AN IMPERIALIST AT BAY: LEO AMERY AT THE INDIA OFFICE, 1940 – 1945 David Whittington A thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements of the University of the West of England, Bristol For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Arts, Creative Industries and Education August 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii GLOSSARY iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTERS I LITERATURE REVIEW 10 II AMERY’S VIEW OF ATTEMPTS AT INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 45 REFORM III AMERY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935 75 UNTIL THE AUGUST OFFER OF 1940 IV FROM SATYAGRAHA TO THE ATLANTIC CHARTER 113 V THE CRIPPS MISSION 155 VI ‘QUIT INDIA’, GANDHI’S FAST AND SOCIAL REFORM 205 IN INDIA VII A SUCCESSOR TO LINLITHGOW, THE STERLING BALANCES 253 AND THE FOOD SHORTAGES VIII FINAL ATTEMPTS AT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BEFORE THE 302 LABOUR ELECTION VICTORY CONCLUSION 349 APPENDICES 362 LIST OF SOURCES CONSULTED 370 ABSTRACT Pressure for Indian independence had been building up throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, initially through the efforts of the Indian National Congress, but also later, when matters were complicated by an increasingly vocal Muslim League. When, in May 1940, Leo Amery was appointed by Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for India, an already difficult assignment had been made more challenging by the demands of war. This thesis evaluates the extent to which Amery’s ultimate failure to move India towards self-government was due to factors beyond his control, or derived from his personal shortcomings and errors of judgment. Although there has to be some analysis of politics in wartime India, the study is primarily of Amery’s attempts at managing an increasingly insurgent dependency, entirely from his metropolitan base. Much of the research is concentrated on his success, or otherwise, in influencing Churchill and diehard Conservatives, who wanted Britain to retain India at any cost, but also Labour colleagues in the coalition, who were much more closely aligned with Congress. Inevitably, Amery’s relationships with his two Viceroys, Lord Linlithgow and Viscount Wavell are central to this investigation. In different ways, his dealings with the dour, inflexible Linlithgow and the surprisingly radical, if irritable, Wavell varied between the cordial and the frosty, yet in both cases he regarded them with a considerable degree of intellectual snobbery. That said, the thesis demonstrates that he was unable to convince these colleagues in Delhi that the man on the spot did not always know best. For many years Amery had been irked by American opposition to his cherished principle of imperial preference, and their overall dislike of the perceived colonialism i implicit in the British Empire. Once the USA had entered the war, transatlantic attempts to interfere in matters in India increased, further damaging Amery’s efforts to promote constitutional reform. It was all the more painful for him that his desire to counter these ideas was compromised by the need to appease American public opinion in the interests of the war effort. In making a balanced judgment on Amery at the India Office it is unwise to look only at his efforts to broker a constitutional settlement that ultimately foundered with the failure of the Simla conference in the summer of 1945. There is ample evidence of better outcomes in administrative and practical areas. From his early achievement in moderating the terms in which Congress could be prosecuted until his later successes in obtaining grain to alleviate famine he revealed a tenacity, and courage that could, on occasion, overcome the suspicion that he often generated amongst his peers. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My first thanks go to my Director of Studies, Dr Kent Fedorowich, who was inspiring and considerate at the same time. Not only did he make sure that I kept up to schedule, but also was caring when I had bouts of ill health. I am especially delighted that he showed enough faith to encourage me to deliver conference papers. My Second Supervisor, Dr John Fisher carried on the ceaseless guidance and support that I received when writing my MA dissertation some years ago. Who said Scots are dour? I have worked in several libraries and archive centres. In particular my thanks go to the staff at UWE (St Matthias and Frenchay), The National Archives, The British Library (African and Asian Studies Reading Room), and possibly most valuable of all, The Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Everywhere I was shown both kindness and consummate professionalism. My son, Ben Whittington, who is an IT specialist showed great patience in helping me with my computer problems. I am especially grateful for his innovative installation of two computer screens to help the writing process. A number of friends have been very supportive. Bill Harwood chauffeured me to and from the Heart Institute at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, thereby taking the strain off my wife. My pals in the Tuesday morning roll-up at Stockwood Vale Golf Club have also been very kind. I am only too pleased to say that they have stopped me from taking myself too seriously. I would not have been able to get to this stage of my journey without the skill of my cardiac surgeon, Dr Carlo Zebele. He kept his promise to get me back at my computer. Finally, and most importantly I must thank my wife, Carolyn. This was the second time during the writing of a history thesis that she had to nurse me through cardiac surgery, and subsequent complications. Perhaps for a while, and granddaughters permitting, we can now have some sort of conventional retirement! iii GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah Satyagraha Peaceful, non-violent protest Shabbash Well done, congratulations Swaraj Independence or freedom AICC All India Congress Committee CUP Cambridge University Press C-in-C Commander-in-Chief ICS Indian Civil Service JICH Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography OUP Oxford University Press SEAC South East Asia Command iv INTRODUCTION This thesis will examine the realities of imperial management, chiefly from a metropolitan perspective. In simple terms, it will consider Leo Amery’s success or failure as Secretary of State for India from May 1940 until July 1945; a period that coincided exactly with Winston Churchill’s first occupation of 10 Downing Street. There has been relatively little academic consideration of Amery’s entire spell at the India Office, and similarly there has been a shortage of analysis of the wider matter of the administration of Britain’s dependencies from London, in wartime. This study represents an attempt to fill both these lacunae. The research that has been undertaken shows that an examination of Amery’s effectiveness needs to encompass not only a review of his own strengths and weaknesses, but also an evaluation of the wide variety of external factors that affected his duties as Secretary of State. Certain of these influences might well have been important at any time in the twentieth century. However, the complications introduced by global war proved to be even more critical, frequently making Amery’s task almost impossibly onerous. A brief account of the formation of Amery’s imperial ideas will be attempted in the first two chapters, but to make any real sense of his approach to his official duties it is necessary to consider the detailed aspects of his personality. For a politician who had enjoyed the advantages of Harrow, Balliol and All Souls, he remained an outsider. Indeed, were it not for his luck in 1917 to have the support of his mentor, Lord Milner, in obtaining the post of assistant to Lord Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, he might well have remained a backbencher. 1 A number of reasons can be adduced as to why he failed to secure a major post in the Cabinet, but it will be seen that a tendency to verbosity, both in speech and the written word, reduced his influence with his colleagues. As early as 1920, the normally taciturn Stanley Baldwin had remarked that ‘Amery does not add a gram of influence to the government’.1 Despite the fertility of his mind, particularly in realising the strategic and global potential of technological progress, he often spoiled matters by self-delusion, either regarding supposed past successes, or perhaps more seriously, his future capacity to be effective. Examples of both scenarios abound. Firstly, in a speech to the Oxford University Conservative Association on 24 November 1934 he predicted that the provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act would be favourably received by moderate opinion in India, thereby making Congress largely irrelevant.2 This claim proved to be completely incorrect. Secondly, a few weeks after being appointed to the India Office, Amery, in conversation with Churchill, offered to go to France to ‘keep the French up to scratch’.3 Not surprisingly the Prime Minister rejected this attempt to rally Britain’s demoralised allies. The following chapters will show Amery to have been a patriotic and hard working man, but also prone to intellectual snobbery, and not a little pomposity. He was often generous about the personal and moral qualities of colleagues such as Stafford Cripps, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Archibald Wavell, and even Churchill, but rarely did he praise their intelligence.4 Such accolades were generally reserved for 1 Robert Holland, review of William Roger Louis, In the Name of God, Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1992, North American Conference on British Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 755. 2 Oxford Mail, 24 November 1934, Amery Papers, AMEL 2/5, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge.