International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371

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International Journal of Intercultural Relations

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijintrel

A critique of critical acculturation

John W. Berry

Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Article history: This critique is divided into three sections. The first section is a review of my positions on Accepted 16 June 2009 three core issues regarding the nature of the human sciences (particularly cross-cultural and acculturation psychology) that have been raised throughout these articles. Knowledge Keywords: of these positions is essential background to understanding my comments in the second Knowledge section. In the second section are some comments on specific claims and assertions about Understanding my work that have been made in the articles. I believe that many of these assertions do not Human science represent my views, nor my empirical research, on acculturation. Of necessity, I have had to select certain themes among all of these assertions. Although the special issue is a critique of acculturation theory and research in general, the majority of the comments are addressed to my work in the area. Hence, I have concentrated on criticisms directed at my own work, rather than attempting to address the field as a whole. However, my comments likely have more general import for the field of acculturation psychology as a whole. I invite readers to consider these very contrasting sets of views about how we are to understand individual human beings within the context of cultures, and of culture contact and change. A third section returns to some of the basic issues regarding the nature of the scientific enterprise. I advocate a dual approach, accepting both the natural sciences and cultural sciences ways of advancing our knowledge of human behaviour in context. I argue that dismissing the positivist traditions of the natural sciences, and replacing them with social constructionist concepts and methods is a regressive step in our search to improve our understanding of acculturation. Moreover, I have found little in these articles that advances our knowledge of acculturation, or our potential for making applications for the betterment of acculturating individuals and groups. ß 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The opportunity to reply to these articles is very much appreciated. This reply is divided into three sections. The first section is a review of my positions on three core issues regarding the nature of the human sciences (particularly cross- cultural and acculturation psychology) that have been raised throughout these articles. Knowledge of these positions is essential background to understanding my comments in the second section. In the second section are some comments on specific claims and assertions about my work that have been made in the articles. I believe that many of these assertions do not represent my views, nor my empirical research, on acculturation. Of necessity, I have had to select certain themes among all of these assertions. Although the special issue is a critique of acculturation theory and research in general, the majority of the comments are addressed to my work in the area. Hence, I have concentrated on criticisms directed at my own work, rather than attempting to address the field as a whole. However, my comments likely have more general import for the field

E-mail address: [email protected].

0147-1767/$ – see front matter ß 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2009.06.003 362 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 of acculturation psychology as a whole. I invite readers to consider these very contrasting sets of views about how we are to understand individual human beings within the context of cultures, and of culture contact and change. A third section returns to some of the basic issues regarding the nature of the scientific enterprise. I advocate a dual approach, accepting both the natural sciences and cultural sciences ways of advancing our knowledge of human behaviour in context. I argue that dismissing the positivist traditions of the natural sciences, and replacing them with social constructionist concepts and methods is a regressive step in our search to improve our understanding of acculturation. Moreover, I have found little in these articles that advances our knowledge of acculturation, or our potential for making applications for the betterment of acculturating individuals and groups. I begin with a well-known quote: ‘‘There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so’’. (Shakespeare; Hamlet, Act II, scene ii). There are two reasons for using this quote. If we replace ‘good’ with ‘true’, the following two statements can be generated:

– All things are true if one thinks they are; there is no need for an empirical referent in the outside world. This remark is directed at the recent advent of the social constructivist perspective in anthropology and psychology. – Numerous assertions about my views are made in the various articles; simply saying and repeating them does not make them true. This remark is directed at the serious lack of evidence provided by many of the authors to substantiate their assertions.

2. Nature of the human sciences

There are three fundamental issues where my views about the human sciences differ from those underlying these articles. First is the character of scientific enquiry in the human sciences generally. The second is the comparative study of human behaviour in cultural context (i.e., cross-cultural psychology). And the third is the study of how individuals work through the process of adapting to a life in a new society (i.e., acculturation psychology).

2.1. Cross-cultural psychology

Here are two propositions:

– Human beings are part of the natural world; as members of a single species, we share basic psychological processes and capacities. These commonalities allow for intercultural understanding, and for making comparisons. One task for psychology is to search for these commonalities, as part of our search for an understanding of our common humanity. – Human beings are part of the cultural world; we make various cultures, and are shaped by these cultures. One task for psychology is to sample these variations in order to appreciate our magnificent variety; another task is to employ them in comparative research in our search for our common humanity.

My claim is that both propositions are true. However, my reading of the main arguments in the articles in this special issue indicates that the authors consider only one (the second proposition) to be true. For example, Chirkov comments (p. 97): ‘‘Thus, the process of acculturation could be addressed from two different philosophical positions. Researchers could apply a naturalistic approach position and analyze acculturation as a natural science phenomenon trying to explain it through discovering and applying universal covering laws of acculturation and then predicting future outcomes of this process. Or researchers could look at acculturation through the prism of the interpretative social sciences and focus on the dynamics of the changes in the intersubjective meanings of various culturally constructed realities and study individuals’ intrasubjective meanings that immigrants assign to their actions in a new country’’ (emphasis on Or added). In my view, this ‘either/or’ position seriously limits the possibility of attaining a comprehensive knowledge of the processes and outcomes of acculturation. My position is that the use of approaches from both the natural and cultural traditions of research should be used in research on acculturation. The advantage of employing both approaches is that it allows for comparative work (based on our common membership in one species), and for work that focuses on the individual within the nexus of a single culture. This joint approach can be based on three sets of ideas drawn from the field of cross-cultural psychology. In taking this dual stance, I follow in the footsteps of Donald Campbell who advocated using concepts and methods drawn from both traditions. In editing Campbell’s collected papers, Overman (1988, pp. xviii, xix) notes that in many of his works, Campbell sought: ‘‘to reconcile differences between the quantitative tradition and all it stands for and the qualitative tradition and all it stands for. The dominant characteristic of these essays is Campbell’s ability to weave a path, not just between quantitative and qualitative knowing, but also between the goal of objectivity and ontological nihilism, between the empirical-behaviourist expectation and the solipsism of phenomenal absolutism. His success depends on our willingness not to be wedded to choosing between the two sets of beliefs, but being able to recognize and operationalize an intermediate position ...Donald Campbell is most notable over his long career as a social science researcher and theorist to synthesize and reconcile these opposing perspectives’’. J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 363

More recently, others have taken this dual stance. For example, Fry (1996) has advocated a ‘multicultural approach’ to the philosophy of science, in which both positions (‘cultures’) are seen as part of a larger frame for engaging in social science theorizing and research. And Glynos and Howarth (2007, p. 1) note that starting with Bernstein (1976) and continuing to the present, while ‘‘the dominant view [is] that social and political theorists ought to distinguish and then choose between explanation, interpretation and critique, [Bernstein] optimistically advocates their dialectical integration for any theoretical approach worth its salt’’. In my view, it makes no sense to advocate for one perspective, and to dismiss the other, as is done in this special issue.

2.1.1. Nature of culture A core question in cross-cultural psychology is the nature of culture. This issue has three aspects: what is culture; where is culture, and how can it be accessed? With respect to the first question, I accept that the claims for culture to be both concrete and symbolic to be valid. The longstanding view in anthropology that cultures exist concretely and are available for observation was challenged in the 1970s by Geertz (1973) who saw ‘‘culture in the mind of the people’’, as ‘‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols’’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 89), and as ‘‘a conceptual structure or system of ideas’’ (Geertz, 1984, p. 8). However, a dual approach has been advocated by D’Andrade (1995, p. 212) who defined ‘‘... culture as the entire social heritage of a group, including material culture and external structures, learned actions, and mental representations of many kinds ...’’. That is, culture is made up of socially shared concrete features (artefacts and institutions) as well as abstract features (representations of these concrete aspects and symbols). This dual approach, which I also advocate, has informed much of recent work in cross-cultural psychology. With respect to the second question (but related to the first), does culture have a separate existence as a quality of collectivities and groups; and does it reside in the psychological makeup of individuals? Is culture to be conceptualized: as an independent variable (having an existence outside any particular individual): as an organismic variable (internalized as part of an individual’s psychological makeup); or with some combined status? In my work with the ecocultural framework, my answer (Berry, 2000) is that it is both. That is, cultures exist as shared features of groups prior to the presence of any particular new members (be they neonates or immigrants). In a sense, cultures are ‘‘lying in wait’’ for individuals to come along, and become participants in the process of cultural transmission from cultural communities to individuals (Berry & Georgas, 2008). To justify the view that there are two levels to be considered, it is helpful to recall the argument (Kroeber, 1917)that culture is superorganic, ‘super’ meaning above and beyond, and ‘organic’ referring to its individual biological and psychological bases. Two arguments were presented by Kroeber for the independent existence of culture, at its own collective level. First, particular individuals come and go, but cultures remain more or less stable. This is a remarkable phenomenon; despite a large turnover in membership with each new generation, cultures and their institutions remain relatively stable. Thus, a culture does not depend on particular individuals for its existence, but has a life of its own at the collective level of the group. The second argument is that no single individual knows or possesses all of the culture of the group to which one belongs; the culture as a whole is carried by the collectivity, and indeed is likely to be beyond the biological or psychological capacity (to know or to do) of any single person in the group. For example, no single person knows all the laws, political institutions and economic structures that constitute even this limited sector of one’s culture. For both these reasons, Kroeber considered that cultural phenomena are collective phenomena, above and beyond the individual person, and hence his term superorganic. This position is an important one for cross-cultural psychology since it permits us to employ the group–individual distinction in attempting to link the two, and possibly to trace the influence of cultural factors on individual psychological development. Hence, I consider that culture is, in important ways, an independent variable (or more accurately, a complex set of inter-related independent variables). However, from the ecocultural perspective the processes of cultural transmission and acculturation lead to the incorporation of features of culture as part of the individual; hence culture also becomes an organismic variable, part of the psychological makeup of every person. It is simultaneously outside and inside the individual. Being both ‘‘out there’’ and ‘‘in here’’ (Berry, 2000) the interactive, mutually influencing, character of culture–behaviour relationships becomes manifest. With respect to the third question, can culture be accessed by anthropological research methods that have been used for hundreds of years, such as observation, and asking questions of individual members and key informants? The ethnographic enterprise has used these methods to great advantage, and cross-cultural psychology has adopted them to our own advantage. Numerous textbooks (e.g., Ember, Ember, & Peregrine, 2007), essays (e.g., Hunt, 2007), archives (e.g., Human Relations Area Files), and thousands of culture-specific ethnographies attest to the important accumulation of cultural knowledge about peoples of the world, and to their comparative examination. In my view, these approaches (which are broadly within the positivist tradition, since they accept the reality of the object of study) should not be dismissed entirely and replaced by the more recent interpretive approaches. Again, I assert that both approaches to studying culture can and should be used, to the advantage of our field. The metaphor used by Pike (1967) to advocate the joint use of emic and etic approaches to cultural, linguistic and psychological phenomena is compelling Berry, 1999a). The dual use of the two ways of examining a phenomenon corresponds to using a pair of binoculars: using both eyes provides perspective on what is being observed. 364 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371

2.1.2. Absolutism, relativism, and universalism Three theoretical positions have been outlined in cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002): absolutism, relativism and universalism. Absolutism holds that human beings are qualitatively and fundamentally the same the world over, and are can be understood without having regard to the cultures into which they have been enculturated. Concepts of, and assessments of, psychological qualities need not take cultural features into account. Claims that ‘intelligence is intelligence’, and ‘depression is depression’ are held to be absolutes, and they can be understood, measured and compared without cultural constraints (e.g., Lynn, 2006). In sharp contrast, relativism considers human behaviour to be sofundamentallyentwinedwith,andaproductofculturesthatnocommonpsychologicalconceptsormeasuresofthem can be valid, nor is it possible to make comparisons across cultures. The universalist perspective asserts that all human societies exhibit commonalities (‘‘cultural universals’’), and that all individual human beings possess basic psychological processes (‘‘psychological universals’’). These psychological processes are shared, species-common characteristics of all human beings on which cultures play infinite variations during the course of developmentand daily activity. Since cultural variations are the verystartingpointfor thesearch for underlying similarities, it is clearly different from absolutism, which denies any important role for culture. Universalism is the position that I espouse for both cross-cultural and acculturation psychology. With respect to cultural universals, what is the evidence for their existence? In our cognate disciplines of anthropology (e.g., Murdock, 1975), sociology (e.g., Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, 1950), and linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 2000) there is substantial evidence that groups everywhere possess shared sociocultural attributes. For example, all peoples have tools, social structures (e.g., norms and roles), social institutions (e.g., marriage and justice) and languages. It is also evident that such underlying commonalities are expressed by cultural groups in vastly different ways from one time and place to another. That is, common processes become developed and expressed differentially across cultural groups. There is parallel evidence, at the psychological level, for both underlying similarity and surface variation (Berry et al., 1997). For example, all individuals have the basic processes needed to develop, learn and perform speech, technology, role playing and norm observance. I know of no studies that reveal the absence of any basic psychological process in any cultural group. Even with the existence of these common processes, there are obviously vast group and individual differences in their development, and in the way of expressing these shared underlying processes. My own position is that of universalism, which is a vantage point that allows consideration of both cultural uniqueness and similarity at different levels. It also allows for the comparative integration of psychological phenomena across cultural communities.

2.1.3. Process, competence, and performance Another second set of concepts that is relevant to our discussion is a threefold distinction among: psychological processes or capacities (which are posited to be shared features of all human beings); the development of competence (which are posited to be variable across individuals and cultures); and the appearance of performance (which are also posited to be variable across individuals and cultures). Processes are those psychological features of individuals that are the fundamental ways in which people deal with their day-to-day experiences, such as perception, learning, and categorization. Competencies are those features of individuals that develop with cultural experience, such as abilities, attitudes and values. They are developed on the basis of the interaction between the basic underlying processes and peoples’ encounters with the outside world. Performances are those activities of individuals that are expressed as behaviour, such as skilled work, carrying out projects, or engaging in political action. Performances are those expressions of competencies that are appropriate to, or are triggered by, the need to act in a suitable way in a particular context. The actual performance will depend, not only on the competence, but also on a host of situational factors. For example, all individuals have the basic processes required to learn a language (or multiple languages). Which language(s) will be learned (competencies) depends on the cultural context in which the individual develops. And in a situation where there is a choice of language, the performance will depend on the language of the interlocutor, and the requirement to speak a particular language in any specific situation (such as at work, or in one’s cultural community). Understanding these three psychological phenomena is a prerequisite for interpreting the theoretical position of universalism. We can only actually observe performances, in all their variety, in all their cultural and intercultural contexts. Competencies can only be inferred from patterns of regularities in these performances (whether exhibited in naturalistic settings, or under controlled test conditions). And, most removed from observable human behaviour are the underlying processes; these also require the making of inferences from these patterns. In my view, the goal of science is the generation of the most parsimonious explanations for observable events. It is thus important to keep up the search for the underlying regularities (psychological universals) that are likely hidden beneath the culturally patterned behavioural variability.

2.2. Acculturation psychology

Many of the critical comments made in this special issue refer to my approach to acculturation, particularly to a lack of attention to culture (at least as defined by the critics who accept the interpretive version). This section reiterates two basic frameworks that have guided my work on acculturation psychology. More details of these frameworks can be found in Berry (2005). J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 365

Fig. 1. General acculturation framework showing cultural-level and psychological-level components, and the flow among them (Berry, 2003).

2.2.1. Cultural and psychological levels In keeping with the cultural/psychological distinction made above for cross-cultural psychology, I argue that there are the same two levels to research on acculturation. The framework in Fig. 1 shows these two main domains of research (Berry, 2003). The rationale for this distinction in acculturation psychology is that individuals who share a common cultural heritage, or who are settled into a common society, do not necessarily experience, navigate or adapt to acculturation the same way. That is, there are usually vast individual differences across individuals who share cultures and societies. This framework outlines and links cultural and psychological acculturation, and identifies the two (or more) groups in contact. It provides a map of those phenomena which I believe need to be conceptualized and measured during acculturation research. At the cultural level of enquiry (on the left) we need to understand key features of the two (or more) original cultural groups prior to their major contact. It is essential to understand these pre-contact qualities of the groups that are now attempting to live together following migration. Migrants bring cultural and psychological qualities with them to the new society; and the new society also has a variety of such qualities. The compatibility (or incompatibility) in religion, values, attitudes, personality (etc.) between the two cultural communities in contact needs to be examined as a basis for understanding the acculturation process that is set in motion. It is also important to understand the nature of their contact relationships (left and centre). It may be one of the domination of one group over the other, or of mutual respect or of hostility; all kinds of relationship, ranging from positive to negative, are possible. Finally at the cultural level, we need to understand the resulting cultural changes in both groups that emerge during the process of acculturation. No cultural group remains unchanged following culture contact; acculturation is a two-way interaction, resulting in actions and reactions to the contact situation. In many cases, most change takes place in non-dominant communities; however, all societies of settlement (particularly their metropolitan cities) have experienced massive transformations following years of receiving immigrants. These changes can be minor or substantial, and range from being easily accomplished through to being a source of major cultural disruption. The gathering of this information requires extensive ethnographic, community-level work, using methods derived from hundreds of years of research in cultural and social anthropology. These may employ methods based on the concepts of culture outlined earlier: that is, culture is both ‘out there’ and pre-existing, and ‘in here’ and created during social interaction. At the individual psychological level (Graves, 1967), we need to consider the psychological changes that individuals in all groups undergo, and their eventual adaptation to their new situations. Identifying these changes requires sampling a population and studying individuals who are variably involved in the process of acculturation. These behavioural changes can be a set of rather easily accomplished behavioural shifts (e.g., in ways of speaking, dressing, and eating) or they can be more problematic, producing acculturative stress as manifested by uncertainty, anxiety, and depression (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987). As noted above, most research on acculturation (e.g., Sam & Berry, 2006) reveals large individual differences in these shift and stress phenomena. Similarly, research on the various forms of adaptation (psychological and sociocultural; Ward, 1996) usually reveals a large range of individual differences. A key task of acculturation psychology is to understand the links between the cultural and psychological sets of information, as well as within these sets, for example how behavioural shifts relate to the sociocultural adaptation. In my view, if these cultural and psychological concepts were not distinguished and assessed independently, it would be very difficult to obtain a clear picture of the process and outcomes of the acculturation process. 366 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371

Fig. 2. Acculturation strategies in ethnocultural groups, and in the larger society.

2.2.2. Acculturation strategies The concept of acculturation strategies refers to the various ways that groups and individuals seek to acculturate. Knowledge of these variations has increased substantially in recent years (see Berry, 2003; Sam & Berry, 2006), challenging the assumption that everyone would assimilate and become absorbed into the dominant group (Gordon, 1964). At the cultural level, the two groups in contact (whether dominant or non-dominant) usually have some notion about what they are attempting to do (such as colonial policies, or reasons for migrating). At the individual level, persons will vary within their cultural group (e.g., on the basis of their educational or occupational background); and within their families, persons will vary according to their gender or position (e.g., mother and son). The more immediate outcomes of the acculturation process (including the behaviour changes and acculturative stress phenomena) are now known to be a function, at least to some extent, of what people try to do during their acculturation (i.e., their acculturation strategies). These strategies continue during the process of acculturation, and vary over time with acculturation experiences (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006, Fig. 4.18; Ho, 1995). And the longer term outcomes (both psychological and sociocultural adaptations) often correspond to the strategic goals set by individuals and by the groups of which they are members (Berry, 1997; Berry & Sam, 1997). Initially, attitudes towards various ways to acculturate were assessed (Berry, 1970). Later work (e.g., Berry et al., 2006) incorporated other psychological features (such as cultural identities, language, social behaviours and motivations) along with attitudes, leading to the more comprehensive concept of acculturation strategies. In all this work, four ways of acculturating were derived from two basic issues facing acculturating peoples. These issues are based on the distinction between orientations towards one’s own group, and those towards other groups (Berry, 1974, 1980). This distinction is rendered as (i) a relative preference for maintaining one’s heritage culture and identity and (ii) a relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups. It has now been well demonstrated that these two dimensions are empirically, as well as conceptually, independent from each other (e.g., Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Sabatier & Berry, 2008). This two dimensional formulation is presented in Fig. 2, for specific ethnocultural groups and individuals (on the left) and for the larger society and individuals (on the right). These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, shown as varying along bipolar dimensions, rather than as bald (positive or negative) alternatives. Orientations to these issues intersect to define four acculturation strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which group is being considered. From the point of view of specific ethnocultural groups (on the left of Fig. 2), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining ones original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, integration is the strategy. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger social network. Integration may take various forms, including alternation between cultural ways, and a merging of them (Berry, 2008). Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then marginalization is defined. Note that integration has a very specific meaning within this framework: it is clearly different from assimilation (because there is substantial cultural maintenance with integration), and it is not a generic term referring to any kind of long term presence, or involvement, of an immigrant group in a society of settlement (Berry, 2007). The assessment of these acculturation strategies are now a core J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 367 feature of acculturation research (e.g., Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Chirkov, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), and variations in them have been related to variations in both acculturation experience and to adaptation (e.g., Berry et al., 2006). These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the specific ethnocultural groups. However, the original anthropological definition clearly established that both groups in contact would change and become acculturated. Hence, in 1974 a third dimension was added: that of the powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation would take place (Berry, 1974, 1980). The addition of this third dimension produces the right side of Fig. 2. Assimilation when sought by the dominant group is termed the melting pot. When separation is forced by the dominant group it is segregation. Marginalization, when imposed by the dominant group it is exclusion. Finally, integration, when diversity is a widely accepted feature of the society as a whole, including by all the various ethnocultural groups, it is called multiculturalism. Integration can only be chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity (i.e., when there is widespread acceptance of a multicultural ideology; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977). Thus a mutual accommodation is required for integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This strategy requires non- dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (e.g., education, health, and labour) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society. This position is now widely promoted by various countries (e.g., European Union, 2005; Government of Canada, 1971); every group and every individual, is expected to give a bit in order to achieve a win–win intercultural situation in contemporary plural societies. With the use of this dual framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their groups, and between specific ethnocultural groups and the larger society within which they are acculturating. Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are common sources of difficulty for those experiencing acculturation (Bourhis, Moise, Perrault, & Senecal,1997; Navas et al., 2005). For example this can occur when individuals in the larger society do not accept the main ideology of their society (such as when individuals oppose immigrant cultural maintenance in a society where multiculturalism is official policy), or when immigrant children challenge the way of acculturating set out by their parents. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, we observe the phenomenon of acculturative stress, with variations in levels of adaptation. The presentation of these strategies for the non-dominant group has been based on the assumption that non-dominant groups and their individual members have the freedom to choose how they want to behave during their acculturation. This, of course, is not always the case; the preferences (attitudes) of individuals do not always become expressed in their actual behaviour. Thus, in addition to attitudes, researchers usually also assess behaviours in the same domains as their attitudes (for example, the preferences and actual behaviours for, food eaten, language used, religion, and family relationships). There is always less than a perfect relationship between acculturation attitudes and behaviours (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), just as in the case of any other areas of life. As noted above, the combination of acculturation attitudes and behaviours has been termed acculturation strategies.

3. Critical comments on articles

Based on these general observations about cross-cultural and acculturation psychology, and the portrayal of my positions on them, I now turn to comments on some specific issues raised in the articles in this special issue. In the opening sentence of the concluding article, Chirkov refers (on p. 177) to the ‘‘reflections and opinions’’ presented in the special issue. In this characterization of the material as opinions I strongly agree. As foreshadowed in the opening quotation from Hamlet, thinking (or saying or writing) something does not necessarily make it true.

3.1. Coherence of articles

One would expect that the articles in a special issue of a journal on a single topic would present a coherent picture of the topic being addressed. At the very least there is an expectation of editorial comment on the differences across the articles. Instead, the editor seems to have been unconcerned with disparities and inconsistencies among authors, preferring to summarize only the communalities in the concluding article (as well as in the introduction and the first article). For example, most articles in the special issue advocate the ‘interpretive’ or ‘constructivist’ approach to acculturation rather than following the ‘positivist’ approach that is currently the dominant one (articles by Chirkov, Bhatia and Ram, Cresswell, Waldram). However, two articles (e.g., Rudmin, Weinreich) do adopt a strict psychometric approach, which has its roots in the positivistic tradition. No comment on this disparity is made, and hence no proposal is made to advocate the path forward using both interpretive and positivist approaches together. Are we to develop the field of acculturation psychology in two mutually inconsistent directions? There is frequent criticism of mechanistic linear models of the process of acculturation in the articles. For example, Tardif- Williams and Fisher (p. 150) argue that acculturation is a ‘‘dynamic and complex process ... (that is) ... a dialogic, relationally constituted, and continually negotiated (unfinalizable) process’’. Despite this emphasis on complexity and interaction, there is yet another mechanistic model produced by Rudmin (p. 117, Fig. 2). And Weinreich presents a highly mechanistic computerized procedure to assess cultural identities, but exactly how it works in practice is not easy to 368 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 understand, since access is limited to those who have enough money to buy into his scheme. Neither of these mechanistic models is criticized by the editor nor by any of the authors in the special issue.

3.2. What is universalism?

The understanding of the position of universalism (as articulated above) is misrepresented in the special issue. It appears that the differences between the positions of absolutism and universalism are not understood. For example, the phrase ‘law of acculturation’ was used with quotation marks (by Chirkov, p. 100, footnote 2) in commenting on our research with immigrant youth (Berry et al., 2006). We do not use this phrase (as implied by the quotation marks), nor would I. The search for pan-human regularities is very much a goal of comparative research on acculturation, but such acculturation universals have not been attained as yet. And, when they are attained, in keeping with the position of universalism, they will only be accompanied by important qualifications by various cultural, social and economic factors.

3.3. What and where is culture?

Throughout the volume, there are claims that there is not enough attention paid to ‘culture’ in acculturation research (at least as defined by the current ‘interpretive’ approaches; see Waldram article). For example, Chirkov (p. 95) argues: ‘‘My second thesis is that there is no attention given to culture in acculturation research ...’’ (emphasis on no added). He further asserts that most research is guilty of: ‘‘ignoring/omitting/skipping the descriptive phase of scientific research’’. This sequence is exactly the one that I have proposed and advocated (Berry, 1989) and that is used by many cross-cultural psychologists: emic and etic approaches are both necessary and complementary (Berry, 1999a). As noted earlier, Pike (1967) argued that having these two perspectives on cultural and psychological phenomena is like having binocular vision: perspective is gained by having two different points of view. Even a cursory examination of my general acculturation framework (Fig. 1) would reveal that this joint examination of cultural and psychological acculturation phenomena is exactly what I have been proposing, and doing, for years. The first research activity is to carry out the ethnographic research with the cultures (left side of the figure); only then is it possible to develop psychological research procedures and instruments to examine the individual level phenomena (right side of the figure). In my own research on acculturation with indigenous peoples, I have carried out these initial ethnographic studies, using concepts and methods inherited from cultural anthropologists. In fact much of my work on acculturation has been carried out by a team, in which there has usually been an anthropologist member (see Berry, 1976; Berry et al., 1986; Mishra & Berry, 2008; Mishra, Sinha, & Berry, 1996). And in my research with immigrant, refugee and sojourner groups, almost always the work has been carried out in collaboration with members of the relevant ethnocultural community (Ataca & Berry, 2002; Aycan & Berry, 1996; Kim & Berry, 1985; Krishnan & Berry, 1992; Kwak & Berry, 2001; Sands & Berry, 1993; Zheng & Berry, 1991). The immigrant youth study (Berry et al., 2006) was carried out with assistants selected from the relevant ethnocultural community. Thus, in my view, the charge that culture has been ignored in the process of carrying out research on acculturation is simply not valid. It appears that the charge is that if I do not adopt an exclusively interpretive approach to culture, then I do not study culture! Moreover, the two issues underlying the acculturation strategies framework (Fig. 2) were identified during extensive ethnographic work, and are based on both key informants and open interviews at the beginning of the research projects. And the domains of concern to both groups during acculturation are similarly identified by them. The cultural issues of concern and even contention between them, such as language, heritage custom retention, and social relations can only be identified in this way. This is why, when asked (as I am frequently) for my ‘acculturation attitudes scale’, I reply that I do not have one. My position is that every acculturative arena requires initial ethnographic research to identify the domains of concern to the two groups in contact; only then can they be rendered into a reliable and valid research instrument for use with acculturating individuals.

3.4. What is acculturation?

A number of articles seek to (re)define acculturation in various ways. For example, Rudmin (p. 106) recommends that ‘‘acculturation be defined as second-culture acquisition’’. This is a return to a unidimensional, and assimilationist view of the process of acculturation; acculturation becomes simply taking on another culture (see comment on the concept of enculturation, below). It entirely ignores the complexity of the process, which necessarily involves working out how to live with and between two cultures. If acculturation is to be redefined in terms of only one culture (and in a single direction—that of culture acquisition) the core meaning of the concept will be lost. A second example is the proposal by Weinreich (p. 125) that acculturation be (re)defined as enculturation. In my view, as long as individuals are involved in two distinguishable cultural groups in contact, then acculturation (not simply enculturation) processes will be involved. This is because enculturation is a process of becoming a competent member of, and identifying with, one particular culture (Berry, 2007). In culture contact situations, this would involve an individual in two enculturation processes; this is precisely what is portrayed in my cultural transmission framework (Berry et al., 2002, Fig. 2.1), which Weinreich seems to have missed. As explained in the accompanying text, when there is such double enculturation, the phenomenon is appropriately termed acculturation. The interplay between the two concepts (see my J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 369 discussion of cultural transmission; Berry, 2007, p. 546) is complex; however, the central criterion is whether one or two cultures are being transmitted. If the situation involves two cultures, then it fits the longstanding meaning of acculturation. There is an assertion by Weinreich (p. 125) that I assume that in acculturation settings ‘‘both the dominant and heritage cultures are benign and congenial ...(and that) .... These assumptions reflect an implicit ideology that cultures are benign for all-comers’’. Similarly Bhatia and Ram (p. 148) claim that my framework ‘‘implicitly assumes that both the majority and minority cultures have equal status and power’’. These are prime examples of the belief that simply saying something makes it true. No evidence is presented by either critic; indeed no evidence can be presented because I have never held these positions, nor have ever expressed them. On the contrary, for example in my work with Aboriginal peoples (e.g., Berry, 1999b) the key to understanding their acculturative experiences and the variable outcomes (often negative) is the existence of domination, conflict and resistance. When cultural incompatibility or conflict is present, then integration is not likely or even possible; instead other strategies (particularly separation and marginalization) are the most common ways of acculturating.

3.5. What are acculturation strategies?

Perhaps the most contentious issue addressed in the special issue is that of acculturation strategies. Rudmin has made a number of critical comments about the ways I have assessed acculturation strategies. He acknowledges that he has published these criticisms previously (2001, 2008); however, he does not acknowledge that I and my colleagues have responded to these criticisms on two occasions (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2008; Berry & Sam, 2003). Surely the norms of sound scholarship require that both sides be presented, or at least referenced. A second issue is whether acculturation strategies are really strategies in the sense that individuals actually seek out and strive toward a particular way of acculturating that suits them. For example, Cresswell (p. 163) proposes that the concept of intentionality be employed to understand an individual’s acculturation. For him, ‘‘intentionality involves actively ordering living experience. Even though raw sensational impressions are a mass of unorganized stimuli, our experience is not one of the unorganized chaos because we order it’’. As I understand this argument, he proposes that individuals are not pawns in the acculturation process, but actively decide and proceed towards a particular goal in their intercultural life. This is exactly my claim when I moved beyond assessing acculturation attitudes, to incorporating identities, behaviours and motivations in the more comprehensive notion of acculturation strategies. However, it is not clear where in our 2002 book we claim ‘‘that the notion of intentional states involves relativism, solipsism, or radical subjectivity (e.g. Berry et al., 2002) ...’’, or that ‘‘...the realist-absolutist dualism upon which the Emic–Etic distinction is made (e.g. Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998) is a false dualism ...’’ (Cresswell, p. 164). I am not sure that I understand these claims; however, I am sure that I have never stated these views! Without specific references to these attributed points of view, it is difficult to know how to deal with them. A related set of comments is made by Waldram (p. 174) when he asserts that: ‘‘...contrary to John Berry’s famous formulation, individuals do not ‘‘choose’’ a ‘‘strategy’’ for acculturation, but rather engage with the new stuff of culture as they encounter it, often without the kind of conscious scheming that Berry seems to suggest, and in ways that relate to, but are not bound to, their sense of identity and heritage’’. Again, there is no documentation for the assertions that these views have been expressed in my work; perhaps they are so ‘‘famous’’ that he can pull them out of thin air! Moreover, the contrast between these various statements regarding my concept of acculturation strategies cries out for editorial attention. What does the ‘critical approach’ really say: are acculturation strategies actively sought by ‘intentional’ acculturating individuals or they are mere pawns in the process? Consistency in the presentation of a critical perspective is missing.

3.6. Applications and future research

A charge made frequently in the volume is that there is nothing useful or applicable that can be derived from the existing body of knowledge on acculturation. However, a reading of the articles in the volume leads me to conclude that the situation is unlikely to be any better with the use of types of the research advocated here. There is a considerable amount of opinion, verbiage and speculation, and little of substance that can be used for policy or program development. My experience over the years with policy makers and public officials has convinced me that the kinds of information deriving from these more interpretive and constructivist approaches are looked upon skeptically by them. They typically want to know ‘how you know what you claim to know’; how much of the information being communicated is really valid information, based on the realities that they must deal with in their public roles, and how much is just in the researchers’ heads.

4. Conclusions

Most of the articles in this special issue take a singularly one-sided approach to acculturation psychology, with respect to concepts, methods and applications. Conceptually, they define culture in a very narrow way, based on social constructivist views about culture and behaviour, and their relationships. The contribution of the positivist conception of culture (as having an actual and concrete existence) is dismissed because it does not fit this narrow definition. Similarly, the well-established methods of positivist behavioural science, with its emphasis on reliability (reproducibility) and validity (both internal and external) are dismissed in favor of more subjective and interpretive positions (where these important issues are not typically addressed). And with respect to applications, the use of existing knowledge about psychological acculturation in the 370 J.W. Berry / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 33 (2009) 361–371 educational, health and organizational domains is entirely ignored (see Sam & Berry, 2006, part 4 on applications). This is particularly surprising because the agenda for applications outlined at the end of the issue (p. 180) is largely a repeat of concerns that already been addressed, and to some extent accomplished, by research on acculturation psychology following the positivist tradition. Finally, much of the presentation is extraordinarily polemical, often replacing what has been actually done and reported in the literature with opinion and misrepresentation, and occasionally ignoring what has been published. To repeat, simply saying so, over and over again, and without providing evidence from specific published statements, does not make an assertion true. I agree that criticism is essential for making progress in research and application. However, the articles in this issue give me little hope for the future if this exclusively social constructivist agenda is pursued. Just as the Goddess of victory challenges all athletes to excel, my challenge to these authors is ‘‘just do it’’, but better!

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