How Whitehall Planned Britain's Retreat from the Extra
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4 COO 'Britain's Crisis of Confidence': How Whitehall Planned Britain's Retreat from the extra- European World, 1959-1968. A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirementsfor the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Stirling. ROSS CHRISTIE November 2004. ýS 061 i Contents. Abstract. iv Declaration. vA Acknowledgements. vii ix List of Abbreviations. List of Tables. xiii Introduction. 1 Chapter I: The Whitehall Policy-Making Apparatus, 1959-1968. 36 Ministers and Officials. 38 The'Overseas' Departments. 42 The Creation of a Unified Ministry of Defence. 53 The Treasury and the 'Overseas' Departments. 58 The Cabinet and its Committees. 66 Summary. 70 Chapter II: The Macmillan Government's, 'Future Policy Study, 1960- 71 1970'. The International Economic Environment and Britain's World Role. 76 Resources and Overseas Expenditure. 85 The Three Circles. 95 Britain's Extra-EuropeanRole. 103 The Reaction of Ministers and Officials. 111 Summary. 117 11 Chapter III: British Policy Towards Africa, 1959-1968.119 'Africa: The Next Ten Years': A Policy Agenda for the 1960s? 121 Britain and the Continuing Problem of Apartheid. 139 An Economic Price Not Worth Paying: A Colombo-Style Plan for Africa. 143 The Ramificationsof South Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth. 147 British Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa: The View of the 'Overseas' 151 Departments. Assessing the 'Balance of Advantage' between South Africa and 155 CommonwealthAfrica. A Post-IndependencePax Britannica in East Africa? 165 'A Position of Secondary Importance Among our Interests in the World'. The 169 Labour Government'sWithdrawal from Africa: 1964-1968. Summary. 190 Chapter IV: British Policy in the Middle East, 1959-1968.192 Britain's Main Interests and Obligations in the Middle East. 194 The Decision to Act Unilaterally Against Iraq, 1961.198 A Questioning of the Kuwait Commitment? 201 South Arabia and Aden: A Seemingly Intractable Problem. 205 The Treasury's Losing Battle to end Britain's Middle East Role. 217 Michael Cary's Review of Britain's Role East of Suez, 1963.221 The Foreign Office's Case for Retaining Britain's Position in the Middle East. 226 The Policy of the Labour Government on Assuming Office: 1964-1965.229 The Defence Reviews -A Decisive Change in Policy: 1964-1967.241 Britain's Final Withdrawal from South Arabia, 1967-68.252 The Final Decision to Withdraw from the Middle East, 1967-68.255 iii Summary. 261 Chapter V: British Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1959-1968. 264 Britain's Principal Geo-Political Interests in South-East Asia. 266 The Malaysian Scheme: An Inauspicious Beginning? 271 The Problems of 'Overstretch'. 276 The Conservative'sQuestioning of the SEATO Commitment. 280 A Decision Deferred:The Problem of Indonesian Confrontation. 282 The Foreign Office Planning Staff Review, 1964. 293_ American Influence on the Policy of the Labour Government, 1964-1966. 298 A Revision of Britain's South-East Asian Role: The Defence Reviews, 1965- 307 1967. 'Never Glad Confident Morning Again': The Impact of Devaluation. 326 Summary. 334 Conclusion. 337 Dramatis Personae. 349 Appendix (I): Future Policy Ad Hoc Committee Structure. 365 Appendix (II): Principal Holders of Office, 1959-1968.366 Appendix (Ill): Ministry of Defence: After 1964 Reorganisation. 369 Bibliography. 370 iv Abstract. This thesis attempts to give an account of how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawal from extra-Europeancommitments in the years 1959-1968, demonstratingthat foreign policy developmentwas essentially a cross-departmentalprocess, involving a synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury, Board of Trade, Ministry of Defence, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, as well as the Foreign Office. More specifically, the thesis is concerned with the direct effects of the interplay of different departmental policies on British retrenchmentfrom Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. Most accounts of how ministers and officials approached the subject of withdrawal from international commitments lack any substantive analysis of documentary evidence, a fact attributable to the 'thirty-year rule'. Many academic works also contain a reference to 'delusions of grandeur' as the main explanation as to why Whitehall guided a tentative course in extracting Britain from its remaining overseas obligations. By examining Whitehall's attempts to review future policy, usually on an inter-departmentalbasis, this thesis questions the commonly held assumption that an outdated imperial sentiment permeated the political establishment until economic reality, namely the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, forced Britain to confront the fragility of its position. Developing and expanding upon previous scholarship, this thesis makes a contribution to historical knowledge by providing the first sustained and unified study of how the highest echelons of Whitehall framed Britain's long-term strategic aims in the late 1950s and 1960s. This thesis is a contribution to administrative, diplomatic and military history, and provokes a number of questions. To what extent, for example, did economic considerations inform the decisions of leading policy-makers? Did a misjudgment over the strength of British 'power' lead to the pursuit of inappropriate foreign policy V objectives? How was foreign policy affected by defence policy? What influence did the Treasury exert over high foreign policy? Did the influence of civil servants vary according to policy issues and the personalities involved? In what ways did the views of the departments responsiblefor economic matters differ from those in charge of defence policy on the priority attached to military expenditure? To what extent did the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence disagree on matters regarding Britain's overseas commitments and possessions? In answering such questions, this thesis casts new light on how Whitehall, between 1959 and 1968, reduced the scope of Britain's internationalcommitments, redirecting the central thrust of British foreign policy away from extra-Europeancommitments towards Europe. vi Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, and that the work which it embodies has been done by myself and has not been included in any other thesis. Signed: November 2004. vi' Acknowledgements I wish to thank the Student Awards Agency for Scotland (SAAS), the Arts and Humanaties Research Board (AHRB), and the Faculty of Arts, University of Stirling, for funding this doctoral thesis. The basic research work for this thesis in London, Cambridge and Oxford could not have been undertaken had it not been for the generous decision of the SAAS and AHRB to provide financial assistance for three years. For access to archival or written sources, I am grateful to custodians and staff of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; Churchill College, Cambridge; the Library of Congress, Washington, DC; the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh;the Public Record Office, London; Stirling University Library; the Trustees of Harold Macmillan's papers; and the Executers of Lord Duncan-Sandys'sEstate for permission to access documents and other material. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor George Peden, for his tireless support, advice and encouragement. For reading and commenting upon early drafts of this thesis, I must also express gratitude to Dr Robert McKean and Dr Richard Whiting. I would like to thank the staff and research students of the Department of History at Stirling who have given me both encouragementand support over the past three years. Special thanks must be afforded to Dr Tim Lovering, Dr Mark Nixon, and Mr David Kaufman, all of who listened to my ideas and offered kind advice. vi" Finally, special thanks should be extended to my family, whose moral and practical support was of great comfort throughout. In the absence of my parents' encouragement,I am sure that this thesis would not have been finished. ix List of Abbreviations TEXT AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement A(O)C Africa (Official) Committee (Cabinet) ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malaya ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and the United States ATUC Aden Trade Union Congress BP British Petroleum CAF CentralAfrican Federation(Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia,Nyasaland) CENTO CentralTreaty Organisation(UK, Turkey, Pakistan,Iran) CIA Central Intelligence Agency CO ColonialOffice COS Chief of Staff CPC ColonialPolicy Committee (Cabinet) CPM Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting CRO Commonwealth Relations Office DC Defence Committee (Cabinet) D(O)C Defence (Official) Committee (Cabinet) DEA Department of Economic Affairs DOPC Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Cabinet) DOP(O)C Defenceand OverseasPolicy (Official)Committee (Cabinet) DTC Departmentof TechnicalCo-operation EEC EuropeanEconomic Community FAMA Foundation of Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the X Sahara FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (Aden) FO Foreign Office FOPS Foreign Office Planning Staff FPC Future Policy Committee GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product HMG Her Majesty's Government (UK) IBRD InternationalBank for Reconstructionand Development ISC InternalSecurity Council (Singapore) IMF InternationalMonetary Fund LTSG Long-TermStudy Group MCP MalawiCongress Party MoD Ministryof Defence MP Member of Parliament NATO NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation NIBMAR No Independence Before Majority African Rule (Southern Rhodesia) NLF National Liberation Front (Aden) NHS National Health