'The Fools Have Stumbled on Their Best Man by Accident': an Analysis of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party Leadership Selections

Home , 1922 Committee, Brendan Bracken, Dennis Walters, Harold Macmillan, Julian Amery, Leonard Ropner

University of Huddersfield Repository

Miller, Stephen David

'The fools have stumbled on their best man by accident' : an analysis of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party leadership selections

Original Citation

Miller, Stephen David (1999) 'The fools have stumbled on their best man by accident' : an analysis of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party leadership selections. Doctoral thesis, University of Huddersfield.

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http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/ 'TBE FOOLS HAVE STLUvMLED ON TIHEIR BEST MAN BY ACCIDENT': AN

ANALYSIS OF THE 1957 AND 1963 CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP

SELECTIONS

STEPBEN DAVID MILLER

A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the

requirementsfor the degreeof Doctor of Philosophy

The Universityof Huddersfield

June 1999 MHE FOOLS HAVE STUNIBLED ONT]HEIR BEST MAN BY ACCIDENT': AN

ANALYSIS OF THE 1957AND 1963CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERSHIP

SELECTIONS

S.D. MILLER

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

1999

g 1)66 gjýECi tc- LL Stephen Miller The University of Huddersfield

Doctor of Philosophy

'The Fools Have Stumbled On Their Best Man By Accident': An Analysis of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party Leadership Selections

Abstract

This thesis assessesthe outcomes of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party Leadership Selections of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. It analyses the two selections using an original analytical framework, that demonstrates the importance of both individual and situational criteria in determining the outcomes of leadership selections. The individual criteria are the party status of the candidates, and their actions and conduct during the selections.The situational criteria are the situation and circumstances surrounding the selections, the formal and informal aspects of the selection procedure used, and the candidates fulfilment of acceptability, electability, and governability. Acceptability, (the need to retain or maintain party unity), electability, (the need to be electable), and governability, (the ability to govern), are the three core situational criteria on which the candidatesare judged. This framework was developed to offer a full and inclusive explanation of the outcomes of the two leadership selections, because the existing analyses of leadership selections has a restrictive approach, and does not offer a conclusive and systematicanalysis. The thesis demonstrates that the outcomes of the 1957 and 1963 leadership selections have clear parallels and distinctions in their outcomes. Both selections produced a stop-gap leader in a time of crisis for the Conservative Party. However, the situations were clearly distinct, and this was influential in the outcome. The 1957 selection occurred following a crisis over foreign policy, while the 1963 selection occurred during a deep-seated period of domestic crisis and upheaval. In January 1957, the Conservatives had three years before a general election had to be held, while in October 1963, a general election was imminent within twelve months. The selection procedure was influential in both selections. The informal aspects of the procedure were more influential in 1957, while the procedure had become more formalised in 1963, and this prepared the way for the establishmentof formal leadership elections in the Conservative Party in 1965. The choice of Macmillan and Home was made because of the circumstances in which the selections occurred, and because they fulfilled the three core criteria more conclusively than the other candidates. In both outcomes, acceptability was clearly the most important core criteria because the selections occurred at a time of severe disunity in the party, and this deemed party unity as the crucial task of the new leader. In 1957, Macmillan was selected as he fulfilled the requirements of the situation better than R. A. Butler, the other candidate. In 1963, Home became leader becauseof the weaknessesapparent in the other candidates, and was the compromise candidateto retain party unity. This thesis concludes that the wider individual and situational criteria set the terms of reference on which the core situational criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability are judged. The most important wider criteria were the candidates' actions during the selection, the selection procedure, and the situation that the selection occurred in. This demonstrates the utility of the analytical framework developed in the study. I

CONTENTS

Abstract

List of Tables and Diagrams

Acknowledgments ii

Introduction

The Area For Investigation

The Research For The Study

The Method Of Analysis

Chapter One 5

The Analvtical Framework

The Interactionist Interpretation of Political Leadership

The Analytical Framework

The Analytical Framework and Party Leadership Selection in Britain: 1957-1997

Chapter Two 47

The Conservative Part3: and the Selection of Its Leaders

The SeIection of Conservative Party Leaders: 1902-1965

The Functions of Conservative Party Leaders

The Formal Aspects of the Selection Procedure

The Informal Networks of Communication ii

The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions

Chapter Three 74

The Candidates: Party Status and Personalities

The Candidates' Party Status

The Candidates' Personalities

Chapter Fou 114

The Suez Crisis and The 1957 Leadership Selection:

The Candidates' Actions and Conduct

Butler

Macmillan

Chapter Five 149

The Suez Crisis and the 1957 Leadership Selection:

The Situational Interpretation

The Situation and Its Requirements

The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal

Networks of Communication

The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and

Governability

Chapter Six 182

The 1963 Leadership Selection: III

The Candidates' Actions and Conduct

Butler

Home

Maudling

Hailsham

Chapter Seven 219

The 1963 Leadership Selection:

The Situational Interpretation

The Situation and Its Requirements

The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal

Networks of Communication

The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and

Governability

Conclusion 265

The Outcomes: Assessment

The 1957 Leadership Selection

The 1963 Leadership Selection

The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions

Biblio2rat)hv 277 List of Tables and Dia2rams

Tables

1. The Acceptability, Electability, and Governability Criteria 33

and Party Leadership Selection in the British Conservative

and Labour Parties: 1957-1997

2. Totals of Winners of LeadersfiýpSelections, 1957-1997,35

andtheir fulfilment of the Acceptability,Electability, and

GovernabilityCriteria

Diagrams

1. The Selection of Party Leaders: Analytical Criteria 14

2. Levels of Progression from 'Outsider' to 'Insider' Status 17

in a Political Party. ii

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following for permission to consult and quote from the

archival material that has been the central research for this study: the Trustees of the

Estate of Harold Macmillan, First Earl of Stockton, for permission to consult and quote

from the Macmillan Diaries at the Bodleian Library, Oxford; The Master and Fellows of

Trinity College, Cambridge for the use of extracts from the Papers of R. A. Butler; Sir

Alistair Cooke, the former Director of the Conservative Political Centre for pern-dssion

to consult the ConservativeParty Chairman'sOffice files at the ConservativeParty

Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford; and Sir NEchael Simmonds,the current Director of

the Conservative Political Centre for permission to quote from Conservative Party

Archive material in this study; The Borthwick Institute of I-Estorical Research,

Universityof York, for permissionto use materialfrom the Papersof the First Earl of

Halifax; andthe permissionof the Public RecordOffice for the use of Prime Minister's

Office files: "Crown copyright material is reproduced by permission of the Controller of

Her Majesty's Stationary Office".

I would also like to thank the following archivists and librarians for their invaluableassistance during my researchof the archivalmaterial: Dr. Martin Maw, the former Conservative Party Archivist; Jill Davidson, the current Conservative Party

Archivist; Nia Mai Williams, the Archivist of the Papersof Harold Macmillan;the staff of the Modem Papers Reading Room, Bodleian Library, Oxford; Jonathan Smith,

Manuscript Cataloguer,Trinity College Library, Cambridge;the staff of the Wren

Library, Trinity CollegeLibrary, Cambridge;and ChristopherWebb, the archivist, and the staff of the Borthwick Institute of I-listoricalResearch, University of York. iii

My thanksgo to the staff of University of HuddersfieldCentral Library; Sue

White, the HumanitiesLibrarian; and the staff of the Inter-Library Loan Servicefor

providing me with valuable assistanceduring the research of this study. I would also

like to thank the University for funding the research,and especially for the funds for my

numeroustrips to Oxford and Cambridge to complete my archival work. Many thanks

to the staff of the Division of Politics at The University of Huddersfield for support and

advice during the study. I would also like to thank my fellow researchersin the

Division, Dr. Steve Brown and Dik Esp, for their good humour and many useful

commentson my work throughout the completion of this study.

I would particularly like to thank Georgina Blakeley of the Division of Politics

for her support.Georgina is also my landlady,and I would like to thank her for putting

up with my constantdoubts about my ability to finish this study. Her reassurancehas

helpedme considerably.I would also like to thank ProfessorBrendan Evans, the Pro-

Vice Chancellor of the University, for his contribution to the development of my

interest and knowledge of Conservative Party politics.

I would especially like to thank my Director of Studies, Professor Andrew

Taylor, who has played a fundamental role in the formation, development and

11is his knowledge completionof this project. expertiseas a supervisorand profound 4Pof ConservativeParty Politics have had a major influenceon me during this study, and I am very grateful for his commitmentto this project, and the hard work he has put in to help me completeit. I would also like to thank Andrew for inspiring my interest in

ConservativeParty Politics, and specificallythe Macmillan era, during my days as an undergraduate.Without that this study would never have been conceived,never mind written. iv

would like to thank my fiiends and family for their support and is encouragement;particularly my sister, Catherineand my grandparents.This thesis dedicatedto my parents, Keith and SusanMiller, who have played a far more important

it role in the completion of this study than they realise. I could not have done without them. I

Introduction

The Area For Investigation

This thesis analyses the outcomes of two Conservative Party leadership selections.These are the selections of Harold Macmillan to replace Sir Anthony Eden in January 1957, and of Sir Alec Douglas-Home to replace Macmillan in October

1963. These selections are two of the most controversial in the history of leadership selectionin Britain, becauseof the manner in which Macmillan and Home were selected,and the outcomesthey produced.Both selectionswere madeusing the 'magic circle' system of selection. This was the method by which the Monarchy and the party hierarchyconducted informal consultationsto determinethe bestcandidate, rather than using a formal election procedure. Both selectionsoccurred at a time when there was a call for greater accountabilityand opennessin political parties, and the selectionof

Home in October 1963 led to the downfall of the 'magic circle' procedure.In 1965, the Conservative Party introduced formal leadership elections, using a secret ballot of the party's MPs. The selection of Macmillan also contributed to that process, but the selection of Home was the catalyst for the change.

Leadershipselection is an understudiedand misunderstoodarea of political science, and the two selections chosen for analysis are typical of the misinterpretation and weaknessesin existing work on leadershipselection in Britain. Many of the publicationson the two selectionsare restrictive in their analysis,and do not fully explainthe outcomes.This is becauseof the dominantemphasis on the issueof party unity, at the exclusion of any investigation of the other determining factors that influencedthe outcomes.This has led to the needfor the developmentof a coherent analyticalmethodology by which to analyseleadership contests, because of the lack of 2

a viable approach in existing analyses.The analytical framework developed and applied

in this study offers a new, inclusive, and systematic approach to the analysis of the

outcomes of leadership selections, by assessingthe importance of all individual and

situational criteria that may influence the outcome of a selection. The individual criteria

are the party status of the candidates, and the impact of their actions and conduct

during the selection process.The situational criteria are the situation and circumstances

surroundingthe selection,the selectionprocedure used, and the candidates'fulfilment

they judged. These (the of the three core criteria on which are Z:, are acceptability need for party unity), electability (the need to win elections), and governability (the ability to govern). This method of analysis will, therefore, offer a full explanation of the outcomesof the two selections.

The Research for the Study

The research for the study had three main components, each with a distinctive objective. The first consisted of an in-depth analysis of the secondary source material on the history of the Conservative Party's methods of leadership selection, the two selections of January 1957 and October 1963, and works on the careers and lives of the candidates in the selections. These were R. A. Butler, Harold Macmillan, Lord

Home, Lord Hailsham, and Reginald Maudling. This provided the background informationfor the investigation.The secondwas a study of the existingliterature on political leadership,leadership politics and leadershipselection. This was utilised in the developmentof the analyticalframework appliedin the investigation.The final areaof researchconsisted of archivalmaterial to gain primary evidenceto developthe study.

The following collectionsof archivalmaterial were consulted:The ConservativeParty 3

Archive,the BodleianLibrary, Universityof Oxford; The Diariesof Harold Macmillan, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; The Papers of R. A. Butler, Trinity

College, University of Cambridge; The Public Record Office, Kew; and The Papers of the First Earl of Halifax, the Borthwick Institute of I-EstoricalResearch, University of

York. This level of research has developed the study into one that encompasses research and ideas in British party politics, political science, political psychology, and contemporary history.

The Method of Analysis

The method of analysis of the outcomes of the two selections has three stages.

The first is the presentation of the analytical framework to be used to analyse the selections.This is assessedin chapterone, and outlinesthe individual and situational criteriathat will be analysed,to assesstheir influenceon the outcomeof the selections.

All of the component factors of each criteria are demonstrated here. The second stage is the application of the analytical framework to the two selections. This is assessedin chapters two to seven. Chapter two analyses the Conservative Party's history of leadership selection from 1902, to the selection of Home in October 1963, This sets I the context for the study, and demonstratesthe different situational parallels and distinctionsbetween the selectionsover the period. This, therefore,acts as a contextual introduction to the analysisof the two selections.The third chapter assessesthe careers,party status and personalitiesof the candidates,and therefore, analysesthe first individualcriteria.

Chaptersfour and five apply the analytical framework to the selection of

Macmillan.Chapter four analysesthe candidates'actions during the SuezCrisis, which 4 formed the selection process, becausethe den-ýiseof Eden was widely expected.

Chapter five applies the Situational Interpretation to the selection. This chapter analysesthe influence of the situational criteria of the situation, the selection procedure, and the candidates' fulfilment of acceptability, electability, and governability. Chapters six and sevenapply the analytical framework to the selection of

Home. Chapter six assessesthe importance of the candidates' actions during the selectionprocedure, and chapter sevenapplies the SituationalInterpretation to the selection.

The final stage is the assessmentof the outcomes. This forms the conclusion to

brings C, investigationCý into the study, and ZPtogether the resultsof the the two selections.

The conclusionwill demonstratea full explanationof the outcomesof both selections, and assessthe different influence of the individual and situational criteria in determining The finish discussion C,the outcomes. study will with a of the parallelsand distinctionsbetween the two outcomes,and will assesswhat they demonstrateabout how the Conservative Party selects it's leaders in different situations and circumstances. 5

Chapter One

The Analvtical Framework

This chapter has two sections. The first assesses the Interactionist

Interpretationof political leadershipand leadershipselection, and the influencethis has

had on the development of the analytical framework. The second section discussesthe

analytical framework. This is outlined in abstract form, and is then applied to party

leadershipselections in the British Conservativeand Labour partiesbetween 1957 and

1997.The two main componentsof the analyticalframework will be discussed.These

are the Individual Interpretation,which assessesthe importanceof the candidates'

party statusand their actions, and the SituationalInterpretation, which assessesthe

influenceson the selection.The situational factors are the circumstancesthat the

selectionoccurred in, the selectionprocedure used, and the importanceof eachof the three core criteria that must be met in leadershipselections: Acceptability, Electability,

and Governability. The section will finish with an analysis of party leadership selection in the British Conservative and Labour Parties between 1957 and 1997. Five specific selections from that period are analysed using the framework to demonstrate its application.

The Interactionist Interpretation of Political Leadership

The Development of the Interactionist Inteii2retation

The InteractionistInterpretation of political leadershiphas resulted from the synthesisof the 'Great Man' and the Determinist/Situationalschools of political ' leadership. Recent analysishas stressedthe importanceof personality'sinteraction

1 The term 'Interactionist Interpretation' is derivedfrom Elgie's useof the 'interactionistapproach' in R. Elgie, Pofitical LeadershipIn Liberal Democracies,(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).The term I 6

in behaviour.2 The with the enviromnent understandingt) political action and InteractionistInterpretation developed from the realisationthat 'Great Man' theories, and SituationalInterpretations were insufficientto accountfor political leadershipand the emergenceof political leaders.It developedfrom the assumptionthat political leadersdo matter, and that individuals do make a difference within the political environment. However, the Interactionist Interpretation does not assume that individuals play the dominant role in the leadershipenvironment, but takes as its central assumption that 'all leaders are constrained in the extent to which they are able to act freely'.

The 'Great Man' School of Political LeaderLhiR

The 'Great Man' schoolof political leadershiphas a long tradition, dating back to the nineteenthcentury, and stressesthe importanceof great figureswho emergedat certaintimes to have a major impact on the courseof history. ThomasCarlyle was a theorist of the 'Great Man' school, and he stressedthe importance of these men. He made four assertions. The first was that some people were born great, and greatness was an innate God-given quality. The second, was that such people were objectively great, and it was not just that everyonethought they were great. The third, was that their greatnessenabled them to changethe courseof history. The final assertion,was

history for the 4 Carlyle that they changed0 the courseof good, and were moral people. wrote in 1840

haveused is phrasedas the 'InteractionistInterpretation' as it fits moreclearly my frameworkof analysis. 2 A. C. Elms, Personalityin Politics, (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1976), p. iv; and F.I. Greenstein,Personality and Politics: Problemsof Evidence.Inference, and Conceptu-alization (Chicago:Markham Publishing, 1969),pp. 28-29 3 Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democracies,p. 5 4 Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal p.6 7

Universal history, the history of what man has accomplishedin

this world, is at the bottom the history of the Great Men who

have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great

things that in the ones... all we see standing accomplished world

are properly the outer material result, the practical realisation and

embodiment,of thoughtsthat dwelt in the Great Men sent into

the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may be justly

considered,were the history of these'

The 'Great Man' school emphasisedthe impact of outstanding individual I figures on the courseof history, and believedthat thesefigures were more important than the environmentin which they operated.Romantic philosopherslike Frederich

Nietzsche agreed with Carlyle's ideas, as they believed that a sudden decision by a

6 great man could alter the courseof history. William Jamesstated that developments in society were due to great men who initiated movement, and prevented others moving society in another direction. 7 This school believes eras of history are directly associatedwith 'Great Men'. For example,the Reformationis associatedwith Luther and Calvin,the RussianRevolution with Lenin and Stalin, and fascismwith 11itlerand

Mussolini. Eighteenth-centuryrationalists believed that luck must be added to the personalqualities of great menif they were to determinethe courseof history.

s T. Carlyle,Heroes and Hero Worship, (Boston:Adams, 1841) in Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democraciesp. 6 6 B.M. Bass,Bass and Stogdill's Handbookof Leadership:Theorv. Research and Managerial Applications (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990),p. 37 7 W. James,'Great Men, GreatThoughts and their Environment', Atlantic Monthly, 46,1880, 441-459in Bass,Handbook Leadershi 37 pp. of , p. 8

There are obvious problemswith the theoriesexpounded by the 'Great Man' school.Firstly, it excludedthe impact of 'great women', and it also did not specify what was a 'morally good' action. Most importantly in the context of the Interactionist

Interpretation,it 'exaggeratedthe influencethat individualsexerted on the courseof events and is irrelevant in the context of modem political leadership, becauseit takes no account of the many factors, institutional, social and historical, that act as constraintson political leaders'.8

The Determinist/Situational School of Political Leadership

The Determinist or Situational school of analysis stresses the absolute importanceof the situation or environmenton determiningpolitical leadership,thus directly opposingC7 the 'Great Man' school. The Determinist school arguedthat 'the course of history was determinedby the impersonalinterplay of social and cultural forces over which individuals had little control'. 9 The Determinist school states that leaders have power because they are in the right position, or they have the abilities required by the situation at that moment." It disparagesthe 'Great Man' school as it believesit neglectsthe great impersonalforces of history, and saw the school as a misplacedpersonality cult. This school has argued that leadershipdoes not really count, and is merely an epiphenomenon." The school of cultural determinism developedto oppose the ideas of men like Carlyle. Herbert Spencer,a cultural determinist,wrote in 1873

8 Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democracies,p. 5 9 Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democracies,p. 6 10D. G. Winter, The PowerMotive (New York: The FreePress, 1973), ' p. II 11J. Blondel,Political Leadership:Towards a GeneralAnalysis, (London: Sage, 1987), p. 18 9

If it be fact his in its a that the z;,great man may modify nation

structureand actions,it is also a fact that there must have been

these antecedent modifications constituting national progress

before he could be evolved.Before he can re-makehis society,

his him If is be like societymust make ... there to anything a real

explanation of these changes,it must be sought in the aggregate

of conditionsout of which both he andthey havearisen 12

Elgie has argued that the school of Social Determinism implies that individuals are powerless,and that all individualswould act the sameway in the samesituation, which is a contention he disagreeswith. He claims that this school of analysisis reductionistin its approachto political leadership,and thereforedoes not explainthe leadershipprocess fully. Elgie's contentionis difficult to dispute.Political leadershipis much more complex than either the 'Great Man' or Determinist schools suggest. These levels of analysis give no recognition to the importance of a power motive, or any personality variable, that would influence the course of events. Blondel has asserted that the enviroment introducesconstraints and providesopportunities, and is thus of " overriding4: 1 importance. It is the 'raw material,substance and framework'.

The Utility of the InteractionistInteipretation

The Interactionist Interpretationthat results from the synthesisof these two levelsof analysisis the dominantparadigm for the study of political leadershiptoday,

12B. Kellerman,Political Leadership:A SourceBook, pp.13-14 in Elgie, Political LeadershipIn Liberal Democracies,p. 7 13Blondel, Political Leadership,p. 30 10

and it explainsa considerableamount about the emergenceof political leaders.The

Interactionist approach developed,because both the 'Great Man' and Determinist

in influences schools were reductionist, emphasisingCI only one aspect that political leadership.For Elgie, the essenceof the Interactionist Interpretation is that it

emphasises'the extent to which political leaders are able to influence the decision- making process [and] is considered to be contingent upon the interaction between the leader and the leadership environment in which the leader operates.' 14 The

Interactionist Interpretation combines the personal and systemic demandsof the leadershipprocess.

Three elements comprise the interaction process of political leadership. The first are the ambitionsand styles of political leaders,the secondare the institutional structuresof the societiesthey lead, and the third are the needsof the society. The

InteractionistInterpretation believes that the environmentin which leadersoperate will both structure their behaviour, and limit their freedom of action.15 Elgie has demonstratedthis in Political Leadership In Liberal Democracies. He has analysedthe roles of Presidents and Prime Ministers in six countries, Britain, France, Italy, Japan,

Germanyand the United States.

Elgie's prime aim was to assess the extent to which the leaders in these countriescan shapethe decision-makingprocess, or whetherit was shapedfor them.

I-fis main conclusion was that, in all six countries, the leadership process was influencedmost significantlyby institutional structures.However, this does not mean that leadershipis determinedin advance,and 'institutionalism'is neither deterministic

14Elgic, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democraciesp. 7 15Elgie, Political Leadershivin Liberal Democracies,p. 8, and p. 191

I/ I 11

16 nor reductionistic'. By pinpointingC. the three central elementsof the Interactionist approachto political leadership,Elgie has illustrated the necessityof an inclusive approachto the study of political leadership, as many factors are involved in exercising it. The institutional approach to politics is an important aspect of the Interactionist

Interpretation. The approach shows how 'institutions help to determine the nature of the leadership process', and how the institutional structure of a society is primarily responsiblefor structuringthe interactionbetween the leadersand their environment.17

The Influence of the Interactionist Inte[pretation on the AnalZical Framework

The Interactionist Interpretation's emphasis on the importance of political actorswithin the environment'in which they work, has had a major influenceon the development of the analytical framework used in this study. The three core componentsof the Interaction processof political leadership:the ambitionsand styles of political leaders, the institutional structures of the societies they lead, and the needs of the society, are embodied in the two interpretations that are central to the analytical framework.The ambitionsand stylesof the candidatesare embodiedin the Individual

Interpretation, which analysesthe candidates'party status, and their actions and conduct.The institutional structuresof the society,and the needsof the society are at the core of the SituationalInterpretation. This analysesthe selectionprocedures used

(the institutional structures)and the circumstancessurrounding the selection,and the needfor acceptability,electability and govemability(the needsof the society). Society is taken here to meanboth societyin a generalsense, and the ConservativeParty in a specificsense, as the forum in which the selectionswere made.

16Elgic, Political Leadershipin Liberal Democracies,p. 191, and 206 17Elgie, Political Leadershipin Liberal p.203 12

The Interactionist Interpretation, by its inclusive and non-reductionist approach,also advocatesa full assessmentof both individual and situationalfactors, andthis hasled to the inclusiveapproach used in the analyticalframework. This means

full the influencina factors leadership 1957 that a assessmentof all 0 on the selections of and 1963 is evident in tfiýs study.

The Analytical Framework

This section outlines the two Interpretations that are used to analyse the two leadershipselections. These are the Individual Interpretation and the Situational

Interpretation. The analysis is not meant merely to demonstrate whether one interpretation was more valid than the other, but to use them to show whether any of the different components within the two interpretations were more important than the others.For instance,is party unity alwaysthe principaldominant objective, or doesthe imminenceof an election, and the obvious need to win that election, or a need to rescue a party's reputation for governmental competence, override the importance of this objective? These graduations of the importance of the component factors of each interpretation,are a significantpart of the analysisof the two leadershipselections, and the section will finish with an account of how the two leadershipselections will be assessedusing the analytical framework.

The analytical framework was developed from the use of a number of sources consultedduring the literature review of material on leadershipselection, leadership selectionin British political parties,and party leadersin Britain. Use was also madeof archival material which highlighted significant aspectsof importance in leadership

in the ConservativeParty. The following diaggram the selections,especially 0 sets out 13 analytical framework used in the study. The aim of the analysisis to illustrate if any of the components of the Individual and Situational Interpretations had a determinant role in the selections of 1957 and 1963. This is why the framework is set out with the core situationalcriteria at the foundation of the framework,and the wider individual and situational criteria connecting to it. 14

" Diagram One- The Selection of Party Leadersý Anal3jical Criteria

Party status - Broad Their actions FC,Fmal aspects of internal/external towards the Procedure requirements leadership selection Informal networks - Often determinants -Effect of campaign of communication on other criteria for leadership the e. g. imminent election

goal = good leader

lo govern - to implemcm pdicic. s andprogrammes

To win electloný atidjorin a government

To relain mamialti imitv as a cohesiveparty

" The development of this table was influenced bý Stark's analvsis of the 'Hierarchý of Strategic Part) Goals'. which stressed the importance of unity, victorý and policy. This is in L. P. Stark, Choosing A Leader. Party Leadership Contests in Britain from Macmillan to Blair. (London: Macmillan, 1995). p. 125) 15

The IndividualInteipretation

777eParty Statusof the Candidates

This section considers the importance of the candidates' position in their party,

and more specifically in the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet. A significant aspect is 0 whether any of the candidates occupied the three 'great offices of state', the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, or Home Secretary, or their shadows

in opposition. This needsconsideration to illustrate if occupationof these positions

gave the candidatesan advantageover opponentswho did not occupy theseoffices.

The seniority and status these positions give to politicians appears to give them an

advanta,(.),,e in leadership selections. Of the 53 candidatesto stand in leadership

selections in British political parties from 1963 to 1994,26 had served in the 'Great

offices of state', and only 9 of the 53 lackedCabinet or ShadowCabinet experience. '9

This illustrates two matters of significance.First, that Cabinet or shadow Cabinet

experienceis essentialfor leadershipcandidates, and second,that experiencein one of

the 'great offices of state', is often an essentialrequirement.

The level of progression or decline in a candidate's career at the time of a

selection must be addressed.If a candidate'scareer was progressingtowards an

achievement,or an occupation of the great offices of state,this appearsto give them

an advantageover candidateswho may have previously occupied one of the most

senior positions, but whose careerpaths had moved into less senior positions at the time of a selection.The Parliamentaryposition of candidatesin terms of whetherthey

were members of the House of Commons, the traditional career path to the

Premiership,or whether they were membersof the House of Lords, may have an

19Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 85 16 influenceon the outcome.These issues raise aspects of great significance.First, that if a candidate has experience of office as Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, or Home

Secretary, but no longer occupies one of those offices, then their chances of attaining the leadershipwill be reduced.The level of this reductionof their chanceswill depend on how far they have fallen away from the summit of political office. The clearest example of this is the candidacy of R. A. Butler in the Conservative Party selections of

1957 and 1963. Butler was Chancellor from 1951 to 1955, but was Leader of the

Commons and Lord Privy Seal at the time of the selection of Harold Macmillan in

1957, who had replaced Butler at the Treasury in December 1955. In 1963, Butler was

First Secretary of State, and de facto Deputy Prime Minister, having previously been

Home Secretary from 1957 to 1962. Butler's career at the time of both selections can, therefore,be perceivedto have been in decline away from the principal offices of goverment. The failure of Dennis Healey's candidacy in the 1980 Labour Party selection is another example. Healey had been Chancellor in the 1976-79 Labour government, and the May 1979 election defeat may have led him to be perceived as having experienced a step away from the principal offices of state, and reduced his status. On similar lines, the failure of Kenneth Clark in the 1997 Conservative Party selectionof William Haguecan be explainedin this way. Clark had beenChancellor in the 1992-97Conservative administration, and the massiveelection defeat of May 1997 may havereduced his status.

The level of 'insider' statusof a candidateis of great importancein an analysis of leadershipselections, and thereforerequires definition. The move from 'outsider' statusto 'insider' statusin a political party seemsto developover a numberof stages.

A politician is an 'outsider' at the start of their careersas a junior back-bencher.If they 17 do not progress beyond back-bench status, thev remain political 'outsiders' in the partv. The first stage of 'Insider' status is an attainment of a junior government position, as a Parliamentary Private Secretary, or an Under- Secretary. The second stacreis promotion to ministerial or Cabinet rank. The attainment of one of the 'great offices of state' marks the final stage,It) and a full achievementof 'insider' status. This marks the ultimate step in 'insider' status in a political party. This level of progression is displayed in the following diagram. Ic

Dia! ýram Two: Levels of Progression from 'Outsider' to 'Insider' Status in a Political

Party

'outsider ...... 'insider': first ta e ------* 'Insider- second stag junior back-bench MP Junior government position Ministerial and Cabinet

position

, great offices of state'

This section analysesthe different status of the candidatesin both selections by analysing the above criteria, and assesses the importance of their party status in their selection. This part of the Individual Interpretation is analysedin chapter three. 18

7he Candidatesand their Actions

This section analysesthe importanceof the candidates'actions and conduct during the selections. The issues for consideration here are first, the reaction of the candidatesto the possibilityof their candidature,and how this affectedtheir conductin the rest of the selectionprocess. Stark has correctly identifiedthree aspectsthat need consideration in analysing candidates' decisions to stand. The first aspect is whether the candidates' participation in the selection was expected. The 1963 selection was unique in this respect, as the situation was complicated by the passageof the Peerage

Act in July 1963. This Act allowed peers to renounce their peerages, and stand for electionto the Commons.This meantthat both Lords Home and Hailshambecame candidatesin the 1963 selection,when they were not previouslyexpected to stand.

This was especiallythe casewith Home, who did not enterthe contestuntil late in the controversy.In many selections,candidacies can be foreseenand predicted,but the eventual victor can often be perceived as a shock. Examples of this include Thatcher's victory in 1975, and Major's in 1990. Another significant point here is that selections occurring when a party is in goverment can attract more candidates than those in parties in opposition, as the new leader is certain to become Prime Nfinister. However, as Stark has pointed out, this is unconfirmedby the data of selectionsin Britain from

1963 to 1994. He notes that selectionsin governing and opposition parties have averagedsimilar numbersof candidates.These are 4.0 in governingparties, and 3.5 in 20 opposition partieS.

The second aspect is the apparent (or declared) motivation behind the candidacy.There appearto be three broad motivations for standingin a leadership

20Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 95 19 selection.First, the candidatesbelieve they can win. This is the dominantmotivation, and Stark's analysishas shownthat 36 of the 53 candidatesin British contestsfrom

1963 to 1994 stood to win. However, in only 6 of the 16 contests over that period, did all the candidates stand to win. These were the 1963 Conservative contest, the 1967

Liberal contest, the 1976 Liberal contest, the 1982 SDP contest, the 1988 Liberal

Democrat contest, and the 1990 Conservative contest.21 It is a matter of great

here, ConservativeParty's informal significanceC. to note that the method of selection before 1965, was designed to find candidates who could win, and were thus not determinedby any other motive. The formal electionprocedure by a secretballot of

NTs openedthe procedureto candidatesof all three motivations.This was certainly the casewith John Redwood's candidacy in the 1995 Conservative Party contest, as he stood primarily to enhancehis reputationas a possible'leader-in-waiting'. This was illustrated by his candidacy in the 1997 election, following Major's resignation.

The second motive is that candidateswant to enhancetheir reputations and be seenas a 'leader-in-waiting',as preparationfor a future contest.This appearsto be the second most dominant motive, and examplesof this include James Callaghan's candidacy in the 1963 Labour Party contest, Geoffrey Howe's and JamesPrior's in the

1975Conservative contest, and as alreadynoted, John Redwood's candidacy in 1995.

The third, is they wish to attract attentionto themselves,to enhancetheir reputationas politicians rather than as 'leaders-in-waiting', and also to attract attention to a particular issuethat they are committedto. This is the least commonmotive, and the following exampleshave beencited: Enoch Powell in the 1963 Conservativecontest,

Bryan Gould in the 1992 Labour contest, and Anthony Meyer in the 1989

21Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 100 20

22 Conservativecontest. Another motive that appearsto be lesscommon is the wish to

removean incumbentftom office. This motive could be appliedto Anthony Meyer in

1989, and Nlichael Heseltine in 1990. However, this motive is often in alignment with

other motives, particularly the belief in victory, and this was the case with Heseltine's

candidacy in 1990. The third aspect concerns whether the leadership selection rules

were a factor in the candidate'sdecision to stand.This is particularlythe casewith the

ConservativeParty's selectionsbefore 1965, where only the motivation of winning was of prime significance, as the party's senior figures would not consider candidates with other motivesas viableleadership candidates. 2'

Another significant area for consideration are the 'campaigns' of the candidates.As the Conservative Party selections of 1957 and 1963 were 'magic circle' selections,campaigns were not as importantas in formal elections.The actionsof the candidatesduring the selectionprocess is of obvioussignificance to their candidature as perceptions of them could change dramatically during the selection process.

Teadership selections resolved by the magic circle typically did not involve anything

be 'campaign'. This informal which could easily recognisedC, as a was one of the selection systems supposedvirtues: candidateswere not seento be competing against 24 one another. This, however,changed with the 1963Conservative Party selection,as the announcementof Macmillan's intention to resign during the Party Conferenceat

Blackpool created a situation where the candidates could 'campaign' for the leadership,and turned the Conferenceinto a US-style leadershipconvention. This developmentplayed a major part in the downfall of the informal system, and its

22Stark, ChoosingA Leader p.99 23Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 85 24Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 106 21 replacementby a formal election procedure of the party's NTs in 1965. The motives andimpact behind these actions will alsobe assessed.

Leadership campaigns are of great importance in leadership elections, as it gives the opportunity for the candidatesto compete for the support of the selectorate.

Starkhas assertedthat leadershipcampaigns only matter if the outcomeof the contest would have beendifferent if the ballot for the electionhad taken place before, rather

25 than after, the campaigning. However, this analysis is restrictive, and ignores the importance of campaigning Stark is correct in asserting4D that campaigning is only .,. important if it affected the result of the selection, and the 1963 Conservative Party

illustrates have selection the effect that campaigningZD can on the result of a selection.

This was becauseHailsham, Butler and Maudling's chancesof successwere adversely affectedby their 'campaigning'at the Party Conference.Home's conductat the Party

Conferenceleft him in he did did a stronger0 position, as not appearas a candidateand not overtly campaign, but he nevertheless performed well at the Conference. What

Stark's assertiondoes ignore is that all campaignscan be saidto have someeffect, as they all either improve or weaken candidates' chances,and it is only the level of that effectthat differs in impact.This is especiallythe casein ConservativeParty selections since 1965, as the campaigns of Margaret Thatcher in 1975, John Major in 1990 and

1995, and William Hague in 1997, all contributed significantly to their victories. The

1975,1990 and 1997 selections show this as the outcomes were not predicted before campaigningbegan, and in 1995,Major's campaignappears to have consolidatedhis support in the party. The candidates'actions and conduct in the two selectionsare analysedin chaptersfour and six.

'5 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 117 22

The Situational Interpretation

Ae Situation and its Requirements

The influence of the situation and circumstancesthat the party found itself in will be assessedhere. These will be shown to set the basic terms and requirements that the successfulcandidate must fiilfil when he or she succeedsas party leader. The aspects of the situation that are assessedare first, the state of the party. If the party was disunitedand low on morale,then the new leadermust reuniteit and invigorateit.

The second concerns whether a general election was imminent. If an election was imminent, then the candidates must demonstrate that they had the necessaryqualities to appeal to the electorate. This is always an important attribute, but becomes of most significancein selectionsnear to a generalelection. The third concernsthe party's reputation.If the party had lost a reputationfor governmentalcompetence, then the new leader must demonstratethe necessaryministerial skills, experience and effectivenessto improve the party's reputation. An important analytical distinction will be made in the assessmentof this factor. This is between the different importance of competence and effectiveness. The new leader must demonstrate an effectiveness at leading from the front. This is of more significance than competence, as competence doesnot necessarilyendow the candidatewith an ability to direct and dictate as head of a govemment. 23 ne SelectionProcedure: Formal Aspectsand Informal Networks i) Formal Aspects

The by leaders is leadership procedure which are selected a significant0 aspect of selection. The most important aspect of the selection procedure is that it should produce a satisfactory outcome -a good leader. A leader of a political party has many important functions, and must fulfil the roles of 'Election-winner, party-unifier,

Cabinet-maker, Cabinet-manager and inter-party broker', among others.26 This illustrates the importance of the analytical framework developed in the study, as the first concernselectability, the second,acceptability, and the final three, govemability.

The determine importance circumstancessurrounding ZDa selectionwill the exact of each criteria, but as the former Liberal leader, Lord Grimond, once stated, 'The trick of beinga "good" leaderis to be on the stagewhen the audienceis readyto like your sort of performance'.27 The selectionsystem should be practicaland flexible, andbe ableto meet the needs of a political party at a particular time, but the most important aspect is producingthe right outcome.It mustalso be regardedZ' as legitimateby the participants, the party and the public. The 1963 Conservative Party selection of Home signalledCý the downfall of the Conservatives informal system of 'emergence', as the nature of

Home's selection undermined the system becauseof the atmosphereof conspiracy that surroundedit, and the adversereaction it inspiredin Home's opponents,the Labour

Party andthe public. The acceptabilityand the credibility of the systemhad collapsed.

An important factor is whether the systemhas an influence on the types of leadersthat were selected.Punnett has argued'the particularmethod that a party uses

26R. A Punnett,Selecting The PartyLeader. Britain in ComparativePerspective, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf,1992), p. 11 27The Independent,29 July 1988in Punnett,Selecting The Partv Leade p. 12 24 to select its leaders is likely to affect the types of persons that emerge, and the abilities they bring them' 2' This is is interest with . certainly true, and of most when applied to the Conservative Party's method of selecting its leaders before 1965, as there was no definiteprocedure, so the methodused in each selectionuntil 1965 was designedto find the right person for the situation that the party found itself in. The methods used by the party in the two selections of 1957 and 1963 analysed in this study, involved informal consultation within the upper echelons of the party - what could be termed the party hierarchy, to find the leader most acceptableto the party. The party hierarchy is the group of senior and influential figures at the apex of the party, in both the

Parliament (the House of Commons and House of Lords), and the party in the country.

This group of senior figures and party managersplay a major role in the key decisions

in that are taken the managementCP and co-ordinationof the party, suchas the selection of a new leader. An important fact that must be noted is that this group is not a monolithicblock - its membershipvaries depending on the decisionthat must be taken, and the pressuresof the situationthat the party finds itself in. However, certain key figures always appear to be constant members of the party hierarchy. These are the

Prime Minister, the Chairman of the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers, the Chief Whip in the Houseof Commons,the Chief Whip in the Houseof Lords, the party chairmanand the chairmanof the NUCUA, and constituencyassociations.

What Macmillan termed in 1963 as 'the customary processes of consultation' did not exist, as there were no clearly definedrules to the procedure.The new leader gemerged'as the right man to unite the party, manageit and lead it to victory in the

GeneralElection. This final requirementbecame of particular importanceif a General

" Punnett, Selecting The Party Leade p.2 25

Election was imminent.Leadership selection procedures are dynamicprocesses, and

the Conservative Party before 1965, altered its method of selection to meet the

requirementsof each situation that the party found itself in. There were core principles

on which eachselection was built, but the procedurewas meantto be flexible, so as to

meet the requirements of each situation. This means that the formal aspects of the proceduresused in 1957 and 1963 are an important part of the analysis of the outcome

It is interesting in Britain has of each selection. 0 to note that each political party

changedits leadershipselection procedure on more than one occasionsince the two

leadership selections of 1957 and 1963. After Home's resignation in 1965, the

Conservative Party formally elected its new leader, Edward Heath, using an election of

its NVs by secret ballot. This was a changeHome was instrumental in instituting, as he

saw that the procedureby which he was selectedwas tainted beyond repair. The

ConservativeParty used this systemof a secret ballot of the party's Ws until the

election of William Hague as successor to John Major in June 1997. Following his

election, Hague introduced a system of one member, one vote (OMOV) for the

election of future Conservative leaders. The Labour Party introduced an electoral college process for the election of party leaders in 1981, and the Liberals (and

subsequently,the Liberal Democratsafter the merger of the Liberals and the Social

DemocraticParty in 1988) electednew leadersby a ballot of party membersfrom

1976. This shows the importance of analysing the selection procedure in each selection,as the characteristicsof the systeminfluence the outcomeffindamentally.

f 26 ii) Informal Networksof Communication

The informal networks and lines of communication within political parties are of importance in leadershipselections, and this is particularly the case with the

Conservative Party's methods of selection before 1965. Punnett has noted the importance of informal networks in selection procedures, as 'the formal rules of a leader-selection system do not necessarily reveal how the process will actually operate.'29 These informal networks exist in two broad forms. The first are those within the party itself These serve as lines of communication within the party hierarchy,and help to find the leaderwho is most acceptableto the party. 'No matter how democratic and open a leader-selection system may appear on the basis of the formal rules, in practice it may be managed by an elite.)30 There are also lines of communicationwithin the party that link the upper reachesof the party to the back- benchesand grass-rootsorganisations. The 1922 Committeeof back-benchersin the

Conservative Party and its executive, serve to communicate opinion to the leadership stratum, and the NUCUA serves the same purpose for the constituency membership.

The secondset of lines of communicationare those betweenthe party and the press.

These often serve as a meansof the party hierarchy filtering information to the press in situations like the 1963 Conservative Party selection, when the party hierarchy wanted to prepare the party and the public for the emergenceof Home. These are also significantin the oppositionthat can developto the emergenceof one particularleader, and act as feeders'Of information to the opponents,particularly if the press is in sympathywith the opponents.

29Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader p. 10 30Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 10 27

Stark has arguedthat 'the outcomeof a contesthas little to do with who is making the choice', and it is the qualities of the candidates and the situation in which the contest arisesthat determineswho wins. He argues that different electorates appear to apply the same criteria of acceptance, electability and competence in leadership selections, and 'the fact that leadership selection rules determine the composition of the leadershipelectorate does not mean that the rules determinethe outcome of contests'. Thus, he argues that 'there is little support for the view that how parties

leadersdetermines This choosetheir who they will choose'.3' assessmentappears to be restrictive,and ignoresthe importancethat different selectionprocedures can have on the outcome of selections. The most prominent example of the effect a selection procedure can have on a selection is the 1963 Conservative Party selection of Home.

Home would not havebeen elected in a ballot of the party's Ws, the systemused to select Home's successor,Edward Heath in 1965, and if that system had been used in

1963 the likely victor would have been Butler or Reginald Maudling.

YheAcceptability Criterion

This is the first of the core criteria that must be met by candidates for the leadersl-ýip,if they are to be serious contenders. This criterion means the attribute of acceptabilityin the party, and the consequentability to unite it. It denotesacceptability to the party principally, and public acceptanceis a secondaryconsideration to this.

Variousaspects of this mustbe analysed.The first is the extentto which candidatesare acceptableto the party in a generalsense. If the candidatesarouse hostility, or havea history of arousing hostility in the party, this will affect their fulfilment of this

31Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 131,and pp.137-138 28 requirement.The secondis the extent of opposition to the candidatesin the party.

Whether the opposition is from a small or a large section of the party, is of obvious significance in this respect. The third aspect is from what area of the party this opposition comes from. If it is from a section that has major influence in the party, this will affect candidates' fulfilment of the criteria. However, if it is from a small and insignificantrp grouping, this may not affect the level of the candidates'acceptability in the eyes of the selectoratewho determine the decision.

This factor has been termed the 'first-order criterion' and is certainly of massivesignificance, as disunitedparties do not operateeffectively in government,and do As Stark has 'in not win general elections. suggested,0 assessingthe relative merits of leadership candidates, a party's highest priority is to select someone who will preservethe unity of the party'. However, as Stark argues, this is not the only considerationin selectinga leader, and the level of determinantimportance of this criterion depends on the extent of disunity in the party at the time of the selection.

'Only in extraordinary circumstances does this unity goal become an explicit consideration'.Stark offers the exampleof the selectionof Michael Foot as Labour

Party leader in 1980, as a selection when a party was in almost complete disunity, and acceptability was the decisive criterion. 32 The selection of William Hague as

ConservativeParty leaderin June 1997 following the Conservative'sworst election defeatsince 1906 can alsobe cited as an example,as the party was an almostcomplete stateof disunity.

Rather than the ultimate detern-dningfactor, the acceptabilityfactor can be termed as the basecriterion which must be achieved,if a candidatehas any chanceof

32Stark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 126 29 being in leadershipklection. It is first but decisive 0 successful a the goal not alwaysthe one, as many factors are taken into account in the selection of a party leader. However, in many cases, if a candidate fulfils the acceptability factor, then he or she usually becomesleader, even if other candidatesbetter fulfil the other criteria.

TheElectability Criterion

This factor is often of prime significance in leadershipselection, especially if the selection occurs at a time when a general election is imn-dnent.This criterion revolves arounda perceivedability to win generalelections, as judged by the party hierarchy.

Electoral appealis of obvious importanceto leadershipcandidates, and is a major factor in the decision of the selectorate.If parties do not win elections they do not gain or retain power, and are ineffectiveas a party or potentialparty of government.This factor has been correctly tenned 'the second-ordercriterion', as it is the second fundamental factor that candidates must achieve in order to gain the leadership.

Acceptability is the first as disunited parties do not win elections, and then electability comes to the fore, as parties do not gain power if their leader is unelectable. The aspects that candidates must achieve in order to be seen as electable include first, a good public image that reaches out to the electorate generally and, most significantly, doesnot offend any significantsection of the electorate.Secondly, candidates must be good public performersand communicators.This is distinct from an ability to perform in the House of Commons,and an ability on a public platform is of more importance.

Third, is good public visibility. A candidatethat currently holds one of the 'great offices of state' would find this easierto achieve,as he or shewould be widely known to the electorate,because of the statusand public visibility of the post. A failure to 30 fulfil these aspects seriously affected a candidates chances of gaining the leadership.

This was especially true if a candidate was not widely known to the electorate, or perhaps more significantly, it offended a section of it and aroused hostility in the country.

Different circumstances obviously require different leaders, and a specific circumstancethat increasesthe importance of electability, is whether a selection takes place when a general election is imminent. However, other circumstances affect the types of leaders that will be chosen based on their level of electability. Some examples of this from formal leadershipelections, include the election of John Major as

Conservative Party leader in November 1990, in succession to Margaret Thatcher.

Major was chosen, as Thatcher's increasingly conflictorial style was offending

Conservativevoters, and causingparty disunity. A generalelection was due in 1992, so the party removed Thatcher from office, after the challenge of Michael Heseltine against her leadership, as it was felt she would not win the next general election. Major was chosen for his more conciliatory and voter-fiiendly image, that signified a change of style, not substance,that contributed to the Conservative Party's fourth successive election victory in April 1992. Another recent example is the election of Tony Blair as

Labour Party leader in 1994. Blair was elected after the death of John Smith, as he offereda new imagethat denoteda sea-changefrom 'old Labour' to 'new Labour', as the image of 'old Labour' was perceivedto have contributed to the party's poor electabilityfrom 1979, and this was exacerbatedafter the party's fourth successive defeat in April 1992. 31

TheGovernability Criterion

This factor is the ability, or perceived ability, to implement policy prograrnmes and managegovernment affairs - to govem the country. Significantaspects that come under considerationhere are whether a candidatehas wide and extensiveministerial experience,especially in the domestic arena. For parties in opposition, a senior position on the oppositionfront-bench would denotegovernability. This would count heavilyin a candidate's favour, as it would enhancetheir reputation in the party as an effective

Mnister. Secondly, concerns whether a candidate has held, or is currently in occupation of one of the three 'great offices of state'. Current occupation of one of theseposts is a major advantageto candidates,and this is more significantthan having previouslyheld one of the posts,as this signifiesthat a candidate'scareer is in decline, away from the summit of government. An aspect of major importance is the candidates' reputation for effectiveness, as compared to competence. Competence in government illustrates an ability to fulfil a role as a Minister, whereas effectiveness denotesa more dynamicreputation. This is an ability to makethings happen,and more importantly, to lead from the front, to direct affairs, as compared to just fulfilling a role in office. Demonstrating this attribute significantly enhanceda candidate's reputation, and their chancesof gaining the leadership.

The Assessmentof the Two LeadershipSelections using the Anal3jicalFramework

The analyticalframework outlined in this chapter will be applied to the two leadershipselections of 1957 and 1963, and will accountfor the selectionsof Harold

Macmillan in January 1957 and of Sir Alec Douglas-Homein October 1963. This assessmentwill be based primarily aroundthe candidates'fulfilment of the three main 32 criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability, but will demonstratethe importance of the other influential factors, such as the status of the candidates, their actionsduring C' the selections,the immediaterequirements of the situation,the selection procedure, and the informal networks of communication used in the selection procedure. The analysiswill, therefore, offer a full explanation of the two selectionsby consideringboth the criteria that candidatesare assessedon, and the other influences on the decisions that are made. The analysis takes into account both internal and external factors, direct and indirect factors, and assessesthe importance of the differencesof the situationssurrounding the two selections.

The assessmentof the candidates' fulfilment of the three core criteria will demonstratewhich of the criteria Macmillan and Home fulfilled, and therefore show which, if any, was consideredthe most important by the selectoratein that selection,

if determiningfactor. The be levelledin importancein and any was the 1.12 criteria will thus each selection. It is important to note that all the criteria are of vital consideration in leadership selections, so it will not be the case that any are discounted in importance, but the analysiswill demonstratewhether any were consideredof more importance during the selections. This multi-layered approach to the analysis will offer the fullest explanationof both outcomes.

The assessmentof the wider influential factors will serve to emphasisethe distinctionsbetween each selection, and analysethe role of externalfactors suchas the circumstancessurrounding the selections,and the natureof the influenceof the aspects of the selectionprocedure, both formal and informal. Thesewill be shownto set the basic terms of referencefor the core acceptability, electability, and governability criteria. The Analytical Framework and Party Leadership Selection in Britain: 1957-1997

The following table sets out an analysis of leadership selections in the British

Conservative and Labour Parties from 1957 to 1997, using the three core situational criteria of Acceptability, Electability and Governability. It is based on a range of primary sources and secondary sources on leadership selection in Britain.

Table One: The Acceplahility, Electabihýv, and Govertiabdhý- Criteria and ParlY Leadership Selection in the British Conservative and Lahour Parties: 19517-199

1957 Conservative Acceptability Macmillan Macmillan Electability Macmillan Governability Macmillan/Butler 1963 Labour Acceptability Wilson Wilson Electability Wilson Governability Wilson 1963)Conservative Acceptability Home Home Electability Hailsham/Home Governability Butler/Maudling 1965 Conservative Acceptability Heath/Maudling Heath Electability Heath./Maudling Governability Heath/Maudlinc, 1975 Conservative Acceptability Whitelaw Thatcher Electability Whitelaw Governability Whitelaw 1976 Labour Acceptability Callaghan Callaý, -han Electability Callaghan Governability Callaghan 1980 Labour Acceptability Foot Foot Electability Healey Governability Healey/Foot 1983)Labour Acceptability Kinnock Kinnock Electability KinnocUHatterslev Governability Kinnock 1988 Labour Acceptability Kinnock Kinnock Electability Kinnock Governability Kinnock 1989 Conservative Acceptability Thatcher Thatcher Electability Thatcher Governability Thatcher

The format for this table is based on a similar anal-N-sisbv Stark in Choosing A Leader. p. 132. 34

1990 Conservative Acceptability Major Major Electability Major/Heseltine Governability Major/Hurd 1992 Labour Acceptability Smith Smith Electability Smith Governability Smith 1994 Labour Acceptability Blair Blair Electability Blair Governability Blair 1995 Conservative Acceptability Major Major Electability Major Governability Major 1997 Conservative Acceptability Hague Hague Electability Hague/Clarke Governability I Clarke/Howard

The table shows that in the fifteen contests between 1957 and 1997, the winners of the contests most often met the acceptability criterion, as fourteen of the fifteen winners met this. Only in the 1975 Conservative contest did the winner not meet the acceptabilitycriterion, and sioficantly, the victor, Margaret Thatcher, did not meet any of the criterion in that contest. This contest is thus unique in leadership

34 1957 The selections since . next most commonly met criterion was electability, and thirteen of the fifteen winners met this. Only in the 1975 Conservative, and 1980

Labour contestwas this criterion not met. In both instances,the partieswere in a state of disunity and weaknessafter an election defeat, and the dominant need was for 35 Unity. Governability was the least met criterion, and eleven winners met this. Winners met all criterion in elevencontests. Only in the 1963Conservative, 1975 Conservative,

1980Labour and 1997 Conservative,were all criterion not met by the winners.Thus, acceptabilitywas the most common criterion to be achievedby eventualvictors in leadership selectionsfrom 1957 to 1997, with 93.3% of victors achieving this criterion.

34For an analysisof the 1975Conservative Party Selection,see chapter one, pp.40-43 35Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader,p. 61 for an accountof the stateof the ConservativeParty in the 1975leadership election, and p.p. 91-94 for the stateof the LabourParty in the 1980leadership election. 35

Electability was the next most common, with 86.6% of victors achieving this.

Governability was the least conunon with 73.3% of victors fulfilling this criterion. The

following table displays this data.

Table Two: Totals of Winners of Leadership Selections, 1957 to 1997, and their fuyi'lment of the Acceptability, Electability, and Governability Criteria

Criteria Winners fuIrilling each Percentages of winners criteria in leadership fulfilling each criteria (%) selections from 1957 to 1997. Total = 15 winners Acceptability 14 93.3 Electability 13 86.6 Governability 11 73.3 All three criteria 11 73.3

What these figures show is that all, or virtually all, winners in leadership

contestsmust be acceptableto the party, and this is the basecriterion on which they

are fundamentallyjudged. However, virtually all candidatesmust also be perceivedto

be electable to be successful, and candidates are also judged strongly on their I

experience as a senior member of the government or opposition. Despite the

acceptability criterion being met by the most winners, the difference between the

figures of winners who met all three criteria (73.3%) is not a major difference, and

points to the significance of achieving all three in leadership selections. It appearsthat

the exactcircumstances of the selectionsaffect the importanceof eachcriterion, but all

are of fundamentalimportance in determiningthe outcomeof leadershipselections.

This analysis illustrates a number of points of significance.First, that if

candidatesare to win the contest, they must be acceptableto the party, and offer

prospectsof uniting it, or retaining unity. Second,that candidatesmust be seenas

electableand presenta good public image, and be a good public performer. Third, 36

7 is important in if have ,governability an attribute most cases,and candidates experience as a memberof Cabinetsor ShadowCabinets, this givesthem a clear advantage.It is also clear from the contests of 1957 to 1997 that experiencein one of the 'great offices of state',or the shadowpositions, gives candidates a distinct advantage.

The analysis of the contests using the three core criteria also shows that being the strongestcandidate on all three criteria most often has resultedin that candidate beingelected, but it is possibleto reachconclusions on whetherany of the criteria are more important than any of the others. Despite the fact that most victors met the acceptability criterion, this does not mean that this is the most important. The closenessof the numbersmeeting C) the electability criterion to those who attained acceptability(thirteen to fourteen),shows that both appearto be of equal significance in leadershipselections, and of more importance than the governability criterion.

Governability is still of real significance in leadership selections, shown by eleven of the fifteen winners attaining this, but it is apparent that acceptability and electability are of more importance in leadership selectionsthan goverriability.

Rather than the criteria being seen as separate objectives to be met in leadership selections, it is more useful to see them as part of a progressive level of suitability for the position. If candidates cannot unite parties (acceptability), they cannotwin electionsas the electoraterarely votes for disunitedparties (electability), and if they cannotwin elections,they are not in a position to govern (govemability).

The criteria form part of a leadershipsequence that must be fulfilled for the leaderto be successful.The relative importanceof the criteria in specificleadership selections are often, therefore, determinedby the exact circumstancesof the situation that the party finds itself in. The imminenceof a generalelection increases the importanceof 37 electability, for instance. This demonstrates how the wider individual and situational criteria set the terms of referenceon which the core criteria arejudged. It is usefulto see the three criteria as part of the stages towards the party's attainment of a successful leader. Acceptability is the core criterion, the foundation upon which a successfulcandidacy is built. Electability follows on from this at the next level, leadingr) towards a successfulleadership. Governability moves the leadershipcandidacy onto the final level, that of governance.

The Individual and Situational Criteria and Specific Leadership Selections in Britain,

1957-1997

The following broad data leadership in Britain COsection relates the on selection from 1957 to 1997, using the acceptability,electability and governabilitycriteria, to specificexamples to illustratehow the analysiscan be usedto explainthe outcomesof leadership selections. The selections chosen for use are the 1965 and 1975

Conservative Party selections, and the 1980,1983 and 1992 Labour Party selections.

These five selections have been chosen for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate selections that used different formal procedures - the 1965 and 1975 Conservative selections used a secret ballot by the party's NTs, and the 1980,1983 and 1992

Labour selectionsused a ballot of the ParliamentaryParty in 1980, and an electoral collegeof the ParliamentaryLabour Party, the unions and the constituencyparties in

1983and 1992.Second, they illustratehow different situationsand circumstances,and how candidates'reputations can affect selections. 38

777e1965 Conservative Party Selection

The selection of Edward Heath to succeed Sir Alec Douglas-Home ifi July

1965 was the first formal leadership election in the Conservative Party. Heath was electedby a secretballot of the party's NTs, and despitenot achievingC, the required majority, becameleader after Reginald Maudling, his only rival, decided not to stand in the required secondballot. On the three core criteria, acceptability,electability, and

Heath Maudling individual governability, and ZDwere of equal status,and the wider and situationalfactors determined the outcome.

The party status of the candidateswas significant. Following the election defeat in 1964, Home had Heath Shadow Chancellor, Maudling Shadow appointed as and =1

Foreign Secretary.This was a'significantZ.7 promotion for Heath, and a demotion for

Maudling his his Home. Maudling had that affected statusand prospectsof succeedingID been Chancellor in the Macmillan and Home administrations,and was widely discredited after the election defeat for his failure to provide an upturn in the economy

36 to coincide with the election. Maudling's appointment as Shadow Foreign Secretary signified a downturn in his leadership prospects, as Home was a former Foreign

Secretary, and as party leader, took the dominant role in foreign affairs.

Heath's promotion to Shadow Chancellorsignified that he was seen as the

'leader-in-waiting', and was favouredby Home to be his successor.His handlingof the opposition's response to the government's Finance Bill in 1965 impressed

ConservativeNVs improved his though Maudling favourite and position, Zýwas the becauseof his wider ministerialexperience. 37 The conductand campaigningof Heath

16See I Campbell,Edward Heath. A Biography,(London: Cape, 1993), p. 166for detailsof the effect of Heathand Maudling's appointmentsin the ShadowCabinet in 1964on their leadershipprospects. 37A. Watkins,The RoadTo NumberTen: From Bonar Law to Tony Blair, (London:Duckworth, 1998),p. 186;Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 130;and I Ramsden,The Winds of Change:Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975,(London: Longman, 1996),pp. 235-236 39

Maudling in the Maudling to take diffident and 0 was significant result. appeared a attitude to the selection at the outset, whereas Heath organised his campaign well.

'Heath's brisker campaign was efficient, well organised and much and more aggressiveZP than Maudling's'. 38Ramsden has noted the importance of the press reporting on the difference of the two men's styles, and that Butler and Macleod switched their

ftom Maudling to Heath because his '9 allegiance0 C) of aggressiveCý campaigningCl and style.

This illustrates the the in determining It significance of campaigning 0 the outcome. was also important in that the party was selecting a Leader of the Opposition, not a Prime

Nfinister. The party needed someone who displayed a combative style to take on

Harold Wilson, rather than an emphasison ministerial experience, as the party wanted

40 Capolitical bully'.

Maudling's relaxedattitude convincedmany Conservative NTs that Heath was

better to take Wilson 41 Maudling's has been described the option on . Zý campaign as lethargic, as he did not even canvasshis colleaguesin the Shadow Cabinet. His tactics were to rely on a reaction to Heath's role in Home's downfall, and to portray

Maudling as the family man, against -Heath the bachelor. Given the outcome, his

42 This the importance the strategy was not successful . signifies of candidates' personalities,the situation and circumstances,as the Conservativesneeded a leader

Wilson in Commons who would provide strong0 oppositionto the and the country, as

38N. Fisher, The Tory Leaders. Their Struggle For Power, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 125 " Ramsden, Winds of Change, p.237 40Ramsden, The Winds of Change, p. 238 41See Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 166; and D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home. (London: Sinclair- Stevenson, 1996), pp. 386-390 for Home's support of Heath and the decline of Maudling's position regarding the leadership. Maudling denies he was diffident and 'lazy' towards the 1965 selection and states that he did not overtly campaign for the leadership as he felt the opportunity should be offered to him, rather than fighting for it. Fighting for the leadership would have made his task as leader far more difficult. For details seeR. Maudling, Memoirs, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1978), pp. 136-137 42Fisher, The Tory Leaders, pp. 124-125 40

43 an electionwas imminentdue to the narrownessof Labour's electionvictory. As the

two candidateswere equalon the three core criteria, their statusand conduct,and the

situation surroundingZP the selection played a major role in determiningC. the selection of

Edward Heath in 1965. As The Economist's Alistair Burnett noted, the party picked

Heath as the man 'most likely to bullock their way back into power'. 44

Yhe1975 Conservative Party Selection

This contest is unique in leadership selections between 1957 and 1997, as this

was the only contestthat sawthe eventualvictor not meetany of the three core criteria

of acceptability, electability and governability. Margaret Thatcher's victory can be

accountedfor by the circumstancesof the selection,and the reputationsand conductof

the other candidates,principally William Whitelaw, Thatcher'smain opponentin the

secondballot. There was a wide feelingin the ConservativeParty that Edward Heath

could no longer continue as Conservative leader after two successiveelection,, defeats,

and that Heathite Conservatism had run its course. Thatcher's narrow, but

nevertheless,impressive, victory over Heath in the first ballot opened the way for a I contest between Thatcher and other widely tipped successors.Thatcher's victory was

so impressive, as she was not an expected successorto Heath, and did not have wide

governmentalexperience. An importantsituational factor was the circumstancesof the

contest.It hasbeen widely acknowledgedthat there was 'a dearthof talent at the top'

in 1975, as Maudling and Powell were no longer contenders.Whitelaw was the

43Fisher hasargued that this contestcentred. on the differenceof personalitiesof Heathand Maudling. This is in The Tory Leaders,p. 126 '4 Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 238 41 beneficiary of tl-ýis,but he was too loyal to Heath to exploit it, and felt that as Party

Chairman, appointed by Heath, he could not oppose him.45

Thus, the circumstancesof the discrediting,of the Heath administrationand his brand Conservatism, desire for led of and the growingcý a move to the right,Zý to

Thatcher's victory in the first ballot, and the momentum of that victory carried her through to defeat Whitelaw decisivelyin the secondballot. In the secondballot,

Thatcher gained 52.9% of the vote, to Whitelaw's 28.6%. The reputation of the candidateswas important in the selection, as Thatcher campaigned vigorously in the first and second ballots. This persuadedmany NPs to vote for her in the first ballot as her led by Airey Neave, NVs her campaign0 team, told that candidacywas only a means of removingHeath, andthen someoneelse would win the secondballot. Thatcherwas

'stalking horse', designed beat Heath, but presentedas the Cl not to to take enough from him to the to Whitelaw 4' However, Thatcher's support away open contest up . widely unexpectedvictory over Heath led to the momentum that carried her through to victory over Whitelaw in the secondballot. Whitelaw's reputationwas also significant in Thatcher's victory. He was seen as an 'alternative Heathite', and with the move away from Heathite Conservatism that was signified by Thatcher's victory in the first ballot, this meanthe could not gain the necessarysupport to beat Thatcherwith this reputation. Conservative NTs had been coerced to move to a new brand of

Conservatism,after the two electiondefeats of 1974

45Fisher, The Tory Leaders 154 , p. 46Rarnsden, Winds of Change,p. 443 and 449. Ramsdennotes the importanceof Neave'srole and the under-estimationof Thatcher'schances of victory. 42

In the mood of the momentthe fact that, after Heath's fall, he

[Whitelaw] was the established candidate may not have been to

his advantage. He was too closely identified with the old regime

and with the old policiesto be acceptableto those who wanted

to the leadership to have a new look. 47

Similarly, Ramsden has noted that, '[Thatcher] acquired great credit simply by having forced the party into the decisionit had now taken, to get rid of Heath; the votes on the first ballot provedto Ws that without her determinationthey would have

decisionthat them did 48 This taken a most of not actuallywant' . explainsmuch about the decisionto selectThatcher as Heath's successor.She offered a new approach,and different policies,and the only real alternativeto Heath,Whitelaw, was trappedby his loyalty to him and his identification with the Heath regime. Whitelaw's loyalty to

Heath also determinedthe nature of his conduct,and led him to have a minimal and ineffective impact on the contest, despite being the best equipped candidate on the core criteria. Ramsdenhas also noted that the candidatesin the secondballot were 'tainted by their for Heath in the first ballot 49This denotes the cowardice' not standing against . importanceof the circumstancessurrounding the election,and the state of the party, and explainswhy the three core criteria of acceptability,electability, and governability, provedto be of little importancein the determinationof the outcome.The acceptability criterion cameinto play in the secondballot, as the other candidatesnow appearedto

47Fisher, The Tory Leaders 174 ' p. 41Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 451 49Fisher, The Toly Leaders,p. 153; Watkins,The Roadto NumberTen, p. 190;and Ramsden,Winds gf Change,p. 451 and 454 43 offer a threat to party unity, as if there had not beena secondballot, the party would haveunited aroundthe new leaderafter the first ballot.

1980 Labour Party Selection

The eventual victor in this contest, Michael Foot, fulfilled the acceptability and governability criteria, and his victory can also be explained by the circumstancesof the selection, and the reputation of Denis Healey, his main rival. Foot was the most acceptablecandidate, as Labour Ws and union leaderswere opposedto Healey's election,because of his reputationas Chancellorin the 1976-79Labour administration.

Healeyhad introduced measures which were controversialwith Labour NTs and union leaders, such as the measures during and following the RAF crisis of 1976.50 This showsthe importanceof Healey'sreputation and party statusin his failure to succeed

Callaghan.This led the initially reluctant Foot to be persuadedto stand by union leaders. 5'

Healey had more governmental experience than Foot, but his reputation was affectedby his role in the previousLabour governmentthat hadbeen defeated in 1979.

Foot was Deputy Leader to Callaghan in the 1976-79 goverment, and was loyal to

Callaghan.Healey's reputationwas in decline,while Foot's remainedstable after the electiondefeat. A significantfactor in Foot's victory was his popularity with the party outside Parliament.This was important, as Labour plannedto introduce an electoral college for the election of party leaders,which would be comprisedof NTs, union leaders,and constituencyparties. Foot was the most acceptablewith union leaders,

50Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 150 5' Callaghan has noted that Foot told him he did not intend to be a candidate. This is in M. Jones, NEchael Foot, 446 in Watkins, The Road to Number Ten 152. For details the p. ýumberp. of pressure put on Foot to stpd by union leaders, see Watkins, The Road to Ten, p.p. 152-156 44 and the party in the country, and was a well-liked NT. He played on the movement to an electoral college, and it contributed to his victory, as he would have won a contest 52 under the proposed electoral college system.

Ae 1983 Labour Party Selection

This contestused the electoralcollege system,under which NTs had 30% of the vote, union leadershad 40% of the vote, and constituencyofficials had 30% of the vote. The winner of this contest, Neil Kinnock, was seen as the 'acceptable face of the left' by NUs and union leaders,and he fulfilled the acceptability,electability, and governability criteria. His main rival, Roy Hattersley, fulfilled the electability criterion, but Kinnock was the widely expectedvictor from the outset of the contest,especially by the left of the party, who were in the ascendancy.53 The acceptabilityfactor appears to haveplayed the dominantrole in the selectionof Kinnock as leader,and Hattersley as deputy leader, as their alliance seemedto offer the best prospectsof unitingC) the party, as Kinnock represented the left and Healey the right. This alliance has been described as 'the dream ticket'. This was of major importance becauseof the divisions in the Labour Party after the massive election defeat of 1983, and points to the importance of the circumstances surrounding the selection.54 Kinnock gained a clear victory, showinghis acceptabilityto the party. He gained71 % of the total vote, and 38 of the 46 unionsrepresented supported him, 75% of Ws voted for hin-ýand almostall 55 of the constituency parties.

52This accountis basedon Punnett,Selecting The PartyLeader, pp. 91-94; and Watkins,The Roadto NumberTen pp.152-156 53Watkins, The Roadto hLumberTen, p. 162 54Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, pp.162-164 55This accountis basedon Punnett, The PartyLeade P.I 11; Watkins, The Roadto -Selecting , and NumberTen, pp.161-165. 45

777e1992 Labour Party Selection

John Smith succeededNeil Kinnock by a massive majority, following

Kinnock's resignation after the April 1992 election defeat. Kinnock himself felt Smith's election was inevitable, and advised the other contender, Bryan Gould, a close 56 associate of Kinnock's, against standing, as 'Smithy had got it all sewn Upi. Smith fulfilled all three core criteria, and from the beginningof the contestwas regardedas the likely victor. He receivedthe immediatebacking of the leadersof the three largest uruons.

This contest was not surrounded by the difficult circumstances of party disunity. It was not a battle betweenthe left and right of the party, as Kinnock's 0 reformsof the party had shiftedthe party to the right. Sn-dthrepresented the desireto continuethat processin an long-term effort to regain power, following the party's fourth successiveelection defeat. The only other candidate, Bryan Gould, was not a

57 seriouscontender, and the contestwas over differencesin tone and style, not policy.

The election of Margaret Beckett, a left-winger, also suited the circumstances of the election as the Strýith-Beckettalliance could be presentedas a 'dream ticket' of left and 's right, securing harmony and balance in the parliamentary party. Smith fulfilled the three core criteria, and was the most senior and experiencedof the candidates,and representedthe Labour Party's desireto continuethe processof reform to gain a more 59 moderate image, and regain power at the next general election.

56B. Gould, GoodbyeTo All That, p.253 in Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, p. 166 57Watkins, The RoadTo NumberTen, p. 168 51Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, p. 167 59The detailsof this contestare in Punnett,Selecting The Party Leader pp.115-118; and Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, pp.165-175 46

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the analytical framework to be used to analyse the Conservative Party selections of 1957 and 1963. The abstract section on the framework showedthat a wide range of individual and situationalfactors must be considered in an analysis of any leadership selection. This section, and the analysis of leadershipselection in Britain from 1957 to 1997, has shown that successfulcandidates must be assessedas being successfulon the three core situational criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability - they must demonstrate an ability to unite the party, to win electionsand govern effectively.However, the wider individual and situationalcriteria, such as the selectionprocedure, the reputationsand actionsof the candidates,and the circumstancessurrounding the selection,must be analysedas they often play a central, if not determinantrole, in the outcomeof leadershipselections.

As hasbeen stressed,they set the basic terms of referenceon which the core criteria are judged. This shows the significance of usingC, an inclusive, interactionist approach to analyse all the individual and situational factors that contribute to the outcome of leadership selections, and this will be demonstrated by the analysis of the 1957 and

1963 Conservative Party selectionsusing this analytical framework. 47

Chapter Two

The Conservative Party and The Selection of Its Leaders

This chapter has five sections. The first is a summary of the Conservative

Party's selection of its leaders from 1902 to 1965. The second analysesthe functions of ConservativeParty leaders.The third discussesthe formal aspectsof the selection procedure. The fourth analyses the importance of the informal networks of communication used in the selection procedure. The final section analyses the situationalparallels and distinctionsin the outcomesof the selectionsfrom 1902 to

1965

The Selection of Conservative Party Leaders: 1902-1965

This century the Conservative Party has had a variety of experiences in the selectionof its leaders.The natureof the experienceoften dependedon whether the party was in opposition or in power, whether there was an obvious heir apparent, and whetherthere was contentionover who shouldbecome leader. This section has two parts. The first discussesthose occasions when the leaderslýiippassed to obvious heir apparentswhile the party was in power, and the changeoverswere swift and easyand illustratedthe benefitsof the system.These occurred in 1902,1921,1922,1937 and

1955. Interestingly, three of these (Austen and Neville Chamberlain,and Anthony

Eden),were failuresas party leader. The secondpart discussesthose selectionswhich involved competitionfor the leadership.This is definedas being the casewhen there were two or more candidatesconsidered in the selection.These occurred in 1911,

1923,1957 and 1963. 48

The Successionof Clear Heir Apparents

1902: Arthur Bat(our

In 1902, Lord Salisbury resignedC, as Prime Minister and was succeeded by

Arthur Balfour, his nephew.Balfour was the obvioussuccessor to Salisbury,as he had a good reputation as a Nlinister, and few opposed his succession. King Edward VII commissioned Balfour to form a government, and two days later he was acclaimed leaderof the party by a meetingof ConservativePeers and NIPs at the Carlton Club. '

1921: AustenChamberlain

In March 1921, Bonar Law resigned as party leader because of ill health. The

Conservativeswere still part of the Coalition that had been formed during the First

World War. The party, however, took the samegovemmental approach, as if they were in goverment as the single ruling party, becauseof their dominant position in the

Coalition. Prime NEnisterLloyd Georgeappointed Austen ChamberlainLeader of the

Commons, and on 21 March 1921 a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club acclaimed

2 him asLeader of the Unionistsin the Commons.

1922: Andrew Bonar Law

The next leadershipselection took place in October 1922, after the Carlton

Club meetingwhich broke up the coalitiongovernment. Lloyd Georgethen resignedas

Prime Nlinister, and advisedthe King to sendfor Bonar Law, as Austen Chamberlain had resignedbecause of his wish to continuethe coalition. In an unprecedentedstep

1 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 2 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century.' GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 49 for the party, Law insistedon being approvedas party leader before acceptingthe

3 Premiership in discussionsAkrith Lord Stamfordham, the King's Private Secretary. On

23 October 1922, the meeting took place at the Hotel Cecil, and Law was selected unanimously. He then immediately kissed hands with the King on accepting office.

1937:Neville Chamberlain

On 28 May 1937, Neville Chamberlainwas asked by the King to succeed

Stanley Baldwin, following the latter's resignation. The successionwas rapid as

Chamberlain,Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931, was the unopposed successorto

Baldwin. On 31 May 1937, a meeting of the party at the Carlton Club endorsed him as leader.5

1955: Sir Anthony Eden

On 6 April 1955, Sir Anthony Eden succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister, after Churchill had resigned the previous day. Like Chamberlain, Eden was the long recognisedcrown prince and had waited many years to succeedChurcl-0. He was endorsedas party leaderat the party meetingon 21 April 1955at ChurchHouse.

3 For an analysisof the role of the Stamfordhamand Law discussionsand the reasonsfor Law's request,see chapter two, pp. 65-66 4 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty Leadership Selection This Century.' GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 5 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty Leadership Selection This Century'. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3:and Watkins,The Roadto NumberTen, p.39 11'Meetings Held To Elect The ConservativeLeader'. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO and Watkins,The RoadTo NumberTen, pp.62-63 _20/39/3; 50

SuccessionsInvolving Competitionfor the Leadership

1911.:Andrew Bonar Law

The 1911 leadership selection was unique as the Conservatives were in opposition,and it was the first time there had been a vacancyin the leadershipof the party in the Commons in opposition since Disraeli had assumed the leadership in

7 1849 In November 1911, Balfour because his leadership, . resignedCý of attacks on and the divisions in the party over tariff reform. Balfour was also widely regardedas a failure as party leader. As the party was in opposition, there was one leader of the party in the Commons and one of the party in the Lords. Lord Lansdowne was already leaderof the Lords, but therewas considerabledisagreement as to who shouldsucceed

Balfour as leaderof the Commons.

There was also disagreementover how the leader should be chosen. There were two candidates,Austen Chamberlainand Walter Long. Long declaredthat the correct procedure was for the issue to be decided by a meeting of the Privy

Councillors, but this was a minority view. Neither of the two candidates could gain an overall consensus of support throughout the party, as Long was widely viewed as being incompetent,and Chamberlainwas distrustedas a Liberal Unionist, and for his position on tariff reform. They were also 'champions of two interests': Long of rural

Conservatismand moderateprotectionism, and Chamberlainof Liberal Unionism and tariff reform.' This explainstheir candidacies,and also their failure to attain the leadership,as they were consideredas feasibleleaders by the supportersof the issues they represented,but could not unite the whole party behind their candidacies.The

' V. Bogdanor,'The Selectionof The Party Leader', in A. Seldon/S. Ball (eds.), Conservative Century.The ConservativeParty in Power Since 1900,(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1993), p. 70 1ýA. Seldon,'Conservative Century' in Seldon/Ball (eds.), ConservativeCentury, p. 27 51 issueneeded to be resolvedswiftly becausethe party conferencewas due to be held in

Leeds the following week, and the party's senior figures wanted to keep the conference out of any decision on the leadership. The view that was most popular was that a meeting of all Unionist NPs should be summonedto elect a leader, and this should be convened hastily. Lord Balcarres, the Conservative Chief Whip, declared on

9 November,the day after Balfour announcedhis resignation,that the Conservative

Ws objectedto an alternativevote system,and wantedthe candidatesreduced to two, and then settled by consultation.9

Bonar Law, however, insistedon standing.C, Law was little-known, but was a compromisecandidate who offered better prospectsof uniting all sections of the party.10 As we have seen,Long and Chamberlaincould not unite the party, whereas

Law was in a better position to do so, as he had supportedBalfour in his call for a referendumon tariff reform before the generalelection of December1910, and could " not, therefore, be accused of disloyalty. On 13 November 1911, at a meeting of

Unionist NTs at the Carlton Club, Long and Chamberlain withdrew from the contest.

This occurredafter they agreedprivately to do so beforethe meeting,to allow Law to come forward, as they both saw that they could not unite the party behind their candidacies.They then proposed and secondedLaw as leader of the party in the

Commons.12 Law was the right choice in the circumstances,as he offered the best prospects of guaranteeing party unity, and Lloyd George stated at the time, 'The fools havestumbled on their bestman by accident'.13

9 BalcarresDiary, 9 November1911, in Vincent (ed.), The Cra"ford Em-ers(Manchester: 1984) in Bogdanor,'The Selectionof The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball,(eds. ), ConservativeCentury, p. 71 10'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century.' GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 11Bogdanor, 'The Selectionof the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentuly, p.73 12For analysisof the significanceof the Long and Chamberlainmeeting, see chapter two, p.64 "I Ramsden,The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-19401(London: Longman, 1978),p. 91 52

1923: Stanley Baldwin

The Stanley Baldwin 28 May 1923 followed selection of on the resignationzlý of

Bonar Law as Prime Minister, because of recurring ill health. There were two 1-5 candidates for the leadership: Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord

Curzon,the Foreign Secretary.King GeorgeV selectedBaldwin after taking advice throughLord Stamfordham,and Lords Balfour and Salisbury,which suggesteddoubts 14 aboutthe suitabilityof Curzon. Curzonhad seemedto havethe strongerclaim, as he hadbeen acting Prime Minister during Law's illness,and was the most seniorfigure in the Cabinet.Stamfordham told Curzonthat he had not beenselected as he was a peer, but Punnetthas labelledthis as an excuserather than the real reason,yet fails to offer

for However,Bogdanor Curzon havebeen an explanation this. suo,1,9ests that may seen as a stalkinghorse for the return of AustenChamberlain as leader,and this would have beenviewed as treacheryby the Conservativeback-benchers, who had stood by Law 15 and Baldwin after the removal of Lloyd George. One possible explanation is that a memorandum supporting Baldwin was drafted by J.C. C. Davidson, which was given to

Stamfordhamby Law's Private Secretary,and the King took this as a statementof

Law's but the importance the Davidson Memorandum be own views, of can . discounted.16 The King's own views, and the adviceof Balfour, and Lord Derby who was vehementlyopposed to Curzon,were decisivein the outcome.The explanationfor the appointmentof Baldwin is that the King had doubtsabout appointinga peer in the

" 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century.' GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3.For analysisof Balfour and Salisbury'sadvice, see chapter two, pp. 68-69 Bogdanor,'The Selectionof the Party Leader', in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentury, p.74 Punnett,Selecting The PartyLeader p.35. For an analysisof the role of the Davidson Memorandum,see chapter two, pp. 65-66 53

current circumstances,and feareda provocative,class-war gesture to Labour, as there

were no membersof the Labour oppositionin the Lords.

On 23 May, a party meeting of peers and MPs was held at Hotel Cecil, at

which Baldwin was unanimously endorsed as party leader, after Curzon had proposed

the motion. Baldwin had been an anonymousfigure before the fall of the coalition, but

his role in the downfall of Lloyd George greatly improved his reputation, and he

became a key Nfinister in Law's administrationas Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Baldwin also had a moderateimage, and was seento be in a better position to preserve the unity of the party that Law had achievedfollowing the departure of Austen

Chamberlain.

17 1957:HaroldMacmillan

In January 1957, when Anthony Eden resigned in the aftermath of the Suez

Crisis, there were only two obvious candidates for the party leadership: Harold

Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and R. A. Butler, the Leader of the

Commons and Lord Privy Seal. Despite this, and the fact that Butler was almost

unanimouslyexpected to succeedEden, the successionof Macmillan was relatively

swift. Edenresigned as PrimeNfinister on 9 January,and Macrnillan was chosenby the

Queenon the afternoonon 10 January." The Queenconsulted Lord Salisbury,Lords

Chandosand Waverley, and Winston Churchill, who all expresseda preferencefor

Macmillan.Salisbury conveyed the feelingsof the Cabinet,who he had consultedalong

17For the detailedanalysis of this selection,see chapters four and five 18A. Howard,RAB. The Life of R.A. Butlerp(London: Cape, 1987), p. 246. For detailsof the wide expectationof Butler to be Eden's successor;and 'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty Leadership SelectionThis Century'. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3.For the chronologyof the succession. 54 with Lord Kilmuir. Eden, however,did not directly advisethe Queen,but supported

Butler to succeedhim. 19

There was a massivemajority in the Cabinetin favour of Macmillan, and only threeButler supportershave been identified. 20 A new feature of this selectionwas the

Cabinet consultations, and the limited weighing of the opinions of the party, that were reported to the Monarch. The lin-fted consultationsof wider party opinion were undertaken by the Chief Whip, Edward Heath, and the Chairman of the 1922

Conunittee, John Morrison, of the opinions of Conservative MPs, and of Oliver Poole, the Chairman of the Party Organisation, of party organisers. Salisbury delivered these to the Queenalong with the Cabinetconsultations. Kilmuir has statedthat the views of

Cabinet the decisive factor in the Macmillan21 The ministers were selection of . consultationsalso showedthat Butler arousedhostile opposition in some sectionsof the party, especially the 'die hard' Imperialist wing, after his appeasing stance during the Suez Crisis. Macn-dllan,on the other hand, had no such opposition to him, and was the unity candidate. Macmillan was elected as leader of the party at a meeting at

Church House on 27 January 1957.22

1963:Sir Alec Douglas-Home23

The leadershipselection of October 1963condemned the informal systemto its downfall, and a major factor in this was the length of time it took to settle the

"' Avon Papers.AP 20/33/12 Eden to Adeane,12 January1957 in B. Pimlott, The Queen:A Biographyof ElizabethII (London:Harper Collins, 1995)p. 259 20A. Home, Macmillan 1894-1956(London: Macmillan, 1989),p. 468; and Howard, RAB, p.247 21'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century'. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3,and Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure:Memoirs, (London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson, 1964),p. 286 22'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection This Century'. GeoffreyD. M. Block. 3 February1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 23For the detailedanalysis of this selection,see chapters six and seven 55 leadershipquestion. The cue for the selectionwas Macmillan's prostateillness, which led him to signal his intention to resign on Tuesday8 October.24 The issuewas not resolved until Home kissed hands with the Queen on agreeingC) to form an

Saturday 19 October 25 This longevity to the discredit administration on . was central that was heapedon the party after the leadershiphad been decided.

The 1963 leadershipselection had two aspectsthat made it unique in the history of the ConservativeParty's selection of its leaders.The first was that the situation was complicatedby the announcementof Macmillan's intendedresignation during the Party Conference in Blackpool. This turned the Conference into a quasi-

U. S. Presidential forum, had been campaigning0 a situation that previously always successfifflyavoided. The secondwas the more formal attemptto canvassthe views of the whole of the party, through consultationsof the NTs, peers,candidates and party members. This opened the door to greater accountability, and the unsatisfactory outcomeof the selection,and its effect on the party's image,meant a new systemof selectionwas inevitable.

The Functions of Conservative Party Leaders

The leader of the ConservativeParty holds a unique position in British party politics, astheir authority far surpassesthat traditionallybestowed on their Labour and

Liberal Democratcounterparts. Kelly has arguedthat the leader'sauthority dominates three areasof the party machinery.Firstly, policy is at the sole discretionof the leader.

He or shehas the final word on policy, and no 'official' constraintsexist, eventhough

24R. Shepherd,The PowerBrokers: The Tory Party and its Leaders,(London: Hutchinson, 1991), p. 152 '-' SelectingThe Party Leade 43 Punnett, , p. 56 there aremany sections of the party that influencepolicy discreetly.Party Conferences and party meetings do not have a formal influence on policy. Secondly, the leader chooses the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet. Thirdly, the leader shapesthe organisation of the party, inside and outside Parliament, by his or her appointment of the Party

Chairman.26 The leaderthus shapesand definesthe upper echelonsof the party. 'The

ConservativeParty has alwaysentrusted its leaderwith great authority. He is free to choosehis Cabinetor ShadowCabinet and he appointsthe chairmanand officers of the party.M Fisherthus concurswith Kelly's argument,and showsthe extent of the power bestowedon the leaderof the party.

Bogdanor has correctly suggestedthat the Conservative Party leader has five tasks. They must, firstly, be competent and efficient as a senior member of the government or opposition. Secondly, they must be perceived as an electoral asset, and thirdly, they must have the support of the Conservative back-benchers. Fourthly, they must retain the support of the party in the country. However, 'Above all, a

Conservativeleader 2' For this for must not split the party' . reason,candidates the leadersl-ýpwho are perceived as being divisive, do not gain the post. These tasks show the importanceof the analyticalcriteria of acceptability,electability, and governability, as the first task is governability,the secondelectability, and the final two concern acceptability.

Nigel Birch, Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1957-1958 in

Macmillan's first government,once assertedthat the party's organisationinstituted a systemof 'leadershipby consent',wl-kh meantthat the leaderwas leader,only as long

"R Kelly, 'Power in the ConservativeParty. Towards a New Assessment',Politics Review, 1, (4), April 1992,p. 26 " Fisher,The Tory Leaders,p. 1 28Bogdanor, 'The Selection the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball, ConservativeCenturv. 94 of . 57 as the party wantedhim to be leader.29 Mckenziehas suggestedthat the impressionof absolute power in the leader is ffýsleading, and that the Conservative Party's leaders havetraditionally been in a muchmore insecureposition than the leadersof the Labour 3' Party. This is correct becauseif a leader is not successful, he or she will be quickly jettisonedand replaced.

'The Leadershipof the ConservativeParty is a subjectwhich gives rise to a considerable popular and even academic mythology. ' There are two conventional viewpoints about the Conservative Party leadership. The first is that the party 'is and

hasbeen According in always oligarchical'.31 to this view, the peoplewho matter the party are the influentials,or 'the men in grey suits', and the introduction of the formal electionprocedure in 1965has not changedthe party's essentialpower structure.The second viewpoint is that the party was once oligarchical, but the new electoral procedure of 1965 changedall that. Thatcher or Major, and perhaps Heath, would not havebeen elected under the old systemof emergence." Onefeature that has certainly remained constant over the course of the century is that if the party finds itself in difficulty, the leadertakes sole responsibilityfor the party's fortunes. 'The leaderleads and the party follows, except when the party decidesnot to follow; then the leader 0' ceasesto be leader. This illustratesthe power the leaderof the ConservativeParty holds,and alsothe insecurityof the position.

29Birch, The Conservative PLT!y p. 42 in R. Mckenzie, British Political Parties, (London; Heinemann, 1964), p. 21 '0 Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p.22 31Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds.), Conservative Century, p. 69; and 95 32Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldom/Ball (eds.), Conservative Centu 96. , p. The inclusion of Heath as an exainple is my choice. 33Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p. 145 58

The Formal Aspects of the Selection Procedure

The Conservative Party's selection of its leaders before the institution of formal leadership elections in 1965, did not have any specific formal election rules, and different methods were used to select the party's leaders, depending on the circumstances surrounding the selection. The only formal aspect to the selection process that was a constant feature of all selections, was the party meeting that endorsedthe selection made after the informal networks and consultations had determinedthe new leader,and if the party was in power he had beenappointed Prime

Nfinister. These informal networks and consultationsdominated all the selections where an heir apparent did not exist. 'In 1902,1921,1922,1937,1940 and 1955 there was no need for any procedure to be devised, since there was an obvious heir apparent'.34 In 1922,Bonar Law, contraryto tradition, was endorsedas leaderat the " party meeting before becoming Prime Minister. This denotes the importance of the adaptabilityof the party's selectionsystem, and how the nature of the selectionwas determinedby the circumstancessurrounding it. "

An interesting developmentover the course of this century has been the

the this changingZý composition of party meeting, and evolved to give a wider endorsementfrom the party to the new leader. Before 1922, the meeting only consisted of Conservative NIPs and Peers, but in 1922, prospective Conservative candidateswere alsoinvited. This, however,was not a binding precedent,and was not repeated in 1923. In 1937, Conservative NlPs, Peers, prospective candidates and

34Bogdanor, 'The Selectionof the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentury, p. 69; and Mckenzie,British Political Parties,pp. 51-53 35Memo by Stamfordham,Windsor Castle,Royal Archives,K. 1814/1in Bogdanor,'The Selectionof The PartyLeader', in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentury, p. 70 36For an analysisof the 1922selection, see chapter two, pp.65-68 59 membersof the Executive Committee of the National Union, were invited to the meeting to endorseNeville Chamberlainas Prime Minister and party leader. From

1955, National Liberal Peers, NTs and candidates were invited, and this remained the

the 1965 37 'At in composition of party meeting until . no stage this process of evolution was the Party Meeting seriously considered as an electoral college nor was its composition consideredfrom this point of view', demonstratingits role of " endorsement, not election. Humphrey Berkely, Conservative NP for Lancaster in

1964, had Home for to the following who pressured a change party's selection system C) the 1963controversy, noted of the systemtraditionally used in the party

In the pastand until 1963despite differences in tenninology as to

the leadershipand differencesin the compositionof the electoral

college, the same procedures so far as the party is concerned

have in practice been applied. Soundings of influential people

havebeen taken, a contesthas been avoided, and when the party

hasbeen in power, a Prime Minister has alreadybeen appointed.

The Leader was then presented,amid universalacclaim, to the

electoral college, most of whom, until 1963, had not been

39 consulted.

37'Appendix 1. ConservativeParty LeadershipSelection this century'. GeoMeyD. M. Block. 3 February1965. Attached to 'Secret.Selection of PartyLeader'. JAD/EAM. 5 February1965. CPA CCO _20/39/3 38'Appendix 5. AlternativeForm of PartyMeeting', 5 February1965, JATD/GME CPA CCO 20/39/3 3"Choosing A Leader- Memorandumby Mr. HumphreyBerkely, MP, 9 December1964' CPA CCO 20/39/3 60

Before 1965, the ConservativeParty took a governmentalapproach to the selection of its leaders,which meant the method of selection used dependedon 40 whether the party was in power or in opposition. Until 1922, the party only had a formal leaderwhen there was a ConservativePrime Minister in office, or when an ex-

Prime Minister remainedas leaderin the Lords or Commons.When in opposition,the party did not have a leaderof the whole ParliamentaryParty, but had a leader of the

House of Conunons and a leader of the House of Lords. If the party returned to power, it was for the Monarch to choosewho would becomePrime Minister. If the party had only recently left office, then the former Prime Minister retained his dominantposition.

Thesemethods of leadershipselection emerged from the practicesof nineteenth century politics, from a time when the party did not have an extra-Parliamentary

41 This developed organisation. only towards the end of the nineteenth century, as mass democracy developed. The party's practices thus evolved from a time when the views of the party outsideParliament were not consideredto be important. Two featuresof the Conservative Party's leadership selection emerged from the practices of this time.

The first was the exercise of the Royal Prerogative which required the Monarch to chose the Prime Nfinister. He or she would seek advice and make informal consultations,but the choicewas essentiallythat of the Monarch. The party hierarchy, however,guided the Monarchtowards their preferredcandidate.

The secondfeature was the weighingof opinion in the party by party notables.

This was the informal mannerby which the party's preferencescould be communicated to the Monarch, and is consideredin detail in the next section. This practice of

'o P=ett, Selecting The Pagy Leader, p. 28 41Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 33 61

in the had longZ) honourabletradition, weighing0 opinion party a and and was perceived as being effective. It ran against conventional democratic practices, but analysts of

ConservativeParty leadersl-ýpselection have agreedon two distinct advantagesof the older system.42 The first is that the method was swift and easy. The selection of

Macmillan to replace Eden in January 1957 took a day to resolve, for example. The secondadvantage is that a consensuscan emergemore easilythan in a ballot of Ngs and wider party figures, and thus can maintain party unity as a leader who is generally acceptableto all sections of the party is selected.

The informal networks and consultations,therefore, rather than any formal procedure, were the most important aspect of the selection process until 1965.

'Meetings,elections, votes, majorities:they play little part in Conservativeculture, as anyone knows who has studied the perplexity of Conservative NVs when they are confronted by an election of any description within their own party'. 43

The Informal Networks of Communication

Apart from the selectionsof 1902,1921,1937 and 1955,where heir apparents to the leadershipwere clear and obvious, informal networks played a vital and determinantrole. In eachof the other selections,the Monarch consultedsenior party figures or privy councillors, or the outgoing Prime Minister, and then invited the candidatethey identified as the most suitable,to form a government.The Monarch normally consultedthe outgoing Prime Nfinister. The exceptionsin the Conservative

Party's selection of its leaders are 1923 and 1955 - the succession in 1955 was

42Bogdanor, 'The Selectionof The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCenturv p.71; Mckenzie,British Political Parties,p. 45; and Punnett,Selecting The Party Leader,p. 34 41Watkins, The RoadTo NumberTen, p.9 62 obvious, and in 1923 Bonar Law was too ill to be consulted,and he asked to be excusedfrom offering advice.44 The outgoing Prime Ministers to offer advice were

Macmillan in 1963, and Eden in 1957.

The Monarch also consulted any senior party figure or privy councillor, that was felt to be able to offer valuableadvice in determiningthe choice. For example,

Lords Chandosand Waverley,and Churchill in 1957, and Balfour and Salisburyin

1923 45 Therefore, the hierarchy in the informal 46 . party played a major role networks.

Their advice, especiallythat of senior party figures and former party leadersin the selectionsbefore 1957,was often crucial in the decisionsthat were taken. One feature that is apparentis that the Monarchwas not bound to ask a retiring Prime Minister for a view as to his or her successor,and the precedentof 1957,when Eden's advicewas not influential, showsthat the Monarch does not have to acceptthose views.47 This illustrates that in most casesthe advice of an outgoing leader was not deemed to be crucial to the decision,and the advice of the party's 'elder statesmen'was of more significance. The only exception to this was Macmillan's role in the 1963 selection, as he was determinedto play a central role in the selectionof Home, and felt that role was essentialfor Home to becomeleader.

If a Prime Minister resignedor died with no obvious successor,'the electoral machineryof the party concernedwill be usedto choosea new party leader,and that " person will be summonedto the palace and appointed Prime Nfinister'. This illustratesthe vital role of the informal networksin the party, as before 1965they were the 'electoralmachinery' of the party. The reasonfor the use of the informal networks

44V. Bogdanor,The Monarchyand the Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1995), p. 79 45Bogdanor, The Monarchyand the Constitution,p. 79 " For a definition of the party hierarchyand its composition,see chapter one, p.24 47Bogdanor, The Monarchyand the Constitution,p. 94 48Bogdanor, The Monarchyand the Constitution,p. 84 63 was 'becausethe crown was anxiousto appointsomebody who would be acceptableto

hierarchy felt this finding the party', and the party was a more effective method of 0 the most acceptablecandidate than a formal leadership election.49 Until 1957, the consultationswere limited to a smallnumber of advisers,but in 1957,the Cabinetwere consultedas part of the procedurefor the first time, and the consultationsin that selection were more exhaustive. In 1963, this was entrenched further as the consultationscovered all sectionsof the Parliamentaryparty, and consultationswere undertakenof the views of the party in the country. The informal networks became more extensivebecause of the difficult circumstancessurrounding C, the selection.There was also growing pressurefor greateraccountability by the party and the public, 'But despitethese more extensivesoundings there was still criticism that the leader was so effectively chosen by a 'magic circle' of senior figures in the party.

There was no set pattern or uniformity to the informal consultations of each selection,and they, therefore,fitted the situation and circumstancesthat surrounded each one. The consultations were of an undefined nature, and there were no written rules or conventions.A certain degree of consistencycan be found across the selections,but this was more due to situationalparallels, than a uniform pattern in the natureof the informal consultations.This undefinednature meant that the practicewas adaptable,and allowed the party to face different situational requirements.On 18

November1964, Sir NEchaelFraser, the GeneralDirector of the CRD, wrote to Lord

Blakenham,the Party Chairman,during the developmentof the formal leadership electionprocedure

'9 Fisher, The Tory Leaders 6 ' p. 50Fisher, The Torv Leaders, pp. 6-7 64

Becauseof the sort of party we are, no systemof election or

selectionwill in fact succeedunless the actual processhas really

beenresolved by private negotiationsbefore it takesplace. In any

new arrangementswe make, therefore, it is most important not

to think that they can do thejob for us from scratch.51

This view denotes the tradition in the party of the use of informal networks in the selection of the party's leaders, and the vital role they were felt to have. The examples of the informal networks in the party's selection of its leaders before 1965 include those during the 1911 selectionof Bonar Law. These were the agreement betweenLong and Chamberlain,the other two candidates,to standaside for Law, and the offer madeby Balcarresto undertake'soundings' in the party of opinion on who should succeedBalfour. Balcarres offered to make soundings of opinion to see if there was a majority for one candidate,and 'if so, whetherthe othersmight be persuadedto withdraw so that the party meetingmight be offeredjust one name'." The decisive action in the outcome, however, was Long and Chamberlain'sprivate agreementto withdraw if anothercandidate came forward. They did so after Chamberlainoffered to withdraw to settlethe deadlock,but only if Long also agreedto, and 'once that offer was made,Long could hardly refuse'. Many ConservativeMPs at the party meeting expresseddismay at the choicebeing madeby private agreement,but it followed in the tradition of the party's leadershipselection in using informal networks to settle the

53 succession.

51Fraser to Blakenham, 18 November 1964 CPA CCO 20/39/3 52Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds.), Conservative Centurv, p. 72 53J. Ramsden, An Appetite For Power. A History of the Conservative Pagy Since-1830, (London: Harper Collins, 1998), p. 215; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 23 65

In 1922,the discussionsbetween Stamfordham and Law to persuadeLaw to succeed as party leader were significant. Following Lloyd George's resignation,

Starnfordharnwas at once despatchedto ascertainBonar Law's views. Law told him he was no longer leaderof the party, and that the party was 'broken up'. He declared that until he knew he had the party's support, he could not acceptoffice. Law then statedthat he would needto be presentat a meetingof the 'whole party', to discoverif he had its full backing. Stamfordhamtold him that the King was sendingfor Law

'independently of these party considerations', and that the King had a duty to form a governmentas soon as possibleafter acceptingLloyd George's resignation.He also told Law that unlessa new governmentwas formed, the Irish Treaty would not be ratified, and would lapse.Law still maintainedthat he neededto be electedleader of the party at a party meeting.Following a considerableamount of discussionbetween the Palace and Law, the King accepted that he should be elected at a party meeting, and he told the King he would consult with 'those who might help him form a government'. On 23 October, Law was elected leader at the party meeting and was then appointedPrime Minister, reversingthe usual procedureto fit the circumstances that the selectiontook placein. 54

In 1923, the Davidson Memorandum, the soundings undertaken by

Stamfordham, and the Balfour and Salisbury consultations were the informal communications.According to Fisher, Bonar Law preferred Baldwin, but did not 55 expressthis view. The King decided,after consultingboth Lord Balfour, the only other living Conservativeex-Premier, and a Conservative elder statesman,Lord

Salisbury(the son of the former Prime Nlinister), to appoint Baldwin. There was no

5' Watkins, The RoadTo NumberTen, pp. 8-10; and Mckenzie,British Political Parties,p. 35 55Fisher, The Tory Leaderslp. 28 66 attemptat a systematiccanvass of the Cabinetor of NTs, pointing to the importance of informal networks in the decision.

Watkins has stated of the Davidson Memorandum,'Law had nothing to do with it. Indeed,it misrepresentedhis views'. Ramsdenhas argued that Bonar Law gave no formal adviceto the King, but 'may have known' of the DavidsonMemorandum, 56 which was supposedto representLaw's view that Baldwin should succeedhim.

Clark hasargued that Davidson'sobjectives were clear,as he had long been'intimate' with Baldwin, more so than he was with Law, but had nothing in common with

Curzon,'nor any prospectof promotion,nor of keepinga job in governmentat all'. He believesthat the crucial assertionin the Davidsonmemorandum was 'Lord Curzon is regardedin the public eye as representingthat section of privileged Conservatism

). 57 which hasits valuebut in this democraticage...

The Davidson memorandum was delivered by Colonel Waterhouse, Bonar

Law's Private Secretaryto Stamfordham,on May 20, when he informed Starnfordham of Law's resignation.It was said by Stamfordham'snote on the successionin the

Royal Archives, to have 'practically expressedthe views of Mr. Bonar Law". Blake has arguedthat 'there is no internalevidence in the documentto suggestthat it expressed

Bonar Law's views'. Davidson stated that it was written, as he was requestedby

Stamfordhamto give the 'point of view of the averac,,e back bencherin the House of

Conunons'. Davidson believed it did correspondwith Law's own views, but the 58 memorandumwas an expressionof Davidson's views only. Stamfordhamadvised

56Bogdanor, 'The Selection the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds.), Conservative Centu 73; of , p. Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, p. 11; and Ramsden, An AT)PetiteFor Power, p.250 5' A. Clark, The Tories. Conservatives and the Nation State. 1922-1997, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), p-23 5' R. Blake, The Conservative Party From Peel to Maior, (London: Arrow, 1997, third edition), pp. 211-212; and R. Rhodes-James(ed. ), Memoirs of a Conservative. The Memoirs and Papers J.C, C. Davidson. 1910-1937. ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 151-163 67 the King to sendfor Curzon,so the DavidsonMemorandum could not haveinfluenced his views strongly, and the King's decision was formed by his own belief that the

for be Prime Nlinister. 9 However, Davidson circumstanceswere wrongC) a peer to the

Memorandumwas not decisive,while the advice of Balfour was influential, as it

confirmed the King's own assessmentthat Baldwin was the best candidatein the circumstances.60

'In thosedays the acceptedmethod of settlingthe successionlay in 'soundings'

by the King's Lord Stamfordham'61 Balfour of opinion private secretary, . urged that Baldwin be for 'one Prime Nfinister should appointed over-riding0 reason:the ought to be in the House of Commons'.The King decidedafter Balfour's advice, which were

conformity with his personaljudgement, to sendfor Baldwin.62 Lord Salisburystated that Curzon's candidacyshould not 'lightly be ignored', but his advice was not

influential. Balfour recorded his observations, and his belief that Baldwin should

succeedLaw, in a memorandumfor the record confirming his views. He also stated that he 'understood from Stamfordham, that these views were probably in very close

those held by His Majesty' 6' The fact Curzon conformity with already . that was a

peer, and none of the membersof the Labour oppositionwere in the Lords counted

againstCurzon, but the choicewas only madeto suit thesecircumstances, and did not

mean that Lords would permanentlybe excludedfrom considerationfor the party

59Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 212 60For an explanation of this point, see chapter two, pp. 52-53 Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 211 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century', Geoffrey D. M. Block, 3 February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3; Mckenzie. British Political Parties, p.40; and Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 250 63Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, p. 11, C. Hazelhurst, 'The Baldwinite Conspiracy', lEstorical Studies, 16 (1974), p. 169 in Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, pp. 90-9 1; and Clarke, The jo-ries, p. 23 68 leadership.'It is clear that the principle reason for the choice of Baldwin was the 64 difficulty of having a peer as Prime Minister'.

The examplesof the use of informal networks of communicationin the selectionof the party's leaders,has shown that they were the vital componentof the selectionprocedure, where a clear heir apparentdid not exist. They helpedto inform the Monarch, or confirm his or her own judgement,of who was the best candidatein the circumstancessurrounding the selection.

The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions

The first clear trend in the selectionsis that if there was a clear heir apparent, no procedurewas neededor used, and that person succeededautomatically. The examples of this are Balfour in 1902, Austen Chamberlain in 1921, Bonar Law in

1922, Neville Chamberlain in 1937, and Anthony Eden in 1955. The second is that the informalpractices used in the selectionsallowed it to be adaptable,and meetthe needs of different situations and circumstances surrounding selections. For example, Bonar

Law electedleader before becomingPrime NEnisterin 1922,contrary to tradition was I-C when the party was in power, because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the selection.

The informal consultationsbecame more extensiveif the party had to selecta new leaderin a time of severedifficulty. For example,the party meeting in 1922 to elect Law as leader before he becamePrime Mnister, for the reasons explained

65 Another is the Cabinet in 1957, the informal earlier. example consultations and canvassesof party opinion by Heath, Poole and Morrison. This was the first time the

64Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 213 65See chapter two, pp. 65-66 69

Cabinethad beenconsulted, and this was becauseof the severestate of disunityin the party after the Suez Crisis. This was entrenched further by the selection of Home in

1963, when the informal consultations of the Cabinet, Conservative NTs, the Lords, and the constituencyparties, took a more formal nature. This was becausethe party was in a severe state of disunity, and the party hierarchy wanted to assess party opinion fully. The fourth trend is that the party meetingdid not elect its leaders,but merely endorsedthe decision of the party hierarchy and the monarch. As already noted,the only exceptionto this was the 1922selection of Law.

It is clear that when the Monarch consultedthe outgoing Prime Minister for adviceon his successor,that advice does not alwayshave to be taken up, and is not always decisive.It was in 1963, but in 1957, Eden offered his opinion that Butler would be a worthy successor,whereas Macmillan was selected.Conversely, the advice given by senior party figures to the Monarch was usually decisive, and this was especiallythe caseif it confirmedthe Monarch'sview on a successor.For example,the advice of Balfour in 1923, and Churchill in 1957. The next clear trend is the role of the Monarch's Private Secretary was often of vast significance in ascertaining the views of the party's seniorfigures on the selectionof a new leader.For example,the role of Stamfordhamin 1922and 1923,and Adeaneand Ford in 1957and 1963.

A significanttrend is that situationalpressures had a highly influential role on the natureof the selection,and the systemwas designedto be flexible enoughto cope with a wide range of situational variables.For example,the imminenceof a party conferenceaffected the selectionprocedure, as it threatenedto allow wider party opinion to play a role in the selection,a factor successfullyavoided by the party hierarchyin finalising the choice quickly. This occurredin 1911,and also in 1963 as 70 the selectionwas controlledtightly, the two instanceswhere the party conferencewas a complicating factor. Both selections produced similar outcomes: the party selected a surprise compromiseleader to keep the party together, as the other candidates experiencedsubstantial opposition to their candidacies.66

In 1963, Macmillan's statement of his intention to resign, made by Home during the party conference,signalled the opportunity for the party conferenceto play a role in the selection of Macmillan's successor.It also complicated the party hierarchy's deliberations on who that successor should be. The role of the party conference was important in the 1963 selection as it meant that a 'campaign' for the leadership,similar to campaignsin formal leadershipelections, was instigatedby the public platform that the candidatesfound themselveson. Their actionsduring the party conferencehad an important bearing on the outcome of the selection, as Home improved his candidacy, whereas Butler, Maudling and Hailsham all adversely affected

67 theirs.

The next situational pressure was the wider party political situation, and the

Parliamentary position of candidates. This was an important situational factor in the

1923 and 1963 selections, although both had different outcomes. The 1923 selection of

Baldwin was affectedby this as his main rival, Lord Curzon,was a peer and it was felt that a peer could not succeedLaw at this time. This was becausethere were no membersof the Labour oppositionin the House of Lords, and a Prime Nlinister from the Commonswas felt to be more suitablein this situation.In 1963, a key situational influence was the institution of the Peerage Act in July 1963. This legislation allowed peersto renouncetheir peerages,and standas candidatesfor the House of Commons.

156For an explanationof the effect of the party conferenceon the 1911selection, see chapter two, p.51 67For the effect of the party conferenceon the 1963selection, see chapter six 71

This allowedHome and Hailshamto becomeviable candidatesto succeedMacmillan, andtherefore, was a factor in the outcomeof the selection.

The imminence of an election has proved to be a strong situational influence on the selection of the party's leaders, and this was especially the case with the 1963 selection of Home. This selection occurred with only a year to go before a general election had to take place, and alongsidethe key situational influence of the wide discredit heapedon the Macmillan regime, was a key factor in the outcome. The imminenceof an electionmeans that electabilitybecomes a key attribute,in an effort to gain or secureanother term in office. Home's electabilitywas felt to be significant,as he was not directly associatedwith the domesticfailures of the Macmillanregime, had an inoffensivereputation, and a wide reputationas a competentminister. This was in contrast to the other candidates, especially Butler, whose electability was felt by the party to be low, becauseof his direct associationwith Macmillan. Conversely,the

1957 selection occurred at a convenient place in the electoral cycle, as the party had until 1960 before it had to hold an election. Evidence suggeststhat Macmillan was selected as a stop-gap leader, as Home was in 1963, because of the wide expectation that the governmentwould fall becauseof the SuezCrisis, but Macmillanwas the best 68 qualifiedcandidate for the situation.

A clear feature is that general acceptancein the party can often be more important than widespreadenthusiasm for a candidate.This is especiallywhen there was substantialopposition to the favoured candidates,and this occurredin 1911 and

1963.This points to the nature of the party's selectionof its leaders:the party often took a pragmaticapproach, designed to keep ideology and factions out of the party's

" For a fuller analysisof this point, seechapter five. 72 key decision-making,and it's approachto government.Opposition to candidateswas deemed to be of more importance than appointing a leader who was enthusiastically endorsed in the party. This is especially apparent in selections when the party was in a state of severedivision and difficulty, as in 1911,1957 and 1963.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstratedthat the ConservativeParty's selectionof its leadersbefore 1965was dominatedby the use of informal networks of communication to find the best leader.There were no formal rules, and the only formal aspectof the procedurewas the party meetingthat endorsedthe choice of the Monarch and the party hierarchy. The systemwas designedto be flexible enoughto meet a wide variety of situationalvariables that the party may havemet in selectingits leaders,and this was its raison d'Etre. The procedures adaptability is also apparent in the different ways the systemwas usedin different circumstances.

The important role of the party hierarchy in the selection of the party's leaders has been demonstrated,as they were the foremost actors in giving advice to the

Monarch, and in undertakingsoundings of party opinion. It is also apparentthat the role of the party hierarchy evolved over the period Until 1957, the informal consultationswere limited to a small number of the advisors and were randomly conducted,but in 1957 and 1963,they had more extensiveand more formal roles in the soundingsof Cabinet and party opinion. It is clear, however, that the informal selectionprocedure was designedto find the most generallyacceptable leader, and that this was often more important than a widespreadenthusiasm for a candidate.This is 73 especiallyapparent in selectionsat times of severedifficulty for the party, like the selectionsof 1957 and 1963. 74

Chapter Three

The Candidates: Partv Status and Personalities

This chapteranalyses the party statusand personal qualities of the candidatesin

the two leadershipselections. The candidateswere Harold Macmillanand R.A. Butler

in January 1957, and Butler, Lord Home, Reginald Maudling, and Lord Hailsham in

October 1963. The party statusof the candidatesdiscusses the posts that they had

achieved,and the extent to which they were political 'insiders' or 'outsiders' in the party, during their careersprior to the leadershipselections they were involved in. This aspectis analysedby demonstratingdifferent graduationsof 'insider' status,following the definition set out in chapter one.' The section on the candidates'personalities analysesthe characteristicsthat were important in their successor failure in the two

selections.

The Candidates' Party Status

Macmillan

Before 1940, Macmillan was unsuccessfulin attaining any significant status in the party. He was in many ways a 'frustrated careerist', who from becon-dngan NP in

1925 remained an obscure back-bencher.Macn-dllan, from the base of his first constituency,Stockton-On-Tees, focused on economicissues as a meansof gaining attention.In publicationssuch as IndustEyand the State(April 1927),Reconstruction:

A PleaFor A National Poligy (December1933), The Next Five Years (March 1935), and The Price Of Peace (May 1938), he attacked the government's policies to deal with economic and industrial problems. Macmillan was greatly influenced by the

' For the analysisof the graduationsof 'outsider' and 'insider' status,see chapter one, pp. 16-17 75

poverty, deprivation,and industrialdecline in Stockton,which led him to focus on this

issue.However, despitethese efforts, Macmillan remaineda political 'outsider' in the

ConservativeParty. He can be classifiedas an 'outsider' in this period, as he was not

regarded as a successful back-bencher. Unlike Butler, he did not gain the traditional junior posts that gained him the first stage of 'insider' status in the party, such as

ParliamentaryPrivate Secretaryor Under-Secretary.Macmillan was an ordinary back-

bencheron the outer realmsof the ParliamentaryParty.

Macmillan's lack of successled him to considerjoining OswaldMosley's New

Party in 1931, but he did not as he believedthat remainingwith the ConservativeParty 2 was the best way of furthering his career. That Macn-dllanwas tempted to join

Mosley illustratesthe extent to which he was unsuccessfulas a party politician in this

period. He continuedhis strategyof attackingthe government'seconomic policies in

The Middle W in June 1938. Macmillan believed this was his political testament, but

like his earlier work, it was not successfulin improving his party status, but did 3 influence younger Conservatives, like Hugh Fraser and Edward Heath.

The policy of appeasementtowards Nazi Germanygave Macmillan another

focus of attack in his efforts to kick-start his career. He becameone of the anti-

appeasers,along with Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. The anti-appeaserswere

not successful,and were not feared as a threat by the ConservativeParty hierarchy.

Macmillan later noted that 'We had no power to changethe Government,even if we 4 could have rallied at that time sufficient Members to bring about its fall'. The

declarationof war on 3 September1939 did not changeMacmillan's 'outsider' status,

2 H. Nicolson,Diaries and Letters 1930-1939,(London: Collins, 1966),entry for 30 May 1930,p. 76. Harold Nicolson was a memberof the New Party, and Macmillan told him he felt it wasbetter for him to remain a ConservativeMP. 3 Home, Macmillan 1894-1956pp. 107-109 4 H. Macmillan, Winds Of Change1914-1939, (London: Macmillan, 1966),p. 550 76 but when Chamberlainfell as Prime Minister in May 1940,he held high hopesfor an up-turn in his career,as Churchillsucceeded Chamberlain as PrimeNfinister.

After Churchill came to power, Macmillan gained his first government post, as

Under-Secretary to the Nfinister of Supply, Lord Beaverbrook on 29 June 1941. This was his first government post after sixteen years as an M[P, and was the most junior position in the Ministry. Following that appointment,Macmillan occupiedthe same post at the ColonialOffice. In December1942, he becameBritish NfinisterResident in

North Africa. This was a clear promotionfor Macmillan,as he had direct contact with

Churchill and Cabinetstatus. However, Macmillan remaineda political 'outsider', as althoughhe had attainedthe first stageof 'insider' status,he was detachedfrom the

Westminsterscene, and was of low statusin the party. The advantagesof the post were perceivedby Macmillan, and he acceptedChurchill's offer 'immediately and gratefully'. ' He did gain valuable experience in this post, and was a success, as he gaineda good reputationwith Eisenhower,the Allied Commander-in-ChiefThis came to be of great significance during the Suez Crisis. Once the war had ended, Macmillan became Secretary of State for Air in the caretaker government before the 1945 election. He finished the war years with an enhancedreputation, but was still an insignificantfigure detachedfrom the upperrealms of the party.

During the opposition years of 1945-1951, Macmillan began to improve his statusin the party. He becamea chief contributor on the Industrial Policy Committee that producedThe Industrial Charterof 1947,and playeda key role in publicisingit at the meetings with trade unionists and businessmen,which contributed to the formulationof the policies.Macmillan produced key documentsthat were influential in

5 H. Macmillan, War Diaries, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. xxi; and H. Macmillan, The Blast 0 War 1939-1945, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 185 77 the final version of The Industrial Charter, such as Industrial Roligy and The

Government Indust ConservativeResearch Department documents and . reveal the central role he played in the formulation of the IPCs policy proposals, and the 6 publicity of them. This helped to increase perceptions of Macn-dllanin the party as a politician with good electability. This role also served to decreaseMacn-Oan's

'outsider' chic in the party becauseof his role on the IPC, but his party statusremained outside the upper realms of the party.

When the Conservativesreturned to power at the 1951 election, Macmillan gained the post of Minister of Housing and Local Government.This was a junior position in the Cabinet,and evidencesuggests that he wanteda more seniorpost. This appointment, however, illustrates how far away from the summit of the party

Macmillanwas in 1951. It proved,nevertheless to be a successfulappointment for him, and its potential was summedup when Churchill told Macmillan on his appointment:

'It [will] make or mar my political career. But every humble home will bless my name,

7 if I Macmillan's legislator his succeed'. ability as an effective and administrator, and electabilityin publicisingthe housingdrive, improvedMacmillan's statusin a post of vital electoral significance. His role as the man who built 300,000 houses a year increasedMacrnillan's party statusand his visibility in the country, and he was invited to give one of the first ever Party Political Broadcastsin 1953.As Ramsdenhas noted,

'Macmillan was seen as one of the government's stars, much in demand for 8 constituencyengagements'. Bracken noted to Beaverbrook that 'Macmillan has shown a great deal of good sensein his dealingswith the public'. This was illustrated

6 'The Worker and Industry', initialled 'H. M', The Governmentand Industry', undated;'Industrial Policy', undated;and 'SuggestedPlans and Datesfor Areas to be visited by membersof the Industrial Policy Committee,5 December1946 CPA CRD 2n156 7 Diary entry for 28 October195 1, Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 9* (I 11) I J. Ramsden,The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957,(London: Longman, 1995), p.257 78 when Macmillan visited Exmoor in August 1952 following severe floods which destroyed Lynmouth, and the national press acclaimed Macn-dllan's visit. 9 Macmillan becamemore of an 'insider' in the party over this period becauseof his successat

Housing, and he further increasedthis statuswhen he.penetrated the 'inner circle' of the Churchill government,when he was promotedto Minister of Defencein October

1954. Macmillan did not enjoy thýs post as defence matters were dominated by

Churchill,and he had little successthere, but the post improvedhis statusin the party, and also his governability as he moved into one of the key foreign policy positions in the govemment.

When Eden succeededChurchill as Prime NEnister in April 1955, Macmillan succeededhim as Foreign Secretary.This significantlyimproved his statusin the party, as he now occupiedone of the three 'great offices of state, and was on a traditional careerpath to the party leadership.Macmillan now fulfilled the final stageof 'insider' status.Macmillan had alwayscoveted the position of Foreign Secretary,and enjoyed the job, but did not appreciateEden's interferencein the work of the Foreign Office.

Macmillan was only at the Foreign Office for six monthsbefore agreeingto become

Chancellor of the Exchequer in December 1955, replacing Butler at the Treasury. Eden had first askedMacmillan to considergoing to the Treasurybefore the 1955 election, and he was askedagain on 23 September1955.10 This move, after monthsof stalling and negotiationover terms for moving posts,was significantfor Macmillanas he now occupiedanother of the three 'great offices of state'. It was the key domesticposition

9 R. Cockett(ed. ), My Dear Max: The Lettersof BrendanBracken to Lord Beaverbrook,1925-1958 (London:I-Iistorians' Press, 1990), entry for 7 January1953, pp. 135-136; and The Times, 20 August 1952 10Diary entry for 3 April 1955,Ms. Macmillan dev. d.20 (79). and Diary entry for 23 September 1955Ms. Macmillan dev. d.23* (57-58) 79 in the government,and a traditional career path to the leadershipthat was more " common than the Foreign Office route.

Macmillan's three years at Housing had given him an appetite for

power and had shown the party something of his flair for

presentation, hitherto generally unsuspected;from 1954 he

moved within two years through the Ministry of Defence, the

Foreign Office and the Exchequer,and so developedan all-

rounder'sclaims on the highestpost of all."

Following the onsetof the SuezCrisis in July 1956,Macmillan became one of

Eden's most important ministers,and, along with Lord Salisbury,was the most vocal

'hawk' in the Cabinet who supported Eden's aggressivestance towards Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Macmillan was at the core of key

Nfinisterson the Egypt Committee,and played a major role in the determinationof policy and planningfor the invasionof the CanalZone. As Chancellor,Macmillan had the ultimate responsibilityfor the safe-guardingof Britain's financial well-being. His concerns over the state of the British economy, after the full extent of Britain's problemswith the oil supply, led him to signalthe retreat from the Canal Zone on 6

November, after it becameclear that the US governmentwould not help Britain financiallyunless a cease-firewas called.Macmillan's centralityin this decisionshows the full extentof his statusand position in the party.

11The detailsof Macmillan's negotiationswith Eden,and his belief that Butler shouldnot become DeputyPrime Minister (which Butler wanted)are in Diary entriesfor 24 October,18 Novemberand 7-13 December1955, Ms. Macn-dllandep. d.24* (2-4,8 1,108v-1l4v) " Ramsden,Age of Churchill and Eden, p.257 80

This signalling of the cease-firealso served to increaseMacn-dllan's status, despite his transformation from one of the most aggressive Nfinisters in calling for military action, to giving the signal for the retreat, and being 'first in, first out'. This was because when Eden went to Jamaica, Butler became the focal point for

ConservativeMPs' discontent,while Macmillan used the situation to promote his statusregarding his leadershipcandidacy, if Eden was forced to resignbecause of the crisis. This was especially apparent at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November when Macmillan delivered a rallying cry to the party's MPs that invigorated their spirits.The speechincreased his statusas a leadershipcandidate, as it had then become clear to the party that Eden was unlikely to continue as leader. Following Eden's departurefor Jamaica,Macmillan played a key role alongsideButler in re-building

Anglo-US His long-standingfhendship President Eisenhower 0 relations. with was rejuvenated in this period, and Macmillan's actions in securing the necessaryfinancial help for the British governmentincreased his status with the US government,who appearedto favour him over Butler in successionto Eden. At the time of the selection of Eden's successor,Macn0an occupied a position of considerablestatus in the party, and was in a prime position to becomeleader should Eden relinquish his position.

Butler

Butler becamethe ConservativeNIP for Saffron Walden at the 1929 general election, and rapidly attained his first position of junior rank in the government.In

August 1931, He became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Samuel Hoare at the

India Office, and was promoted to Under-Secretaryof State in August 1932. Sir

SamuelHoare, the Secretaryof State for India told Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy of 81

India, that he appointedButler becauseof his knowledgeof Indian affairs.13 He then becameUnder-Secretary at the Ministry of Labour in May 1937,before moving to the sameposition at the Foreign Office following Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary on 20 February 1938.

Over the first decadeof his career,Butler becamea political 'insider' in the

ConservativeParty, as he attaineda junior position in the party quickly, and was then promoted severaltimes. This can be deemedas the first stage of Butler's 'insider' status. His time at the ForeignOffice was crucial to his party status,as he gainedgood experienceby his close work with Chamberlainand Halifax, and representedthe

Foreign Office in the Commonsas Halifax was a peer. 'He becamefar more of an habitu6 of No. 10 than any other junior Nfinister'. This was significant in terms of

Butler's experienceof governability.However, it had a disadvantageas Butler was directly associatedwith the policy of appeasement,and when this failed by the outbreak of war, this affected his status with the anti-appeasersin the party, but they

NVS 14 did not representa significant section of Conservative . The 'Munichite' tag only affectedButler's party statuslater in his career,during both leadershipselections of 1957 and 1963. This tag acted in accumulation with the Suez Crisis and with the dissolutionof the Central African Federationin 1963,which affectedButler's status with the traditionalistright wing of the party. This accumulationof doubts affectedhis acceptabilityin both selections,but did not affect his statusduring the late 1930s,as he was still a junior memberof the government,and obviously not a contenderfor the leadership of the party at this time. In the New Years Honours list of 1939, Butler was

13 R.A. Butler, The Art of The Possible,(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971),pp. 4546 14Howard, pp.72-73; and R. Rhodes-James(ed. ), 'Chips': The Diaries Sir Henry Channon, _RAB, of (London: Weidenfeldand Nicolson, 1993),entry for 13 April 1939, p. 193. Channonwas Butler's ParliamentaryPrivate Secretary,and notedthe closenessof Butler and Chamberlain. 82 nominatedby Chamberlainto the Privy Council, and at thirty-six he was the youngest

Privy Councillor since Churchill, and Butler was obviously delighted at this award, which buttressedhis growing 'insider' status. He noted of the honour: 'Greatest political honour.Youngest except for Winston' [Churchill]."

On 20 July 1941, Butler became President of the Board of Education, and this was a clear promotion for him. His work in introducingthe 1944 'Butler' Education

Act significantly enhancedhis reputation, and status in the party as a progressive

Conservative who was likely to play a key role in the rejuvenation of Conservatism after the SecondWorld War. Churchilltelegraphed Butler on the passageof the Act on

3 August 1944, and told him 'Pray accept my congratulations. You have added a notable Act to the Statute Book and won a lasting place in the history of British

Ramsden 'The Act triumph into education'. noted that was a signalCl whose passage law Butler figure for the future'. 16Butler's as Chairman ...established as a major work of the Post-WarProblems Central Committee (PWPCC), which aimedat preparingthe party for the realities of Post-War Britain also increased his party status, and both significantly increased his govemability.

Following the 1945 election defeat, Butler became a key player in the rejuvenationof the ConservativeParty, and its adaptationto the conditions of Post-

War Britain. He is widely acknowledgedas the party's Thilosopher-in Chief through his work as Chairman of the ConservativeResearch Department (CRD) and the

Advisory Committeeon Policy and Political Education(ACPPE). This was increased by his role as Chairmanof the Industrial Policy Committee(IPC) that producedThe

's Notes,'Privy Councillor', c.May 1939, Butler MSS RAB G 10 (22) 16'Telegram from the Prime Nfinister addressedto Mr. R.A. Butler on the occasionof the Education Act receivingRoyal Assentand becominglaw'. SignedWinston S Churchill, undatedBILder MSS RAB G 16 (179); Butler, Art of the Possiblep. 122;and Ramsden,Age of Churchill and Eden, p.40 83

Industrial Charter of II May 1947. The Industrial Charter emphasisedthe party's

acceptanceof the role of the statein the plannedeconomy, and the public ownershipof

coal, rail transport,and the Bank of England.Both were importantgroups in preparing the party's response to Labour's Post-War settlement, and Butler's role as Chairman

influential his in Butler's of these party organisationsshowed growing0 status the party.

governabilitywas also illustratedby his successfulchairmanship of both committees.

11isappointment as Chairmanof the IPC was a surpriseto him, as Oliver Stanleyand

Oliver Lyttelton, two other members of the IPC, were of more senior status. This

serves to illustrate Butler's central role in the rejuvenation of party policy after 1945,

and the consequentstatus in the party that went with that role.17 This period servedto

increasehis 'insider' status,as he gained more influencein the upper-realmsof the

party.

However, his role in the 1945-51 period of opposition increased doubts about

Butler with the right wing of the party. Their doubts first arose during the appeasement

era. He was seen as a 'wet' and a 'milk and water socialist', who was denigrating the

party's principles,and this decreasedhis acceptabilitywith this wing of the party. The

opposition of the right wing was led by Sir Waldron Smithers,Conservative NT for

Orpington, who attackedThe Industrial Charter in correspondenceto Butler, and in

the press.18 However, two points must be noted about the effect of this on Butler's

statusin the party. Firstly, this period was far beforethe two leadershipcontests that

he was involved in, and was therefore,not influentialin affectinghis statusin 1957 or

1963. The circumstances surrounding both selections, and Butler's response to them,

17Butler, Art of the Possible p. 135 18 , 'Orpington Division - Privateand Confidential', Smithersto Butler, July 1947Butler MSS RAB H92 (110), 'Private and Confidential- not for publication-'Industrial of Magna CharterT The ConservativeIndustrial Charterattacked by Sir Waldron Smithers,J. P., M. P. - to the authorsof the Charter.London, July 1947'. Butler MSS RAB H92 (112-145):and The Times, 12 May 1947 84 were the most influentialfactors in the outcomes.Secondly, despite misgivings in some sections of the party to the conciliatory response adopted to Labour's Post-War settlement, many saw the necessity of such a response, and did not oppose Butler for playing a key role in directing it. The failure of the right wing opposition to The

Industrial Charter at the 1948 Party Conference illustrates the lack of effect this had on

Butler's party status.There were only three votes againstThe Industrial Charterat the

Conference,after the membersof the IPC submittedan amendmentthat calledfor it to be acceptedonly as a basisof Conservativepolicy, and this was almost unanimously '9 accepted. Memories are often long in politics, but not that long. Macmillan noted of

Butler's role in The Industrial Charter: 'His [Butler's] work in guiding the unfolding of

Conservatism him in the first the leaders'20 This is the new placed rank of party's . a correct assessmentof Butler's party status,and was illustratedwhen he was appointed

Chancellorof the Exchequeron the Conservative'sreturn to power in October 1951.

Butler now enteredone of the 'great offices of state' with an obviouspositive effect on his 'insider' status,and his govemability,acceptability and electability,as a possible future candidate for the leadership.However, Eden was the clear heir apparentin 1951, and was expectedto succeedChurchill sooner rather than later.

Butler was chosenby Churchill for his moderateimage and his ability to deal with the

'Commonsstuff, over the widely expectedappointment, Oliver Lyttelton. Sir Robert

Hall, the Director of the Economic Sectionbased in the Cabinetoffice, noted in his diary that Lyttelton was the expectedappointment in the Treasury, and Macmillan

19Butler's notesfor an essayon the party's evolutionafter the SecondWorld War, undatedCPA CRD 2/53/1,,and Butler, Art of the Possiblep. 148 11H. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 191ý4955, (London:Macmillan, 1969), p.308 85 noted that Lyttelton was also the expectedappointment within the party.2' Butler was

Chancellorin dealing deficit successfulas :Dwith the massive that the new government inherited,and was a popularchancellor with the party and the public.22 By the autumn of 1952, the balance of payments was back in surplus. In January 1953, Party

Chairman,Lord Woolton wrote to Butler and told him 'you seem to be working

23 financialmarvels'.

In June 1953, Churchill suffereda stroke, and as Eden was also recuperating from major surgery, Butler became de facto acting Prime NEnister for the period of their absence.Tl-ýs was significantfor his status,and he cameto be seenas a possible alternative to Eden as party leader, but Eden remainedthe obvious successorto

Churchill. However, the 'establishmentplot' against Butler to prevent him from succeedingChurchill instead of Eden, with the plan for Lord Salisbury,the Lord

President,to be the figureheadfor the governmentduring their absence,illustrated doubts about his acceptability to the party hierarchy. Butler was aware of the plot to prevent him succeeding Churchill, as he revealed in 1978.24 However, the plot was probablydue to the wish to securethe successionfor Eden as it was felt to be rightly his, rather than a plot directly againstButler. He was pressuredby a numberof back- bench NTs who were opposedto Eden succeedingChurchill, but the vast majority appearto have sharedthe party hierarchy'sview that Eden was the right successorto

Churchill25 However, Butler's during Churchill Eden's improved . conduct and absence

21Butler, Art of the Possible,p. 156;A. Caimcross(ed. ), The RobertHall Diaries, 1947-1953 (London:Unwin Hyman, 1989),entry for 15 October195 1, p. 169; and Macmillan, Tides of Fortune p.497 22The Balanceof PaymentsDeficit was L700 million 23Woolton to Butler, 15 January1953 Butler MSS RAB G26 (9) 24BBC RadioProfile, 29 June 1978in Howard,RAB5 p. 199 ' 21Rayner to Butler, 12 July 1953Butler MSS RAB G26 (63-64).Brigadier Ralph Raynerurged Butler to graspthe leadershipas he felt Edenwas not the right successorto Churchill, and statedthat many of his back-benchcolleagues shared his view. 86 his relationshipwith Churchill, and his status in the party hierarchy.This point was noted by JanePortal, Butler's niece, who was also Churchill's secretary.26

Butler's status in the party began to take a clown-turn, when Eden finally succeeded Churchill in April 1955. Following the give-away Budget before the election, and its resultant negative effect on the British economy, Eden wished to remove Butler from the Treasury, as he felt Butler had lost control of the economic front, and was losing his touch as Chancellor. Eden retained him at the Treasury after the election victory, but within a few months, had decided to promote Macmillan to

27 Chancellor. There followed monthsof negotiationwith both men to persuadethem to take the planned new posts, as they were reluctant to move. Butler's reputation as

Chancellor worsened in October 1955, as he had to introduce a package of emergency measuresto restoreconfidence in the pound,and repealed many of the measuresof the

April Budget." He also received a hostile reception at that year's Party Conference.

Butler decided in December 1955 to become Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the

Commons,a cleardemotion in status.

Butler's move away from the Treasury had a significant effect on his party status, as he moved away from the 'great offices of state', and the summit of the party.

He was still an 'insider', but his influence was decreasingin the upper realms of the party. This move also left Butler without a firm departmentalfooting, as his new posts were administrative and presentational. It also signalled a decline in Butler's

26Portal to Butler, 28 June 1953 Butler MSS RAB 026 (55). and Portal to Butler, 23 September 1953 Butler MSS RAB G26 (56-58) 2' Notes, September 1955 Butler MSS RAB G28 (93). Butler reveals that Eden asked Butler to consider a move from the Treasury that month, and discussedthe matter at Chequers.Eden asked Butler to 'lead the Commons and handle the party'. 28Butler increased Purchasetax by a fifth at all levels and increased profits tax from 22.5.% to 27.5%. Details of the announcement of these measuresare in Parliamentary Debates(Commons), Fifth Series. Vol. 545.26 October 1955. cols. 202-230 97 electability,as he was not as publiclyvisible as when he was Chancellor,and was also perceived negatively by his colleaguesin the Cabinet and the Parliamentary party.

The onset of the Suez Crisis in July 1956 marked a further down-turn in

Butler's As he longer he did party status. no 0 occupied a senior office, not exerciseany significant influence over government policy, and was not at the core of the Egypt

Comrnittee. Evidence suggeststhat Butler was deliberately excluded by Eden and the party's senior figures becausehe was distrusted, and did not agree with the aggressive policy adopted towards Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. This illustrates his lack of status and influence at the apex of the party.

When Eden becameill and went to Jamaicafor recuperationin November

1956, Butler becamede facto Prime Minister for actingZD and took on the responsibility the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone. He also had to instigate the rebuilding of Anglo-US relations, that had been tarnished by the government's attitude towards Nasser's actions and the resultant invasion of the Canal Zone. Butler's new temporary position served to inflate his status in the party, but it had disastrous consequencesfor his position in the party when Eden resigned in January 1957.

Butler's exposed position as acting Prime Minister led him to become the focal point for the fury of Conservative Ws, who felt betrayed by the withdrawal of the British forces, and felt humiliated at the failure of government policy. He was, therefore, in a weakenedposition in the party in January 1957.

The sameloss of statusoccurred to Butler before the leadershipstruggle of

October 1963. He became Home Secretary following Macmillan's appointment as party leader in January 1957, and also held the posts of Party Chairman and Leader of the Commons before the 'Night of the Long Knives' of 12 July 1962. The posts he 88 held in Macn-dllan'sgoverrunents had adverselyaffected his party status. This was despite Butler occupyingC. one of the 'great offices of state' as Home Secretary, and it can be deduced that this post is less prominent as a traditional avenue to the

Pren-ýiership,than the Treasury or the Foreign Office. The posts Butler occupied were posts that required senior status and vast experience,but adversely affected his party status regarding the leadership for two reasons.First, they aroused opposition in the party. This was especially the case with the dissolution of the Central African

Federation, which Butler was placed in charge of as NEnister for Central Affica in July

1962. This offended the traditionalist right wing of the party, who were opposed to the dissolution of the empire. It exacerbated the doubts about Butler by re-stirring memoriesof accusationslevelled at him during the SuezCrisis and the appeasement era. These accusations of 'wetness' served as a cumulative effect from the three episodesthat affected his party status in 1963. The second reason was that the posts

Butler held were not necessarilyposts that attracted the right kind of publicity needed for a leadership candidate. The Chancellor can demonstrate a sound handling of the economy, and can contribute positively to the party's electoral fortunes, as the economy is often the central issue in general elections. The Foreign Secretary is in a position to convey a statesman-likeimage and develop good relationships with foreign leaders;and also presenta good electoralimage as a competentstatesman. Butler did not occupy one of these two prime positions at the time of the selection, and this damagedhis leadershipprospects.

Following Macmillan's extensive reformulation of his government on 12 July

1963, Butler becameFirst Secretaryof State and de facto Deputy Prime NEnister, and also Minister for Central Africa. In a letter to Macmillan prior to the re-shuffle, Butler 89 pointed out his fears that this move could affect his position and statusin the party, and compared the situation to that of December 1955. He wrote that

Without a classicaloffice suchas Lord PresidentI shallbe out on

a raft as I was after Anthony Eden's decisionin 1955.1 know

what this means.One has a personalassistant and inadequate

staff to transactbusiness. I thereforethink I shall be out on an

African limb, since all the work done as Deputy viz. the

Broadcastingand White Papersand interviewswith ITA etc. is

anonymous,as is the Home Affairs Committee and almost

29 everythingworthwhile.

Nevertheless, Butler agreed to take on the position, probably after assurances by Macmillanthat his statusas the most senior minister in the governrnentwould be made fully clear, and that his position as the most likely successor to Macmillan was not affected. 11ismove away from the 'great offices of state' did lead to a decline in his party status, and in October 1963, Butler was perceived as a spent force.

Home

Lord Home had risen slowly through the ranks of the party until he became

CommonwealthSecretary under Eden. He becameParliamentary Private Secretaryto

Neville Chamberlainin February 1936. Home later becameUnder-Secretary at the

Foreign Office in the caretakergovernment of 1945 before the massiveConservative

29Butler to Macmillan, II July 1962, Butler MS S RAB G38 (22) 90 defeat. Like Butler, Home reachedthe first stageof 'insider' statusquickly, but when he left the Commons in July 1951 on succeedingto the Earldom of Home, his status in the Parliamentary party decreased,as he was now in the Lords. However, he became

Minister of Stateat the ScottishOffice in October 1951, and Ramsdenhas statedthat

Home's successin this job 'was the re-launchingof Alec Home's careertowards the

30 preniersl-ýp'. As Commonwealth Secretary, he was a member of the Egypt

Committee during the Suez Crisis. When Macmillan came to power in 1957, Home remainedat the CommonwealthOffice, andbecame one of his confidants,especially on foreign and colonialpolicy. This closerelationship with Macmillanwas to be centralto

Home's party statusat the time of the 1963 leadershipstruggle, and also showedhis positionas a political 'insider' in Macrnillan'sgovernment.

Problems over foreign policy came to dominate the early years of the

Macmillan regime, and Home's response to the many problems, including the Seretse

Khama and the long-running Cyprus problem 'consolidated his position in the upper ranksof the Cabinet'.31 WhenLord Salisburyresigned over the releaseof Archbishop

Makarios, the spiritual leader of the Greek Community and the advocate of political union with Cyprus, Home gained Salisbury's positions as Lord President of the

Council and Leaderof the Lords, further enhancinghis statusin Macmillan's Cabinet.

When the resignation of Derek Heathcoat-Amory as Chancellor became widely expectedin 1959,Macmillan wanted to replacehim with Foreign SecretaryLloyd, and felt Home would be the potentialreplacement for Lloyd at the Foreign Office.32

" Ramsden, Age of Churchill and Eden, p. 246 31Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home pp. 190-191 32Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 194 91

Thorpe has arguedthat Home's five years at the CommonwealthOffice were the 'most important of his career to date'. This was because he was now the most

senior of the younger generationof Conservativesthat included Hailsham,Duncan

Sandys, Selwyn Lloyd, Edward Heath and Iain Macleod. I-Es work at the

CommonwealthOffice also gave him a higher governabilityrating, as he worked with

seniorinternational statesman, and gaineda reputationas a competentn-dnister in the

foreign policy arena. Home becameForeign Secretary on 27 July 1960 and 'with this

promotion,Home enteredthe innermostcircle of Macmillan's Cabinet'.33 Thorpe has arguedthat 'there was no figure in the ConservativeCabinet who had the necessary

seniority and knowledge of the wider context of foreign affairs to deny Home the

successionto the Foreign Office'. It is clear that Butler had the first, but it is not as

apparentif he had the second.Thorpe's assessmentseems to ignore two important

points. Firstly, Butler was far more senior than Home in the summer of 1960, and it

was widely known, especially to Macmillan, that he wanted to go to the Foreign

Office. Secondly, Macmillan wanted a Foreign Secretary he could control, much in the way that both he and Eden had treated Lloyd. This subserviencethat Home would yield to Macmillan, unlike Butler becauseof his status in the party, explains his

appointmentbetter than an emphasison seniority.

This promotion was certainly important for Home, as he enteredone of the

'great offices of state', and occupied a traditional avenue to the leadership.IEs

'insider' status reachedfruition when he enteredbecame Foreign Secretary.When

Home becameForeign Secretary,he saw Macmillan every day as the Prime Minister

believeda close relationshipbetween Prime Minister and Foreign Secretarywas vital

33Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 204 92 to the successfuloperation of govemmentS.34 This increased his visibility and reputation with the party hierarchy and its most senior figures. Home's appointment was greetedby Conservativeback-benchers with amazementbecause he was an Earl, but Thorpe hasargued that 'when the dust had settledand unbiasedobservers realised that Alec Home was not an ineffectual aristocrat but a politician of wide practical

began 35 This by Home's biographeris experience,the tune to change'. assessment a charitableone, and does cloud the wide feelingin the Parliamentaryparty that he was tan earl too far', as Macmillan did have a penchant for having Peers in key offices in his goverment, suchas Poole andHailsham.

Thorpe is correct in asserting that Home's competence as Foreign Secretary improvedhis status.His wide experienceof contemporaryproblems of foreign policy, which developedfrom his time at the CommonwealthOffice, impressedhis colleagues and also leading foreign politicians. Home's experience of government was principally in foreign affairs. He had been Parliamentary Private Secretary to Chamberlain during the Munich crisis, and later served as a Minister of State, and as Commonwealth

Secretary in Macmillan's goverment before becoming Foreign Secretary, so his qualifications for the post cannot be disputed. Home particularly impressed the party hierarchyas Foreign Secretary,by the good relationshipshe developedwith world ministers in charge of foreign affairs. One particularly important relationship that developedwas between Home and Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State from

November1960. This was of particularimportance during the Cubanmissile crisis.

" Macmillan conveyedthis in a letter to Home on 21 July 1986in the Home Archive in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 213 15Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 2 10 93

Home's statusin the party increasedafter the 'Night of the Long Knives'. 'In a

Cabinet now weighted towards a younger generation, Macmillan turned increasingly to

36 Home for disinterestedadvice'. This was because,for a variety of reasons,

Macmillan did not trust Butler, principally becausehe had leaked news of the impending 12 July 1962. The the Cabinet Zýreshuffle of majority of were now of the next generationof leadingConservatives like Maudling and Heath, who Macmillan did not feel as comfortablewith. Home's position within the party becamemore important after 12 July, as Butler's position was in decline with his move away from the senior offices of state.Maudling, promoted to Chancellor,was seenas one of the younger generation,a possibleleader-in-waiting who was not yet quite readyfor the leadership.

Home was convenientlyplaced between the two, and was in a good position for the leadershipfor a numberof reasons.First, he occupiedone of the two offices that are traditional avenuesto the leadership, the Foreign Office, and this had many advantages for his party status, including an increasedseniority and influence, and positive electoral connotations. Second, Home was not seen as a possible successorto

Macmillan,so could increasehis statusas a politician rather than as a possibleleader.

Third, he was in a position betweenthe Macmillan 'Old Guard' (that includedButler) andthe 'Next Generation'(that includedMaudling andHeath). This was advantageous to Home's party status, as the old guard were now discreditedand not wanted as possibleleaders, and the party had doubts about the younger men over whether they were yet ready to take over. Home was in a comprorniseposition in party status betweenthe two.

36Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 255 94

Maudlin

Reginald Maudling was elected as a Conservative NT in February 1950, following a period at the Conservative Research Department following the 1945 election defeat.Maudling was a secretaryon the Industrial Policy Committeethat produced The Industrial Charter of 1947. In early 1952, he was appointed

Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Maudling was unsure whetherto take the offer, as he was more interestedin economicpolicy, but accepted

Butler him do it ladder In after advised to so, as would a step on the political .

November 1952, he was appointed Economic Secretary to the Treasury.37 He gained valuableexperience by deputisingfor Butler at the World Bank and IMF meetingC. in

1953. It is clear that Maudling reachedthe first stageof 'insider' status in the party very quickly, and this gave him a platform to improve his position in the party.

When Eden became Prime Minister in April 1955, he promoted Maudling to

Minister of Supply, his first full ministerial post, and with the post, he became a Privy

Councillor. Maudling had thus risen to his first ministerial post within five years of becoming an MP. When Macmillan becamePrime Minister in January 1957, he wanted

Maudling Minister Supply,but Maudling declined 0 to continueas of and took the post of Paymaster-General.This involved a demotionfrom ministerialrank, but Maudling has that he did his decision, the 'fascinating'3' He stated not regret as work was . deputisedin the Commonsfor Lord Nfills, the Minister of Fuel and Power, and also assistedHeathcoat-Amory, the Chancellor.

Maudling becamePresident of the Board of Trade after the Conservative victory in the 1959 election,his first Cabinetpost. This promotion to one of the key

" Maudling, Memoirs, pp. 52-53 38Maudling, Memoirs, p. 65 95

economicbriefs in the governmentincreased his statusin the party. In October 1961,

Maudling was promoted to Secretary of State for the Colonies. This involved a move

away from the domesticeconomic portfolios that he had occupiedbefore, but was an

important post becauseof the rise of African nationalism and the granting of

independenceto the colonies. Maudling's main task was to supervisethe transition of the coloniesto independentstatus, and the previous Secretaryof State,Iain Macleod, had comein for criticismfrom the right wing of the party, for the progressivepolicy of granting independence.Therefore, the post ran a severe risk to Maudling's

acceptabilityto the party. A major problemwas the CentralAfrican Federation,which was made the responsibility of Butler in 1962. The effect of the Central African

problemon Maudling's party statushas been well outlinedby Ramsden.He arguesthat it servedto 'undem-dnethe claims of Macleod, Maudling and (once again) Butler to become party leader, for in all three casestheir policy on Central Africa turned right-

39 wingers into implacable opponents'. This post, therefore, clearly affected his

acceptability with the right wing of the party.

Following the 'Night of the Long Knives', Maudling was promoted to

Chancellorof the Exchequer.This promotion confirmedthe final attainmentof his

'insider' statusin Macmillan's government,as he enteredone of the 'great offices of state'. Maudling had a good deal of experienceat the Treasury after his time as

Economic Secretaryand PaymasterGeneral, and was viewed by Macmillan as a progressiveappointment. When Macmillanappointed Maudling, he gave him the brief of expandingthe economy,and reducing unemploymentin preparationof the next election. However. there 'was a time lag between government changesand the

" Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 150 96

reactionin the economy'.Ramsden has argued correctly that the recoverydid not start until the middle of 1963,and before that the worst winter for sixteenyears increased

seasonal unemployment. The overall unemployment figure was three-quarters of a

40 the 1947 Maudling million, worst since . was nevertheless successful at presenting

the economicmeasures with confidence,something that Lloyd, his predecessor,had

failed to do. His 1963 Budget was a successand increasedconfidence in the govermnent.

Maudlinghimself felt that the strengthof his position in the leadershipstruggle was based on this success.In 1963, The Daily Telegraph published a regular poll of

ConservativeWs views on who they would like to have as leader in successionto

Macmillan.In the summerof 1963,Maudling had 'a very large majority'. 41 Clearly,

after his displays of sound control over the economy, he was rated highly by

ConservativeMPs and was felt to be the leadingcandidate to succeedMacmillan from the 'younger men'. This was also the case among his Cabinet colleagues, who felt that a changeto the next generationof leadingConservative figures, was the best option because of the discredit being heaped on older Conservatives,and especially

Macmillan. Of his standing in the party over the summer of 1963, Maudling noted 'I had a remarkablesummer of support from the ParliamentaryParty, who were likely to be in substanceif not in form the decisiveelement I. 42

On 18 June 1963, 'a wave of hysteria' was createdwhen the officers of the

1922 Committeepresented the casefor Maudling's immediatesuccession. Ramsden hasdescribed the reasonsbehind this move: 'The theory behindthis was that the party

" Ramden, Winds of Change,pp. 179-180 41Maudling, Memoirs,p. 125 42 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 97

shouldskip straightto the next generationand play safeby going for a safelymarried

man'. He has also noted that Macmillan referredto Maudling as being a good option

because of his attraction as a 'respectable Wilson'. The Daily Telegraph reported on

20 June 1963, after interviewing fifty 'representative' Conservative NTs, that their

votes on the successionwere: Maudling - 21, Hailsham - 8, Heath - 6, Butler - 4,

Powell - 3, Home and Macleod -I each, and undecided- 5. A poll in The Dail

Express also found Maudling was the clear favourite. " This assessmentis significant,

as it revealsa reasonfor his attractionto ConservativeNVs: His 'clean' imagewould

be a distinct advantageto the party. It presenteda man of the next generation,not taintedby the sleazeaccusations against Macmillan's government, that were prompted

particularlyby the Profurnoaffair.

However, after the summer,Maudling's prospectsbegan to decline, as his

support began to dissipate and his position weakened. He has noted that after the

summer recess, his Cabinet colleagues estimation of him began to drop, and their

reactions to him became 'less enthusiastically cordial'. Thorpe has stated that

Maudling's support 'melted away like the morning dew. "' Maudling has also recordedan episodeat the party Conferencein Blackpool which indicatedhis loss of status.He met an unidentifiedCabinet colleague in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel, who had written to him over the summer stating that Macmillan should go, and

Maudling should take over. This colleaguenow told him that he was supporting

Home to be Macmillan'ssuccessor. 45

" Ramsden,Winds of ChgpZep. 192 44Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 259 '5 Maudling, Mcm irs, p. 126 98

This dissipationof Maudling's status can be accountedfor by focusing on a numberof reasons.First, the supportwas not as widespreadas it hasbeen accounted.

This has been arguedby Thorpe, who believedthat the support for Maudling in the summer of 1963 that was recounted in The Daily Telegraph polls, was not as well foundedas the polls suggested.He has stated that the polls had a low initial baseof

NTs, andwere conductedselectively among younger NTs sympatheticto Maudling. It did not convey the views of senior ConservativeNTs, who were nevertheless influencedby the polls, and beganto considerthe virtues of a Maudling candidacy.

Second,the party did want to moveto a new generationof leaders,of which Maudling wasthen the leadingfigure, but did not feel the time was yet right to move, and settled on Home as the stop-gapleader to take the party through the forthcoming election.

Third, Maudling's status began to collapse because of his conduct and the characteristics he displayed. He did not appear as a competent public figure; he remainedtoo quiet, and did not give the impressionby his conductthat he wantedthe leadership.Macmillan noted he felt Maudling was 'uninspiring'. Along with the mistakes he made, especially his poor conference speechon the economy, this explains the declinein Maudling's party status.46

Hailsham

Lord Hailshamwas Nlinister of Education between January and September

1957.Hailsham then becameParty Chairmanand Lord Presidentof the Council, with

Cabinetrank, and contributedsignificantly to the party's victory in the 1959 election.

46Maudling notedthat he could not explain the decline in his support,and this lack of perceptionis indicativeof the reasonsfor his failure. Maudling noteshe could not explain his collapseof supportin Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 99

The ConferenceChairman at the 1957 Party Conferencewas told by a constituency representativethat 'the audiencegave [Hailsham] the mantle of Churchill. His star rose like a rocket'.47 Hailshamincreased his profile and status at the party conferenceby his includingbathing in delight publicity stunts, the seato the of photographers,eating Cý giant sticks of rock, and ringing a bell to signal the start of Macmillan's leader's addressto the conference.However, Macmillan felt he had been upstagedat the

Conference,his first as leader,and in 1958 his staff madediscreet attempts to ensure this was not repeatedat that yearsconference. Hailsham did, nevertheless,still ring the bell at the 1958 Blackpool Conference. 'Hailsham's main job was thus to rally the

in he 4' During his he party moraleand this was a great success'. tenure as chairman, addressedmeetings of constituencyleaders, and spoke at a considerableamount of constituency meetings and dinners. There is evidence that Hailsham offended certain senior figures in the party with his exuberance,and was removed as Chairman after the election victory. Hailsham has noted that 'I did not get many thanks. Harold

Macmillan wrote me a reasonably polite letter of thanks after the result and immediatelydemoted me'. Hailshamhas statedthat his demotionwas due to a mis- understandingby Macmillan of his role 'in an entirely private matrimonialmatter in

49 which I hadbeen called as a witness',but fails to specifythe meaningof thiS. He has also recorded that he did not expect to stay as party chairmanafter the election victory, and would not haveaccepted the offer if it had beenmade. Hailshamwished to leavethe goverment altogether,because 'I was fed up with being cold shouldered

47Ramsden, Winds of Change,pp. 47-48 4"Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 49 49Lord Hailsham,A Sparrow'sFlight: Memoirs, (London:Collins, 1990),p. 324 100 and snubbedafter I had given my best and achievedsuccess in a seeminglyimpossible task'. However, Poole persuadedhim to remain in the government.50

Hailsham then became Minister for Science and Technology and Lord Privy

Seal. Hailsham, however, was demoted, as he relinquished the position of Lord

President of the Council. Following Home's promotion to the Foreign Office in July

1960,he becameLeader of the Lords. He led the governmentsnegotiations in the talks on the Multi-Lateral Test Ban Treaty in July 1963.However, Hailsham'sgovernability stagnatedafter his chairmanshipof the party, and rather than gaining promotion and an increasein status,his position in the party did not improve.Hailsham, did not reachthe samelevel of 'insider' statusas the other candidates,as he did not occupy any of the senior domesticor foreign policy Cabinetportfolios. He did not occupy any of the cgreatoffices of state' during his careerprior to the leadershipcontest. His statusas a candidate in October 1963 was based purely on his successas Party Chairman, with the electabilityhe demonstratedbeing the prime factor in his positionas a candidate.

By the time of the Blackpool Conference, Hailsham's status in the party was high, as it becameclear Macmillan favoured him as his successor,and this beganto dissipatevia informal networks to the party, principally through Julian Amery, Maurice

Macmillan and Randolph Churchill. However, his flamboyant conduct at the

Conferencereduced his status in the party drastically, especiallyamong older and traditional Conservatives,who alreadyhad doubts about his temperamentalsuitability for the leadership.I-Es status was basedlargely on style over substance,because of his flamboyantimage, but after Blackpool his statusin the party as a leadershipcandidate had diminishedgreatly.

" Hailsham,A Spaffow'sFlight, P.326 101

The Candidates' Personalities

Macn0an

It has often beensuggested that Macmillan's rise through the party to become

Prime Nfinister in January 1957 was due to his 'killer instinct'. This personality trait is often left undefined, and thus in existing analyses of his personality remains unsubstantiated,and appearsas a vagueclich6. This term, therefore,requires definition to illustratewhy it was a significantfactor in Macinillan attaimnentof the leadership.A

'killer instinct' can be defined as a senseof opportunism,an ability to take chances when they appear. It is, therefore, an ability to act decisively. It has often been suggestedthat this 'killer instinct' was the result of Macmillan'swife, Dorothy's thirty year affair with Bob Boothby, a colleagueof Macmillan's.It is said that this gave him

'the grit of the oyster' that drove him to gain the party leadership. However, such an assessmentmust remainas conjecture,as Macmillannever statedthat the effect of his wife's affair led to the developmentof this attribute. Many of his friends and colleagues did believe that the effect of his wife's affair gave Macmillan a determinationto succeedin politics, but it is still an assumptionthat cannot be proved.5'

Nevertheless,Macmillan's decisivenessat certain points of his career,and his ability to exploit situations,was of great significancein his progressto the sununit of the Conservative Party. Two instances of this were of most importance. The first was his conduct during the sagaof the December1955 re-shuffle when Eden wanted to

51Pamela Egremont, a close friend of Macmillan's, told this to Alistair Home, Macmillan's official biographer, and Butler also told Home that Macmillan'swffe's affair did 'enhance his character'. Details of these interviews are in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, pp. 89-90 102 replaceButler at the Treasurywith Macmillan.Butler was determinednot to be moved unlesshe becameDeputy Prime Minister, but Macmillan saw an opportunityto block his requestto buttresshis own positionin the Cabinet.Macmillan also believed that the post of Deputy Prime Minister was not necessaryin the government, but saw that he could surpassButler in party status if he becameChancellor, and Butler became

Leaderof the Commons,without the title of Deputy Prime Mnister. Only when Eden agreedto declineButler the position did Macmillan agreeto move to the Treasury.

The secondinstance, which was of more significance,was Macmillan's decisiveness during key stagesof the Suez Crisis, including the instigationof the cease-firein the

CanalZone, and Ms conductduring the 1922Committee meeting of the 22 November

1956, when he confirmed his suitability as Eden's successor.This is consideredin detail in chapterfour.

One of the key personality traits that Macmillan displayed was his ability as a showman,a salesmanfor the party and its policies.This was demonstratedduring his promotion of The Industrial Charter in 1947, but came to the fore with great effect during Macmillan's time as Minister of Housingfrom 1951to 1954.His image as the man responsiblefor the housing drive and the 300,000 housesa year, was vital to

Macmillan's growing attractivenessto ConservativeMPs becauseit demonstratedhis electability.Housing was a socialissue of major electoralsignificance in 1951, because of the destruction of houses during the second world war. The 1945-51 Labour government'sinability to dealwith this issuegave the Conservativesthe opportunityto exploit its full electoralpotential in 1951, and Macmillan did this with great aplomb.

His rapid promotion throughtý the party ranks over the next six yearsshowed the effect 103 tbýsquality had on Macmillan's leadershipcandidacy when Eden retired in January

1957.

Butler

It has often been commentedin existing analysisthat Butler lacked a 'killer instinct', unlike Macmillan, to grasp the opportunities that he had to gain the leadershipof the party. As with the assessmentof Macmillan, this term is often not defined,and thereforeremains unsubstantiated. However, following the definition set out in the previous section, it is clear that Butler did not have the same senseof opportunismas Macn-dllan,and was perceivedas being indecisiveduring his career.

This was especiallyso during his time as Chancellorfrom 1951 to 1955. Macmillan

during ROBOT float in 1952, noted 0 the controversyover the plan to the pound that

'He [Churchill] is evidently disappointed in Butler, who is really Loo agreeable, too pliant, and too ready to go from plan to plan, accepting perhaps too readily the rejectionof each'.52 This indecisivenessand lack of directionwas also commentedon by Sir Robert Hall, who worked closely with Butler at the Treasury. Hall believed that

Butler's methodof working at the Treasurywas to try out a policy, and then discardit quickly, if it did not produce immediate dividends. This served to frustrate Ws colleagues,and Hall noted in July 1952 that 'I have now lost most of my respectfor the Chancellorthough I still like him and think he is good at somethings. But he is a weak man fundamentally.I feel strongerz: - than he is and as he is not a very good instrument,one tends to discount him'.53 As Hall worked closely with Butler, as

Director of the EconomicSection at the CabinetOffice, his views are significant.

52Diary entry for 29 February1952, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 10 (2v-3v). Emphasison original. 5' Caimcross(ed. ), Hall Diaries 1947-1953entry for 16 July 1952,p. 240 104

Butler's lack of a 'killer instinct' was displayedduring his time as acting Prime

Minister when Eden and Churchill were incapacitatedin the summerof 1953. As he was the temporary figure-head for the government, Butler had an ideal opportunity to stakehis claim and demandthe leadership.However, the 'establishmentplot' designed to protect Eden's position as the heir apparentappeared to intimidateButler, and he

54 merely'concentrated on the smoothrunning of the administrativemachine. Hehada chanceto improve his position in the party by making someoutstanding performances in the Commons,but he does not appearto have done so. John Colville, Churchill's

Private Secretary, noted in July 1953, of Butler's performance during his opening of a foreign affairs debate in the Commonsthat 'It was a dull speech,yet more dully delivered. He is certainly no orator'. 55

Another personalitytrait is Butler's inability to inspire the party when it was most necessary.Ramsden has noted that this inability becameapparent when Butler became Leader of the Commons and Lord Privy Seal in December 1955, and that he was 'efficient in tl-ýs role if lacking in the inspirational qualities needed in a party manager. The management of the Parliamentary party improved, but the impression given to the country at large did not.56 This camemost notablyto the fore during the

1922 Committee meeting of 22 November 1956 in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. On that occasion,it was imperative for Butler's leadershipcandidacy that he gave an uplifting performanceto ConservativeNPs to convincethem of his virtues as Eden's successor.This is somethinghe failed to do, and is consideredin detail in the next chapter. This failure counted strongly againstButler's electability rating in January

Howard,RAB, pp.199-200 J. Colville, The Fringesof Power:Downing StreetDiaries, 1939-1955,(London: Hodder and Stoughton,1985), entry for 21 July 1953,p. 332 " Ramsden,Age of Churchill and Ede p.291 105

1957,and again in October 1963,he failed to uplift the party at the party conferencein

Blackpool. THs was also a significant factor in his failure to succeedMacmillan, as it led him to be perceived as a candidate who could not inspire the party in the forthcoming general election, and he was viewed as having low electability. This is also evidence of Butler's lack of a 'killer instinct', as he was in the best position to grasp the leadershipin 1963 by convincingthe party of his electoralvirtues, yet he failed to do so.

A key element of Butler's personality that became apparent over this period was that he was a competentminister, but not necessarilya leader.There appearsto be a clear distinctionbetween competence and effectivenessin political leaders,and by

1955,Butler was failing to be effective as Chancellor.There is no doubt that he had lost his way at the Treasuryby the last year of his tenure, and this must have raised doubtsabout his ability as a possibleleader of the party. AlongsideButler's reputation for indecision,this inability to dictate from the front, and his loss of grip on the economic front, was a clear factor in the reduction of his govemability. This was somethingthat Eden felt strongly, and was the reasonbehind his desire to replace

Butler at the Treasury with Macmillan from September 1955. It can, therefore, be assumedthat this was also perceivedby his Cabinetcolleagues, who were the main selectoratefor Eden's successor.

Butler's competenceas a minister and his governability were the reasons belýindMacmillan's appointmentof him as Nfinister for Central Africa in July 1962.

The governmenthad been besetby problemswith Central Affica, and he felt Butler was the only minister who could deal with it effectively.Macmillan noted that 'Rab 106

57 [Butler] is wise and wily - both useful qualitiesin this tangledproblem'. However, he did not feel that Butler had the necessaryqualities to be party leader.Macmillan noted on the day Home becameparty leader that 'All this pretenceabout Rab's

[Butler's] "progressive"views is rather shallow. His real trouble is his vacillation in any difficult situation.He has no strengthof characteror purposeand for this reason should not be p.M.,. 58 Clearly, Macmillan believed that Butler was a competent minister,but not a 'leader. The commentsof Hall cited earlier show that he was not the only personwho believedButler did not havethe necessarypersonal qualities to be party leader.

Home

The key aspect in Home's personality that was influential in his selection in

October 1963 as Macmillan's successorwas his inoffensive image. This acceptability deemedhim the ideal compromisecandidate to hold the party together, as it was divided over the other candidates.This image was also consideredto be a valuable asset by the party hierarchy in Home's electability in October 1963, but his status as a peer countedagainst this. Ramsdenhas noted that 'Home had few personalenemies

hardly him the and anyonesuspected of underhandmotives ... after recentclaims about the lack of integrity in public life, this was Home's strongestsuit'. 59 TEs greatest achievementat the CommonwealthOffice was his ability to hold togetherthe disparate

family, its differences,feuds 60 This elementsof a multifarious with and rivalries'.

57Diary entry for 9 October1962, Ms. Macn-dllandep. d.47 (47) 58Diary entry for 19 October1963, Ms. Macmillan del). d.5 1* (30). Emphasison original. 5'Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 201 60Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Homep. 202 107

this key that Home displayed: enlightensCý attribute a general acceptance and acceptability

Underneath Iýs insouciant air of calm, Home possessed an

intuitive feel for what was important and what was secondary.

Underlying this was his remarkablepolitical skill in knowing

what would wash with the party and what would be acceptable

to Parliament Unlike Rab Butler, he did the ... not see politics as

art of the possible; he regarded it as a choice between the

unpalatableand the disastrous."

This illustrates a significant personalitytrait of Home's: that he knew what would be acceptableto the party and what would not, and this was central to his acceptability as Macn-dllan's successorin 1963. He had an 'intuitive feel for what was

62 Thorpe has that the Macmillan politically viable' . argued one of central reasons that appointed Home was his 'ability to establishproductive political relationships', and this was a vital attribute at the Foreign Office in dealingwith internationalstatesman. It alsoillustrated Home's governability.

Thorpe believesthat Home had 'done good by stealth' in his careeras he had not naturally sought public attention, unlike Hailsham. The posts that he held in governmentsfrom 1951 to 1963 also complementedthis, as his posts at the Scottish

Office and the CommonwealthOffice were not posts that attracted public attention.

Thorpealso believes this was the casewith Home's time at the ForeignOffice, but this

61Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 214 62Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 212 108 must be questionedfor two reasons.Firstly, foreign policy was at the fore-front of

Conservativepolicy under Macmillan, and when Home becameForeign Secretary,he was more in the public gaze.Secondly, the CubanMissile Crisis thrust Home into the public arena,because of the national and internationalpress and television coverage that it received.Nevertheless, Thorpe's argumenthas somemerits in explaininga key aspectof Home's personalitythat was of sizc,,,nificance in October 1963. As he had

'done good by stealth', and also becauseof his positionas an outsidecandidate for the leadership,he was not scrutinisedin the sameway as the other candidatesand his weaknesseswere not so obviousbecause of this. The effect of this was due to his self- effacingpersonality and the circumstancesof his candidature.63 Macmillan believed that Home's best quality was that he was 'not ambitiousin the senseof wanting to schemefor power althoughnot foolish to resisthonour when it comesto him. He gives

64 impression by This that a mixture of great courtesy' . personal quality was of vast significance in October 1963, because of the scandalsthat had beset the Conservative

Party, and Home's 'honourable' image was felt by the party hierarchy to be vital in regaining Conservative support.

MauLling

A key elementof Maudling's personalitywas his inability to inspire the party when it most neededit, and he most neededto do it. This was most apparentduring his speechto the party conferencein October 1963, and counted againstthe party hierarchy's assessmentof his electability. This key aspect of Maudling's personal failing is in later but Lamb has its '11islack C analysed chapters, noted significance: of

63Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp.287-288 64Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (28) 109 enthusiasmand spontaneityin deliveringit convincedtoo manypresent that he was not the type to 'convert the uncornmittedor inspirethe faithful' in.an electioncampaign'. 65

Pearcehas also summedup well this characteristicof Maudling's

Maudling had a logical n-ýindwhich worked at very great speed.

He solved problems,he was generallycultivated, but, no more

than Nigel Lawson a generationlater, could he make a big

Maudling lacked conference speech... simply the arts of waiting,

word-stress,audience-encouragement and pouncing.He sounded

like plywood with the gift of speech.66

This was also a factor in his failure to gain the leadershipin 1965. Maudling was also perceived as being lazy, and taking too relaxed an approach to the campaigning in the 1965 contest with Edward Heath, and did not make any attempt to gain the party's support in that election. This has parallels to Maudling's failure in

1963. Butler noted that he first gained this reputation from his time at the CRD from

1945-50,as he gave the impression'of being too much at easeand of not straining

67 himselfto the the Butler sameextent as others'. notedthe effect of this reputation

This is a feature he [Maudling] carried into later life, and in a

way it was a pity, becausepeople were to think that he was too

65 R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years. The Emerizina Truth, (London: John Murray, 1995), p. 493 66 E. Pearce, The Lost Leaders, (London: Little Brown, 1997), p. 329 6' Butler, Art of The Possible, p. 140 110

easygoing,perhaps too insouciant. In fact he was extremely

industrious:able to take jobs in his stride and masterthem with

dispatch.But he struck an attitude that was deceptiveto those

who knew him less well, and I feel it did not do him justice. 68

Butler denoteshere the obvious importanceof reputation in politics, as only closecolleagues can deducea proper assessmentof a colleaguescharacter, wHe those outsidethat circle rely on a deductionfrom rumour and reputation.Thorpe has noted that at the time of the 1963 selection, Maudling 'seemed too 'quiet' a figure and some felt him to be indolent, though their numbersdid not include those at the Treasury, who knew that Maudling's incisiveintellect enabledhim to dealwith the agendain half the time it took most people'.69 Clearly, this was a major disadvantageto his candidacy in October 1963.

Hailsham

A key elementof Hailsham'spersonality was his exuberanceand effervescence.

This was central to his electability, but he often displayed a poor judgement and over- excitement,and led to a perceptionthat he did not havethe right temperamentfor the leadershipof the party. This was perceivedby the Americangovernment during the negotiationsfor the Multi-Lateral Test Ban Treaty negotiationsin July 1963,in which

Hailsham played a crucial role as the government's representative.70 It was also illustratedby Hailsham'spublic outburstson televisionduring the ProfurnoCrisis. The

68Butler, Art the Possible 140 of ' p. 69Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 273 70 The significanceof this is consideredin detail in chapterseven, pp. 262-263 ill most dominant example,however, came during the Party Conferenceat Blackpool during the 1963 leadership controversy. FEsobvious delight at Macmillan's backing for his candidacyfor the party leadershipled him to promote himself dramaticallyas the party's prime electoral asset.However, this parading of himself and the campaigning of his supportersled to doubts about his temperamentthat lost him support after the conferenceended and the decisionon Macmillan'ssuccessor came to be made.

Hailsham's effervescent personality was the prime factor in his attractivenessto

Macmillan, and his belief that Hailsham was the party's best electoral asset in 1963.

His role as Party Chairman in the 1959 election campaign was central to the effectivenessof the Conservativecampaign, and contributedto the massivemajority gainedin that election.Macmillan appointed Hailsham as 'a flag waving chairman',and he 'devotedhis advocate'sskills to the presentationof the party's case', and 'revelled in the publicity' that he generated as a necessarymeans of gaining the public's support.

As Ramsden has 'He for this 7' This noted was certainly a natural showman's role' . quality was the reason why he becameMacmillan's favourite to succeed him in 1963, and it was only the doubts about Hailsham's judgement and governability that led

Macmillan to focus his attention on Home after the party conference.

Conclusion

This chapterhas demonstratedthat the party statusand the personalitiesof the candidateswere of vast importancein their candidaturesin the selections.The role of the party status and the personal characteristics,and how the latter dictated the candidatesactions during the selections,in the outcomesof the selectionsis discussed

Ramsden, Winds of Change, p.49 112 in later chapters,but key themesare demonstratedin this chapter.It has shown that party statusprior to a selectionis more important than a candidate'scareer status. A long career is not seenas a long apprenticeshipfor the leadership, and the situation and circumstances surrounding a selection determines what aspects of a candidates party statusare of most importancein the selection.An attainmentof the various stagesof

'insider' status is important in leadershipselections, but in 1957 and 1963, a move away from the final stage of 'insider' status, the 'great offices of state', detrimentally affected a candidates chances.In the selections of 1957 and 1963, the candidate with the most experience,but neverthelessof less status and influenceat the time of the selections,Butler, did not succeedto the leadership.

An occupationof one of the 'great officesof state' at the time of the selections gave a candidatea considerableadvantage in the selections.However, the situation and circumstancesdeemed the exact importanceof that status. In 1957 and 1963,

Butler had moved away from those positions to less senior posts. In 1963, Maudling was Chancellor of the Exchequer while Home was Foreign Secretary. While the

Chancellorshipis the more traditional route to the leadership,Home was chosen becausehe was felt to be the best candidatein the circumstances,and becauseof the personalcharacteristics that each had displayed.He was more acceptablebecause of his image,and Maudling was not felt to be inspiringenough to be a leaderto drive the party to victory in the forthcon-dngelection.

Personalcharacteristics and qualitiesare of vast significanceto a candidate's chancesof gaining the leadership.Their actions during their careers, and most importantly, prior to a selection,can demonstratetheir political skills, and how they would fulfil the three core criteria of acceptability,electability and governability on 113 which candidatesare judged in the selections.This was important in both the 1957, and 1963 selections as has been summarisedhere and analysedin greater detail in later chapters. In 1957, Macmillan's inspirational qualities were of great importance in his successful candidature, and in 1963, Home's general acceptability deemed him successful, and Maudling's and Butler's lack of inspirational skills, and Hailsham's questionabletemperament for the highestoffice led to the failure of their candidacies. 114

Chapter Four

The Suez Crisis and the 1957 Leadership Selection: The Candidates' Actions and

Conduct

This chapter assessesthe influence of the candidates'conduct and actions during the Suez Crisis on the outcome of the 1957 leadership selection. As demonstratedin the chapter,the key actionscame in the latter stagesof the crisis and its aftermath, principally in November and December 1956. The analysis on the actions and conductof Macmillanand Butler before that serveto set the sceneand context in which the key actions took place. This acts as an introduction to the complex machinationsof the SuezCrisis, wl-kh were a centralinfluence on the outcome.

Butler

Butler's Conduct during the Onset of the Crisis: Aupust 1956

Butler was ill with a viral infection during the onset of the SuezCrisis. When he returnedto work at the end of July, Butler was excludedfrom the Egypt Committee that co-ordinatedpolicy during the crisis. Therefore,his initial absencethrough illness meanthe had lost an opportunity to take part in the key decision-making,and Butler did not appear to exercisea significant influence on policy throughout the crisis.'

Butler alwaysfelt that Eden's policy towards Nasser,and particularly his comparison of Nasserto I-Etlerand Mussolini, was a grave political mistake.For this reason,Eden dubbedButler one of the 'Weak Sisters'in the Cabinetwho opposedthe use of force.

However,he alwaysremained loyal to Eden, and did not stateopenly his oppositionto governmentpolicy during the crisis.

1Howard, RAB, p.231 115

It has beensuggested that Butler just turned up at the meetingof 30 July, the first after his return from illness,and was listed as 'Minister in attendance'.However, this is not a generallyaccepted view, and there is no evidencein the minutesof the 2 meeting to suggest this took place. Selwyn Lloyd, who succeeded Macmillan as

Foreign Secretary, has assertedthat Butler attended meetings of the Egypt Committee regularly, but it is an accepted view that he was not at the core of the Egypt

Committee? 11isseniority in the governmentand his ministerialexperience meant he could not be fully excluded,but his role was a peripheralone. Butler seemedto believe that he could be a restraininginfluence on the aggressivenessof Eden, Macmillan and

Salisburyet al., and felt his doubts about the use of force could be expressedmore effectivelyfrom within the Cabinet,rather than outsideit.

The successof this strategymust be assessed.The fact that military action did not start until 30 October, over three months after the onset of the crisis, suggeststhat

Butler's strategy was somewhatsuccessful, but there were many other factors that acted as a restraint on military action. Theseincluded the securingof the necessary financial resourcesfor the action, and the internationalsupport for an invasion. A particularly important factor was the oppositionof the United Statesgovernment to military action. It is, therefore, impossibleto reach a definite conclusionon whether

Butler's restraining influence on Eden and Macmillan's aggressiveresponse was

successful.The delay in military action was probably due to a combinationof all the

restrainingfactors, both economicand political, but Butler's conduct did have the

outcomehe desired.

2 H. Thomas,The SuezAffair (London:Penguin, 1967), 50 Butlerjust , p. suggeststhat turned up at the meeting;and C. Brady, 'The CabinetSystem and Managementof the SuezCrisis', ConteMDOrarv gecord,volume 11, number2, (Summer1997), p. 67 I S. Lloyd, Suez 1956:A PersonalView, (London: Cape,1978), p. 85 116

Two aspects were central to Butler's behaviour on the Egypt Committee.

Firstly, he opposedthe useof force, and only believedit shouldbe usedas a last resort.

Secondly,he believedthat the disputeshould be referredto the United Nations. At the

Cabinet meeting of 23 August, Butler stated that the party in the country would

support the use of force, 'if all practicablesteps had been taken to try to securea

4 settlement by peaceful means'. At the meeting of the Egypt Committee of 24 August,

Macmillannoted Butler's uncertaintyabout the use of force: 'He wantedmore time, so as to show that every possiblemethod had beentried, before the final decisionto use

force. I argued that if D Day were postponed too often or too late, it would never

happen.We must be resolved'.5 At the Cabinetmeeting of 28 August, the membersof the Egypt Committeerelayed details of developmentsto the other Cabinetmembers.

Macmillan noted that ministerssupported the efforts made by the goverrunent,and they particularly stressed that passing the dispute to the United Nations would be

advisable.Butler felt this 'would help the Party. We could show that we had tried

everything'.6 Flis attitude to the crisis during this period had a damagingeffect on his

reputation within the party. I-Iis strategy resulted in him being distrusted. The problem was that Butler was not preparedto stand by his convictions, and state openly his

oppositionto the use of force. He would support Eden in Cabinet,and then criticise

him in the SmokingRoom and the Lobby, and this strategyresulted in Butler being

distrusted.

4 Lloyd, Suez1956 p. 134 5 Diary entry for 24 August 1956,Ms. Macmillan deR.d. 27. (59) 6 Diary entry for 28 August 1956,Ms. Macrnillan deR.d. 27. (67-68) ' For an analysisof the significanceof this point, seechapter five, pp. 169-170 117

Butler's Reaction to the Invasion of the Suez Canal: 30 October

On 17 October,while the plansfor the collusionwith Franceand Israel for the invasionof Egypt were being finalised,Butler attendedthe openingof the CalderHall power station in Cumbria as the government'srepresentative. Eden and the party hierarchywanted him out of the way, becausethey knew of his oppositionto the use of force, and felt he would not reactpositively to the plan. When Butler returnedfrom

Cumbriaon 18 October, he was summonedinto a meetingwith Eden, and was told that it hadbeen suggested in discussionsbetween Pineau, the FrenchPresident, Mollet, the FrenchPrime Minister, and Eden that in the eventof confrontationbetween Egypt and Israel,British and Frenchforces shouldintervene in the CanalZone, and separate the combatants.Butler told Eden of his concernsat the possiblepublic reactionto the plan, and suggestedthat an agreementwith Franceand Israel to free the SuezCanal, and then internationaliseit, would be more advisable.Eden replied that 'things were now moving in the direction he had described',and Butler confirmedhe would stand by E en 'in a circumstances'.8 The declarationof support 'in all circumstances'was

significant, as it tied Butler to the policy, so he could not later claim that he was not privy to the plans of the goverment. Eden recalledlater in his life that Butler 'never once madeany criticism of substanceat the Cabinetnor even to me privately, as he could havedone at any time'.'

The questionthat hasto be addressedis why did Butler not statehis opposition to the invasion?Howard's analysisof this issue suggeststhat 'there is always the argumentthat more can be doneto temper a policy from within than by denouncingit

8 Butler, Art of The Possible,p. 192 9 Note for Biographer,9 September1968, Avon Papers,AP 33nin D. Dutton, Anthony Eden. A Life and Reputation. (London: Arnold, 1997),p. 399 lis

from without'. He argues that Butler adopted this position in his later life as his explanationof why he did not opposethe use of force, and the invasionof the Canal

Zone." However, there is no evidenceto support this in Butler's Papers or his memoirs,but the argumentdoes have someplausibility. It does explainhis behaviour not just over the questionof the invasion,but also his actionsin Cabinetand on the

Egypt Committee. This analysis must remain as conjecture, as there is no clear evidencefor this havingbeen the motive behindhis actions,and it could simply have beena lack of courageby Butler to opposeEden andthe 'hawks.

Butler's Reaction to the Cease-fire: 6 November

Following the cease-fireof 6 November,the needfor the British governmentto rebuild relationswith the United Statesbecame of paramountimportance because of their oppositionto the useof force, andButler playeda major role in this. The needfor financialassistance became vital, and he used his friendsbýpwith GeorgeHumphrey, the US Treasury Secretary, in order to securethat assistance.Butler noted in February

1957that he was telephonedby Humphreyfollowing the cease-fire,and he offered to help the British government,but only if they complied with the UN resolutions, showingthe weak bargainingposition the goverrunentwas in." Butler, and Macmillan as the next most senior minister in the government, also maintainedcontacts with

Winthrop Aldrich, the US Ambassadorto Britain, after the cease-fire.These contacts were of great significanceto the resolutionof Anglo-US tensionthat resultedfrom the invasion. On 8 November, Butler had spoken to Aldrich privately at an evening

10Howard, R_AB, p. 232 11Notes, February 1957, and 'Reminiscencesending with Suez', undatedButler MS S G31 (70 89) 119

reception at Downing Street, where Butler 'deplored' the current divisions between the British and US governments, and 'he was quite evidently greatly disturbed by the coursefollowed by majority of Cabinet although he did not specificallyso state'.12

Butler told Aldrich that he was the onlY man who could explain the attitudes of the membersof the British governmentto Eisenhower.

On 21 November, Aldrich informed the State Department in Washington that he had seenMacmillan and Butler at 10 a.m. that morning, and 'they said that the government'spolicy concerningwithdrawal of British troops from Egypt must be determinedwithin the next two days'.13 Butler believedthere was no reasonwhy the

Cabinetshould not decideon withdrawal, but they were also still anxiousthat either

Macmillanor Butler should seethe Presidentas soon as possible,and Aldrich agreed with this proposal. Hoover replied on 21 November that a meeting with President

Eisenhower would not be feasible until 'possibly week of December 3', and the withdrawal of the troops must come first.14 Butler's conduct during the period after the cease-fire was vitally important in the resolution of Anglo-US relations.

Butler's Conduct during the 1922 Comn-ýtteeMeeting of 22 November

Butler's position as a candidatefor the party leadership,if Eden was to retire, was severely affected by his conduct at the meeting of the 1922 Committee of

Conservativeback-benchers on 22 November.He had to addressthe meeting in the

12N. J. Norris (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Volume XVI 1955-1957 (57 1), (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, 12 November 1956, pp. 1115-1117 13Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (598) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, 21 November 1956, pp. 1171-1172 14 Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (600) Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 21 November 1956, p. 1173; Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 195; and Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 459 120

aftermathof the decisionto cease-fire,and the agreementto withdraw from the Canal

Zone. These decisions caused great dissent in the party, and as Eden was incapacitated,Butler took on the responsibility for informing Conservativeback- benchersof developments.He had also that day defendedthe government'sactions in the Commons,an unnervingand exhaustingexperience, which may havecontributed to

Butler's lacklustre performance in front of the 1922 Committee. He was warned by the

Chief Whip, Edward Heath, before the meeting that the Suez Group 'might make trouble', as they were opposedto him for his reputationas an appeaser,and because he was at the forefront of discontentnow that Eden's departure for Jamaicafor recuperationwas imn-dnent.15

As Eden appearedto be finishedas Conservativeleader, it was imperativefor his leadershipcandidacy that Butler delivereda good performance.He addressedthe meeting before Macmillan, and gave a speech on a planned overhaul of the

Conservative Party's publicity arrangements.He also gave an account of the crisis, and spokeof the uncertaintyof the internationalsituation. He noted the bleak state of the party's current electoral prospects, and of the need for the party 'to try to get our messageacross a bit better'.16 The speechdid not inspire confidencein the party's

NTs. Clark has accurately describedthe task that Butler needed to fulfil at this meeting.'The problemfor the party managers,and particularlyfor Butler, was how to presentthe reality of military and economicdefeat in such languageas would, as might, allow it to be acceptedon the Tory back-benches'.17 This is somethingButler failed to do. He had madea 'highly expensivemistake', as he had not given the party

Clark, The Tories, p. 308 P. Goodhart, The 1922. The-Story of the 1922 Committee, (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 174; and Clark, Ihe Tories, p. 3 10 17Clark, Ihe Tories, p. 309 121

what it wanted to hear, and this damagedhis chancesof succeedingEden. 18 Ilis uninspiring performance and major miscalculation in not uplifting the meeting had dire consequencesfor Butler.

This meeting was a significant factor in the failure of Butler to become leader, but as the choiceof Eden's successorwas predominantlythe Cabinet's,his conductat this meeting of the 1922 Committee could only have had an indirect, though powerful, influenceon his failure. However, junior ministershad been speciallyinvited to the meeting, and Parliamentary Private Secretaries reported the results of the meeting to ministers.The Cabinetwas, therefore,fully awareof the natureof the performancesof the two candidates,and it can be strongly assumedthat their performancesdid affect the Cabinet'sviews on who should succeedEden. This is not the view of Goodhart, one of the secretariesof the 1922 Comn-dttee,but this is a naive assumption,as the negative performanceof Butler must have confirmed, and even increased,doubts

19 abouthim in the Cabinet.

Butler's Conduct as Acting Prime Mnister: 23 November to 14 December

On 23 November,Eden departedfor Jamaicaon medicaladvice to recuperate after the strain of recent months.Butler played a large part in the planningfor this, while Macn0an opposedthe trip. Butler's papersillustrate this conflict of opinion.He recordedafter the crisis and leadershipissue had beensettled

Is Howard, RAB, p. 241 19Goodhart, The 1922, p. 175 122

I had for some time had very close relations with Horace Evans

andthe other doctors.Terrible bedroomscenes occurred prior to

the decisionto sendAnthony Eden off to Jamaica.In and during

these,Harold Macmillan showedgreat spirit, and said that the

Prime NEnistershould on no accountgo to Jamaicaas he would

neverrecover. I, on the other hand,having been brought up in a

more orthodox school,thought that a changewas essential.As I

was informedthat a clinic was not necessary,I thought a British

d020 Colony would

This accountraises some issues of major interest concerningButler's role in the decisionthat Eden shouldrecuperate in Jamaica.Firstly, he playeda pivotal role in the decisionby stressingthat a 'changewas essential'.Butler may have emphasised this as he felt that Eden neededto be removed from the scenewhile Butler and

Macn-dllanattempted to rebuild the Anglo-US alliance,as Eisenhowerwas reluctant evento speakto Eden.Butler may havehad his own leadershipprospects in mind, but this has been discountedby many people,including Howard, who stressthat he was caught unawaresby the rapidity of the demiseof Eden. This view is confirmed by

Butler's papers,which show that he wantedEden to remainas Prime Nfinister until at least July 1957. Butler's lack of perception of the state of Eden's position illustrates that he did not seean opportunityto enhancehis leadershipcredentials.

The decline of his reputationin the party during the crisis was compounded when Butler becameacting Prime Minister in Eden's absencein November 1956.The

20'Reminiscences ending with Suez',undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89) 123

major consequenceof his conductwas that he becamethe 'scapegoat'for the failure of governmentpolicy, wl-&h had great significancein the outcome of the leadership selection.Macmillan noted of Butter's new role that, 'the main responsibilityfell on

Butler, by best 21 Butler's he supported the rest of us, as we could'. papersreveal that receivedmany letters of supportfrom fiiends and colleagues,though notably not from senior ConservativeS.22 He now had to take on the responsibilityfor trying to repair the damagethat the crisis had caused.The US News and World Report of 14

Decemberran the following headline:'RAB BUTLER'S JOB - BAILING BRITAIN

OUT', and this sumsup the enormity of his task.23 Butler has recordedthe depth of

Wsnew responsibilities

I was left in chargeof the government,with the odious duty of

withdrawing the troops, re-establishing the pound, salvaging our

relationswith the U. S. and the U. N., and bearingthe brunt of

the criticism from private members,constituency worthies and

the general public for organising a withdrawal, which was a

collectiveresponsibility. 24

Butler also noted an important consequence of his new role, as 'It was of courseunfortunate that I was left as Head of the Governmentduring a period when

from Suez imminent'2' He his but withdrawal was . was consciousof scapegoatrole,

21H. Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959,(London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 170 22Chuter Ede to Butler, 20.11.56Butler MSS RAB G30 (63) 23US Newsand World Report, 14 December1956 Butler MSS G30 (75) 24Butler, Art of The Possible,p. 194, and 'Reminiscencesending with Suez',undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89) 25Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 124

could do nothing to avoid it or mitigate its consequences.Captain 'Cub' Alport, a former colleagueof Butler's at the CRD, had warried him of the possibility of this when Eden departedfor Jamaica.He told him 'the only thing I would say is that it is vital alwaysto take accountof the forces of boldnessand resolutionwhich the last few weeks have released in the Parliamentary Party & the country generally'.26 The

Imperialistwing, especiallythe SuezGroup who advocatedan aggressiveresponse to

Nasser,were the foremost opponentsof retreat, and focusedtheir dissenton Butler when he took on the responsibilityfor that when Eden went to Jamaica.27 On the sameday as Eden's departure,the order was given for the withdrawal of one British battalion from Port Said. On 26 November, Butler spoke to Aldrich prior to the

Cabinet meeting of that day. He told him that he believed in the 'ultimate indestructibility' of Anglo-US relations, and that the relationshipwas essentialto

Western 2' This illustrates 'special civilisation. that the re-buildingof the relationship' was deemedto be crucial, and Butler's actions were directed by this objective, alongsidethe vital needto keepthe party togetherin Parliament.

Aldrich reportedto the StateDepartment that he felt it imperativeButler and

Macmillanshould be invited to Washington,adding that Butler would probablybe too busy to go himself, but Macmillan would go. The extent of Butler's new responsibilitiesmeant he was confinedto working on regainingsome stability on the domesticpolitical scene.This had an important consequence,as it allowed Macmillan to use his contacts with the US goverment to his advantagein preparing his

26Alport to Butler, 20.11.56,Butler MSS RAB G30 (65) 27 For a detailedanalysis of the views expressedby the SuezGroup, and their effect on Butler's position as a leadershipcandidate, see chapter five, pp.166-169 28 'Confidential. The SuezCanal Crisis - Diary of events- 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/28-,and Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-195716141Telegramfrom the Embassyin the United Kingdom to the Department of State,London, 26 November1956, pp. 1196-1197 125

leadership candidacy. Butler was allowed no such opportunity. On 27 November,

Aldrich called Butler, and 'found him considerablyencouraged by his talk yesterday

Humphrey' 29 Butler indicated that his impression the the with . of outcome of meeting was that 'as soon as the British can announcea definite date for completewithdrawal of forcesfrom Egypt the US door will be open for urgent considerationof the various

30 problemswhich have arisenbetween US'. This illustratesthe prime need to secure

US financial support, and the role of Butler and Macmillan in securing that assistance.

Butler's Conduct during the Withdrawal from the Canal: 3-14 December

On 3 December,Lloyd announcedthe decision to withdraw British forces gwithoutdelay' in the House of Commons,and on 8 December,the first phaseof the

Anglo-Frenchwithdrawal began.3' The reactionto the announcementwas fierce, and there was clear anger, frustration and division in the party. There was a considerable amountof criticism levelledat Butler for not makingthe announcementof withdrawal himself Conservativeback-benches felt stronglythat he shouldhave taken this role, as

Lloyd's standing in the Commons had fallen so low. Butler wound up the debate, and was now in the firing line of Conservative MPs' anger. Patrick Maitland, NIP for

Lanark, noted that 'The Lord Privy Seal's [Butler's] remark, winding up the debate, that "we intendthe arrangementsshall be as satisfactoryas they canbe... " left room for 32 a great deal of doubt'. Butler told the Conunonsthat 'to be obsessedwith talk of a

29Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (619) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, 27 November 1956, p. 1204 30Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (619) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, 27 November 1956, p. 1204 31 R. Rhodes-James,AnthoLiy Eden, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 586 32 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a Meeting held in Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 14 November 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 126

strangleholdwhich one side may exerciseover the other gets us nowhere; we must think rather in terms of a partnershipin which eachside has much to contribute and eachcan help the other to ever-increasingprosperity'. 33

Rhodes-Jamessupports the justification for the criticism against Butler, and believesit would havebeen better for his reputationif he had done so, as 'the decision did Butler much harm, with the Party in such an evil mood, casting around for

34 This by the fact that there little Eden scapegoats'. was exacerbated was criticism of in the constituencies,nor of Macmillan, and 'this left Butler isolated and vulnerable, and his enemieswere swift to vent their own emotionsupon him. It was very unjust, but justice in has habit being 3' Eden politics an uncomfortable of very rough'. returned from Jamaicaon 14 December,but the US governmentwould no longer work with him. The roles Butler and Macmillan playedin the partial rejuvenationof the Anglo-

US relationship was acknowledged in a letter from Humphrey to Butler, who told him

want you both [Butler and Macmillan] to know how very appreciativeI am of our relationshipand our confidencein eachother. I think it has helpedmatters with both our countries'. On 23 December,the last British and French troops withdrew from

Port Said.36 Butler was now reviled by many in the party becauseof his conduct duringthe crisis, and particularlyas the actingPrime Nfinister at the time of retreat and withdrawal.

33'Notes for Lord Privy Seal'sWinding-Up Speech,6 December1956' CPA CRD 2/34/29 34Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden p.586 35Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden, p.586 36Humphrey to Butler, 18 December1956 Butler MSS RAB G30 (67). and 'Confidential. The Suez Canal Crisis - Diary of events- 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/28 127

Macmillan

Macmillan's Reaction to the Onset of the Crisis and his Role on the Egypt Comn-ýttee:

Auo-,ust 1956

Macn0an reacted strongly to Nasser's nationalisationof the Suez Canal

Company,and encouragedEden in his forceful attitude to the crisis. He described

Nasser's speechdeclaring the nationalisation of the Canal Company as, 'very truculent

37 - an AsiaticMussolini, full of insult and abusefor U. S. and UW. Macmillanbecame one of the most vocal 'hawks' in the Cabinet, and was a key player on the Egypt

Committee. He noted on 27 July, 'P. M. has appointed a "SueZ' committee of the

Cabinet- himself,Salisbury, Home [CommonwealthSecretary] and myself- with other ministersturning up as required.We met for 2 hours, 7.15-9.15 and settleda lot of

38 mattersI.

Macmillan's conduct on the Egypt Committee was an important aspect of the

British government'sresponse to the crisis, and he also playeda key role in informing the US governmentof the British government'sbelief in the necessityfor the use of force. On 30 July, Macmillan met Robert Murphy, the US Deputy Under-Secretary of

State, who had been deployed by President Eisenhower to assessthe British

Government'sattitude to the crisis.Macmillan expressed to Murphy that if Nasserwas allowedto get awaywith this, Britain would be finishedas a world power. He declared that the governmenthad decidedto remove Nasserfrom office, and to use force if

the 39 He Murphy necessary,and governmentsaw no alternative. asked to make this clear to Eisenhower.Macmillan had worked with Murphy in North Africa during the

37Diary entry for 27 July 1956,Ms. Macmillan, dep. d.27. (9) 38Diary entry for 27 July 1956Ms. Macmillan dep. d.27 (10) 39Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957(33) Telegramfrom the Embassyin London to the Department of State,31 July 1956,2 a.m., pp. 60-62 128

Second World War when Macmillan was British Minister Resident, and Murphy was his opposite number, fulfilling the same role for the US government. Murphy immediatelyreported this conversationto Eisenhowervia a telegramto the US State

Department, and Eisenhower was so alarmed by his account, he promptly despatched

Secretary of State Dulles to London.

Macmillan's intention was undoubtedlyto fhghten Murphy enoughfor him to inform Eisenhower of the government's intention to use force. As he expressedin .s diary entry for that day, 'We did our best to frighten Murphy out of his life. We gave the impressionthat our military expeditionwas about to sail (it will take at least 6

f ý. 40 weeks to prepare it, in act) Macmillan recorded the following day, 'It seemswe have succeededin thoroughly alarmingMurphy. He must have reported in the sense which we wanted, and Foster Dulles is coming over post-haste. This is a very good development'.41 He continuedin the same tone to Dulles as he had expressedto

Murphy on 31 July, and talked of the potential loss of the British position in the

Nfiddle East, and the need for the British government to act firMly. 42 This illustrates that Macmillanbelieved that the US governmentneeded to be kept informed of how seriousthe British governmentwas in its 'hawkish' attitudeto the crisis.

Macmillan's role in the planning for government policy far exceededthe parametersof his responsibilitiesas Chancellor,and illustrateshis pivotal role in the

SuezCrisis. On 18 August, during the First London Conference,Macmillan dined with

Dulles where he restatedhis view that 'Britain was finishedunless Nasser could be brought to acceptin someform an effectiveinternational participation in the practical

40Diary entry for 30 July 1956,Ms. Macmillan, dep. d.27. (12) 4' Diary entry for 31 July 1956,Ms. Macmillan, dep. d.27, (13) 42Norris (ed.), FRUSXPVI 1955-1957 (46) Memorandumof a Conversation,11 Downing Street, London, I August 1956,6.30p. m., pp.108-109 129

operation of the Suez Canal'. He noted of Dulles' attitude that 'I cannot help feeling that he really wants us to "go it alone", and has been trying to help us by creating the

43 right atmosphere'. On 21 August, he had a private conversation with Dulles at I Eden's reception for the US officials at Downing Street. Macmillan asked him if he plannedto remainas Secretaryof State,if Eisenhowerwas re-electedon 6 November.

Macmillan told Dulles that he was thinking of returning to the Foreign Office 'in the reasonablynear future', and Dulles' decisionwould affect this as they had previously worked well together during Macmillan's spell at the Foreign Office. Dulles replied that he had no definite plans, but would probably remain as Secretaryof State if

Eisenhowerwas re-elected." It is apparentthat Macmillan was trying to gain US support, but the exact motives for his actions remain unclear. Macmillan may have wanted a return to the Foreign Office, or may have been vying for US support for his leadershipcandidacy, if Eden was forced to resign becauseof the crisis.

At the Cabinet meeting of 23 August, Macmillan declared that 'if Nasser succeeded,our position in the Middle East would be undermined,our oil suppliesin

45 jeopardy, and the stability of our economy gravely threatened'. On 26 August, he subnýtted his Treasury paper, The Econonýc Consequencesof Colonel Nasser, wl&h statedthat if the oil situationwas lost, Britain and Europe were finished.46 In the days prior to the subn-ýissionof this paper, Macn-Oan's concern at the oil situation is apparentin his diary entries.On 24 August, he wrote, 'without oil andthe profits of oil we could not exist', and the following day notedthat the governmentwas facedwith a

"3Macmillan Diary, 19 August 1956in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 417 44Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-1957(108) Memorandumof a conversationbetween Secretary of StateDulles and Foreign SecretaryMacmillan, 10 Downing Street,London, August 21 1956,pp. 248- 249 45Lloyd, Suez1956, p. 117 46Treasury paper, 26 August 1956in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 419 130

terrible dilemma,of taking action with the possibleconsequence that the Canalwould

47 be This that Britain Europe have'had it'. Macmillan, closed. would mean and would however,believed that force shouldbe used, and hoped that Britain's friends in the

NfiddleEast would standby them.48

Tl-ýsled Macmillan to continuethe policy of frightening the US goverrunent, and making them aware of the seriousnessof Britain's problems.He noted on 15

Septemberthat 'we must (if we possiblycan) keepthe Americanswith us, or we shall haveno chanceof getting out of our financialmess. At present,they only want to lend us somemoney. That isn't really much good to us. We want somecontribution to the

differencein between'.49 This was the nature of Macmillan's strategyin dealingwith

US the the governmentthroughout Z) the crisis, and was exacerbatedwhen extent of

Britain's oil problemsbecame apparent.

On 19 September, Douglas Dillon, the US Ambassador to Paris, reported to

Dulles the resultsof conversationshe had with Macn0an and Salisbury.He reported

that they still held the attitudethat military actionwas the only solutionto the problem,

and this should begin as soon as was politically feasible. Macmillan also 'repeated his

very strong languageof a month ago sayingthat successby Nasserwould meanthe

end of Great Britain and must be opposedat all costs'. Dillon addedthat this was

meantin an economiccontext, and Macmillan stated'England was preparedto sell all

of her foreign assets,including all her Americansecurities if necessaryto gain victory.

He saidthe presentaffair was a caseof all or nothing'. Dillon suggestedthat if this was

the view of the government, military action would probably start in a month.

47Diary entry for 24 August 1956,Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 27. (57) 48Diary entry for 25 August 1956,Ms. Macmillan dev. d.27, (60-61) 49Diary entry for 15 September1956 Ms. Macmillan del).d. 27 (102) 131

Macmillanand Salisburyfelt two things neededto be achieved.First, a reductionin the opposition of Labour to the use of force, and secondly, closer co-operation with the

US. 50 Two characteristicswere central to Macmillan's conduct throughout this phase of the crisis: his belief in the need to use force, and the need to gain US support to solve the oil problem that was a major concem for the British goverrunent.

Macmillan's conduct, however, was not aimed at improving his position as Eden's successor.It was not then clearthat Eden would resignas the crisis had not reapedits full consequences,and he had not seenthe 'window of opportunity' that camelater in the crisis.

Macmillan's Conduct during his Meeting vAth Eisenhower in Washington: 25

September-1956

From 20 September to 1 October, Macmillan visited the United States to attendthe annualmeeting of the InternationalMonetary Fund. Macmillan's diary note for 24 September illustrates his persistent concern at Britain's financial state, as 'the state of our reservesand the pressureon Sterling make me very anxious. If this situationgoes on too long, it may well overcomeus, and be driven to devaluationor bankruptcy'." He repeatedthe fears on 4 October that, 'without oil and the profits from oil, neither U. K. nor Western Europe can survive'. 52 This shows how the oil problemhad not lessened,but had escalatedduring his visit to the US.

Macmillanmet Dulles at the StateDepartment in Washingtonon 25 September at 3.40 p.m., with Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassadorto the US. Their

50Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-1957(233) Memorandumfrom C. DouglasDillon to the Secretaryof State,London, 19 September1956, pp. 521-522 51Diary entry for 24 September1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.27, (119) 5' Diary entry for 4 October1956, Ms. Macmillan del).d. 27. (18v). Emphasison original document. 132

discussioncentred around the problem of the paymentof duesfor the SuezCanal, but 53 Macmillan stressedto him that Nfiddle East oil was vital to the British economy.

Macn0lan also had a private talk with Dulles, which 'dealt chiefly with Suez'. Dulles expressedto him that he felt economic and political measurescould work just as effectivelyas military action. He replied, 'the presentmilitary situation was such that 54 they could without undue expensehold action in abeyance'. Dulles also reminded

Macmillan'frankly of how he and the Presidenthad helpedus in May 1955.They had an Election now themselves,and like us, were fighting on the cry of "peace and

6th! '. 5' An prosperity". He hoped that peace could be kept - at least until November interesting conundrum is what effect did this declaration have on Macmillan's thinking?This was a clear warning againstthe use of force until at least 6 November, yet the invasionthat beganon 30 October suggeststhat it did not havean effect on his

thinking, or at least on Macmillan's influence on government policy. The evidence

suggeststhat Eden was desperatefor military action to begin, with or without the

support of the US goverment.

Of greater significance is Macmillan's visit to Eisenhower at the White House

the sameday. Eisenhowertold Dulles afterwardsthat he andMacmillan did not discuss

the crisisin great detail, yet Macmillaninformed Eden that the Presidentsupported the

British Government'swish to 'bring Nasser down', and Eisenhoweraccepted that

Britain must win.56 Macnullan had told Eisenhower,'we could not play it long,

53Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-1957(263) Memorandumof a conversation,Department of State, Washington,25 September1956,3.40 p. m., pp.577-580 54Diary entry for 25 September1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.27, (2v-3v)-,and Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-1957(265) Memorandumof a conversationbetween Secretary of StateDulles and Chancellor of the ExchequerMacmillan, Departmentof StateWashington, 25 September1956, pp. 580-581 55Diary entry for 25 September1956 Ms. Macmillan dep. d.27 Qv) 16Norris (ed.), FRUSXVI 1955-1957(264) Editorial Note, p.580; Diary entry for 25 September1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.27. folio 121;and Reportto Eden,26 September1956 in Home, M-acmillan 1894-1956Pp. 430. This accountis also in Lloyd, Suez1956, p. 149 133

without aid on a very large scale - that is, if playing it long involved buying dollar oiI7.57 Eden hadjust returnedfrom Paris where he had comeunder pressurefrom the

French Government to act swiftly', and Macmillan's account had a major effect on .s thinking. The account Macmillan gave to Eden starkly contradicts Eisenhower's accountof the meetingto Dulles in a telephoneconversation soon after the meeting.In his report of the meeting with Eisenhower, Macmillan wrote that Eisenhower accepted that Britain must win, and he felt Eisenhower was 'determined to bring Nasser down'.58 This is contradictoryto the accountEisenhower gave to Dulles

President said that Mr. Macmillan talked very much more

moderately [about the Suez] than he had anticipated. He

cheerfully admitted that the issue was Nasser rather than the

Canal (said if they closed up the Shell oil refinery, England would

havebeen much worse off). He said that Macmillanwas far less

bitter than he had been a few weeks ago'9

It is impossibleto determinewho was giving the more accurateaccount, but

Macn-dllan'saccount was written a day after the meeting,whereas the conversation involving Eisenhowerand Dulles took placedirectly after it, so Macmillanhad time to devisean alternativeaccount to deliverto Eden. His diary entry for that day conforms to the accounthe gaveto Eden, in stressingthat 'On Suez,he [Eisenhower]was sure

57Diary entry for 25 September1956, Ms. Macmillan del). d.27. (121). Emphasison original document. 58Macmillan to Eden, 26 September1956 in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 430 59Norris (ed.), FRUS 1955-1957XVI, (264) Editorial Note, p.580 134

that we must get Nasser down. The only thing was, how to do it'. 60 These contradictory accounts of the meeting suggest that Macmillan was possibly playing a doublegame with Edenand the AmericanGovernment, but it could alsohave been just a misinterpretation by Macmillan of Eisenhower's attitude. He did deceive Eden by not informing him exactly of what had been discussedat the meeting.Nevertheless, Eden as the foreign affairs expert in the Cabinet,would have beenfully awareof the nature of the US goverment's responseto the crisis, but he was no doubt encouragedby

Macmillan's favourable account of the meeting. Macmillan might have been deliberatelydeceiving Eden, and it can be assumedthat if this was occurring, it was designedto enhancehis own prospectsas a candidatefor the leadershipof the party, if

Eden was forced to retire. However, Macmillan could also havejust misinterpreted

Eisenhower's attitude, as Cham-dey has argued. He explains MacnUan's misinterpretationof the US government'sattitude as beingdetermined by the long held belief in the British governmentthat was instituted by Churchill - that the differences betweenBritish interestsand US intentionsdid not exist, and Ministers refusedto face up to them whenthey did.

Charmley believesthat 'Once in Washington he [Macmillan] continued to interpretwhat the Americanstold him throughthe star-spangledspectacles customarily donned by Churchillian acolytes when observing America'.61 He believes that

Macmillan did not conspireagainst Eden in giving him a misleadingaccount of the meeting.He explainsthe differing accountsby the fact that when Macmillan and

Eisenhowerworked together in Algiers during the SecondWorld War, he dealt with

60Diary entry for 25 September 1956, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 27. (12 1) 6' J. Charn-dey,Churchill's Grand Alliance. The Anglo-American Special RelationshiR. 1_940-1957, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995), p. 331 135

Eisenhowerby projectinghis own views on him, andEisenhower then usuallyfollowed his advice.Macn-dllan believed this had occurredon 25 September,and gave Eden an optimistic account of the attitude expressedby Eisenhower,which was nevertheless 62 false in expressingthe President's commitment to a compliance with the use of force.

This argumenthas a good degreeof plausibility,and doeshelp to explainthe differing interpretationsof the meeting.This charitableinterpretation of Macmillan's conduct seemscorrect. It was too early for him to have seen the 'window of opportunity' to enhancehis chancesof succeedingEden, which occurred after the 6 November

Cabinetmeeting that signalledthe cease-firein the CanalZone.

Macmillan'sRole in the Cease-fireof 6 November:'The Window of Opportunity'

Following the invasionof the Canal,on I Novemberthe British Government was warned that the US government was contemplating oil sanctions against Britain and France. Selwyn Lloyd has recorded that at the second meeting of the Egypt

Committeethat day, 'Macmillan threw his arms into the air and said "Oil sanctions!

That finishes itii). 63 Eden informed Eisenhower on 5 November that 'it is no mere form of words to say that we would be happy to hand over to an international organisationas soon as we possibly can. As you can imagine, no one feels more stronglyabout this than Harold [Macmillan]who hasto provide the money'.64

On 6 November, Cabinet discussionscontinued on whether the military operation againstEgypt should continue.Macmillan settled that argumentby telling the Cabinetthat there had beena severerun on the pound,which had originatedin the

62Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, p.333 63Lloyd, Suez 1956,p. 211 64Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957(499) Messagefrom Prime Minister Edento President Eisenhower,London, 5 November1956, pp. 984-986 136

US. He declared that Britain's gold reserves had fallen by LIOO million ($280 million) over the last week, and sincethe start of the crisis they had lost one-eighthof their reserves.65 He contactedGeorge Humphrey, and was told that the US government would only assistthem if they ordered the cease-fireby midnight. Assistancewould comevia US support for an RVEFloan to buttressthe pound, and at 5 p.m. (GMT), allied high commandordered the cease-fire.Before the Cabinetmeeting, Macmillan had Lloyd that 'in the financial 66 told view of and economic pressureswe must stop . This 'u-turn' by Macmillan,from beingthe foremost'hawk' in the Cabinetto beingthe

Nlinisterresponsible for signallingthe retreat,led to accusationsof deceitand betrayal.

Harold Wilson, the Shadow Chancellor,described Macmillan's conduct during the

67 crisisas 'first iri, first OUt).

Macmillan maintainedin his memoirsthat the lossesfor the first few days of

November were $279 million, and 'was partly due to the effect on Sterling of the clear

between 68 The factor in his split the allies'. possibility of oil sanctionswas a critical decision,as he believedthat Britain could ride the financialcrisis but not oil sanctions, indicating the pivotal influence of the oil problem. Kunz has argued convincingly that

Macn-Oandeceived his Cabinet colleaguesand Eden by citing 'a clearly erroneous figure. '69 The evidence she offers for this is that the loss could not have been $280 million for the week ending6 November,as Macmillanwas told by the Treasuryon 7

Novemberthat the loss for the previous week was only $85 million.70 She claims

65 Home, Macmillan 1894 -1956 p.448 66Lloyd, Suez 1956 p. 209 67Home, Macmillan 1984-1956. p.449 68Home, Macmillan 1894-1956 p. 448; and Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959, p. 164 69D. B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (London: Univ. of Carolina Press, 1991), p. 132 70PRO T 236/4189 "Note of a Meeting at 11 Downing Street on Wednesday, 7 November 1956" in 5iplomacy Kunz, Economic of the Suez Crisis, p. 132 137

further that he deceivedthe Cabinet by telling them that the reserve losseshad originated in the United States, whereas this was not revealed by the Treasury or Bank of Englanduntil 20 November.'Macmillan knew he was misleadingthe Cabinet', as the only counter explanation possible is that Macmillan confused pounds with dollars,

tlýs is to degree71 Kunz for Macmillan's and contention not convincing any . accounts actionsby his deductionthat his cover up would not be easilyor quickly discovered,as he had the ultimate responsibility for Britain's finances as Chancellor. Only Butler could havechallenged the declarationbecause of his past experienceas Chancellor,but as he was opposedto the invasion in the first place, Butler acceptedMacmillan's calculationsat 'face value'.72 Butler noted in February1957 that 'Harold Macmillan was even clearer in his rnind on the need for withdrawal than anyoneelse. This was becauseof the great strain on Sterling, our isolation from the Commonwealthand world opinion and the danger of the effect of United Nations sanctions on our

73 economys.

Macmillan's conduct on 6 Novembercan be accountedfor by two alternative explanations.The first is that he knew that it would be pointlessto continuethe Suez expedition,and the British governmentneeded US financialsupport because of the oil situation,so he decidedto cut the government'slosses. The secondis that Macmillan had realisedthat Eden was now finished as Prime Minister, and saw a 'window of opportunity' to press his claim for the party leadership.This is the view of Robert

Rhodes-James,who assertsthat the 6 November Cabinetmeeting was the occasion that led Macn-Oanto see the 'window of opportunity' that he had previously not

71 Kunz, Economic Divlomacv of the Suez Crisis p. 132 72Kunz, Economic Diplomagy of the Suez Crisis, p. 133 73Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS G31 (70) 138

expected,and had not worked for. Rhodes-Jamesbelieves the opportunityjust came

andMacmillan took it. 74 This explainsin part why he acted as he did on 6 November.

Macmillan's sense of opportunism was important, but the severity of Britain's

financial be discounted determining,factor in his escalating problemsmust not as a C) decision.

A more cynical explanationlinked to this is that this wasjust one of a seriesof manoeuvres by Macmillan to undermine Eden and force his resignation. There is

obviously no direct evidenceto substantiatethis argument,as Macmillan would not admit to it. However, Nigel Birch, a loyal supporter of Eden's, maintainedthat

Macmillanhad pushed'Eden into Suezin the hope that it would bring about his fall'.

Home has called this the 'pulled-the-carpet-out'thesis, and statesthat this view was

not subscribedto by those who worked closely with Eden and Macmillan, including

Philip De Zueleta, who was Private Secretary to both, Lord Blake, who helped Eden write his memoirs, and Lady Avon, Eden's widoW.7' However, Birch becamean implacableopponent of Macmillan after his forced resignationfrom the Treasury in

January 1958, and this may explain his view of Macmillan's conduct. This cynical interpretation places a strategy or plan on Macmillan's actions that does not appear to haveexisted. The oil situationdictated Macmillan's actions, but it is also apparentthat he had seenthe 'window of opportunity' that the situation presented.Macmillan's actionshad the desiredoutcome as it underminedEden's position, and improved his positionas a candidatefor the leadershipshould Eden retire.

74Interview with RobertRhodes-James featured in 'Reputations:The Macmillans. Portrait of a Political Marriage'. BlakewayProductions for BBC TV. First shown 14 March 1996. 75Home, Macn-dllan1894-1956 p. 461 139

The 'window of opportunity' argument can be further substantiatedby

Macmillan's actions prior to, and following, Eden's departure for Jamaica on 23

November. These were particularly effective in buttressing his candidacy to succeed

Eden. After the 6 Novembercease-fire, Macmillan persistently attempted to persuade

representativesof the US government to allow him to visit the US to negotiate with

Eisenhower and Dulles. This could be viewed as part of his plan to press his claim to

replaceEden, but could also be accountedfor by the urgent needto sort out the oil

problem.On 9 November,Macmillan spoketo Aldrich to discusswhether he should

ask the US State Department for permission to leave for Washington immediately to

consult Humphrey about the question of oil imports to Britain. Aldrich advised

Macn-dlIannot to raise this matter, and to wait until Eden could visit the US himself

Aldrich gave this adviceas the StateDepartment wanted to dealwith the oil problem

through the OEEC, rather than directly with the British government, as British troops

76 in Egypt were still .

Macmillan continued his quest to gain US support to help resolve the British

government'soil problems.On 16 November,he spoke to Aldrich and said that the

OEEC meetingin Parishad gone well, and 'it would not be necessaryfor GreatBritain

to make any special representationsto the United States in connection with its

problemsregarding oil'. Aldrich noted that there were two things presentlyoccupying

Macmillan's mind: the obtaining of fund availableto Britain from the INE, and 'the

possibilityof moneyfrom the FederalReserve Bank on the Americansecurities owned

by the British Treasury'. Macmillanfelt thesewere worth approximately$900 million,

76Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957(571) Telegramfrom Embassyin United Kingdom to Departmentof State, 12 November1956, pp. 1115-1117 140

and if the governmentcould obtain two-thirds of the market value of the securities, and $600 million ftom the INE fund, that would be sufficientto 'tide Britain over the

77 difficult period ahead'.

Aldrich felt that the British government were now prepared to withdraw from the CanalZone, and let the UN settlethe disputebetween Israel andEgypt. Macmillan also discussedthe possibility of going to Washingtonas 'Eden's deputy', to continue negotiationsas Eden's health meant he would not be able to undertakesuch a trip.

Aldrich informedthe StateDepartment that 'this might be a hint that somemovement is foot in Cabinet Eden' 7' The US Government that Eden on the to replace . now saw was in a precarious position, and unlikely to continue as Prime NEnister. This was confirmedto Aldrich on 19 November,when Macmillantold him that Eden had had a breakdownand would imminentlydepart the countryto recuperatefor a fortnight, and this would be followed by his retirement. Macmillan told Aldrich that Butler would becomePrime Minister, Macmillan Foreign Secretaryand Lloyd Chancellor,but he also noted 'Possibly Macmillan might be Prime Minister'. Aldrich also informed the

State Department that 'Macmillan is desperatelyanxious to see the President at earliest possible opportunity and apparently consideration being given to appointment of

Macmillan as Deputy Prime Minister during Eden's absencein order that such a

take British troops' 79 This meetingmight placeat once after withdrawal . action again followed Macmillan's strategyof gainingthe financialsupport, and alsoUS supportfor his leadershipchallenge, if Eden resignedbecause of the crisis.

77Norris (ed.), FRUS XVI 1955-1957(583) Telegramfrom the Embassyin the United Kingdom to the Departmentof State,London, 17 November1956, pp. 1142-1143 78 Norris (ed.), FRUS 1955- 1957XVI (588) Telegramfrom the Embassyin the United Kingdom to the Departmentof State,London, 19 November1956, pp. 1142-1143 79 Norris (ed.), FRUS 1955- 1957XVI (593) Telegramfrom the Embassyin United Kingdom to the Departmentof State,London, 19 November1956, p. 1163 141

Macmillanagain spoke to Aldrich that evening,and confirmedthat Edenwould be holidayfor fortnight, then he The first following goingCý on a and would retire. action Eden's departurewould be the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone.

Macmillan asked for 'a fig leaf to cover our nakedness,to securethe majority in

Cabinetfor withdrawal. I-Esactions during this phaseof the crisis in negotiatingwith the US government can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, Macmillan was chosen by the Cabinetto lead the negotiationswith the US government,because of his good relationshipwith both Dulles and Eisenhower,and it was felt this must be exploitedin order to stabilise the Anglo-US alliance. The second explanationis that he was exploitingEden's healthproblems to enhancehis own leadershipcredentials, by openly campaigningfor the supportof the US government.It is impossibleto reacha definite conclusionon this issue,but the securingof the financialsupport was imperative,while

Macmillan probably did perceive the benefit of US support for -his leadersbýp candidacy. The outcome of these actions was positive for Macmillan. He helped to gain the financial support from the US government,and also promotedhis leadership candidacy, with evidence suggesting that Eisenhower favoured him as Eden's successor.

Macmillan's Conduct durinR the 1922 Conunittee MeetinR of 22 November

Both Macmillan and Butler addressedthis meetingwith the 1922 Committee, in the aftermath of the decision to accept the cease-firein the Canal Zone. Butler addressedthe meeting as acting head of the government,and there is some dispute over whether Macmillan was invited to speakat this meeting.Alan Clark has argued that he rose to speakduring the traditional bangingof desksfollowing Butler's speech 142

and interrupted the proceedings.However, Howard maintainsthat Butler invited

Macmillan to accompany him, as he knew the reception from the committee was going

81 to be hostile, and he neededsome support. In his notes on the crisis, Butler states

'Harold [Macmillan] and I went togetherto the 22 Committee.We could not tell them all the facts'. " Butler thus reveals that they went in unison to the meeting, and implies

Macmillanwas intendedto speakto the Committee,in contrastto Clark's assertion.

Macmillan was present at the meeting in his capacity as Chancellor to explain the poor stateof the economyin the aftermathof the crisis.

Butler addressedthe meeting first, and was followed by Macmillan, who delivered a rallying cry to the party's NVs. He invigorated the Committee with a speechthat showed impeccabletiming, and an acute understandingof political psychology. He appeared to offer hope to the party's NTs, whose spirits were low after the embarrassments of recent months. Conservative NTs were convinced

MacmiHanwas the man to succeedEden after his performance at the 1922 Committee meeting, illustrating the full effect of the meeting on the outcome of the imminent selection.Macmillan, as one MP presentrecalled, 'made a bid for the leadershipwhich we knew was cominginto question.It was a real leadershipspeech'. 82 Butler finished his speech,and announced'now the Chancellorof the Exchequermay care to say a word or two about oil'. Macmillandid muchmore than this. 'It was rhetoric and it did border on the 'ham', but he contrived to set their [ConservativeNPs] troubles in the frameworkof the long adventureof politics, full of hard knocksbut still a gameworth

80'Alan Clark's History of the Tory Party'. Episodetwo: The Rank Outsider.An Oxford Television CompanyProduction for BBC TV. First broadcast21 September1997; and Howard,RAP. P.240 81Notes, dated February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 82Goodhart, The 1922,p. 175 143

83 playing more than any other'. This was cone of the classic confrontations in the history of the 1922 Committee', and it was a confrontation that Macmillan won. A whip presentat the meetingrecalled that 'Harold [Macmillan] was at his most ebulient andmanaged to win the day, not only on the merit of what he said (as it seemedto the

Committee)but also physicallyin that his expansivegestures nearly causedpoor Rab

[Butler] to fall backwards from the adjacent seat'.84 Macmillan also cunningly conveyedto the party's NTs that he would be willing to servein a caretakercapacity to allow the party to restore somesemblance of stability, by emphasisinghis age and his 'advancingyears'. This, along with his virtuoso performance,served to 'plant the seed' that he would be a viable option as a stop-gapleader, who could restore the 85 party's short-term fortunes, and then hand over to a younger leader.

Clark has noted the effect and the outcomeof Macmillan's performanceat the meeting, as 'the applause was long and hard, and members left the room with their 0 spirits raised for the first time since the summer. 6 This was what the party needed at this time, someoneto instil confidenceand lift the party after the embarrassmentsthat had followed the retreat from Suez.Conservative Ws felt that they neededsomething exceptionalbecause of the severetrouble that the party found itself in, and this explainsMacmillan's attractivenessto MPs, and the party hierarchy. Ramsdenhas noted an important point about Macmillan's conduct after he becamePrime Minister, that relateswell to the attitude he expressedto ConservativeM[Ps on 22 November.

'Macmillan had recognisedthat the best way to deal politically with such a national

83J. Ramsden,'Rab did sometimesmiss tricks which Macn-dllanmanaged to take', The Listene 19 March 1987,p. 23 84Goodhart, Ihe 1922,p. 175 85Clark, The Tories, p.3 11 86 Clark, Re Týori. es p.311 144

humiliationwas to refuseall apologies,enquiries and witch-hunts,and then to ignore the issue altogether by highlighting other things in his speeches and in the party's

97 campaignmgý. This was the strategy Macmillan adopted at the 1922 Committee meeting, to show the party that the crisis could be quickly forgotten by uniting together, and working to erase the memory of the crisis from the party and the electorate.

Macmillan's actions can be perceived as being aimed at deliberately underminingButler's claims for the leadership.This is certainly the view of Lady

Butler, who believesMacmillan did everythinghe could to prevent Butler becoming

Prime Nfinister, and that her husbandnever recognisedMacmillan's jealousy and hostility, always taking him at face value.8' An alternative explanation is that

Macmillanmerely used the meetingas an opportunityto deliver what the party's MPs wanted to hear, and so demonstrated his political acumen. This is supported by De

Zueleta who told Home that by the 1922 meeting, Macmillan 'saw that Eden could not go on, and Butler could not possibly take over'. '9 This realisation dictated the nature of Macrnillan's conduct, not personalspite againstButler. However, when he was chosen to replace Eden on 10 January 1957, the choice was essentially that of the

Cabinet,so this meetingcould only havehad an indirect, yet important influenceon his victory, as ministerswere fully awareof the outcomeof the meeting.The importance of Macmillan's conductat this meetingin his selectionas Eden's successorcannot be understated.

87Ramsden, An AppetiteFor Power,p. 362 88Interviews with Lady Butler featuredin 'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party'. Episodethree: From EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First broadcast28 September1997; and 'Reputations:The Macmillans.Portrait of a Political Marriage'. BlakewayProductions for BBC TV. First broadcast14 March 1996. 89Home, Macmillan 1894-1956.p. 462 145

Macmillan's Conduct durinR Eden's Absence: 23 November 1956-9 Januajy 1957

Macmillan left Butler to defend the government's position in the Commons when Eden went to Jamaica,thus exposinghim to attacks from both sides of the

House.However, Butler was acting headof the governmentand had the responsibility for explainingand defendinggovernment policy in the Commons,so Macmillan was not compelledto supportButler in this task. He only appearedonce in the Commons after the cease-fire and only then spoke on econon& policy, but was not required to do more.90 Macmillan once noted that Butler, 'asked me to act as his main confidant,

labouredtogether in We it to and we completeagreement ... made a rule always attend 91 [the House of Commons] together and each to speak on the lines we had agreed'.

His singleappearance in the Commonsover this period contradictsthis claim, but his conduct as Chancellorin explainingthe government'seconomic position cannot be questioned.

Butler recordedan interestingobservation on the attitude of Macmillan during

Eden's absence.Butler recalled in February 1957 that 'Macmillan and the younger men showedgreat determinationin their view that the situationcould not continue'.92 This observationillustrates an interestingdevelopment in the attitudeof Macmillan.Prior to

Eden's departure for Jamaica,Macmillan wanted Eden to stay on, but when he returned,he wantedEden to retire. This could be due to the realisationthat Eden was now finished, and that the manoeuvringfor the prime position in the emergingnew

order was beginning.An argumentthat could be offered to support the theory that

Macmillan manipulatedButler's exposedposition, is that he already knew of the

905s H. C. Debs. Vol. 561.26 November 1956, cols. 1050-1066 9' Macn-dllarL Ridin The Storm, p. 170 92Notes, February 1957, Butler MSS G31 (70) 146

opposition to Butler in the party from those NTs opposed to Suez, and exploited it to its full potential. His solitary speech in the Commons during the period after Eden's departurefor Jamaicasuggests this may have been the case. Butler, however, has assertedthat Macmillan did not conspire against him or Eden. He wrote in February

1957

When questionedby historiansI should say that there was no

great plot at the end of Anthony Eden's Preniership as the

newspaperswould sometimessuppose. In some ways I have

evidence that Harold Macmillan was surprised himself His

behaviourcertainly indicated that he deservesevery assistancein

his heavyresponsibilities 93

Butler's assessmentis correct. Macmillanwas chosenon merit becauseof his

conduct during the latter stagesof the crisis and its aftermath,which displayedthe

qualitiesthe party neededin tbýssituation. Macmillan noted after the crisis that once

Eden had left for Jamaica,'he could neverreturn and remainas P. M. for long. Apart

from the appearanceof running away from a battlefield the party had been terribly 94 shattered.It becameclear by Christmasthat the P.M. was really-unableto go on'.

This can be interpretedas a further cue for Macmillan'sefforts to take the 'window of

opportunity', as he knew Eden was finished, and this dictated the nature of his

conduct.

93'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undatedButler MSS RAB G31 (89) 9' Diary entry for 3 February1957, Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 28*. (3) 147

Macmillan also noted that 'the only way out was a resignation on the grounds of health. It became clear that Eden was a sick man. The strain of recent weeks and monthshad told on him terribly. This reasonwas not a political excuse.This illness

95 The first this that Eden have been forced was a reality'. part of entry suggestsz;, may out, and his illness was the cover for the real political reasonsbehind the party's removal of its leader. The emphasison the illness being a 'reality' may also be due to

Macmillan's efforts to hide the truth. Dorothy Macmillan's nephew, the Duke of

Devonshire,made the following statementregarding Macmillan's role in the episodein

1996: 'Uncle Harold's role in it all is extremely interesting. I would only say: it all

it?,. 96 turned out very well for him in the end, didn't This illustratesthe confusionand ambiguity in interpreting Macmillan's actions during the Suez Crisis, and this is epitomisedby his reputationof being 'first in, first out'.

Conclusion

Thýischapter has demonstratedthat the key actionsof the two candidatesin the selection of January 1957, Macmillan and Butler, came in November and December

1956.The most important of the actions occurredat the 1922 Committeemeeting of

22 November,at which Macmillanconvinced the party that he was the stop-gapleader who could re-unitethe party and revive its fortunes.Butler did not fulfil this, and was blamedby the party for the failure of the government'spolicy during the Suez Crisis, as he was head of the governmentwhen the policy finally failed. He was the party's

95 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan-der). d. 28*. (5). EMDhasis on original document. 96Interview with the Duke of Devonshire featured in 'Reputations: The Macmillans. Portrait of a Political Marriage'. Blakeway Productions for BBC TV. First shown 14 March 1996. 148

he did the scapegoat,Zý and this was entrenchedwhen not make the announcementof withdrawal from the Canal Zone on 3 December.

The analysisof the candidates'conduct during the early stagesof the crisis

serves two purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the complex machinations of the Suez

Crisis, and the influence they had on the outcome of the selection. Secondly, it demonstratesthat Macmillan did not openly conspireagainst Eden during September

and October 1956, as has been suggested in some existing analysis. It is somewhat

debatablethat Macmillan conspiredagainst Eden to any extent during the crisis, but it is apparentthat he did see the 'window of opportunity' to promote his leadership

candidacythat the cease-fireof 6 November presented.Whether his conduct in

instigatingthe cease-firewas an attempt to undermineEden, or to save the British

economy,must remainas conjecture.This chapterhas demonstrated that the actionsof

Macmillan and Butler were central to the outcome of the 1957 leadership selection. 149

Chapter Five

The Suez Crisis and the 1957 Leadershin Selection: The Situational

Interpretation

This chapter applies the Situational Interpretation to the 1957 leadership selection. It assessesthe influence of the situation that the party found itself in, the formal and informal aspectsof the selectionprocedure, and the candidates'level of acceptability,electability and governability, and their effect on the outcome - the selectionof Macmillanand the failure of Butler to attainthe leadership.

The Situation and its Requirements

The Core Requirements

The Conservativegoverment had three urgent considerationsfollowing the retirementof Eden. The first was to unite the party behind a new leader,the second was to boost party moraleand savethe party from collapse,and the third was to revive the Anglo-US relationship. The Special Relationship was only of tertiary importance to the party at this time. Unlessthe party fulfilled the first two objectives,the government was not going to be in a position to even consider reviving the Anglo-US relationship, as the retention of power was unlikely. Pimlott believesthat there were three criteria on which the selectionof Eden's successorwas based.Firstly, the verdict on the crisis, and Pimlott suggeststhat the need was to sweepthe crisis away from the political sceneas soon as possible.This was certainlytrue, and it was necessaryfor the crisisto be erasedfrom the memoriesof the electorate,and the new leader had to fulfil this.

The secondcriterion was the appointmentof a stop-gapleader to get the party through the current difficulties and restore some stability to the party. This was also a 150 consideration,and Macrnfllan's age comparedto Butler's suggeststhis may have occurred,but Macmillanwas the better qualifiedof the candidatesfor the position. The tl-ýirdwas the needfor the best candidateto securere-election for the Conservatives.

This was also a highly important consideration, as it was widely expected that the party would fall becauseof the crisis, bringing about an imminent election. However, the party did have breathing spaceas a generalelection did not have to be called until

1960.1

The Need for a Stop-gap Leader

The evidencesuggests that Eden would not havebeen accepted by the party to continue as its leader following his departure for Jamaica for recuperation in

November 1956. This was becausehe was widely discreditedas leaderfollowing the failure of the government's policy towards Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal

Company, and towards the invasion of Egypt on 30 October. Concerns about Eden's health also raised doubts about his position as leader. Macmillan felt that once Eden departed for Jamaicahe would not return as Conservativeleader for long, and

Macmillanwas right. As he noted

For several days past (since Christmas,in fact) many of our

colleagues have been very restless. There had been many

meetings- no intrigue, but great concernat the apparentinability

of the P.M. or anyoneelse to take hold of the situation.Outside

the ranks of the Cabinet,etc., M. P.s have been meeting.There

1 Pin-dott,The Queen p.257; and Blake, The ConservativeParty, p.279 151

has been a generalacceptance of the fact that the government

could not go on. As soon as Parliamentmet it would be in

trouble; in a few weeks it would fall. At the sametime, no one

d02 hasknown what to

The goverment's policy during the crisis had causeddeep divisions within the party, and Eden could not repair thosedivisions because he had instigatedthem in the first place.Once Eden had departedfor Jamaica,he no longer had the power baseto remainin chargeof the party, and it was only a matterof time beforehe was succeeded by a new leader.The US governmentwas also hostile to the continuationof Eden's

Premiership,and 'rumours started to circulate that the United States would never

3 resumenormal relationswith Britain unlessthere was a changeof leadership'. The

US governmenthad been aware since November that the continuation of Eden's leadershipwas unlikely becauseof the discreditthat was heapedon the party following the failure of the govermnent's policy. Eden's relationship with Eisenhower had also beenwrecked by his attitude during the crisis, and there is no doubt that the President was hostile to the continuationof Eden's leadership,and he believedthat the 'Special

Relationship'could not be restoredwhile Eden was in power. The pressin the United

States also believed Eden was finished as Prime Minister, and his image also had detrimentaleffects on Britain's statusinternationally. 'They presentedBritain as 'the sick man of Europe, with the sick man of Britain at its head'. The negative connotationsthat this inspiredcontributed to the end of Eden's leadership.

2 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (4). 3 Clark, The Tories, p. 3 11 4 Clark, The Tories, p. 311 152

Only by convincingthe party that it could survive, would the Conservatives have a chanceof restoringtheir fortunes,and this was, therefore,a vital requirement for the new leaderto fulfil. This points to the probabilitythat the new leaderwould be viewed as a stop-gap appointment, to enable the party to re-unite behind the new leader,and recover its short-term fortunes in the aftermathof the crisis. The widely held notion that the party was likely to fall becauseof the crisis also contributesto the assessmentthat Macmillan's appointmentwas as a stop-gap leader. In fact, on his appointmentas Prime Minister, Macmillan told the Queenthat his governmentwas only likely to survive for six weeks, a comment she remindedhim of on his sixth anniversary as Prime Nfinister.

The Restoration of Party Unity and Morale

This was the most important task for Eden's successor.The Conservative Party was in a considerablestate of disunitybecause of the divisionsthat were causedby the goverment's policy during the Suez Crisis, and the new leader would have to unite the whole party, ministersand back-benchers,behind him. ' The crisis would have to be wiped from the political landscapeas soon as possible,so that it no longer caused division,or gavepolitical capitalto the Labour Party. Morale neededto be restored,as the party's spirits were low after the embarrassmentsof recent months, and the humiliation of the retreat from the Canal Zone. The government'spolicy during the crisis was shown to have beenwrong, and costly in both domesticterms, and in the damageit did to the Anglo-US relationship.The needfor morale deemedit necessary for a leaderwith a high degreeof electabilityto be selected,as the party neededto be

5 Blake, The ConservativeP, p.278 153 convincedof its own qualities,much as a leader needsto convince an electorateto vote for their party at a general election. This meant that an inspirational leader was neededto lift the party's spirits.

The Crisis and the Electoral Cycle

An important situationalfactor was the time that the party had to recoverfrom its presentdifficulties, as a generalelection was not due until 1960.This meantthat the party, despitethe wide belief that the governmentwould fall becauseof the crisis, did not haveto go to the polls for threeyears. This would allow the new leadertime to re- unite the party, and restoreits moralein time for the election.This, nevertheless,had to be achievedquickly, for if unity was not restoredin a short time, the government would collapse.However, the lack of pressurethat the imminenceof a generalelection would put on the situation,eased this concern.It was also important as it would show the party's NTs that if they united behind the new leader, they could still secure another term in office, and this acted as a spur to party unity. This was also important as it gave the opportunity for the SuezCrisis to be wiped from the memoriesof the electoratebefore the next election.If this could be achievedby the new leader,success at the next electionfor the party would still be a possibility. 154

The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal Networks of

Communication

Formal Aspects

7he Canvassof the Cabinet

The selectionprocedure used to selectEden's successorfollowed the traditions of the party, by relying on informal discussionsby the party hierarchywith the Cabinet and senior party figures, to determine the best successorto Eden. Before his resignation,Eden had discussedthe successionwith Sir NlichaelAdeane, the Queen's

Private Secretary.He suggestedthat 'a senior minister who was not personally involved shouldbe askedto take soundingsin the Cabinet', and Lord Salisburywas suggestedas a possibleminister who could fulfil this task.6 Lord Presidentof the

Council Salisburyand Lord ChancellorKilmuir, were chosento representthe party hierarchyby conductingthe soundings,as they were senior party figures, membersof the Cabinetand were not contendersfor the leadership.7 On 9 January,Eden met

Butler, Macmillanand Salisbury,and told them that he would inform the Cabinet,at 5

8 p.m. that evening, of his decision to resign as party leader. Macmillan first realised something was going to happen when he received a message that morning at the

Treasury summoning him to 10 Downing Street at 3 p.m. Eden told him 'there was no

9 way out'. Before the Cabinet meeting, Salisbury, privy to the news of the resignation,spoke to Kilmuir, and advisedhim that, in this situation, the Queenwas entitled to ask advice from anybodyshe wished about who should replaceEden. He also told Kilmuir that the Queen did not need to wait for a party meeting, as that

6 Watkins, The RoadTo NumberTen, p.63 7 Fisher,The ToKyLeaders p.83 8 Shepherd,The PowerBrokers, 146; Rhodes-James,Anthony Eden, 596 . and p. 9 Diary entry for 3 February1957, Ms. Macmillan del).d. 28*. (3). 155 would havemeant abandoning the most important part of the Royal Prerogative.They then agreedon the procedurethat shouldbe adoptedto selectEden's replacement.

This was for Salisburyand Kilmuir to seeeach Cabinet NEnister individually in

Kilmuir's office in the Privy Council Offices.The mannerof the consultationsfollowed all precedents of previous selections, except for the selection of Bonar Law in 1922, who insistedon being electedparty leaderat a party meetingbefore becomingPrime

Nfinister.'o This procedurefollowed the principle of 'you choose,we sendfor, that characterisedthis selection,and the selectionof Home in 1963. Sir Edward Ford, the

Queen'sAssistant Private Secretary,told Ben Pimlott 'we took the view that that it was for the ConservativeParty to selectits leaders,and that the Queenshould not do anythinguntil she was sure what the party had decided'." This meant that the party chosethe bestcandidate, and the Queenappointed that nominee.Pimlott hasdescribed this selectionas 'putting the Prerogativeon ice', as it meantthat the party chosethe successoron this occasion,while allowing the Royal Prerogativeto remain in tact.

However, Pimlott believes that this selection led to the downfall of the Royal

Prerogative, as the selection by the party hierarchy of Eden's successorshowed it was a 'doubtful instrument'.In assertingthis view, Pimlott ignoresthe often dominantrole of the party hierarchyin the selectionof ConservativeParty leadersunder the 'magic circle' systemof selection,and it is apparentthat the Monarchytraditionally preferred havingthe choicemade for them by the party hierarchy.12

After the Cabinetmeeting, Macn-dllan and Butler, the only two contendersto replace Eden, left Ten Downing Street. The rest of the Cabinet were asked by

10 Macmillan, Riding The Storm,p. 183;and Rhodes-James,Anthony Eden,p. 596 11Pimlott, The Oueen P.257 12piMlott, ýhe 260 __p._QUeen, 156

Salisbury Kilmuir individually in Kilmuir's following and to see them office, C)the procedure they had agreed earlier that day.13 As Butler recorded, 'Cabinet NEnisters were 'corralled' to give an immediatejudgement between Harold Macmillanand me as successor'.Macmillan, in contrast, wrote that 'there was no attempt by either

Salisburyor Kilmuir to usewhat one rrýightcall a prefect's influenceon the opinionsof thosethey interviewed'.14 SelwynLloyd objectedto the consultationsbeing conducted by Salisburyand Kilmuir becausethey were Peers,suggesting a belief that they would not be impartial and neutral canvassersof Cabinet opinion. The ConservativeParty hierarchywere centralactors in the selectionof Macmillan, and he was the choice of the party hierarchy.There is no evidenceto suggestthat Kilmuir and Salisbury'fixed' the results of the canvassof the Cabinet,but the fact that they were supportersof

Macmillan must have had someinfluence on their collection of the opinions of their colleagues. Unlike the selection of Home in October 1963, the selection of Macmillan in January 1957 was the choice of the Cabinet. Lord Kilmuir later describedthe consultations

To eachBobbety said, 'Well, which is it, Wab or Hawold?' As

well as seeingthe remainderof the ex-Cabinet,we interviewed

the Chief Whip [Edward Heath] and Oliver Poole, the Chairman

of the Party. John Morrison, the Chairman of the 1922

Committee, rang me up from Islay the next morning. An

13Diary entry for 3 February1957, Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 28*. (5) 14Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 467; Butler, Art of the Possible,p. 195;and Macmillan, Ridiang The Stormlp. 183 157

overwhelmingmajority of Cabinet NEnisterswas in favour of

Macmillan"

Macn-Oan noted, 'I heard afterwards that the opinion was particularly unanimous in favour of me, and not Butler'. 16 Kilmuir later told Rhodes-Jamesthat only Patrick Buchan-Hepburnhad supportedButler. Anthony Head also recalledthis as being the case,but Butler believedthat Walter Monckton, the Paymaster-General and JamesStuart, the Scottish Secretary,also supported him.17 On 10 January,

Salisbury Palace the was summoned to the to report the results of the soundings0 of

Cabinet, and the informal consultationsby the Chief Whip, Party Chairman and

Chairman of the 1922 Committee, to the Queen. He did this at IIa. m., and recommendedMacmillan as the successorto Eden. Salisburydid not give his own views, only expressingthose of the Cabinet, and his assessmentof the Cabinet's support for Macrnillan was crucial in the selection.

However, Salisbury's role in the selection did arouse controversy, as it appeared that his own views were important in the selection, as he felt Macmillan should succeedEden. Bogdanor has describedthe criticisms levelled at the selection.

'The processof consultationenabled critics to caricaturethe processof selectionas one in which the Premiershipwas being decidedby an unrepresentativeclique, out of touch with the realitiesof the secondhalf of the twentieth century'." Macmillannoted in answerto thesecriticisms that, 'sincethe Socialistsafterwards tried to makeout that this was a personaland private effort by the head of the Cecil's, it is important to

15Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 285 16 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.28*. 6). Emphasis on original document. 17Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden p. 599; Interview, Lord Head in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p.468; and Howard, RAB, p. 247 18Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 95 158 verify that Lord S[Salisbury]merely acted as a meansof conveyingto the Queenthe general view within the party'. '9 It is clear that Salisbury did convey the views of the

Cabinet,but his own supportfor Macmillanprobably also weighedin his favour.

At 12.55 p.m., Macmillan was telephonedby Adeaneand was summonedto

Palace 2 Prime Nfinister 2' Butler informed by the at p.m., and was appointed . was Heath Macmillan be Eden's Following Butler that was to successor. 0 this, walked alone along the Embankment.When a cameramaninquired what he was doing, he replied, 21 'I'm taking a walk - the best thing to do in the circumstances'. Macmillan was endorsed as party leader at the traditional party meeting in these circumstances on 22

January at Church House.22 Lord Salisbury, as chairman of the meeting, proposed the motionthat

The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, M. P., be elected Leader of

the Conservativeand Unionist Party; and that this Meeting, with

full appreciation of the great services which he has already

renderedto the Nation in many of the highest Offices of State,

pledges its loyal support to him in discharging the great

responsibilitieswith which he hasnow beenentrusted 23

19Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (6-7) 20Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macn-dllan dgp. d.28*, (7) 21Macmillan, Riding The Storm, 184, Daily Sketch, 11 January 1957 in Howard, RAB, . and p-247 22'Meetings to Elect the Conservative Leader'. Geoffrey D. M. Block, 3 February 1965 -CPACCO 20/39/3 23'Agenda. Party Meeting in the Assembly Hall, Church House, Westminster, at 12 noon on Tuesday, 22nd January 1957' CPA CCO 4nl i 8o 159

In the tradition of previous party meetingsto elect new leaders,the defeated candidatehad to secondthis motion, which Butler duly did. Macmillanwas thus now confirmed as successorto Eden as party leader and Prime Minister.

Influenceon the Outcome

Pimlott noted of the selectionthat 'the processwas not only quick. It was smooth.There was no time for unseemlywrangling - or for secondthoughts, either aboutthe decision,or the methodof makingit. Butler had seemedthe likely successor, the next his rival was kissing hands'.24 The selectionwas resolvedin a rapid manner, as Eden resignedat 5 p.m. on 9 January,and Macmillan becamePrime Minister at 2 p.m. on 10 January.Clark has assertedthat the selectionprocedure has 'never been bettered'in terms of 'minimisingdivision andforeshortening the period of uncertainty'.

This illustrates one of the 'magic circle' systemsattributes: the easeand speedof succession.The speed at which the decision was reacheddid not allow time for extensiveconsultations within the party, and the decisionof the Cabinetwas crucial in the selection of Macmillan. This served to minimise dissent in the party, and paved the way for Macmillanto set aboutre-building Conservative fortunes. 25

This is in stark contrast to the selectionprocedure used to select Home as

Macmillan's successorin October 1963.This procedurewas far longer, taking eleven daysto complete,compared to the twenty-four hours that were neededto complete

Macmillan's appointment.The canvasswas far more extensivein 1963,but was more complex and the views of certain Conservative Nfinisters and NTs were misrepresented,unlike the selectionof Macmillan.There was also opposition from at

24Pirnlott, The Queen p.258 25Clark, Ihe Tories, p.312 160 leasthalf the Cabinetto Home's appointment,whereas there was only slight dissentto

Macmillan's appointment, as only one minister voted for Butler. This ease of the succession,and the lack of oppositionto it, suggeststhis was a far more successful selectionprocedure than that usedin October 1963.

Informal Networks

Therewere two broad types of informal networks. The first were the informal canvassesof wider party opinionundertaken by Poole,Heath and Morrison. Poole, the

Party Chairman,.and Heath, the Chief Whip, conductedinformal canvassesof wider party opinion, and they affirmedthat the greatestsupport was for Macmillan,and that significantly stronger opinions had been expressedagainst Butler. Morrison, the

Chairmanof the 1922Committee, also recommendedMacmillan as the candidatemost supportedby Conservativeback-benchers, despite the fact that he was on holiday on the Isle of Islay off the Scottishcoast at the time of the selection.26 The secondset of informal networkswere the consultationsundertaken by the Palacewith other senior party figures, including Churchill, and Lord Chandos(formerly Oliver Lyttelton) and

Lord Waverley(formerly Sir John Anderson,the ConservativeChancellor during the war-time coalition government). They affirmed that Macmillan was the party's choice to succeedEden, and that he was felt by the party's senior statesmanto be the most acceptablecandidate.

26Shepherd, The PowerBrokers, p. 147;and Diary entry for 3 February1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.28*, (6) 161

777eCanvasses of WiderParty Opinion

The indirect canvassof back-benchopinion by Heath illustratedthat there was a significant'anti-Butler' faction on the Conservativebenches. He also receivedmany letters from ConservativeNIPs who were opposedto Butler, and he recommended

Macmillan.27 Heath told Geoffrey Hutchinson that 'the outcome was "highly acceptableto a substantial"majority in the House, a majority to which he himself belonged'28 Butler 'anti-Butler' faction his 4ý . acknowledgedtlýs undermined prospects of succeedingEden, illustrating the importance of the informal networks that expresseddiscontent at his candidacy.'It was clear from the representationsthat had beenmade to the Chief Whip's office that there were manyon the back-bencheswho would opposemy succession;there was no similaranti-Macmillan faction'. 29

However, a certain number of Conservativeback-benchers complained that they had not been consulted, thus questioning the extent of the informal canvassingof back-benchers.Tom Iremonger, the ConservativeNT for Ilford, complainedin the pressthat his views had not been askedfor, and statedthat the canvassinghad been conductedon a selectiveand 'oligarchical' basis.This provokeda responsefrom other

ConservativeMPs, including Martin Lindsay, the ConservativeMP for Solihull, that

Iremonger should have informed the party whips of his opinion, as he himself had done.Nigel Fisher,a biographerof Macmillanand then a ConservativeMP, statedthat he sent his views to the Chief Whip, and believesthat 'Edward Heath had ample information to basehis 30 However, be on which advice'. this must questionedas there was less than twenty-four hours between Eden's resignation and Macn-Oan's

27Shepherd, The PowerBrokers p. 146 28 G. Hutchinson,Edward Heath, p. 86 in Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, p.66 29Butler, Art of the Possible,p. 195 30Fisher, The Torv Leaders,p. 84 162 succession.However, Heath could have, and probably did, collect views on Eden's successorbefore he resigned,as it was clear that he was finished as Conservative leaderfrom late 1956,which would explainthe extent of the views gatheredso quickly over the period of 9 to 10 January. According to Punnett, many Conservative NTs

31 haveacknowledged that this took place,but he offers no evidencefor thiS.

Poole also found opposition to Butler existed in the party in the country.

Morrison also recommendedMacmillan, and basedthis on his assessmentof back- benchopinion, despitethe fact that he was on holiday at the time of the selection.32

Morrison probably relied on consultations by members of the 1922 Executive

Committeewith Conservativeback-benchers in reachingthis decision.

YheConsultations of Party Influentials

The Queenalso consultedother senior party figures, including Churchill, and

Lords Chandosand Waverley.Bogdanor has questionedthe qualificationsof Chandos and Waverley that entitled them to be consulted,but this can be explainedby their former statusin the party, and their experienceof working with both Macmillan and

Butler. This led them to be in a position to offer an opinion on who was the most

to Eden33 Churchill's Conservative viable successor . role as the elder-statesmanwas influential,and the Queenconsulted him as he was the only other Conservativeleader still alive, exceptfor Eden, and Churchill told Butler later that he went for the 'older man', and did so becausehe felt Macmillanwas more decisive.34 However, the Queen

Punnett,Selecting The Partv Leader,p. 37 32This is in Shepherd,The PowerBrokers 147;Macmillan has he argued , p. assertedthat thought Morrison sentan assessmentof back-benchopinion in Diary entry for 3 February1957, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d.28*. (6) 33Bogdanor, The Monarchyand the Constitution,p. 95 34'Reminiscences ending with Suez',undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89); Interview betweenHoward and Sir John Colville, 4 June 1985in Howard,EAR, p.247; and Rhodes-James,Anthonv Eden, p.600. 163 consultedChurchill as she was requestedto do so by Anthony Montague Brown,

Churchill'sPrivate Secretary.He felt that if Churchill's views had not beenconsulted, it might appearthat he disapprovedof the choice madeby the party and the Queen.

Brown then telephoned Adeane who suggested that he should visit Chartwell,

Churchill's home,to ascertainhis views. However, Brown statedthat this would not appearas a thorough consultation.and would not satisfypublic opinion,as the imageof

Churchill giving 1-ýsadvice to the Queen at the Palace would add gravitas to the

35 selectionof Macmillan.

Beaverbrooksuggested to Butler that Churchill was the dominantvoice in the selectionof Macmillan, and 'Churchill is all powerfiil at BuckinghamPalace. You know how I like him. But I do not agreewith his sole right to selecthis successorsin

Downing Street' 36 The that Churchill's the dominant in the . suggestion was voice decision that Macmillan was to replace Eden cannot be totally discounted, and illustrates the importance of informal networks of communication in ascertaining the best successor.Butler commentedon Beaverbrook'sassertion in his private accountof the selection of Macmillan. He suggests one of the key reasons why Macmillan was chosenahead of him was the ...ambience" and connectionsof the presentincumbent of

10ý. 37 the post at No. Howard has also argued that Macmillan gained better intelligenceof the developmentsthan Butler after the canvassof the Cabinet, and

Macmillan these he later denied3' Butler's was madeaware of views, something . notes

Butler notedthat Churchill told him he went for the 'older man', but doesnot revealit was becausehe felt Macmillan was more decisivethan Butler. 35Watkins, The Roadto NumberTen, p.65 36Beaverbrook to Butler, 23 January1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (47) 37Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 38Howard, EAR, p.247 164

were madein February1957, so he was referringto Macmillan,and suggestsChurchill

playeda crucial role in the selectionof Macmillan.

Someaccounts of Macmillan's selectionassert that Eden was not consultedby the Queenbecause he was consideredtoo ill to offer advice.According to Macn0an's

diary of 3 February 1957, Eden told him that he had 'neither been asked for his advice

had it'. Kilmuir believedthis to have been true 39 However, nor volunteered also . a documentin Eden'sprivate papersshows that he informedthe Queenduring their final

audienceas Queen and Prime NEnister, that he felt Butler would be a worthy

successor.Eden wrote to Adeane,on 12 January1957, and stated'the Queenmade no

formal requestfor my advice but enabledme to signify that my debt to Mr. Butler

while I have beenPrime NEnisterwas very real and that I thought he had discharged

his difficult task during the three weeks while I was away in Jamaicavery well'. 40

Eden's views were not influential in the selection, illustrating the decline of his

reputation in the party.

Influenceon the Outcome

The informal networks of communication within the party were of importance

in affirmipg the oppositionto Butler, and the support for Macmillan in the party and

the party hierarchy. This was becausethe canvassesof wider party opinion undertaken

by Heath,Poole and Morrison, illustratedthe existenceof an anti-Butler faction in the

parliamentaryparty, while there was no significant section in the party opposedto

Macmillan. This meant Macn-dllanwas the most acceptablecandidate to unite the

39 Macmillan Diary, 3 February1957 in Macmillan, Riding The StOrm,p. 184; and Kilmuir, Political Adventure p.287 40 AP 20/33/12Eden to Adeane,12 January1957 in Pin-dott,The Queen,p. 259 165 party. This opposition to Butler was central to his failure to becomeleader, as the

Conservative Party is reluctant to select leaders who cannot guaranteeparty unity.

The consultations of party influentials had a great influence on the outcome, as they affirmed that Macmillan was the choice of the party's senior statesman.In particular, the views of Churchill were decisive, as he still held a position of considerablegravitas. No one was still more influential in the Conservativehierarchy than Churchill,and his views were boundto havebeen influential. The views expressed by Churchill, Chandos and Waverley served to exacerbateparty opinion that I Macmillan was the right candidatefor the dire situation that the party found itself in, which was augmentedby the canvassof the Cabinet.

The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and Governability

Butler i) Acceptability

Butler was deemed to be unacceptable as successorto Eden for a number of reasons,and the clearestevidence of his unacceptabilitywas the existenceof an 'anti-

Butler' faction on the Conservativeback-benches. This became apparent through lettersand conversationsreceived and undertaken by the Chief Whip, Edward Heath as part of the informal networks of the selection procedure. Heath found that many

ConservativeMEN were opposedto Butler succeedingEden. Many of Butler's Cabinet colleaguesshared the doubts of back-benchersabout a Butler leadership.Kilmuir noted that 'party feeling in the House of Commonswas runningvery strongly against

Butler at this time', and he believed that the parliamentary party would have 166 disintegrated,if Butler had been selectedas Eden's successor.41 In February 1957,

Butler offered this explanation as to why Macn-ffllanwas chosen to replace Eden

Therewere three criticismswhich went in favour of the choiceas

finally made by the Queen. The first was the reaction of

ConservativeNTs, after visiting their constituenciesat Christmas

time, to the retreatfrom Suez.The secondwas the attitude of the

younger membersof the Cabinet.The third was the "ambience"

and connectionsof the presentincumbent of the post at No. 1042

The first two factors were directly associatedwith Butler's reputation in the party, and this illustratesthe importanceof the declinein his reputationthat resulted from the crisis.The 'scapegoatfactor' was dominantin Butler's unacceptabilityand his failure to succeedEden. The reasonsfor this oppositionto him were, firstly, the blame put on him for the failure of the Suezinvasion, and the cease-fireand withdrawal from the Canal Zone. When Butler became acting Prime Nfinister during Eden's convalescencein November 1956,this coincidedwith the withdrawal from the Canal

Zone, and the compliancewith US conditionsfor the rescue-packagefor the British economy.Butler, as the head of the governmentat that point, becamethe scapegoat for the failure of the government'spolicy during the crisis. This was particularly apparent with the right-wing Suez Group, who were vehemently opposed to withdrawal,before the govermnenthad toppled Nasserfrom power.

41Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden,p. 599; and Kilmuir, Political Adventure,p. 285 42Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 167

Butler becamesymbolic of all that had gone wrong, and for the retreat which was abhorred by many in the party, especially on the Imperialist right wing. The attitudes expressedby many in the party during the crisis illustrated that Butler's acceptabilityas Eden's successorwas going to be seriouslyaffected by Wsposition as acting Prime Minister. Membersof the SuezGroup expressedthese sentiments at the meetingsof the ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.At the outset of the crisis, Captain Charles Waterhouse,NP for Leicester, South East, wamed

Nasser'saction of 26 July was a 'direct challengeto the British position in the Middle

East and Affica, comparablewith the situationin 1939'. Robert Boothby, NT for East

Aberdeenshire,believed Nasser's action was comparableto Hitler's seizure of the

Rhineland.On 31 July, Leonard Ropner spoke againsta compromise,and demanded that the nationalisationof the Canalmust not be accepted.On 29 October,John Biggs-

Davidson,NT for Chigwell, told the Committeethat 'if we are not preparedto use force we are finished. This is an issue on which governmentsshould be preparedto fall'. 43 Waterhouse'asked what is the altemativeto force? He foresaw a disastrous situationin which we shall stand absolutelyalone and any threat of military action by

Nasseror any further aggrandisementshould be consideredas a casusbelli'. 44 On 7

November,Julian Amery, NT for Preston,North,

43'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Report of a meetingheld in Room 11 at the Houseof Commonsat 5.0 p. in. on Monday 30 July 1956.', 'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Record of a meetingheld in Room 14 at the Houseof Commonsat 6.30 p. m. on Tuesday31 July 1956.', and 'Confidential. Conservative ParliamentaryForeign Affairs. Middle East Sub-Committee.Minutes of a meetingheld in Room 13 at the Houseof Commonsat 6 p.m. on Monday 29 October1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 44'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Middle East Sub- Committee.Minutes of a meetingheld in Room 13 at the Houseof Commonsat 6 p. in. on Monday 29 October1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 168

Ur-gedthat now we had a foot in the door, we should not stop

until we had attainedthree main objectives:a settlementof the

Canal question, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and

destructionof Nasser'smilitary junta. At the sametime we must

stand on the Prime Nfinister's conditions for a cease-fire: that we

must not be excludedfrom the U.N. force, and must remainuntil

the abovesettlements could be guaranteedby the U.N. 45

Sir Ian Horobin, NP for Oldham East, and F.M. Bennett, NP for Torquay, endorsedAmery's view, andLouis Spearmanstated his disagreementwith government policy. On 14 November,Patrick Maitland, MP for Lanark, 'questionedwhether the governmenthad followed the right course in calling a cease-firebefore our full objectiveswere achieved'.Waterhouse followed Maitland's statementby telling the

Committeethat the governmentmust make it clear that the forces would not be withdrawn until the Canal had been clearedby the UN. Amery 'consideredthat the way to wreck a rebuilding of relations with America was to go cap in hand'.

Waterhousetold the Committee, 'we must make it clear we were not preparedto withdraw our forcesuntil the Canalwas clearedby the United Nations'.46

At the meeting of 21 November,F. W. Harris, NT for Croydon, North West, expressed 'great anxiety at rumours that the Government was contemplating withdrawal of our forces before the United Nations had implementedthe conditions

45'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Record of a meetingheld in Room 10 at the Houseof Commonsat 4 p.m. on Wednesday7 November'CPA CRD 2/34/2 46'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Record of a meetingheld in Room 10 at the Houseof Commonsat 4 p.m. on Wednesday14 November1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 169 laid down by the Prime Nfinister and the Foreign Secretary'.47 Harris also statedthat he could not supportthe government'in any prematurewithdrawal', and at the same meeting,Amery arguedBritish forces shouldremain in Port Saiduntil the government had 'solid guarantees' about the Canal, and an Arab-Israeli settlement. Dudley

Williams statedhis oppositionto any withdrawal before the governmenthad achieved its objectives,telling the meetingthat unlessthis happened,a generalelection would be 48 calledand the goverment would lose.

These sentimentsshow that anyonewho led the retreat from Suez would be reviled in some sectionsof the party, and when Butler was placed in chargeof the retreat from the Canal Zone, his standing in the party was severelyaffected. This decisionangered the Imperialist wing of the party, as 'the subsequentcessation of

Anglo-Frenchaction and the eventualwithdrawal were viewed [by the SuezGroup] as clear-cut defeats'. The bulk of the party believedin the use of force and this had a

Butler's 49 This has been in letter from Poole, major effect on reputation . confirmed a to Heath during the May 1957 controversy over the impending decision by the government to allow British ships to begin re-using the Suez Canal, in accordancewith the termsNasser had laid down. At a meetingwith a numberof Suezrebels including

ViscountI-Enchingbrooke, Victor Raikes,and JohnBiggs-Davidson, who all spokeout

againstthe decisionto withdraw troops in December1956, they told Poole they would

resign the party whip. Poole acknowledged,'there is no doubt that the views they

expressedto me are widely held in certain sectionsof the party'." It can thus be

47'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Record of a meetingheld in Room 10 at the Houseof Commonsat 4 p.m. on Wednesday21 November1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 48'Confidential. ConservativeParliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.Record of a meetingheld in Room 10 at the Houseof Commonsat 4 p. m. on Wednesday21 November1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 49L. P. Epstein,British Politics in the SuezCrisis, (London:Pall Mall, 1964),pp. 48 and 65 50Poole to Heath, 10 May 1957CPA CCO 20/l/5 170

assumedthat thesesentiments were just as widely held in the party in December1956

and January 1957, if not in even stronger terms during that immediate fall-out from the

crisis. This denotestheir significancein Butler's unacceptabilityto ConservativeWs

opposedto the cease-fireand withdrawal.

This decisionhad a major effect on the outcomeof the leadershipselection in

January1957, as Butler was deemedto be unacceptablebecause of the oppositionto

him from ConservativeNTs that this action, and others, aroused.Anthony Nutting,

who resignedas Nlinister of State at the Foreign Office in protest at the invasion of

Egypt, hasexpressed the depth of this oppositionto Butler in the party becauseof his

actions during tfitis period. He has stated that -Butler was the 'Suez Group's chosen

scapegoat',and they sawto it that he could not succeedEden. 51 Similarly, 'the feeling

in the Party was that if he would not take responsibilitywe could not have him as

leader.Afterwards Rab [Butler] was houndedfor that very reason,by what I call the

'blue blood and thunder' group, and one or two of them did their best to stop Rab becoming Eden's successor'.52 Butler revealed his incomprehensiontowards the

party's selectionof Macmillanwhen he told Home, 'I couldn't understand,when I had

done a most wonderful job - picking up the piecesafter Suez- that they then chose Harold [Macmillan]7.53

When Lord Beaverbrookwrote to Butler following the selectionof Macmillan,

and told him, 'if the H [House] of C [Commons]had beengiven the opportunity to

decide the leadershipyour selectionwas certain, he was incorrect as all evidence

suggeststhat Butler would not have been selectedleader by his colleaguesin the

5' A. Nutting, No End Lesson:The StoEy Sue (London: Constable,1996,2nd 159 of a of , edition), p. 52Maudling, Memoirs, p.64 53 Maudling, Memoirs, p.64; and Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 465 171

House of Commons.54 This was due to a large extent becauseof Butler's role as the

'man who led the troops out' of the Canal Zone. It is also apparent that Butler's

conductduring the crisis did not just offend the SuezGroup and the traditionalistright

wing. Fisherhas arguedthat 'even thoseNTs who agreedwith him were, though to a

lesserextent, critical of his apparentlack of resolution'.5' This is a correct assumption,

as Butler did offend colleagueswith sirnilarviews to the crisis, by his lack of courage.

I-Es criticism of government policy via indirect channels,such as the Commons

SmokingRoom and the Lobby, also raiseddoubts about the extent of his resolution.

Anthony Head, NEnisterof Defencein 1956, acknowledgedto Home that this was a

major fault of Butler's, and had consequencesfor the outcome of the leadership

selectiononce Eden resigned

The whole time he [Butler] was saying'on the one hand,on the

other'. It did him a lot of harm. If Rab [Butler] had been more

forceful throughout the period, he could have been Prime

Nfinister.But there was an ambivalenceabout him all the way -

and it did him absolutelyno good in the Cabinet16

Nigel Nicolson, who resignedas ConservativeNP for Bournemouthover the

government'sactions during the SuezCrisis, also recalledthis attitude of Butler's. 'He

played a double game,which cost him a lot of backing. He would speakup for the

Governmentin the House, and then go into the SmokingRoom and say to everyone

54Beaverbrook to Butler, 23 January1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (47) 55Fisher, The Tory Leaders 86 fiome,p. 56Interview, Lord Headin Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 465 172 how terrible it was. He thought that it would get him support, in fact it did the reverse'.57 Kilmuir has acknowledgedthat this behaviour was a major factor in

Butler's unacceptabilityto ConservativeNTs

For this sharp decline in his personalfortunes Rab [Butler) had

no one to blame but himself Many at that time consideredthat

his habit of publicly hedginghis political bets was too great a

weaknessand this accordinglydamaged his position both in the

Conservativehierarchy and in the Parliamentaryparty. "

It has been argued that the Suez Crisis also re-stirred memoriesof Butler's reputationas a Munichite during the appeasementera of the 1930s,and that the feeling in the party was that they would not havean 'appeaser'as its leader.It is the casethat

Butler's conduct during the Suez Crisis did invoke memories of his conduct during the

1930s, and did lead to doubts about his candidacy, but only because of Ws.conduct during the Suez Crisis itself It is more useful to see these apprehensions as an accumulationof doubts about Butler, that was provoked by his conduct during the

SuezCrisis: Thus, his conductover the secondhalf of 1956was more important in his unacceptability to certain sections of the party than his conduct during the appeasementera. Memories can be long in politics, but not that long. This is a view that Ramsdenconcurs with. 'Butler had done enoughduring the recent SuezCrisis to inspireanew a widespreadlack of respectin the party; at the least, recent eventshad

57 Interview, Nigel Nicolson in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956,p. 465 58Kilmuir, Political Adventure,p. 285 173 reinforcedearlier attitudes, and arguablyit was by then the recentevents that mattered

59 MoSt,.

The secondfactor in his unacceptabilitywas Butler's poor performanceat the

1922 Committee meeting of 22 November. The weaknessesin his leadership qualities illustrated by his performance, including his inability to uplift the party and invigorate it after the difficulties of the crisis, showedthat he was unacceptableas successorto

Eden. This performancein front of ConservativeNUs confirmed their doubts about

Butler's candidacy,and this informationfiltered through to the Cabinetand the party hierarchy, via the party's informal networks of communication. The letters Heath receivedopposing Butler's candidacyis evidenceof this.

The third factor in Butler's unacceptabilitywas his policy of supportingEden in

Cabinetduring the crisis, and then criticising him in the SmokingRoom and via other channelsto ConservativeNVs. It is widely acknowledgedthat Butler undertook this during the crisis, and his indiscreet criticism of the government'spolicy provoked distrust of Butler. This contributed to his unacceptability,as he was not seen as a trustworthy colleague,and his hedging of his political bets led to an impressionof indecisivenessthat damaged his leadership candidacy. The Cabinet were the detem-dningvoice in the selectionof Eden's successor,and, alongsidethe doubts that alreadyexisted, those expressedby the Conservativeback-benches confirmed Butler's unacceptability.'The question,as so often in Conservativeleadership struggles, was not how manypeople were for you, but how manywere againstyou'. " This is a basic rule of politics which Butler did not seemable to grasp. His failure to succeedEden

59 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 329 60Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home., p. 289 174 was the result of oppositionto his candidacywithin his own party, and his consequent inability to unite it.

ii) Electability

Butler was the most unelectableof the two candidates,and this was illustrated by hýisperformance at the 1922 Committeeon 22 November.His poor performance showedthat he did not have the ability to rise to the occasion,and could not lift the party's morale. This meant that Butler was not perceived as the most electable candidate,because he was not seen as inspiring enough to the party, and would thereforenot inspirethe electorateat a generalelection. His failure to makethe crisis appearas a victory of sorts, and to place it in 'the long adventureof politics', as

Macmillandid, meantButler was not felt to be enoughof an inspirationalleader to be selectedas Eden's successor.This meantButler was not victorious on the electability criterion, but his unacceptability to sections of the party, as opposed to his unelectability, was more important than this factor.

iii) Governability

Butler was a ministerwith a vast experiencein government,in the most senior offices of state as Chancellorof the Exchequerfrom 1951-1955,and thereforewas a strong candidateon the governabilitycriterion. However, certain featuresof Butler's position in the governmentin January 1957 countedagainst his governabilityrating.

Firstly, Butler's careersince December 1955 had moved away, not towards the 'great offices of state'. He had left the Treasuryin December1955 to becomeLeader of the

Commonsand Lord Privy Seal.This move from the most senior domesticposition in 175 the government,to posts with no departmentalfooting, gave the impressionto the party that Butler's careerwas in decline,away from the leadership.

Ifis temporaryposition as acting Prime Nlinister in November 1956 gave the indication that he was in position to succeedEden, but this position had more disadvantagesthan advantages. This was particularly the case with Butler's acceptability to the party, as he became the scapegoatfor the failure of the government'spolicy during the crisis. Thus, this acted againstnot for his candidacy.

Butler was a widely experienced Minister in government, but his governability rating was lower than Macmillan's at the time of the selection in January 1957.

Macmillan i) Acceptability

Macmillan was acceptableto the majority of the party hierarchy,the Cabinet and the party's NTs. He was thus in a position to unite the party, unlike Butler, as he pulled together left and right, ministers and back-benchers.There was no anti-

Macmillan faction on the Conservativeback-benches, unlike the existenceof an anti-

Butler faction. Blake has noted that 'what the party neededwas decisiveness,vigorous language,and a clear lead. Butler would havebeen unacceptable to the Suez Group and the Tory Right. Macmillan raised no correspondingantipathy among the Tory

Left'. 61 This assuranceof Macmillan's was a central factor in his attractivenessto

ConservativeNTs in the aftennath of the Suez Crisis. Significantly,Bracken wrote,

'The so-calledCanal die-hardsthink better of him [MacnUan] than they do of Eden 62 and Butler. Fisherhas noted that 'although Parliamentwas in recessat the time of

6' Blake, The ConservativeParty, p.278 62Cockett (ed. ), Dear Max, p.200 -M-y 176

Eden's resignation,anyone in close touch with Conservativeopinion in the House of

Commonsshould have known that Macmillan was the party's probablechoice as his

63 successor'.

Macmillan'sacceptability to the party as Eden's successorwas due to a number of reasons, but his conduct at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November demonstratedthe qualities that made him the most acceptablecandidate. Firstly,

Macmillan's virtuoso performanceat the meetingdemonstrated that he had the ability to lift the party's morale by his rallying cry to the party's NTs. This also significantly servedto unite the party's NTs as it gavethem a purpose.He madethem believethat the party's difficulties were not insurmountableby placing the crisis in the 'long adventureof politics, and instilled confidencethat if the party united behindthe new leaderthen they could revive their fortunesand win the next election.As Campbellhas noted, 'the party was determinednot to be ashamedof Suez:Macmillan could better

64 brazen it out, while restoring relations with the Americans at the same timeý.

Charmley concurs with this view, 'as Macmillan had been mounting a decent impersonationof someof Churchill'straits for sometime, it was not surprisingthat the party preferredhis up-beatmood to Butler's lugubriousone'. 65

This ability was crucial, as the party was in a severestate of disunity and the difficulties were mounting. The party hierarchyfelt that if the party was to recover from the debacle,it neededa leaderwith an exceptionalability to instil confidenceand lift spirits. Macmillan had demonstratedthis with assuranceand decisivenesssince the cease-fire,and the 1922 Committeemeeting gave him the opportunity to convincethe

63Fisher, The Tory Leaders p.85 64Campbell, Edward He p.97 65J. Charmley,A I-Iistojy of ConservativePolitics 1900-1996,(London: Macmillan, 1996),p. 155 177

Party's NIPs that he was the best candidate. A crucial factor in Macmillan's acceptabilitywas the fact that his reputationremained largely untarnishedby the Suez

Crisis, despitethe fact that he was 'first in, first out', and played a large part in the failures of the goverment's policy. In fact, his reputation was enhanced,as he appearedto rescue the British economy by instigating the cease-fire. This was because

Macmillan acted decisivelyin realising the futility of continuing the operation, and limited the damagethat the crisis caused.Butler becamethe main scapegoatfor the failure of the government's policy, as he was head of the government at the time of the admissionof defeat,while Macmillanremained in the background,working to savethe

British economyand revive Anglo-US relations.

A significantfactor in Macmillan's acceptabilitywas the mannerin which he actedas a rallying point for ministersand NTs who were opposedto the continuation of Eden's leadership. Macmillan told Butler on 15 December that the younger membersof the Cabinet,and especiallyPeter Thorneycroft,did not believethat Eden

66 could continue as Prime Nfinister. This was of significancein the leadership selection,as he had developeda bedrock of support over that period by acting as a focal point for discontentwith Eden's leadershipof the party.

Macmillan also noted that Nfinisters and back-bencherswere meeting and discussingthe future, and the needfor a new leader.It can,therefore, be assumedthat he helpedto galvanisesuch opinion. The fact that Butler felt Eden shouldcarry on as leaderuntil at least July 1957,meant that he did not canvassfor support in the same way as Macmillan, and gave his rival a head start in the contest for the succession.

Turner believesthat Macmillan becameleader becausethe party, and especiallyhis

66Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 178

Cabinetcolleagues, trusted him more than it did Butler. This assessmentthus concurs with the correct view that Macmillan was more acceptableas successorto Eden than

Butler 67 As Thorpe has 'there back- . noted, was a groundswell of opinion among benchersfor Macn-dllan,and there was a small minority who were opposed to Butler at any price. The combinationof thesetwo factors securedthe decisionfor Macmillan.68

Another interpretationof Macmillan's acceptabilitywas the perceptionthat he was a stop-gapleader 'to tide the party over the crisis'. Sampsonhas arguedthat it

69 was 'widely assumed' in 1957 that Macmillan's leadership was a stop-gap measure.

Macmillanwas selectedas he was acceptablein beingable to unite the party, and guide it safelythrough its immediatedifficulties. This explainsthe appointmentof Macmillan, as it was seenas a short-termexpedient, dictated by the circumstancesthat the party found itself in after the SuezCrisis. His age comparedto Butler's also suggeststhis was the case, but Macmillan was more acceptablethan Butler to the party as successor to Eden.

ii) Electability

Macn-dllanwas the most electableof the two candidates,as he had an ability to uplift and inspire the party and the public, unlike Butler. The 1922 Conunittee meeting was important in this, as his invigoration of the party's ND?s offered hope for a revival in the party's fortunes.Macmillan's use of this highly effectiveelectioneering ploy, and his physicalgestures that exudedconfidence and decisiveness,demonstrated that his ability as a public speakerwas profound, andMacmillan already had a reputationin the

67J. Turner, Macmillan (London:Longman, 1994),p. 127 68D. R- Thorpe, SelwynLloy (London: Cape,1989), 270 , p. 69Sampson, Macmillan, p. 125 179 party for this. His success as Minister of Housing during the 1951-55 Conservative administration,especially in his public promotion of the housing drive, showed his ability to publicise the government's programmein an important electoral arena.

Macmillan's establishmentof PremiumBonds as Chancellorin 1956 also confirmed this ability.

Macmillan exuded more confidencein a rejuvenationof the party's success than Butler, and this convincedthe Cabinet,the party hierarchyand the party's NTS that he was the most electablecandidate. Despite the fact that a generalelection was not due until 1960, the electabilityof the candidateswas still a vital considerationin the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, becausethe party was in such a severe state of disunity and low in confidence.The needfor a restorationof unity and an increasein morale,meant that the situationthat the party was in signalledan urgent needfor an increasein public confidence,and this was exacerbatedby the fact that it was widely expectedthat the governmentwould fall becauseof the crisis. Macmillanfulfilled this, while Butler did not.

iii) Governability

Macn-Oanwas Chancellorin January1957, and had previouslybeen Foreign

Secretary,so had occupiedtwo of the 'great offices of state' in succession.He was thus on a traditional careerpath to the party leadershipby occupyingthe most senior foreign and domestic briefs in the governmentprior to the leadership selection.

Macn-Oanwas of great statusin the government,and his governabilitywas higherthan

Butler's, as his careerwas progressingtowards the leadership,while Butler's appeared to be moving away from the summitof the government.He had a wide experienceof 180 governmentsince 1951, as NEnisterof Housing and Local Government,Minister of

Defence, Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was on a clear line of progression to the leadersl-ýip.Ramsden has noted an important aspect of

Macmillan's governability that appealedto Conservative voters

Macmillan [brought] to the task of reviving his party from the

trough in which it found itself in January 1957 both a foreign

policy record and an aristocratic bearing that appealedto the

deferentialTory voter, and an approachto domesticpolicy which

attracted the more pragmatic Conservativewho looked for

evidenceof economiccompetence and socialcaring. 70

The Cabinet felt that Macmillan was a candidate with a high level of governability,and despitethe fact that Butler had a wider experienceof government,

Macmillanwas seenas the more effectiveand decisiveminister because of his conduct

CriSiS. 71 during the Suez His links with the US governmentalso increasedMacmillan's reputation for governability, as the rejuvenation of Anglo-US relations was to be of paramountimportance for Eden's successor.He thus did not have a significantly higher governabilitythan Butler, but was seenas a more effective minister, and on a progressivecareer path.

'0 Ramsden,An Appetite For Power 361 ' p. 71Charmley, History of ConservatiVePolitics, p. 155 181

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the Conservative Party had three considerations following the Suez Crisis. The first was to restore party unity. The second was to restore party morale, and the third was to revive the 'special relationsl-ýip'with the United States government. The appointment of Macrrdllan was a stop-gap and short-term appointment, as the party's vision for the future was short- term. This was becauseit was believedthat the goverment would fall becauseof the crisis. Nevertheless,Macmillan was the best qualified of the candidates.The selection also occurredat a convenientplace in the electoralcycle, as it allowed the party time to recover before it had to go to the polls, but the restorationof party unity was an immediateconcem.

This selectionwas the first in the party to havea canvassof the Cabinet,and an assessmentof wider party opinion. The selectionprocess was quick and smooth, and resolvedthe matter without disruption. The informal networks in the party were vital to the selectionprocess, as they confirmedMacmillan's acceptabilityto the party, and the existence of an anti-Butler faction in the parliamentary party, that deemed Butler unacceptableas party leader. Macmillan fulfilled the core criteria of acceptability, electability,and governability,while Butler did not. This was becauseof their actions during the Suez Crisis, and Macmillan fulfilled the party's requirementsin the aftermathof the SuezCrisis better than Butler. 182

Chapter Six

The 1963 Leadership Selection: The Candidates' Actions and Conduct

This chapteranalyses the candidates'actions during the 1963 selectionof Sir

Alec Douglas-Home as party leader. The candidates were Butler, Home, Maudling, and Hailsham,and the significanceof their actionsin the outcomeof the selectionwill be demonstrated.

Butler

Butler's Actions during the Decline of Macmillan's Leadership: July - October 1963

In the summerof 1963, Butler did not know himself if he really wanted to succeedMacmillan becauseof his previous failure to gain the leadershipin January

1957.This was a critical determiningfactor on his conductthroughout the period from the summer of 1963, to Macmillan's resignation in October. He was also affected by the perceptionof his prospectsof succeedingMacmillan, which seemedslim as party opinion was in favour of a new leader.Butler wrote in a confidentialdiary note

My diagnosisshows that there is a very strong movement in

favour of somebody not too closely associated with the

Establishment. What is really happening in the Party is that the

herd instinct is unleashedand that they are tending to attack

anybodyin authority starting with the Prime Nlinister, including

the Chief Whip and also embracingthe leaders of the 1922

Committee,Morrison and Mott-Radclyffe,who are thought to be 183

too old world. These in their turn are not making much stand

againstthe herd and aretending to acceptthe drift'

This showedButler that his chancesof gainingthe leadershipwere not high, as the party wanted to move to the next generationof leading Conservatives.This was becausethe present generation of senior leaders were widely discredited by the allegations,and events of the recent months, principally the Profumo, crisis. This continuedthroughout the surnmer,and it becameclear he did not expect to succeed

Macmillan. Butler dined with Macmillan at Chequerson II September,where they talked for four hours,with the conversationalmost exclusively devoted to Macmillan's future prospects.Butler noted of the end of the evening, 'as we approachedmy bedroomdoor, he said that since my own prospectswere uncertainin regard to the leadershipI shoulddo well as a king-maker.But my own private diagnosiswas that at this point he hopedand intendedto remainas leader.2 This also showsthat Macmillan did not feel Butler shouldsucceed him. Macmillanfelt he gaineda clear impressionof his deputy'sposition

He would naturally (if I resign) acceptthe Premiershipif there

was a generalconsensus of opinion for him. But he doesn't want

anotherunsuccessful bid. It is clearthat in his hearthe doesnot

expectany real demandfor him. He would prefer to be Warwick

I 'Confidential Note', 12 July 1963. Butler MSS RAB G40 (72-73). 2 Butler, Art Of The Possible, p. 238 184

(which he could be) and not try to be King (which he can't be).

On the whole,he is for HailshaM3

This quote illustrates that Butler did not expect to gain the leadership in 1963, becausethe party wantedto choosea new leaderfrom the next generationof leading

Conservatives,and this attitude determined his conduct. It also shows that he supported Hailsham, as the leader from the next generation, because of his electioneeringexperience, which was of obvious vital significancebecause of the impendinggeneral election.

Butler's Reactionto Macmillan'sillness before the Party Conference:8 October

At the Cabinetmeeting on 8 October,at which Macmillandeclared his wish to lead the party into the next election,and during NEnisters'discussion on this, Butler wisely did not commit himselfto help in any possibleconsultations to find Macmillan's

4 successor,which as acting Prime Nlinister he was within his rights to do. This was probably becausehe did not want to count himself out as a candidate for the leadership,and also he did not want Macrnillanto retire, so the discussionwas seenas an irrelevant distraction to him. Following the onset of Macmillan's illness on the eveningof 8 October,Butler did not like the mannerby which Macmillan's resignation was being rushedthrough by the party managers.He illustrated this discontentat the developingcourse of events,when he telephonedTimothy Bligh, Macmillan's Private

Secretary,just after midnight on 8 October. He told him that it was important to

3 Diary entry for II September1963, Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 50*. Emphasison original document.Extracts from this entry are in H. Macmillan, At The _(75).End Of The Day: 1961-1963, (London:Macmillan, 1973),p. 494 4 Howard,RAB, p.309 185 rememberthat the ConservativeParty's conferenceswere more like rallies, and 'one did not take a seriousdecision at a rally. 5 Butler wished this informationto be made clear to Macmillan, and offered the following courseof action. He arguedMacmillan shouldmake it clear that he was not going to give up the leadershipof the party, and reservehis position on whether he would be fight the next election as leader.6 This illustrates two points of significance. Firstly, Butler wanted Macmillan to remain as

Conservativeleader, and second,he wantedMacmillan to stay on as he did not believe he would succeedhim, and feareda movetowards the next generationof Conservative leaders.This explainsButler's wish for a cautious approachto be adopted to the situation.

Butler's Conduct at the Party Conference: 9- 12 October

Butler did not like the atmosphere generated by Home's relaying of

Macmillan's intention to resign once a successorhad been found. He felt that a cautious and inoffensive approachwould be sensible,so as to not appear to be canvassingfor the leadership,and ruining any chancehe had of succeedingMacmillan.

Butler has describedhis approach:'I spent most of the time in my room to avoid 7 creating the wrong impression'. Unfortunately for him, this meant he created no impression,and had just an adverseeffect on the prospects of his candidacyas

Hailsham'seffervescent approach.

At lunch on 12 October,the day of the rally at which Butler was to makethe

Leader's Speechin placeof Macmillan,he and his wife dined with Alec and Elizabeth s Bligh to Macmillan, 8 October1963 PRO PREM 11/50081ý2) 6 Bligh to Macmillan, 8 October1963 PRO PREM 1115008(57) 7 Butler, Art of the Possible,p. 242; 'Alan Clark's Historv of the ToKyParty'. Episodethree: From - EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionProduction for BBC TV. First shown28 September1997; and diary note, c.20 October1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (5) 186

Home.Home told Butler he was seeinghis doctor in London next week. Accordingto

Thorpe, Butler did not graspwhat this signified and askedhim why, to which Home replied, 'becauseI have been approachedabout the possibility of my becomingthe

Leaderof the ConservativeParty'. 'It is difficult to imaginea more unsettlingpiece of newsfor Butler to receiveat what was alreadya difficult and nervoustime for him'.8

Thorpeis correct in describingthe impact of this declaration,and it did affect Butler's performance.Butler's speechwas poor, and it did not inspire the conference.He delivered the speechpoorly, and it was 'flat and uninspiring. 9 Butler was delivering a speechthat had been preparedfor Macn-dllan,which may explain in part the poor performance,but he still had a history of failureson suchoccasions, as with the speech to the 1922 Committeein November 1956. The Times noted the main weaknessin

Butler's candidacythat was revealedby the speech- his failure to inspire the party, which gavethe impressionthat he could not inspirethe electorate.'Had he lived 3,000 yearsago he would surelyhave been conscripted for the Oracleof Delphi. He is not a vote charmer'.10 The speechwas not the uplifting oration that the party neededafter the shockof Macmillan's illness.Butler was also heckledby an Empire Loyalist during the speech,and Home, as ConferencePresident, had to intervene to restore order while Butler moppedhis brow to composehimself 11 He had againfailed to rise to the occasion,and this exacerbatedthe doubtsabout him in the party.

Home recalledof the speech,denoting the impact of Butler's failure. 'It was rather a pity really that he just had this one sort of failure, which anyonecan have. 12

8 Thorpe,Alec Douglas-Home,p. 296; and A. Home, Macmillan 1957-1986,(London: Macmillan, 1989),p. 551 9 Howard,BAR, p.313 10The Times, II October1963 " Shepherd,The PowerBrokers, p. 155 12Reputations, 13 July 1983in Howard,RAB, p.314; and Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 297 187

Maudling noted of Butler's performanceat the Conference,that 'Rab [Butler] was himself,neither more nor less.He had to deputizefor Harold [Macmillan] and give the final speech of the Conference, and he did this with great dignity, not trying to seize for himself the opportunity to advancehis own ambitions'.13 This illustrates much aboutthe natureof Butler's actions,and his failure to attain the leadership.

Butler's Reaction to the Canvassesof Party Opinion: 15 - 17 October

At the Cabinet meeting of 15 October, (chaired by Butler), approval was given for the four canvassesof party opinion to take place. The Cabinet consideredthe procedureas the last item on the agenda,as was usual for 'political' matters, and 14 agreedthat it was the right procedure. This followed instructionsfrom Macmillanto

Butler in a minuteof 14 October,in which he statedthat he hadbeen considering 'how best to proceed with the customary processes of consultation'. 15 This demonstrates that Macrnillanwas fully in control of the consultationprocess, and Butler announced the planson 15 October.He reportedto Macn0an that 'they all agreedthat this was the right procedure'.16 Ramsden has noted of Butler's conductover the canvasses

Butler's acquiescenceis not surprisingin the light of an aide-

memoirethat he had composedfor himself in the previous July;

he wrote that in the eventof a leadershipcontest there shouldnot

be a ballot, and that he preferredthe collection of opinionsby the

whips, the results of which should be 'conveyedto the present

Maudling, Memoirs p. 126 Butler to Macmillan, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(24) Howard,RAB, p.316; and Diary entry for 15 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.5 1*. (17) "'Leadership of the Party, 14 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(32) and CPA CCO 20/8/7 11Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 201 188

leader'; he added significantly that if there is clearly a big

majority for one candidatethen I think the rest of us shouldpull

17 in and help'.

This explainsmuch about Butler's conducttowards the leadershipcontroversy, after the return from the party conference.He felt that party unity was the most important objective,and he would support the candidatewho appearedbest able to secureparty unity. This was alsoaligned with Butler's beliefthat he would not succeed

Macmillan.

Butler's Reaction to the 'Midnight Meeting' Opposition: 17 October

Rarnsdenhas describedthe impact that the 'Midnight Meeting' opposition could havehad. 'Sincethis group includedthe Deputy Prime Minister, The Chancellor of the Exchequer,the Leadersof both Lords and Commons,and the Party Chairman, they had considerablecollective weight aswell as numbers'.18 Edward Boyle, Nfinister of Education,noted in his record of the meeting,'RAB [Butler] & RM [Maudling] won't say. QH [Hailsham],IM [Macleod],EP [Powell] - No', and significantlynoted they were being 'overtakenby events'.On 17 October,Powell 'appealedto RAB this 19 afternoon not to let us down'. This illustrates some doubt about whether Butler would claim the leadership,as he believedhe would not get it. This is an indication of doubts on the part of Butler's fellow opponentsof Home as to whether he would demandthe leadership.

" Butler note, 12 July 1963,Butler MSS, G40 in Rarnsdcn,Winds of Change,p. 202. Emphasison original. 18Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 206 19Boyle MSS, 5581 in Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 206

I 189

The news of Home's lead in the canvassesprovoked the other candidates to

push their claimsfor the leadership.They tried to persuadeLord Dilhorne, the Lord

President, to agree to a meeting of Nlinisters to discuss the matter, but this was

refused. Much of the blame for the resulting deadlock, according to Shepherd, must go

to Butler. As Deputy Prime Nfinister and acting Prime NEnister, he had every right to

call a Cabinetmeeting, yet failed to do so. This is a failure which suggestsa lack of

courageby Butler, and is a further indicationof why he did not becomeparty leader.

Butler felt he had missedhis chance,and was not the choiceof the party.

On the afternoonof the 17 October,Butler, Macleod and Maudling heardfrom

William Rees-Mogg,the Deputy Editor of The SundayTimes, that Macmillan would

advisethe Queento sendfor Home, and this led to a seriesof meetingsand telephone

conversations to try to organise the opposition to him. Macleod has implied that the

press were deliberatelyinformed before the Cabinet, to prepare the public for the

Home 20 Butler, however, inactive emergenceof . remained and only took telephone

calls from his supporters.Joint Party ChairmanMacleod and Powell, Minister of

Health, outraged at the course of events, led the opposition to Home, and they telephonedhim that afternoonto inform him of the reasonswhy they objectedto him beconýngleader.

Butler telephonedDilhorne on 18 Octoberto ask him to persuadeMacmillan to authorisea meetingof the other three candidates,before a final decisionwas conveyed to the Queen,but no reply was madeto Butler's requeSt.21 According to Lady Butler,

Macmillan refused to talk to Butler while he was in the nursing home, and was

201. Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership, The Spectato 17 January1964, p. 66; and R. Shepherd,lain Macleod,(London: Pimlico, 1995),p. 328. Macleoddid not revealit wasRees-Mogg in The Spectato " . Butler, Art Of The Possible,p. 248; and Fisher,The I )rv Leaders,p. 109 190 determined Butler was not going to get a chance to succeed him. Howard, however, found no evidencethat Butler madeany attempt to. contact Macmillan, but stateshe did telephoneDilhorne to requestMacmillan's authorisationof the meeting of the other three candidates.Butler, Hailsham and Maudling did meet, without Dilhorne, at n-ddday,but Macmillan was now set on this course of action and was not to be dissuaded.22 Butler probablymade the requestunder pressurefrom his fellow rebels, as he demonstrateddiffidence and unease at the opposition*toHome's emergence,and did not want to threatenparty unity by opposinghis succession.The oppositionwas understandablyled by thosewho felt they had a legitimateclaim to the leadershipof the party, but in reality did not. Butler's diffidencetowards the oppositionshows that he believedhis emergingas leaderwas not in the party's best interest,as he knew he was not the choiceof the party.

Butler's Reaction to Home's offer of the Foreign Office: 19 October

At his first meetingwith Home,Butler reservedhis position, andtold Home he would give him his decisionlater that evening,following another discussion.Butler remainedthe key figure in the opposition,and Home and his opponentsknew that if

Butler agreedto serve,Home would becomeparty leader.For this reason,the rebels andtheir supportersurged Butler to hold out. He had beenapproached having lunch at the Carlton Club on 18 Octoberby Rees-Mogg,and other supportersof Butler, who 23 urged him not to serve. If he refused to serve, Home's chancesof forming a governmentwould have been reduced,and his authority severelyweakened. Butler

22'Alan Clark's History of the Tory Party'. Episodethree: From EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First shown28 September1997; Howard, RAB, pp.318-319; and Shepherd,The PowerBrokers p. 157 Shepherd,Lain Macleod, p-333; and Butler, Art Of The Possible,pp. 248-249 191 told Macleodthat he would only serveunder Home, if he was satisfiedthat it was 'the only way to unite the party'. Mollie Butler urged her husbandnot to agreeto serve.24

Butler's emphasison the importance of party unity was a critical determining factor on his conduct,along with the perceptionthat he would not be offered the opportunityto succeedMacmillan. I-Es own commitmentto unity meantthat he would not snatchthe leadershipfrom Home, and once he perceivedthat Home was the man the party wanted, he agreedto join his governmentas Foreign Secretary.His meeting with

Home on IS Octobersuggests this was his most important concern

I saw Lord Home this afternoon. He said that everything

dependedupon my decision and that of the Chancellor of the

Exchequer I that I ... said must reserve my position on two

grounds: first, as to whether it was right to go back to a

hereditarypeer at the presenttime and second,as to whether he

in Cabinet The had been could conunandenough unity the ... thing

rushed and there had not been sufficient considerationof the

difficulties. It was now up to him to secure the necessary

I him the the Ministers unity... gave particulars of who were unwilling to go on and he took down their namesand said he

would seethem.

I saidthat I was honouredby any suggestionhe had made

for me but would like to seehim later in the eveningwhen I had

the answerto the questionof unity... I was only trying to seek a

" Macleod,'The Tory Leadership'in Spectator.17 January1964, p. 66; and Fisher,The Toly Leaders p. 110 192

solution,which would obtain the maximumunity. We decidedto

leave the matter until I met him again2'

Butler's realisation that he could not now become leader, as there was insufficientdemand for him, andthat Home had the impetusin the selection,led him to agreeto serve.The other rebels' desirefor Butler to becomeleader was strongerthan his own. He lacked the ruthlessnessto take the leadership,and 'this is an endearing characteristicin the man; it was a fatal flaw in the politician'. This was something

Powell believed,and expresseda conversationhe and the other opposershad with

Butler during their oppositionto Home, on televisionin 1983

We handedhim a loadedrevolver and told him all he had to do

was pull the trigger. He askedif it would make a noise and we

said,"That is in the nature of guns,RAB. " He askedif it would

hurt and we said,"That too is in the nature of guns, RAB," and

he said,"I don't think I will. D'you mind?"26

Of Butler's conduct, Hailsham commentedthat 'Ferdinand the Bull had preferredto sniff the flowers rather than take what would have been his if he had

itv. 27 wished So, 'the sad truth was that, almost from the beginning,Rab [Butler] succumbedto what appearsto havebeen a fatal intimationof his own ultimatepolitical defeat', tlýs led to his ineffective to Home's 28 Butler and opposition succession.

25'Secret'. 18 October1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (101) 26Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 110; and Reputations, BBC TV, 13 July 1983 in P. Cosgrave, The Lives of Enoch Powell, (London: Bodley Head, 1989), p. 188 " Hailsham, A Sparrow's Fli 3 56 gh , p. 28Howard, RAB, p.304 193 himself was drawn to this explanation.'To sum the whole thing up, it is no good thinlýing there is no life left if one is not elected Pope. One can always be a respected

Cardinal.On the other handwhile there is a chanceit is a good thing to be in for it. "

This clearly illustrates the certainty in Butler's own mind that he would not succeed

Macmillan. There appearsto have been a desire for the leadership,but not the detern-ýinationto get it, and a realisationthat he could not obtain it. This inaction by

Butler severelyupset his supporters.Joint Party ChairmanLord Poole told Dennis

Walters,who had led the Hailsharncamp, 'I tell you if you had seen[Butler] yesterday morning,dithering about in a gutlesssort of way, you would not want him to be Prime

Minister of this country.I was quite appalled;quite disgusted'.30

Butler's decisionto serveas Foreign Secretarycan be easilyexplained. Firstly,

Butler believedthat Home was the man the party wanted, as he could guaranteethe unity of the party, andButler realisedthat he could not. Secondly,Butler did not really want the leadershipas he had alreadyfailed once in January1957, and knew that the party did not want him. Thirdly, Butler did not have the necessary'killer instinct' to demandthe leadershipand was not preparedto use the 'loaded revolver' presentedto him by Powell, Macleod and Maudling. All three combinetogether to give the fullest explanationof Butler's actions,or in-actions, during the leadershipcontroversy.

As Ramsdenhas noted, 'Butler was exactlythe wrong man to be placedin this situation.Like Home he wanted to have the Leadershipwithout fighting for it, but unlike Home he had no Macmillan to stage-managethe successionin his favour; 31 without a lead from him the resisterscrumbled away'. Butler's conduct meantthat

29'Confidential Note'. 31 July 1963Butler MSS RAB G40 (83-84) 3' D. Waiters,Not Always, pp.136-18 in Ramsden,Winds L)fChang-e, p. 207 31Ramsden, Winds of Change p.207 194

nobodybut Home would succeedMacn-dllan. Ramsden has also offered a sympathetic

interpretation of Butler's actions

To be fair to Butler, there was a positive side to the case; unlike

the situationin January1957, he had it entirely within his grasp

to becomePrime Nlinister in October 1963, for if he had stood

out, severalothers would have done so too, and Home would

havehad to report to the Palacehis failure to unite the party; but

once Home had been given the first try to form a Cabinet, his

failure could have been brought about only through a

constitutionalcrisis involving the Monarchy, and with the party

split; it is inconceivablethat a Butler team formed after Home's

public hurniliationwould havebeen able to unite the party to win

the upcon-dngelection"

This illustratesthe vvider political factors that may have had an influenceon

Butler's conduct. The implicationsof opposingHome once he had been offered the

chanceto form a governmentwere immense,and would have instigated a general

political and party crisis, alongside the party's existing difficulties. Once Home

occupiedTen Downing Streetto conducthis consultations,he had the momentumto become party leader and Prime NEnister, and Butler could not have altered the

outcomewithout provoking further political problemsfor the party. The chancesare

32Ramsden, Winds of Change p.207 195 that this was not a factor in Butler's thinlýing,as he alreadyknew he could not succeed

Macmiflan.

Home

Macmillan's Inquiries into Home's Reaction to the Possibilfty of his Succession:July -

September-1963

Macmillan courted both Hailshamand Home during the summerof 1963, to discoverthe prospectsof their succeedinghim. Macmillantold Hailsharnin Junethat he was the right manto succeedhim, if he decidedto quit. Macmillanalso approached

Home, but his responsehad been unenthusiastic.This was the pattern of Home's responsesto Macmillan's enquiriesthroughout the summerand autumn of 1963. At the Ministerial meeting on the Denning report, the government's report on the

Profumo Affair, on 18 September,Macmillan mentioned to Home that he was consideringretirement before the next election, and he respondedthis would cause disunity in the party, and 'great troubleswill follow'. This was Home's biggest fear aboutthe succession,and for this reasonhe wantedMacmillan to remainas leader.On

6 October,Macmillan discussed the leadershipsituation with Home, and they outlined their concernsat the proposedplan for Macn-dllanto announceat the Conferencethat he would resign in January.On the sameday, the two men discussedthe situation at

Chequers.Before this meetingMacmillan had beenundecided, but following it, he had decidedto stay on, as therewas no agreementon who shouldbe his successor,and his retirementthreatened disarray. This showsthat Home wantedMacmillan to remainas leader,as he believedthere was no successorwho could unite the party. 196

After the Cabinet meeting of 8 October, Dilhorne told the Cabinet that if

Macmillandid resign,he would be availableto conductany Cabinetconsultations on a possiblesuccessor, and Home also declaredhis readinessto assist,as he was not a candidate.33 Macleod later alluded to this as a significant factor in the leadership

contest, as Home had assuredthe Cabinetthat he was not a candidate,but did not

specify whether this ruled him out from the contest under any circumstances.

Macleod's accusationsare unjustified, as circumstanceschanged rapidly over the courseof the leadershipcrisis, and Home could not havepredicted how circumstances might changein the future. His actionsalso show that he was not then considereda candidate,and did not considerhimself to be a candidate.

Home's Reaction to Macmillan's illness and his Role in the Resignation Statement: 8-

9 October

Following the onsetof Macmillan's illness,Home and Dilhorne visited him in hospitalon 9 October,and they togetherwrote the statementthat Home would readto the Party Conference,that madeit clear Macmillanwould not be continuingas leader.

Macmillan discussedthe possibilityof Home succeedinghim, and he did not express any willingnessto do so. This led Macrnillan to state his preferencefor Hailsham.34

Home's reluctanceto standas a candidateis clear from Macmillan's discussionswith him, and his illnessdid not changethat. Hailsham'santics at the party conferencedid, becauseHome's doubtsabout Hailsharnwere confirmed,and he was pressuredby the party's seniorfigures to stand.

33Shepherd, lain Macleod.p. 306; and Howard,RAB, p.309 34Diary entry for 9 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.5 1* (9). This is also in Macmillan, At The End of the Day. p.502; Shepherd,The PowerBrokers, p. 153; Shepherd,lain Macleod,p. 309; Lord Home,The Way The Wind Blows, (London:Collins, 1976),p. 181; and Fisher,The Tory Leaders p. 104 197

The exact nature of Home's role in the formulation of the resignation statement

is unclear.Butler believedthat the party hierarchy forced the resignationstatement

from Macmillan, and according to Bligh, the resignation statement was due to the

pressureput on him by Home (primarily), and Redmayne, the Chief VVThip,and Poole.35

The fact that Macmillan did not mention the statementat the party to celebratethe

renovationof 10 Downing Street was evidenceof the statementbeing forced from

him. 36 Butler had a considerableamount of disagreementwith the party hierarchyover

the developing course of events, and this was instigated by Home's role in the

resignationstatement. He notedin his diary of c.20 October

I had a certain amount of differenceof opinion with the Chief

Whip on arrival sincehe and the hierarchywere particularlykeen

to hurry on the Prime Minister's retirement - i.e. Macmillan. I

was equallykeen to give him a chanceto recoverand not to have

to take vital decisionswhile he was an invalid37

Butler was implying that the party hierarchymanipulated Macn-dllan's current weaknessto manoeuvrehim into resignation,as they felt he was finishedand wanted to install Home as his successorunopposed, and as quickly as possible.As Poole was

Joint Party Chairman,it can be assumedthat he was representingthe wishes of the party hierarchy.Butler felt that Macmillan should not make a hasty decision, and should wait until he knew the full extent of his illness." 11is advice was ignored,

35 October1963'. Butler MSS RAB G40 (103-105 36Howard, RAB, p.3 10 37Diary note,c. 20 October1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (5) 33'Confidential. Prime Minister'. SignedT. J. B. (Bligh). 8 October 1963PRO PREM 1115008(57- 58). For detailsof Butler's displeasureat Macmillan's hasteto resign. 198 testifying to the lack of influencehe had with the hierarchy,and that the succession was hurried on to install Home as Macmillan's successor. Dilhorne and Home's offer to help in conductingthe canvassescan also be assumedto be evidenceof the party hierarchy's natural wish to control matters. The party managersdid want Macmillan to retire, but thereis little evidenceto suggestthat Home playeda major part in this.

Home's Conduct at the Pagy Conference and his Reaction to the Pressureto Stand: 9-

12 Octobe

Maudling noted of Home's performanceat the Conference,'AJec [Home] presidedwith discretionand a certainalooffiess. '39 Home playeda pivotal role in the

Party Conferenceat Blackpool, as he was Presidentof the National Union that year, and in this capacitymade the statementof Macmillan'sintention to resign.This speech cast Home into the public eye, and his chancesof succeedingMacmillan beganto be reportedin newspapers,and talked about at the Conference.However, Home madeno declarationsof his intentionsto standas a candidate,as he probably did not believe himselfto be a possiblecandidate at that time.

Following the resignation statement,Hailsham, obviously concernedabout

Home's growing prominence,reminded him of their earlier agreementfollowing the institution of the 1963 PeerageAct in July, that 'the field would support only one peer'. He told Home that he did not think he should stand becauseof his lack of experienceof domesticpolitics. Home told Hailshamthat he had servedat the Scottish

Office for four yearsand also worked at the NEnistryof Labour. Hailshamreplied this was not enough, and Home made no indication that he might or might not stand,

39Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 199 despitedeclaring he was not a candidateat the Cabinetmeeting of 8 October,only two daysearlier.

It has been arguedthat Home's conduct at Blackpool was dominatedby the need to act cautiously,and to not be seento be canvassingfor the leadership.'Alec

Home shrewdlyweighed his options as the field of front-runnerscame back towards him'.40 Home perceivedthat he could fill the role of stop-gapleader, as Butler was not feasiblebecause of his closenessto the Macmillan regime that was widely discredited in the party. The younger candidatessuch as Maudling and Macleod were felt to be not yet ready to succeed: the situation proved too late for Butler, and too soon for

Maudling and Macleod. Home and Hailshamwere seenas possiblestop-gap leaders, until one of the younger generationof leading Conservativeswas ready to take the leadership,and after the generalelection had been fought. As Thorpe has correctly argued,'they [Home and Hailsham]plugged a gap betweenthe Macmillangeneration, approaching their seventies, and the 1950 intake, who might block the leadership for too long a period by succeedingto the office of PrimeNfinister too young. 41

Home was only sevenmonths younger than Butler, but did not havethe same level of 'guilt by association' with Macn-dllanthat Butler had. Home, it can be assumed,had perceivedthat he might be called upon as a stop-gapleader, and this dictatedhis cautiousconduct at Blackpool, evenwhen he was under intensepressure to stand.However, an important point must be noted: Home was not widely seenas a candidatebefore the Blackpool conference,and did not want to be. He only agreedto be a candidateafter his perception of the consequencesof a Hailsham leadership, following his conductat Blackpool. Thorpe's analysisis only relevantafter Hailsham's

40Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home 286 ' p. 41Thorpe, Alec Dou las-Home,p. 287 200 actionsmade Home decideto stand,and he appearsto be implying a plan of action by

Home to gain the leadership,which evidencesuggests was not the case.Home only agreedto becomea candidateafter pressurewas put on him to keep out Hailshamand 0 Butler, but he probably did perceive that he may be called upon before that point.

Even before his successfulperformance in the foreign affairs debate,Home found himselfunder pressureto throw his hat into the ring. Among thoseto pressurise him was Dilhorne, who had been perturbed by Hailsham's behaviour at Blackpool,

DuncanSandys, John Hare, Sir Anstruther-Gray,Sir CharlesMott-Radclyffe and Nigel

Birch. SelwynLloyd was also centralto the pressurebeing put on Home. He reacted nonchalantlyto this pressure,and 'Home played the part of reluctant candidateto perfection,a fact that key figures in the other campswere beginningto recogniseand fear'.42 Tony Lewis, a correspondentwith The New York Times,told DennisWalters, a supporter of Hailsham, that Home's conduct was similar to that of compromise

candidatesat American leadership conventions. Thorpe's analysis suggests an element

of scheming towards the leadersl-ýpby Home by playing this role of compromise

candidate,and that may or may not have beenthe case,as Home may not have been

consciously striving to create that image. However, the important aspect is the impact

of this behaviour,and it was highly beneficialto Home and added positively to his

candidacy.Nfinisters, NTs and party activistsliked Home's performance,yet remained

unawareof his potentialcandidacy.

The other candidates'chances were adverselyaffected by their behaviourat the

Conference,and this dissatisfactionwith the other candidatesimproved Home's

position, as did his own performance.He madea successfulspeech on foreign policy,

42Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 294; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 105 201 and affirmed his status as an effective Nfinister. Home told the Conferencebefore beginninghis speech:'I am offering a prize to any newspapermanthis morning who can find a clue in my speechthat this is Lord Home's bid to take over the leadershipof the Conservative Party'. Thorpe has stated that one of the people present on the platform whisperedto their neighbour,Wec you're lying!). 43 Home's speechwas a great successand was widely applauded,and was popular with the Conference delegates.Punnett has argued, 'in contrast[to Butler's and Maudling's speeches]Lord

Home's contribution in the debateon foreign affairs was regardedas a considerable success'.44 Thorpe noted of Home's speechthat 'for those who were close observers of the way things were developing,however, it was yet another example of the " reluctant candidatekeeping his options open". This more accuratelydescribes the motivesbehind Home's conductthan an analysisbased on the idea that he pursueda consciousplan to gain the leadership.

There has been a considerableamount of conjectureas to Home's motives behindhis conduct at the conference.Was his reallyjust a reluctantcandidate, or was he playing the role of compromise candidate to perfection, to improve his prospects of succeedingMacrnillan? There does not appearto be a way of attaining a conclusive answer to this, and the most important aspect is the impact of his performance.

Comparedto Maudling's and Butler's speeches,Home's was a major successwhich contributedpositively to his candidacy,whereas the speechesof Butler and Maudling had a detrimental impact on their candidacies.The effect of Home's conference performanceled to his name becomingincreasingly prominent in rumours on who

43Private Information in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,pp. 294-295 44Fisher, The Toly Leaders,p. 104; and Punnett,Selecting the Party Leader p.40 4' Thorpe,Alec Dou las-Home,p. 295 202 would succeedMacmillan. On the eveningafter Home's speech,Reggie Bennett, the

ConservativeMP for Gosport and Fareham,told Macleod that support for Home was growing, to which Macleod replied 'don't be so bloody ridiculous. Alec told us in

Cabinethe wasn't a runner'. This illustratesthe impact of Home's performanceat the

Conference,and how he emergedas a candidate,when he was originally felt to have no realisticprospect of becomingleader. "

On 12 October,the day of the rally that traditionally followed the Conservative

Party Conference,Home told Butler over lunch that he was seekingmedical advice aboutputting his nameforward for the leadership.47 Ramsdenhas noted that Home's ovationas chairmanduring the Leader'sRally overshadowedButler's as the speaker.48

It can be assumedthat this was the key date at which Home's behaviour tumed towards striving to gain the leadership,as the conferencewas over, and the full consequencesof Hailsham'santics at the conferencebecame clear. Home felt he would be calledupon as the compromisecandidate, and he felt he could unite the party better thanthe other candidates.

Home's Conductduring the Canvassesof Parjy Opinion: 15-17October

On his return from Blackpool, Home went to seeMacmillan on 15 October at

3.30 p. m. He told Macmillan of the eventsat Blackpool, and Macmillan askedif he had decidedto be a candidate.Home replied he was seeinghis doctor that evening, andMacmillan was 'relieved' by this news.Home told Macmillanhe had beenalarmed by Hailsham's conduct at Blackpool, and Macmillan turned his attention fully to

46Fisher, The Toly Leaders,p. 104 47Howard, RAB. p.313. Homesought medical advice because he wasunsure whether his poor eyesightwould affect his ability to fulfill his dutiesas Prime Nfinister; and Fisher, The To!y Leaders p. 105 4' Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 200 203

Home. Home told Macmillan that 'he would be preparedto undertakethe task if he was askedby the Prime Nfinisterto do so in order to preventthe party collapsing'.49

This was a key determinanton Home's behaviour, as he had been convinced by

Macmillanand the party's seniorfigures that his candidacywas the only way to save the party. He appearsto have decidedto standon the 15 October. SelwynLloyd, in effect Home's campaignmanager, noted in his diary, 'Tues. 15 October. Saw Lord

Home. He said that he had come to the conclusionthat he will acceptif the Queen sendsfor him after all the consultationsand it being apparentthat most people want him'. 5'

Home was the first NEnisterto see Macmillan that day, and told him of the concemstowards Hailsharnfrom the US govemment expressedby David Ormsby-

Gore, the Ambassadorin Washington.The Americansdoubted Hailsham's suitability to be Prime Nlinister becauseof his conduct during the Test Ban Treaty negotiations.

Home's relayingof this informationruined any chancesof the leadershipthat remained for Hailsharnafter Blackpool. That evening,he underwenta medicalexamination that pronouncedhim fit enoughto becomePrime Nlinister, and 'if the party wantedhim, he would stand."

Home's Reactionto his Emergenceand the Oppositionto Him: 17-19October

Following the considerationof the results of the canvassesby Macn-dllanand the party hierarchy,Home was told by Macmillanthat he was recommendinghim to be his successor.Following this news, Home stayedat his London residence,I Carlton

49Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,pp. 298-299 50Selwyn Lloyd Diary, 15 October1963. SELO 61 (211) SelwynLloyd Papers,Churchill College, Cambridgein Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,p. 300 5' Thorpe,Alec Douglas-Home,p. 302 204

Gardens,and was joined by Lloyd and Redmayne.The opponentsof his succession now beganto contact him to expresstheir displeasureat the course of events.While

Home reacted calmly to the protests, Lloyd told Hailsharnit would look like sour grapesif he blocked the emergenceof Home. Dilhorne arrived at Carlton Place, and

Home told him 'I was quite preparedto come forward as the candidateto unify the

party, acceptedby everyone;but if it is said that my coming forward would split the

party, that is a different proposition'. Dilhorne told him that he 'must pay no

attention'.52 This illustrates the central role of the party hierarchy in buttressing

supportfor Home's succession,and giving him the confidenceto obtainthe leadership.

Home was invited to the Palaceon IS October at 12.30 p.m., and was askedto

seeif he could form an administration.The fact that he conductedthe consultations

with his opponents from Ten Downing Street had a major impact on the effect of his

attemptsto persuadethe dissenters,and the oppositionsoon collapsed.Home had the

momentum and the initiative, and with the strong support of Macmillan and the party's

seniorfigures, used this to securehis position as the incumbent.Maudling and Butler,

the key opponents who Home neededto convince to support him, had agreed to serve

by the following day, onceit becamefully apparentthat he had the momentumand the

apparentsupport of the party. Home was agitatedover the discontentexpressed at the

'midnight meeting', but Macn-dllancharacteristically told him, 'look, we can't change

our view now. All the troops are on the starting line. Everything is arranged'.

Macmillan noted, 'he [Home] felt like withdrawing. I urged him not to do so. If we

give in to this intrigue, there would be chaos.Butler would fail to fonn a government,

52Selwyn Lloyd recordof 17 October1963. SELO 61 (6). SelwynLloyd Papers,Churchill College, Cambridgein Thorpe,Alec Douglas-Home,p. 312; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 109 205 even if given another chanceno one else would succeed'.53 This illustrates that

Home's conductduring the final stagesof his successionwas driven by Macmillan.

Home set about consulting the opponents to his successionin order to persuadethem to serve under him. Macmillan was contacted by Home following his audienceat the Palace, and Macmillan advised him to see Butler and Maudling immediately,to try to get Butler to accept the Foreign Office, and Maudling the

Treasury Macmillan told Home if he did this 'the game would be in his hands'.54

Home met Butler, Hailsham,Maudling, Powell, Macleod and Boyle individually that aftemoon.55 Macleod and Powell stated they would not serve, while the rest reserved their position, until they had seen how the situation was developing.That evening,

Home again interviewedMaudling, Hailshamand Butler. Maudling, after Hailsham's agreementto serve, now changed his mind and accepted Home's offer of continuing as

Chancellor.Following discussionswith Home on 18 October,Butler was satisfiedthat

Home's successionwas the only way to secure party unity, and accepted the offer of the post of Foreign Secretary.

Maudling

Maudling'sReaction to Supportfor his Succession:July - September1963

Support for Maudling to be Macmillan's successorgrew after the successof the 1963Budget, and polls in The Daily TelegLa-phindicated that he was the favourite with ConservativeNTs in the summerof 1963.Maudling reactedto this support for him, by going to seeMacmillan to clarify his position. He recorded,'I thought it right

53R Churchill, The Fight For the Toly Leadership (London:Mayflower, 1964),p. 137; Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership'in Spectator.17 January1964, p. 66; and Diary entry for 18 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.5 1*, (24). This is in Macmillan, At The End Of The Day 515 IP entry also p. 54Diary entry for 19 October1963, Ms. Macmillan del).d. 5 I *, (27) 55Fisher, The Torv Leaders p. 109 206 to go and see Harold [Macmillan], to assurehim that while I should like to be his successor,I would play no part at all in any intrigues to get him to go'. Maudling noted he could not rememberthe exact detailsof the conversation,but recalledit was canentirely fiiendly one, and the understandingbetween us was open and sincere'.56

Butler has recorded on 31 July 1963 that Maudling asked him if he becamePrime

Nfinister, Maudling Treasury, he if could C'stay on at the and would acceptthe same the situationwas reversed?Maudling was thus trying to ensurethe supportof Butler, if he was in a positionto becomeleader. 57

Maudling's Conductat the Party Conference:9-12 October

Maudling recalled in his memoirs, 'a lot was bound to depend on how the various candidates performed at the Conference. He was due to make the

Chancellor's speech early in the Conference proceedings, and was told by his supporters that it was vital that he got it right: 'I am afraid I did not'. In his memoirs,

Maudling recounts an explanation for his conduct that was given by Wilfred Sendall of

The Sundqy Express on 4 October 1973, that he believes fully explains his conduct

Maudling would not wish to frustrate or defeatRab Butler. Ms

loyalty to his old ResearchDepartment chief was too strong. He

therefore had to be convinced that Butler had no chance

I that Maudling had anyway... pointed out the conference

platform reservedfor him the next morning, when he was to

reply as Chancellorto an important debate.I exhorted him to

56Maudling, Memoirs, p. 125 51Confidential note, 3 1' July 1963 Butler MSS G40 (83-84) 207

believe his On Maudling that this was moment... the platform as rose to speak,lain Macleod generouslywhispered to him: 'Go

on, Reggie, this is your chance'....Thus Reginald Maudling, at

the critical moment in his career, declaredhis faith. If only the

deliverycould havematched the words.

But, alas,it fell abysmallybelow them.

Handedto Churchill,or to Macmillanor Macleod,this text could

haveproduced a famousspeech. Maudling himself wrecked it5s

This extract makestwo significantpoints in relation to Maudling's conductand its impact. Firstly, he felt Butler should succeedMacmillan, and he would only challengefor the leadershipif it becameclear Butler was not in the running. Secondly, his conduct at Blackpool had a detrimental effect on his chancesof gaining the leadership,because of the poor delivery of his speech,and unlike Macn-Oan,he did not havea senseof opportunismin order to 'seizethe moment'. Maudling did not give an inspiring performance,and this clearly affectedhis reputationof whether he could inspire the voters at a generalelection. Clearly, Maudling's poor speechdid have a detrimentaleffect on his chancesfor the leadership,and did not makethe impactthat it might have done, and his sympathyand loyalty to Butler, after their close working relationshipduring the 1940sand 1950s at the CRD has been widely documented.

However, the extent of Maudling's subservienceto Butler can be questioned.It must have been apparentto Maudling in 1963, that he was in a far strongerposition than

Butler to gain the leadership,because he was in a more senior position in the

58The SandayExpress, 4 October1973 in Maudling, Memoirs,pp. 127-128 208 government,and the party andthe public hadbeen pressing for a 'younger man'. Thus, the situationin 1963was in Maudling's favour, and he could have acted on this. That he did not contributesmore to an explanationof his failure to gain the leadershipthan a subservienceto Butler.

A key influenceon Maudling"s conduct was his view that, 'back in London decisionswould be taken by 'deliberationand not by the decibelmeter'. This was a correct assumption,but the importance of the candidates' conduct at the Party

Conference and it's impact should not be discounted. This may also explain

Maudling's lack of impact at the Conference,as he felt his conduct there would not havean important effect'on the decisiontaken. Maudling later admittedto this failing,

'what perhapsI had not realisedwas how closelythose channels[of communicationin 59 the parýy] had been listening to the decibel meter'. Ramsden has noted the significanceof Maudling's failure, as he failed 'to raise the conferencetemperature,

[and this] was eagerlycontrasted by the presswith the successof Macleod, Hailsham and Home'.60 Maudling and Macleod had a private pact, that whoever was in the strongest position at the time of the selection of Macmillan's successor,would help the other. Macleod,an ablepublic speaker,assisted Maudling with his speech,but this had no effect on it, and his 'performancewas pedestrianand his hopesslipped away as the 61 speechsagged heavily to its conclusion'. They all gavepowerful performancesat the . conference,and Home's improved his position as a candidate,wMe Hailsham'sdid not. Maudling did not inspireany enthusiasmfor his candidacyby his performanceand this affectedhis prospectsof succeedingMacmillan.

59Maudling, Memoirs p-128 I Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 198 6' Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 104 209

Maudling's Conductduring the 'Nfidnight Meeting' Opposition: 17 October

On 17 October,following the emergenceof Home, Maudling tried to persuade

Dilhorne to summon a meeting of Nfinisters to discuss the leadership issue, or at least to review the proceduresby which the Queen was to be advised, and both these 62 requestswere refused. Maudling has noted that the emergenceof Home after the

party conference gave rise to 'considerable concern and apprehension. There were

manyof us who felt that Alec [Home], with all his qualities,suffered from a disability 63 in political terms in being the fourteenth Earl of Home'. This was also felt by

Macleod andPowell, in particular,and alongwith the desireto promotetheir own, and

indirectly, Butler's candidacies,these were the two dominant motives behind their

conduct after the emergenceof Home as the front-runner in the selection.

Maudling,Powell andMacleod felt they were an importantpart of the Cabinet,

and were entitled to expresstheir doubts about Home's potential leadershipof the

party. On 18 October, Maudling had been dining with the Governor of the Bank of

England,and when he arrived home,was told of Home's emergenceand that 'several

people were deeply concerned'.Maudling was invited to Powell's house in South

Eaton Place where the 'Midnight Meeting' began,with Maudling, Powell, Macleod,

Erroll and Aldington present.Butler kept in touch with the meeting by telephone.

Redmayne,following his discoverythat the meetingwas taking place,joined them, and

twe made it clear that in our view the choice was a mistakefrom the party point of

view'. Maudling later noted of Macmillan's view that this meeting was 'unseemly

behaviour',that 'we all had a strong and genuinefeeling: we all thought a rnistakewas

62Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 65 61Maudling, Memoirs, p. 128 210 beingmade. It was not only our right but our duty to say this in the most effectiveway we could'.64 Maudling expressedhis view that Butler was the best candidate,but if

Butler could not serve, his own was a viable candidacy. Maudling, Powell and

Macleod wanted Butler to emergeout of self interest, allied with the feeling that he was the man best suitedto succeedMacmillan. They all also hoped to be the party's leaderafter Butler, so supportedhis candidacyfor dual purposes:they all felt Butler shouldsucceed Macmillan, but alsowanted to promotetheir own positions.

Maudling's Reaction to Home's Offer of the Treasufy: 19 October

On Friday 19 October, following his audiencewith the Queen,Home asked

Maudling to see him at 10 Downing Street. Home offered him the opportunity to continue as Chancellor,and Maudling 'said that I hoped he would withdraw that questionbecause I would hateto say 'No' to him. Though I was happyto serveunder him, I thought he was the wrong choice and Rab [Butler] would be the right one. "'

Home told Maudling that it was important for him to note that there was great opposition to Butler in the party, and if the opponents to Home prevented him beconýngleader, Butler would not succeedbecause of this opposition,and Maudling would becomeleader. Maudling told Home that he 'was not trying to play that sort of gameat all', and told Home that he would serveunder either man, but felt that Butler 66 was the better choice. Maudling cameto realisethat the opposition to Butler was too strong for him to becomeleader, and that Home was the choiceof the party, and acceptedhis invitation to servelater that day. This was the reasonbehind his decision

64Maudling, Memoirs, p. 129 65Maudling, Memoirs, p. 129 66Maudling, Memoirs p. 129 211 to serve,as Maudling sawthat Home now had the momentum,and the supportfor the party's seniorfigures. That evening,Home againinterviewed Maudling, Hailshamand

Butler. Maudling, after Hailsham's agreementto serve, now changedhis mind and acceptedHome's offer of continuingas Chancellor.He told Butler that 'things were closingin'.

Thus, the oppositionled by Maudling, Macleod and Powell, and apathetically supportedby Butler, dissipatedas soon as it becameclear that Butler would not be the choiceof the party, and that Home was. The impact of this oppositionwas, therefore, limited, and only servedto indicatethat Home was the choice of the party, which led to the rapid disintegrationof it. Maudling may also havebeen motivated by a desireto becomethe 'leader-in-waiting',which would havebeen improved by his continuation as Chancellor,the most seniordomestic position in the government.

Hailsham

Hailsham's Reaction to Macmillan's Inquiries on the Possibility of his Succession:

June-October 1963

In June 1963, Hailshamwas visited by Oliver Poole, and 'the purposeof his visit was to tell me that I should preparemyself to becomethe next Leader of the

ConservativeParty'. Hailshamhas noted his surpriseat this, as he did not realisehe was being considereda candidate,or that Macmillanwas on his way out, and did not take Poole's declarationseriously as he regardedButler as the certain successor,and

Macleodas an outsiderto Butler. 67

67Hailsham, A Sparrow'sFlight p.348 212

Macmillan has noted that he sent Hailsharnto Moscow as the government's representativein the Test Ban Treaty negotiations,deliberately to 'test his powers of

Macmillan 'he did 68 However, Hailsham did negotiation'. noted, yM well' . not impressthe US officials during the negotiations,and they had doubtsabout Hailsham's temperamentalsuitability for the leadership.Home informedMacmillan on 15 October that he had receiveda messagefrom David Ormsby-Gore,that the US goverrmientfelt

Hailshamhad shown a lack of judgement during the negotiations,and this led the

Americangovernment to be uneasyat the prospectof Hailshambecoming leader. 69

On 30 September,Macmillan sent for Hailsharn, and told him he was contemplatingresignation, and that if he did so, he wantedhim to be his successor.On

7 October,Macmillan statedthat he wishedHailsham to succeedhim after Christmas, when he would retire. 'I rememberbeing almost struck dumb with surprise at the contentof our conversationand do not remembera thing that I said'.70 Julian Amery and Maurice Macn-dllan arrived in Blackpool on 9 October, and immediately sought out Hailshamwith an important messagefor him from Macmillan,who wanted him to act at once and stake his claim for the leadership.Hailsham was 'flabbergasted'with

Macmillan's request but 'once the Prime Minister said something you took it

71 seriously'.

Hailsham'sconduct towards the successionwas galvanisedby this declaration.

This was a coupleof hoursbefore he was due to give his CPC lecture.Hailsharn, 'in all

68Diary entry for 5 September1963, Ms. Macn-dllandev. d.50*. (64). Emphasison original document. 69For a detailedanalysis of the significanceof this point, seechapter seven, pp. 262-263 " Hailsham,A Sparrow'sFligh p.350 71Fisher, The To!y Leaders,p. 102;Hailsham, A Sparrow'sFlight, p.352; and Interview with Lord Hailshamfeatured in 'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party'. Episodethree: From EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First shown28 September 1997 213 loyalty to him', told Butler of his intention to disclaimhis peerage,and Butler tried to dissuadehim out of this move, but Hailsham had decided to stake his claim after

Macmillan's message.On 10 October, he discussedthe leadershipissue with Home, and Home told him that he was under strong pressureto put himself forward as a candidate.Hailsham has recorded that he was not surprisedat this declaration,but did not regardHome as a seriouscontender, and only saw himself,Butler and Macleod as candidates.This underestimationof Home's candidacyis a common trait to all the candidates,and explainsthe initial apathy to his threat to their ambitions. On 10

October,Hailsham, in the postscriptto his lectureto the ConservativePolitical Centre at the Pavilion Cinema,announced his intention to disclaim his title and become a contenderfor the leadership

It is not always realisedthat I have been proud of my father's

life. I to to that heritage I felt it public was proud succeed ...

would be contraryboth to my duty as a colleagueand my duty to

the State to do any act which would be interpreted as an act

calculatedto underminethe authorityof the PrimeNEnister of the

day. But it must be obviousto you that that situation no longer

exists.I shall continueto try to servemy country honourablybut

I wish to say tonight that it is my intention to disclaim my

peerage.If I can find anyoneto receiye me as a candidateto

standfor ParliamentI shalldo so72

72Churchill, Fight For the Tory Leadership p. 109 214

Film footage from the time shows an audienceshouting and applauding,and

Hailshamrecalls that he was considerablyembarrassed at the scenes,and with being the centreof attention.Others were more condemnatory,and one witnesspresent told

Butler he thought it was 'reminiscentof a NurembergRally'. William Deedes,Minister

Without Portfolio, on the platform with Redmayneduring the lecture, recalled that they knew that Hailshamwas going to make this announcement,and decidedthat as membersof the governmentthey could not applaudand had to appearimpartial, and just stood on the stagemotionless. Young noted that Hailshamleft the platform 'with the sort of rapture more often accorded by teenagegirls to pop singers than to 73 potentialPrime Mnisters. Hailshammade his declarationduring the vote of thanks following the lecture, and as he hasnoted, 'the effect was one of the most dramaticin my lifetime', and he had started the over-enthusiasticand over-indulgentbehaviour that cost him support,and lost him a placeas a candidate. This had a significanteffect on senior party figures, who did not like the image that Hailsharn was conveying at

Blackpool.

The effect of Hailsham'sspeech could hardly havebeen more dramatic,and its impact on the Conferencewas phenomenal,as 'the whole audience,and the platform, went mad, standingand cheeringand waving in the full light of the nationaltelevision: and, of course,the whole presswas f ull of it the next morning'.74 Hailshamhas stated that he tried to 'keep out of the public eye' for the rest of the Conference,but his flamboyantbehaviour, his paradingof his baby as a voter-winningexercise (something he later denied), and the behaviourof his supporters,turned Macmillan, the party's

73Hailsharn, A Sparrow'sFlight p.353; Interviewswith Lord Hailsharnand Lord Deedesin 'Alan Clark's History of the Tojy Party'. Episodethree: From EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First broadcast28 September1997; Butler, Art of the Possible 243; Fisher, The Toly Leadersl 103 ' p. and p. 74I-Iailsham, A Sparrow'sFli-gh p.353 215 most senior figures and ConservativeNPs away from Hailsham, and they turned

75 towar s ome.

Hailsham began a concerted effort to seduce the conference.He was a showman,a rabblerouser, a 'I-EghChurch Heseltine'.However, his overt attempt to snatchthe leadership,along with RandolphChurchill's distributionof 'Q' badges,only servedto alienatemany in the party who felt that the leadershipissue should not be 76 settledin so vulgar and public a manner. Churchill gave badgesto Butler and his wife, which Butler threw away immediately.As Deedeshas argued, 'kissing babies while campaigningis one thing, parading your baby while as a candidatefor the leadershipis another'. To all intents and purposes,Hailsham scuppered his chances.

Fisher has noted the effect of Hailsham's antics, as 'in the result, the uninhibited canvassing for Hailsham reacted against him and alienated more support than it attracted'.77 Macmillan was visited by Dilhorne and Redmayneon their return from the conference. They told him they were upset at Hailsham's and his supporters' behaviour at Blackpool. They said they were supportive of his succession,but felt his open courting of the Conference was 'turning "respectable' people away from Hogg'

78 [Hailsham].

Rarnsdenhas noted, 'Hailsham's campaignseemed to have everything going for it; he was the Prime NIinister's candidate,he was anyway the darling of the

75Hailsham denied this chargeand statedthat his wife and babywere there to supporthim emotionally,not advertisehis candidature.Hailsham has also notedthat he disapprovedof Randolph Churchill's distribution of 'Q' badges,which madehim appearlike a candidatein an American leadershipconvention. This is in Hailsham,A Sparrow'sFligh p.352 76'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party, Episodethree: From EstateOwners to EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First Broadcast28 September1997 and Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 102 77Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 103 78 Diary entry for 14 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.51*. (13-14) 216 conference;he had a team ready to run his campaign'.79 This explainsin part why

Hailsham'sconduct failed to havethe desiredimpact: the ConservativeParty was not used to campaignsfor the leadership,and did not find them conducive.Hailsham's enthusiasm for impressing the conference did not appeal to the party. Aggressive campaigningwas detrimentalto a candidate'schances, and John Boyd-Carpenter,

Chief Secretary to the Treasury, has summarisedwell the party's attitude to campaigning.'The ConservativeParty still then retainedthe concept that gentlemen don't throw their hats, or their coronets, into the ring. It preferred the convention, howeverartificial, that leaderscome forward in responseto the pressureof others. 80

This not only helps to explain the failure of Hailsham,but the selectionof Home.

Maudling noted of Hailsham'sperformances at Blackpool that 'Quintin [Hailsham] was his warm, ebullient, emotionalself, commandingthe enthusiasmand loyalty of many, but arousing the doubts and apprehensionsof many others. 81

Hailsham's Reaction to Home's Emergence: 19 October

After Hailshamreturned from Blackpool, he tried to arrangea meeting with

Butler andMaudling, to makesure they all actedtogether, as this would preventHome becomingleader. He managedto do so, but only after Home was on his way to the

Palaceto be offeredthe task to seeif he could form a govemment.After Hailshamsaid they shouldstick together,Butler 'said he had alreadygiven his word to Alec [Home]'.

A secretminute from Redmayneto Bligh has illustrated the discontentof Hailsham after the party conference,and the worry this was causingto the party hierarchy.It

79Ramsden, Winds Chang 198 of , p. " J. Boyd-Carpenter, Wgy of Life, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1988), p. 177 81Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 217 declared, 'it is most important that we should try to keep Lord Hailsham in the boat This be the importancein that do ... note must regardedas of most urgent order we 12 not fail to take action on it at precisely the right moment'.

Maudling and Hailshamtelephoned the 'midnight meeting' and statedthat they opposedHome, but would serveunder Butler. Butler, Hailshamand Maudling met at midday following the 'midnight meeting'. Home met Butler, Hailsham, Maudling,

Powell, Macleod and Boyle individuallyfollowing his meetingwith the Queen.Powell,

Macleod, Boyle and Maudling all refusedto serve immediately,Butler reservedhis position as did Hailsham.Hailsham, later that evening,decided to serve.He had been persuadedby Selwyn Lloyd, a strong supporterof Home, who told Hailshamthat it would look like sour grapesif he refusedto serve.Pressure had also beenput on him by Amery, Poole and Thomeycroft. 83 Clearly, after the party conference, Hailsham was in a weakenedposition, and was not in a positionto becomeleader, and it became clear that Butler had too much opposition in the party to succeed.This explainshis decisionto agreeto servein a Home administration.

Conclusion

This chapterhas demonstratedthat the actions of the candidatesat the Party

Conferencewas centralto the outcomeof the selection.As the conferencetook place during the selection,it constitutedthe 'campaign' for the leadership,such as usually occurs in a fonnal leadership election. Butler and Maudling both gave poor perfonnancesat the conferencein their speeches,while Hailshain's over-exuberance and obviousexcitement at the prospectof becomingparty leader,raised doubts about

82'Secret. Mr. T. I Bligh'. SignedM. R. (Redmayne).17 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(8) 83Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 108 218 his suitability for the highest office in the government. In contrast, Home's conduct at the party conferencedemonstrated that he was generallyacceptable as a can&date.

Butler's inactive role in the opposition in the Cabinetthat emergedto Home becomingparty leader demonstratedtwo important points. Firstly, that he did not believehe could becomeleader as he was not acceptableto the party, and secondly, that it was not in the interestsof party unity for him to prevent Home succeeding

Macmillan. Home's delivery of Macmillan's resignationstatement to the conference, and his speechas Foreign Secretarywere vital to his emerging candidacy,as his competent conduct was in stark contrast to that of the other candidates,whose weaknesseswere exposedto the party. The fact that Home was not an expected candidateat the time of the conferencemeant he was not scrutinisedas much as the other candidates,but his conduct neverthelesshad a better impact than that of the other candidates.This lead to the pressurethat was put on Home during, and after the conferenceto standas a candidate.Home only aowed his nameto go forward after he saw the weaknessesof the other candidates,and he put himself into the ring in the interests of party unity as the compromise candidate. 219

Chapter Seven

The 1963 Leadership Selection: The Situational Interpretation

This chapter applies the Situational Interpretation to the 1963 leadership

selection.It analysesthe influenceof the situationand the selectionprocedure, and the ratingsof the candidates'acceptability, electability and governability.The chapterthen

assessestheir effect on the outcome- the selectionof Home and the failure of Butler,

Maudling and Hailshamto attainthe leadership.

The Situation and Its Requirements

The Decline of Macmillan's Goverrunent: 1962-63

On 27 April 1962, Macleod distributed a memorandumon the political

situation in Spring 1962, and noted 'I am afraid there is no question that the electorate

are bored with us as a government.This springsmainly from the fact that we have

been in office so long. " The Conservative Party had been in power since 1951, and

the secondterm of Macmillan's governmentwas experiencingthe difficulties that a

party in power for a long period can experience,in both ideologicaland goverrunental

terms. Macmillan noted on January 1"' 1963

1962 is over. It has beena bad year, both in Home and Foreign

politics. The government'sposition is weak andthere is a general

view that the Socialistswill win the next GeneralElection. The

country is in a dissatisfied and petulant mood. My own

popularity has gone down a lot. There is a wave of anti-

' 'The Political Situation, Spring 1962', lain Macleod,27 April 1962CPA CCO 20/8/5 220

European and anti-American feeling. There is trouble about

growing unemployment. The press is, with scarcely an exception,

hostile Can in 1963 1964.1 don't know. But I ... we recover and

meanto havea good trY2

Dissatisfaction was being expressed by the public about Macmillan's

Edwardianimage, and the failure of the government'sprogramme. A memorandum from Paul Bryan, the Party Vice-Chairman,to Macleod andPoole illustratesthat 'there is a trace of feeling amongthe YCs [Young Conservatives]that we are being led by an old man', showingthe disadvantagesof Macmillan's image.' On 15 October 1963,

Macmillannoted that policy was not splitting the party, and that the party's difficulties were due to 'boredomwith materialsuccess', and the apparentinability to harnessthis to spiritual purposeS.4 The electorate had become bored after many years of

Conservative rule, and the party appeared to need to undergo a process of rejuvenation.

The Imminenceof the GeneralElection

The leadershipstruggle came at an inconvenienttime for the party in the electoralcycle, as a generalelection was due in October 1964, at the latest. On 17

February1963, Macmillan noted, 'faced with Wilson (47 or so) we must have a young man (Heath or Maudling). This line of approachleaves out poor Butler as well as me. 5 Of course, there's something in it'. This shows one of the central requirements in

2 Diary entry for I January1963 Ms. Macmillan dev. d-48 (35-36).Emphasis on original. 3 Bryan to Macleodand Poole, 15thMay 1963CPA CCO 20/8/6 4 Memorandumby the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(27) 5 Diary entry for 17 February1963 Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 48 (79) 221

1963: a leader with a new image to face Labour leader Harold Wilson, to give the party some chanceof winning a fourth successiveelection victory. As Macmillan noted,this meanta youngerleader with an imagenot closelytied to his, which counted against Butter. Macmillan noted on 5 September 1963

I cannotgo into an Election and lead in it. I am beginningto feel

that I haven't the strengthand that perhapsanother leader could

do what I did after Eden left. But it cannot be done by a

pedestrianpolitician: it needs a man with vision and moral

strength- Hailsham,not Maudling. Yet the back benchers(poor

fools) do not seemto have any idea, except a 'young man'. . Admirableas Maudling is, I doubt if he could revive our fortunes

6 as well as Hailsham.

This illustratesthe needfor a youngerleader, and also the divisionsof opinion over who shouldbe Macmillan's successor,but it is clear that Macmillan's careeras leader was coming to an end, and he had perceived tfýis. On 4 October 1963,

Macmillan noted 'my decisionto retire before the next GeneralElection is right. The problem is how exactly to announceit and how to get the right successor.Butler would be fatal. Maudling uninspiring.Hailsham, with Maudling and his men in loyal 7 support, might still win. Macmillan thus supportedHailsham as a younger, more electableleader, and it was only doubtsabout Hailsham that aroseafter the Blackpool

Conferencethat led him to focus his attentionsolely on Home.

6 Diary entry for 5 September 1963 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 50* (63) 7 Diary entry for 4 October 1963 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 50* (117) 222

The Role of the 1963 PeerageAct

The Peerage Act that was passed on 31 July 1963, was a central situational influenceon the outcomeof the selection.According to Macmillan, without the Act,

'Butler would have succeeded,almost without challenge'. Stark has noted that 'the making of Prime NEnisterDouglas-Home depended as much on this constitutional reform as it did on the magiccircle selectionsystem'. 8 Without the Act, this could not havetaken place, as the party would not accepta leaderwho was not a memberof the

House of Commons.Home could now becomean NP, and was therefore a feasible candidate.The samenow alsoapplied to Hailsham.

The Act was passedafter the pressureof Viscount Stansgate,who wishedto disclaimhis peerageand return to the Commonsas Anthony Wedgewood-Benn,and he had undertakena three year campaignto obtain his right to do so. Benn had succeededto the Viscountcy on his father's death, and tabled a Bill proposing that peerscould disclaimtheir peerageif they so wished. The Bill originally passedby the

Commons would have allowed the renunciation of peeragesonly after the next dissolutionof Parliament,which meantthat former peerswould havebeen ineligible to be selectedas parliamentarycandidates for the 1964general election. However, the

Lords amendedthe Bill to allow renunciationof peeragesfrom the moment the Act went into effect, and this was acceptedby the Cabineton 27 June.It was also decided - that 'surrendershould not extinguishthe Peerageitself, and this was important as if this had occurred, Home would not have allowed his name to go forward for the leadershipas he was proud of his family heritage.9 This constitutional reform,

8 Macmillan, At The End Of The D, p.509; and. Stark, ChoosingA Leader p. 134 9 SeeStark, ChoosingA Leader,p. 88; and Thorpe,Alec Douglas-Home,pp. 2'59-261 223 therefore,had a major influenceon the outcome,as without it, Home would not have succeededMacmillan.

The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal Networks of

Communication

Formal Aspects

YheDevelopment of the Procedure:Motives and Effect

The attitude of the Palaceto the selectionof Macmillan's successorwas 'you choose,we send for'. 'O In other words, the party should determinewho the best successorwas, and the Palacewould ask that personto form a government.This led

Macmillan and the party hierarchy,because were clear divisions of opinion on who would be the best candidate,to decide to undertakeextensive canvasses of party opinion to determine the best successor.This desire lay behind the emphasisin

Macmillan's resignation statement at the party conference on the use of the 'customary processesof consultation'. Drafts of this statementin the Public Record Office file on the leadersfiýpcontroversy, show Macmillan took enormouscare in his deliberation over the contentand phraseologyof the message.This is particularlyapparent with the key phrase 'customary processesof consultation'. Drafts show that he did not originallyintend to usethis phrase,and the final versioncontains the following: 'I hope that it will soon be possiblefor the customaryprocesses of consultationto be carried " out within the party about it's future leadersl-ýp'. Drafts of the messagecontain the following crossedout, and replacedwith the phraseMacmillan used

10Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Homep. 292 11'Confidential. Foreign Secretary'.Signed Harold Macmillan. 9 October 1963PRO PREM 11/5008 (36) 224

I hope that it will soon be possiblefor the chief figures of the

Party to consult together about the future leadership with various

individuals and groups in both Houses of Parliament as well as in

the Party outside,thus making it possiblefor Her Majesty to be

given any advicewhich Shemay seek12

This fine-tuningcan be interpretedin a numberof ways, but the oppositionto

Butler's successionis clear in the announcement,and in the subsequentcanvasses.

have becausehe did Macmillan appearsto changedCP the original phrase not wish to makeit explicit that the whole party would be consulted.This was becausehe and the party hierarchywanted to consult only those whose opinions were consideredto be important, and that agreedHome should succeedMacmillan. If the whole party was consulted,the resultmay not havebeen the one that they wanted.Tl-ýs explains the use of the phrase 'customary processesof consultation', as there were no 'customary processes'for this situation, so Macmillan did not make a formal commitmentto consult the whole party. The phrasewas also ambiguousenough to allow Macn-dllan and the party hierarchyto conductthe canvassesin the mannerthey wanted.Macleod was convinced that Macmillan arranged for the canvassesof party opinion to deliberatelyblock Butler from succeedinghim, by makingthe oppositionto him in the

13 party fully apparent. However, if there was opposition to Butler's succession, then

Macmillanwas justified in making the party aware of that fact, -ashe could not unite the party.

'2 'Confidential. Foreign Secretary.' Unsigned. 9 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(38,48,50) 13Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership'in Spectator.17 January1964, p. 65 225

Two alternativetheories can be offered to explain why the procedurewas developed.Firstly, the proceduretook that form so that the party hierarchyappeared to be consulting the whole party, and justified their selection of Home as Macmillan's successor.Secondly, there were deep divisionsof opinion in the party on who should succeedMacmillan, and the canvasseswere the best meansof finding the candidate most acceptableto the party. The evidencesuggests that the party hierarchywanted

Home to becomeleader as he could best guaranteeunity, and becausethere were divisionsof opinion, neededto demonstratethe support for him. By developingthis procedure,the stagewas set for his emergence,and the procedureplayed a major part in the selectionof Home asMacmillan's successor.

Redinayne'sCanvass ofMPs: Method, Results,Influence on the Outcome i) Method

The methodused was for the party whips to ask NTs questionson who they felt shouldsucceed Macmillan, who they would leastlike to succeedMacmillan, and if they felt Home would be an acceptable leader. Ninety per cent of NPs were said to have been interviewed personallyby a whip, the rest by telephone,or if abroad by telegram,and somewere seenmore than once.14 There appearto have beenas many as four questionsasked of NTs

1. Who shouldsucceed Macmillan?

2. Who shouldbe the secondchoice?

3. Who amongthe candidateswould you leastlike to seeas leader?

" Ramsden,Winds of Change p.203 226

4. If thereis deadlockbetween Rab [Butler] and Quintin [Hailsham],would you accept

Alec Home? 15

The wording of the questionsdoes not appear to have taken a consistent pattern, but the nature and purposeof the questionsasked is clear. The secondand fourth questionswere specificallydesigned to emphasiseHome's candidacy,as the party hierarchyknew he was generallyacceptable to most NVs, even if he was not their first choice. The third questionwas designedto emphasisethe opposition to

Butler that existedin the Parliamentaryparty, and thus enhanceHome's prospectsin the process.As Home was the only candidatewho could unite the party, the party

hierarchyemphasised his namein the questioningof NTs. Bogdanorhas describedthis

procedure of leading questioning as 'guided democracy', or a reliance on the opinions

of certain senior and influential figures, over more junior members of the 16 parliamentary party.

Redmaynecalculated the first, secondand third choicesof NVs, and also the

definite aversionsto candidates.By using this method,Redmayne reduced the field of

feasible candidatesin this canvassto Home, Butler and Maudling, and eliminated

Hailsham, Macleod and Heath. The purpose of this method was to find the

compromisecandidate who was generallyacceptable to the party, and to illustrate the

depth of the opposition to candidates.This servedto promote Home as the most

generallyacceptable candidate, and the candidatewho arousedthe least opposition,

15The Times, 16 January1987 in Bogdanor,'The Selectionof the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball, ConservativeCentury p.75 " Bogdanor,'The Selectionof the PartyLeader' in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentuly p.75 227 while emphasising the opposition to Butler and Hailsham that existed among

ConservativeNVs.

ii) Results

The evidencesuggests that ConservativeNUs preferred Home to Butler to succeed Macmillan, despite the controversy surrounding the uniformity and impartiality of the canvass.What becomesclear is not a widespreadendorsement of

Home's candidacy,but a generalacceptance of it. Redmayneassessed the opinionsof

300 ConservativeNVs, andtold Macn-dllanthat their views were "freelygiven. 11islist of the original candidates- Heath, Macleod, Maudling, Hailsham,Butler and Home - was reduced to Butler, Maudling and Home, becausethe support for Heath and

Macleod was negligible, and Hailsham had the largest number of opponents.

Redmaynethus re-allocatedthe first choicesfor Hailsham,Heath and Macleod by the second choices of those NTs who had put these as their first choice. The votes were re-allocated as follows - Home: 26; Butler: 18; Maudling: 18.17 Home led on first preferences,but had the clearestlead on the secondand third preferences.The first preferenceswere:

Home: 87; Butler: 86; Hailsham: 65; Maudling: 48; Macleod: 12; and Heath: 10.

The secondand third preferenceswere:

Home: 89; Butler: 69; Maudling: 66; Hailsham: 39; Macleod: 18; and Heath: 17.

" 'Prime Nfinister'. SignedM. R. (Redmayne).16 October1963 PRO PREM 1115008(12) 228

The recordeddefinite aversionsto the three men were also significant.The results for these were

Home: 30; Butler: 48; Hailsham: 78; Maudling: 6; Macleod: 1; and Heath: 1.18

Home gained support ftom a wider and more general section of the party, accordingto Redmayne.He noted of the results

On every count Lord Home has the advantageeven if it is

Apart from Home's lead I sometimesvery narrow... actual am

impressedby the generalgoodwill shown towards him even by

those who give reasonsin favour of other candidates,and I

cannotfail to cometo the conclusionthat he would be best able

to secure urýted support'9

The resultsillustrated that Butler and Hailshamwere opposedby a number of

ConservativeNTs, as was Home but not to the sameextent. Home had a clearerlead on secondand third preferences,which Redmaynefelt indicateda generalacceptance of his candidacy.It is fully apparentfrom the canvassthat Home was not a clear winner, but did arousethe least oppositionof the candidates.It is perhapssignificant that Redmaynedid not differentiatebetween second and third preferences,as if he did make it clear who emergedas the clear winner on second over third preferences,

18'Secret. Mr. T. J. Bligh'. SignedM. R- (Redmayne).18 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(5) ""Secret. Mr. T. I Bligh'. SignedM. R- (Redmayne).18 October 1963PRO PREM 11/5008(5-6) 229

Home's lead may not havebeen as clear as it was. This suggeststhat Home may only havebeen the third choice of a number of ConservativeNTs, and this may not have

promoted his candidacy as strongly.

iii) Influence on the Outcome

The canvassesdid not reflect the feelings of the whole party, but were

weighted in favour of the party's most senior figures, which kept the selectionof

Home in the tradition of the party's previous selectionsof its leaders.The use of

multiple questionsin a canvasssuch as this, can be manipulatedin favour of a

compromisecandidate, and this was the outcome of these canvasses.It was also a

definiteintention in the use of the questions. Ramsdenhas noted that 'since the whips

were countingvotes againstas well as for eachcandidate, it is not difficult to seehow

such discussions appeared to be the 'making' of a majority for Home as the least

2' Butler the ConservativeNVs, unpopular candidate'. never saw canvassof which 21 suggestsan elementof conspiracyby the party hierarchy.

Shepherd believed Redmayne's leading questioning of NTs in Home's favour

resulted in an inflation of his support. Fisher has argued that Lord St. Aldwyn

suggestedto Redmaynethat he should stressHome's nameto Ws, as the candidate 22 most likely to unite the party. Ngs who had supportedHome, but not as their first

choice,were askedby Redmayneif their preferencewould be different, if they knew

that he was definitely a candidate.This prompted many NTs to review their choice.

Redmaynelater admittedthat NTs opinionswere not given equalweight, and that his

11Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 205 21Butler, Art of the Possible p. 247 22Shepherd, The Power Brokers p. 156; and Fisher, The Toly Leaders, p. 106 230 conclusionwas biasedtowards 'people on whose opinion one would more strongly 23 rely than on others'. As Ramsdenhas noted, 'tl-ýs would mean that the senior backbenchersnow backing Home would have a disproportionate effect on the outcome'.24 Butler was told by NTs that they were contactedby junior whips who stressedthat Home was standing,and that eachof the interviewersadopted a different approach,so questioningthe uniformity andimpartiality of the canvassof Conservative

NTs. Traditionally,this methodwas adoptedin more informal soundingsthan this in the party's history, and as such was therefore not unprecedented,but reflected the hierarchy'sdesire for Home to becomeleader. This canvasshad a major effect on the outcome,as it showedHome was the most acceptablecandidate to ConservativeNTs.

Dilhorne's Canvassof the Cabinet:Method, Results,In fluenceon the Outcome . i) Method

Dilhorne's canvassof the Cabinet has provoked even more controversythan

Redmayne'scanvass of ConservativeNVs. This is becauseof the method used by

Dilhome, and the interpretation he offered of the results. In his record of the canvass that was deliveredto Macmillanon 15 October,Dilhorne illustratedthat he calculated the first choicesof each memberof the Cabinet, and treated Butler, Maudling and

Hailsham as voting for themselves,but did not include Home's vote for himself

Dilhorne,also calculatedthe number of supportersfor each candidateif Home was eliminated from the selection, and then made the same calculation if Home and

Maudling were eliminated,and if Home and Hailshamwere eliminated.A significant

23Shepherd, The Power Brokers 156; Fisher, The Tory Leaders, 107 ' p. and lp. 24Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 205 231 aspect of Dilhorne's canvassis that he does not offer an assessmentof what the

25 Cabinet'sviews were if Butler was not a candidate.

ii) Results

The results were interpreted by Dilhome as showing the extent to which opinion was split, if Home was not a candidate.The first choicesof NEnisterswere as follows

Home: 10; Butler: 3; Maudling: 5; Hailsham: 2.

Home was not countedas voting for himself, so his total was 11. If Home was eliminated,the resultswere:

Butler: 8; Hailsham: 5; Maudling: 7.

If Home andMaudling were eliminated,the resultswere:

Butler: 12; Hailsham: 7.

If Home andHailsham were eliminated,the resultswere:

Butler: 14; Maudling: S.

" Dilhome to Macmillan, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(18-19) 232

Dilhome also attacheda break-downof the results,to illustratewhich Nfinisters had for 2" This list has voted eachcandidate . of candidates raised controversy,as the ten Ministers who voted for Home as their first choice includedMacleod and Boyle, who were definite opponentsof Home. A variety of argumentshave been advanced to explainMacleod's inclusion in the 'Home Ten'. Dilhome told Home that 'it is not a thing about wl-&h I would makea mistake', and Home commentedthat Dilhome was a lawyer, and trained not to get things wrong. Butler's reaction showed a lack of surprise:'Macleod was very shifty, much more than you think'. Powell declaredthat it

forgery. Macmillan 'well, know Macleod Highlander V." was a stated you ... was a

Home's argumentthat Macleod was being too clever for his own good and playing a deviousgame is, accordingto Ramsden,'hardly convincing, but must neverthelessnot 28 be discounted as a possibility. Macleod may have been trying to buttress his own position by voting for Home, as once the opposition to Butler became clear, he would possiblyhave come into the runningas an outsidecandidate.

As Fisherhas noted, 'it is not easyto understandhow so large a majority could have been composed'.At least nine of the twenty membersof the Cabinetwere for

Butler - Boyd-Carpenter;Edward Boyle; Henry Brooke, Home Secretary;Butler;

FrederickErroll, Presidentof the Board of Trade; Hailsham,Macleod; Maudling; and

Powell. The Cabinetwas thus split at the time of the canvassdirectly betweenButler andHome. This explainsthe useof the canvasses,in showingwhat the situationwas if certain candidates(except Butler) were eliminated. This served to emphasisethe oppositionto Butler in the Cabinet,that may or may not have really existed,and it in

26Dilhome to Macmillan, 15 October1693 PRO PREM 11/5008(17-19) 27Home, Macmillan 1957-1986pp. 562-563; and Shepherd, Macleod,p. 326 -Iain 11Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 206 233

inflated for Home 29 The 'Midnight Meeting' turn the support . oppositionsuggests that the impressionof a Cabinetfully behind Home, to the extent portrayedby Dilhome, was false.

Macleod claimed that Dilhorne's figures were 'simply impossible', and that expressionsof genuineregard for Home were translated into second or even first 30 preferences. Only two Ministers were for Home, and Macleod used as evidence his meetingwith five NEnistersfor lunch on 18 October, where none of those presentfelt

Home was the first choice. Hailsharn,Butler and Boyle were also not presentat the meeting, which illustrated to Macleod that Dilhorne's results were incorrect.31

Ramsdenhas explainedDilhorne's misleadinghssessment of the Cabinet,as he 'failed to understandthe depth of the actual oppositionto Home as Prime Nfinister because there was so little hostility to Home the man, and he too may have misreportedsome who had acquiescedwhen his namewas mentionedas first preferencesfor Home'.32

This genuine regard, rather than an enthusiastic endorsement of Home, resulted in the inflation of supportfor him in the Cabinet,and the falseimpression of support that was conveyedby tWs canvass.

iii) Influence on the Outcome

The mistakesmade in both the Ws and the Cabinetcanvasses can be put down to misunderstandingsdue to the use of complex and multiple questioning and conversations,that inflatedthe support for Home. Alternatively,it could havebeen the case that the party managersand senior figures had decided Home was the right

29Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 107 30Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator, 17 January 1964, p.65 31Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in SRectator, 17 January 1964, p. 65 " Ramsden, Winds of Change, p.205 234 candidateand manipulatedthe canvassesto make sure they got the majority for the leaderthey wanted.They felt it was their duty to do this for the good of the party. This was a view Macleodconcurred with in his article in The Spectatorof 17 January1964.

He took the view that they had acted 'in accordancewith their idea of duty [and] had 33 simply produced the wrong result by asking questions in a particular way'.

Dilhorne's canvasswas the most significant,as 'no one unacceptableto his colleagues could havebecome their leaderand when Dilhome reportedan overwhelmingCabinet

34 consensusfor Home, it was decisive'. This assessmentis correct. Dilhorne's canvass was critical to Home's emergence,as it gave the impressionthat he was generally acceptableto the Cabinetas Macmillan'ssuccessor.

777eCanvasses of the Lords and the Constituencies

The constituency canvassillustrated that opinion was split between Butler and

Hailsharn,but most soundingshad been taken at Blackpool, before Home was a 35 candidate. On 16 October, Redmayne reported that it was 'clear that the constituencies support Home with Butler a fairly close second; Hailsham is third, and 3' the othersnowhere. Lord St. Aldwyn's canvassof the active ConservativePeers in the Lords reportedthat the first choiceswere

Home: 28; Butler: 14; Hailsham: 10; Maudling: 2.

The secondchoices were:

33Ramsden, Winds of Change p.206 34Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 107 35Ramsden, Winds of Change p.203 36Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(11) 235

37 Home: 12; Butler: 13; Hailsham: 12; Maudling: 8.

However, thesecanvasses were not as influential as the canvassesof NPs and the Cabinet,but did confirm the impressionthat Home was the generallyacceptable candidate.

Informal Networks

Thesenetworks had a major role in the selectionof Home. They disseminated and filtered information from the party hierarchy to the candidates,and potential candidates,prior to and during the selectionto either buttress a candidate'sposition, or to dissuadethem from being a candidate. They also served as a means of communicationbetween the party and the party managers,and as links to the press.

Theseexisted in two forms: thosebetween the party managersand the pressto prepare for the emergenceof Home, and thosebetween the pressand the opponentsof Home to buttresstheir candidacies.

YheParty Hierarchy to CandidatesNetworks: July - October 1963

Theseplayed a major role in buttressingcandidates, or dissuadingthem of their prospectsfor succession.Butler was made aware of his poor chancesof succeeding

Macmillan by informal discussionswith senior figures on the executive of the 1922

Committee. On 18 June 1963, John Morrison advised Butler to take part in the goverment fonned by the next leader,but declaredthat he would understandif Butler

" St. Aldwyn to Macmillan, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(15-16) 236 did not wish to serve after having alreadylost out on the leadershiponce in 1957.38

This illustratestwo points: that Morrison was convincedthat Macmillanwas finished, and that Butler was not the man to succeedhim. At the end of June 1963,Morrison declaredto Butler that 'the chaps won't have you', just prior to him leaving for

Rhodesia,to preside over the conferencethat was to ratify the dissolution of the

Affican Federation39 The this Central . cumulativeeffect of and earlier conversations with 1922 Committee officials, causedButler to inquire about his reputation in the party. Later that week, he was visited by Redmayneand Poole, who wondered whetherhe would be willing to servein any new administrationthat might be formed.

They told Butler they wantedto keep the disruptionthat Macmillan'sretirement would

4' They implying that his causeto a minimum. were own chancesof succeeding

Macmillan were not good, and confirmedMorrison"s own assessment.Butler asked two friends on the Executive of the 1922 Committee if Morrison's assessmentwas

fim-dy that it 41 A in Butler's correct, and they replied was. confidential note papers confirmsthat the party had a strong desireto skip a generation,and did not want him to succeedMacmillan

I was visited by John Morrison and Alex Spearman.The burden

of their song was that in view of the strong inclination of the

younger backbenchersto get somebodyof the new age group it

was likely that opinion would crystalliselike this as representing

" Butler, Art of the Possiblel p. 236 39Goodhart, The 1922, 191 . " Confidential Note'. 21 June 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (68-69) 4' Goodhart, The 1922, p. 191 237

the greatestcommon factor. They were both extremelyfriendly

but seemedquite sureof their diagnoSiS42

Informal networks also served to put pressure on Home at the party conference,to throw his hat into the ring. These networks came from the 1922

Committeeand also back-benchers,instigated by SelwynLloyd, the most seniorback- bencher. Following his sacking as Chancellor in July 1962, Lloyd had acquired prominenceas a disseminatorof information from the back-benchersto the party managers.The figureswho, alongsideLloyd, put pressureon Home, were Sir William

Anstruther-Gray,John Morrison, Sir CharlesMott-Radclyffe and ColonelLancaster of the 1922Conunittee, and Duncan Sandys,John Hare, Edward Heath and Nigel Birch, who were ministersand back-bencherswho f elt Home should succeedMacmillan. 43

Redmayne,and senior backbencherswere 'working for severaldays to influencethe votes in favour of Home', but 'they were perfectly entitledto ensure,if they could, the election of the man whom they thought best able to unite the party and best fitted to 44 lead the country'. Fisher supports Bogdanor's view that 'guided democracy' was taking placevia theseinformal networks.Hailsham noted that Home was pressuredto becomea candidateat Blackpool by senior party figures. On 10 October Home told him that he [Home] 'was under strong pressureto disclaimand throw his hat into the ring'. 45 Thesenetworks had a major influenceon Home's decisionto stand,as he saw that he was the most acceptablecandidate to the party through the genuineregard for him.

42'Confidential Note'. 31 July 1963Butler MSS RAB G40 (83-84) 43Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 105;Home, Macmillan 1957-1986 p. 183; and Shepherd,lain Macleod 318 , p. 44 The Tory Leaders 106 Fisher, , p. 45Hailsharn, A Sparr w's Flight, p.351 238

7he Party Hierarchy - Candidates- Palace Circle of Networksduring the Selection and Home's emergence

Thesenetworks were of major significanceduring the selection,and servedto convey information to buttress support for Home, and expressthe discontentof the opponents.The Palace was kept in touch with developmentsduring the selection through Sir NEchaelAdeane, The Queen'sPrincipal Secretary,and Sir Alan Lascelles, the Queen'sPrivate Secretary,by the party managers.Bligh notedto Sir EdwardFord, the Queen'sAssistant Private Secretary,on 9 October,that the Queengave permission for Home to give Macmillan's statementof his intention to resign to the party conference.The Palacewas also informedby the opponents'camps of their discontent at Home's succession.Dennis Walters of the Hailshamcamp contacted the Palace,and stated that Nfirusters were unhappy at the consultations, after information of the results

46 had filtered OUt.

Butler was excludedfrom the networks during the contest,probably because he was perceived as a threat to Home, and the party hierarchy did not want to keep him up to date with developments.Macmillan did deliberatelykeep Butler in the dark over critical developmentsabout the procedureto be adoptedto install his successor.

He failed to inform him of the time the canvasseswould take to be completed,while keepingthe Queenfully informed, telling her it would only take a couple of days to

47 complete,after the Cabinethad agreedon the procedureMacmillan had determined.

Butler was under the impressionthat the canvasseswould take sometime to complete, and felt this would work in his favour, as support for him could be consolidated.This

Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 204 Macmillan, At The End Of The D, p. 511 239 was obviously not Macmillan's intention. He also refused to talk to Butler while he was recoveringfrom his operationin the nursinghome, and Lady Butler felt this to be typical of the deviousnessof Macmillan. 48 Macmillan did act in a secretive and devious mannertowards Butler, but this cannotjust be attributed to any personalspite. He believed that Butler was not the right man to succeed him, becauseof Butler's personalfailings which meanthe was unableto unite the party.

ThePress to Home's opponentsduring the Selection and Home's Emergence

Theseplayed a crucial role in the developmentof the opposition to Home's emergence.They existed as a two-way movementof communication,and Macleod used the press to galvaniseopposition to Home during the Party Conference,and

William Rees-Mogg, an opponent of the succession, promoted and galvanised the oppositionto Home following his emergence.On the eveningof 11 October,Macleod, following rumoursof Home's growing prominenceas a candidate,gave two respected lobby journalists, David Wood of The Times, and Harry Boyne of The Daily

Telegrap briefing in his the Imperial Hotel in , an off-the-record room at the early hours of the morning. He confirmed to them that Home had now emergedas a 49 candidatefor the leadership.

On the afternoonof 17 October,Butler, Macleod and Maudling were told by

Rees-Mogg,that Macmillanwould advisethe Queento sendfor Home and ask him to discoverif he could form a government.This servedto further galvanisethe opposition to Home, and led to a seriesof meetingsand telephoneconversations to organisethe

48Interview with Lady Butler in 'Alan Clark's Historv of The Tory Party'. Episodethree: From Estate Ownersto EstateAgents. An Oxford TelevisionCompany Production for BBC TV. First shown28 September1997 49Shepherd, The PowerBrokers p. 154 240 opposition. Rees-Mogg continued to play a crucial role in the opposition, and

Butler he having lunch in Carlton Club, him approached while was 0 the and urged not 50 to serve.

TheParty Hierarchy to the Pressafter Home's Emergence

Thesewere deemedof particular importancein preparingthe country for the emergenceof Home. A memorandumfrom Redmayne to Bligh of 17 October illustratesthat great emphasis(with Macmillan's approval)was placedon keepingthe field open, and stopping rumours of candidatesdropping out, or no longer being considered.This was to be done by Harold Evans, Macn-dllan'sPress Officer, who would prompt the presswhen the situationwas felt to be readyfor Home's emergence, and weight could be put behind 'the probablesuccessor'. The documentplaces great emphasison the needto be certain on how the pressare to be 'handled, and Evans, 51 Bligh and Deedes would play the crucial roles on this. These were significant as they easedHome into the public arena as Macmillan's successorand seemed,to some extent,to control oppositionto his succession.

The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and Governability

Butler i) Acceptahility

Butler was deemedto be unacceptableby many sectionsof the Conservative

Party for a variety of reasons. Firstly, his level of acceptability as MacnUan's

50Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership'in Spectator.17 January1964, p. 66; Shepherd,Iain Macleod, p.328. Macleoddid not revealit was Rees-Moggin The Spectato; and Butler, Art of the Possible pp.248-249 11Redmayne to Bligh, 17 October 1963PRO PREM 11/5008(7) 241 successor,was tarnishedby the 'guilt by association'that he had with the discredited

Macmillanregime. This meantthat, as the party wanted to move to a leaderfrom the next generationof leading Conservatives,Butler was not acceptableto the party. In

March 1963, Macmillan warned Butler that criticism of him was also criticism of

Butler, as they were seenas inseparable,and 'the combinationof the Kennedyimage 52 plus Harold Wilson at 46 was a potent force in favour of a younger man'.

Butler's careerwas now moving away from the 'great offices of state', and he was also more closelytied to Macmillanafter he becameDeputy Prime Minister. This severelyaffected his leadershipprospects, as Macmillan's reputation was in serious decline,and the party wanted to move to the next generation:'He [Butler] had the 53 samedisadvantage as Macmillanhimself - age and length of service'. The declineof the Macmillan governmentfrom 1962, and the allegationsof sleazeand corruption arousedby the Profurno crisis, was central to Butler's unacceptability,as he was directly associatedwith that decline as Macmillan's deputy.

Secondly, Butler was not seen as a 'leader'. 'Macmillan's overriding motivationwas undoubtedlyhis determinationto block Butler from the successionand his consequentwish was to do all he could to securethe leadershipfor Hailsham".

Similarly,Fisher believes 'the courseof the leadershipcrisis can only be explainedby

Macmillan's determinationthat Butler should not succeedhim as Prime Nfinister'.54

This determinationwas based on Macmillan's belief that Butler did not have the necessary'steel' to be leader. The definition of 'leadershipsteel' can be taken to mean

Butler's indecisiveness,and his perceivedinability to lead from the front and direct the

Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 194 Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 194 Shepherd,Iain Macleo 307; Fisher,The ToKyLeaders, 102 ,, p. and p. 242 courseof the government.Macmillan felt Butler had certainpersonality characteristics that meanthe should not becomeleader, much as Churchill had doubts about Eden's temperamentalsuitability for the Premiership. What Macmillan called Butler's

4vacillations'were significant.Butler could not provide the definite line neededto keep the party together, and both of these are legitimatereasons for Macmillan to oppose

Iýs succession.Julian Amery, Macmillan's son-in-law and Minister of Aviation, felt that Butler was not madeof 'officer material.5' Many in the party, and significantly the party hierarchy,agreed with Macmillan.

Thirdly, Butler was clearly unacceptableto certain influential sectionsof the

ConservativeParty, and in particular the right-wing. Butler appearedto be a divisive candidate,and for this reason,the party hierarchy deemedhim unable to unite the party. Redmayne informed Macmillan that the opposition to Butler, as expressedin the 56 NVs canvass, was 'personal'. This meant that the opposition to him was for both personaland political reasons,and Redmaynebelieved this significantly affected his acceptability to the party. Butler traditionally had a capacity for arousing great opposition in the party, as he had done in 1957.

It was already apparentthen [June 1963] that Butler suffered

from the samedouble handicap in 1963 as he had done in 1957:

not only were the right implacablyopposed to his views, but also

there was little enthusiasmfor him as a potential leader among

centre and left NTs who agreed with his policy views - in

55The Makers of Modem Politics, 3: RabButler: Allist of the Possible,BBC Radio Four, 1995 5'Redmayneto Macmillan, 16 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(12) 243

October the One Nation Group was to decide not to support

hiM. 57

This is significant as it meant the opposition was not just confined to the right, but a wide feelingacross the party was that the new leadershould comefrom the next generationof leadingConservatives, like Maudling and Heath. Macmillan was fearful of the split that might appearin the party, if Butler succeededhim becauseof this oppositionto him. Butler was still tarriishedby his imageas an appeaser,and this was exacerbatedby the memoriesof the Suez Crisis. The party's right wing would not accepthim as they sawhim as weak and ditheringbecause of his conciliatorystances in both instances. Furthermore,he was seenby many (not just on the right) as a 'milk and water socialist' after his work on the 'New Conservatism'after the 1945 election defeat. 58

The opposition from the party's 'die hard' Imperialist wing was further increasedby his work in Macmillan's governments.11is pivotal role in the break-up of the Central African Federation (CAF) severely affected his reputation in this influential section of the party. When Butler addressedthe House of Commonson informing them of the agreementfor the dissolution of the Federation in July 1963, the oppositionbenches cheered Butler loudly, and he was congratulatedon his successby the Labour spokesmanon CommonwealthAffairs. 'It was all, no doubt, good, clean

parliamentaryfun - but even the amusedsupport of his opponentswas a dubious

blessingfor Rab [Butler], given the reputation he had borne for 'milk and water

5' Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 194 58'Private and Confidential. (not for publication) "Industrial Charter or Magna Charter?". The Conservative Industrial Charter attacked by Sir Waldron Smithers, JP, MP, to the authors of the Charter. London, July 1947'. Butler MSS RAB H92 (112-145) 244

59 socialism' ever since the days of The Industrial Charter'. Howard is correct as the dissolutionof the Central Mrican Federationoffended the traditionalist right wing of the party, who were opposedto the dissolution of the empire. It exacerbatedthe doubts about Butler by re-stirring memories of accusations levelled at him during the appeasementera and the Suez Crisis. These accusationsof 'wetness' served as a cumulativeeffect ftom the three episodes,that severelyaffected Butler's acceptability in 1963.

The level of Butler's unacceptabilitywas apparentto a large extent amongthe

Cabinetand the party hierarchy,as well as the party's NVs. The oppositionto Butler makingthe Leader's Speechin placeof Macmillanis evidenceof his unacceptabilityto somemembers of the Cabinet,and the party's desirenot to promote his candidacyto succeedMacmillan. Butler had to persuadetwelve membersof the Cabinetto accept his right to makethe speech,after he hadbeen warned of the oppositionto him making the speechby Lord Aldington and Peter Goldmanon his arrival in Blackpool on the

9 October60 This Butler eveningof . was significant,as was the obvious choice to make the speechas acting Prime Minister in Macmillan's absence,and he was also

Deputy Prime NEnister.Following the warning from Aldington and Goldman, he immediatelysought a formal invitation to makethe speechfrom the National Union to buttresshis claimsto doing so. Butler showeda ruthlessnessin persuadingthe Cabinet to allow him to acceptthe invitation, which the Cabinet did eventuallygrant on the " eveningof 9 October. This oppositionillustrates the doubtsabout certainministers'

"' Howard,RAB, p.301 60Butler, Art Of The Possible.p. 241 61Howard, RAB, p.3 11; and Butler, Art Of The Possible,p. 241 245 support for Butler's candidacy,and questionsthe level of his acceptabilityto the

Cabinet.

The party hierarchywere also opposedto Butler's succession,and this is clear from Macn-dllan's diary notes made during the leadership controversy. The party

hierarchy were also influenced by Macmillan's implacable opposition to Butler

succeedinghim, and most significantlyby the fact that their assessmentof the growing

Home support after Blackpool appeared to be a 'keep out Butler' movement.

Macmillan also recorded Butler 'was much disliked by the Party Organisation, 62 especiallythe women.Why this is so, no one seemsto know'.

ii) Electability

There were many reasons, linked to his level of acceptability, why Butler was

deemed to have a poor electability rating. Firstly, his image was too close to

Macinillan's, and this would affect the party's position at the next general election as

the Macmillan regime was now widely discredited.This was a factor in his lack of

electoral appeal, as Macmillan's image had been severely tarnished by the events of

recent months, including the government'spoor handling of the Profumo crisis. If

Butler succeededMacmillan, the new goverment would be perceivedby the public in

the sameway, and Macmillan had talked of the needfor the 'younger men' to emerge

in the monthspreceding.

Macmillanhad noted on 15 Octoberthat MPs who showeda desirefor a move

to the next generationover the previous summer'to help with the election', would

support Maudling or Hailsham, 'since Mr. Butler is not so much of a changeas all

62Diary entry for 16 October 1963,Ms. Macmillan del).d. 51*, (19) 246 that'.63 This confinns the poor position that Butler was in becauseof his close associationwith Macmillan. The practical need for a complete change was duly apparentin Macmillan's thinking, and he persuadedButler that 'they sank or swam

64 This both the Macmillan Butler, the together' . confirms closeness of and and also desperationthat the Macmillan regime was in during its final months in office.

Macmillan's imagewas one of the reasonsfor selectinga new leader,and this counted strongly against Butler. Secondly, Butler was an uninspiring performer on a public platform, and did not appearto be able to lift the party for the next election.A new, vigorous imagewas seenas essentialby manyNTs if the Conservativeswere to win a fourth successiveelection victory. Fisher has argued that Macn-Oan's opposition to

Butler was

No doubt based on the view that Butler lacked the steel

necessaryfor strong leadership and the inspiration needed to pull

the Party through a toughly fought election. Many membersof

the Parliamentary Party shared this opinion. Others took the

oppositeview. They believed,in the words of Iain Macleod, that

Butler had one important asset,apart from his great experience

of goverment - that he could attract 'wide, understanding

support from many people outsidethe Tory Party. And without

suchan appeal,no generalelection can be won'. 65

63Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(26) 64Howard, EM, p.298 61Fisher, The Tory Leaders.p. 102 247

Evidence suggeststhat Macleod was wrong, and Macmillan was right, and many Conservativevoters did not believe Butler would appeal to the electorate.

Macmillan's convictionwas that he did not havewhat it would take to lift the party for the forthcomingelection. Macmillan made this point to Lord Swinton, an old friend of

Butler's, who neverthelessfelt he 'would lose the election disastrously'.66 Dilhome and Redmaynewere againstButler succeedingMacmillan as they felt 'the Party in the 67 country will find it depressing'. Public correspondence received on the party leadership prior to Macmillan's resignation shows some opposition to Butler for electoral reasons,and little support for him, as he does not appearto have inspired

Conservativevoters. One concerned Conservative activist wrote

What strangedeath wish has seizedso many Conservativesthat

they should contemplate,even for a moment, choosing Rab

Butler to lead them into an election?With all the qualities of

integrity and ability that would make a good Prime Minister, he

is electoralpoison! Every time he speakson the radio he losesus

thousandsof votes, and when he appearson television,tens of

thousands.I-Iis voice, mannerand looks are againsthim. "

Butler was not a good public performer; he never seemedto rise to the occasionin the sameway as Macmillan, so could not rally the party so close to the

66Diary entry for 30 September1963, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d.50*, (112) 67Diary entry for 14 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep.d. 5 I *. (14) 68Leach to Macleod, 10 October1963 CPA CCO 20/39/1 248 election, and for this reasonwas not seento be a viable candidateon his electability rating.

iii) Governability

Butler was clearlythe most successfulcandidate in terms of governability,and there was a great deal basedon this criterion to suggestthat Dutler was the most feasible candidate. However, there were also some significant reasons against, alongsidethe defects in his candidacyfor reasonsof acceptabilityand electability.

Firstly, in supportof his candidacywas his wide governmentalexperience. Fisher noted

'there is no doubt that Butler was the best qualifiedof the contendersand none of the younger membersof the Cabinetin the House of Commonscommanded sufficient

69 support to defeat him'. Macmillan noted on 15 October that those Ministers and

NTs who place most emphasison 'the orderly conduct of governmentwould go for

Butler' 70 Butler had been Minister Macmillan became Prime . an effective since

NEnisterin 1957,and his relianceon Butler in times of strain for his governmenthas been well documented.Butler often stood in for the leader when he acted as the internationalstatesman on tours of the Commonwealthand the United States.He was the fixer in Macmillan'sgovernments, and becamea sourceof great strengthto him. A secret and personal minute from Macmillan to Butler on 7 May 1963 illustrates this.

It would be a great help to me if you would be preparedto take

on some of my duties, both on the backroom work of running

someof the Committeeswhich I havebeen doing and also on the

69Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 102 70Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 1115008(26) 249

formal Anything do or representationalside ... that you can to

relieve me of some of this necessaryand important but time-

consumingwork will be a great blessingto me"

Macrnillan's reliance on Butler can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, he genuinelyneeded the supportof Butler, and it was an essentialaspect of the successful operation of his government. Secondly, he was using Butler's dependabilityto discredit him in the eyesof somesections of the party, for reasonsof personalspite.

Macmillan's choice of Butler to take on the responsibilityfor the dissolution of the

CentralAffican Federationin March 1962has been interpreted in this way by Butler's former colleaguesand analystsof this period. Turner has describedthe post as a

72 Roy Welensky, then Prime Minister Federation, epoisonedchalice' . the of the believedthat Macmillan's intention in giving Butler the responsibilityfor the break-up of CAF, was to discredithim in the eyesof the right-wing of the ConservativeParty.

Now that I am no longer in office I think I can say to you that I,

of course,fully realisedhow difficult was the task that Macmillan

gaveyou and as I said to you in your office I was convincedthat

he did it in the hopethat it would breakyou73

Macmillan recognisedfiill well that the responsibilityfor the break-up of CAF would discredit Butler in the eyes of the party's imperialistwing, who were already

" 'Secretand Personal.My Dear Rab'. SignedH. M. (Macmillan). 7 May 1963CPA CCO 20/8/6* and _CCO20/8/7 71Turner, Macmillan, p. 186 73Welensky to Butler, 3 January1964 Butler MSS RAB G41(36) 250 hostile becauseof his behaviourduring the Suez Crisis, and for his reputation as a

Munichite. However, Macmillan's appointmentcan be viewed in a more charitable perspective,as his governmenthad been beset by problems with CAR Butler was viewed by Macmillan as the only Minister capable of solving the problem. The evidencesuggests this to havebeen the case,and the allegationsof personalspite can be dismissed.

Butler had illustrated his ability to be a competent minister throughout his career, as Presidentof the Board of Education from 1941-44, as Chancellorof the

Exchequer from 1951-1955, and as Home Secretary from 1957-1962. However, in

1963,Butler, in the sameway as in 1957,did not occupy a 'great office of state'. He was First Secretaryof State and Nfinister for Central Affica, and tlýs affected his governability rating. Butler, despite being Macmillan's most senior minister, gave the impressionof a careerin decline,away from and not towards the summit of political

office. Alongsidea wish widely held in the party for a leaderof the next generationof leadingConservatives, this countedstrongly against Butler.

Home i) Acceptability

Home was deemedby the party hierarchyas the candidatemost acceptableto the party for a variety of reasons.Firstly, he was acceptableto those sectionsof the

party who were strongly opposed to other candidates.Following his canvassof

ConservativeNVs, Redmayneinformed Macmillan that the opposition to Home

expressedin the canvassonly arosefrom his position as a Lord, and was not personal, 251 as it was for Butler and Hailsham.74 This was significant,as it illustratedto Redmayne that Home was held in high regard in the party, and was generally acceptableas

Macmillan's successor.Macmillan's diary entriesduring the leadershipcrisis show that the party hierarchy felt this general acceptability was the most significant feature of support for Home. On 14 October,Macmillan recordedthat Dilhorne and Redmayne told him that they supportedHome's successionas support for Hailsham,which had evaporatedafter his flamboyantdisplays of showmanshipat Blackpool, was moving towardsHome. Macmillannoted

The movementagainst Hogg (on this account) had not gone to

Butler or Maudling, but to Home. The "draft" Home movement

was in reality a "keep out" Butler movement.I was struck by the

fact that both Lord Chancellorand Chief Wýhipagreed on this

analysisand both are, or were supporters of the Hogg succession.

Both are againstthe Butler successionon the grounds that the

Party in the country will find it depressing75

In other words, Home appearedto unite all sectionsof party opinion that were againstother candidates.This level of generalacceptability comes through prominently in the canvasses,and justified the party hierarchy's support for him. This led to the second reason for Home's acceptability.He was the compromise candidatewho appearedto unite all sections of party opinion. Even in the constituencieswhere awarenessof Home as a candidatefor the leadershipwas minimal, Lord Chelmerand

74Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(12) 75Diary note for 14 October 1963,Ms. Macmillan dep. d.51*, (14) 252

Mrs. Shepherdof the NUCUA 'were certain everyone would rally around Lord

Home'.76 This further galvanisedthe party hierarchy'scertainty that he was the most acceptablecandidate, as opinion in the constituencieswas split betweenButler and

Hailsham. Macmillan conveyed this growing certainty among the party hierarchy, and

'the truth is that with the three main "hats" in the ring (Butler, Maudling and

Hailsham)and the very strong feelingboth for and againsteach, were excited by their

candidature,the only way out was a "compromise' candidate.Lord Home was the 77 only compromisecandidate possible'.

Macmillan's diaries illustrate the extent of ConservativeMPs' support for

Home's successionas the compromisecandidate. On 16 October,Macmillan saw Peter

Thomeycroft,Minister of Defence;Boyle; Lloyd; Hare; Brooke; and Sir Keith Joseph,

NEnisterof Housing and Local Government.Only Lloyd declaredhis outright support

for Home. However, Macmillan noted, 'practically all of these Ministers, whether

Hoggitesor Butlerites or Maudlingites,agreed that if Lord Home would undertakethe

task of P.M. the whole Cabinetand the whole Party would cheerfiilly unite under him.

Sandys(Commonwealth Sec. ) feels this especiallystrongly'. " Once the new leader

was in place the party would unite around him, and as Home appearedthe most

acceptableto all sections of party opinion, he was deemed the most acceptable

candidate.However, did this generalacceptance constitute real supportfor Home as a

leader of the party? In Redmayne'scanvass, second and third preferencesshowed a

clear lead for Home over Butler, but a questionmust be asked:what if most of this

76Diary entry for 17 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dev. d.5 1*. (22) 77Diary entry for 20 October1963, Ms. Macmillan deR.d. 5 1*, (33). Emphasison original document. 78 for 16 October1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d.51 (20) Diary entry . 253 lead consistedof third preferences,and if this was the case,surely it questionsHome's level of acceptability.

The 'Midnight Meeting' opposition establishedthat at least eight membersof

Cabinet Home's 79 This Dilhorne's the strongly opposed appointment. questions assessmentof the extent of Cabinet support for him. It appearsto be the casethat

Macmillan and the party hierarchyfelt that the generalacceptance for Home was more significantthan Cabinetsupport for Butler, as the Cabinetwould unite around Home oncehe was in placeas leader.It is apparentthat the factors againstButler countedfor

Home's acceptability.On 15 October 1963,Macn-dllan noted that the Cabinetwould be universallybehind Home as he is popular, and would make 'an effective chief. "

Despite the questionsthat have beenasked of the canvasses,the party wanted Home more than Butler, and there was a lack of real opposition from the party as a whole to

Home's emergence,reflected in the broad crosssection of supportfor him. Home was also acceptableto the party as a stop-gapleader, as the older, domesticministers in the

Macmillan government, like Butler, were now discredited. The younger, new generation of leading Conservatives,like Maudling and Heath, were also not yet felt to be ready, and would be discreditedby leadingthe party into the next election,which the Conservativeswere widely expectedto lose. Thus, Home's position was as a stop- gap leader, acceptableas he was Foreign Secretaryin Macmillan's government,and not tarnishedto the sameextent with the domesticfailures. This was alignedwith his position as the compromisecandidate, and galvanisedhis level of acceptability.

Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 204 Memorandumby the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 1115008(29) 254 ii) Electability

Home was deemedby the party hierarchy as the candidatewith the highest level of electability.This was for two reasons.Firstly, he had a clean reputation,and was untarnishedby the scandalsthat had beset Macn-Oan's government in recent years. He was seen as enough of a change to mark a clear distinction between

Macmillan's government, and any future administration. This would be a clear

electoral advantage,as Home was the stop-gap between the discredited senior

domesticministers like Butler, and the next generationof Maudling and Heath, who were felt to be not yet readyfor the leadership.

Ramsdenhas noted that Home had 'few political enemiesand hardly anyone

suspectedhim of underhandmotives', and that 'after the recent claims againstpublic 81 life, this was Home's strongest suit'. This was true not only in terms of his

acceptability,but it also had positive electoral connotations.The party hierarchyfelt

Home could persuade floating Conservative voters, tempted to vote for Labour, to

vote Conservative,as he markeda clear distinction from Macmillan's regime,and did

not appear to give offence to any section of the population. However, Home's position

as a Lord did not give the Conservativesthe new imagethat the party had hoped for.

The party hierarchydo not appearto have been concernedby this, and felt he was a

good stop-gap leader, and was not likely to causegrave offence. The fact that the

Conservativeswere widely expectedto lose the electionmay also have led them not to

give too much concernto this matter. The secondreason was Home's high profile in

the goverrunentas Foreign Secretary.As he was not in charge of one of the key

domesticposts, Home was not as tarnishedwith the domesticfailures of 1962 and

81Ramsden, Winds of Change,p. 201 255

1963as Butler. Home was also widely known becauseof his role in the CubanNEssile

Crisis, and Ws growing prominenceas a internationalstatesman could be emphasised to the electorate.

iii) Governability

Home was not as pron-dnentas Butler in governability,but had more yearsof experiencethan Maudling.However, Home did currently hold one of the 'great offices of state', the Foreign Office. This meanthe, despitehis position as a Lord, was in one of the traditional avenuesto the leadershipof the party. I-Es lack of experiencein domesticposts obviouslycounted against his governability,but his position as Foreign

Secretarywas a positiveattribute that contributedto his candidacy.Another significant aspect of his governability was the reputation he gained as Foreign Secretary with leading world statesmen.On 15 October 1963, Macmillan noted that Home representedthe 'old governing class at its best', and that he was well liked by

President Kennedy, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, and President Gromyko. 82

This was felt by the party hierarchyto be a major attribute to Home's status in the selection,and meant that he could continue the emphasisplaced by the Macmillan governmenton the importanceof foreign affairs.

82Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(28) 256

Maudling i) Acceptability

Maudling was deemedto be unacceptableto the party for two main reasons.

The first was that he was not inspiring enoughto unite it, and lead it to victory in the generalelection. This was expressedin the canvassof ConservativeNTs. Redmayne informedMacmillan that there was little personalopposition to Maudling, but he failed to get 'official positive support'. There was a feeling expressedthat Maudling was not 93 readyto be leader,and not inspiringenough. This was confirmedto the party by his poor speechat the Party Conference.This lacklustre performanceconfirmed that

Maudling was not acceptableas an inspirationalleader that would be of value at the next election.The secondreason why Maudling was unacceptablewas that he was not yet felt to be ready for the leadership. This had been expressedin Redmayne's canvass of ConservativeNTs, and Maudling was seenas the 'leader-in-waiting',who required more experiencein governmentbefore becoming leader.

ii) Electability

Maudling was deemedto be unelectableby the party hierarchyfor the same reasonsthat he was unacceptable.These were firstly, that he was an uninspiring performeron a public platform. 'No one felt that he could convert the uncommittedor

84 faithful This hierarchy, inspirethe to an electoralvictory' . was the view of the party and they felt this most prominentlyafter Maudling's speechas Chancellorin the debate on economic policy at the Party Conference.Maudling's speech, as has been demonstrated,was poor in its delivery, and minimal in its impact on the conference

83Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (12) 94Fisher, The Toly Leaders p. 104 257 delegates.This was felt by the party hierarchyto give an indication of how Maudling would fail to inspirethe party andthe electorateat the imminentgeneral election.

He was also felt to be not yet ready for the leadership,and was the 'leader-in- waiting'. As noted, this was a view that was confirmed to the party hierarchyin the canvassof ConservativeNTs, and they felt this was also a view held among

Conservative voters. However, public correspondencereceived by Conservative

Central Office illustrated that Maudling was a popular choice with a number of

Conservativevoters, from the summerof 1963to the period of the selection.In July

1963, T. W. Warburton, the President of the Shipley Division Conservative

Association, informed Macleod that his executive believed that the Conservatives could still win the next election,but 'the essentialprerequisite is youthful, virile and competentleadership, which must not be long delayedand the one who can meet this requirement and restore the party's fortunes is the Rt. Hon. Reg Maudling'.

ConservativeMP Evelyn Emmet informed Macleod on 4 October that opinion in her constituencyfelt that Macmillan shouldretire, and there was ninety per cent support for Maudling to replace him, and this was most prominent amongst the younger

" voters. This last point is of major significance.The prominenceof Maudling's popularity among younger voters was a concern of the party hierarchy, and they believedthat older and traditional Conservativevoters felt that Home was a better

option than Maudling, as a stop-gapleader to get the party through the next election.

It was felt that a further period in opposition was neededfor Maudling or Heath to preparethem to take over the leadership.

85Ruskin to Poole,6 October1963; and Warburtonto Poole,31 July 1963CPA CCO 20/39/1 258 iii) Govemability

Maudling achieved the governability criterion to some extent, as he was I currently in a 'great office of state', as Chancellorof the Exchequer.This was also a traditional avenue to the leadership,and he had been perceived as a successas

Chancellor,especially following his 1963Budget which had coincidedwith an increase in support for Iým to succeedMacn-dllan among ConservativeWs. This suggests there was a clear link betweenthe two. Maudling had also beena successfulminister in

Macmillan's government,as Colonial Secretary,so had a considerableamount of ministerialexperience. However, as with Maudling's acceptabilityand electability,he was felt to be too inexperiencedfor the leadership,and neededa further period of consolidationin governmentor opposition, to prepare him for the leadership.The imminenceof the generalelection was also a factor in this feeling,because if Maudling becameleader and was defeatedat the election,this. would affect his standingand his govemabUity over a longer period past the general election.

Hailsham i) Acceptability

Hailshambecame an unacceptablecandidate after his conduct and actions at the Party Conference.Evidence suggests that he was felt to be unacceptablein many quarters of the party and the Conservativevoters before then, but his actions at

Blackpool confirmedand strengthenedthese doubts. Hailsham was most unacceptable to the party hierarchyand the more traditional Conservativevoters, while he appeared to be acceptableamong younger ConservativeNgs and voters becauseof his high profile, and his ability at electioneeringand publicity. 259

The doubts over Hailsham'stemperament and judgement were central to this unacceptability,which was impressedon the party after his conduct at the Party

Conference.His obvious desire and excitementat the prospect of becoming party leader led to an over-enthusiasticpromotion of his candidacy, epitomised by the conduct of his supporters,especially by Randolph Churchill's distribution of badges,and Hailsham'sparading of his baby daughterat the conference.This offended many of the party's seniorfigures, and raiseddoubts about his temperamentfor high office. On 15 October 1963, Macmillan noted that there were many pro-Hailsham

ConservativeNTs especiallyfrom northern and the most threatenedconstituencies.

They were from the constituenciesthat could only be won by non-political votes.

Macmillan,however, also noted that the seniorfigures in the constituencyassociations were alarmedby the 'demonstrationsof pro-Hailshamism',but that support for him fforn the constituencieswould still be great.86 This demonstratesthat Hailsharnwas acceptableto the younger sectionof the party, but most crucially he was not to the party's senior figures and the party hierarchy, and after the Party Conference, they turnedtheir attentionto Home.

ii) Electability

Hailshamwas initially seenas the most electablecandidate, but as with the declinein his acceptability,his electabilityfell drasticallyafter the Party Conference.In the summerof 1963,Macmillan believedHailsham to be the best availablesuccessor becauseof his electability. Hailsham had a high profile in the country, and had demonstratedhis electioneeringability in his role as Party Chairmanduring the 1959

" Memorandumby the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(30) 260 electioncampaign. 'In 1963,he [Macmillan] picked out Hailsham,seeing in him (as he wrote in October), 'what I was like in my strongerperiod, am to a greaterextent than people appreciatebehind the scenes,and would like my successorto be'. Macrnillan then tried to rise Hailsham's profile further, and all his roles from then on, especially the Test Ban Treaty negotiations,were to raise his profile and widen his Mnisterial

87 experience.

Macmillan noted on 15 October 1963,that Hailshamwould have a 'mass of feeling' in favour of him as a better opponent to Wilson, 'indeed the only one we have'. He noted that this was a vital considerationin the marginalseats, and the many safe seatsunder threat.88 But, following the party conference,the doubts about

Hailsharnled Macmillanto turn his attentionto Home. Dilhorne statedto Macmillan on 8 October 1963that if he retired 'the only hope is Quintin [Hailsham]', as he was well known throughout the country, and they would have a better chancewith him than Maudling in the general election." However, for all the positive effect that

Hailsham"selectioneering and publicity skills had on his candidacyprior to the Party

Conference, the poor temperament and judgement that he displayed there raised doubtsabout his candidacy,and endedit. Fishernoted

'Quintin Hailshamhad been a splendidChairman of the Party. He

was uniquely capable of rousing the enthusiasm of the

constituencyworkers and had madea significantcontribution to

the Conservative in 1959 [colleagues] victory ... acknowledged

Ramsden,Winds of Change,p. 195 Memorandumby the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 1115008(30) 89Dilhome to Macmillan, 8 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(64) 261

that he would make an inspiring leader of the party at a general

election, but they questioned his judgement, should the

Conservativeswin it, as the leader of the nation'. 9'

Thesedoubts over the consequencesof a Hailshamleadership were of critical significancein the declineof his candidacy.Another central factor in this declinewas

Wsoffending of traditional Conservativevoters by his actionsat the Party Conference, and this loss of a bedrockof Conservativesupport was seenby the party hierarchyas a major factor against Hailsham's candidacy. Public correspondenceon the party leadershipprior to Macmillan's resignationillustrate public doubts about Hailsharn, that it canbe assumedwere exacerbatedby his behaviourat the Party Conference.One concernedvoter wrote to CentralOffice

For God sakeis no commonsense at all left in the leadersof the

Party. Hailsham alienatedthe bulk of the electorate by twice

showing himself on television as a man who was unable to

control himself, much less control the Tory Party. In fact, you

may as well suggestJack Profumo as your next likely chief,

indeed even he to many would be less obnoxious than this 91 wildest paranoiac.

Another voter from Kent declared,'a Tory representativeof cross section of thinking opinion appalledat thought of possibility of a 'ham actor' becomingPrime

90Fisher, The Torv Leaders p. 102 91Ruskin to Poole, 6 October 1963 CPA CCO 20/39/1 262

Nfinister. Stop Hailshamat all costs.Anyone elsepreferable to appealto logic and not hysterical emotion'.92 The expressionof these types of views all counted against

Hailsham'selectability.

iii) Governability

The doubts expressedby the party hierarchy and Conservativevoters about

Hailsham's temperamentand judgement meant he had the lowest rating of the

candidatesin tenns of governability.Another factor againstHailsham was his lack of

senior ministerialexperience, and the fact that he was not in a 'great office of state'.

He had been Party Chairmanduring the 1959 election campaign,and had become

NEnister of Sciencefollowing that appointment,and was Leader of the House of

Lords. Hailshamwas, therefore,not in a traditional avenueto the leadership,and did

not have senior govemmentexperience. This affected his govemability, but his poor

temperamentand judgement were of more importance to the party hierarchy. As

previously stated,this was confirmedby his actions at the party conference,and the

doubts expressedby the US governmentalso galvanisedthis impression.As noted,

David Ormsby-Goreinformed Home in October 1963 that the US governmenthad

doubts about Hailsham's temperamentalsuitability for the leadership and Prime

NEnistership,and when Home told Macmillan of these doubts on 15 October,

Hailsham's candidacywas finished. The US officials felt Hailsharn was 'a difficult

partner, unwilling to accepthis secondaryrole, and with his lawyer's instinct for the

detail of the small print, draggingout negotiation on minor points and almost losing

backing 93Ormsby-Gore had told Home that 'if Lord Hailsham the on major points'.

92Henson to Macleod, 11 October 1963 CPA CCO 20139/1 9' Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 267 263 was made Prime Nfinister this would be a tremendous blow to Anglo-American relations and would in fact end the specialrelationsbýip'. "' The US governmenthad major doubts about Hailsham'sgovernability, and this led to Macmillan's decisionto promote Home as his sole preference,especially in conjunction vvith Hailsham's behaviourat the Party Conference.

Following tl-ýsrevelation, Macmillan noted on 15 October 1963,that Hailsham loses on the governability rating, because of his impulsivenessand arrogant 9' interference. Fisher noted the effect of Hailsham's antics at the Party Conference on

perceptionsof his ability to govern, as 'his lack of judgement seemedconfirmed and

his too-evidenteagerness for the Premiershipensured that he would not achieveit. His

bandwagoncame to a halt almost as soon as it had startedto roll'. 96 On 16 October,

MacnUan noted that Keith Josephwas, 'fearful of Hogg's [HAsham's] eccentricities, 97 especially in foreign affairs'. These doubts about Hailsharn's temperament for the

highest office of goverment were prevalent,and were central to the failure of his

candidacy.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstratedthat the leadersbýpselection occurred at an

inconvenientplace in the electoral cycle for the party, as a general election was

imminentwithin twelve months.The PeerageAct of 1963was a vital situationalfactor

as it meantthat Home and Hailshamcould stand as candidatesfor the leadership,and without the Act, Butler or Maudling would have succeeded.The selectionprocess was

94'Top SecretNote for the Record' in the StocktonPapers in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home,pp. 298- 299 95Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October1963 PRO PREM 11/5008(26) 96Fisher, The Tory Leaders,p. 103 9' Diary entry for 16 October1963 Ms. Macmillan deR.d. 51* (20) 264 the most complexand extensivein the party's history, and it's nature contributedto

Home's victory. This was becauseit demonstratedfully the opposition to the other candidates,and the general acceptability of Home as the stop-gap, compromise candidate. Tfids was especially apparent with Dilhome's canvass of the Cabinet, which maximisedthe oppositionto the other candidates,that may or may not have existed, and demonstratedHome's acceptability.The informal networks were important in the selectionprocess, as they disseminatedinformation to the candidateson their prospects of succeedingMacmillan, and also preparedthe party and the public for the emergence of Home.

Home was deemedto fulfil the core criteria of acceptability,electability, and governability,better than the other candidatesbecause of the oppositionto them in the party, and the weaknessesof their performances at the Party Conference. In particular,

Butler's weaknesseswere fully exposed,and his position in the party was perceivedto have fallen away from the summit, and Maudling was not yet felt to be ready to succeed to the leadership. Thýis explains Home's appointment as the stop-gap compromiseleader, to take the party through the inuninentelection. 265

Conclusion

The Outcomes: Assessment

The conclusionto the study is in three parts. The first is an assessmentof the outcome of the 1957 selection of Macmillan. The second is an assessmentof the outcomeof the 1963selection of Home asparty leader.The third analysesthe parallels and distinctionsbetween the two selections,and what the outcomesillustrate about how the ConservativeParty selectsits leadersin different situationsand circumstances.

The 1957 Leadership Selection

Macmillanwas chosento succeedEden in preferenceto Butler, as he was the most acceptablecandidate to the party. He offered the best prospectsof re-unitingthe party and restoring its morale. Butler's unacceptability to sections of the party, as illustratedby the existenceof a distinct 'anti-Butler' faction amongConservative M[Ps, showedMacmillan's acceptability,in comparisonto the hostility Butler arousedin the party. However, an analysisbased solely on Macmillan's ability to unite the party does not fully explain the outcome of the 1957 selection. It does not acknowledge the influenceof wider individual and situationalcriteria on the outcome.The analysisof thesecriteria has demonstratedthat the outcomeof the contestis more fully explained by an emphasison three criteria. These are the actions of the candidatesduring the

SuezCrisis and its aftermath,the situationthat the party was in becauseof the failure of the government's policy during the Suez Crisis, and the selection procedure, particularlythe role of informal networks on the outcome.The wider individual and situationalcriteria determinedhow the core situationalcriteria would bejudged. 266

The actionsof Macmillan and Butler during the SuezCrisis were of particular importancein the outcomeof the selection.Tl-ýs was becauseButler's conduct raised doubts about his qualificationsfor the leadership,and also causedgreat oppositionto him in the Cabinet, and among the party's NPs. Butler's conduct at the 1922

Committeemeeting of 22 November 1956was of massivesignificance in his failure to succeedEden, as it constitutedthe 'campaign' for the party's support in the aftermath of the crisis, becausethe leadershipselection was now widely expected.Butler's poor performancein defendingand explainingthe government'spolicy to the Committee, confirmedto the party's Ws that he did not have the necessaryqualities to be party leader,while Macmillan showedthat he did. Butler's inability to inspire the party, or unite it with hope for Conservativeprospects, made him unacceptableto Conservative

NTs, and demonstratedthat he may not be an electableleader because he could not inspire the electorate. Butler's conduct as acting Prime NEnister exacerbatedhis unacceptability to the party's MlPs. The Suez Group of Conservative NTs focused their dissenton Butler after the withdrawal of British troops from the CanalZone on 3

December 1956. This large group of NTs, who had supported the goverriment's aggressiveresponse to Nasser's nationalisationof the Suez Canal Company, now opposedButler as successorto Eden. They constituteda large part of the 'anti-Butler' faction on the Conservativeback-benches.

In contrast, Macmillan's conduct during the Suez Crisis and its aftermath, showedhe was the most acceptablecandidate to the Cabinetand ConservativeNTs.

The sectionon Macmillan's conduct during the early stagesof the crisis, prior to the invasion,shows that Macmillancannot be accusedof 'conspiring' towards the leadershipbefore the 6 November signal of the cease-firein the Canal Zone. This is 267

contrary to some existing analysis that suggests Macmillan deliberately led Eden into the crisis to cause his downfall. Following the cease-fire,Macmillan did see the

',%rindow of opportunity' to stakehis claim on the leadership,but an analysisbased on

Macmillan 'conspiring' againstEden before then, doesnot contributeto an explanation

of the outcome.

Macmillan's conduct at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November was

central to his acceptability. He invigorated Conservative NTs with a rallying cry that

offered hope, and he made the outcome of the crisis appear as a victory of sorts.

Macmillan was viewed as the exceptionalpolitician who could savethe party from its

presentdifficulties. He also presentedhimself as a good option as a stop-gapleader,

who could restore party unity in the current circumstances.The short-term nature of

the vision for the future of the party hierarchy,Cabinet and NTs, contributedto the

outcomeof the selection,as it was widely expectedthat the party would fall becauseof

the crisis.Macmillan's actions at that meeting,and during Eden's absence,appeared to

unite ministersand back-benchersbehind his candidacy,and he becamea rallying-point

for thoseNTs opposedto the continuationof Eden's leadership.

The situationthat the party was facedwith also contributedsignificantly to the

outcome. This was becausethe state of great division in the party, causedby the

government'spolicy during the crisis, meant that a leader who could unite it was

urgently required.Party unity is alwaysa vital considerationin leadershipselection, but

this becomesof paramountsignificance in selectionswhen a party is in vast state of

disunity. Macmillan's ability to unite the party was vital to the outcome of the

selection. The electoral cycle was also in the Conservative'sfavour as a general

election was not imminent, and did not have to be held until May 1960. This meant 268 that if the party united behind the new leader, it could still be successfulat the next election, if the memoriesof the Suez Crisis had been erasedfrom the minds of the electorate. This contributed to the outcome as Macmillan showed at the 1922

Committeemeeting that he may be more able than Butler to eradicatethe SuezCrisis from the political landscape.The selection procedure was an influential situational factor, and this was especiallythe casewith the informal networks of the procedure.

The formal selectionprocedure was uncomplicated,and resolvedthe selectionin less than twenty-four hours, and limited possibledissent to Macmillan's appointment.It illustratedthat he was by far the most acceptablecandidate to the Cabinet.

Macmillanfulfilled the core situationalcriteria of acceptability,electability and governability,while Butler did not. Butler was unacceptablebecause of the lack of

Cabinet support for him, and the existence of the 'anti-Butler' faction among

ConservativeNPs. The doubts about his candidacyaroused by the Suez Crisis, re- stirred criticismslevelled at Butler during the appeasementera. I-Esconduct during the

SuezCrisis was all important,and servedto accumulateand intensifythe doubtsabout his acceptability.Butler was also unelectablebecause he did not convincethe party hierarchy,Cabinet or NTs that he could lift the party at a generalelection. He did not fulfil the governabilitycriteria, as he was not in a 'great office of state', as Macmillan was, andhis careerappeared to be moving away from, not towardsthe leadership.

In contrast,MacnUan fulfilled the three core criteria, as he was acceptableto the party, and demonstratedbetter prospects of uniting it as there was no anti-

Macmillan faction in the party.- The vast majority of the Cabinet supported his candidacybecause he was best able to fit the requirementsof the situation that the party found itself in. The notion of Macn-ffllanas a stop-gapleader also contributedto 269 his acceptability.Macmillan was the most electablecandidate, and he demonstrated this at the 1922 Committee meeting by his ability to uplift the party. This was of vital importancedespite the time before an electionhad to be called,as the party neededto regain public support after the Suez Crisis. Macmillan also fulfilled the govemability criterion, as he was in a 'great office of state, and was on a traditional career path towards the leadership.The outcome of the 1957 selection can be easily explained because of Macmillan's acceptability to the party over Butler, but a fuller analysis demonstratesthe nature of the influenceof individual and situationalcriteria on the outcomeof the selection.

The 1963 Leadership Selection

Bogdanor has argued that 'there is no evidence that the result seriously ' misrepresentedConservative opinion'. This is a correct assessmentin the sensethat

Home was generally acceptable to the party, and was in a position to unite it, as opinion was divided over the other candidates.However, an analysisbased solely on

Home's ability to unite the party does not fully explain the outcome of the 1963 selection.The analysisof the individual and situationalcriteria have shownthat Home was selectedleader for a variety of reasons.Three criteria appearto be of the most significance:the candidates'actions and conductduring the selection,the situationthat the party was in, and the selectionprocedure that was used to selectHome. As with the 1957 selection,these wider individual and situationalcriteria determinedhow the core criteria would bejudged.

1Bogdanor, 'The Selectionof The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball(eds. ), ConservativeCentury p.79 270

The actions of the candidates were of importance as the actions of Butler,

Hailsham,and Maudling, allowedHome to emergeas leader.Their 'campaigns'at the

Party Conferencehad a negativeeffect on their candidacies,while Home conducted himself well, and as he did not appearprominently then as a candidate.Home was pressured to put himself forward by the party's senior figures because of the weaknessesof the other candidates,and his own soundperformance at the conference.

Butler andMaudling's poor conferencespeeches, and the over-enthusiasmof Hailsham and his supportersto promotehis candidacyoffended the party hierarchy.It also raised doubts about his suitability for the leadership,as the party was not then conduciveto campaignsfor the leadership.Butler and Maudling confirmedwhat had beensuspected by the party hierarchy,that they would not be ableto inspirethe party to victory at the inuninentelection.

The broad situationalrequirements of a leadernot directly associatedwith the domesticfailures of the discreditedMacmillan regime, and the imminenceof a general election, counted againstButler. This was becausehe was directly associatedwith

Macmillan,and was tarnishedby 'guilt by association'.Maudling sufferedfrom tMs for different reasons.He had shownwith his conferencespeech that he was not a leader who could inspirethe party and the electorateat the next election,and he was not yet felt to be ready for the leadership.The broad requirements,therefore, led attention to be focused on Home as a stop-gap, compromiseleader who could take the party through the next election.This was felt after his performanceat the Party Conference, as it was believedhe could attract the electorateas he was inoffensive,was not directly associatedwith the domestic failures of the last Macmillan govemment as he was

Foreign Secretary,and was a competentminister who could unite the party. 271

The selectionprocedure servedto enhanceand promote Home's candidacy, and emphasisethe weaknessesof the other candidates.The use of multiple questions and multiple canvasses,and the natureof the inquiriesmade, inflated supportfor Home as the generallyacceptable candidate who could unite all sectionsof the party. Home's position as the compromisecandidate, was confirmedby the opposition expressedby significant areas of party opinion to Butler, Maudling and Hailsham. Redmayne's canvassdemonstrated that there was opposition to Butler, Hailshamand Maudling in the party, and that Home was held with genuineregard in all sectionsof the party, and

Redmayneinterpreted this as an endorsementof his candidacy.

Dilhorne's canvassof the Cabinetinflated the supportin the Cabinetfor Home.

This was illustratedby the 'Midnight Meeting' opposition,and the Cabinetappeared to havebeen split equallybetween Home and Butler. However, Dilhorne, like Redmayne, took genuineregard for Home as an endorsementof his candidacy.This canvasswas the most significant, as it illustrated to the party hierarchy that Home was most acceptableto his Cabinet colleagues,and galvanisedhis candidacy.The informal networks of the selectionprocedure were important, as they informed Butler that he was not a viable candidateto succeedMacmillan, and convincedHome that he was the compron-ýisecandidate that the party hierarchywanted.

The three core criteria of acceptability, electability and governability were determinedby the above criteria, and Home fulfilled all three to an extent. The most important were acceptabilityand electability,but Home also fulfilled governability as he was Foreign Secretary. The other candidatesdid not fulfil acceptability and electability,and tWswas crucial to Home's emergence.Butler, Hailshamand Maudling did not fulfil thesecriteria, becauseof the oppositionthat Butler and Hailshamaroused 272 in the party. Maudling and Butler were not seenas inspiring enoughto lift the party for the imminent election, and Hailsham failed both criteria becauseof the doubts about his temperamentand judgement that were causedby his actionsat the Blackpool

Conference.Butler andMaudling did fulfil the govemabilitycriterion, but werejudged on the other two. Home becameleader because he filled the broad requirementsof the situation, his actions at the Party Conference,the crucial role of the selection procedure,and his resultantfulfilment of acceptability,electability, and governability.

This confirmedhim as the compromisecandidate, because of the weaknessesof the other candidates.

The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions

The analysisof the two selectionsdemonstrates that there were clear parallels and distinctionsin the influenceof individual and situationalcriteria on both selections.

However, one aspectis clearly commonto both selections.The wider individual and situational criteria set the basic terms of referenceon which the core criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability were judged. The individual criteria were of more weight in the 1957 selection becauseof the longer period involved in influencingthe outcome.The 1957selection was influencedby the six monthsfrom the start of the Suez Crisis in July 1956, until the resignationof Eden in January 1957.

This has led to, and justifies, the extra weight given to the candidates'actions in the analysisof the 1957 selection, as opposed to the two months of Septemberand

October 1963that influencedthe 1963selection.

It is apparentin both selectionsthat the candidates'actions were centralto the

outcomes.The main examplesof this are Butler and Macmillan's conduct at the 1922 273

Committee meeting of 22 November 1956, and the conduct of Butler, Home,

Maudling and Hailshamat the Party Conferenceduring the 1963 selection.As these

constitutedthe 'campaigns'that are normally evident in formal leadershipelections,

this points to the importanceof candidates'actions in the outcomesof all leadership

selections.It also illustratesthe need for a full systematicanalysis of the candidates'

actions, which has been conductedin this study, yet is a feature lacking in existing

analysesof leadersfiýpselections.

Both selectionsillustrate that a long careerand wide experienceas a memberof

the goverment do not weigh in a candidatesfavour, unlessthey are in a high position

in the party at the time of the selection.This usually meansbeing in one of the 'great

offices of state', and Butler's move away from the summit of governmentat the time

of both selectionscontributes to an explanationof why he failed to become party

leader in 1957 and 1963. The perception of a career in decline was pivotal to Butler's

unattractivenessto the party.

The situations were distinct in 1957 from 1963, as the electoral cycle was in the

party's favour in 1957, as an election was not imminent. In 1963, an election was due

to held within the next twelve months, and this put pressureon the party to make a

choice as leader who could win that election. This is obviously always an important

considerationin leadershipselection, but the imminenceof an election increasesthe

importanceof electability.Evidence suggests that the party still choseto make a stop-

gap appointmentin 1957, as in 1963, and this is indicative of the generalmanner in

which the ConservativeParty selectsits leadersin situationsof domesticcrisis.

In 1963,the party was in a more deep-seatedspiral of declinethan in 1957, as

the party had beenin power for twelve years,and thus six and a half yearsmore than 274 they had beenin 1957.The declinewas also more long-term, and constituteda general domestic political crisis in 1963, while in 1957, the party was in trouble becauseof one crisis on foreign policy. This distinction betweengeneral domesticupheaval, and a specific foreign crisis led to a harsherverdict on the governmentin 1963, and less optirnismfor a rejuvenationin fortunes. The party was clearly greatly divided at the time of both selections,but the situationin 1957led to greaterhopes for a recovery,if the crisis could be eradicatedquickly from the domestic scene.This was far more difficult to achieve in 1963. The party's recovery in 1957, resulting in the massive

1959 election victory suggests this, when compared to the party's defeat in 1964, despitethe closenessof the result of that election.

The informal networks of the selectionprocedure used in 1957 were of more importance than the formal selection procedure, in contrast to 1963. This was because the formal selection process was far shorter, taking less than twenty-four hours to complete, as compared to the eleven days of the 1963 selection process. The 1957 selectionprocess was also far lesscomplex, as it was predominantlya straight Cabinet choice, as opposed to the multi-faceted canvassesof Cabinet and party opinion used in

1963.The nature of the enquiriesmade in 1957was far simpler.This simplicity of the selectionprocess led to the greater importanceof the informal networks in 1957, as they servedto illustrate the full extent of party opposition to Butler that confirmed, and exacerbatedthe doubts of the Cabinet, as expressedin the formal selection procedure.This is a clear distinctionto that usedin 1963,as thesedoubts from outside the Cabinetwere establishedin the formal selectionprocess by Redmayne'scanvass of the party's NVs. 275

The Cabinet was canvassedfor the first time in 1957, and in all previous selections,informal networks had dominatedexclusively. Informal networks retained their dorninancein 1957,but the consultationsof the Cabinetstarted a trend that was entrenchedin 1963,and led towardsthe moreformal procedurethat was usedto select

Home. The fact that there were more candidates,and a less obvious successor,in

1963,also contributedto the formalisedprocedure. This was the basisfor the formal electionprocedure established to selectHome's successor,Edward Heathin 1965.It is clear that the situation and circumstancesof both selectionswere central to the selection procedure that was used, as there was growing pressure for greater accountabilityin the party.

The informal networks in the party remained of great importance in the selection procedure of 1963, but they took on a different form, in line with the formalised nature of the selection process. The advice of the outgoing leader, a commonfeature of most selectionswhere there is no heir apparent,took the form of an extensivecanvass of party opinion, includingthe Cabinet,NVs, the Lords and the constituencies.This constitutedthe advicethat Macmillangave to the Queen,and was pivotal to the outcome.Thus, the traditional informal networks were now part of the formal selectionprocedure. The other informal networks in the party, such as those that linked the party hierarchyto the candidatesbefore and during the selection,served to buttress the fonnal selectionprocedure. They servedto pressurecandidates into standing(in the caseof Home), and persuadingcandidates of their poor chancesof succession(in the case of Butler). No other senior figures were consultedby the

Queen in 1963, a clear distinction from the party's previous selections.The 1963 276 selection signalled the move to formal leadership elections from 1965, and the 1957 selectioncontributed to settingthat trend in motion.

In 1957 and 1963, the core criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability, were determinedby the wider individual and situational criteria, in particular the situation,the candidates'actions, and the selectionprocedure. It is clear that acceptabilityis the most dominantof the core criteria in both, as the basecriterion on which the candidateswere judged. Party unity is centralto both selections,but tl-ýs does not fully explain the outcomes.This explainsthe analysisof the individual and situational criteria which determinedthe outcomes. In 1957, Macmillan was more enthusiasticallyendorsed than Home was in 1963, while Home was generally acceptable.Butler's unacceptabilityto sectionsof the party in both 1957and 1963,as determinedby his conduct and actions during both selections,explains his failure.

Electability and governability were of significance in the outcomes, but acceptability outweighedtheir importance.Tfiýs was becauseof the massivescale of disunity in the party at the time of both selections.

This study has demonstratedthe utility of the analyticalframework devised and applied to explain the outcomesof both selections,and in particular the extensive analysisof the situationsand circumstances,the candidates'actions, and the selection procedure.This is becausethey are of major significancein determiningthe outcomes of leadershipselections. 277

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