^^Ibid. 102g)id. lO^Ibid. 34

Broder also predicted that a new generation of politicians were moving into position to take over the American government.

He pointed out that Nixon had completely restaffed his team from the 1960 campaign and had surrounded himself with men in their thirties and forties.

Broder also predicted that if Nixon was elected President he likely would not choose re-treads from the Eisenhower years to staff the new administration, but would likely turn to the "men from academia and the law, congressional staffs and, most particularly, from the 26 Republican-held State capitols who represent the future and promise of the GOP, "

Broder observed:

New forces are stirring in both parties. Nixon has managed to keep up with them and even to shape them to his purpose. But it wiU take all of the skill that Hubert Humphrey holds for him to ride the Democratic wave of the future, rather than be drowned in it. 107

lO ^avid S. Broder, "New Generation of Politicians Moving Up to Take Over the Am erican Government, " The Washington Post, April 2, 1968.

^Q^Ibid.

lOOlbid. 107ibid. 35

After the death of Dr. King and the civil disorders in

Washington and other major cities, Broder decried the bitterness of the campaign, and was particularly critical of Senators Kennedy and

McCarthy.

He faulted McCarthy for charging President Johnson with policies "which guarantee years of mounting lawlessness, violence and virtual civil war. "109

Broder was equally critical of Senator Kennedy for accusing the President and his associates of "calling upon the darker impulses of the American spirit, " and "removing themselves from the American tradition. Broder added:

The charge of fomenting civil war and the implication of un- Americanism are unjustified, even by the loose standards of political rhetoric. Had Richard M. Nixon uttered those words, it would have been taken by many as proof that 'the old Nixon' had returned to American politics. Why a more lenient standard should apply to McCarthy’s or Kennedy's words than to Nixon's is not clear to me.

19®David S. Broder, 'Rebuilding Sense of Identity, Purpose For American People, Is the Task Ahead, " The Washington Post, AprU 9, 1968.

^^^Ibid.

ll°Ibid. 36

But Nixon has, in fact, made no such inflammatory remarks on this or any other subject. He halted detailed public criticism of the administration's Vietnam policy as soon as there appeared to be a prospect of peace negotiations. His comments on the riots have been similarly restrained. lH

Broder sensed in the closing days of the Indiana campaign that Senator Kennedy was going to win, which he did, but that the victory would not be the complete triumph that the Senator desired.

Broder compared Senator Kennedy's effort in Indiana to that of his brother, John, in West Virginia during 1960 when that campaign

"caught fire" and gave JFK his campaign theme and the impetus to 113 move on to the nomination.

Broder e^glored his thesis thusly:

It was in West Virginia that John Kennedy found his case, his voice, and himself.

That simply has not happened to Robert Kennedy in Indiana. In narrow political terms, the primary here may serve his purpose. If he beats both Eugene J. McCarthy and favorite-son Gov. Roger Branigin, as the polls now say he will, he may well give his stalled bandwagon the shove it needs to roll through the rest of the primaries and into the nomination.

l l l lbid.

112£)avid S. Broder, "Indiana Not Doing for RFK What W. Va, Did for Brother, " The Washington Post, April 30, 1968. 37

But in human term s, Indiana is not providing what Kennedy needs. There is precious little joy in his quest for votes here. What he is discovering about the Hoosiers seems to be making him, not more self-assured, but less certain of himself, his mission and his convictions.

This opinion is subjective, but it is strongly held not just by this reporter but by many others who have watched the campaign unfold. Kennedy's manner—the nervous, self-deprecating jokes; the trembling hands on the lectern; the staccato alternations of speech and silence; the sudden shifts of mood—all seem to betray an anticipation of hostility from the crowds.

He has not found in Indiana the causes that challenge him, nor has he discovered in himself the language, the spirit or the insight to bring to the voters of this State his vision of what America needs. As a result, one feels, they have not yet accepted Kennedy as the symbol or spokesman of their own aspirations.

That mysterious process may begin later on, in some other state, or it may never happen at all. But Robert Kennedy carries his own memories of his brother in West Virginia, and he knows the difference between a candidate winning a primary and a primary making a President.

That is why a victory here—whatever its size—cannot, for him, be complete.

Broder depicted the Lidiana primary as the "hardest-fought presidential primary in Indiana history" on the eve of the balloting.

When the results were in, Kennedy had amassed 42 percent of

l^ % id .

^^^avid S. Broder, "Record Vote Seen in Indiana; District Goes to Polls Today, " The Washington Post, May 6, 1968. 38 the total with Governor Branigin running second with 31 percent and

McCarthy finishing third with 27 percent,

It was the heaviest primary vote in the history of the State, 117 Broder reported, in a race in which "few real issues emerged. "

hi his post-election analysis. Broder decided the Kennedy win was more impressive than originally-estimated. 118

McCarthy's presidential nomination hopes were barely alive,

Broder concluded, because of the Minnesotan's poor showing in the big cities.

Kennedy's victory came from a three-pronged strategy. Broder decided, consisting of (1) heavy television spending; (2) intensive organizational work by volunteer and professional groups, and (3) concentrated personal appearances by the candidate himself to generate 120 interest and activity by normally inactive primary election voters.

Broder predicted that unless McCarthy could catch up in the remaining primaries that both he and Humphrey were unlikely to stop

^^®David S. Broder, "RFK Wins Indiana; McCarthy Third, " The Washington Post, May 7, 1968.

117Ibid.

ll^David S. Broder, "Kennedy's Indiana Victory Was More Impressive Than It Looked, " The Washington Post, May 8, 1968.

^^^Ibid. 39

Kennedy's drive for the nomination. ^21

Broder regarded the performance of Nixon in the hidiana primary as even overshadowing the efforts of Kennedy as the former vice-president, running unopposed, nevertheless attracted 501,149 votes and ouipoUed Kennedy by a 3-to-2 margin.

Oregon. Kennedy followed up his victory in Indiana on May 7 with another victory a week later in the Nebraska primary where he 123 defeated McCarthy 51 percent to 31 percent.

Broder described the next important primary in Oregon on 124 May 28 as a "last gap effort" by McCarthy,

As the campaigning shifted to Oregon, Broder speculated that

McCarthy appeared to be m issii^ his last chance to defeat Kennedy in a State that offered McCarthy his best chance to upset the New York Senator.

^^^Ibid.

^^^Ibid.

^^^David 8. Broder, "Oregon Crucial for McCarthy, Reagan Races," The Washington Post, May 16, 1968.

^^^Ibid.

125uavid S. Broder, "McCarthy in Oregon: Missing Last Chance?" The Washington Post, May 18, 1968. 40

Ten days before the Oregon primary, Broder noted that "the 126 odds apparently are shifting in Kennedyls favor. "

Broder's assessment was that up to this point McCarthy and his supporters had not e^qiloited the possibilities for victory in

Oregon. Broder attributed this failure to campaign oqiense problems 128 and a reduced schedule of personal appearances by McCarthy.

Broder commented;

Thus, the prospect 10 days before the voting is that Kennedy will win Oregon, the state where the population mix and political history both present more problems for him than any other in which he is running. 129

Broder warned at the same time, however, that despite

McCarthy's problems, there was no "soaring optimism" in the Kennedy 130 ranks because of serious factionalism.

At this juncture in the campaign Broder took note of the attrac­ tion the McCarthy campaign had ignited for the younger generation.

While making a ^oomy prediction about McCarthy's chances in

Oregon, Broder observed:

This is the great thing McCarthy has done. He has involved a whole new generation in politics—and what marvelous young

^2®Ibid. 127g)id. 128n,id. 129ibici. ISOjbid. 41

people they are. As he prophesied his challenge to President Johnson channeled at least some of the energy and the idealism of the campus protesters into legitimate channels of politics.

In a sense McCarthy's own fate has now become irrelevant. The student workers think they have accomplished their major goals of denying President Johnson renomination and forcing a start of peace talks on Vietnam. No one can prove them wrong. The whole history of our political era shows that efforts which fall short—or even fail utterly—of their objective nonetheless can leave behind the seeds of future triumphs.

You cannot talk to the McCarthy volunteers without knowing that as they have been e^qplaining McCarthy, they have also been discovering America.

That is why, whatever his own fate this year, McCarthy was right when he told the University of Nebraska students Sunday, 'What has happened in our campaign will not be a footnote in history but a part of the main text, ' 131

It was during the Oregon primary campaign that Broder scored his major scoop of the entire year with a speculative story that Nixon was considering Governor Spiro T. Agnew, of Maryland, as vice- presidential running mate.

On May 16 Broder wrote that Nixon appeared confident of winning the Republican nomination and was now turning his attention

^^^David S. Broder, "McCarthy Challenge A ttracts A New Generation to Politics, " The Washii^on Post, May 14, 1968. 132 David S. Broder, "Nixon Eyes Agnew as Running Mate, " The Washington Post, May 16, 1968. 42 to a running mate, and that Agnew was "the latest and most Interesting 1 qo addition. "

Broder listed the other potentials as California's Governor

Reagan; Senator Charles H. Percy, of Illinois; Governor James A.

Rhodes, of Ohio; and Governor Raymond P. Shafer, of Pennsylvania.

Broder indicated that Nixon had decided against anyone outside of the political arena such as a businessman or educator. Mayor

John V. Lindsay of New York and any Southerners had been eliminated 135 because of political realities.

Of Agnew, Broder wrote:

Of late, Nixon himself has been displaying keen interest in Agnew as a vice-presidential nominee. The Maryland Governor was one of the earliest Rockefeller for President champions, but became disillusioned after Rockefeller refused on March 21 to enter the Oregon primary. Agnew is now an uncommitted favorite son.

— At their recent meeting, Nixon was ^parently as impressed with Agnew and his views on urban problems as Agnew was with him. Nixon also noted the high esteem in which Agnew is held by other Republican Governws he has interviewed, a respect he considers remarkable for one who has been in office less than two years.

The vice presidential nomination is important, because Nixon ezqpects the 1968 election to be as hard fought, if not as close, as 1960 was, 136

^^^Ibid. 134ibid. 135ibid. 136]bid. 43

Despite McCarthy's slow start in the Oregon campaign he came on strong, and three days before the balloting Broder reported that the situation was fluid and while Kennedy should still win, some were saying his campaign had "misfired. "137

A day later McCarthy was "laying down the sharpest attack he has ever made on Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, " Broder observed, and 1 38 McCarthy was predicting victory,

On election eve Broder predicted the Oregon vote the next day would be the closest of the 1968 Democratic preferential primary sweepstakes.

The early returns from Oregon indicated a McCarthy victory and Broder's first dispatch said that if the lead stood up it would break a 22-year-old string of 27 straight election victories-for the Kennedy family.

l^^David S. Broder, "3 Stump Oregon to Windup, " The Washington Post, May 25, 1968.

^^®David S. Broder, "McCarthy Blasts RFK in Oregon Finale, " The Washington Post, May 26, 1968.

139uavid S. Broder, "Close Race Seen in Oregon Today, " The Washington Post, May 27, 1968.

l^David S. Broder,-lîBig Win fe Scored By Nixon, " The Washington Post, May 28, 1968. 44

The lead did stand and McCarthy defeated Kennedy by 47.1 percent to 38.2 percent with President Johnson receiving 14.6 percent to finish third and Humphrey receiving 4,2 percent from write-in votes. ^^1

Broder's post-election assessment was that in addition to "shattering the myth of the Iknnedy's invincibility, " the victory gave no final decision to whether either McCarthy or Kennedy could defeat

Humphrey at the August convention.

Describing McCarthy's win as "impressive, " and one not predicted in any of the polls. Broder concluded:

Nonetheless, the outlook now is for a close contest between McCarthy and Kennedy, and the major question is: What can either man achieve by a narrow victory in terms of takii^ the nomination from Humphrey? In the Humphrey camp today the answer was plain: Nothing. But a high-ranking Ifennedy aide said he believed that if McCarthy won California, "He would become for the first time a damned formidable candidate. "143

California. Only a week remained after the Oregon primary before California voters went to the polls and the campaign focus

^^^Ibid. 142 David S. Broder, "Oregon Enhances Front-Runners' Outlook, " The Washington Post, May 29, 1968.

^^^Ibid. 45 swung to the nation's most populous state. For the first time since Kennedy entered the race in March, 144 Broder reported, the New York Senator attacked McCarthy. Kennedy told a San Francisco audience that his opponent's campaign had deteriorated into "a campaign to distort me and stop me."^^®

At the same time, Broder wrote, Kennedy hinted that the 146 McCarthy method was being engineered by the Humphrey forces.

Broder also described Kennedy as "grim" and that at one point in a major speech he almost "seemed to betray an expectation of defeat. " ^^7

Broder's first dispatch from Los Angeles after Senator

Kennedy's assassination at the Ambassador Hotel on election night, described the 1968 presidential campaign as "buffeted by events more 148 dramatic than any in this century. "

^^^David S. Broder, "RFK says McCarthy Distorts Truth, fT The Washington Post, May 31, 1968.

145,Ibid.

146 Ibid.

^«ibid.

^^^David S. Broder, "Campaign Halted by Opponents," The Washington Post, June 5, 1968. 46 After 12 paragraphs of news concernii^ the tragedy, Broder

did not lose sight of the practical political Implications of the event

and reported:

Political observers agreed that the most direct effect of the indefinite moratorium will be to strengthen the positions of Humphrey and Nixon, the front-runners-for their respective parties' nominations. 149

Broder saved his grief and shock for another story filed the

same day—June 5—as Senator Kennedy lay mortally wounded at 150 Good Samaritan Hospital,

Comparing the events of Los Angeles to those of DsJlas when

President Kennedy was assassinated, Broder related;

One moment there is a candidate, waving to his crowd, enjoying a reception that augurs further victories ahead. 151 And then there is chaos. Broder was at the NBC studio in Burbank examing election 1 59 returns when news of the assassination broke.

150 Davids. Broder, "First Dallas, Now L.A a Nightmare All Too Real, " The Washington Post, June 5, 1968.

l^ISI llbid.tu.j

152ibid. 47 Describing his reaction, he recalled: In Dealey Plaza, it was the pop-pop of the shots over the noise of the motorcade and the crowds. Last night at the studio... it was the chilling cry, "Someone*s been shot at the Ambassador."

The nightmare relived is protracted. Already the vigil at Good Samaritan has been longer than the wait at Parkland, and dawn has not yet broken. Like a watchman of the night, ashen­ faced Frank Mankiewicz climbs back on his perch atop the squad car, and gives the bulletins on the surgeons' work.

The outcome, this time, is not swift.

While covering the C aliforniaipfiihary, Broder filed a long column on the contest between incumbent U. 8. Senator Thomas K.

Kuchel and Dr. Max Rafferty for the Republican nomination for

U. S. Senator.

In one of his infrequent miscalculations, Broder predicted that

Kuchel "appears to be on his way to another term. ,,155

California Aftermath. A week after the assassination of

Senator Kennedy, Correspondent Broder sought to answer some ques­ tions for himself and the nation about the events of the year.

^^^Ibid.

^^toavid 8. Broder, "California's Right Wing Seems To Be Losing Its Magic Touch," The W ashii^on Post, May 26, 1968.

^®®Ibid, 48

He related;

& makes no sense to delude ourselves about the losses we have suffered. The abundance of this land so pervades our consciousness that self-deception is easy.

But the fact is, that however rich or resourceful a country may be, its spirit can be broken and its will shattered by a succession of events that are beyond its capacity to bear. Since 1963, this country has gone through the traumas of presidenti^ assassination, city riots, the nightly televised violence of Vietnam and now the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy. Ahead lies another summer, with a threat of further riots, and then a presidential campaign overhung by the threat of violence to the candidates. And at its end-- thanks to George Wallace and the flaw in our Constitutional system for presidential elections—we may face a period of two months or more when no one can say who has a rightful claim to the presidency.

Anyone who thinks that this situation does not contain the seeds of possible anarchy has a marvelous capacity for self-delusion.

It seems to me no exaggeration to say that our survival as a Nation now depends on the ability of such "familiar" men as Nixon and Humphrey to "think anew" about our condition and the courses of action that are open to us.

If this is not to be an Age of Anarchy, I believe, it must be an Age of Reform.

Kennedy's comeback victory in California and his subsequent death ended the long primary strug^e which had started with the winter 157 campaign in New Hampshire.

^®®David 8. Broder, "Some Answers to RFK Death Constitute Form of Escapism, " The Washington Post, June 11, 1968.

^^^David 8. Broder, "Primary Vote Held Important As E3q>res- sion of Public's View," The Washington Post, June 4, 1968. 49

The ramifications of the primaries were not clear and Broder

suggested that while Kennedy and McCarthy had been contesting each other, Humphrey had been amassing enough delegates in non-primary

states to obtain the Democratic nomination.^®®

Nixon, while running mostly unopposed. Broder noted, had received large votes in all of the states where he ran and it would be

"both unwise and unfair" to overlook the "record numbers" he had achieved.

The contenders were now approaching their respective con­ ventions—the Republicans in Miami, and the Democrats at Chicago. CHAPTER m

THE CONVENTIONS

At Miami. Nearly a month before the Republican Convention convened. Broder predicted on July 16 "it seems possible but unlikely that Nixon can be stopped on the first ballot. "

Broder also stre sse d the belief that if Nixon did not win on the first ballot, Reagan would profit more than Rockefeller,

Broder based this assumption on four premises: (1) enthusiasm for Nixon was restrained; (2) Reagan appeared more likely to offset the rising Wallace strength as compared to Rockefeller; (3) Reagan had escaped strong liberal GOP attack because Rockefeller's only hope of stopping Nixon was to keep Reagan in the race, and (4) Reagan, unlike Rockefeller, had refrained from attacking Nixon, which pleased 162 party organization regulars.

^®^David S. Broder, "Reagan Would Be Beneficiary If Nixon Fails on 1st Ballot, " The Washington Post, July 16, 1968.

^®^Ibid. 162ibid, 51

Twelve days later Broder saw Reagan's stock rising as the I go California conservative stepped up his wooing of southern delegates.

Despite any gains by other candidates. Broder was firm in his prediction that Nixon would win and the day after the completion of the convention roster he labeled Nixon as "within easy reach of a first ballot presidential nomination. "

Broder correctly reported as the convention opened that Nixon had successfully staved off any massive bolt to Reagan by the southern delegates. With the issue in slight doubt. Broder drew a larger picture of the Republican Party in convention, and wrote: The GOP is not fractured or splintered as it was when it marched hell-bent for disaster out of the Cow Palace in 1964. But it is not quite whole^ again, either.

And vdiat of Wednesday, when the presidential nominee is chosen? Will it be Richard Nixon again? A chance by-product of the Republican Age of Innocence, the Eisenhower Administration, when it was impossible to believe, briefly, that the Republicans could win without changing their outlook on life. Nixon represents

l®3jjavid S. Broder, "Reagan Stock Rises, " The Washington Post, July 28, 1968.

^®^David S. B roder, "F irst-B allot Victory For Nixon Seen, " The Washington Post, July 14, 1968.

Ifi^David 8. Broder, "Nixon Backers Holding South Against Reagan, " The Washington Post, August 6, 1968, 52

at this convention the triumphs of professional technique over the difficult choice of direction. He has come here as the front- runner and favorite, with no one knowing what he really means to do about Vietnam or the cities or almost anything else if he is elected President.

Broder also took exception to those who readily ridicule the

convention process.

Even though it may be the easiest institution in the nation to

ridicule. Broder observed:

American political parties are not. Lord knows, paragons of virtue or logical consistency. But they provide the connective tissue between the separate layers of national, state and local government and the constitutionally divided executive and legislative branches of each. Through their convention processes they mediate the regional, racial, economic and ideological differences of this diverse, continent-sized Federal republic into a consistent whole.

Through party loyalty, party discipline and even the much- scorned party platform, the parties translate our increasin^y personality-oriented presidential elections into meaningful mandates for government. 167

Nixon's first ballot victory could not be considered any kind of upset. Broder stated, because he had been considered a likely

^®®David S, Broder, "GOP Presents a Picture Out of Focus, " The Washington Post, August 4, 1968.

^®^David S. Broder, "The Convention Process Seems to Work Despite All the Buffoonery and Boredom, " The Washington Post, August 5, 1968. 53

winner since his sweep of the p rim a rie s in Oregon and South Dakota la st May.

But despite th ese fo re c a sts the nomination of Nixon still had to be considered "one of the most implausible political events of our

era.

Implausible, Broder reasoned, because a party which was

searching for a winner had overlooked two popular governors of our most populous states to nominate a man who (1) had not won an election on his own in 18 years; (2) had no established political base in either California or New York; (3) was a battle-scarred veteran of the political wars, and (4) had lost the presidency and the governor­ ship of California,

Broder asked how did Nixon do it ?

Broder analyzed the Nixon comeback strategy and estimated the key points as (1) the belief that Goldwater would lose in 1964 and the resultant decision to play the "good soldier" and campaign anywhere for the Republican party; (2) making good on this promise by stumping

^®®David S. B roder, "N ixon's Form ula: Hard Work, Skill, Good Timing, " The Washington Post, August 9, 1968,

169ibid.

170lbid. 54

36 states In six weeks for the ticket in 1964; (3) repeating the per­ formance in 1966 by speaking in 35 states for 86 Republican candidates;

(4) blurring of his loser's image by these campaigns for other candidates; (5) keeping his lines of communications open to all factions of the party, and^(6) forsaking the temptation after the 1966

Republican comeback year to attempt a lock-up of the nomination in favor of a year's moratorium on politics to travel abroad and polish 171 his reputation as a foreign policy and International affairs expert.

The capstone of the strategy was to call in his nationwide chits of goodwill accumulated since 1964 and embark on a risky but well- planned series of primary races designed to fully erase any loser’s image.

Of the Nixon strategy. Broder concluded:

And in the end, the impossible, implausible thing seemed quite routine, Richard Nixon was nominated. 173

For all his masterful strategy in gaining the presidential

nomination for himself, Nixon was faulted by Broder on the vice

^^^Ibid.

1 7 3ibid. 55 presidential choice of Maryland Governor Spiro T. Agnew which,

Broder observed, sent the delegates home less enthused than when they arrived.

Broder criticized the choice in these words:

Well, the choice of a running mate was his (Nixon's) first real decision, and in the crunch, Nixon wavered. He displayed the same timidity the same kind of refusal to step up to an issue— that so badly compromised his 1960 race for the presidency.

A bold choice, such as Lindsay, or even Reagan, might have antagonized some of his backers, but it would have shown Nixon ruling his fate, rather than submitting to circumstances. In 1960, under similar conditions, John Kennedy reached out for Lyndon Johnson. In doing so, he outraged a good number of those whose votes had just made him the nominee, but he gained the support he needed to win the election. A choice of Lindsay by Nixon would have been a comparable stroke.

But Nixon waffled, and in doing so, raised a question that is more important than the choice of the Vice President: Does he really have the nerve it takes to be President? ^75

Broder decided that the 1968 Republican Convention was a transitional one for the party rather than a radical departure from its past. —

^74i)a,vid S. Broder, "GOP Convention Too Close to 1964 for 'Turning Point, The Washington Post, August 12, 1968. 175p)id.

1 7 6 ibid. 56

A lot of deadwood was gone and some new faces had appeared by virtue of the 1964 defeat and the 1966 comeback, but the change

"was not enough to liberate the GOP from the drag of the past. "

With the party platform adopted, the nominees selected and the campaign ahead. Broder concluded:

Because there had been such an excess of ideological warfare in 1964, this year there could be no real debate on the issues at all. Because of 1964, this year's delegates were almost mandated to come up with a non-ideological, centrist candidate, acceptable to the South, and no one fit that description but Richard M. Nixon.^

At Chicago. Vice President Humphrey and his supporters were claiming enough delegates for a first ballot victory as the Democratic

National Convention opened in Chicago, but despite the lead trouble was mounting for the front-runner. 1 7Q

First of all, rumors of a southern rebellion against Humphrey were circulating. There also was the boomlet being led by California

Democratic Leader Jesse Unruh to urge Senator Edward Kennedy

(D-Mass.), into the race.

178]bid.

^^^David 8. Broder, "HHH's Woes Mount on Eve Of Convention, " The Washington Post, August 25, 1968.

^®°Ibid. 57

Adding to the confusion was the e^ectation of demonstrations from anti-war groups and 20,000 men including 5, 600 Illinois National

Guard Troops and 7, 500 regular Army personnel were in Chicago to assist local police in quelling any disorders. 181

Battle lines were also forming over a stiff floor fight anticipated on rules, credentials and Vietnam platform plank controversies. 182 Some of Humphrey's troubles dissipated on the first day of the convention, however, when Senator Kennedy told his followers in unmistakable language that he would not run.

Humphrey's southern defection was not as serious as originally sipposed, and by the second day of the convention. Broder was reporting "Vice President Humphrey picked up additional Southern support tonight for a first ballot nomination. "

Broder also reported, "Humphrey's seemingly unshake able grip on the presidential prize was confirmed by his main rival. Sen.

Eugene McCarthy. McCarthy told interviewers that Humphrey's

^®®David S. Broder, "Senator Bars Race; Smathers for HHH, " The Washington Post, August 26, 1968. ^G^ibid. 58

victory 'was probaWy settled more than 24 hours a g o . "'165

Broder said that the easing of the Southern opposition enabled

Humphrey's supporters to concentrate their activity on Unruh and

Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, both of whom were worried about

Humphrey's capacity to win the election against Nixon. 186

Daley had delayed his endorsement of Humphrey since the

opening of the convention in the hope that Ted Kennedy could be per­

suaded to enter the competition.^

Humphrey was nominated on the first ballot of the Wednesday night, August 28, session which was affected by occurrences in down­ town Chicago,

Broder was at the convention site, and reported: To dramatize the breadth of his political support Humphrey had his seconding speeches given by Mayor Carl Stokes of Cleveland, first big-city Negro Mayor, and by former Gov. Terry Sanford of North Carolina, often described by Humphrey as a symbol of the moderate 'New South. '

^®®David S. Broder, "McCarthy Agrees His Defeat Is Likely, The Washington Post, August 27, 1968.

16®David 8, Broder, "Daley Delays Candidate Choice, " The Washington Post, August 25, 1968.

188David S. Broder, "Humphrey Wins Nomination for Presi­ dency on First Ballot, " The Washington Post, August 29, 1968. 59

But the scenes of violence in the streets—watched by many of the delegates on television screens around the hall—seemed almost to mock the claims of harmony.

As word spread of what was h^pening, the anger in the hall rose. Colorado State Chairman Robert Maytag tried unsuccess­ fully to recess the convention, saying we 'cannot nominate a President under conditions prevailing in the streets of Chic^o. *

It remained for Sen. Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut in his nominating speech for McGovern, to put the issue in its bluntest form . 'As I see the confusion in the hall and watch on television the turmoil and violence. •. competing for the attention of the American people, ' Ribicoff said, 'there is something in my heart other than the speech I intended to give. '

'With George McGovern as President of the United States, ' he said, 'we wouldn't have to have Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago. '

Daley and his Illinois delegation, sitting directly in front of the podium, came to their feet with a roar of anger and shook their fists at Ribicoff. Unruffled, the Connecticut Senator stared down at Daley and said, 'How hard it is to accept the truth. How hard it is. '

Frank Mankiewicz, the former Kennedy aide who seconded McGovern's nomination, also referred to the 'night sticks and tear gas and the mindless brutality we have seen on our television screens tonight and on this convention floor. ' 189

The events affecting the convention were downtown clashes between the anti-war protesters and the police as the demonstrators started their forbidden march toward the International Amphitheatre,

^®®Ibid. 60 but were Intercepted by police and National Guardsmen. There had been earlier clashes in Grant Park, the rallying point for the 190 m arch ers. Broder said the balloting Wednesday n i^ t ends "one of the most dramatic and upset-filled nomination strug^es in the history of the Democratic Party.

Broder e:^ressed serious cbubt about the chances of the

Democratic ticket in the General Election. He wrote the day after the convention nominated Humphrey,

"it left unsettled the doubts that the Party could extend its eight-year tenure in the White House.

Broder was struck by the series of surprising events leading to Humphrey's nomination:

Ten months ago, when the date was set for the Democratic convention, it was assumed by almost everyone that the delegates would come to Chicago simply to ratify Lyndon B. Johnson's e]q)ected second-term candidacy. But that assumption reckoned without the rising public opposition to the Vietnam war and without the effort of the quiet ex-professor named McCarthy, long overshadowed by his more vocal Minnesota colleague, Humphrey.

^®°Ibid.

^®^Ibid.

^82]bid. 61

In chilly New Hampshire, McCarthy put his seemingly Quixotic effort to its first test and quickly assembled the vanguard of the army of college-age political workers whose participation in the campaign was to become one of the hallmarks of 1968.

To the astonishment of almost everyone, McCarthy won over 42 percent of the New Hampshire vote against a write-in campaign for the President, run by the state Democratic organization.

That March 12 upset had dramatic results. Six days later. Sen. Robert F. Kennedy of New York overcame his earlier doubts and plunged into the race as a second anti-Administration candidate. And on March 31, facing a second defeat by McCarthy in the Wisconsin primary. President Johnson told a stunned Nation he 'would not seek or accept' renomination. 193

The bitter struggle within the convention and events in downtown

Chicago moved Broder to observe, "The Democratic Party woke up today with the worst hangover in a century, "1®*

Broder concluded:

The whole question of this Democratic convention has not been whether Humphrey would win the nomination but whether he would take over a party or a ruin. The answer is that the wreckage is more complete than even the pessimists had predicted when the delegates arrived in Chicago last weekend.

The Democrats' reputation—and Humphrey's—is indelibly tarnished for millions of television viewers who saw Humphrey's nomination as a piece of the u^y mosaic of police clubbing young demonstrators, of brawling and booing galleries, and of the Party

194 David S. Broder, "Hangover in Chicago, " The Washington Post, A i^st 29, 1968. 62

leaders who put Humphrey in office mouthing obscenities at speakers who protested the violence, 195

Broder complimented the nomination of Senator Edmund 8.

Muskie of Maine as the vice presidential running mate for Humphrey, but expressed the doubt tiiat even Muskie's "quiet diplomacy" could save the ticket, Broder expressed the belief that most of the Democratic candi­ dates in the states and the men managing the local and Congressional campaigns believed their ticket was a loser, 1Q7

Broder did see three bright spots in the otherwise dismal

Democratic picture, including (1) the continued racial integration of the Party; (2) the infusion of young people, and (3) attention to the reform of the Convention form itself. 1®®

^®®Ibid.

l®^David 8. Broder, "Poking in Debris of Convention Turns Up Hope for the Party, " The Washington Post, August 30, 1968.

188ibld. CHAPTER IV

THE CAMPAIGN

With Humphrey. With the conventions concluded and the two- month campaign now underway, Broder assessed the chances of the 199 two parties as pitting the weaknesses of each against the other.

Broder saw each of the candidates—Nixon and Humphrey—in essentially negative term s.

Broder believed that both parties had overlooked their strongest possible candidate for reasons "good and sufficient to the delegates. "200

The fact that the Republicans chose Nixon over Rockefeller, and the Democrats nominated Humphrey over McCarthy, Broder concluded,

"It is hardly surprising.. .that each party rests its hopes for victory principally on the weaknesses of the other. "291

Broder believed the campaign was starting with Nixon in a stronger position than Humplirey, but the Wallace candidacy with its

12®David S. Broder, "Political Lineup Pits Weaknesses, " The Washington Post, August 30, 1968.

200lbid.

2 9^Ibid. 64 emphasis on the law and order issue, could result in neither major candidate winning the requisite 270 electoral votes. ^92

With less than two months of the campaign remaining, on

September 10, Broder continued to see Nixon with a "commanding lead. "293

At the same time Broder predicted "that George Wallace may have as large a role in any stop-Nixon strategy as Hubert H,

Humphrey.

Broder believed the likeliest way to stop Nixon was for Wallace to garner his maximum electoral votes in the South and Humphrey to defeat Nixon in either Texas or Illinois and hold the major states where he was leading. 205 Broder was increasingly critical during the campaign of

Governor Agnew as the Republican vice-presidôntial choice, and lavish in his praise of Senator Muskie as the Democratic vice- presidential selection. 299

®°^Ibid.

293David S. Broder, "Early Analysis Gives Nixon Commanding Lead in Race, " The Washington Post, September 10, 1968. 294p)td. 205g)%d.

299r>avid S. Broder, "Presidential Choice Concerns Individual More Than Party, " The Washington Post, October 8, 1968, 65

!bi a column praising the Republicans for the reservoir of fine talent to lead the nation, and condemning the Democratic Party as

"weary, ill-tempered and out of sorts, " he questioned Nixon's ability and judgment solely on the choice of Agnew with this closing paragraph:

I find myself remembering that from the rich array of talent in the Republican Party, Richard Nixon chose Spiro T. Agnew for his vice presidential candidate, and that in the supposed ruins of the Democratic Party, Hubert Humphrey found Edmund 8. Muskie. 207

Broder joined Humphrey on his first post-convention trip to the Midwest and Humphrey promptly ran into an embarrassing situation in Michigan. 298

He had to withdraw his earlier statement made in Denver that troops were being brought home from Vietnam. Humphrey had used the homecoming of a Marine regiment to back up his contention, but it proved to be a routine rotation, not any new withdrawal. 209

Broder'8 reporting reflected Humphrey's poor start with its

"sparse crowds, spotty scheduling and its frequent snafus by the candidate. "210

29?lbid.

298gavid 8. Broder, "HHH Heckled in Mich. Foray; Retreats on Troops, " The Washington Post, September 12, 1968. 299ibid.

2^0j5a^yl^j Broder, "Leaders Admit HHH Is Trailing, " The Washington Post, September 15, 1968. 66 After tlœ first week of Humphrey's campaign, Broder concluded;

What is known is that the first of the e i^ t weeks Humphrey has to overtake Nixon did little to enhance Humphrey's hopes and may, indeed, have added to his problems with his party, the President and the voters. 211

After this trip with Humphrey, Broder had formed an opinion on what was causing Humphrey’s troubles. 212

Broder believed that Humphrey's cheerfulness and loose 0 1 3 tongue were hurting his chances.

Broder wrote;

Yet, this year, it must be said, Humphrey's cheerful optimism has betrayed him. The 'politics of happiness' proclaimed as his goal when he announced his candidacy last spring came to sound like a mockery after Robert Kennedy's murder. His good humor enrages dissident Democrats. A Vietnam war protester, who saw Humphrey marching in a parade in Pittsburgh, shouted in rage: 'Why are you smiling when m en are dying?'

No one who knows Humphrey believes for a moment that the war, in his eyes, is anything but a curse. But, where Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy could agonize in public over the war, Humphrey remained doggedly upbeat.

His bedrock belief that things are bound to get better extends

2^^1bid. 2^2j5j^yi^ Broder, "Cheerfulness and Loose Tongue Are Hurting HHH in Campaign, " The Washington Post, September 17, 1968.

213 Ibid, 67

to his attitude toward his staff, which is notorious among politicians for its mediocrity. Humphrey has borne with the limitations of his aides for years, in apparent confidence that they are bound to improve, but he is campaigning today without the kind of assistance a presidential candidate deserves, and this can be blamed on no one but himself.

The indulgence he extends to his staff he also uses to excuse bad habits of his own, particularly his loose tongue.

The good heart and the cheerful spirit that are Hubert Humphrey are endearing qualities; but by themselves they will not win for him this fall. A President is more than a cheer­ leader. 214

Just a week before the election Broder again wrote a flattering column about Muskie and suggested that the Democratic Party should have reversed the ticket and made Muskie the Presidential candidate 215 with Humphrey as his running mate.

In his praise of Muskie, Broder said the Maine Senator was the one man in the campaign who had enhanced his "reputation and standing. "219

Broder stated:

But the emergence of Muskie—who prefers to call himself a progressive rather than a liberal—seems to be a vindication of

214ibid.

219David S. Broder, "Muskie's Campaign Restores Faith in Vitality of Liberalism, " The Washington Post, October 29, 1968.

216Ibid. 68

the liberal tradition, the tradition of reason and restraint; of readiness to e^erim ent and yet of respect for institutions and traditions; of tolerance of dissent, of skepticism of authority and, above all, of trust in the good faith of others.

Muskie*s meetings are the quietest in America this fall, blessedly devoid of the overamplified shouts of the Wallace crowds, and the strident oratory of the Humphrey speeches. 21 *

Broder praised Muskie as giving the finest political speech of the campaign, and then suggested in a political year that had left many Democrats dissatisfied with the convention choice, perhaps "it may be just the ticket that's upside down. "218

During this final stage in the campaign, after a four-day swing on the campaign trail with both Nixon and Humphrey, Broder was reporting:

This is the time—late October—when a winning candidate begins to generate crowds beyond those his advance men can pull out, crowds of the curious, even nonsupporters, who come out to see the man they think will be their President.

That is the kind of crowds Nixon is drawing today. The beauticians and their customers—all in white smocks—step out of the beauty parlor in Tamaqua to watch Nixon pass, and so do the men in their hunting caps and mackintoshes at the P & B sporting goods store. This kind of crowd is absent from the Humphrey campaign. 219

------g ------2l?Ibid. 218ibid.

219navid S. Broder, "Four Days on Trail of Two Candidates, " The Washington Post, October 27, 1968. 69

With Nixon. Broder joined the Nixon campaign swing into

California in mid-September and found "the Wallace threat.. .upper­ most in Nixon’s mind today. "229 Nixon's concern about Wallace manifested Itself to Broder in the Republican nominee's refusal to participate in a three-way tele­ vision debate with Humphrey and Wallace for fear of giving the Alabaman additional e^qposure. 221

Brodmr traveled to New York and Pennsylvania with the Nixon campaign during this same period and reported from Philadelphia that

"Richard M. Nixon gambled and won today on the proposition that he could outdraw Vice President Humphrey in Democratic Philadelphia. "222

Nixon's crowd of 200,000 to 225,000 in downtown Philadelphia enabled him to win the ''battle of the crowds" against Humphrey, Broder told his readers. 222

Whereas Broder was commenting durii^ this time on the

220j)avid S. Broder, "Nbmn Sees Rival Camps In Dixie Deal, " The Washington Post, September 17, 1968.

221ibid.

222gavid 8. Broder, "Nixon Tops HHH In Philadelphia, " The Washington Post, September 20, 1968.

2 2 3 ibid. 70 sparseness and imenthusiastic Humphrey crowds, Nixon's audiences

"...for the most part, were friendly and enthusiastic."224

In an opinion column following the coast to coast trip with

Nixon, Broder interpreted his "surprising finding that Nixon was hopeful of a good showing by Humphrey in the South. "225

This seeming parade^ Broder found, was due to the remarkable over-all lead enjoyed by Nixon, marred only by Wallace's rising strength in the South and border states. 229

Nixon was fearful. Broder found, that his lead over Humphrey in many of the Northern states could vanish by election time, and he would need victories in some of the Southern and border states to be elected. 227

The Humphrey situation at this juncture, was so bad. Broder observed, that the latest Gallup Poll figures applied to traditional state voting patterns by union strategists were giving Humphrey only

224i)avid S. Broder, "Nixon Pledges Help In Wiping Out Slums, " The Washington Post, September 21, 1968.

225i)avid S. Broder, "Nixon Becomes Avid Backer Of Humphrey in the South, " The Washington Post, September 22, 1968,

226ibld.

2 2 7 p)id. 71 eight electoral votes garnered from Rhode Island and the District of Columbia. 2^8

Broder believed that Nixon was also concerned about doing well in the South because "he is seeking a national mandate" and wanted "the South to feel it has a stake and apart in my presidency. "229

Nixon was also concerned, Broder decided, that Wallace might emerge from the election in the electoral count as "the leader of the opposition" and provide him a strong base to make an even stronger bid for the White House in 1972 with Nixon as his principle target. 230

Thus, Broder concluded:

That is why the Nixon camp was so disturbed at reports that Democratic organizations in the South were making no real fight against Wallace and that is why Nixon, of all people, has become a rooter for Hubert Humphrey in the South. 231

hi a mid-campaign report on October 6, a month before the election. Broder commented "if the election were held today,

Richard M. Nixon would be a near-certainty to recapture the White

House for the Republican Party. "232

228]bid. 229g)id. 230ibid. 231ibid.

232i5avid S. Broder, "Nixon Within 24 Votes—as of Today, " The Washington Post, October 6, 1968. 72

Broder also conceived at this point that Humphrey might go down to the worst Democratic defeat since 1952, and might even finish th^d in the three-way race behind Nixon and Wallace.

Broder was not entirely convinced that Wallace would not emerge as the strongest third-party candidate in 50 years and run so well that the election would be thrown into the U. S. House of Repre­ sentatives. Despite the pessimistic tone of the Broder report insofar as the Humphrey camp was concerned. Broder had detected at this stage that the Nixon campaign may have peaked, and that Humphrey was starting his remarkable comeback that was to carry him to a near last-minute victory.

After noting that Nbrc»n's continuing lead was buUt on past momentum and did not seem to be picking up any new steam, Broder observed:

The survey indicates, however, that Nm>n's campaign does not seem to be on the upswing in any key areas while Humphrey

234ibid. ' ’I ■ 2 3 5 jbid. 73

is plainly improving his position in some states and the Wallace strength shows little sign of leveling off. 236

With just a little over a week left in the campaign, Broder seemed to still believe Nixon would win, but noted that even the well- paced and excellently organized Nixon campaign was having an effect on the candidate.

Broder* s eye caught this and he reported:

Only if one looks very closely can one see the effort it is costing Nixon—the arm gestures a little more marionette-like than they were a month ago, the eyes closed momentarilv in fatigue while applause and a band fanfare fill the hall. 238

Broder never became fully enamored of either major candidate throughout the campaign and criticized them both as second-rate as well as the campaigns they were conducting insofar as they succeeded in developing what he considered the important issues. 239

He depicted the candidates in one column thusly through the eyes of the California electorate:

Hubert H. Humphrey is the fellow who finished fourth In

236ibid.

22'^David S. Broder, "Four Days on Campaign T rail, " The Washington Post, October 27, 1968.

^^^Ibid. goq David S. Broder, ’Western States Unaroused By Larger Campaign Issues, " The Washington Post, October 15, 1968, 74

the favor of the California Democratic delegation, running behind even the Rev. Channing Phillips. And Richard M. Nixon is the man Californians declined to elect as their Governor in 1962. So, understandably, the prospect of either of them moving into the vhiite House next January is not one that causes Cali­ fornians of either party to do nlp-ups. 240

Broder said both candidates had failed to develop the issues;

And, so far as one can judge, they have failed; Humphrey, because he is mired in the controversies of the Johnson Admin­ istration and the Democratic Convention; Nixon, because he is following a computerized course of caution that dictates saying as little as possible as inoffensively as one can.

What is being lost in this campaign is the opportunity to enlist opinion and energy behind the causes that are somewhat larger even than the Central Arizona Project or Max Rafferty*s rhetor­ ical exaggerations.

None of the men v^o may be President for the next four years seems able to reach and hold the country, either. It is not just the college kids, the militant blacks, and the disaffected blue- collar workers who are turned off; this vdiole section of the country is not listening.

Presidents always complain of their Isolation once they are in office; but this year, the candidates have been encapsulated by their own choice or their own failing. And none of them is harnessing the energy and potential of this, the most dynamic growth area in America, for any purpose. 241

With Wallace. Broder never underrated the Wallace chances, but did not accompany him on much of the campaign trail.

He devoted only one entire opinion column to Wallace and this

240ibid.

24libid. 75 occurred on October 20 when he wrote a half-serious, half-jocular column about a television advertising actress who said she had a vision that Wallace would win. 2^2

In a serious vein. Broder differed with commentators who believed Wallace's strength would dissipate by election time. 243

Broder*s opinion of Wallace and his campaign was clearly evident in the closing paragraph of this column:

I suppose that if one wanted to name four institutions that are fundamental to the functioning of a free republic one would think of the institutions of law, of religion, of education and of a free press. These are Wallace's targets in a campaign which, seen close-up, is clearly not a campaign at all, but an incitement of anarchy and violence and thus a clear and present danger to anyone whose liberties depend on the self-restraint of a demo­ cratic society. 244

The final surprise of the campaign occurred just five days before the election on October 31 when President Johnson announced a bombing halt in Vietnam. 245

Broder interpreted the event as helping Humphrey’s chances

^^^avid S. Broder, "’Dodge Rebellion* Girl Says Her 6th Sense Picks Wallace, " The Washington Post, October 20, 1968.

243Ibid.

244n,id.

245j)avid S. Broder, "The Impact, " The Washington Post, November 1, 1968. 76

and wrote the neat day, that the halt "would strengthen Democratic chances of retaining the White House and Congress in Tuesday's election. "246

Humphrey's rise in the polls coupled with the bombing halt,

Broder explained, indicated an election far closer than "had seemed possible two weeks ago. "247

Broder correctly predicted the outcome, however, in a thorough state-by-state analysis on the Sunday before the election, November 3, 1968.246

In his assessment. Broder stated flatly Nixon and Agnew had been losing ground the past month but still were leading in enough

states to win.

And, Broder forecast accurately:

Richard M. Nixon is the one candidate who can win an electoral college majority, Hubert H. Humphrey and George C. Wallace might—but probably won't—take enough states from him to stale­ mate the election. Neither can win it for himself. 250

2 4 W

^^^Ibid.

^^^avid S. Broder, "Only Nixon Can Win It, " The Washington Post, November 3, 1968, 249ibid.

^^®Ibid. 77

Broder said the Humphrey-Muskie gain had been "rather dramatic, " but was still overshadowed by the "tlme-for-a-change" issue employed by Nixon. 2^1

By election eve the polls were confusing and both Gallup and

Harris refused to pick a winner although Gallup's final survey indi­ cated a 42 percent to 40 percent lead for Nixon, and Harris had 252 Humphrey surging into a 43 percent to 40 percent lead.

Broder did not withdraw his prediction of a Nixon victory, but concluded that the polls had created "an atmosphere of total uncer­ tainty" about the 1968 presidential campaign. 2®3

In a beautifully-written column of recollections about the campa%n prepared for use on election day, Broder told his readers: To all of these, the celebrities and the unknown, the living and the dead, the victors and the victims, who made this year what it was our thoughts turn on this, the day that dominated their lives and plans.

And you hope that in some degree, the results wül justify their sacrifices, and the outcome redeem the faith of those who put so much of themselves into the process of picking the President. 254

2Sllbid. 252jbj[d.

2®4£)avid S. Broder, "As Another Campaign Ends, Some Memories Linger, " The Washington Post, November 5, 1968. CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

£:gpectations of a close race proved to be well-founded and on election ni^t, at midnight, long after most of the polls had closed,

Broder reported that Nixon and Humphrey were battling-indecisively in 0 5 5 a race that threatened to be thrown into the House of Representatives.

Broder observed that although Nixon had held comfortable leads throughout the campaign until the final week, was now locked in a race

"as close as his losing 1960 race with John F, Kennedy. "256

And, there was the possibility. Broder perceived, that Wallace could take four or more southern states and deny either Nixon or

Humphrey an Electoral College majority. 2^^

Deep down in the story. Broder remarked:

Yesterday's voting climaxed one of the most incredible years in American political history, a drama where each turn seemed more astonishing than the one before. 258 _

255i)avld S. Broder, "Nixon, HHH in Close Race, " The Washington Post, November 6, 1968.

256ibid.

25?ibid. 258ibid. 79

Not until 12d)3 p.m ., on Wednesday, November 6, did

Humphrey concede, following the news services and networks putting

Illinois in the Nixon column. Nixon's victory, Broder said, was "one of the greatest personal comebacks and one of the closest elections in the history of American politics.

Nixon's electoral margin of 290 to 203 to 45 over Humphrey and

Wallace did not prove decisive enough to insure a Republican Congress, and made Nixon the first President since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to take office at the start of his White House tenure with an opposition Congress. 261

Broder Reflects. Broder* s observations on the over-all campaign and the role that political reporters played in the campaign were made both before and after the election.

Early in the campaign, during the furious closii^ days of

2®®David S. B roder, "Nixon Wins With 290 Electoral Votes; Humphrey Joins Him in Call for Unity, " The Washington Post, November 7, 1968. 2^Qlbid.

^®^Ibid. 80 the Indiana primary, Broder observed:

A presidential campaign is an enterprise of such magnitude, involving the energies of so many people in so many places at the same time, that it can never be adequately comprehended or described by any observer.

The ^amor, the excitement and most of the publicity center on the candidates. As they sweep through a state, the spotlight of television and newspaper coverE^e that focuses on them occasionally picks up a few background faces or scenes—a county chairman here, a local headquarters there. But it moves on at the candidate's own jet-propelled pace, leaving the local scene again in darkness.

And yet, what is fundamental and enduring and ultimately decisive in a presidential election is what is so rarely seen: the structure of the cam pa^ in hundreds of cities, towns and counties across the land. It is these local organizations—and the way they relate to the people they are trying to reach—that makes the difference. They are the invisible but vital 90 percent of the political iceberg. Their success or failure is never measured until the returns come in. 262

Broder had regained any loss of confidence in the campaign

system following the election and commented, "nothing vital was lost

and considerable of value may have been achieved.

The achievements of the campaign, Broder concluded, were the (1) preservation of the presidential selection system by avoiding

262j)j^y|^j S. Broder, "Profile of Hoosier County, " The Washington Post, May 5, 1968.

^^^David 8. Broder, "Nothing Vital Lost in Election Costing So Much in Men, Money, " The Washington Post, November 10, 1968. 81 a contest thrown into the House; (2) survival of the two-party system by Wallace's relatively poor showing; (3) the regained health of the

Republican Party after a disastrous defeat only four years before;

(4) the continued strength of the Democratic Party despite the Chicago

Convention, and (5) the remarkable achievement of Richard Nixon,

Broder* s distaste for Vice President Agnew was still apparent as Nixon was scolded again for selecting Agnew and Broder editorially urged the new President to do a better job of staffing his Administra­ t i o n . 2 6 5

During the campaign year Broder had scarce time and space to reflect on his own role and that of his colleagues in the campaign.

Once during March after Governor Romney's surprising with­ drawal from the New Hampshire primary. Broder reflected on the role of the political reporter in the presidential campaign, and he was clearly concerned about the effect of political reporting on particular candidates, although he defended his colleagues and himself to a degree. 266

264ibici,

265 Ibid.

^®®David S. Broder, "Reporters Closest to Romney Were Among Most Suxprised, " The Washington Post, March 5, 1968. 82 Broder reasoned that political reporters must go beyond the mere words of a candidate's speeches to examine his campaign, but warned that writers should at the same time "be aware of our own limitations and be skeptical of our own judgments. "26?

He added: Understanding another human being is about as fearsome a task as one can set for himself. The men who seek the presidency are rarely simple, ordinary souls of the kind every reporter grew up with or knows from his neighborhood poker game. 268

Broder reserved his harshest ju(%ment and criticism for him­ self and his colleagues until after the election when he elaborated in detail through a magazine article. 269

Broder conceded there is an undercurrent of anti-press sentiment in the nation which is manifested in open skepticism and "even derision. "2^9

This low esteem is not altogether undeserved. Broder points out, and "the press has as big a credibility gap as any institution in

26?ibid.

^99lbid. 269i5avid S. Broder, "View of the Press: Political Reporters in Presidential Politics, " The Washirgton Monthly, Volume One, Number One (February, 1988), pp. 20-38.

279lbid, pp. 22, 23. 83 this society—>a vulnerability which other elements of the power structure have recognized and exploited.

Broder suggests thejnractice of journalism has faded to keep pace with the times, and "it is my impression that the adaptive response from the press has been perhaps more slt^gish than that of 272 any other major institution."

Journalism has changed less during the past generation, Broder believes, than the practice of medicine, law, education or politics. 2^3

Broder*s definition of his job:

& is the job of the political reporter to cull from the thousands of words-and the hundreds of incidents that compromise each day on the road with a Presidential contender those few words, incidents, and impressions that convey the flavor, the mood, and the significance of what occurred.

Here we can broaden the frame of our discussion, for the process of covering a campaign is no different from covering any story.

Selectivity is the essence of all contemporary journalism. And selectivity implies criteria. Criteria depends on value judgments, which is a fancy word for opinions, preconceptions, and prejudices. There is no neutral journalism. 274

2'^^Ibid, p. 22.

272ibid, p. 23.

273]bid,

274ibid, p. 25. 84

Broder compresses the job of the political reporter into five roles, all of which are controversial. The roles include. (1) that of a summarizer of the candidate's positions; (2) that of talent scouts;

(3) that of race-caller or handicapper; (4) the public defender, and

(5) unpaid assistant campaign manager for the candidate he is covering, 2?^

Broder* s definitions of these roles are a harsh indictment of the p ress.

As a summarizer of the candidate's position. Broder notes that all of the w riter's prejudices and misconceptions enter into his interpretation of the candidates' position. 276

The talent scouts Broder describes as a small group of Eastern newsmagazines and newspapers, columnists and television figures who are mostly Democratic-oriented. These men serve as an unofficial screening committee who through the power of their position can make or break any potential contender for the presidency. “277

275ibid, pp. 26, 29, 31, 32, 33. 276ibid, p. 26.

27?lbid, pp. 26, 27, 28, 29. 85

In reflection, Broder remembered;

I often thought, for example, as I saw Romney during his Presidential campaign, surrounded by our circle—men a genera­ tion younger than he, many of us with cigarettes in our mouths, drinks in our hands, and cynicism in our hearts—that he must have felt as helpless with us as I would feel if my fate or future as a journalist were being decided by a committee of ^m n ey 's colleagues among the elders of the Mormon church. 2*8

The third role of the political reporter—the race-caller or handicapper—is one of telling the public everyday how the presidential sweepstakes stand. 279

This is an impossible task to perform with any degree of accuracy, Broder concludes, "and if the reporter has even a vestige of conscience, he knows that is the one question he can never answer with any confidence. "280

The attempt to anticipate elections leads to much uninformed predicting which the reporter tries to disguise as straight reporting. 281

In his role of public defender, Broder describes the tendency of political reporters to become mcensed that a candidate is somehow trying to mislead the public. The reporter then takes it upon himself to

278%bid, p. 28.

279%bid, p. 29.

280ibid, p. 29. 2®^Ibid. 86 be a public defender and loses all semblance of objectivity. 282

Once the reporter assumes this stance, Broder observes, "he abandons almost all pretense of being anything less than an arbiter of the outcome of the election. "283

The reporter who takes on the fifth role as an unpaid, volunteer campaign manager of the candidate he is covering is the most despicable of all, in Broder's estim ation. 284

Broder stated:

This is the opposite of the Public Defender syndrome, and in every respect more obnoxious. When he is playing Public Defender, the reporter at least is living up to the stereotype of the hard-nosed, independent, aggressive news hound—even though his motives may have precious little to do with the pursuit of news.

But when he appoints himself Assistant Campaign Manager, he becomes a fawning lackey of the candidate, waiting on him with bits of advice, reveling in the supposed intimacy of his relation­ ship. He takes to defending the candidate in the press bus, and may even go so far as to remonstrate with his coUeagues who are writing 'unfriendly' pieces about his new hero. He is a sad spectacle, but there is no blinking the fact that on every campaign I have seen, one or more of our colleagues have strayed from the paths of righteous skepticism and become avowed, active promoters of the candidacy of the man they are covering.

282ibid, p. 32*

283%bid.

284]hid, p. 33. 87

There Is a suWe revenge, however, for the candidate who allows this to happen. Invariably, the advice that newspapermen give candidates is the worst claptrap imaginable. I could cite examples, but I wUl not. I have probably said enough already to be esgpelled from the p ress bus for life. 285

And, Broder had a word of warning for future presidential years:

Men will continue to run for President and reporters will go right on coverinff their campaigns. Caveat lector. Let the reader beware. 286

One of the causes of the credibility gap which Broder believes exists between the press and public is the failure of the press itself to communicate effectively on its own role and responsibility "as an institution inherently critical of whatever establishment is in power. "287

He also believes the press has failed to assist the public to understand the strengths and shortcomings of our political system and institutions. 288

This situation. Broder believes, has contributed to the public's cynicism about politics without really trying to correct these

^^^Ibid, p. 33.

28®David S. Broder, "R eporters Closest to Romney Were Among Most Surprised, " The Washington Post, March 5, 1968.

297j5avxd g. Broder, "Notes on Communicating, " The Univer­ sity of Chicago Magazine, January, February, 1969, p. 13.

^^^Ibid, p. 214. 88 situations. 289

Publicizing individual cases of corruption or wrong-doing by

office holders is important, Broder asserts, but does not go to the

institutional problems that are far more serious dangers to our political system. 290

Broder also complains that the press is still devoting too much time to superficial coverage of public issues without going into the 291 underlying causes.

As an example he cites the discovery by many reporters in

Washington that the "issues before Congress, or under debate in the

Administration, are not the issues that the newspapers and television are reporting on. "292

He concludes:

We in the communications media, in short, face a period when, like other basic institutions we must concern ourselves simul­ taneously with defending our rights in a society that is rather intolerant of our claim to special status and at the same time do far more than we have to improve our own performance. 293

^^^Ibid.

290ibid.

291ibid. 292n,id.

293 Ibid, 89

Broder is optimistic about the new crop of reporters entering the field and says the one clear improvement in newspapers in the past 15 years is the quality of young men and women coming into the field, 294

The 1968 campaign was described by Broder as the most intensive, grueling and difficult he has ever covered. 295

The four months prior to the assassination of Senator Kennedy in Los Angeles "were the hardest I ever worked in my life, " Broder stated.

Dramatic events were occurring with the rapidity of "ejqploding firecrackers, " Broder recalled, "and it was a time vdien a reporter barely had time to digest a major development before another important story broke, "296

The one event that surprised him the most and caught the press unawares was the announcement of President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election.

Broder was in Wisconsin covering the prim ary there when it was announced that the President would appear on national television to make an announcement.

294p)id. 295 Statement by David S. Broder, personal interview. 2®9jbid. 90

Broder said he had an intuition that something big was going to

occur, but thought it was probably a halt in the bombing of North

Vietnam. At any rate Broder felt he should be in Washington and left the

Wisconsin primary trail to return to the capital and watched the

President announce his decision.

Broder believes one of the most difficult tasks in covering a

Presidential election is judging where and when the really significant

events will occur.

This is nothing that can be taught, Broder commented, but is a

"feel" or "knack" that a reporter must develop.

"That is why I came back to Washington for President Johnson’s

announcement. I had a hunch that something really big was breaking, "

he added.

Broder believes that the basic element to covering national

politics is contact with the local political leaders.

National politics is an enlargement of precinct politics and to

understand national politics a reporter must know what is going on in

the statehouses, courthouses and right on down to the precincts.

Broder eigqplained.

Big scoops that occur during great political campaigns are the

result of the spadework that is performed by the reporter in the 91 relatively dull times between elections, Broder added, and these contacts must be maintained in the non-election years. 29?

This year is one of those off years and Broder is spending much of his time on Capitol Hill maintaining the contacts viiich will assist his coverage of the Congressional races in 1970, and the next Presi­ dential election in 1972.

"Both of the national chairmen, Fred Harris and Rogers

Morton, are on Czgaitol Hill, as are the leading contenders for the

1972 Democratic nomination—Senator Kennedy and Senator Muskie, "

Broder pointed out.

Broder criticized himself for an error late in the 1968 cam­ paign, "a campaign which I thought was getting dull. " Late in September and early October, Broder recalled, it appeared that Nixon was an easy victor and Broder failed to catch the

Humphrey surge until very late.

"I was spending much of the time covering some interesting

Senate races in the West and misjudged the closeness of the

Presidential contest, " Broder stated.

Broder only wrote two columns on Wallace during the campaign, and this was deliberate. Broder remarked.

297gtatement by David S. Broder, personal interview. 92

"I simply could not be around that man and not react personally, "

Broder admitted.

"I found that his campaign was offensive to me and I chose to disassociate myself from covering him, " Broder added, 298

Broder found it impossible to be objective about Wallace and stayed away from him.

"It was not fair to my readers to present any biased or prejudiced reporting, and it was not fair to Wallace for me to cover him because he was a Presidential candidate and did deserve honest and fair coverage, " Broder observed.

Broder was particularly critical of Vice President Agnew through the campaign, but now believes that Agnew will do an outstand­ ing job.

"I have a lo t of respect for Agnew and I believe he is a solid guy who will perform well, " Broder stated.

"I had been favorably impressed by Agnew and thought he had handled himself well at Governor’s conferences. That’s Wiy I was surprised when he put his foot in his mouth during the campaign, "

Broder continued.

The national scoop that Broder obtained early in the campaign

298gtatement by David S. Broder, personal interview. 93 that Agnew was being considered as a running mate for Nixon was one of the examples "of being at the right place at the right time, " Broder recalled* 299

Broder was accompanying Nixon on a campaign trip and during the flight Broder was summoned to the candidate's side.

"Within two minutes Nixon was talking about vice presidential possibilities, and two minutes later he was talking about Agnew, "

"Nixon seemed very impressed with Agnew* s reputation with the other Governors, " Broder explained.

"I didn't predict that Agnew was going to be the running mate;

I reported that he was under consideration, " Broder emphasized.

Broder recommends for improved Presidential coverage that reporters be drawn from a wider age range; from a larger group of newspapers; from more parts of the country, and from additional “ racial groups.

"I hope that 1968 was the last time the Presidential campaign press corps is all white, " Broder commented.

"We need younger reporters on the campaign and more news­ papers represented, " Broder added.

299gtatement by David S. Broder, personal interview. 94

"The campaign press corps is a tightly knit group and the impact of each additional reporter makes a difference. "299

Broder also believes it would be helpful if more reporters outside of the East Coast and with a conservative political philosophy covered the presidential campaign.

Reporters covering the candidates should be rotated so that they do not become too familiar with one candidate to the extent they

are influenced, Broder stated.

Above all, Broder concluded, "there must be an awareness among the reporters of the kind of power they have in presenting these candidates to the American public. "291

Evaluation. My evaluation of Broder*s work in the 1968 cam­ paign is that he performed in an excellent manner.

Using his own definition of the five roles of the political reporter, I rate Broder high in every category.

The first role, that of the summarizer of the candidate's positions, saw Broder presenting these in a consistent and well- balanced manner. —

299gtatement by David S. Broder, personal interview.

291ibid. 95

Broder fairly presented the major candidates' views on the

Issues and I believe that a reader of Broder would have an accurate understanding of the positions taken by both Nixon and Humphrey.

My only criticism in this respect is the coverage of Vice

President Agnew. Broder was cutting to Agnew in two columns and we never

heard Agnew's views through Broder's columns.

Broder did say that he had a personal friend on Agnew's staff

and covered Agnew rarely because of his friend's role. Broder lists the second role of the political reporter as that of

a talent scout, and in this respect I found Broder free of drum-beating for any candidate either before or after the primaries and conventions,

I found no hint of Broder's personal views in his reporting of

the presidential possibilities and I don't believe he was personally

influenced by any of the candidates.

In the third role as a race-caller or handlesqiper. Broder was

extremely resourceful and responsible.

While correctly predicting the outcomes of both conventions and

the election, he tended to understate rather than overstate the case.

His prediction of a Nixon victory was not a crystal ball-type

column, but involved a state by state analysis backed up by voting

patterns, polls and contacts with local politicians. 96

Broder also played the fourth role of the political reporter well. This is the role of the public defender.

There was no self-righteous, breast-beating in Broder's reporting. The issues he did choose to raise as important to the campaign were valid and well documented. For example, he esqplained the dangers of an electoral college stalemate in a historical context. Unlike some of his colleagues, he did not foresee the end of the Republic if either Nixon or Humphrey were elected.

And, he also excelled in the fifth and final role of the political reporter, that of an unpaid assistant campaign manager for the candidate he is covering.

Broder exhibited the ability to keep himself at arms length from the candidates and maintained an aloof, objective approach to the men he was covering. While Broder seems to command the respect and admiration of both his colleagues and the politicians, he does not forget his primary role as a neutral and objective observer employed to report what happens and to eg ress his opinions in a responsible and informed manner,

I believe that Broder, through training and e^qperience, and assisted by an unusual amount of insight, common sense, intuition 97 and ability, covered the 1968 presidential campaign fairly, objectively and interestingly. BIBLIOGRAPHY 99

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Gerald, James E. The Syial Responsibility of the Press. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.

Copple, Neale. Depth Reporting, An Approach to Journalism. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Incorporate^ 1964.

MacDoi^all, Curtis D, Inteipretative Reporting. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938.

MacDougall, Curtis D. Newsroom Problems and Policies. New York: The MacMillan Company, l941.

B. PERIODICALS

"Dave Broder Did, " Newsweek, (August 19, 1968), pp. 60, 61.

"A Sense of When and Where, " Time, (August 16, 1968), p. 38.

Broder, David S, "Notes on Communicating, " The University of Chicago Magazine, January-February, 1969, pp. 12-14.

Broder, David S. 'Wiews of the Press: Political Reporters in Presidential Politics, " The Washington Monthly, Volume One, Number One (February, T969), pp.

C. NEWSPAPERS

Broder, David S. "The Reporters Closest to Romney Were Among Most Surprised, " The Washington Post, March 5, 1968, p. A13.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Stacks Chips High and Lets Them Ride, " The Washington Post, March 10, 1968, pp. B l, B3. 100

Broder, David S. "Wallace Nightmare Haunting Political Bedfellows in Capital, : The Washington Post, February 13, 1968.

Broder, David S. "RFK WonT Oppose LBJ Renomination, The Washington Post, January 31, 1968.

Broder, David S. '*Neck RFK Saved by Staying on Sidelines May Be His Own, " The Washington Post, February 6, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Ready and Willing Says Rockefeller, " The Washington Post, March 2, 1968.

Broder, David S. "It's Now a New Ball Game for GOP Contenders, " The Washington Post, March 3, 1968.

Broder, David 8. "Goldwater Declares He Can't Back Rocky, ff The Washington Post, March 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Dropping Other Shoe Subjects Nixon Peril of Microphonitis, " The Washh%ton Post, January 30, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Senator May Win 19 of 24 Delegates, " The Washington Post, March 13, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Pm In It To Win, Senator Declares, " The Washington Post, March 17, 1968,

Broder, David S. "Wallace's Deeds for Country Overlooked in 2- Party Uproar, " The Washington Post, March 14, 1968,

Broder, David S., Leroy F. Aarons. "Rockefeller Entry Set for Thursday, " The Washington Post, March 20, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Why Rockefeller Bowed Out, " The Washington Post, March 22, 1968,

Broder, David S. "Miami Base To Be Set Up For Reagan, " The Washington Post, March 26, 1968.

Broder, David S ., Leroy F. Aarons. "To Take Primary Route, " The Washington Post, March 16, 1968, 101

Broder, David S. "Wisconsin Labor Mired in Tardy LBJ Bid, " The Washington Post, March 30, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Administration's Supporters Now looking to Humphrey, " The Washington Post, April 1, 1968.

Broder, David S. "The Shying of an Image—With Deliberate Sipeed, " The Washington Post, April 13, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Branigin Buildup Threatens Axiom: Kennedys Don't Lose," The Washington Post, April 15, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Kennedy Emerging as Indiana Favorite, " The Washington Post, AprU 27, 1968. Broder, David S. "System of Self-Government Being Tested in * 68 Election, " The Washington Post, April 23, 1968.

Broder, David S. "New Generation of Politicians Moving Up to Take Over the American Government," The Washington Post, April 2, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Rebuilding Sense of Identity, Purpose For A m erican People, Is the Task Ahead, " The Washington Post, AprU 9, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Indiana Not Doing for RFK What W. Va. Did for Brother, " The Washington Post, April 30, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Record Vote Seen in Indiana; District Goes to Polls Today, " The Washington Post, May 6, 1968.

Broder, David S. "RFK Wins Indiana; McCarthy Third, " The Washington Post, May 7, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Kennedy's kidiana Victory Was More Impressive Than It Looked," The Washington Post, May 8, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Oregon Crucial for McCarthy, Reagan Races, " The Washington Post, May 16, 1968.

Broder, David S. "McCarthy in Oregon: Missing Last Chance?" The Washington Post, May 18, 1968, 102 Broder, David S. "McCarthy Challenge Attracts A New Generation to Politics, " The Washington Post, May 14, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Eyes Agnew as Running Mate, " The Washington Post, May 16, 1968.

Broder, David S. "3 Stump Oregon to Windup, " The Washington Post, May 25, 1968.

Broder, David S. "McCarthy Blasts RFK in Oregon Finale, " The Washington Post, May 26, 1968. Broder, David S. "Close Race Seen in Oregon Today, " The Washington Post, May 27, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Big Win Is Scored By Nixon, " The Washington Post, May 28, 1968.

»der, David S. "Oregon Enhances Front-Runners' Outlook, " The Washington Post, May 29, 1968,

Broder, David S. "RFK Says McCarthy Distorts Truth, " THe^ Washington Post, May 31, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Campaign Halted by Opponents, " The Washington Post, June 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "First Dallas, Now L. A .... a Nightmare All Too Real, " The Washh%ton Post, June 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "California's Right Wing Seems To Be Losing Its Magic Touch, " The Washington Post, May 26, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Some Answers to RFK Death Constitute Form of Escapism, " The Washii^on Post, June 11, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Primary Vote Held Important As Expression of Public's View, " The Washington Post, June 4, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Reagan Would Be Beneficiary ff Nixon Fails on 1st Ballot, " The Washington Post, July 16, 1968. 103

Broder, David S. "Reagan Stock Rises, " The Washington Post, July 28, 1968.

Broder, David S. "First-Ballot Victory For Nixon Seen, " The Washington Post, July 14, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Ni?K>n Backers Holdii^ South Against Reagan, " The Washington Post, August 6, 1968.

Broder, David 8. "GOP Presents a Picture Out of Focus, " The Washington Post, August 4, 1968,

Broder, David S. "The Convention Process Seems to Work Despite All the Buffoonery and Boredom, " The Washii^on Post, August 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon's Formula: Hard Work, Skill, Good Timing, tt The Washington Post, August 9, 1968.

Broder, David S. "GOP Convention Too Close to 1964 for 'Turning Point, '" The Washington Post, August '2, 1968.

Broder, David S. "HHH's Woes Mount on Eve of Convention, " The Washington Post, August 25, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Senator Bars Race; Smathers For HHH, " The Washington Post, August 26, 1968.

Broder, David 8. "McCarthy Agrees His Defeat Is Likely, " The Washington Post, August 27, 1968.

Broder, David S, "Daley Delays Candidate Choice, " The Washington Post, August 25, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Humphrey Wins Nomination for Presidency on First Ballot, " The Washington Post, August 29, 1968. Broder, David S. "Hangover in Chic^o, " The Washington Post, A i^ust 29, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Poking in Debris of Convention Turns Up Hope For the Party, " The Washington Post, August 30, 1968, 104

Broder, David S. "Political Lineup Pits Weaknesses, " The Washii^on Post, August 30, 1968,

Broder, David S. "Early Analysis Gives Nixon Commanding Lead in Race, " The Washington Post, September 10, 1968.

B roder, David S. "P residential Choice Concerns Individual More Than Party, " The Washington Post, October 8, 1968,

Broder, David S. "Leaders Admit HHH Is Trailing, " The Washington Post, September 15, 1968.

Broder, David S. "HHH Heckled in Mich. Foray; Retreats on Troops, " The Washington Post, September 12, 1968,

Broder, David 8. "Cheerfulness and Loose Tongue Are Hurting HHH in Campaign, " The Washington Post, September 17, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Muskie's Campaign Restores Faith in Vitality of Liberalism, " The Washington Post, October 29, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Four Days on TraÜ of Two Candidates, " The Washington Post, October 27, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Sees Rival Camps In Dixie Deal, " The Washington Post, September 17, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Tops HHH In Philadelphia, " The Washington Post, September 20, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Pledges Help In Wiping Out Slums, " The Washington Post, September 21, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Becomes Avid Backer of Humphrey in the South," The Washington Post, September 22, 1968.

B roder, David S. "Nixon Within 24 Votes—as of Today, " The Washington Post, October 6, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Western States Unaroused By Larger Campaign Issues," The Washington Post, October 15, 1968. 105

Broder, David S. '"Do(%e Rebellion' Girl Says Her 6th Sense Picks Wsdlace, ".The Washington Post, October 20, 1968.

Broder, David S. "The Impact, " The Washington Post, November 1, 1968.

Broder, David 8. "Only Nixon Can Win It, " The Washington Post, November 3, 1968.

Broder, David S. "As Another Campaign Ends, Some Memories Linger, " The Washington Post, November 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon, HHH in Close Race, " The Washington Post, November 6, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nixon Wins With 290 Electoral Votes; Humphrey Joins Him in Call for Unity, " The Washington Post, November 7, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Profile of Hoosier County, " The Washington Post, May 5, 1968.

Broder, David S. "Nothing Vital Lost in Election Costing So Much in Men, Money, " The Washington Post, November 10, 1968.