Civil Rights and the Primary Election of 1964 in Indiana: The Wallace Challenge* Matthew E. Welsh** In the spring of 1964 Democratic Governor George Corley Wallace of Alabama announced that he was going to campaign for the presidency of the United States, opposing President Lyndon B. Johnson, also a Democrat. Wallace had become a national figure by defying the United States Supreme Court in refusing admission of Negro students to the University of Ala- bama, and his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomi- nation had obvious overtones of racial intolerance which I found most disturbing. Indiana had come a long way since the adoption of its Constitution of 1851, Article XI11 of which barred Negroes and mulattoes from entering the state. At that time blacks already living in the state, many of whom had been born here, were not regarded as citizens. They could neither vote nor hold public office. They could not serve on juries or in the militia, and they were barred from public schools.' Article XI11 was voided by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1866. The General Assembly authorized school integration in 1877, prohibited discrimination in enjoyment of public accommodations in 1885, and in 1963 created the Indiana Civil Rights Commission with broad pow- ers and an adequate budget.2 The record also disclosed, how- ever, that the statewide referendum in 1936 approving amend- ment of the Constitution to permit Negroes to be members of * This article is an account of the 1964 primary election in Indiana as experienced and remembered by one of the major participants in the campaign. The account was written several years after the events occurred and was edited additional years later. Specific reference to newspaper clippings and personal correspondence was not always possible. ** Matthew E. Welsh, a Democrat, served as the forty-first governor of Indiana from 1961 to 1965. * Emma Lou Thornbrough, The Negro in Indiana before 1900: A Study of a Minority (Indiana Historical Collections, Vol. XXXVII; Indianapolis, 1957), 31. 21bid., 206, 329, 259-60. 2 Indiana Magazine of History the Indiana National Guard was very close (426,031 to 398,201, a majority of only 27,830Y and that the Ku Klux Klan had allegedly seized control of the state Republican party for a while in the 1920s. Obviously, Wallace felt Indiana might well be most receptive to his racially oriented program. What particularly concerned me was the impact a large Wallace vote would have on the people of Indiana-on their perception of themselves. I felt very strongly that a powerful showing by Wallace would surely affect-adversely-the polit- ical and social climate of Indiana, perhaps for a generation, as it would revive and give credence to a racist philosophy my administration had worked very hard to def~se.~The future could only be viewed with foreboding if Wallace should carry the state, and such a victory might well have national implica- tions. President Lyndon B. Johnson did not ask me to run against Wallace in the Indiana primary in 1964. He did not have to. I felt it was Indiana’s problem-not his. It was a problem that we had to meet and resolve ourselves, and I thought that it was my responsibility as governor to lead the attack. It was against this background that the decision was made to oppose the Wallace campaign for Indiana’s delegates to the 1964 Democratic National Convention. This is the story of what was done to meet the challenge. It is the basis for one chapter of my book, Statehouse Indiana, 1961-1965.5 Constitution of Indiana as Amended (Indianapolis, 1962), [ 13-14111. 4 The extent of discrimination in Indiana and the Midwest was a continu- ing surprise to me. For example, during the 1960 campaign I discovered that black families traveling through the state frequently had great difficulty in finding restaurants or public restrooms that they could use. In another incident my campaign staff had arranged for me and my “road show” to stay overnight at the Brown Hotel in Louisville after a television program there. At the time the reservations were confirmed, the hotel was advised that one member of the party, Ollie Miller, our cameraman, was black; and we were told that this would not be a problem. However, when we attempted to register, he was refused. After some argument I finally told the desk that since I had a twin-bed room, he would stay with me, and only on that basis was he permitted to stay. To avoid further confrontations we ordered breakfast in our room next morn- ing. When it was delivered, I was shaving, and the black waiter, seeing only Ollie, excitedly exclaimed: “Man, you better get out of here!” Such was the temper of the times. Statehouse Indiana, 1962-1965, by Matthew E. Welsh, is a forthcoming publication of the Indiana Historical Bureau, Indianapolis. Civil Rights and the Primary Election of 1964 3 In the late evening of March 30, 1964, Indiana Secretary of State Charles 0. Hendricks called a news conference and told reporters that all prospective candidates for the presidential preference primary in Indiana would be certified to the ballot. The way was thus cleared for Governor George Corley Wallace of Alabama to take the second step in his national campaign to “shake the eyeteeth of the liberals” in America. Wallace would be joined on Indiana’s Democratic ballot by me, as stand-in for President Lyndon B. Johnson; John Hugh Latham, a retired construction worker from Rockville, who advocated that only white and American Indian voters be allowed at the polls; Lar Daly, the madcap showman from East Chicago, who cam- paigned in an Uncle Sam suit; and Mrs. Faye (Fifi) Carpenter- Swain, a Cincinnati housewife, who popped up occasionally at elections, clad in wildly colorful garb, wearing a wristwatch on an ankle, and dispensing jelly beans by the handful. The less cluttered and more sedate Republican ballot would list Senator Barry Goldwater and Harold Stassen as adversaries. Frank Beckwith, Indianapolis, and Joseph G. Ettl, South Bend, both lawyers, also were certified to the GOP lineup.’ The next day, March 31, Edward H. Ziegner wrote in the Indianapolis News: All that may be proved in Indiana’s May 5 presidential preference primary is that getting on the ballot involves little more than filling out an application blank. Secretary of State Charles 0. Hendricks yesterday certified five Democrats and four Republicans for the presidential ballot, ignoring evidence presented before the State Election Board that some petitions bore false signatures. Hendricks told reporters, before he made his decision, that the signatures on one petition weren’t even legible.’ The Democratic leadership in Indiana had never doubted that Wallace would be admitted to the ballot in the Hoosier state, and our plans for a vigorous campaign already were underway. We had first become aroused by the Wallace foray into northern primaries when his progress in Wisconsin brought national attention. In mid-March we had learned that Wallace definitely would enter the Indiana primary. All my advisers agreed with me that it was essential we meet the challenge head on, but not all agreed that I should become directly involved. ‘The story of the Wallace campaign was written with the help of Jim McManus, who was my news aide all during the last year of my administration and who was personally in the thick of this fight. I am deeply indebted to him for his able and dedicated support then and his assistance with this chapter. ‘ Indianapolis News, March 31, 1964, p. 20. 4 Indiana Magazine of History On March 20 I conferred in Washington with Senators R. Vance Hartke and Birch E. Bayh, Jr., and other members of the Indiana congressional delegation. Both senators agreed that the Wallace presence in Indiana could do serious mischief and that we must not underestimate his potential vote, especially in the steel towns in the Calumet Region. Both men, however, declined to enter the race as a “favor- ite son” or stand-in candidate for President Johnson, who had previously announced that he would not enter any primary contests. It seemed to me that we could not risk running a relatively unknown Democrat, someone without a statewide constituency, who might actually lose the election. Nor could we reasonably expect even the venerated name of Governor Henry F. Schricker to stand alone against the political winds of the Wallace candidacy without a strenuous campaign.3 I held no illusions about my own personal popularity at the polls after the tax battles of the year bef~re.~But it also weighed heavily in my thinking that Wallace, outside of his overt segregationist policies, embodied the same conspiratorial view of our federal government, the same “know-nothing” poli- tics that had been prevalent in Indiana for so many years. My administration had begun with a victory over that kind of politics; I didn’t wish to end the four years with a loss to the same foe. So, at the end of my meeting with the two senators, I made the decision to become the president’s stand-in on the Indiana primary ballot in 1964. We then gathered together a group of Indiana Democrats who were in Washington, including congressmen and several party officials, called in newsmen, and told them what was going on. From that moment we were committed to a campaign that was to become one of the most intensive political efforts of our experience. At the Indiana statehouse Jack L. New, my executive sec- retary, received the news of my decision by telephone and directed Jim McManus, my news aide, to issue an immediate statement to local newsmen.