UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Struggling against Inferiority: German Army Policy, 1890-1914

by

Gavin J. Wiens

A THESIS

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JANUARY, 2010

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•+• Canada Abstract

The diplomatic and geographic circumstances confronting Germany before the First World War demanded the maintenance of a large standing army. Consequently, in 1890 the Prussian Minister of War, Julius von Verdy du Vernois, introduced a long-term program of army expansion intended to increase the number of active formations and provide all able-bodied German males with military training. Whereas considerable political and social obstacles, together with the inauguration of a naval construction program in 1898 precluded its completion, the possibility of a two-front war thereafter ensured that the "realization of compulsory military service" remained the fundamental objective of the General Staff. Not even the return of budgetary preference to the army following the second Moroccan crisis in 1911 and the subsequent approval of substantial army bills in 1912-13 diminished the intense pressure for a large-scale increase in the peacetime-strength and the implementation of the core principles of the "Verdy Plan."

ii Table of Contents

Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Introduction 1 Chapter One: From the "Verdy Plan" to the "Big Army Bill" 5 Chapter Two: Operational Planning and the Quinquennat of 1899 28 Chapter Three: The General Staff versus the Ministry of War, 1899-1911 48 Chapter Four: The Army Bills of 1912 and 1913 70 Conclusion 106 Bibliography 112 Appendix A: The Balance of Military Power, 1887-1914 117 Appendix B: German Government and Military Expenditures, 1901-1913 118 Appendix C: Strength of the German Annual Recruit Contingent, 1890-1913 119

iii 1

Introduction

On 11 January 1887 the Reich Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, explained to the Reichstag the international situation confronting Germany. "No one is going to embroil us with Russia," he declared. "The question as to how we shall stand with France in the future, I find less easy to answer." Bismarck therefore asked the parliamentary deputies: "Is this epoch of frontier warfare with the French nation at an end, or is it not?"1 Both domestic and foreign political considerations had compelled the Reich Chancellor to introduce the Septennat, the seven-year period over which the Reichstag could approve military expenditures, one year early. In January 1886 Georges Boulanger, who had continuously expressed anti-German sentiment and a desire for revanche after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, had been appointed French Minister of War. Bismarck, concerned that the opposition parties in the Reichstag were becoming too influential, wanted to present Boulanger as a serious threat to the European peace and thereby mobilize popular support for the government. "I can only voice my own suspicions in this regard," Bismarck had continued, "and say that it is not at an end." The demands for a large-scale increase in the standing army nevertheless floundered upon parliamentary opposition and the demand for more significant concessions. But following a dissolution of the Reichstag and fresh elections, the new Septennat was approved in March 1887. The Reich Chancellor had easily accumulated substantial support for the approval of an army increase that, considering the international situation, appeared absolutely necessary. But only one decade later the Ministry of War, responsible for the administration and organization of the army, had virtually renounced large-scale expansion. Moreover, between 1899 and 1911 the development of the standing army came to a standstill as successive Ministers of War preferred the step-by-step introduction of new technologies and the elimination of existing deficiencies in the organization to numerical increases. How did this happen?

1 Bismarck to the Reichstag, 11 January 1887, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VI Legislative Period, 18th Session, vol. 93 (Berlin, 1886-7), 335-43. 2 Alan Palmer, Bismarck (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), 234-5. 2

The land armaments race that occurred shortly before the First World War has naturally been exhaustively examined. Two studies, in particular, have recently attempted to explain the lengthy period of stagnation in the development of the European armies and the subsequent rapid armaments build-up in 1912-13. David Herrmann examined this occurrence, as well as the relationship between diplomacy, political decision-making and military strength. In the years before the First World War political leaders had not entered diplomatic crises with the express intention of provoking a conflict. European armies were at the time attempting to predict the future conditions of warfare and were therefore in the process of implementing new weapons and equipment. The balance of military power, however, had started to shift by 1912. European governments thereafter began increasing military budgets, which in turn precipitated a spiralling armaments race. Subsequent fears that one power might eventually gain a significant military advantage assisted in the creation of "windows of opportunity," that in turn produced more threatening crises and, ultimately, the catastrophe of the First World War. David Stevenson similarly focused on the background of the rapid acceleration of land armaments in 1912-13. This process was not caused by gradual improvements in technology, Stevenson argued, but rather solely by the actions of nervous army leaders who remained concerned about a potential shift in the balance of military power. The rapid increase in the German army after 1912, in particular, resulted from a sudden change in the balance of power in the Balkans, where Germany's main ally, Austria- Hungary, would have to concentrate a large part of its military strength. The resulting armaments race in the years immediately before the First World War, together with an increasingly unstable international situation, above all contributed to the events of the July Crisis and the outbreak of a general European conflict.4

German armaments policy has similarly received considerable attention and several important studies stand out. The thesis that the development of the army was primarily influenced by the international situation confronting Germany was first

3 David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 4 David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 3

challenged by Eckart Kehr. The primary concern of the Ministry of War, he proposed, was not the military strength of Germany's potential opponents, France and Russia, but rather the changing domestic political circumstances.5 A similar interpretation has more recently been presented by Stig Forster. The army administration was much more concerned about the social and political character of the annual recruit contingents and the reliability of the army in the event of a Social Democratic uprising than with the progress of military reforms abroad. This "militarism from above" was nevertheless contrasted with a increasingly more vocal and aggressive middle-class "militarism from below." Popular associations such as the Army League, formed in January 1912, expressed public anxiety that the international position of Germany had deteriorated following the implementation of the "Tirpitz Plan." By 1912-13 these associations had gained such an influence on the government that even the Ministry of War, the opponent of the General Staff in the quality versus quantity debate, could not reject a large-scale increase in the peacetime strength.6 The most controversial study pertaining to German army policy before the First World War, however, was published by Fritz Fischer in 1969. The peculiar economic and political development of Germany during the late nineteenth century, together with the status as a late-comer on the colonial stage, had created a unique brand of aggressive imperialism by 1911-12. Two factors thereafter compelled the German government to war in 1914: an increasing sense of fatalism resulting from the failure of Weltpolitik and the increasingly unstable domestic situation and the mobilization of extreme right-wing nationalism. Moreover, Fischer made the fantastic claim that the decision for war had first been taken at the so-called "war council" on 8 December 1912 and that the Army Bill of 1913, as well as several other measures, were the direct result of German preparations for a European conflict.7 The introduction of the "Verdy Plan," that called for the training of all able- bodied German citizens and a large-scale expansion of the army, as well as the continued

5 Eckart Kehr, "Class Struggle and Armament Policy in Imperial Germany," in Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977) 6 Stig Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus: Die Deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik zwischen Status-Quo- Sicherung undAggression 1890-1913 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985) 7 Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975) 4

insistence of the General Staff to accomplish the "realization of compulsory military service" have formed an important component in all of these studies. The connection between the two, however, has often been neglected. This might seem self-evident. The General Staff continually requested large-scale increases in the peacetime strength in the years preceding the army bills of 1912-13 and, in addition, expected these increases to be accompanied by the creation of additional active army corps, both measures outlined by Julius von Verdy du Vernois in 1889-90. But how far did these requests correspond to the core principles of the Minister of War's program? Did the nature of the demands coming from the General Staff change over time and, furthermore, how much did the increasingly unstable international situation and the succession of diplomatic crises before the First World War modify these requests? Could the "plan" proposed by Verdy therefore not be considered an idea or a concept? The sources required for such an examination varied greatly. Correspondence, memoirs and diaries formed the foundation of the evidence that was used to piece together the orientation of army policy in the General Staff, Ministry of War and the government. Archival sources naturally proved extremely important. The majority of unpublished archival material pertaining to army policy before the First World War are contained in the German Federal Military Archive in Freiburg im Breisgau. A considerable amount of material, however, was lost during the Second World War and what remains is only a fraction of the records that together can demonstrate the conflicting viewpoints within the army before the First World War. Nevertheless, the persistence of the core principles of the "Verdy Plan," the training of all able-bodied German citizens and the establishment of additional active formations, as an "idea," all the way from the "little army bill" of 1890 through to the Army Bill of 1913, should be discernable from the following pages. 5

Chapter One: From the Verdy Plan to the "Big Army Bill"

On 16 December 1887 the Prussian Minister of War, Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff, declared to the Reichstag: "we are strong" but "if we look around us, we are not strong enough." The reorganization of the French army had proceeded more rapidly than expected following the Franco-Prussian War, while increasing public pressure for revanche and the recovery of the "lost" provinces of Alsace and Lorraine had continued to exercise a dangerous influence on French foreign policy. The Russian government, though bound to Germany by the Reinsurance Treaty, was nevertheless funding large- scale military reforms and could, under strong pressure from the pro-French elements in St. Petersburg, adopt a decidedly more aggressive diplomatic stance in the future. With Austro-Hungarian foreign policy objectives in the Balkans more likely to enhance rather than diffuse international tension, a thorough reassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the German army seemed necessary in the winter of 1887-88. Whereas "we do not seek war," Schellendorff assured the deputies, "we must at the same time organize ourselves in order to endure one with honour." The peacetime preparedness of the standing army was therefore of paramount importance. If the already tense diplomatic situation continued to gravitate towards a military conflict, the primary function of the Ministry of War was to ensure that Germany possessed both the manpower and equipment necessary to achieve a decisive success shortly following mobilization. Consequently, on the same day that he appeared before the Reichstag, Schellendorff reminded Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck that "the greatest asset" for an offensive operation was the ability to appear "as strong as possible in the first battles." For this purpose the Minister of War proposed a major modification to the compulsory military service law. Articles 57 to 59 of the Reich Constitution of 1871 required every German male citizen to complete a pre-determined period of service

1 Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff to the Reichstag, 16 December 1887, in Stenographische Berichte iXber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VII Legislative Period, 13th Session, vol. 101 (Berlin, 1887-8), 288-9. 2 Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff to Bismarck, 16 December 1887, quoted in Michael Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generdle: Deutsche Rustungspolitik in der Ara Bismarck (1871-1890) (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003), 452-4. 6

following his twentieth birthday. Three years in the standing army and four years in the reserves, thereafter accompanied by a longer period in the territorial militia or Landwehr, provided a wartime mobilization-strength of 59,461 officers and 1,996,549 non­ commissioned officers and men. The alterations that Schellendorff proposed, among them a longer period of service in the Landwehr, would, on the other hand, raise the number of troops available at the beginning of a future conflict by more than 700,000.3 This measure, combined with an accompanying partition of the Landwehr into two independent contingents, particularly benefited the so-called occupation or Besatzung army. Consisting of both reserve and Landwehr units, this force was responsible for garrisoning occupied enemy territory and protecting strategically important railways, depots and other military installations. The addition of around 410,000 men to the Besatzungsarm.ee would from then on enable the entire strength of the field army to be concentrated for the main operations. The financial expenditure required for such a project was not inconsiderable. The Minister of War estimated that the strengthened active and reserve formations, as well as the accompanying extended period of training for the Landwehr, would demand the annual addition of 64 million Goldmark to the Prussian army budget. When the contingents from Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg were included in these calculations, the additional annual expenditure amounted to 82.5 million GM.4 The nation would simply have to endure the increased cost of military preparation, Bismarck candidly admitted to the Reichstag deputies on 6 February 1888, since such a step was absolutely necessary for "a full preparation for use of the great power that God has vested in the German nation."5 The modifications to the compulsory military service law were approved by the Reichstag on 8 February 1888. But was this measure sufficient to guarantee that the

3 Ludwig Rttdt von Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1922), 33-4; Palmer, Bismarck, 237-8; Michael Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generate, 449-50. For the proposed modifications see "Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend Anderungen der Wehrpflicht," 9 December 1887, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 103 (Berlin, 1888), 270-7. 4 Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generdle, 450. 5 Bismarck to the Reichstag, 6 February 1888, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VII Legislative Period, 30th Session, vol. 102 (Berlin, 1887-8), 723-33; W.N. Medlicott and Dorothy K. Coveney, eds., Bismarck and Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1971), 172-3. See also Palmer, Bismarck, 237-8. 7

entire able-bodied manpower of Germany would become available at the beginning of a future campaign? One month before succeeding Schellendorff as Minister of War in April 1889, Julius von Verdy du Vernois felt ready to answer this question in the negative. The existing active formations, which required the addition of reserve troops during mobilization, were too few in number and dangerously under-strength. Since effectiveness in wartime largely depended upon the ratio of active to reserve troops within a unit, Verdy complained to the Chief of the General Staff and close confident, Alfred von Waldersee, that there was little doubt that the high percentage of reserve troops required to augment the active cadres would have an adverse effect upon the overall operational capability of the field army. The peacetime strength of the standing army would have to be increased and additional active formations established. The compulsory military service law would also have to be applied more rigorously than the modifications of 1888 allowed. More than 100,000 German male citizens still escaped military service each year because the existing peacetime training structure had not expanded along with the population. The future Minister of War, with the support of Waldersee, therefore advocated training the "entire able-bodied manpower of the Reich."6 Moreover, the seemingly haphazard arrangement of the peacetime formations would have to be corrected. The assimilation of the previously independent German federal armies into the Prussian military structure after 1871 had created both over- strength and under-strength active army corps. Rapid mobilization and deployment would be extremely problematic under these conditions, Verdy cautioned, since a "corps of 43 battalions can never be equally organized and manoeuvred as a corps of 25 battalions." The "old proven standards" of uniform organizational structure would have to be reintroduced before the field army could be expected to achieve early and decisive successes.7

6 Verdy du Vernois to Waldersee, 26 February 1889, and Waldersee to Verdy du Vernois, 2 March 1889, printed in Heinrich Otto Meisner, ed., Aus dent Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 1, Die Berliner Jahre 1886-1891 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1928), 226-7. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 28-9. 7 Verdy du Vernois to Waldersee, 19 March 1889, printed in Meisner, Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 1, 243-4. 8

These proposals were not unprecedented. Similar sentiments had periodically been raised by individuals within both the General Staff and the Ministry of War in favour of a more complete application of compulsory military service and the re- establishment of a genuine "nation in arms." The increasing suspicion that Germany was lagging militarily behind the other European great powers in the late-1880s only amplified these demands. In May 1889 the Prussian military plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg, Maximilian Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, submitted a detailed report to the Chief of the General Staff outlining the ongoing armament reforms in Russia. Over the next five years, Yorck wrote, the Russian government intended to increase the military budget by around 40 to 60 million Roubles and concurrently expand the peacetime

o strength of the army by 150,000 men. Two months later, in July 1889, the French government announced legislation to reduce the active military service period from five to three years and to extend the total service requirement, including the obligatory assignment with the reserves, from twenty to twenty-five years. The memorandum soon after produced by Alfred von Schlieffen, the deputy Chief of the General Staff, clearly revealed the combination of concern and frustration at the progress of military preparations abroad and the corresponding absence of reform at home. The conservative recruitment policy of Schellendorff and his predecessor, Georg von Kameke, had, over time, regrettably transferred the burden of military service onto a relatively small portion of the population. "Elderly family fathers must be pulled into the field," Schlieffen lamented, while young able-bodied men "await the call of the Landsturm [the local militia] at home." The Ministry of War was calling up only 44 percent of all able-bodied German male citizens. The French, in comparison, were then training 73.5 percent of their available manpower. With a population of just over 37 million, France would eventually be able to mobilize 4.3 million trained men, while Germany, with almost 47 million inhabitants, could deploy only 2.3 million active and reserve troops at the beginning of a future conflict. Schlieffen concluded that the unrivalled discipline and

8 Yorck von Wartenburg to Waldersee, 31 May 1889, in Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« unddie Generate, 633-4. 9 Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« unddie Generate, 610-1. 9 training of the German formations, consistently highlighted by opponents of large-scale peacetime expansion, would only partially offset this future numerical inferiority. The prevailing circumstances convinced Verdy to communicate his concerns to the Reich Chancellor in late August 1889. Relinquishing the military advantage over France involved "great dangers" for Germany and a further expansion of the army organization could therefore "no longer endure postponement." The Minister of War above all recommended abolishing the Septennat, or the seven-year period over which the parliamentary deputies could approve military expenditure. The allocation of funds for such a long period inevitably meant that the army administration was compelled to follow "step-by-step" behind each foreign military reform. The introduction of a more flexible budgetary scheme, on the other hand, would permit the Ministry of War "to demand and arrange in one stroke everything" that was still considered necessary. In order to increase the peacetime strength of the army and, in doing so, facilitate the "training of all available recruit material," Verdy furthermore proposed the creation of two entirely new active army corps. These additional formations would provide the organizational framework around which a much larger portion of the population could perform compulsory military service. Bismarck nevertheless vehemently disapproved of the timing of these seemingly superfluous demands. The two additional army corps could indeed be established "without a break with the Septennat" using existing supernumerary units, but the Reich Chancellor cautioned that "further reaching views," such as a substantial increase in the annual recruit contingent or the creation of new peacetime units, would have to remain "absolutely secret until following the new elections" that were scheduled for February 1890. The "task of the policy of the Reich,"

10 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, 25 August 1889, printed in Terence Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2004), 116-7. See also Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generate, 611-3; Oliver Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914: Das Militdr und der Primat der Politik (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 2007), 166. 11 Verdy du Vernois to Bismarck, 31 August 1889, printed in Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Kriegsrustung undKriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1 (Berlin, E.S. Mittler, 1930), 33-5. See also Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 38-9; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 29; Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generate, 632-3. 10

Bismarck reminded the Minister of War, would always be to avoid domestic disputes and thereby prevent the emergence of potentially "hostile Reichstag majorities."12 But the full scope of the "Verdy Plan" remained hidden from Bismarck until the following spring. The Minister of War, writing to the Reich Chancellor in early March 1890, demanded that the Septennat system be replaced by an "iron budget" or Aternat, consisting of five distinct stages of army expansion and extended over several years in order to account for the changing domestic and foreign political circumstances. The opening stage of the "Verdy Plan," to be completed no later than October 1890, foresaw an immediate increase of around 39,400 men. The entire program, the Minister of War calculated, would eventually expand the standing army by over 150,000 men and require the additional annual expenditure of 117 million GM. Since the active formations numbered 468,409 men in 1889, the proposed measures represented a dramatic thirty-two percent increase in the peacetime strength. But the organizational and structural difficulties that would inevitably result from such an enormous and sudden infusion of manpower were unfortunately necessary for a complete revitalization of the field army. Furthermore, the concept "that each able-bodied man must also be trained for military service," formulated by Gerhard von Scharnhorst during the Napoleonic Wars but subsequently neglected, would, Verdy argued, have to be reintroduced in order to "forestall the dangers that threaten the existence of the German Reich." The acceptance of such a long-term program would have the additional benefit of binding the hands of the parliamentary deputies and thereby suppressing as much as possible unwelcome influence in the development of the army. The existing three-year service, already a serious point of contention between the government and the left-leaning parties in the Reichstag who pressed for a shortened training period, could, in this manner, then be preserved.13 The Minister of War repeated these views the next day during a meeting of

12 Bismarck to Verdy du Vernois, 6 September 1889, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 36-8. See also Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 39-40; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 29-30; Schmid, Der »Eiserne Kanzler« und die Generate, 635; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 171. 13 Verdy du Vernois to Bismarck, 8 March 1890, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 38-43. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 29-30; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 167-70. 11

the Prussian Ministry of State. German military strength had experienced considerable increases over the preceding decade and, consequently, the peacetime strength of the army would have to be expanded in a more systematic manner in the future. The corresponding application of the "ideas of Scharnhorst," on the other hand, would not only exploit the military potential of the rapidly expanding German population but also dramatically improve the overall quality of the field army following mobilization.14 The domestic political crisis that preceded Bismarck's dismissal on 22 March 1890 temporarily suspended the debate over army expansion. The appointment of Leo von Caprivi as Reich Chancellor, however, soon produced a more favourable atmosphere for the implementation of the Minister of War's program. Shortly after assuming office, Caprivi had labelled the Reinsurance Treaty, arranged with Russia by Bismarck in June 1887 as a substitute for the Three Emperor's League, as a completely unnecessary complication of German foreign policy.15 "We have the unchanged desire to live with Russia in good circumstances," the new Reich Chancellor wrote in May 1890, "but we must as far as possible have consideration for our allies...[and] at least cause them no difficulties."16 The existence of a Russo-German agreement could have potentially serious diplomatic consequences. Whereas Bismarck might have been capable of juggling "five balls at once," Caprivi had thereafter remarked, his successor would "do well to manage with just two."17 The obligation to keep confidential the articles of the Reinsurance Treaty would presumably only heighten the tension between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy and, in doing so, "shake the confidence in the strength and unity of the Triple Alliance." The Reich Chancellor, moreover, did not expect the Russian government to give a "favourable interpretation" to any agreement and remain

14 Verdy du Vernois to the Prussian Ministry of State, 9 March 1890, in Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 40-2; FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 31. 15 Memorandum composed by Caprivi, 28 March 1890, printed in E.T.S. Dugdale, ed., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, vol. 2, From Bismarck's Fall to 1898 (London: Methuen, 1969), 2-3. 16 Memorandum composed by Caprivi, 22 May 1890, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswdrtigen Amtes, vol. 7, DieAnfdnge des Neuen Kurses (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte, 1927), 30-3. 17 J. Alden Nichols, Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 54; Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean, Germany from Reich to Republic, 1871-1918: Politics, Hierarchy and Elites (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 109. 12

neutral in the event of a Franco-German conflict. The "decision for war and peace" depended much more on national interest and public opinion than diplomatic agreements, and, consequently, "the value of an alliance between government and government" had become questionable. Under the circumstances, German foreign policy would have to assume a "simple and transparent" appearance that would mitigate conditions of "unrest and insecurity" and reduce the possibility of a "danger to the peace." Whereas both the Ministry of War and the General Staff had previously raised concerns about the progress of foreign military reforms, the immediate possibility of a diplomatic rapprochement between France and Russia, together with the corresponding danger of a two-front war, boldly highlighted the numerical inferiority of the German army. In 1889 the strength of the French and Russian standing armies numbered around 1,415,000 men. The Austro-Hungarian and German active formations, in comparison, amounted to 730,711 men.19 Having recognized that the current peacetime strength of the army was not at all equal to the requirements of a two-front war, the Reich Chancellor wasted no time in presenting a modified version of the opening stage of the "Verdy Plan" to the Reichstag in May 1890. The proposed legislation, introduced as a supplementary bill to the Septennat of 1887, requested a total increase, concentrated primarily in the field artillery, of 18,574 men. The Reichstag, with the exception of the strongly anti- government Social Democratic Party, at first reacted positively to the "little army bill" and even the Catholic Centre Party, which had strongly opposed Bismarck in the struggle over the Septennat three years earlier, initially interpreted the army increases to be the beginning of a more flexible, less negative political program. But when the Minister of War alluded to possible larger and more expensive army increases on 14 May 1890, the agreeable attitude of the parliamentary deputies quickly evaporated. One week later the

18 Caprivi to Schweinitz, 29 May 1890, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 7, 33-6. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 57-8. 19 Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 36; Forster, Die Doppelte Militarismus, 28. 20 Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 31-2. For the particulars of this legislation see "Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die Friedensprasenzstarke des deutschen Heeres," 6 May 1890, in Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 121 (Berlin, 1890-2), 51-3. 21 Verdy du Vernois to the Reichstag, 14 May 1890, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VIII Legislative Period, 6th Session, vol. 114 (Berlin, 1890-2), 75-6. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 32; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 80-1. 13

long-term objectives of the army administration were further disclosed when Verdy bluntly declared in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag that "we make with these 18,000 men only an initial step...we will therefore have to demand more, in stages that at the time cannot be determined." The brief parliamentary conflict that followed in the spring of 1890 in a sense represented the high-water mark of the "Verdy Plan." The Minister of War, together with Waldersee and Kaiser Wilhelm II, initially responded to the opposition from the Centre Party by advocating a repressive policy and an immediate dissolution of the Reichstag. Wilhelm had even previously blustered in January 1887: "may the day soon come when the grenadiers of the guard purge the place with bayonets and tambours."23 Caprivi, on the other hand, had astutely appreciated shortly after assuming office that parliamentary approval for additional military expenditure would inevitably necessitate significant concessions.24 On 16 May 1890 the Reich Chancellor therefore announced to the Reichstag that the Septennat was no longer a "life or death question" for the government and that a "realization of compulsory military service" might even be more effectively accomplished if the seven-year arrangement was abandoned. This had indeed been Verdy's own belief from the outset, but the Reich Chancellor now appeared willing to proceed even further. Could the peacetime strength not equally be determined every nine, five or three years? Bismarck had energetically sought to preserve the privileged constitutional position of the army and had even dissolved the Reichstag following the rejection of extensive army increases in 1887. Caprivi now declared that the Septennat

9S was "not essentially a military question" but rather "a constitutional question." Both the

Verdy du Vernois to the Budget Commission, printed in "Bericht der VII. Kommission iiber den derselben zur Vorbereitung uberwiesenen Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die Friedensprasenzstarke des deutschen Heeres," 21 May 1890, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 121 (Berlin, 1890-2), 592-630. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarism™, 33-4; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 80-1. 23 Prince Wilhelm to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 8 January 1887, printed in John C.G. R6hl, ed., Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespondenz, vol. 1, Von der Reichsgriindung bis zum Neuen Kurs 1866-1891 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1976), 207-8. See also Palmer, Bismarck, 236. 24 Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 82-3; Charlotte Sempell, "The Constitutional and Political Problems of the Second Chancellor, Leo von Caprivi," The Journal of Modern History, vol. 25 (1953), 239-40. 25 Caprivi to the Reichstag, 16 May 1890, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VIII Legislative Period, 7th Session, vol. 114 (Berlin, 1890-2), 112-5. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 79. 14

Minister of War and the Kaiser thereafter offered considerable resistance to the government proposal to abandon the Septennat and annually increase the number of men "placed at disposition" after two years of service by 6,000. Since around 49 percent of recruits already received only two-years of training before being transferred to the reserves for financial reasons, this concession, designed to offset the proposed increase in the peacetime strength, did not have a fundamental impact on the realization of the "Verdy Plan" or the relationship between the army and the Reichstag. In contrast, the so- called "Windthorst Resolutions," soon after proposed by the Centre Party leader, Ludwig Windthorst, seemed to confirm the suspicion that far-reaching concessions would only encourage an extension of parliamentary influence over the army. According to this motion, the deputies requested that the government 1) not introduce long-term programs for compulsory military service that would involve an "exorbitant" financial burden, 2) abandon the Septennat system, 3) reduce the three-year service period, and in doing so, 4)

Oft implement a two-year service period. Nevertheless, on 22 June 1890, just a week before the acceptance of the "little army bill" by the Reichstag, the Minister of War found reason to remark to Waldersee: "we achieve with one jump...what otherwise with additional stages was to be attained."27 This optimism was entirely unjustified. The acceptance of the "Windthorst Resolutions," together with the proposed army increases, threatened to indefinitely postpone the completion of any large-scale expansion of the peacetime strength. The "little army bill" considerably strengthened the organizational-structure of the field artillery. The capability of the standing army to conduct a two-front war with both France and Russia, on the other hand, was in no degree enhanced by this relatively minor reform.28 Since the staunch opposition from the Reichstag had above all demonstrated that additional army increases would require a corresponding reduction in the military

26 "Vier EntschlieBungen der Haushaltskommission des Reichstages vom 16. Juni 1890," printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 45. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 35-6; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 81-3. 27 Verdy du Vernois to Waldersee, 22 June 1890, printed in Meisner, Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 1, 382-3. 28 The annual recruit contingent thereafter decreased from 204,026 men in 1890 to 193,930 men in 1891, in "Nachweisung der in den Jahren 1890-1914 zum Dienst im Heere ausgehoben Mannschaften," RH 61-332, BA-MA Freiburg. 15

service period, Verdy, who continued to support a long-term program based upon the step-by-step expansion of the army together with the preservation of the three-year service period, was replaced by Hans von Kaltenborn-Stachau in October 1890. The resistance from the Kaiser was more difficult to overcome. At the beginning of April 1891 the Reich Chancellor notified the new Minister of War that Wilhelm was expected to request a new army bill sometime in the coming months. Following lengthy discussions, both Kaltenborn-Stachau and Caprivi concluded that such an increase would only be acceptable to the parliamentary deputies if the two-year service period was offered up as a concession and implemented following the expiration of the existing Septennat in March 1894. But whereas Caprivi had successfully convinced the Kaiser to agree to an increased number of recruits "placed at disposition" during the crisis over the "little army bill," Wilhelm was now determined to oppose additional, more far- reaching concessions to the Reichstag. "If the army increases in manpower," the Kaiser wrote to Caprivi in June 1891, "it would also suffer in inner content and discipline." Wilhelm would consequently "never agree to the two-year service period" and, moreover, had taken the initiative to communicate to the Ministry of War a detailed outline of a program for the further expansion of the peacetime strength. This program, requiring the additional expenditure of around 40 million GM, was, if the necessity arose, to be forced through the Reichstag with threats of parliamentary dissolution and modifications to the electoral law. "We have reached the same point as in 1860," the Kaiser dramatically concluded, "Grandpapa managed to find Bismarck to help him fight and win. I have Caprivi."

The Reich Chancellor immediately rejected these proposals. Whereas the "rejuvenation" of the active formations through a more intensive application of compulsory military service, together with "some other improvements," was urgently required by the Ministry of War, the appropriate political circumstances for such

29 Caprivi to Kaltenborn-Stachau, 3 April 1891, and the discussion between Caprivi and Kaltenborn- Stachau, 7 April 1891, in Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 206-7. 30 Wilhelm II to Caprivi, 15 June 1891, printed in Heinrich Otto Meisner, "Der Reichskanzler Caprivi: Eine Biographische Skizze," Zeitschriftfur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. 111 (1955), 741-3. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 207; Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 375-6. 16

measures had "not yet arrived." The experiences of the previous summer and the considerably weaker condition of the government finances, primarily because of the ongoing negotiations to reduce high tariffs on agricultural products, would have to be taken into consideration. The approval of the parliamentary deputies for additional military expenditure, at the same time, could not be expected without at least a partial adherence to the "Windthorst Resolutions" and a corresponding reduction in the existing military service period. The domestic political situation was "completely different" than in 1860 when Kaiser Wilhelm I, with the assistance of Bismarck, had forced through far- reaching military reforms of the Prussian army. Parliamentary dissolution, followed by new elections, would almost certainly "not lead to a more accommodating Reichstag," while any effort to modify the electoral law through the launching of a Staatsstreich, a peculiarly Prussian form of coup d'etat originating from the monarch and supported by the army, would inevitably be confronted with strong resistance from the federal states. The resulting struggle could even precipitate a complete disintegration of the "loosely established German Reich" and the removal of Prussia as the focal point of a federally unified Germany. Under no circumstances could Caprivi support such a transparently aggressive domestic policy. Others shared these sentiments. Friedrich von Holstein, the long-time political advisor in the Reich Foreign Office, was convinced that a parliamentary conflict would have disastrous consequences for the government and potentially even culminate in a civil war between Prussia and the south German states. In this event, the other European powers would then be free to intervene militarily and exploit the confused domestic situation to the disadvantage of the Prussian monarchy. "Today things are calm," a depressed Holstein wrote to Philipp zu Eulenburg, the Prussian ambassador to the Kingdom of Bavaria, after receiving confirmation of the Kaiser's intentions, "but I have lost the feeling of security."32 Another representative of the Foreign Office, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, was similarly worried that the prevailing domestic political situation

31 Caprivi to Wilhelm II, 16 June 1891, printed in Meisner, "Der Reichskanzler Caprivi," 743-5. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 207-8; Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 375-6. 32 Holstein to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 17 June 1891, printed in R6hl, Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespondenz, vol. 1, 694-6. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 377. 17

was not suitable for the introduction of a new army bill. "We cannot manage without Caprivi," Kiderlen-Wachter warned Holstein in early August 1891, and we "do not wish to impose fresh military demands immediately but rather in three years' time."33 But these statements of opinion only compelled the Kaiser into a temporary retreat. The domestic political obstacles, Wilhelm thereafter remarked, could indeed "result in a postponement, but never an abandonment" of the proposals that had been formulated "following careful consideration." 4 That the continued reluctance to present meaningful concessions to the Reichstag would not only obstruct the further development of the army but produce an uncontrollable domestic political crisis consequently remained extremely probably throughout the following months. In late-July 1891 a French squadron under Alfred Gervais visited the Russian naval base at Kronstadt. The German charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg subsequently wrote to Caprivi that an immediate "turnaround from apprehension to elevated confidence" was clearly noticeable within the Russian government. The opposite took place in Berlin. The enthusiastic reception provided to the French by the Russians not only confirmed rumours of an impending Franco-Russian diplomatic rapprochement, but concurrently strengthened the already widespread conviction that in the future Germany would inevitably be confronted with a two-front war. Under these conditions, additional army increases would eventually be necessary. The Reich Chancellor therefore once again attempted to convince the Kaiser to agree to the two-year service period in a lengthy memorandum composed in August 1891. While "the political events of recent weeks provide no evidence that war is imminent," Caprivi explained, the situation nevertheless "strengthens the view that a conflict in the long or short term is unavoidable." The structure of the federal Reich was not at all appropriate for such an "extreme measure" as a Staatsstreich. The choice was then obvious: either maintain the

33 Kiderlen-Wachter to Holstein, 3 August 1891, printed in Norman Rich and M.H. Fisher, eds., The Holstein Papers, vol. 3, Correspondence, 1861-1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 383- 4. 34 Wilhelm II to Caprivi, 16 June 1891, printed in Meisner, "Der Reichskanzler Caprivi," 745-6. See also J.C.G. Rohl, Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 71-2. 35 Alfred von Btilow to Caprivi, 30 July 1891, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 7, 207-10. 18

status quo and the existing unfavourable military balance of power or facilitate an increase in the peacetime strength by agreeing to a reduction in the military service period. The Septennat would also have to be abandoned. Whereas the constitutional position of the army was based upon the exclusion of parliamentary influence, the government had repeatedly found reason to introduce supplementary legislation within the established seven-year periods. A reduced, more flexible budgetary arrangement would enable the Ministry of War to promptly retaliate to each new foreign military reform. The government would be achieving much while sacrificing little. At the same time, the Reich Chancellor warned that the presentation and timing of the forthcoming army bill was extremely important. The deputies could not appear to have coerced the government into offering up these concessions. The entire issue of the peacetime strength would, in this circumstance, become a "question of authority" and could potentially jeopardize the Kaiser's personal power of military command, or Kommandogewalt. Furthermore, an undesirable conflict with the Reichstag could only be avoided if additional army increases were implemented in the spring of 1894 and designed to correspond with the expiration of the existing Septennat. The presentation of new military legislation would consequently have to be postponed until at least the winter of 1892-93 when the government would be in a much stronger domestic political position. Wilhelm, though under severe pressure from Waldersee and other conservative officers to preserve the three-year service period despite parliamentary opposition, was temporarily convinced by the force of these arguments. The introduction of new army demands would be postponed until the following Fall and a limited experiment with two- year service period would be undertaken. But the Reich Chancellor, concerned that the rejection of the Prussian Elementary School Bill and the impending implementation of the Prussian Minister of Finance's tax reform could again convince the Kaiser to object to the proposed concessions, decided to press the apparent advantage. "The question is not,"

Memorandum composed by Caprivi, 27 August 1891, printed in Volker R. Berghahn and Wilhelm Deist, eds., Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik: Grundlegende Dokumente, 1890-1914 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1988), 37-41; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrilstung und Kriegswirtschqft, attachments to vol. 1, 45-50. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 37-8. 37 Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 211. 19

Caprivi wrote to Wilhelm in April 1892, "whether the three-year service in itself is preferable to the two-year service, but whether we give up the three-year service for the infantry in order thereby to strengthen our peacetime strength by 77,500 men." Shortly thereafter the Ministry of War produced a detailed memorandum outlining both the current military preparations in France and Russia and the intended increases in the forthcoming army bill. The 1889 modifications to the French military service law were more effective than originally anticipated and each year around 230,000 recruits were entering the standing army. The Russian army had recently been increased to 987,000 men, annually supplemented by 281,000 recruits, and more far-reaching efforts were being made to enhance the operational capability of the existing reserve formations. The balance of military power had continued to shift inexorably to the disadvantage of Germany.39 In these circumstances, the "security of the German Reich" could only be guaranteed if "the full military strength of the nation" was placed "in the service of the Fatherland and the allocation of all able-bodied men" in the standing army was undertaken. The Ministry of War, in addition, recommended abandoning the three-year service period. The reduction of the service period would "not impair the training" of the infantry but, conversely, would reduce the financial expenditure associated with a longer assignment in the active formations. These measures would immediately necessitate an annual recruit contingent of around 235,000 men and would eventually increase the mobilization-strength to 4,392,000.40 Although Kaltenborn-Stachau had abandoned the opposition that his predecessor had shown towards the two-year service period, the fundamental principles of the "Verdy Plan," in particular the "realization of compulsory military service," had nevertheless remained intact within the Ministry of War. The Kaiser nevertheless continued to oppose far-reaching concessions to the Reichstag. On 18 August 1892 Wilhelm publically declared in a speech to several

38 Memorandum composed by Caprivi, 6 April 1892, in Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), 243-4; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 211-2; Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 394. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 37-8; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 193. 39 The annual recruit contingent numbered only 194,667 men in 1892, in "Nachweisung der in den Jahren 1890-1914 zum Dienst im Heere ausgehoben Mannschaften," RH 61-332, BA-MA Freiburg. 40 Memorandum composed in the Ministry of War, 17 June 1892, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Riistung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 41-5. 20

officers of the General Staff that he intended to preserve the three-year service period against all opposition. If the Reichstag was unpatriotic enough to refuse an army bill based on this arrangement, a small and well-disciplined army would be preferable to an extension of parliamentary influence.41 The Reich Chancellor and the Minister of War were therefore forced to formulate a compromise. The constitutional obligation of the three-year service would be preserved. But in practice, recruits would be "placed at disposition" after completing two years of training. The Kaiser would be authorized under "special circumstances" to reintroduce the three-year service period, but once the financial arrangements had been completed, the obstacles to reintroducing the third year of training would be almost insurmountable.42 Wilhelm was now also under pressure from members of his court entourage to cooperate with Caprivi. The recent parliamentary rejection of the Prussian Elementary School Bill, Philipp zu Eulenburg argued in a memorandum sent to the Kaiser in September 1892, had severely damaged the domestic political position of the government. The discussions surrounding the "big army bill," moreover, were currently arousing even more public interest. "This legislation can only be successful in the Reichstag, that is, must be passed, despite the Reichstag, or it should not be introduced at all.'" The government needed to appear accommodating. Otherwise, the Reich Chancellor would be confronted with an insoluble domestic political crisis.43 In late-September 1892 the Kaiser finally agreed to Caprivi and Kaltenborn-Stachau's compromise and shortly afterwards the "big army bill" was introduced to the federal council, or Bundesrat. The peacetime strength would be increased by 2,138 officers and 83,894 non-commissioned officers and men, while around 60,000 additional recruits would be enlisted into the army each year to maintain the strength of the active formations. Newly created fourth battalions would also be added to each existing infantry regiment in order to accommodate the additional recruits originating from the two-year

41 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 244; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 41; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 212-3; Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 394-5. 42 Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 213; Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 395; Sempell, "The Constitutional and Political Problems of the Second Chancellor, Leo von Caprivi," 241. 43 Memorandum composed by Philipp zu Eulenburg, 24 September 1892, in Hans Wilhelm Burmeister, Prince Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld (1847-1921): His Influence on Kaiser Wilhelm II and his Role in the German Government, 1888-1902 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 81-2. 21

service period. Finally, the Septennat would be replaced by a more flexible five-year period, or Quinquennat.44 Almost immediately these proposals ran into stiff opposition. The immense scale of Caprivi's demands would necessitate the addition of 64 million GM in continuous expenditure and 67.8 million GM in one-time expenditure to the military budget. But the Reich constitution of 1871 permitted the government to retain revenue from only three sources: indirect taxes on consumer products; customs, postal, tariff and telegraph duties; and the so-called "matricular contributions" collected from the individual states.45 Since the existing government revenue was completely inadequate for the proposed army increases and no new "cover" taxation had been specified when the draft legislation was sent to the Bundesrat in September 1892, the consensus developed that the majority of the additional expenditure would be absorbed by the state governments. Particularly concerned that a future reform of the taxation system would be endangered by the resulting financial burden, the Prussian Minister of Finance, Johannes Miquel, firmly rejected this arrangement. Miquel recognized that financial considerations alone would not prevent additional military expenditure. Nevertheless, during a meeting of the Prussian Ministry of State on 3 October 1892 the Prussian Finance Minister demanded that the proposed new army bill would be "covered" exclusively by federal revenues.4 Caprivi, who had initially intended to postpone the "cover" question until the army increases had been approved by the Reichstag, was thereafter compelled to enter into negotiations with the State Secretary of the Treasury Office, Helmuth von Maltzahn, in an attempt to discover new sources of federal revenue. Although Kaltenborn-Stachau, following lengthy negotiations between the Reich Treasury Office and the Ministry of War, was able to confirm that the entire expenditure associated with the proposed increase in peacetime strength would be "covered" by federal revenue, the unbalanced

44 FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 36-7. For particulars of this legislation see "Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die FriedensprSsenzstarke des deutschen Heeres," 22 November 1892, in Stenographische Berichte ilber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 130 (Berlin, 1892-3), 100-9. 45 V.R. Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 1871-1914: Economy, Society, Culture, and Politics (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1994), 196-201. 46 Miquel to the Prussian Ministry of State, 3 October 1892, in Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 42; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 202. 22

taxation system would continue to present a significant obstacle to a long-term program of army expansion.47 The Reich Chancellor personally introduced the "big army bill" to the Reichstag on 23 November 1892. The proposed increases were inescapably necessary. "Every year that we lose is irretrievably lost" and "every year in which we hesitate to increase the number of recruits in order to spare the older age groups cannot be made good." German male citizens between the ages of thirty and thirty-five were currently overrepresented in the standing army and reserves. The expenditure associated with implementing a large increase in the peacetime strength was indeed enormous, but the government would be "irresponsible now not to introduce" legislation that transferred the burden of compulsory military service onto the younger generations. The Reich Chancellor compared the army structure to a pyramid. The active formations represented the peak and the much more numerous reserve units comprised the base. Whereas the army administration had been content with simply increasing the height of the pyramid by training small contingents of recruits for three-year periods, the introduction of two-year service would instead expand the base by inducting much larger recruit contingents for shorter periods. Small active formations could indeed achieve decisive successes against poorly organized and equipped colonial opposition, but not against highly-trained European "mass" armies. The Reichstag deputies were encouraged to direct questions on the importance of the army bill to the newly appointed government army representative. Already in October 1892 the Reich Chancellor had instructed Major August Keim to organize a large-scale press campaign in support of the forthcoming army bill. Over the course of the following months Keim, who had previously developed a reputation as a radical opponent of the conservative Ministry of War, published countless newspaper articles and press pamphlets emphasizing the necessity of a much larger peacetime strength. But the

47 Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 42; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 224-5. See also the diary entry of Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, then governor of Alsace-Lorraine, from 14 December 1893, printed in Friedrich Curtius, ed., Memoirs of Prince Chloawig ofHohenlohe Schillingsfuerst, vol. 2 (London: William Heinemann, 1906), 448-9. 48 Caprivi to the Reichstag, 23 November 1892, in Stenographische Berichte liber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VIII Legislative Period, 2nd Session, vol. 127 (Berlin, 1892-3), 7-20. See also F6rster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 44-5; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 229-34. 23

"middle-class militarism" that Keim propagated, over time, became much more aggressive than the official government rhetoric. We do not want to defend ourselves by waiting patiently for the opponent to attack us, but rather we want to strike back ourselves, because the first to strike defends better!" The Social Darwinian concept of existential competition between states above all characterized this "militarism from below" and Keim argued that all individual interests had to be subordinated to the enhancement of German military strength on the continent and overseas. "If sooner or later the fury of war breaks loose again, it will be a matter of life and death, at least for Germany. That is not pessimism, but rather the inexorable result of the international political circumstances, that no statesmanship...can change."49 Despite an aggressive tone, the government appreciated the support that Keim's propaganda mobilized. Caprivi even later remarked to the Chief of the Military Cabinet, Wilhelm von Hahnke: "With unfailing zealousness and great skill he has worked...I do not hesitate to say that the adoption of the Army Bill would have been put in question without his assistance.'" The "big army bill" encountered fierce opposition from both the Centre Party and the Radicals. Public opinion was generally inimical to additional military expenditure and because a danger to the peace did not appear imminent, the current economic depression and the need for commercial and trade agreements were much higher priorities among the parliamentary deputies. Still, on 12 January 1893 the Reich Chancellor attempted to persuade the Budget Commission that fresh increases in the peacetime strength were indeed indispensible. The domestic political situation in France was extremely volatile and at any moment a military dictator could emerge and redirect internal discontent into foreign affairs. The Pan-Slav movement, meanwhile, seemed to have convinced the Russian government that the path to Constantinople no longer passed "through Vienna but instead through the Brandenburg Gate." The particulars of the Franco-Russian diplomatic rapprochement were unknown, but the government suspected that military

49 "Warum mul3 Deutschland seine Wehrmacht verstarken?" in August Keim Erlebtes undErstrebtes: Lebenserinnerungen von Generalleutnant Keim (Hannover: Ernst Letsch, 1925), 56; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 64-5. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 204. 50 Caprivi to Hahnke, 16 July 1893, printed in Keim, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes, 72-3. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 63-6; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 242; Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, 110-1. 24

agreements for land and naval operations had been concluded. The exposed geographic position of Germany between these two powers therefore compelled the General Staff to adopt an aggressive offensive strategy. But Caprivi was not convinced that Germany could achieve success in a future war. "Neither an offensive against France nor against Russia is possible with the current army strength of Germany alone.. .if one compares the total fighting-strength of the Triple Alliance with that of France and Russia, Germany and the Triple Alliance are in the minority." Since the combined population of Austria- Hungary, Germany and Italy was around 10 million inhabitants fewer than that of France and Russia, the existing disadvantageous balance of military power would undoubtedly become more acute in the future.51 The Reichstag nevertheless continued to balk at the scale of the government demands. The Kaiser's New Year's Day speech, in which Wilhelm blustered about "sweeping away" the "half-mad Reichstag" if the army bill was not approved, did nothing to diffuse the tense situation.52 In March 1893 Caprivi was therefore compelled to offer up additional concessions. Following negotiations with Kaltenborn-Stachau and the leader of the conservative grouping in the Centre Party, Karl Freiherr von Huene- Hoiningen, the proposed increase in the peacetime strength was reduced by around 14,000 men. But even this compromise proposal was rejected by the parliamentary deputies on 6 May 1893 and Caprivi, confronted with a domestic political impasse, promptly dissolved the Reichstag and announced new elections.53 In June 1893 the German population went to the polls for the third time in six years. The Free Conservatives and the National Liberals were slightly strengthened, while the Liberals and the Centre Party lost support. The so-called government-supporting parties, the Conservatives, Free Conservatives and National Liberals, thereafter together occupied

51 Caprivi to the Budget Commission, 12 January 1893, in "Bericht der VII. Kommission iiber den derselben zur Vorberatung uberwiesenen Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die FriedensprSsenzstarke des deutschen Heeres," in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 131 (Berlin, 1892-3), 985-1038. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 55-6. 52 Holstein to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 1 January 1893, printed in Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespondenz, vol. 2, Im Brennpunkt der Regierungskrise 1892-1895, 1002-3; Waldersee's Journal Entry, 3 January 1893, printed in Heinrich Otto Meisner, ed., Denkwiirdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 2,1888-1900 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1923), 274. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 398. 53 Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 252-3; Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, 111-2. 25

153 of the 397 seats. "The elections turned out tolerably well," wrote August zu Eulenburg, First Court Chamberlain to the Kaiser, "and we may finally be able to squeeze out a majority for the military bill."55 But just as Caprivi had predicted in June 1891, the dissolution of the Reichstag and fresh elections had not adequately resolved the domestic political complications. The support of the majority of the Centre Party, which had managed to return a total of 96 deputies to the Reichstag, was still required to guarantee the acceptance of the army increases and the government, the Reich Chancellor once again concluded, would have to continue to adhere to the "Windthorst Resolutions" or risk suffering a devastating political reversal. On 4 July 1893 the Kaiser therefore inaugurated the new legislative period with an uncharacteristically conciliatory speech from the throne. The future "greatness and fortune" of Germany was dependent upon the military strength of the nation. "The political situation in Europe has experienced no change," Wilhelm admitted, but "the organized military power of Germany in relation to that of our neighbours has meanwhile become more unfavourably configured than in the previous year." Both an exposed geographic position and a unique historical development had compelled Germany to maintain a large standing army. The "more extensive training of our military power with consideration for the progress of the same in foreign countries" was consequently an "urgent necessity."56 This blatant appeal to the patriotism of the parliamentary deputies, in combination with the abandonment of the three-year service period and the Septennat, soon after had the desired effect. The compromise proposal developed by Huene- Hoiningen and Kaltenborn-Stachau was immediately reintroduced into the Reichstag and on 15 July 1893 the army increases were approved by the deputies. The intended modifications to the active formations would be formally implemented on 1 October 1893, while the shortened budgetary period would expire on 31 March 1899. The reaction within the government was generally enthusiastic. "I feel as if a heavy burden

54 Gerhard Ritter and Merith Niehuss, Wahlgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Matehalien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs, 1871-1918 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1980), 40. 55 August zu Eulenburg to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 2 July 1893, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 402. 56 Wilhelm II to the Reichstag, 4 July 1893, in Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, IX Legislative Period, 1st Session, vol. 132 (Berlin, 1893), 1-2. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 256-7. 26 has been lifted off my shoulders," a relieved Philipp zu Eulenburg wrote to the Kaiser, "the acceptance [of the "big army bill"] is a great success...it is the first building block of the new structure."57 The addition of 1,793 officers and 70,110 non-commissioned officers and men to the standing army was indeed a significant achievement for both Caprivi and the government. The increased peacetime strength and enlarged annual recruit contingent heightened the preparedness of the active formations and ensured that in the future a larger percentage of the population would receive military training. But had the far- reaching objectives of the "Verdy Plan" actually been accomplished? Furthermore, did Germany thereafter possess the military strength necessary to conduct a war on two fronts? The "big army bill" had provided less than half of the 150,000 men that the former Minister of War had initially requested in March 1890 and, apart from the addition of several field and foot, or heavy artillery batteries, pioneer companies and railway units, the organizational structure of the standing army had been relatively unaffected. Although the number of active cadres had been increased through the creation of fourth battalions with the existing infantry regiments, these units consisted of only two companies (each with 193 non-commissioned officers and men) and were primarily designed to facilitate the training of the approximately 54,000 additional recruits that the

CO army administration anticipated each year. In the absence of a concurrent large-scale expansion of the army organization, as would have occurred with the creation of additional active army corps these measures simply produced a surplus of reserve troops that could not immediately be incorporated into the field army during mobilization. More importantly, the "big army bill" had not succeeded in training the "entire able-bodied manpower of the Reich." Whereas the annual recruit contingent thereafter increased to 262,320 men in 1893, the Ministry of War estimated that between 30,000 and 40,000

57 Philipp zu Eulenburg to Wilhelm II, 14 July 1893, printed in Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespondenz, vol. 2, 1093. See also Burmeister, Prince Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld, 82. 58 For the final form of this legislation see "Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die Friedensprasenzstarke des deutschen Heeres," 4 July 1893, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, vol. 132 (Berlin, 1893), 1-7. 27

German male citizens still escaped military service each year.59 The field army would therefore not appear "as strong as possible in the first battles," as Schellendorff had demanded in December 1887. The domestic political situation also appeared to preclude the continuation of any step-by-step, long-term program. "Whereas we have restricted our manpower demands," the Reich Chancellor had declared to the parliamentary deputies on 7 July 1893, "we have, at the same time, complied with another wish...that being, to not abruptly implement compulsory military service."

59 FSrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 97. For the strength of the annual recruit contingent see "Nachweisung der in den Jahren 1890-1914 zum Dienst im Heere ausgehoben Mannschaften," RH 61-332, BA-MA Freiburg. 60 Caprivi to the Reichstag, 7 July 1893, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, IX Legislative Period, 3rd Session, vol. 132 (Berlin, 1893), 11-4. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 72. 28

Chapter Two: Operational Planning and the Quinquennat of 1899

The prime motivation in concluding a diplomatic agreement with Russia, Bismarck had explained to the British Prime Minister in November 1887, had been the prevention of a Franco-Russian alliance and the avoidance of a two-front war. Germany and Austria- Hungary were "pacific and conservative" and desired only the preservation of the existing European balance of power. Both France and Russia, on the other hand, had continued to pursue extremely aggressive and expansionary foreign policies and, as a result, could at any moment seriously disrupt the fragile international situation. "Our policy therefore will necessarily tend to secure what alliances we can in view of the possibility of having to fight our two powerful neighbours simultaneously." Under the circumstances, military concerns were of paramount importance. Whereas the Reich Chancellor did not consider either a Franco-German or a Russo-German conflict to be a "matter for despair," a two-front war "against France and Russia allied...would always be a sufficiently great calamity for our country for us to try and avoid it by an amicable arrangement with Russia."1 The impending expiration of the Reinsurance Treaty therefore generated considerable anxiety. Throughout the spring of 1890 the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lothar von Schweinitz, submitted several lengthy reports recommending a renewal of the Russo-German agreement and, in addition, warning of the potential for a future Franco-Russian rapprochement. The Reinsurance Treaty, Schweinitz above all emphasized, had previously prevented "the Russian government from cooperating with France in order to take common action" against Germany. In the absence of such an agreement, Russia, uncertain of German diplomatic support and constantly threatened by colonial disputes with England in East Asia and rivalries with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, would eventually "seek dependence elsewhere."

1 Bismarck to Salisbury, 22 November 1887, printed in Otto Hammann, Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges: Erinnerungen aus denJahren 1897-1906 (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1919), 238-46; Medlicott and Coveney, Bismarck and Europe, 165-7. 2 Schweinitz to Caprivi, 14 May 1890, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 7, 17-9. See also George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 37-8; Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 57. 29

The "amicable arrangement" with Russia was nevertheless allowed to lapse in June 1890. Although Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, was undoubtedly concerned that increased diplomatic cooperation could provide the basis for a future Franco-Russian military agreement, the possibility of a conflict seemed remote. The international situation might indeed eventually deteriorate to the point where a two-front war constituted a real danger to Germany. The army, strengthened by the proposed "little army bill," would nevertheless be equal to such a distant eventuality. "We support our foreign position," the Reich Chancellor stressed to the Reichstag in May 1890, "first upon our own strength, which, to maintain our alliances, we cannot increase enough" and only "then, however, do we depend upon strong alliances."3 The Kaiser went further when he declared that any foreign threat to Germany would be quickly dealt with by the army. During a speech in Konigsberg in May 1890, Wilhelm emphatically declared: "those who dare to disturb the peace will not be spared a lesson such as they will not forget in a hundred years!"4 Holstein basically agreed with this sentiment. The increased Franco-Russian intimacy had "made the situation more serious because it has raised the self-confidence of the war party in both France and Russia." But, at the same time, the "grey eminence" of the Foreign Office considered the international situation to be relatively stable. "Militarily we are as prepared as we can be."5 On 27 November 1891 Caprivi even felt confident enough to declare to the parliamentary deputies that a Franco- Russian alliance would serve to "diminish the nervousness" in both governments and thereby reduce the potential for a European conflict. The possibility of a two-front war more directly affected operational planning. Since 1880 the General Staff had intended to deploy the field army in two roughly equal components against France and Russia. The German army would then conduct an defensive-offensive campaign in both the East and West, with the focus of operations

3 Caprivi to the Reichstag, 16 May 1890, in Stenographische Berichte titer die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VIII Legislative Period, 7th Session, vol. 114 (Berlin, 1890-2), 112-5. See also Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 62. 4 Nichols, Germany after Bismarck, 61-2. 5 Holstein to his cousin, 5 August 1891, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 338. 6 Caprivi to the Reichstag, 27 November 1891, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, VIII Legislative Period, 128th Session, vol. 118 (Berlin, 1890-2), 3107-14. See also William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (New York: Octagon, 1967), 224. .30

being a joint Austro-German offensive into Poland. Since "when and where we shall be able to bring help from the Austrian theatre to the Rhine will depend on the success achieved on the Vistula," it would be a serious "mistake immediately to launch a strategic offensive [against France] and so forgo the advantage undoubtedly offered by a tactical defensive."7 As early as February 1890, however, the Chief of the General Staff had attempted to determine the feasibility of a large-scale offensive operation against either expected opponent. The results were not encouraging. The French would mobilize rapidly, Waldersee concluded, and a considerable portion of the field army would have to be concentrated in the West. The recent construction of extensive fortifications along the Franco-German frontier, moreover, would prevent an early conclusion to operations. Waldersee recommended the establishment of a strong defensive position in Alsace- Lorraine and, if possible, large-scale counterattacks against the exposed French forces. The launching of an offensive in the East seemed similarly problematic. The Russians possessed a considerable numerical superiority but would probably withdraw to better fortified positions in the interior. The Chief of the General Staff therefore suggested a succession of limited offensives designed to disrupt Russian mobilization and gain time for operations to develop in the West. In both circumstances, the numerical weakness of the mobilization-strength appeared to restrict the possibility of a decisive success against either opponent. Waldersee even made the unhappy conclusion from these studies that in the "unlikely event of our being able to use our whole army against France, I would not

Q change the operational plan." Schlieffen, appointed Chief of the General Staff in February 1891, had initially accepted the argument that Germany would have to assume the strategic defensive at the beginning of a future conflict. "However much it goes against our tradition to build fortifications, we cannot, as the weaker side, reject the means used by our opponent to paralyse our military plans." Only a limited offensive into southern Poland could produce tangible successes. Even at this early stage, however, a reorientation in operational

7 Memorandum composed in the General Staff, January 1880, in Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 19-20. 8 Memoranda composed by Waldersee, February 1890, in Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (New York: Berg, 1991), 127; Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 21-2. 31

planning was discernable within the General Staff. If, in the future, the strength of the army in the West could be significantly reinforced, Schlieffen speculated in a memorandum composed in April 1891, then "the French fortifications - since they could be bypassed through Belgium - would not form a great enough obstacle to rule out an offensive."9 The main stumbling block therefore remained the weakness of the field army. Following a discussion with the new Chief of the General Staff in May 1891, Verdy had indeed commented to Waldersee: "he holds the opinion that our fighting strength is not sufficient."1 Schlieffen thereafter attempted to increase the number of wartime formations through the establishment of provisional brigades composed of Ersatz, or replacement troops with each active army corps." The balance of military power clearly demanded such an increase in the mobilization-strength. "The continual growth of the military power of France and Russia and especially the efforts of the latter power to make larger forces available for field operations through organizational measures," Schlieffen reminded Kaltenborn-Stachau in June 1892, "requires that we in turn strive to reinforce the field army by all possible means." Since a significant expansion of the standing army shortly following the formation of Verdy's two new active army corps in April 1890 could not be anticipated in the foreseeable future, the Chief of the General Staff presented proposals for the deployment of second-line troops with the field army. The Landwehr battalions would be organized under brigade and regimental staffs and allocated to the active formations in lines of communication and rear-area functions. The Ministry of War, Schlieffen argued, had "to utilize our entire manpower without delay...in order not to remain behind our neighbours." The "Verdy Plan" had made a definite impression upon the Chief of the General Staff. In August 1892 the French and Russian general staffs concluded a military convention in St. Petersburg. This agreement compelled France to assist Russia in the

9 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, April 1891, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 22-3; Graydon A. Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 41; Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 123-6. 10 Verdy du Vernois to Waldersee, 24 May 1891, printed in Eberhard Kessel, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen: Briefe (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1958), 294-5. 11 Schlieffen to Kaltenborn-Stachau, 3 June 1891, in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 118. 12 Schlieffen to Kaltenborn-Stachau, 18 June 1892, in Ibid., 118-9. 32 event of a conflict between Russia and Germany or between Russia and Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. Similarly, France was committed to support Russia in a conflict between France and Germany or between France and Italy supported by Germany.13 In November 1892 Schlieffen therefore once again proposed measures to increase the preparedness of the Landwehr formations. "I regard it as an unavoidable necessity in a two-front war to make all militarily useful forces immediately available."14 These second-line troops, despite their limited operational applicability, could effectively offset the numerical superiority of the French and Russian armies by releasing active and reserve units from less-demanding support functions. Additional operationally capable formations would then be able to be concentrated for the main combat operations in either the East or the West. Since numerical superiority had essentially been responsible for the Prussian successes in the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Unification, the Triple Alliance would otherwise invariably be at a disadvantage at the beginning of a future conflict. The sole "un-modifiable demand" confronting the government - and one can detect the former Minister of War's sentiments once again - therefore had to be that all able-bodied men receive training for "as long as possible." The continued existence of Germany, Schlieffen thereupon concluded, could not "depend on the retention of so wretched a system as the disposition furlough" that transferred active troops to the reserves after two years, but instead had to be based upon "a large army and strong peacetime battalions."15 Simply put, at present the field army was not capable of conducting a two-front war. "The matter is very simple," Schlieffen wrote to his sister Luise. "We have two opponents against us whose fighting strength will only marginally be absorbed by our allies." While the domestic political obstacles to the further development of the standing army would have to be overcome and the peacetime strength increased "to a considerable degree," the government would also have to conclude the endless debate over the length of the military service period. In the end, the Ministry of

13 The articles of the Franco-Russian Military Convention are printed in Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 180- 1; Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894, 260. 14 Schlieffen to Kaltenborn-Stachau, 19 November 1892, in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 119. 15 Schlieffen to his sister Marie, 13 November 1892, printed in Kessel, Briefe, 295-7. See also Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning, 154; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 42-3. 33

War, according to the Chief of the General Staff, had the sole obligation to recruit "as many soldiers as possible in order to endure a war against France and Russia and maintain our current power position."1 But the operational planning of the General Staff, and therefore the basis an increase in the peacetime strength, was not communicated to the Ministry of War. In August 1892 Schlieffen advocated an offensive against France, "the stronger and more dangerous enemy," instead of waiting in established defensive positions. The majority of the field army would be deployed in the West, where Schlieffen estimated a decisive success could be attained before the Russians had completely mobilized. The German army, as a result, would at least achieve parity with their French opponents.17 The decision to transfer the focus of operational planning from the East to the West was again considered in a memorandum composed by the Chief of the General Staff in December 1892. The speed of Russian mobilization had been increased and Russian forces would likely concentrate behind the extensive fortification systems along the Narew and Niemen rivers. The German forces would be unable to launch a surprise offensive against the Russian army in Poland and, even if they did so, the Russians would likely retreat into the interior. "We would not achieve a decisive battle or the destruction of the Russian army, but a series of frontal battles." Under these circumstances, the German lines of communication would become longer and longer and less well-defended. Furthermore, the strength of the forces required "would be more than we could bring up quickly on the inadequate railways right of the Vistula, and much more than we could spare in the West."18 The Chief of the General Staff, aware that the existing peacetime strength was insufficient to overcome the extensive French fortifications, therefore continued to pressure the Ministry of War for a reorganization of the field army. "If...at the present time the order of battle is composed of an army corps with the normal organization of two infantry and a reserve division," Schlieffen wrote to the Minister of War on 19 October 1893, then doubtlessly would "the former be influenced through the poor quality

16 Schlieffen to his sister Luise, 15 November 1892, printed in Kessel, Briefe, 298. 17 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, August 1892, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 23-4; Tunstall, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia, 42; Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 53. 18 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, December 1892, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 24-5. 34

of the latter." The active formations could not be impeded by the inferior manoeuvring and combat capabilities of the reserve divisions and, if active and reserve troops were combined into mixed army corps, "energetic leadership in war would not count for much." Although second-line troops were not equal to the active formations in combat capability, Schlieffen nevertheless conceded that such units would have to be employed in large numbers alongside the field army in certain instances.19 But the Reich Chancellor and the Foreign Office continued to show temperate concern for the international situation. The German ambassador in London, Paul von Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, noted in November 1892: "we must of course be ready to make certain concessions - that seems clear to me at least - if we want to get out of the difficulty and into a situation in which we could concentrate our entire forces against the West." At the same time, however, the ambassador effectively dismissed the eventual possibility of a two-front war. The Kaiser, he approvingly quoted to Holstein, had recently declared that the "alliance between the Russians and France causes me no anxiety because I will always keep it within my power to purchase Russia's neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war, and we don't need anything more."20 Although Caprivi, writing to the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Fritz Marschall von Bieberstein, in September 1893, commented on the potential explosiveness of the international situation, the recent acceptance of the "big army bill" in the Reichstag had further convinced the government that the German army was capable of resolving any future military occurrence.21 Russian foreign policy, moreover, was not considered threatening. The new German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Bernhard von Werder, reported in November 1893 that both Tsar Alexander III and the Russian Foreign Minister were decidedly pro-German in the views and, although the situation could

19 Schlieffen to Kaltenborn-Stachau, 19 October 1893, in Dieter Storz, Kriegsbild undRiistung vor 1914: Europdische Landstreitkrdfte vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1992), 322; Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 119-20. 20 Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg to Holstein, 28 November 1892, printed in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, vol. 3,424-30. 21 Caprivi to Marschall von Bieberstein, 24 September 1893, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 7, 247. See also Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 222-3. 35

change, there was little chance of a Russo-German conflict in the foreseeable future.22 But the situation did change rapidly. In October 1893 a Russian squadron visited the French Mediterranean naval station at Toulon. An exchange of diplomatic notes between the French and Russian foreign ministers followed and between late December 1893 and early January 1894 the provisions of the existing Franco-Russian Military Convention were transformed into a formal alliance. Despite the obvious danger that such an agreement represented for Germany, Holstein found reason to reassure Hatzfeldt in December 1893: "It will be many years before Russia's new arms are ready."23 By 1893 the far-reaching concessions required to secure parliamentary approval for new military expenditures had convinced both the government and the Ministry of War to restrict their future demands. "The less the government concedes to the army," Holstein had pointed out in early September 1892, "the less it will have to concede to the Centre in compensation."24 But the opposition of the Centre Party to the demands of the army administration had been motivated primarily by tactical considerations. The revolutionary objectives of the Social Democratic Party, on the other hand, represented a more serious obstacle to the long-term expansion of the standing army. Bismarck had attempted to prevent the expansion of Social Democracy and, at the same time encourage national integration by labelling all socialist political leaders as Reichsfeinde, or enemies of the German Reich. Because of their anti-monarchical viewpoint and continued advocacy of world revolution, the "social democratic elements," the Reich Chancellor had informed the parliamentary deputies in September 1878, were "an enemy which state and society are obliged to defend themselves against." Until 1890 rigorous enforcement of anti-socialist legislation had therefore prohibited all trade-union activity, socialist party organization and political campaigning. Social Democrats were still permitted to stand

22 Werder to Caprivi, 27 November 1893, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 7, 253-4. See also Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 223. 23 Memorandum composed by Holstein, 8 December 1893, enclosed in Holstein to Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, 9 December 1893, printed in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, vol. 3, 447-9. 24 Holstein to Kiderlen-Wachter, 5 September 1892, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 1, 395. 25 Volker R. Berghahn, "War Preparations and National Identity in Imperial Germany," in Manfred Boemeke, Roger Chickering and Stig FQrster, eds., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 310-1. 26 Bismarck to the Reichstag, 17 September 1878, in Stenographische Berichte iXber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages,W Legislative Period, 5th Session, vol. 51 (Berlin, 1879), 66-70. 36 for election to the Reichstag, but only as independent candidates. The return of the most prominent socialists from foreign exile after the anti-socialist laws were allowed to lapse in 1890, however, contributed to a tremendous increase in electoral support for the left- wing party. Whereas in 1887 socialist candidates had secured 11 seats in the Reichstag, Social Democratic support swelled to 35 seats in the elections of 1890. This rapid growth continued unabated. The 1893 campaign, conducted during the struggle over the "big army bill," resulted in the election of a shocking 44 socialist parliamentary deputies.27 As early as March 1890 Verdy had instructed the commanders of the active army corps to continually update the lists of suspected socialist "organizations, leaders and agitators." In the event of a future conflict, the Prussian State of Siege Law from 1851 would be proclaimed and all prominent socialists would be arrested at once. But the Ministry of War became increasingly concerned that the "red spectre" of socialism could eventually contribute to a "democratization" of the army. During the late nineteenth century Germany had experienced a process of rapid urbanization. Between 1875 and 1890 the number of people living in Berlin had swelled from 966,859 to 1,587,794, while the populations of Hamburg, Leipzig and Munich had also expanded dramatically. In 1890 almost 22 percent of the German population was concentrated in urban areas of more than 50,000 people, compared with only 12 percent in 1871.29 This large-scale development was naturally reflected in the military. In 1897 the political economist Lujo Brentano published a set of statistics concerning the demographic composition of the army and the navy. The results were predictable. Brentano calculated that around 67 percent of the annual recruit contingents between 1893 and 1896 had been drawn from regions predominantly involved in industry and commerce, areas that because of poor working conditions, lower living standards and high food and luxury good prices resulting from industrialization were far more inclined to support Social Democratic

27 Ritter and Niehuss, Wahlgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, 40-1. 28 Wilhelm Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft, 1890-1914," in Michael Stunner, ed., Das Kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft 1870-1918 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977), 317. 29 Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. 1, Arbeitswelt und Burgergeist (Munich, C.H. Beck, 1990, 34-7. See also Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 1871-1914, 312. 37 candidates. The Ministry of War was therefore confronted with a difficult choice: either increase the peacetime strength and provide military training for an increased number of "tainted" urban recruits that could in the future potentially undermine the conservative character of the military or restrict expansion and thereby preserve the army as the "pillar of the monarchy." But even before the publication of Brentano's detailed study, a collaborative memorandum produced in the Ministry of War and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in the autumn of 1894 had outlined the future development of the army. The admission of socialist recruits was to be hindered "as much as possible."31 The possibility that sympathetic recruits in the army would refuse to suppress a socialist revolution nevertheless caused considerable anxiety in both the government and the army administration. The Kaiser had painted a bleak picture of the situation in a speech to the Potsdam regiment of guards on 23 November 1891. The new annual recruit contingent, Wilhelm had declared, was expected to "be prepared against the domestic enemy as well as the foreign enemy." The moment might come when the recruits would be ordered to "shoot or strike down" their "own relatives and brothers," and this was a task that had to carried out "without a murmur." Moreover, during a meeting of the Prussian Ministry of State in January 1897, the Minister of War, Heinrich von Gofiler, elaborated on the serious consequences of an unimpeded expansion of socialism in the military. The presence of large numbers of urban recruits had already heightened the level of socialist "subversion" in the army and, if measures were not taken immediately, the political reliability of the troops might have to be called into question.33 Waldersee went even further. "One gladly seeks comfort," the former Chief of the General Staff recorded in his diary in December 1896, "that the army will be capable of shooting down the revolutionaries in the end." Whereas the political reliability of the army was at the

30 Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (New York: Berg, 2004), 191-2. 31 Lawrence Sondhaus, "The Imperial German Navy and Social Democracy, 1878-1897," German Studies Review, vol. 18 (1995), 57-8. 32 Wilhelm II's speech in Potsdam, 23 November 1891, printed in Ernst Johann, ed., Reden des Kaisers: Ansprachen, Predigten und Trinkspruche Wilhelms II (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966), 55- 6. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 25-6; Frevert, A Nation in Barracks, 183. 33 GoBler to the Prussian Ministry of State, 26 January 1897, in V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London: Macmillan Press, 1973), 22. 38 time certain, Waldersee could only speculate whether that would remain the case. In a period when the entire European continent was at the precipice of "great social revolutions," there was a fundamental requirement to ensure that the standing army was effective not only against foreign opponents, but domestic enemies as well.34 The launching of a Staatsstreich again became a distinct possibility. On 26 February 1897 the Kaiser gave a speech at a banquet of the Brandenburg Provincial Assembly. "The party that dares to attack the foundations of the state, that rises against religion and that does not even call a halt before the person of the All-Highest Sovereign," Wilhelm declared, "must be destroyed."35 Philipp zu Eulenburg thereafter expressed concern that the Kaiser might finally take the opportunity to dissolve the Reichstag and change the electoral law. "The moment has come when one must act!" Wilhelm had stated. Eulenburg admitted, however, that "if during a serious foreign conflict, the possibility emerges that half the army is handcuffed by a general strike in the country, then we are lost." The second major obstacle to a large-scale increase in the peacetime strength of the army was the navy. In the spring of 1894 the Chief of Staff in the Navy High Command, Alfred Tirpitz, had produced a lengthy study of naval warfare. The main purpose of the fleet was to achieve naval superiority, something that could only be accomplished through offensive action. Amphibious landings in hostile territory, the blockade of enemy ports and coastlines, the damaging of trans-Atlantic maritime interests, and the destruction and raiding of coastal cities, in short the "real means of forcing the enemy to seek peace," were only then possible. Economic prosperity, at the same time, was more effectively safe-guarded by the offensive. "A state which has sea interests, or what is equivalent, world interests, must be able to defend them and make its power noticeable outside territorial waters." The continued protection of "national world commerce, world industry...world transport and colonies," Tirpitz explained, was virtually "impossible without a fleet capable of the offensive." Cruiser warfare and the

34 Waldersee's Diary, 30 December 1896, printed in Meisner, Denkwurdigkeiten des General- Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 2, 381. 35 Wilhelm II to the Brandenburg Provincial Assembly, 26 February 1897, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 528. 36 Philipp zu Eulenburg to Btilow, 20 July 1899, printed in Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespondenz, vol. 3, 1952-58. 39 interdiction of an opponent's merchant fleet could form one component of a naval conflict, but not the main focus, since "exclusive cruiser war from the beginning renounces" the offensive and "the strongest means which naval warfare offers." The employment of a large battleship fleet was therefore "the best, and in many cases indeed the only means of naval warfare which is capable of having a positive effect on the enemy."37 The Kaiser, who was already convinced of the connection between naval power and economic prosperity by the writings of the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan and who disapproved of the existing sluggish, step-by-step construction program of the naval administration, gradually became more receptive to Tirpitz's arguments. On 3 February 1897 Wilhelm therefore ordered the Reich Chancellor, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, to present the Reichstag with legislation for a large-scale expansion of the navy. The German fleet, the Kaiser contended, had to be at least half as strong as the Franco-Russian fleets, "otherwise we would be lost."38 Tirpitz, who was appointed State Secretary of the Navy Office in June 1897, nevertheless had more ambitious and far more expensive objectives. In a discussion with Anton von Monts, the Prince-Regent of Bavaria, Tirpitz explained that the fleet had to posses the strength that would "enable it to fight the strongest of the other navies, namely the British."39 On 6 December 1897 the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Bernhard von Bulow, inaugurated German Weltpolitik, or world policy when he declared to the Reichstag: "We do not want to put anyone in the shade, but we also expect our place in the sun."40 The opening phase of the new naval construction program was thereafter presented to the parliamentary deputies. More importantly, by the time the First Navy Bill was finally approved on 10 April 1898, the fleet had gained budgetary priority over

37 "Dienstschrift Nr. IX," composed by Tirpitz, 16 June 1894, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 87-99. See also Ivo Nikolai Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 75-8. 38 Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst's Diary, 3 February 1897, printed in Karl Alexander von Muller, ed., Ftirst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst: Denkwiirdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit (Osnabruck: Biblio, 1967), 295-6. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 526. 39 Tirpitz to Monts, November 1897, in Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 144. 40 Biilow to the Reichstag, 6 December 1897, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, IX Legislative Period, 4th Session, vol. 159 (Berlin, 1897-8), 60. See also 40 the army. The future navy would consist of nineteen battleships, eight armoured cruisers and numerous smaller ships. Moreover, the larger ships were to be automatically replaced every twenty-five years.41 One of the fundamental prerequisites for the implementation of the "Tirpitz Plan," the State Secretary of the Navy Office had explained to the Kaiser in June 1897, had been the acquiescence of the army administration. "No new demands" could emerge from the army in the foreseeable future.42 The sense of relief that the government would henceforth redirect considerable appropriations from the Ministry of War to the burgeoning navy was indeed detected as early as July 1898 when the then State Secretary of the Reich Treasury Office, Max von Thielmann, at the request of Tirpitz advised the Minister of War that considering the financial problems confronting the federal government, the army would have to exercise the utmost restraint when formulating its demands for the next Quinquennat, scheduled to be renewed in the following spring.43 Gofiler, in a letter addressed to both Thielmann and Hohenlohe subsequently declared his full agreement with the viewpoint of the Reich Treasury Office. The Ministry of War, GoBler assured the government, would not propose legislation for new army increases in the near future but would instead use whatever funds available to improve the organization and internal quality of the army.44 Despite the considerable obstacles to a large-scale increase in the army, the Chief of the General Staff continued to formulate ambitious operational plans. In July 1894 Schlieffen expressed concern that France would begin a future conflict on the offensive. The speed of the French mobilization, at the same time, was cause for serious concern. "It will be difficult to surpass our opponent," the Chief of the General Staff wrote, since everything depended "on whether it was possible to further increase the speed of the German mobilization and deployment."45 Since a significant part of the mobilization-

41 HolgerH. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 (London: The Ashfield Press, 1987), 42. 42 Tirpitz to Wilhelm II, 15 June 1897, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 134-6. 43 Thielmann to GoBler, July 1898, in Volker R. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan: Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II. (Dtisseldorf: Droste, 1971), 254-5. 44 GoBler to Thielmann, 3 August 1898, in Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 97. Also see Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan, 254-5. 45 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, July 1894, in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 67-8. 41

strength would have to be deployed against the Russians in the event of a two-front war, Schlieffen thereafter concluded in August 1895, the French would possess a definite numerical superiority in the West. Under the circumstances, only an offensive with "limited objectives" and designed to produce more favourable conditions for subsequent operations could be considered. The French border fortifications would probably require an extended period to overcome and, consequently, major offensives were "discouraged in the strongest terms" in preference to "the sum of a series of small partial successes." The danger nevertheless remained that the inadequate strength of the field army would preclude even such a moderate offensive. Moreover, an abandonment of the initiative would undoubtedly be "felt by both the army and the people to be an admission of weakness."46 The Chief of the General Staff therefore began to seriously contemplate an large-scale envelopment of the French forces in Alsace-Lorraine. On 2 August 1897 Schlieffen proposed to "find a way" which was barred by "as few fortifications as possible." The conditions for such an envelopment were considered favourable in the area to the north of the French fortifications around Verdun since such an offensive could "be directed against the enemy's lines of communication" and if this was successful, force the French "away from Paris." But the area immediately north of the French fortifications was not suitable for the deployment of large forces. "An offensive which seeks to wheel around Verdun must not shrink from violating the neutrality of Belgium, as well as Luxembourg." At the same time, the enveloping formations would have to be made as strong as possible. The manoeuvring armies would "lose contact with the remainder of the German army," Schlieffen anticipated, and in addition "would be confronting the French masses." Consequently, the "entire German army" would have to be concentrated in the West, while three new active army corps and several reserve formations would have to be created. All available Landwehr units, moreover, would have, to be prepared to both performing rear-area functions and "march immediately behind the active corps."47

46 "The Conditions, Directions and Prospects for a German Offensive against France," composed in the General Staff, August 1895, in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 69-71. 47 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, 2 August 1897, in Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 41; Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 74-6. 42

The Quinquennat of 1899 was a severe disappointed for the General Staff. The increase in peacetime strength of 16,271 men had been far less than Schlieffen had expected. The conflict concerning the Quinquennat of 1899 mainly revolved around the proposed increase in the number of cavalry squadrons. The increase in the infantry was accepted by almost all the parties of the Reichstag but the Centre and the National Liberals in particular resented the increase to the most aristocratic arm of the military. The Minister of War, however, initially stood by even this modest increase in the peacetime strength. The Reich Chancellor, on the other hand, was much more eager to avoid a serious domestic political conflict with the Reichstag. The Conservatives had agreed to support the construction of a large battleship fleet in return for increased tariffs on agricultural products. The National Liberals, the representatives of the industrialists, had entered into this agreement in order to reap the rewards of numerous and large naval ship contracts. The Reich Chancellor was extremely unwilling to jeopardize this arrangement so soon after the passage of the naval program and so soon before Tirpitz was prepared to introduce a Second Navy Bill, set for the spring of 1900. Hohenlohe was also fearful that the Kaiser, who supported an increase in the number of cavalry squadrons, would take the opportunity to advocate once again a Staatsstreich. "The Kaiser has said, he must have everything or nothing. If he doesn't get everything, he wants a dissolution [of the Reichstag]."48 The Reich Chancellor therefore advocated a compromise. The army administration would be allowed to request the reduced 7,006 men at any time during the course of the upcoming Quinquennat if the international situation changed enough to warrant a further increase in the peacetime strength.49 The so-called "small Quinquennat" was approved and went into effect on 25 March 1899. Soon after the approval of the peacetime strength law, however, a debate ensued between the General Staff and the Ministry of War concerning the future organization of the army. GoBler, having relinquished budgetary priority to the fleet, was intent on improving the quality of the active formations and eliminating any deficiencies

48 Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst's Diary, 27 February 1899, printed in Mttller, Denkwurdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 486. 49 Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 107-8; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 229. 43 in the structure of the standing army. The peacetime strength had increased significantly over the preceding decade, but the inner cohesion of the active formations had not experienced a corresponding improvement. "The German army," the Minister of War consequently wrote to Schlieffen in June 1899, had "now assumed a scale in terms of wartime formations" that "exceeded the limits of a healthy development" and, furthermore, encompassed "serious dangers" to the effectiveness of the field army. The large numbers of reserves and Landwehr men required to supplement the active formations during mobilization, Gofller explained, would seriously damage the effectiveness of the active army corps in a future conflict and GoBler and the deputy Minister of War, Karl von Einem, both agreed that the attention of the army administration would have to be directed towards the "future structure of the war formation and organization of the army," from which "all less operationally capable elements" had to be eliminated. In complete opposition to the proposals from the General Staff, which had at the very least requested the creation of additional formations from reserve and Landwehr units, the Ministry of War proposed a large-scale reduction in the number of second- and third-line units. GoBler proposed to disband 144 infantry battalions were to transfer the resulting manpower to the remaining active and reserve units. Such an unprecedented measure, the Minister of War argued, would result in a "considerable improvement in the quality" of the field army since the ratio of trained reserves to Landwehr troops in the reserve units would be dramatically increased. Though not rejecting a future expansion of the army organization, GoBler realized that the proposed reorganization would require a several years to implement. During this period, an expansion of the peacetime strength would be virtually impossible.50 From the perspective of the General Staff and, in particular, the operational planning then being conducted by Schlieffen, a reduction in the number of peacetime formations would severely hinder the effectiveness of the field army to assume the offensive in a two-front war. Schlieffen agreed that a consistent organization of the field

50 GoBler to Schlieffen, 8 June 1899, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistimg und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 57-8; Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 64-6. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 112; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 231-2; Storz, Kriegsbild und Rustung vor 1914, 322-3. 44 army would ensure a rapid and unproblematic mobilization. The Chief of the General Staff, writing to GoBler in August 1899, agreed in principle that the overall combat effectiveness of the army would be reduced by the allocation of a large number of reserve troops in the active formations. The General Staff nevertheless protested against the elimination of so many Landwehr battalions. Such a proposal would mean a "weakening of the reserves troops available for use with the field army by almost a third of their strength," which "in regard to the considerable superiority of our probable opponents" was impossible. At the same time, Schlieffen rejected the proposal from the Ministry of War to create two additional reserve corps consisting of the existing supernumerary third divisions, present with some active army corps, and a reserve division. The Chief of the General Staff instead proposed that the supernumerary third infantry brigades, which were currently attached to the active formations, be combined with reserve brigades to create several mixed divisions. The more complete integration of active and reserve troops in "war corps," Schlieffen argued, would provide additional combat effective formations that could operate alongside the active army corps in a future conflict. Instead of a reduction in the number of battalions, Schlieffen continued, the "missing" third battalions of the small infantry regiments, which had been created when the fourth training battalions that had been formed under the "big army bill" had been concentrated into additional regiments in 1896, be immediately created by increasing the peacetime strength. The General Staff obviously did not share the opinion of the Ministry of War that the strength of the army presented "serious dangers" to combat effectiveness of the field army.51

GoBler admitted that the "political situation of the last decade has meant that always greater masses of troops, which first in the case of mobilization partially from older age groupings under the direction of officers of the retired list" had to be committed to the main operations. Furthermore, the Minister of War acknowledged that the increasing population of Germany allowed the army administration to "feasibly eliminate

51 Schlieffen to GoBler, 19 August 1899, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1,61-7. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 113; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 232-3. 45 the existing defects within the scope of the present organization." What was impossible, owing to the financial situation of the federal government and the shortage of suitable officer candidates, was a "greater expansion of the arms." The Minister of War pointed out that the Prussian success in the Wars of Unification had been made possible almost exclusively from the application of active army corps, and that at the beginning of a future conflict the decisive decision would have to be brought about by the "solid fighting strength of our active army corps." The formation of "war corps," GoBler argued, would cause considerable problems with mobilization. Moreover, the combination of active and reserve infantry units with only reserve artillery and auxiliary units would produce very inferior formations than the French already possessed. The formation of these units upon mobilization would not provide the necessary solidarity in command and cohesion that was necessary for combat effectiveness in a future campaign. The Ministry of War would instead concentrate on eliminating the existing deficiencies in the standing army and the gradual expansion of the peacetime organization. GoBler considered the creation of fourth battalions with all the small infantry regiments infeasible. Parliamentary approval of such a proposal so soon after the passing of the Quinquennat was extremely unlikely and, furthermore, the financial situation of the Reich would, in the future, prevent such an increase in the peacetime strength of the army. The Ministry of War had unquestionably assumed an unwavering stance on the importance of quality over quantity.

Schlieffen nevertheless refused to abandon the pressure for an increase in the number of wartime formations. "An offensive against the French army, which can rely upon enormous fortresses and deploy behind strongly fortified areas," he pointed out to GoBler in November 1899, "has to be carefully prepared and carried out using all available strength." The French, though superior in the number of infantry battalions, tended to rely on larger formations. The resulting "very strong but somewhat cumbersome" organization of the French army corps therefore could be countered by the creation of five new "war corps" immediately following mobilization. By collecting various supernumerary third divisions and fifth infantry brigades the General Staff would

52 GoBler to Schlieffen, 19 October 1899, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 68-72. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 113. 46

be able to deploy a larger number of smaller, more mobile army corps. The numerical superiority in German field artillery would, furthermore, enable these provisional formations to match up favourably with their French counterparts. But while Schlieffen admitted that the current shortage in active field artillery would necessitate the assignment of reserve batteries with the active formations, he outright rejected the Ministry of War's proposal to create additional army corps using a mixture of active and reserve units. "The experiences that the long history of the army offers us...makes it appear almost impossible to use Landwehr or reserve troops in the first-line." Deploying second-line units alongside or within active formations would, furthermore, not enhance the quality of the former. The application of reserve artillery was "for want of something better" and justified, according to Schlieffen, since these units would not be subject to the same "exertions and dangers" associated with the infantry, while if the "war corps" were not equipped with reserve artillery, they "could not be considered as fighting troops." Schlieffen concluded by calling into question the capability to achieve a decisive success in a future Franco-German conflict with considerable improvements in the wartime organization of the field army. The French possessed "infantry which is superior to us in quantity, and artillery which is superior to us in quality." The difficulties presented by the fortress system on the Franco-German frontier, at the same time, contrasted with the "outdated and antiquated" condition of the German field artillery convinced Schlieffen that "we are therefore probably poorly equipped for an offensive."53 The Quinquennat of 1899 nevertheless provided the General Staff with three additional army corps. The accompanying increase in numerical strength, however, was insignificant and rather than resolving the debate between quantity and quality within the army administration, the renewal of the peacetime strength law instead sharpened the policy positions of both the General Staff and the Ministry of War. The focus of army policy thereafter became fixated on improving the training and equipment of the reserve formations. But the fundamental reason for the extensive manpower demands of the

53 Schlieffen to GoBler, 10 November 1899, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 77-9. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 113-4; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 233. 47

General remained hidden from the Ministry of War. In November 1899 Schlieffen had produced a memorandum suggesting possible course of action in a two-front war. Once again, the focus of the plan against the French involved an enveloping attack against the northern flank of the French offensive. The Chief of the General Staff, all too aware that numerical superiority along the entire front was impossible, once again aspired to mass the largest portion of the field army in the West against the French left flank. Although the Germans, because of their numerical inferiority, could not afford to take the offensive from the outset, it would be extremely dangerous to allow the much stronger French forces to withdraw into their formidable frontier fortifications. Schlieffen recognized the "necessary to limit oneself to attacking an enemy wing with numerical superiority" and therefore that the "strongest possible forces must be concentrated against the enemy flank."54 Elaborating further upon the concept of envelopment, the deputy Chief of the General Staff produced a study in January 1900 supporting a large-scale enveloping manoeuvre against the French left flank. Any German offensive would have to take place north of the French fortress line and therefore could not avoid breaching the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg. The enveloping wing, furthermore, had to be made "as strong as possible from the very beginning" so as to "permit it to conduct decisive operations." Secrecy was absolutely essential. The most important prerequisite was therefore "to conduct the planned offensive quickly and with full force, in order, if at all possible, to arrive at a complete decision through the first blows."55 The ambitious scope of the operational planning then being conducted within the General Staff ensured, despite domestic political opposition, social concerns and constantly increasing naval expenditure, the fundamental principles of the "Verdy Plan" remained alive within the army administration.

54 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, November 1899, in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, 105-7. 55 Memorandum produced in the General Staff, 19 January 1900, in Ibid.. 104-5. 48

Chapter Three: The General Staff versus the Ministry of War, 1899-1911

On 24 August 1898 the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Prince Hugo von Radolin- Radolinski, transmitted a written request from Tsar Nicholas II to the Reich Chancellor for an international conference on armaments limitation. The European great powers had consistently endeavoured to enhance their military strength, both on land and at sea, and in the process had created an extremely tense and potentially explosive international situation. The Russian government, Radolin commented, therefore wanted to "push the danger of war into the background," and, at the same time, provide other conservative and monarchical regimes with a convenient weapon against the increasing socialist pressure to constrict military budgets.1 The response from Berlin was anything but positive. The Kaiser, suspicious that an international armaments agreement would only serve to relieve the Russians from their "financial mess," was extremely reluctant to send a delegation to the conference which assembled in The Hague, Netherlands in May 1899.2 The German representative, Count Georg zu Munster, was thereafter similarly sceptical about the tangible advantages of limiting armaments expenditure. "We must not accept anything which would limit or impair our military strength and Germany's independence." The conference, Munster scoffed, was simply "a really dirty advertising stunt which the Russians are running for their young Tsar, whom they want to make into the Prince of Peace."3 Under no circumstances could the German government allow an international agreement to fix expenditures for either the army or the navy.

Considerable opposition likewise emerged in the army administration. Shortly before the conference adjourned in July 1899, the representative of the Ministry of War, Georg von Viebahn, recommended that Germany reject any far-reaching proposals that might hinder future increases in the military budget. The Quinquennat of 1899 was scheduled to expire in March 1904. But a threatening international situation could emerge

1 Radolin to Hohenlohe-Schillingsftirst, 24 August 1898, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 15, Rings urn die Erste Haager Friedenskonferenz, 141-3. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 602. 2 Billow to Wilhelm II, 28 August 1898, printed in Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, vol. 3, The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910, 74. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 602. 3 Munster to Holstein, 12 April 1899, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 603. 49

and compel the Minister of War to request the 7,006 men that had previously been eliminated from the peacetime strength law by the Reichstag. Whereas the Russian proposals might indeed mitigate the "grave problem" of international armaments competition and the constant strengthening of "military forces to proportions hitherto unknown," any multi-lateral arrangement would unmistakably "bind the hands" of the army administration for an indefinite period of time and, in doing so, severely obstruct the "organic expansion of the army" and preclude expenditures for fortifications and other necessary defence purposes.4 The Ministry of War had indeed rejected a large-scale increase in the peacetime strength in 1899. Nevertheless, the army administration needed to be capable of responding to a change in the balance of military power in the future. The German government had only agreed to attend the Hague conference to prevent the Tsar "from making a fool of himself before all Europe." "In practice," the Kaiser declared, "I will continue as before to trust only in God and my sharp sword!" and "will shit on all the resolutions!"5 The Minister of War, however, had no intention of immediately exploiting the absence of an armaments agreement to reintroduce a long- term program of army expansion. During a meeting of the Prussian Ministry of State in January 1900, in which the State Secretary of the Navy Office presented the draft legislation for the Second Navy Bill, GoBler clarified his position. The Quinquennat of 1899 had been entirely sufficient for the prevailing needs of the army. Subsequently, "given the considerable needs in men for the fleet...a substantial strengthening of the army was out of the question." The imminent presentation of the naval demands to the Reichstag furthermore meant that the Ministry of War "would have to be as frugal as possible and avoid loans in the following years for the purpose of army expansion." Though GoBler confirmed that the 7,006 men that had been reduced by the Reichstag might be sought in the future, only the creation of additional foot artillery and pioneer

4 Viebahn to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst, 1 July 1899, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 15, 211-2. 5 Btilow to Wilhelm II, 21 June 1899, printed in Ibid., 300-6. See also Rich, Fhedrich von Hohtein, vol. 2, 607. 50 units were immediately required.6 Since Tirpitz's forthcoming navy bill intended to effectively double the strength of the fleet, the State Secretary of the Treasury Office likewise ruled out a renewal of the "Verdy Plan." During a subsequent ministerial meeting, Thielmann requested that all government departments, including the army, practice extreme reservation in the preparation of the next budget. Gofller hastened to assure the State Secretary of the Treasury Office that the army budget would be limited, at least for the time being, and that major increases in the peacetime strength would not be considered. In March 1902 the Minister of War composed a detailed memorandum outlining the intended further development of the standing army. Since the approval of the last Quinquennat there had been a "period of quiet, steady development." Moreover, the "gradual increase of the peacetime strength had matched the requirements and the war preparedness of the army had been increased." The organization of the field army had been kept "light and usable," such that the existing supernumerary fifth infantry brigades could also be formed into additional divisions during mobilization. GofJler nevertheless once again rejected the centralization of these provisional divisions into "war corps." The Ministry of War estimated that the necessary trained staff officers were not readily available at the time and further argued that any additional army corps had to be assembled in peacetime to ensure that the formations possessed the proper internal cohesion and organization. The adoption of the two-year service period similarly precluded a large-scale increase in the peacetime strength. Both annual recruit contingents in any given year had to be maintained at full-strength to preserve the operational capability of the active units and, consequently, the manpower would not be available to expand the army structure. For the next Quinquennat, Gofiler therefore envisioned only a modest increase in the number of infantry battalions, as well as some regiments of Jager zu Pferde, or mounted infantry, that would augment the strength of

6 GoBler to the Prussian Ministry of State, 20 January 1900, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 66-7. See also Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan, 251; Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 163. 7 Thielmann to the Prussian Ministry of State, 5 February 1900, in Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 109. 51 the divisional cavalry. The foot artillery, pioneers and telegraph troops, in addition to the machine-gun detachments, which had recently become an important asset in wartime, would also be moderately strengthened.8 The army administration, confronted with considerable pressure to reduce future expenditures, thereafter focused more and more on improving the quality of the active formations. The Deputy Minister of War, Karl von Einem, recommended in June 1903 that the next Quinquennat, scheduled to expire in March 1904, be postponed until the following year. For Einem, the financial difficulties caused by the "Tirpitz Plan" and the ongoing discussion about increased salaries for officers necessitated the postponement of the new army budget. "Financial reasons thus speak against the introduction of the peacetime strength law in the next session, and political reasons also apply, beneficially to allow a delay." The army organization was essentially complete, the Ministry of War had determined, and, furthermore, was "a stable one" with which "one could look forward to all eventualities with calmness." The expansion of the army could therefore "endure without considerable disadvantage a delay of around a year." Einem added that such a postponement could also provide the army administration with the necessary time to evaluate the most pressing needs and requirements of the standing army and therefore present more concise demands to the Reichstag. Although Einem, who was succeeded GoBler as Minister of War in August 1903, acknowledged the need to consolidate and expand the organization of the army, he nevertheless completely rejected the concept of "war corps." The reassignment of field artillery, pioneers and communications units to provide the necessary support for such new formations would seriously disrupt the organization of the field army during mobilization without significantly adding to combat effectiveness. "I am convinced of the higher value of the strength of the organization rather than of the higher number of units," Einem recorded in the Fall of 1903. If the

8 Memorandum composed by GoBler "concerning the legislation for the Fall of 1902," 19 March 1902, printed in Reichsarchiv, Khegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 80-3. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 243. 9 Einem to Billow, 3 June 1903, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 67-9. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 130; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 249. 52

proposals of the General Staff were adopted, the army administration would "encumber itself for a long time with inexpedient improvisations for mobilization, [and] would diminish the value of the available corps."10 The preparations for the Quinquennat thereafter proceeded according to the proposals of the army administration. Already in December 1903 the Minister of War had communicated an outline of the new peacetime strength law. The standing army would be increased by only 10,339 men and consist primarily of an expansion of the cavalry.11 The addition of active formations and the "realization of compulsory military service," while important measures for the future, could not be considered in the next Quinquennat. As Einem declared to the Reichstag one month later, future legislation from the army administration would "not contain significant demands." Commenting on the recent development of army, the Minister of War remarked to the Budget Commission on 29 January 1904: "I view the development of the army in the aspect of the establishment of new formations and the creation of new units largely as completed." The number of active cadres, according to the Minister of War was sufficient and the peacetime strength was not only adequate for the training of the annual recruit contingent, but also for the arrangement of additional reserve and Landwehr formations during mobilization.13 Contrary to the sentiments in the General Staff, the higher quality of the field army would provide Germany with a definite advantage in a future Franco-German or Russo-German conflict. But the existing organization of the army was not the only consideration for the Ministry of War. The "needs of the army in peacetime and war," Einem explained to Schlieffen in February 1904, were indeed of the greatest importance to the army administration but, at the same time, the "general political situation and the increasingly unfavourable structure of the Reich finances had to be drawn into consideration." The correction of the existing deficiencies in the army consequently would follow the

10 Memorandum composed by Einem, Fall 1903, in RH 61-397, BA-MA Freiburg. 11 Einem to Billow, 14 December 1903, in Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 132; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914,252. 12 Einem to the Reichstag, 22 January 1904, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XI Legislature Period, 17th Session, vol. 197 (Berlin, 1903-5), 458. 13 Einem to the Budget Commission, 29 January 1904, in Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 64. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 252. 53

program previously outlined by GofJler. The "missing" third battalions in the small infantry regiments would be created, together with new pioneer, telegraph and train units, while additional cavalry units would be established and allocated to the active formations.14 The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War on 8 February 1904 and the subsequent deployment of large numbers of Russian troops to East Asia appeared to justify the limited program of the Ministry of War. Following a conversation with Schlieffen in April 1904, Prince Karl von Lichnowsky composed a memorandum outlining Russian military effectiveness. Whereas active Russian army corps had remained in garrisons along the Russo-German border, considerable manpower had been removed from these formations for service against Japan. The mobilization of the Russian formations in Poland, as well as the combat effectiveness of the remaining units, would be severely impaired in the event of European war. The "current moment," Lichnowsky concluded, would "doubtlessly be favourable" for a Franco-German conflict. Schlieffen soon after elaborated on these arguments in a report to the Reich Chancellor. The mobilization of the Russian formations in the West would depend heavily upon older reservists since the active cadres had been considerably weakened. Even following a conclusion to hostilities against Japan, the return of the formations in Manchuria would be a lengthy process. The Trans-Siberian Railway had a limited capacity and the transfer of large formations would take months to complete. In the meantime, Russia would without question consider a European conflict extremely "undesirable."16 Despite the relatively quiet international situation, the main concern of the General Staff was the step-by-step correction of the exiting deficiencies in the army. "The defects of our organization that are most obvious," Schlieffen wrote in March 1904, "exist in the great number of infantry regiments with two battalions, the absence of a suitable divisional cavalry and the insufficient equipment

14 Einem to Schlieffen, 26 February 1904, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 87-8. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 132; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-191,4,252-3. 15 Memorandum composed by Lichnowsky, 19 April 1904, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 19, Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, 174-5. 16 Schlieffen to Bulow, 20 April 1904, printed in Ibid.. 175-7. 54

of two divisions with field artillery."17 But the Minister of War remained adamant that large-scale increases were out of the question. Einem again informed Schlieffen in April 1904 that "the development of the army in terms of the establishment of new formations and the creation of new troop units can at the time be considered closed."18 The modest proposals of the Ministry of War, which had the support of the Reich Chancellor, therefore resulted in the creation of only eight infantry battalions, nine cavalry regiments, two foot artillery battalions, three pioneer battalions and several railway, train and telegraph units. The new Quinquennat was approved by the parliamentary deputies on 29 March 1905, with the accompanying expenditures amounting to 62.1 million GM in one­ time outlays and 11.8 million GM in continuous outlays.19 The international situation nevertheless continued to deteriorate. Although not a formal alliance, the Anglo-French entente cordiale of April 1904 resolved numerous long-standing colonial disputes between France and Britain, particularly in Egypt and Morocco, and provided the foundation for future diplomatic and military cooperation. Curiously, the Foreign Office still remained unconcerned about the immediate possibility of a European conflict. "England and France will hardly attack us," Holstein wrote shortly after the completion of the entente, but it was more significant that now "no overseas policy is possible against England and France." The continued assertion of economic and political interests, despite the obvious shortcomings of Weltpolitik and the "Tirpitz Plan," was considered a much more important concern for the government. "It is the duty of a Great Power not merely to protect its territorial frontiers," Holstein recorded in June 1904, "but also the interests lying outside them." The conclusion appeared obvious: "If we now allow our feet to be stepped on...we simply encourage others to do

17 Schlieffen to Einem, 16 March 1904, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 88-9. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 132; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 254. 18 Einem to Schlieffen, 19 April 1904, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 90-2. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 132-3; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 254. 19 For details of this legislation see "Entwurf eines Gesetzes betreffend die Friedensprasenzstarke des deutschen Heeres vom 1905," in Stenographische Berichte ilber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XI Legislative Period, vol. 209 (Berlin, 1903-5), 2634-41. 20 Holstein to his cousin, 10 April 1904, in Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 681-2. 55 the same somewhere else."21 The pretext for re-affirming diplomatic influence abroad and, at the same time, testing the strength of the Anglo-French entente, was provided when Theophile Delcasse, the vehemently anti-German French Minister of Foreign Affairs, ordered a military mission to the Moroccan capital of Fez in January 1905. Both Billow and Holstein subsequently convinced the Kaiser to visit the Moroccan port of Tangier during the scheduled Mediterranean cruise in order to encourage the Sultan to resist the expansion of French economic and political influence. Whereas Wilhelm von Schoen remarked that this "historic act" successfully "passed off with a flourish," the Kaiser went further than the Foreign Office had anticipated and emphatically declared that the Sultan would continue to be regarded as a free and equal ruler of an independent

00 state, and that France would have to respect German economic interests in Morocco. The government and the General Staff were convinced that a Franco-German conflict resulting from the First Moroccan Crisis could be conducted under favourable circumstances. Despite the conclusion of the entente, the Kaiser, Prince Louis of Battenberg noted in his diary in April 1905, remained unconcerned about the possibility of British military intervention. "We know the road to Paris, and we will get there again if needs be." The French "should remember [that] no fleet can defend Paris."23 Bulow added: "England's harassment makes no impression on us. In the event of war the match would be played out between Germany and France. Russia [because of the Russo- Japanese War] would not become embroiled with us for the sake of Morocco even if it were able to do so."24 Nevertheless, the Reich Chancellor once again requested the General Staff to provide an assessment of Russian military capabilities.25 The Russian army, Schlieffen responded, would attain pre-war manpower and equipment strengths

21 Memorandum composed by Holstein, 3 June 1904, printed in Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, 220-1. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 684. 22 Schoen to the Foreign Office, 31 March 1905, printed in Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, vol. 3, 224. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2, 694-5. 23 "Notes of a Conversation with H.M. the German Emperor on board H.M.S. Drake," 1 April 1905, in Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914,211. 24 Bulow to Holstein, 6 May 1905, in Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 44. 25 Billow to Schlieffen, 4 June 1905, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 19, 422. 56

approximately six months after the conclusion of peace. The cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of these formations, however, had been considerably damaged. "It is very questionable whether an improvement will take place," the Chief of the General Staff further explained. "Recent history would suggest that the Russian army will not improve, but instead grow more ineffective," while "internal conditions of our great neighbouring empire will surely not help, but rather add to this development." But Schlieffen recommended caution. Russian military ineffectiveness would not necessarily prevent intervention in a future European conflict. "The desire to restore Russia to its former glory after the defeat suffered in East Asia through cheap victory may arise, and such a path could offer a way out of their internal difficulties."26 In a second report submitted in August 1905 Schlieffen repeated that the majority of Russian active army corps had been stripped of experienced and trained manpower for service against Japan. Moreover, a considerable portion of the ammunition and equipment stocks intended for mobilization had been almost completely depleted. The circumstances represented "not only a great weakening of the Russian strength in Europe in terms of numbers and value, but also a great weakening of the army's organization." If a European conflict occurred in the near future, the German army would be confronted with a single-front war against France. The Chief of the General Staff, having recognized that Russian military support would be severely impaired in the event of a future Franco-German conflict, composed the famous "Schlieffen Plan" in December 1905. The fortifications along the Franco- German border would be "sufficiently occupied by the powerful French army" and would offer "great difficulties to the attacker." The only practical solution for an offensive against France therefore involved an enveloping manoeuvre, and such an offensive would regrettably have to violate the neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. Most critically, the right wing of the German army would have to be made "as strong as possible." Schlieffen envisioned the application of nine active army corps, as well as seven reserve corps, for this massive enveloping movement and also for the reduction of

26 Schlieffen to Billow, 10 June 1905, printed in Robert T. Foley, ed., Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 159-61. 27 Schlieffen to Bulow, 18 August 1905, printed in Ibid.. 161-2. 57 the extensive fortifications in southern Belgium. Moreover, several Landwehr brigades would also have to be deployed immediately behind the advancing right wing formations, since the active army corps had to "remain intact for battle" and therefore could "not be used for duties on the lines of communication functions or for investments and sieges of fortresses." Altogether, the Chief of the General Staff recommended the deployment of 33 army corps; six more than existed in the field army in the winter of 1905. "Still more forces must be raised," Schlieffen therefore declared, since an increase in the number of formations could "not be left until after the offensive has been taken when the need has become painfully apparent or when the operations are forced to a standstill." Moreover, the core principle of the "Verdy Plan" was once again expressed. "We have invented universal conscription and the 'nation in arms' and have taught other nations the necessity of introducing these institutions," Schlieffen lamented, but "after having brought our sworn enemies to the point of increasing their armies out of all measure, we have slackened our own efforts." "We boast of the great size of our population, of the millions who stand ready for our orders, but these millions are not trained or armed to the full number of able-bodied men they could yield." Since the entire "Schlieffen Plan" depended on a "realization of compulsory military service" and the training of all able- bodied German citizens, the fierce opposition of the Ministry of War would have to be overcome and a large-scale army increase thereafter introduced to the Reichstag.

The increasing diplomatic isolation persuaded the Reich Chancellor to request a report on the status of the army. Biilow expressed relief that Germany had avoided a conflict during the recent crisis but, at the same time, remained concerned that the resulting mistrust of Weltpolitik and an unpredictable Russian foreign policy could create future complications. Under the circumstances, the German army had to be completely prepared. "Which technical measures could be considered as countermeasures against the French reforms and efforts? Do we not need additional machine guns? Is a quicker rearmament of the artillery not necessary? What about the arrangement of the

28 Memorandum composed by Schlieffen, December 1905, printed in Foley, Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings, 163-74; Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, 113-48; Alfred von Schlieffen, The Papers of Field- Marshal Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, 1833-1913 (Washington: National Archives, 1952). 58

communication troops?"29 The Ministry of War response was predictable. The measures outlined in the previous Quinquennat were in the process of being implemented. The field artillery was being reequipped with a new recoiling gun and the creation of new machine-gun detachments, something that was absolutely necessary after observation of the Russo-Japanese War, was taking place with the infantry units. Einem nevertheless argued that the production and distribution of this equipment could not be accelerated without significant damage being done to internal cohesion of the active formations. The advancement of technology, especially during the preceding decade, had created serious concerns in the army administration. Before recently developed weapons, equipment or uniforms could be distributed and the troops trained in their use, thorough experiments were necessary to determine the proper application. "As significant and astonishing as the development of technology is," Einem maintained, "what today for the army from the technological-military point of view appears necessary" might not be the case in the future. Einem also had to consider the "political and financial point of view" when preparing new army demands. Parliamentary confidence in the Ministry of War was of the utmost importance and "the reputation of the military administration" could "only increase" the fewer times the orientation of army development was changed in the Reichstag. "That the Quinquennat in some respects binds our hands is obvious," Einem acknowledged, but abandoning the five-year budgetary period would have negative consequences. With "each new organization of the army more serious agitation against its existence would occur and eventually become extremely dangerous." Breaking with the Quinquennat would inevitably precipitate a domestic political conflict since the Reichstag would be provided with "the longed for pretext for the numerous wishes" for an annual determination of army expenditures. Such an arrangement "contradicts the interests of the army which the stability of the organization most of all demands."

29 Biilow to Einem, 1 June 1906, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 95-6. See also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 66; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 261-2. 30 Einem to Biilow, 18 June 1906, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 98-103. See also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 66-7; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 262. 59

While not abandoning numerical increases as a long-term objective, Moltke instead initially focused his energies on the most serious deficiencies in the army's organizational structure. Three months after being appointed Chief of the General Staff, Moltke submitted a memorandum to the General Department in the Ministry of War, proposing several improvements to the operational capability of the field army. The most serious defect, Moltke pointed out, was the limited value of the reserve formations for combat functions. The diversion of part of the field army from main operations "at the borders or in hostile territory" for secondary defensive purposes would "in most cases be a mistake." The Besatzungsarmee should be equipped and organized for deployment against hostile landings along Germany's coastline. Moltke furthermore argued that the foundation for this reorganization already existed. Ersatz infantry battalions and artillery batteries, though severely under-strength, were assigned to the larger fortresses or allocated to the active army corps. The Ministry of War would only have to seek approval for the necessary expenditures to establish regimental and brigade staffs, under which these units could be concentrated, and to provide the necessary equipment to be able to accomplish certain secondary functions. The Chief of the General Staff concluded that the necessary preparations "had to be made in peacetime," since improvisations and would inevitably hinder the initial deployment of the field army while not providing the coastal regions with adequate protection until several weeks after mobilization.31

Not surprisingly, the Ministry of War was more cautious. Although the concentration and organization of the second- and third line troops did not require a significant increase in the peacetime strength of the army and the withdrawal of parts of the field army for defensive operations in secondary theatres was an equally unpleasant option, Einem argued that there were numerous concerns that prevented the introduction of such an arrangement. The concentrated application of Landwehr and, above all, Ersatz units without sufficient support from the field army was considered impossible because of the shortage of qualified and experienced officers. "I entertain serious doubt," the

31 Moltke to the General War Department, 7 April 1906, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 94-5. 60

Minister of War wrote to Moltke, "that [the proposed] formations by virtue of their composition and especially because of the quality of their officers are suitable for such an assignment." The almost certain "loose coherence and lesser internal value" of the proposed Ersatz formations made it absolutely necessary that their assigned officers were of a similar quality in "skill and character" as those serving with the field army. The officers available for these positions, particularly at the lower levels, were not suitable. Moreover, the application of troops whose main purpose was the replacement of combat casualties in the field army would create serious complications. Any disruption of the "orderly replacement" in the regular units would constitute a "remarkably serious evil" since it would inevitably have "detrimental consequences for the operational capability" of the field army. The opening months of the Franco-Prussian War and the difficulties then experienced with using reserve units alongside the regular army were referenced by Einem as justification for opposing Moltke's modest proposals.32 The Ministry of War, still unaware of the full particulars of operational planning being conducted within the General Staff, remained extremely reluctant to approve any modification in the army that might increase the demand for more officer positions. In September 1906 the charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg reported on the growing possibility of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. "Russia has lost its fleet and possesses no means in the short term to recreate onc.it must therefore become friends with a power that possesses a great fleet [and] this can only be England."33 Moltke, concerned about the international situation, persisted in his requests for improved organization and equipment. At the beginning of October 1906 the Chief of the General Staff sent a second memorandum to the Ministry of War that attempted to dispel some of the qualms the application of second- and third-line units in operations had raised. Moltke argued that a hostile landing - presumably he was thinking of a British landing in Schleswig-Holstein - would likely take place during or shortly after mobilization. In such

32 Einem to Moltke, 6 June 1906, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1,96-8. 33 The charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg to Billow, 19 September 1906, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 25, Die Englisch-Russische Entente und der Osten, 23. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 293. 61 a case it would be necessary to detach a part of the field army and thereby sacrifice the rapidity of the main operations. There "remains no choice whatsoever," Moltke argued, "we must snatch up all the strength of the Besatzungsarmee without consideration of their quality and other assignments if we do not want to be helpless in the face of a hostile incursion." Against an enemy landing force, which would initially not have a secure source for supply and reinforcement, "inferior troops" could also be successful if they were deployed quickly enough. Moltke, repeating his previous demands, again cautioned that the necessary preparations had to be completed in peacetime. "It does not suffice if the measures for the arrangement of units from the Besatzungsarmee are taken only after word of mobilization," the Chief of Staff argued, since only "through the immediate gathering of these men" could the reserve formations obtain wartime readiness. The contentious issue of officer appointments for the proposed new Landwehr and Ersatz regimental staffs appeared to Moltke to be solvable. Whereas the Military Cabinet would undoubtedly object to the appointment of various officers for character-related reasons and numerous higher-ranking officers would at the same time reject such an assignment, the absolute necessity of these regimental staffs and the expectation that "every higher officer will not shrink from the defence of the Fatherland at the time of danger" led Moltke to believe that the necessary personnel would be available. The old concept of "rejuvenation" of the army was again applied as Moltke warned that the large number of second contingent Landwehr men would be left at home if his proposed reorganization was not adhered to. In their place hostile landings would be countered by calling up the local Landsturm men, which would be even more poorly equipped and organized than the presently available Landwehr. The designated role for reserve and replacement troops could not be forgotten, but the composition of these units "had to allow for combat use in emergencies". The application of these units did "not arise from our intents" but depended "rather on those of the enemy".34

34 Moltke to Einem, 2 October 1906, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 104-5. 62

The announcement of the Anglo-Russian colonial agreement in late August 1907 accelerated the reorientation from Weltpolitik to a continental European policy. The Kaiser emphatically declared in a marginal comment on a report from his ambassador in St. Petersburg, Friedrich von Pourtales, that the tense international situation demanded an immediate restructuring of the taxation system in order to facilitate large-scale military increases: "many indirect taxes; strong fleet, strong army!" At the same time, the Reich Chancellor again appeared willing to advocate an immediate increase in peacetime strength. Britain and Russia preferred peace. France, despite persistent revanchist sentiments, would similarly not enthusiastically enter into a conflict with Germany. The French would nevertheless continue to strengthen the fortifications along the Franco- German frontier, the British would build more Dreadnoughts, and the Russians would concentrate additional troops opposite Austria-Hungary and Germany. Billow therefore wrote Wilhelm that "we must as quickly as possible work on the striking readiness and war effectiveness of the army," but "avoid drawing unnecessary attention to our work and arousing new suspicions." The situation was made more complicated on 6 October 1908 when the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alois von Aerenthal, formally announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Billow, aware that refusal to support Austria-Hungary could precipitate a collapse of the Triple Alliance, thereafter issued his famous "ultimatum" to St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian annexation would have to be accepted by the Russian government. Only a "yes or no" would suffice and, if the Russians answered in the negative, Germany would "let matters take their course."37 At the same time, the tense international situation prompted Moltke to write to the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, to create some kind of unified Austro-German strategy in the event of a European conflict. The German government, Moltke wrote, would "stand on the side of

35 Pourtales to Bulow, 12 June 1908, in Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 293. 36 Bulow to Wilhelm II, 17 June 1908, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 25, 466-7. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 293-4. 37 Billow to Pourtales, 21 March 1909, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 26, Die Bosnische Krise 1908-1909, 693-5. 63

Austria in full strength in the sense of the agreement of 1879" if the latter was attacked -jo by Russia. The meeting at the Reich Chancellor's palace in June 1909 provided an early opportunity for Moltke to make his opinion heard. Biilow had assembled the military leaders as well as the various diplomats involved to discuss the wisdom of seeking an understanding, both naval and diplomatic, with Britain. Tirpitz, whose naval program had spiralled out of control following the construction of the HMS Dreadnought in 1906, maintained that seeking a strength ratio of 3:4 between the British and German fleets was the only possible course of action. Any possible diplomatic agreement, the State Secretary argued, would naturally follow on the heels of such a naval understanding. Moltke, on the other hand, counselled caution. He reasoned that the army, owing to the relative weakness of the navy, could not possibly achieve a decisive success in an Anglo- German conflict. The more prudent solution was to seek an "honourable understanding" with London based on an immediate deceleration of the naval construction program. In an ominous conclusion, Moltke foresaw that a failure to seek a naval agreement could mean a conflict between Britain and Germany. The Ministry of War nevertheless still felt confident enough in its peacetime strength to produce a memorandum in July 1909 that outlined the army's future development. "I consider the framework of the army, as it is constituted in its three main arms," Einem wrote to Moltke, "despite some gaps, as unchangeable for some time to come and consider only the extension of the auxiliary arms as an urgent requirement". The Ministry of War indeed considered it necessary to improve the combat effectiveness of the active formations through the creation of additional machine-gun detachments but the creation of these units, Einem cautioned, would necessitate an increase to the peacetime strength. Consequently, the active army corps located near to the Franco-German and Russo-German borders, as well as the

38 Moltke to Conrad von HOtzendorf, 21 January 1909, printed in Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, vol. 1, Die Zeit der Annexionskrise 1906-1909 (Vienna: Rikola, 1925), 379- 84. See also Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 111. 39 Meeting at the Reich Chancellor's Palace, 3 June 1909, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 28, England und die deutsche Flotte 1908-1911, 168-78. 64

"small" infantry regiments, could be strengthened, but the remaining active formations would be unaffected. Perhaps because he realized that the creation of additional active formations in the next Quinquennat was impossible, Moltke again pressured the Ministry of War to introduce certain internal improvements to increase the combat effectiveness of the field army and simplify mobilization. The Chief of the General again returned to Schlieffen's favourite idea that the diminishing of the offensive power of the army would invariably occur through the application of active formations in secondary theatres and in lines of communications and garrison functions. It was imperative that second- and third-line troops be better equipped and organized into larger formations so that they could assume more important functions in wartime. The General Staff could "only with difficulty extract an appropriately strong army from the scheduled deployment on the eastern and western borders," and therefore certain units, originally allocated by the Ministry of War to replace combat casualties in the regular formations, had to be thoroughly prepared in peacetime to protect the more vulnerable borders and coastlines.41 The potential for a British amphibious landing in Schleswig-Holstein, the northern-most region of Germany, particularly worried Moltke. The improvisation of larger formations composed of ill- equipped reserve and Landwehr units at the beginning of a conflict was not practical for the defence of this area, whereas similar troops, if properly organized beforehand, could be expected to offer strong resistance against an enemy invasion.42 Domestic political considerations now precluded a large-scale expansion of the army and a "realization of compulsory military service." The new Reich Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, consequently formulated his policy around two basic objectives: a limitation of the financially and politically disastrous naval armaments competition with Great Britain; and an easing of the potentially paralyzing domestic

40 Einem to Moltke, 23 July 1909, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 114-6. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 198. 41 Moltke to Heeringen, 1 July 1910, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 118-20. 42 Moltke to Heeringen, 20 August 1910, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 374-6. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 275. 65

political tensions that had followed the financial reform crisis. The Reich Chancellor did not anticipate a fundamental change in the direction of German policy, but, at the same time, endeavoured to "reduce the numerous areas of international friction".43 Instead of Billow's "place in the sun" that supposedly would accompany the construction of a large battleship fleet, the "Tirpitz Plan" had resulted in Germany's diplomatic isolation. But even Tirpitz had realized by 1909 that Germany could not possibly hope to outpace Britain in battleship construction. This had become even more apparent when the British government announced its intention to double German naval construction by laying down eight large battleships in 1910-11.44 Public pressure, however, weighed heavily on the Chancellor. If Bethmann Hollweg openly opposed the naval program, he would leave himself vulnerable to severe criticism from the Social Democrats and Left Liberals that massive funds had been wasted on battleship construction, whereas the Conservatives would argue that Weltpolitik had been abandoned prematurely. The Under Secretary of State in the Reich Foreign Office, Wilhelm Stemrich, perceptively observed in October 1909 that "one does not lightly abandon the idea of great power status."45 Bethmann Hollweg had provided insight into the objectives of his domestic policy when he addressed the Reichstag on 9 December 1909: "What the people demand most is that this economic and cultural work not be disturbed at home or on the world market through experiments and unrest."4 Domestic politics had clearly reached a critical juncture. Bethmann Hollweg's predecessor, Biilow, had attempted in 1909 to extend the existing inheritance tax as part of a large-scale reform of Reich finances. Naval construction had previously been financed mainly through indirect taxes on consumer products, since constitutionally only the federal states were permitted to collect the revenue from direct taxation. But by 1908-9 it had become obvious that this arrangement

43 Bethmann Hollweg to Eisendecher, 18 July 1913, in Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 74. 44 Michael Epkenhans, Tirpitz: Architect of the German High Seas Fleet (Washington: Potomac, 2008), 43. 45 Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 92-3. 46 Bethmann Hollweg to the Reichstag, 9 December 1909, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XII Legislative Period, 7th Session, vol. 258 (Berlin, 1909-10), 166-8. See also Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, 74. 66

was insufficient for providing the necessary funds required for dreadnought-type battleships. The Conservative Party, representing the anti-property-tax-inclined and politically influential Junker landowners, consequently joined together with the regionally- and religious-minded Centre Party to defeat the proposed financial reform in the Reichstag and force Billow's resignation. The result was a polarization of domestic politics. The National Liberal Party, representing heavy industry, had supported financial reform and consequently distanced themselves from their former allies in the Reichstag, the Conservatives. Whereas the new Chancellor's foremost concern was with mending the severed relations between the centre and right, the influential position of the Conservatives, especially in the Prussian parliament, or Landtag, compelled Bethmann Hollweg to pursue a "policy of the diagonal" that was heavily skewed to the right.48 This policy became exceedingly more difficult as the Reichstag elections of 1912 drew closer. Opposition to financial reform and to a progressive modification of the archaic three- class voting system in Prussia had alienated much of the "unconscious" sympathy in the countryside that had until then existed for the Conservatives. While Bethmann Hollweg could not afford to abandon the Conservative Party, at the same time, he had to avoid all but the most absolutely necessary connections with this unpopular parliamentary faction.49 In domestic politics, as in foreign policy, the government had to tack a cautious course between two extremes. The financial burden that the "Tirpitz Plan" imposed on the government was at the same time confronted with stiff resistance from another quarter. Since his appointment as State Secretary of the Reich Treasury Office in July 1909, Adolf Wermuth had managed the government's finances with the basic principle of "no expenses without cover".50 For Wermuth, the uncontrolled armaments expenditure that

47 Herwig, "Luxury Fleet", 37-8; Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 1815-1914 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), 252; Peter-Christian Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913: Eine Studie zur Innenpolitik des Wilhelminischen Deutschland (Liibeck: Matthiesen, 1970), 18-9. 48 Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 85-6. 49 Abraham J. Peck, Radicals and Reactionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Germany (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), 82-3. 50 Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913, 316-7. 67

had dominated government policy in the preceding decade was the root cause for the desperate state of government finances. "Each decision over additional expenditures," Wermuth wrote to Heeringen in September 1910, "which exceeds the present financial strength of the Reich," could only be "conditional" and had to ask the basic question whether "necessary new means have to be introduced."51 Elimination of the practice of financing armaments expenditure with high-interest loans and the achievement of a lasting balance between revenues and expenditures in the Reich household budget, both made all the more difficult by the prevailing tax structure, were the primary concerns for the new Secretary of the Treasury and the objectives that he pursued, in Tirpitz's words, with blind "departmental fanaticism".52 While the Secretary of the Navy might also have been exaggerating when he remarked that Wermuth had succeeded in "surrounding the Treasury with barbed-wire," expenditures for both the army and navy were indeed significantly reduced during the next few years. The domestic political situation ultimately produced the so-called "technical Quinquennaf of 1911. The "esteemed position of Germany and its influence on the preservation of the European peace," Heeringen explained to the parliamentary deputies on 9 December 1910, depended "not in the least on a strong and ready army." But the focus of the new Quinquennat would be the elimination of the existing deficiencies in the organization of the army. The continued equipment of the infantry with machine-guns, which the Ministry of War considered to be lagging behind the progress being made in both France and Russia, needed to be rapidly completed. The heavy artillery would also be significantly expanded, not only to support the infantry against enemy fortifications, but also as a mobile auxiliary for the active units. The communication troops needed to be strengthened. Additional train units, a telegraph battalion and airship detachments had to be created to improve the active and reserve formations. But the attitude of the parliamentary deputies had changed considerably since 1897-8. The failure of the

51 Wermuth to Heeringen, 1 September 1910, in RH 61-300, BA-MA Freiburg 52 Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1 (New York: Dead and Mead, 1919), 178. 53 Heeringen to the Reichstag, 9 December 1910, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XII Legislative Period, 97th Session, vol. 262 (Berlin, 1909-10), 3512-3. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 200. 68

"Tirpitz Plan" had contributed to decreased support for Weltpolitik and demands for the government to return the focus of foreign policy to the European continent. On 10 December the leader of the National Liberal Party, Ernst Bassermann, questioned the cautious policy of the Ministry of War. The proposed Quinquennat, the National Liberals argued, did not go far enough in preparing the army for a future conflict. The army administration had not demanded enough of the "missing" third battalions and, at the same time, the field artillery remained inadequate. The reasons for the modest demands of the Minister of War would have to be examined in the Budget Commission before the Quinquennat could gain approval in the Reichstag.54 On 23 February 1911 the Minister of War once again defended the demands in the Reichstag. The army administration had presented only what was "absolutely necessary" for the military situation confronting Germany. Heeringen nevertheless reminded the Reichstag that military legislation arose "not from the requirements of the moment," but rather was the result of "long lasting work" and "careful observation of the relevant circumstances of our neighbours." The enormous annual expenditures already associated with the army were necessary, Heeringen continued, since the peacetime strength and the technical branches of the army had to develop in connection with the military progress of France and Russia. Furthermore, the Minister of War rejected a sudden, large-scale armament in response to a threatening international situation in favour of a "gradual, planned expansion of the army." The financial expenditures, in consideration of the unfavourable geographic situation and the possibility of a two-front war, were comparatively small. He compared the necessary military outlays to an "insurance premium." When the potential effects of a disastrous conflict were compared with the current necessary financial expenditures, Heeringen concluded, the "insurance premium" could not be considered too high. Finally, the social policy of the army was displayed. It provided the nation with the necessary physical and mental training and brought a "sense of duty, obligation and a love of the Fatherland" to the German people. The nation's

54 Bassermann to the Reichstag, 10 December 1910, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XII Legislative Period, 98th Session, vol. 262 (Berlin, 1909-10), 3547-61. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 203. 69 positive development since 1871, Heeringen declared, had not been solely the result of three successful wars and the enormous expansion of industry and commerce, but rather had been achieved through "the education of the German people through compulsory military service."55 The Quinquennat was thereafter approved. Although the new peacetime strength law resulted in an increase of only 10,875 men, the army administration thereafter was able to establish 113 machine-gun detachments, 18 new field artillery batteries, 4 battalions of foot artillery and several airship, train and pioneer units.5 The most significant consequence of the "technical Quinquennat" however, was the emergence of parliamentary opposition to the modest demands of the Ministry of War. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1911, the "realization of compulsory military service" and the creation of additional active formations, the core principles of the "Verdy Plan," remained more distant than ever.

55 Heeringen to the Reichstag, 23 February 1911, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XII Legislative Period, 133rd Session, vol. 264 (Berlin, 1911), 4871-3. 56 Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 276-7. 70

Chapter Four: The Army Bills of 1912 and 1913

On 4 April 1911 the French ambassador in Berlin was instructed to inform the State Secretary of the Foreign Office that civil unrest in the Moroccan capital of Fez could eventually require military intervention. The Conference of Algeciras, that concluded the First Moroccan Crisis, had convinced Kiderlen-Wachter that diplomatic opposition would be ineffective. Nevertheless, the French occupation of Fez in late May provided the Reich Foreign Office with a fresh opportunity to assess the strength of the Anglo-French entente cordiale. Although the Act of Algeciras had transferred the Moroccan finances and police to French control, the occupation of Fez was in violation of the Franco- German arrangement of 1909 that had reaffirmed Morocco's territorial integrity. The German government, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office wrote, could not tolerate a situation where the Moroccan Sultan ruled "only with the assistance of French bayonets" and warned that any measure that might violate international economic equality and the principle of the "open door" would be completely unacceptable. Otherwise, Germany would assume freedom of action.- Neither Bethmann Hollweg nor Kiderlen-Wachter genuinely desired a Franco-German conflict in the summer of 1911. What both hoped to achieve, however, was a dramatic foreign policy success that "would make the people forget the earlier failures" and revive the now stagnant Weltpolitik. Domestically, the government badly required a diplomatic success to strengthen the existing political system ahead of the Reichstag elections of 1912, in which the Social Democrats were expected to make significant electoral gains. Kiderlen-Wachter at the same time was anxious that diplomatic passiveness would only serve to strengthen the "ring of encirclement." "If we do not use our trump cards now" and oppose the French military intervention in Morocco, "then we will be without political influence in the world."

1 Memorandum composed by Kiderlen-Wachter, 28 April 1911, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 29, Die Zweite Marokkokrise 1911, 97-8. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 316. 2 Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 112-5; Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 148. 3 Kiderlen-Wachter to Zimmermann, 16 June 1911, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 29, 142-3. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 12>. 71

The State Secretary of the Foreign Office was determined to pursue a policy of brinkmanship over Morocco. In June 1911 Kiderlen-Wachter requested the Kaiser's approval to dispatch the gunboat Panther to the Moroccan port of Agadir. German policy, the Reich Chancellor explained to Wilhelm, had to appear "very strong" in order to reach a "favourable result."4 But in attempting to coerce the French government into more significant colonial concessions, the so-called "Panther leap" aroused international animosity. In an after-dinner speech on 21 July at the Mansion House in London, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, sent a clear warning to Berlin. Great Britain would not tolerate being marginalized "as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations" as "peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like [Britain] to endure."5 Germany was not mentioned explicitly in the speech but it was obvious where the British Cabinet had directed their threat. The next day the German ambassador in London, Paul von Wolff Metternich, reported to Bethmann Hollweg that without question England now "faithfully held tight to the entente'''' with France.6 Although the resulting uproar in German public opinion represented a diplomatic defeat for the government, the domestic situation, at the same time, presented Tirpitz and the Reich Navy Office with a golden opportunity. This prevailing mood had to be exploited to pressure the government into introducing a new navy bill. "The possibility of a Novelle moves closer with [the Mansion House speech]," Tirpitz wrote at the beginning of August, "the current of public opinion can become very strong and we can come in danger of missing the moment if we wait until 1913." The intention to capitalize on the diplomatic defeat in Morocco was made even more evident when

4 Bethmann Hollweg to Wilhelm II, 15 July 1911, printed in Ernst Jackh, ed., Kiderlen-Wachter der Staatsmann und Mensch: Briefwechsel und Nachlafi, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1924), 126. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 317-8. 5 Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House, 21 July 1911, in Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 131-2; Keith Wilson, "The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double- Edgedness of Agreements," The Historical Journal, vol. 15 (1972), 513. 6 Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, 22 July 1911, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 29,206-9. 7 Tirpitz to Capelle, 3 August 1911, in Alfred von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente: Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1924), 200-1. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 290. 72

Admiral Eduard von Capelle, the Under-Secretary of State of the Reich Navy Office, wrote to Tirpitz arguing "that the course of the Moroccan affair means a fiasco for the entire fleet policy if we do not go further."8 On 30 August 1911, having successfully exploited the diplomatic defeat over Morocco in order to further arouse public opinion and secure the Kaiser's support, the State Secretary of the Navy Office officially communicated a proposal for a new fleet Novelle to Bethmann Hollweg.9 For Tirpitz, the foreign and domestic circumstances appeared to demand both qualitative and quantitative additions to the fleet. Germany's "insufficient navy," he argued, had been the primary cause for the failure of foreign policy and Weltpolitik. The resulting combination of public dissatisfaction with the government and rabid Anglophobic chauvinism could only be appeased by a "large navy bill". Such an action would furthermore begin the process of rebuilding Germany's shattered international diplomatic and military positions that had suffered significantly following Lloyd George's Mansion House speech. Tirpitz consequently suggested as the minimum requirement the addition of a third active squadron of battleships to the German fleet, the acceleration in the replacement of outdated armoured cruisers, and an increase in the building tempo from two to three battleships each year. The State Secretary of the Naval Office, in an obvious attempt to make the proposed demands more palatable to the Reich Chancellor, also emphasized the domestic political advantages of a fleet Novelle. Whereas the increase in building tempo and the creation of a third active squadron - the latter only partly facilitated by the breaking up of the existing material reserve - would require the addition of approximately 350 million GM to the navy budget, these expenses, Tirpitz argued, could easily be absorbed within the government budget using a combination of long-term loans and tax increases. The forthcoming Reichstag elections, scheduled for January 1912, could also be heavily influenced in

8 Capelle to Tirpitz, 11 September 1911, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 330-2. 9 Wilhelm II had already publicly announced his support for a new navy bill during a speech to the Hamburg Senate on 27 August 1911, in Walter Gorlitz, ed., Der Kaiser...Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg von Miiller tiber die Ara Wilhelms II (Gottingen: Musterschmidt, 1965), 89. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 113. 73

favour of the government by an immediate introduction of a navy bill. The official publication of the navy's demands in October 1911, he reasoned, would "for the elections take the wind from the sails of the Social Democrats and Left Liberals" and might even "produce a [government supporting] cartel of Conservatives, Centre and National Liberals."10 Despite the support of the Reich Treasury Office, Bethmann Hollweg's position by early Fall of 1911 had become virtually untenable. Observing this uncomfortable predicament, the Bavarian representative in Berlin, Graf Hugo von Lerchenfeld- Koefering, reported to the Bavarian Prime Minister, Georg von Hertling that the Reich Chancellor appeared to be caught between "the demands of the Kaiser, the Secretary of the Navy and the great part of the people dreaming of world domination and naval enthusiasm, and the knowledge that irresponsible acquiescence would lead to political catastrophe."11 But irresponsibility often goes hand-in-hand with desperation, and Bethmann Hollweg was indeed in a desperate situation. It seemed more and more probable that, as the Franco-German negotiations over Morocco continued into September, that Tirpitz would succeed in convincing Wilhelm to approve an early announcement of the fleet Novelle and to include it in the government budget for 1912. "Now in any case is the moment for actions," the Kaiser had remarked in early September, "the people demand [a navy bill]...if the Chancellor and Kiderlen and Wermuth will not take part then they will be sacked." The forthcoming Reichstag elections and the anxiety felt within the ruling class concerning the projected electoral gains for the Social Democrats also seemed to justify an immediate introduction of a navy bill. "The Conservatives," the Kaiser continued in a conversation with the Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller, the Chief of the Navy Cabinet, "would be glad for a national slogan to make good again their great mistake in the inheritance tax."12 From Bethmann Hollweg's perspective, a public announcement of the navy bill before the

Tirpitz to Bethmann Hollweg, 30 August 1911, in Tirpitz, Der Aufbau der Deutschen Weltmacht, 207-8. 11 Lerchenfeld-Koefering to Hertling, 9 November 1911, in Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, 92. 12 Discussion between Wilhelm II and Muller in Kiel, 4 September 1911, in Gorlitz, Der Kaiser... Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg von Muller tiber die Ara Wilhelms II, 90. 74

elections could only further weaken his domestic and foreign political positions. To ensure a favourable environment for the upcoming elections, the Reich Chancellor in contrast to the Kaiser, reasoned that something had to be done to calm the domestic

1-3 situation. If Bethmann Hollweg succeeded in preventing an immediate announcement of the Novelle, then it seemed likely that the widespread naval agitation carried on by the Pan-German League, the Navy League and other popular associations following the Moroccan crisis could be mitigated, leaving Tirpitz and the Reich Navy Office without sufficient public support. The absence of a new navy bill in the household budget for 1912 would, at the same time, signal to the British government that the Germans were indeed prepared to enter into serious naval armament negotiations.14 On 6 September, in a lengthy interview aboard the Kaiser's yacht Hohenzollern, Bethmann Hollweg once again emphasized the damaging effect that the Novelle would have on government policy in general and particularly upon Anglo-German relations. He therefore attempted to secure the approval of the Kaiser to postpone the publication of the navy bill at least until after the conclusion of the Franco-German negotiations over Morocco. Wilhelm, still unconvinced that the immediate introduction of a navy bill was unadvisable under the present domestic and foreign political circumstances, nevertheless agreed that a strengthening of the fleet might have to be postponed until late 1912 or even until 1913. "I am agreed with the Reich Chancellor" the Kaiser soon after related to Admiral von Mtiller, "that at first the way out of the Moroccan affair will be awaited, and only then, depending on the reception [of the Franco-German agreement] in the public, shall a fleet Novelle be tackled."15 Bethmann Hollweg was subsequently unnerved when just one week after having seemingly achieved a deferral of the naval question, the Kaiser urged him to immediately announce the Novelle}6 Although the Reich Chancellor's fears were temporarily abated when Tirpitz reluctantly agreed to again postpone the navy bill,

13 Jtirgen Bertram, Die Wahlen zum Deutschen Reichstag vom Jahre 1912: Parteien und Verbande in der Innenpolitik des Wilhelminischen Reiches (Dilsseldorf: Droste, 1964), 120-1. 14 Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 108-9. 15 Wilhelm II to Mtiller, 6 September 1911, in Gorlitz, Der Kaiser...Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg von Mtiller tiber die Ara Wilhelms II, 91-2. 16 Fischer, War of Illusions, 115. 75

the Kaiser's comments shortly afterward were cause for concern. In a letter dated 30 September, Wilhelm explained his position regarding the introduction of a new navy bill to the Reich Chancellor. "I would consider it correct and recommendable, to announce this new objective [the navy bill] through a declaration in the Reichstag." The German people await "action from the government of negotiations," the Kaiser continued, and there had to "be a national achievement to point the enthusiasm of the Germans in the right direction without giving the opponent reason for action."17 The persistent efforts of the State Secretary of the Navy Office to convince the government of both the foreign and domestic political necessities of the Novelle were condemned to failure from the beginning. Confronted with the persistent demands of Tirpitz and the unpredictable behaviour of the Kaiser, the Reich Chancellor thereafter took the first steps towards encouraging the introduction of an army bill. Bethmann Hollweg probably concluded sometime between late September and early October that his most effective weapon against the Novelle was the army. In a meeting with the Minister of War and Wermuth on 9 October, the Reich Chancellor therefore suggested that Heeringen introduce a supplementary army bill at once, instead of waiting until the renewal of the present Quinquennat in 1916.18 This action can only be understood by considering the desperate nature of Bethmann Hollweg's position. The Reich Chancellor, who had strongly subscribed to Wermuth's principles and even supported the State Secretary of the Treasury in limiting the army's demands for Quinquennat of 1911, could not have fully believed in the necessity of introducing a new army bill in the winter of 1911-12. Such an increase in the army, however, could serve a number of political purposes. The presentation of new army demands alongside those of the navy, already proposed by Tirpitz, would inevitably require a reduction in the Novelle. In the event that public indignation over the Moroccan crisis resulted in the parliamentary acceptance of both the army and navy bills, then the question of financing the additional armaments

17 Wilhelm II to Bethmann Hollweg, 30 September 1911, in Tirpitz, Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht, 216-8. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 115. 18 Discussion between Bethmann Hollweg, Heeringen and Wermuth, 9 October 1911, in Fischer, War of Illusions, 116; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 218-20; Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 162-3; Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 201. 76

expenditure would likely flounder upon the issue of the inheritance tax. Bethmann Hollweg probably also counted on the support of the Kaiser once the army had submitted its demands. Wilhelm had indeed previously commented on the undesirable effect that the projected Social Democratic success in the 1912 elections would have on army policy. It was paramount that the needs of the army were addressed before one hundred or more Socialists entered the Reichstag, the Kaiser remarked, since "what we do not request now, we can not later obtain in the Quinquennat."19 The suggestion that the Ministry of War submit a "large army demand" together with a fleet Novelle was initially rejected. Heeringen remained unconvinced that the domestic and foreign political developments since the previous Quinquennat in fact demanded additional improvements to the army. Bethmann Hollweg, on the other hand, was adamant that the political and military relationship between Germany and the other European powers had changed enough following the Moroccan crisis to cause concern. Under these circumstances, the Reich Chancellor asked Heeringen, was an army bill therefore not necessary? Following this prompting, the Minister of War eventually acknowledged that the widespread dissatisfaction in the General Staff with the increases embodied in the Quinquennat of 1911, together with the increasingly aggressive tone of public opinion, sufficiently favoured the introduction of a supplementary army bill. Possibly because he feared a fresh outbreak of the quantity or quality debate within the army and even more likely because he was against allowing Bethmann Hollweg to manipulate the Ministry of War into opposing Tirpitz and the navy, Heeringen at the same time remained ambiguous as to the size and scope of such an increase.20 But during the subsequent discussions between the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff in late October and early November, the supporters of quantity over quality and a renewed implementation of the "Verdy Plan" would succeed in having an influential effect upon the Ministry of War.

19 Wilhelm II to Bethmann Hollweg, 7 August 1910, in RH 61-300, BA-MA Freiburg. 20 August von Heeringen to Tirpitz, 30 November 1911, in Tirpitz, DerAufbau der deutschen Weltmacht, 265-6. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 296-7. 77

On 19 November, in a subsequent letter to Bethmann Hollweg, Heeringen agreed that the serious financial difficulties of the Reich and the inability to introduce new taxes before the Reichstag elections, both factors that had limited the demands for the Quinquennat of 1911, still somewhat precluded large-scale military expenditure. But could the foreign political and military considerations still be assessed as they had been in 1910? The French acquisition of Morocco and the possible deployment of new units of North African troops against Germany in a future European war greatly concerned both the Ministry of War and the General Staff while the Russian army, which ever since the Russo-Japanese War had been a largely discounted in German operational planning, was now rapidly being reequipped and reorganized. Furthermore, primarily because of Tirpitz's naval program, the number of Germany's expected opponents had increased. Great Britain could no longer be counted upon to remain neutral in a continental conflict, and both Heeringen and Moltke concluded that in the event of an Anglo-German conflict, it was imperative that the General Staff was able to assume the offensive against France, Britain's most vulnerable ally, at once and with all available troops. Therefore, in addition to a naval war, Germany in the future would also have to contend with a land war. On the European continent lay "the absolute decision" for Germany, along with "the fate of the Crown of the Hohenzollerns" and "the well and woe of [the] Fatherland." In this context, any additional expenditure on armaments could not be solely directed upon the navy, but rather had to be shared with the army. In the event that the Reich's financial situation prevented significant additions to both the army and the navy, then, the Ministry of War and the General Staff argued, the army had to take precedence. Then and only then, under the protection of the army, could further increases to the navy take place.21

The heightened pressure for a reintroduction of core principles of the "Verdy Plan" had corresponded to the increase in middle-class officers in the General Staff. The large-scale expansion of the army between 1890 and 1893 had been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in aristocratic representation in the officer corps. Whereas 60

21 Heeringen to Bethmann Hollweg, 19 November 1911, in RH 61-300, BA-MA Freiburg. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 223-4; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914,293-4. 78

percent of officers posted to the General Staff in 1906 had come from aristocratic backgrounds, the number of middle-class officers had increased to almost 50 percent by 1912. The Ministry of War had also experienced a similar development.22 Foremost among this group was Erich Ludendorff, who had assumed the important position of Chief of the Mobilization Section in the General Staff in 1908. Above all, Ludendorff advocated the "realization of compulsory military service" and the training of all able- bodied German citizens. "In a coalition war against Germany the numbers at our enemies' disposal are so great that it may be our urgent duty in certain circumstances to deploy against them at the very outset the entire manhood of the Reich capable of bearing arms."23 The international situation demanded a large-scale increase in the peacetime strength of the army, Ludendorff argued, since "God is on the side of the strongest battalions."24 Not surprisingly, similar sentiments from other quarters quickly began to emerge during the preparation for the new army bill. On 29 November, less than two weeks after Heeringen had communicated his position to Bethmann Hollweg, the Chief of the General War Department in the Ministry of War, Franz von Wandel, submitted a memorandum that demanded a complete reassessment of army policy. In 1910 only France was considered a definite opponent in a future European conflict. Russia, because of its military weakness, could only be expected to half-heartedly support France against Germany. At that time it was still uncertain whether Great Britain would intervene on the side of France, except with "moral support". Since Austria-Hungary was sure to support Germany, and Italy still remained at least an unknown variable for the French government, the army could have faced a continental war "with confidence". Whereas the

Karl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1965), 29. 23 Moltke to the Ministry of War, 1 July 1910, printed in Erich Ludendorff, The General Staff and its Problems: The History of the Relations between the High Command and the German Imperial Government as revealed by Official Documents, vol. 1 (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 22-5. See also Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 2, The European Powers and the Wilhelmine Empire, 1890-1914 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1972), 221. 24 Erich Ludendorff, Mein militdrischer Werdegang: Blatter der Erinnerung an unser stolzes Heer (Munich: Ludendorff, 1933), 130. 79

basic structure of the army was still sufficient, Wandel argued, the international situation by the Fall of 1911 had changed considerably. The British were now certain to support France, Russia was seemingly nearing the completion of its armaments program, and Italy was militarily committed against Turkey in North Africa. Financial and domestic political considerations made it impossible to numerically equal Germany's potential opponents, but through a combination of qualitative and quantitative improvements the war-readiness of the army could be significantly heightened. Wandel consequently recommended a rapid acceleration of the modest improvements outlined in the Quinquennat of 1911, together with the creation of the twenty-six "missing" third battalions and additional machine-gun companies and artillery detachments. The most radical measure that Wandel proposed, however, was the creation of two entirely new active army corps. These formations, necessary to increase the speed of mobilization, could not be improvised at the outbreak of war. "Few Germans," Wandel concluded, "will now deny that we are surrounded by enemies, that a struggle with them can scarcely be avoided and that this struggle involves Germany's world position." Although Wandel's memorandum represented a significant departure from the traditional policy of the Ministry of War, the succession of German diplomatic defeats ever since the Algeciras Conference had even more intensely irritated the Chief of the General Staff. At the height of the Second Moroccan Crisis Moltke had voiced his considerable frustration to his wife when he stated that if "we again retreat from this affair with our tail between our legs, if we are not able to put forward energetic demands that we are ready to enforce with the sword, then I despair for the future of the German Reich." "I will then go," he continued, "but before I do, I will make the suggestion to disband the army and place us under a Japanese protectorate." Understandably, Moltke expressed a similar attitude in a memorandum submitted to the Reich Chancellor on 2

25 Memorandum composed in the General War Department of the Ministry of War, 29 November 1911, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustling im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 376-80. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 221-2; Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 133-4; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 298. 26 Moltke to Eliza von Moltke, 19 August 1911, in Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, 1877-1916: Ein Bildvom Kriegsausbruch, erster Kriegsfuhrung und Personlichkeit des ersten militarischen Fiihrers des Krieges (Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922), 362. 80

December 1911. He still considered France to be the most probable opponent in a future European conflict, but, like both Heeringen and Wandel, he recognized that Germany's international position had badly deteriorated over the past few years. Most concerning for the maintenance of peace, however, was the noticeable decline abroad in appreciation for German military strength. A newspaper editorial authored by the British Lieutenant- Colonel Charles a Court Repington had greatly criticized the German manoeuvres of September 1911, an exercise that even the General Staff had regarded as poorly 97 executed. Nevertheless, Repington's account had encouraged similar unflattering commentaries in the French press that emphasized the perceived deficiencies in German organization and tactics. These and other considerations highlighted the need for a supplementary army bill. Reiterating Heeringen's point of view, Moltke also recognized that a conflict with Great Britain at the same time would mean a conflict with France. Under these circumstances it was obvious that "the decision [in a conflict with both adversaries] lay on the land" and that its conclusion "had to be brought about by the army." The influence of Ludendorff and the supporters of the core principles of the "Verdy Plan" was also evident in Moltke's report as he emphasized the necessity to recruit and provide military training for a much larger percentage of the population. In contrast to France, which called up over 82 percent of its able-bodied men, Germany trained less than 54 percent of its far larger population. "It remains always the duty of each state to not only look calmly into the eye of future events but to also prepare for the day of decision." "Germany must arm itself," Moltke concluded, and the army and navy bills would have to "go hand-in-hand."28 Meanwhile, the conflict between the Reich Treasury Office and the navy administration had reached a critical juncture. Wermuth, grasping tightly to his principle, remained adamant that the total expenditure for the proposed fleet Novelle would have to be financed not with additional government loans but instead by new taxes. Wermuth furthermore insisted that if the navy bill was introduced to the Reichstag ahead of the

27 Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 163-4. 28 Moltke to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 December 1911, in RH 61-300, BA-MA Freiburg. See also Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 132-3. 81

January elections, as Tirpitz had requested, it would also be necessary to concurrently submit a proposal for its financial cover legislation. It would be even more beneficial if a long-term financial program, intended to maintain the delicate balance between revenues and expenditures, could be formulated and presented to the Parliament along with the navy's demands. On the other hand, there remained important domestic considerations. Since taxes on consumer goods were already dangerously high and since the federal states were unlikely to agree to alternate forms of direct taxation or to make regular financial contributions to defence, Wermuth concluded that only a significant extension of the contentious inheritance tax could be considered. Tirpitz obviously understood what the State Secretary of the Treasury was attempting to accomplish when he later remarked, that such a policy would mean "the death of each new army and navy bill."29 On 8 December Wermuth again expressed his dissatisfaction with the scope of the proposed fleet Novelle. The new navy demands could be introduced in the Fall of 1912 at the earliest. Whereas the State Secretary of the Treasury Office had previously been receptive to the introduction of a supplementary army bill to counter the proposed navy bill, he now insisted that the preparation of both military measures begin later in the spring of 1912 when the composition of the new Reichstag had been decided and the necessary expenditures would be more likely to gain parliamentary approval. The revenue from new taxes required to finance the additional expenditures could, in any case, not be fully realized until at least the 1913 or 1914 accounting years, while the only immediate alternative, the inheritance tax, would inevitably precipitate a vicious domestic political crisis and a corresponding undesirable struggle between the National Liberals and the Conservatives.30

By late November even the Kaiser had been won over to Bethmann Hollweg's solution of introducing an army bill alongside Tirpitz's fleet Novelle. "Strengthening at

29 Wermuth to Tirpitz, 9 October 1911, in Tirpitz, DerAufbau der deutschen Weltmacht, 226-7. See also Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913, 342-3. 30 Wermuth to Bethmann Hollweg, 8 December 1911, in N 253-25b, BA-MA Freiburg. 82

sea and on land absolutely essential," he telegraphed to the Reich Chancellor.31 The most that the State Secretary of the Navy Office could now anticipate were several small improvements in the existing fleet and the proposed compromise of an additional battleship constructed every other year during the "hole" in the "Tirpitz Plan." When the Kaiser approved this concession at the end of December it appeared as though Bethmann Hollweg's desperate strategy of using the army "as a battering ram against the navy" had succeeded.32 This would, however, soon prove to be a pyrrhic victory for the government. Having been pressured sufficiently by the more radical forces within the Ministry of War and the General Staff, Heeringen presented the Reich Chancellor with the proposed new army bill on 5 January 1912. Although the proposed increases fell far short of the "realization of compulsory military service" and the reintroduction of the "Verdy Plan," the Minister of War suggested many of the same measures that Wandel had advocated in late November. The two new active army corps would be formed partly using existing supernumerary units and partly with newly created artillery, engineer and supply troops. In addition, Heeringen proposed the gradual formation of all "missing" third battalions as well as an acceleration of the improvements outlined in the peacetime strength law of 1911. Yet the compromise that was reached with the presentation of the two military bills satisfied few. Bethmann Hollweg had succeeded in reducing the fleet Novelle but the costs of its implementation were still considerable, amounting to 130.4 million GM in one-time outlays and 79.6 million GM in annual expenses. Similarly, the army bill was much more costly than both the Reich Chancellor and the State Secretary of the Treasury Office had anticipated and Heeringen's demands amounted to an even higher expenditure of 144 million GM in one-time outlays and 296.6 million GM in annual expenses.34 Furthermore, the reorientation of foreign policy from Weltpolitik to the European continent and the resulting return of budgetary preference to the army had not achieved

31 Wilhelm II to Bethmann Hollweg, 30 November 1911, in Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 134. 32 Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 115-7. 33 Heeringen to Bethmann Hollweg, 5 January 1912, printed in Deist and Berghahn, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 380-3. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 304-5. 34 Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 211. 83

the core principles of the "Verdy Plan" and had therefore not satisfied the General Staff. The Ministry of War, on the other hand, continued to voice concerns that such a large- scale and sudden increase in peacetime strength would seriously disrupt the operational capability of the field army in a future conflict. Although Bethmann Hollweg could point out that a reorientation in armaments policy had shifted priority away from Tirpitz's financially crippling naval program, the government's efforts to avoid domestic political crisis had intensified the conflict between the General Staff and the Ministry of War. The supplementary army bill, together with the reduced fleet Novelle, was introduced to the Reichstag on 15 April 1912. The attitude of the parliamentary deputies, as the government and Ministry of War had foreseen was altogether not opposed to additional military expenditure. Only the Left Liberals and the Social Democrats, who had secured an impressive 110 seats in the January 1912 elections, rejected the army and navy demands. Nevertheless, as both Bethmann Hollweg and Wermuth had predicted, the additional expenditures resulted in the re-emergence of the potentially explosive inheritance tax question in the Reichstag. Following lengthy negotiations, Bassermann and Matthias Erzberger, the leader of the Centre Party, together succeeded in presenting a resolution to the Reichstag that would commit the government to introducing a form of direct federal taxation on property by 30 April 1913.35 Although the form and scope of this new financial arrangement was not explicitly defined in the "Lex Bassermann- Erzberger," the parliamentary acceptance of this motion sharply contrasted with the methods used to "cover" the construction expenditures of the "Tirpitz Plan." Bethmann Hollweg thereafter aptly summarized the never-ending succession of difficulties that confronted the government: "Like craters on Etna, crises arise in our politics in never- ending succession...one is hardly cold before the next erupts."36 Despite the ongoing financial question, the Army Bill of 1912, the product of a tentative compromise between the General Staff and the Ministry of War, amounted to an immediate increase in the

Fischer, War of Illusions, 136-7; Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913, 354. Bethmann Hollweg to Oettingen, 17 December 1912, in Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, 90. 84

standing army of 1,387 officers and 27,806 men and was approved by the parliamentary deputies, together with Tirpitz's reduced fleet Novelle, on 14 June 1912.37 The acceptance of the largest increase in the peacetime strength since the "big army bill" invariably worsened the already desperate situation confronting the Reich Treasury Office. Hermann Kiihn, who had replaced Wermuth as State Secretary, felt thereafter compelled to remind the Minister of War in August 1912 that following the recently approved supplementary army bill, "extreme reservation" would be necessary in the preparation of the budget for 1913. The German public had been given the impression that the government's financial plan was capable of covering the entire expenditure, including the increase in peacetime strength. The State Secretary of the Treasury Office was nevertheless concerned that around 34 million GM intended for the Prussian army contingent could not be covered by the current financial plan. Such an enormous expenditure would require other departments to limit their immediate demands and, in the

TO future, could prevent a successful balancing of the budget. The answer from the Ministry of War was in no way negative. Heeringen acknowledged the seriousness of the current financial situation and informed the Reich Treasury Office that the necessary reductions had been considered. But the proposed measures, Heeringen cautioned, were "absolutely necessary for the readiness of the army and in the interests of national defence." Moreover, he reminded Kiihn that the army administration had "for years been compelled in consideration of the financial situation of the Reich to again and again postpone" many urgent needs. Such a situation was "no longer permissible." Although the Ministry of War might endure the reduction of around 3.4 million GM from the army budget for 1913, a further constriction of expenditures, under the circumstances, could not be anticipated.39 Even the Ministry of War now appeared unable to justify further stagnation in the development of the army in light of the extreme pressures of the international situation. But Kuhn remained determined not to accept further large-scale

37 Collenberg, Die deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 92-4, Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 171, Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 209-10. 38 Kiihn to Heeringen, 27 August 1912, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 143. 39 Heeringen to Kuhn, 17 September 1912, printed in Ibid., 144. 85

armaments demands. The federal budget, the State Secretary of the Treasury explained, could not be balanced unless the future requirements of the army administration were substantially reduced. The military budget exceeded the government's financial plan by around 34 million GM for the Prussian contingent alone. Consequently, a deviation from the previously declared "cover" legislation was not possible "not only for financial, but also for important domestic political reasons."40 The international situation rapidly overshadowed these financial concerns. The dramatically increased tensions in the Balkans convinced the Kaiser to summon Bethmann Hollweg, Kiderlen-Wachter, Heeringen, Moltke and the Chief of the Military Cabinet, Moriz von Lyncker, to his hunting lodge in Hubertusstock on 13 October 1912. The possibility of a European conflict resulting from the situation in the Balkans was extremely concerning and Wilhelm therefore requested that the Ministry of War and General Staff immediately formulate a new army bill. Heeringen and Moltke disagreed with the timing of new demands. The military balance of power had not changed considerably since the approval of the army bill of 1912 and the army was prepared for "all political eventualities." Even the intended creation of machine-gun detachments was not considered absolutely necessary in the foreseeable future.41 The mood in the General Staff was hardly passive. In complete contrast to his previous statements, the Chief of the General Staff sent a memorandum, composed by Ludendorff, to the Ministry of War the next day describing the peacetime strength as inadequate. There was an urgent necessity to "actively and decisively strengthen our army in peacetime once again." The numerous gaps in the organizational structure would have to be closed with another supplementary army bill, in addition to a "decisive increase of our peacetime budget in manpower." The reserve and Landwehr formations, despite over a decade of requests from the General

40 Ktihn to Heeringen, 28 September 1912, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 145. 41 Meeting at Hubertusstock, 13 October 1912, in Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 130; Fischer, War of Illusions, 177; Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, vol. 2, 223; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 317-8. 86

Staff to improve the second- and third-line troops, were entirely unprepared for the conditions of a future conflict. The General Staff repeated these concerns. In another memorandum, again composed by Ludendorff with the approval of Moltke, lamented the hostile attitude of both Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office against further large-scale armaments legislation so long as the maintenance of peace was possible. "The question, whether we at the time posses the strength" to properly defend the borders of Germany against hostile offensives, "I must answer in the negative." The formations in the border areas were so weakened that a hostile offensive could possibly seriously disrupt the mobilization of the field army. An immediate resumption of the principles of the "Verdy Plan" was absolutely necessary in order to "make ourselves independent of the measures of our opponents." "We must in my opinion still go further," Ludendorff demanded, "and give our entire army the strength, that alone guarantees definite success in the next war." Whereas the strength of the Austro-Hungarian army would doubtlessly be available against Russia, the General Staff was certain that a future conflict would be conducted solely on the strength of the German army. With what could have been quoted from the former Minister of War, Ludendorff declared: "We must make up our minds to at least take advantage of our manpower... we must again become a people in arms, that we once in great times and by great men had created." Nothing falling short of the "complete accomplishment of compulsory military service" would be considered sufficient.43

The General Staffs concern appeared justified. On 21 September 1912 Wilhelm had remarked to the State Secretary of the Foreign Office that in the event of an Austro- Russian conflict over the Balkans, the Austro-Hungarians would have "right on their

42 Moltke to Heeringen, 14 October 1912, in RH 61-577, BA-MA Freiburg. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 318; Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 130; Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, vol. 2, 223-4. 43 Moltke to Heeringen, 25 November 1912, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Riistung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 388-90; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung undKriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 146-8. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 178-9; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 323. 87

side" and that Berlin would wholeheartedly support Vienna.44 On the same day Moltke submitted a report to the Foreign Office on the military reforms in France, Britain and Russia. The Russian government had retained the older recruit contingents and the strength of the standing army had thereby been increased by around 400,000 men. Moreover, the mobilization process had been improved and the stockpiles of ammunition and equipment in the border areas had been augmented. French public opinion was not threatening. Certain measures had nevertheless been taken to increase the peacetime strength of the active army corps and prepare the defences of the fortifications along the Franco-German border. Although the Chief of the General Staff had not received detailed information on the preparations in the British army, the readiness of the fleet in the North Sea had been improved.45 The attitude of the government thereafter became more and more pessimistic. On 2 October the Reich Chancellor recorded: "as regards the Balkans, my order of this summer remains that we are not getting involved there in any way, but will let matters take their course" still stood. Only one month later, however, Bethmann Hollweg found reason to question the Chief of the General Staff and the State Secretary of the Navy Office on the immediate preparedness of the army and fleet.46 Moltke, in particular, remained convinced that a future European conflict was unavoidable. "If war is coming," he remarked in late October, "I hope it will come soon before I am too old to cope with things satisfactorily."47

On 19 November 1912 the State Secretary of the Foreign Office informed the Kaiser that the Russian army corps in the West had recently been strengthened. In the margin of this report Wilhelm remarked: "We must make demands in the Reichstag for the improved training of our 100,000 untrained men of the Ersatz reserve! It is high

Wilhelm II to Kiderlen-Wachter, 21 November 1912, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 33, Der erste Balkankrieg 1912, 373-4. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 157. 45 Moltke to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1912, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 33, 381-2. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 381. 46 Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 135. 47 Dorothy von Moltke's Diary Entry, 22 October 1912, printed in Dorothy von Moltke, Ein Leben in Deutschland: Briefe aus Kreisau undBerlin 1907-1934 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 35-6. 88

time!"48 Despite the attitude of both the Kaiser and Moltke, Heeringen refused to approve large-scale increases in the peacetime strength. The new supplementary army bill was being prepared in the Ministry of War and the creation of additional machine-gun detachments would be completed by the spring of 1913. The annual recruit contingent, however, would be extremely difficult to increase since available able-bodied manpower was extremely difficult to determine. The General Staff, Heeringen continued, had previously agreed that the field army could "look forward to all future occurrences with the fullest confidence," and, although a new expansion of the army was now clearly necessary, the army bill of 1912 had contained several significant organizational improvements. Ludendorff thereafter acidly remarked in the margins of the Ministry of War memorandum that during the previous winter the "financial question and not the needs [of the army] had been decisive."49 Moltke replied on 2 December. The General Staff had remained silent because the Ministry of War's demands had seemingly "represented the most that could be achieved" at that time. The field army could still "calmly look forward to eventual belligerent occurrences." The Russian rearmament program had not been completed and the French government was still preoccupied with the occupation of Morocco. But the commitment of Italian forces in North Africa and the First Balkan War had changed the situation completely. The Triple Alliance could no longer expect military support from Rome and the Austro-Hungarians would now have to deploy considerable strength against Serbia. Furthermore, after two or three years the Russian army would be considerably stronger and the French administration in Morocco would be capable of recruiting additional colonial formations. The "further extension" of the army could therefore "not be undertaken soon enough" since, in the future, Germany would probably have to "be strong enough to be able to rely on its own strength."50

48 Kiderlen-Wachter to Wilhelm II, 19 November 1912, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 33, 359-60. See also Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914,381. 49 Heeringen to Moltke, 29 November 1912, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 148-9. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 251; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 324. 50 Moltke to Heeringen, 2 December 1912, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 149-50. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 324. 89

Bethmann Hollweg, in speech to the Reichstag on 2 December 1912, declared that Germany, because of the prevailing situation in the Balkans, might have to lend military support to Austria-Hungary. If the interests of the Triple Alliance were threatened, "we would fight on the side of our allies for the preservation of our own position in Europe" and "in the defence of the security and future of our own country."51 The Ministry of War, at the same time, appeared more and more willing to introduce an army bill. On the same day Heeringen communicated the outline of a new increase in the peacetime strength to the Reich Chancellor. The Minister of War indeed recognized that additional armaments expenditures would have to be accompanied with adequate financial cover in the federal budget. The army demands that would have to be presented to the Reichstag, however, were urgently necessary and could not be postponed until the expiration of the current Quinquennat in March 1916. The army bill of 1912 had sought to increase the army's preparedness for a future conflict but, owing to the financial situation, both the General Staff and the Ministry of War recognized that the numerical superiority of the Franco-Russian armies was at that time impossible to eliminate. The international developments of the preceding weeks, on the other hand, highlighted the necessity of increasing the strength of the active army corps, particularly in the border areas. Such an increase was urgently necessary, along with a comparable strengthening of the artillery, cavalry and train, in order "to fully take advantage of the military strength of Germany." The proposed army bill would require between 200 and 300 million GM. The Minister of War, however, remained unsure how such an increase "could be reconciled with the present principles of our financial policy." Wahnschaffe, the Under State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery, expressed similar concerns: "Whereas a year ago they first had to be encouraged to a military bill and nine months ago they had declared, if this military bill is accomplished, can they with light hearts carry out the responsibility."52

51 Bethmann Hollweg to the Reichstag, 2 December 1912, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XIII Legislative Period, 75th Session, vol. 286 (Berlin, 1912- 13), 2471-2. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 179. 52 Heeringen to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 December 1912, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 390-2; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 150-2. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914,324. 90

On 3 December 1912 the ambassador in London, Prince Karl von Lichnowsky, sent a report of a conversation with Lord Haldane, the British Lord Chancellor. Haldane had declared that Britain did not desire a European conflict. In the event of an Austro- Serbian conflict, however, Haldane warned Lichnowsky that Britain could not "remain a quiet onlooker." It had to maintain the balance of power and "would not be able to endure a French defeat" and the establishment of German continental hegemony.53 There could now be no doubt that in the event of a Franco-German conflict, Britain would take the side of France against Germany. This report irritated the Kaiser and on 8 December 1912 he assembled the so-called "war council." Wilhelm interpreted Haldane's statement as a desirable clarification of the attitude of London's in a Franco-German conflict. The Kaiser expected Austria-Hungary to deal "energetically" with Serbia. The occurrence of a Russo-German conflict would be unavoidable if Russia supported the Serbs, but Wilhelm hoped that Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and perhaps even Turkey could be allied with the Austro-German coalition. The German fleet would have to be prepared for a conflict with the Royal Navy. The Kaiser foresaw "submarine warfare against English troop transports in the Scheldt or by Dunkirk [and] mine warfare in the Thames." The State Secretary of the Navy Office was instructed to accelerate the construction of submarines and to convene an immediate naval conference. More significantly, the Chief of the General Staff declared: "I believe a war is unavoidable." In response to the statement by Tirpitz that the German fleet would prefer to see a conflict postponed for one and a half years, Moltke responded that the navy would even then not be prepared for a war with Britain and, meanwhile, the army would be in an even more unfavourable position. Moltke was certainly pessimistic about Germany's chances in a future conflict since, as Muller recalled in his journal, "the enemies were arming more strongly than we, as we were very short of money." The Chief of the Navy Cabinet concluded that the result of the conference was "almost nothing," but, on the other hand, the attitude of the Chief of the

53 Lichnowsky to Bethmann Hollweg, 3 December 1912, printed in John C.G. RQhl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: Eine Dokumentation uber den "Kriegsrat" vom 8. Dezember 1912," in Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, vol. 1 (1977), 98. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 160-1. 91

General Staff had been made clear: "War the sooner the better."54 The "war council" had not established an inflexible timeline for a future European conflict. What its proceedings did influence, however, was the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff on the future development of the army. The impetus for large-scale army increases was thereafter supplied when the Minister of War wrote to the General Staff requesting that the intended requirements in a new army bill be made more specific. Heeringen reminded Moltke that the demands originating from the General Staff for the Army Bill of 1912 had never exceeded those of the Ministry of War. At the same time, he cautioned the Chief of the General Staff about demanding new active army corps. The creation of additional peacetime formations would severely overstretch the army's training structure, while the shortage of suitable officers and non-commissioned officers would produce extremely weak, combat ineffective active formations.55 The scope of the army bill as intended by the Ministry of War was further revealed following a discussion between the Reich Chancellor, Heeringen, Tirpitz and the Kaiser. Bethmann Hollweg recalled that the Minister of War indeed considered the international situation changed enough to demand an increase in the peacetime strength of the army. The Serbs had enhanced their military strength and Austria-Hungary would have to deploy more troops along the Austro-Serbian border. Heeringen admitted that the army was not training all able-bodied German citizens. The Minister of War therefore stated: "We must decide whether we, because continuous revenues are not available, should do without or whether we want to accomplish this strengthening." The proposed new army bill would not only involve the creation of new active formations, but also result in the creation of the remaining "missing" third battalions, additional machine-gun detachments and field artillery units. Such an increase in the peacetime strength would have to be approved by the Reichstag by October 1913 and would require the expenditure

54 Muller's Diary, 8 December 1912, printed Gorlitz, Der Kaiser...Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Mahnekabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander v. Miiller iiber dieAra Wilhelms II., 124-5; Rohl, "An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg," 100. See also J.C.G. Rohl, "Admiral von Miiller and the Approach of War, 1911-1914," The Historical Journal, vol. 12 (1969), 661-2. 55 Heeringen to Moltke, 9 December 1912, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 155-6. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 179-80. 92

of around 400 million GM. The Reich Chancellor, however, could not yet adopt a position towards either an army bill or a possible fleet Novelle, and consequently expected that both the Ministry of War and the Reich Navy Office not operate against the government or release details of the future military demands to the public.56 But even these demands were, by now, not acceptable to the General Staff. On 21 December 1912 the Chief of the General Staff forwarded a memorandum, originally composed by Ludendorff, to the Ministry of War that amounted to a demand for an immediate revival of the "Verdy Plan." Moltke once again reminded Heeringen that the Serbian army had been considerably strengthened as a result of the Balkan conflict and that in the future the Austrians would have to deploy a larger number of troops on the southern border. At the same time, he reiterated that the Italian acquisition of North African territory meant that the Italian army would probably not be able to fully participate in a European conflict in the foreseeable future. The Italians would not have any vital interests threatened or feel compelled to enter into a "struggle for existence," and would therefore not be willing to dispatch the formations that had been previously promised to the General Staff for service on the Upper Rhine. Moreover, Moltke noted, the Triple Entente had numerous advantages over the Triple Alliance. Russia had the motivation to defeat Austria-Hungary and thereby establish a predominant position in the Balkans, while France had the strong desire to avenge the defeat of 1870-71 and regain the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. The Franco-Russian coalition therefore possessed the necessary preconditions for an offensive, which the General Staff conceded was the "stronger form of warfare." Most explosively, Moltke provided the Ministry of War with the first details of the operational plan in the event of war. Germany, because of geography, would have to deploy substantial forces against one opponent, while weaker forces protected the other border. Its army would "always" have to take the offensive against France at the beginning of a future conflict. The resulting violation of Belgian

56 Memorandum composed by Bethmann Hollweg, 14 December 1912, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 39, Das Nahen des Weltkrieges 1912-1914, 145-7; Berghahn and Deist, Riistung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 393-4. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 324. 93

neutrality would only result in an addition to the list of enemies confronting Germany. Whereas the German army could, as was the case in 1870-71, count on a superiority in artillery, a calculation of the opposing forces, according to the General Staff, would produce an inferiority in infantry of around 124 battalions and, if Belgium was added, 192 battalions. The superiority of the Russian forces was even more daunting: the Empire would posses around 374 infantry battalions and 319 cavalry squadrons more than the Austro-German armies. Under these circumstances, the numerical strength of the German army, which for a long time had not corresponded to the size of the German population, was in no way adequate. Around 82 percent of the available French manpower was currently being trained, compared to between 52 and 54 percent of able-bodied German citizens. The General Staff consequently proposed an increase in the annual recruit contingent of around 150,000 men and a corresponding expansion of the peacetime strength of 300,000 men. Furthermore, three additional active army corps were to be requested, partly created through existing supernumerary formations and partly from newly formed active units. The formation of the "missing" third battalions was "self- evident" and had to be accomplished, together with increases to the field and foot artillery, cavalry, communications and airship units. Finally, in order to increase the feasibility of an offensive against France. Landwehr and reserve formations would also have to be strengthened, provided with improved equipment, and supplemented with active personnel. Such an extensive program would involve considerable financial and material difficulties. Nevertheless, the proposed demands had to be realized in order for

en Germany "to be equal to all possibilities." The "great memorandum" of December 1912 was likely the first open discussion of the German intention to launch an offensive through both Belgium and Luxembourg. The concept was nevertheless not foreign. The same day that Moltke communicated his new demands to the Ministry of War, the Kaiser had reported a conversation between

57 Moltke to Heeringen, 21 December 1912, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 395-402; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 158-73. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 180; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 266-8; Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 145-6; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 340-1. 94

himself and the King of Belgium. Bethmann Hollweg later recorded that upon hearing that the Kaiser had remarked that his only wish was to secure the right flank of the German advance, Moltke had warned that the General Staff would have to consider the matter. The Reich Chancellor thereafter commented: "as is well known, our deployment against France was based on us advancing through Belgium" and that "this deployment could not be altered, at least before 1 April 1913." The recently announced increases to the Belgian army would not significantly influence the military situation. "The Belgian army increases would first of all have to be implemented," the Reich Chancellor concluded, "before that, Belgium would probably be too weak to defend her neutrality with arms."58 On 9 January 1913 representatives of the General Staff and Ministry of War met to discuss the scale of future army demands. The position that Heeringen and the army administration were to adopt over the following months was clearly demonstrated. Shortly after the meeting, Wandel recorded in his journal that although the General Staff expected Germany to have to confront Britain, France and Russia alone in a future conflict, the addition of around 300,000 men to the army was, at the time, "militarily infeasible." The thousands of new officer and non-commissioned officer positions created by such an immense increase would be impossible to fill at once and, furthermore, would produce a shortage of experienced personnel in the existing active formations. Wandel was also concerned about the domestic political repercussions of a new army increase. During the negotiations over the Quinquennat of 1911, the General Staff had not pressured the Ministry of War into greater increases and, similarly, the Army Bill of 1912, according to Moltke, had been an "unexpected gift." German newspapers, in reporting the rumours of a forthcoming supplementary army bill, had emphasized the inconsistent character of army policy. The additional expenditures required to finance a new army bill, furthermore, would likely result in the National

58 Memorandum composed by Bethmann Hollweg, 22 December 1912, in Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 162. 95

Liberals reintroducing the inheritance tax question to the Reichstag. Such an action would inevitably create a conflict with the Conservatives and Centre Party.59 The Chief of the General Staff nevertheless continued to pressure the Ministry of War for large-scale increases in the peacetime strength. The military and political circumstances demanded an "early realization" of the program outlined in the December memorandum. The superiority of the entente powers in the "decisive theatres" of a future conflict would exceed five-hundred infantry battalions and Moltke doubted that the government could sustain an effective foreign policy when confronted with such an unfavourable balance of military power. The expansion of the army was therefore "not only a military, but a political question of the utmost importance." The program of the Ministry of War was entirely insufficient for a "reinvigoration" of the active formations and a "rejuvenation" of the reserves. Heeringen had proposed an increase in the annual recruit contingent of around 45,000 men. The Chief of the General Staff recognized, on the other hand, that such a measure would result in only 60 percent of able-bodied Germans receiving military training. The French army, which continued to enlist around 82 percent of available manpower, would still have an important advantage at the beginning of a future conflict. Substantially increasing the annual recruit contingent, Moltke once again explained, would prevent reserve formations from receiving large numbers of Landwehr men during mobilization and relieve the Landsturm from functions previously assigned to the Besatzungsarmee. The creation of the three new active army corps was also urgently necessary. Despite numerical superiority, Moltke reminded the Ministry of War,, the army had needed six months to defeat the French during the Franco- Prussian War. These new formations could partially be established from the remaining supernumerary units, but an expansion of the peacetime strength and an increase in the number of officer and non-commissioned officer positions was nevertheless unavoidable. From the political point of view, the immediate introduction of a new supplementary army bill would accomplish two objectives. First, the increasing public agitation,

59 Wandel's Diary, 9 January 1913, printed in Gerhard Granier, "Deutsche Rtistungspolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg: General Franz Wandels Tagebuchaufzeichnungen aus dem preuBischen Kriegsministerium," Militdrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, vol. 85 (1985), 142-3. 96

represented by the Army League founded by August Keim in January 1912, would be mitigated. Second, a strong confidence in the army's capability to exercise both domestic and foreign political functions would be created. The acceptance of additional military demands, Moltke added, was also currently extremely probable. "I would like to point out...that now the Reichstag, under the impression of the tense political world situation, will be prepared to approve substantial expenditure, whereas this readiness might not exist, if there should be a relaxation [of international tension] later."60 The Ministry of War responded to these demands less than a week later. The proposed increase in the peacetime strength of the existing infantry units, Heeringen argued, would overstrain the current training structure of the army. The measures that the General Staff proposed would, above all, require a reduction in the physical qualifications for recruits. "Until now I have always considered an important advantage for Germany that our recruitment has not needed to reach so exhaustively into the age groups of the eligible for enlistment, as in France." The Minister of War completely rejected a large- scale increase in the annual recruitment contingent. "No important alterations" had occurred in the application of compulsory military service since the Wars of Unification. Moreover, the peacetime strength of the army already represented one percent of the population; just over one percent if the personnel-strength of the navy was taken into consideration. Contrary statements in the press were "based upon errors." Following the expiration of the Quinquennat in March 1916, the army administration would conduct an "accurate appraisal of the political situation and, with that, an assessment of the actual needs" of the army. But Heeringen could confirm that the creation of three new active army corps was "currently very questionable." The large and sudden increase in the number of officer and non-commissioned officer positions would inevitably contribute to a "democratization" of the army. The class-consciousness of the army administration had again emerged to the forefront. "I consider the expansion of the Prussian army by nearly a sixth of its establishment to be such a far-reaching measure, that one must carefully

Moltke to Heeringen, 14 January 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 175-7. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 181. 97

consider whether its internal cohesion...will suffer substantially from it." Heeringen continued: "Without reaching into less suitable circles for additions to the officer corps," the establishment of new active units would be impossible. Material considerations also dominated within the Ministry of War. The necessary equipment and support units would not be immediately available and, consequently, these new formations would not possess a comparable combat effectiveness to the existing active army corps. The urgent requirement to complete the new units would further postpone to an "unforeseeable future" any other upgrades and improvements that might later be considered necessary for the remainder of the army. "The financial capability of the Reich also has a limit."61 The Chief of the General Staff nevertheless remained determined to introduce a revised version of the "Verdy Plan." The acceptance of new army demands by the Reichstag was not infeasible. The Reich Navy Office, Moltke reminded Heeringen, had succeeded in implementing a "very ambitious program" and had thereby guaranteed a "calm and steady development" of the fleet. The distribution of the proposed increases over a three year period, as the Ministry of War suggested, would be unacceptable. The increase in the peacetime strength and the creation of new formations would have to be implemented at once. Similarly, the increase in the annual recruit contingent would have to be approved as soon as possible since the qualitative superiority of the German army over the French could no longer be considered appreciable and, according to the General Staff, was now a "serious illusion." The strengthened annual recruit contingents, the Chief of the General Staff once again maintained, could rejuvenate the reserve and Landwehr units and "ease the burden on the older age groups." Moltke acknowledged that "the most difficult question has been the arrangement of three army corps." The necessity for the Austro-Hungarians to deploy more substantial forces against Serbia following the First Balkan War and the unlikelihood of Italian military assistance on the Upper Rhine made the creation of new formations unconditionally necessary. More

61 Heeringen to Moltke, 20 January 1913, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 402-5; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 178-80. See also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First WorldWar, 187-8; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresriistungspolitik 1890-1914, 342. 98 significantly, the General Staff employed the orientation of operational planning to explain the necessity of new active formations. The three new active army corps were needed to offset the "balance of strength in the West and for the better protection of the East."62 But the Ministry of War thereafter seized the initiative. Heeringen, in a personal appeal to the Kaiser on 23 January 1913, had gained approval for his version of the forthcoming army bill that consisted of modest increases in the existing active units and the creation of fifteen "missing" third battalions for the small infantry regiments.63 The Kaiser, Heeringen thereafter related to Moltke, did not approve of the public announcement of army demands that contained the creation of three new army corps. The program of the Ministry of War already contained a significant increase in manpower and an "even greater increase at the moment" was not considered reasonable. The establishment of additional cavalry and machine-gun units was approved but an expansion of the foot artillery would be dependent on the progress of fortress construction on the Russo-German border.64 But Wilhelm soon after clarified his position to the Minister of War. Although the establishment of three new active army corps was inopportune, the Chief of the General Staff was justified in seeking a large-scale expansion of the army. The French would possess a superiority of around one hundred infantry battalions at the beginning of a future conflict, a situation that was only exacerbated by the realization that the five army corps and two cavalry divisions previously promised by the Italian General Staff would not be available in the West. "That is so serious a situation...that absolutely must be made good." The situation was even more serious "if one takes into account that France has over 20 million less inhabitants than Germany, where countless untrained men run around." The Kaiser favoured the creation of additional active formations, but agreed with the Reich Chancellor that the program of the Ministry of War should first be implemented and preparations for the three new active army corps begin following the

62 Moltke to Heeringen, 22 January 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung undKriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 181-3. See also Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 271. 63 Fischer, War of Illusions, 181. 64 Heeringen to Moltke, 23 January 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 184. 99

acceptance of the forthcoming bill in the Reichstag. The new active formations would then be established with the next Quinquennat in March 1916.65 Ludendorff, the driving force behind large-scale increases, was soon after transferred to the command of an infantry regiment in Dusseldorf.66 Nevertheless, the Chief of the General Staff attempted once more in a letter to Bethmann Hollweg on 30 January 1913 to convince the government of the need for a reintroduction of the "Verdy Plan." Moltke pointed out that the difference in estimated additional expenditure between the programs of the General Staff and the Ministry of War amounted to only 54.8 million GM in one-time outlays and 14.8 million GM in continuous outlays. The enormous expenditure requested by Heeringen would not accomplish much and there would still be significant deficiencies in the organizational structure of the army. Moltke at the same time responded to Heeringen's claim that the army already represented one percent of the population. "I see the essence of compulsory military service not in a percent" but instead "that we train the available able-bodied men." Whereas the Ministry of War had proposed to increase the annual recruit contingent by around 50,000 men, the General Staff demanded that this number be increased to 75,000 in order to "create better peacetime cadres, to decisively rejuvenate the reserve formations and to unburden the oldest age groups." The Chief of the General Staff once again pleaded for quick and decisive action. "The military- political requirements equate to an as quick as possible accomplishment" of the General Staffs demands.67 The impending publication of a new supplementary army bill inevitably created considerable anxiety abroad. On 17 February 1913 the German ambassador in Paris, Wilhelm von Schoen, reported that large sections of the French press were demanding immediate countermeasures by the government. The reintroduction of the three-year

Wilhelm II to Heeringen, 25 January 1913, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 405-6. See also Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 104. 66 F6rster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 272; Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 148. 67 Moltke to Bethmann Hollweg, 30 January 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 186-9. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890- 1914, 344. 100

service period, the Schoen wrote, was currently under serious consideration.68 The Chief of the General Staff thereafter voiced his concern about the possible changes to the military balance of power that such a measure would produce. The reintroduction of the three-year service period would not only immediately increase the French army by 200,000 men, but would also drastically improve the quality of the active formations through the addition in peacetime strength. The fundamental principle of the "Verdy Plan," the training of all able-bodied German citizens, had to be accomplished at once if Germany wanted "the possibility to succeed in the great struggle of peoples." Despite the ongoing preparations for the introduction of the Ministry of War's program, the French measures could also provide the opportunity to include the three active army corps in the forthcoming army bill and for their creation by 1 October 1913. The acceptance of such a large-scale expansion of the army, Moltke concluded, would be certain.69 The Chief of the General Staff followed this communication with another request for the immediate acceptance of his program. The Russians now intended to increase the peacetime strength of the army by three to four new active army corps and, together with the reintroduction of the three-year service period in France, this measure represented a serious danger to the military balance of power. The "at once accomplishment" of the measures outlined in the December memorandum were now much "more urgent" and, according to Moltke, were "for the time being the minimum for the arrangement of the army" that could be expected.7

But the Ministry of War had already ensured that a more modest expansion of the army would be introduced to the Reichstag. On the same day that Moltke communicated his concerns over the recent Russian military reform, Bethmann Hollweg and Heeringen

68 Schoen to Bethmann Hollweg, 17 February 1913, printed in Auswartiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 39, 152-3. 69 Moltke to Bethmann Hollweg, 1 March 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 188-9. See also Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 104. 70 Moltke to Bethmann Hollweg, 5 March 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 189. See also Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 104-5. 101

71 met to discuss the scale of the army demands. The Minister of War thereafter reported to Moltke that the Reich Chancellor had agreed an increase of 3,975 officers and 131,764 non-commissioned officers and men. The annual recruit contingent, moreover, would be increased by 68,425 men and, in doing so, the limit of the available able-bodied manpower in Germany would be reached. Even such a modest program presented considerable difficulties. The officers and non-commissioned officers required for the additional active units would take years to train properly and, in the meantime, the inner quality of the entire army would undoubtedly suffer. The Minister of War at the same time demonstrated that the creation of additional active army corps would only exacerbate the considerable difficulties associated with an expansion of the army. Three new active army corps would require an additional increase of 1,900 officers and 51,500 non-commissioned officers and men. Furthermore, 23,000 additional recruits would be required annually to maintain the strength of these new formations and the Ministry of War did not consider these numbers realistic mainly for financial reasons. Before the creation of new formations could even be considered, the forthcoming increase in peacetime strength would have to be properly digested by the standing army.72 Bethmann Hollweg, who had not intervened in the preparation of the new army bill, had only agreed to the Ministry of War's more modest program because the problem of "covering" the new military expenditure had once again emerged as an explosive issue in the Reichstag. In October 1912 the State Secretary of the Treasury Office had sent Bethmann Hollweg a proposal for a new property tax that corresponded to the "Lex Bassermann-Erzberger." The choice confronting the government was simple: introduce either a tax on wealth or an inheritance tax. The tax on wealth, Kiihn acknowledged, would incite considerable opposition from the federal states which had always sought to preserve their influence in the area of direct taxation. An inheritance tax, on the other hand, would be extremely undesirable since both the Centre Party and the Conservatives

71 Fischer, War of Illusions, 181. 72 Memorandum composed by Heeringen, 5 March 1913, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsriistung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 190-1. 102 would strongly oppose such a measure. The State Secretary of the Treasury Office recognized the considerable difficulties confronting the government. In a memorandum from 23 January 1913, Kiihn remarked: "We may take it as an established fact in our political calculations that an enlarged inheritance tax will not be passed by the Reichstag or at any rate not in a form acceptable to the federal governments." The Left Liberals and the Social Democrats would demand the presentation of a tax that would never be acceptable to the Conservatives.74 During a meeting of the Prussian Ministry of State on 9 March Bethmann Hollweg therefore proposed a compromise solution. The one-time expenditures associated with the army bill, estimated by the Minister of War to amount to 996 million GM, would be financed with a "defence contribution." The 194 million GM in continuous outlays would, on the other hand, be "covered" by a general tax on increases in wealth.75 The Reich Chancellor thereafter explained the importance of such a measure in the Bundesrat in words that closely corresponded to the views of the General Staff. "There has been a change in the distribution of power within the Triple Alliance and also within the powers that the Triple Alliance can expect to face in the event of a military conflict."76 The Reich Chancellor dramatically introduced the army bill to the Reichstag on 7 April 1913. "The question remains only: can we further allow ourselves the luxury to do without tens of thousands of trained soldiers, that we could have but now do not enlist?" A future European conflict would "line up Slavs against Teutons" and, consequently, the proposed increase in peacetime strength was absolutely necessary to "secure the future of Germany."77 Whereas all the parties except the Social Democrats agreed to the scale of army demands, Bethmann Hollweg was unable to convince the parliamentary deputies of the need for new direct taxation. On 24 April the Minister of War therefore appeared

73 Kilhn to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 October 1912, in Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913, 358-9; Fischer, War of Illusions, 182. 74 Memorandum composed by Kiihn, 23 January 1913, in Fischer, War of Illusions, 182. 75 Bethmann Hollweg to the Prussian Ministry of State, 9 March 1913, in Fischer, War of Illusions, 184. 76 Bethmann Hollweg to the Bundesrat, 10 March 1913, in Fischer, War of Illusions, 184-5. 77 Bethmann Hollweg to the Reichstag, 7 April 1913, in Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XIII Legislative Period, 133rd Session, vol. 289 (Berlin, 1913), 4512-5. See also Fischer, War of Illusions, 187; Forster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 281-2. 103

before a secret meeting of the Budget Commission to mobilize support for the proposed measures. The diplomatic attitude of Britain would be unpredictable and Germany would have to deploy significant forces to protect the North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts from a British amphibious landing. The Belgian government, which would undoubtedly side with France in a future conflict, had recently introduced legislation for a strengthening of the army by 50,000 men. The French had also implemented several reforms. The cavalry divisions, reserve formations and fortress garrisons had been strengthened by around 49,000 men, while the border fortifications were in the process of being expanded. The French army corps in North Africa would also probably be transferred to the European continent in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Germany in the West would "stand alone against a united France and Belgium." The military situation in the East was similarly disadvantageous. The First Balkan War had weakened Turkish military strength and, in the future, the majority of the Russian field army would be concentrated against Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Russian military reorganization would be completed in two years. Germany would therefore have to come to the assistance of Austria- Hungary with "considerably stronger power than before 1912," whereas "the period of time we have to reach a decision against France has been reduced by the enhancement of Russian military strength." The numerical inferiority of the Austro-German armies, moreover, had increased to around 1,450,000 men and would likely increase when France reintroduced the three-year service period. "The danger of war," the Minister of War declared, "was not urgent at the time," but since the geographic and military situation meant that Germany would have to assume the offensive against France in a future conflict, a new army bill was absolutely necessary. The expansion of the annual recruit 78 contingent was now required to offset this numerical superiority. The army bill nevertheless encountered further opposition with the parliamentary deputies insisting on reductions in the number of aristocratic officer positions with the 78 Wenninger to the Bavarian Ministry of War, 24 April 1913, and Graevenitz to the WUrttemberg Ministry of State, 24 and 25 April 1913, printed in Dieter Groh, "Die geheimen Sitzungen der Reichshaushaltskommission am 24. und 25. April 1913," Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 11 (1971), 30-8. See also FOrster, Der Doppelte Militarismus, 285-7. 104

staffs of the new active units. The Kaiser once again confronted this opposition with a demand for dissolution of the Reichstag, new parliamentary elections and introduction of an amended army bill. Bethmann Hollweg steadfastly refused to consider dissolution of the Reichstag. The result of the preceding elections meant that the government could not risk dissolving the Reichstag "over issues such as the responsibility for adjutants and rations." "This would be the worst possible election slogan" and the government would consequently "look ridiculous." Only the Left Liberals and the Social Democrats would 70 profit from such an eventuality. The necessary financial "cover" for the army bill also presented considerable difficulties for Bethmann Hollweg. The Bundesrat had proposed the introduction of a subsidiary federal government tax on increases in wealth. This proposal, however, was only acceptable to the Conservatives. Only following lengthy negotiations between the government and the leaders of the individual parties was a compromise solution produced. Erzberger and the Centre Party proposed to convert the subsidiary tax into a direct federal government tax on wealth and were supported by the National Liberals, the Progressive People's Party and the Social Democrats. The support of the socialists was crucial. Bethmann Hollweg thereafter declared to the Bundesrat that he could not bear the responsibility for rejecting the tax and that the "extremely delicate situation" of "settling the appropriations in cooperation with the Social Democrats and then expecting the other parties to approve the army bill" could not be tolerated. The Bundesrat approved of the "cover" legislation and the supplementary army bill was , approved by the Reichstag, with the exception of the Social Democrats on 13 June 1913. The peacetime strength of the army had been increased by around 4,000 officers and 127,000 non-commissioned officers and men, while 884 million GM were required for OA one-time expenses and 183 million GM annually for continuous outlays. Furthermore, the annual recruit contingent was thereafter increased to 358,956 men. But despite the increased acceptance of the need for a further expansion of the army, the implementation 79 Bethmann Hollweg to Plessen, 25 April 1913, in Fischer, War of Illusions, 187. 80 Fischer, War of Illusions, 181; Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 190; Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 295. 81 "Nachweisung der in den Jahren 1890-1913 zum Dienst im Heere ausgehoben Mannschaften," in RH-61- 332, BA-MA Freiburg. 105 of the "Verdy Plan" and the "full realization of compulsory military service" had again floundered upon a combination of domestic political problems and the opposition of the conservative Ministry of War. 106

Conclusion

On 29 June 1913 the Bulgarian army launched a surprise offensive against the Greek and Serbian forces in Macedonia. Only seven days after setting off the Second Balkan War, however, the Bulgarian government appealed to Russia to organize an armistice. The Chief of the General Staff viewed the events with a sense of optimism. The success of the Greek and Serbian armies and the emerging possibility of a Greco-Romanian agreement meant that in the future a grouping of states could emerge that would both be independent of Russia and provide a counterbalance to Serbia in the Balkans. The recent improvement in relations between Austria-Hungary and Romania would also improve the diplomatic and military position of the Triple Alliance. But the international situation was still extremely unfavourable and Moltke nevertheless remained convinced of an inevitable "collision between Germandom and Slavdom."1 In March 1914 the Chief of the General Staff therefore commented to Conrad von Hotzendorf that he regretted "again and again that Austria swapped" a reliable and valuable ally in Romania" for a doubtful and weakened Bulgaria." In the future everything would be done in Berlin "to keep Romania with the Triple Alliance." The one positive to emerge from the recent Balkan conflict had been the Turkish decision to accept a German military mission to reorganize their shattered army. The Turkish government could subsequently be counted upon as a probable ally in a future conflict. But Turkish military support was almost worthless. "If in the past one talked about Turkey as a sick man, then one now has to talk of a dying one...our military mission equals that of a team of doctors who stand around the dying bed of an incurably sick man."2 Following additional reports from the chief of the German military mission in Constantinople, Liman von Sanders, Moltke elaborated further on these views. "To count on Turkey in the near future as a benefit to the Triple Alliance or Germany must be regarded as completely mistaken."

1 Moltke to his wife, 22 July 1913, printed in Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente 1877-1916, 373-4. 2 Moltke to Conrad von Hotzendorf, 13 March 1914, printed in Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, vol. 3, Der Ausgang des Balkankrieges und die Zeit bis zum Fiirstenmord in Sarajevo, 609-12. See also Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 170-1. 3 Memorandum composed by Moltke, 18 May 1914, in Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 171-2. 107

The heightened international tension resulting from the Second Balkan War once again persuaded the General Staff to once again attempt to determine the level of Italian military support at the beginning of a future conflict. During the German army manoeuvres in Schleswig in September 1913 the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Georg von Waldersee, had approached the Italian Chief of Staff, Alberto Pollio, concerning the transportation of Italian troops to Alsace-Lorraine. Following lengthy negotiations in December 1913, the German and Italian army administrations agreed upon the transportation of five infantry and two cavalry divisions to Alsace-Lorraine. Even this tentative arrangement did not satisfy the Chief of the General Staff. "At present we have to take the given circumstances into consideration, and we must begin the war as if the Italians were not to be expected at all." Moltke further concluded that "we cannot now allow for any changes to the dispositions already agreed on."4 Waldersee similarly remained unconvinced that Italian military assistance had been guaranteed. Although Pollio was both intelligent and competent, there were numerous pro-French politicians in the Italian government. Together with "the strange circumstances on the Adriatic" and the "latent opposition to Austria," Waldersee concluded that "the new Italy has so far always done its business through the victories of others."5 On 30 May 1912 the General Staff produced a memorandum on the participation of Great Britain in a Franco-German conflict. The British would undoubtedly support France and the Royal Navy would protect French commercial interests and overseas possessions and facilitate the transport of additional French troops from North Africa to France. The British would, in addition, transport an expeditionary force of around 131,000 men to the continent which, in the opinion of the General Staff, would represent "an equal opponent" to the active German formations. The British were expected to disembark along the French Channel coast and from there could move into Belgium and thereby confront the advancing German forces.6

4 Moltke to Conrad von Hotzendorf, 13 March 1914, printed in Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, vol. 3, 609-12. See also Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 168. 5 Memorandum composed by Waldersee, May 1914, in Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 168-9. 6 Memorandum composed in the General Staff, 30 May 1912, inLambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914, 393-4. 108

The continuing shift of the balance of military power to the disadvantage of Germany provided the background to the final negotiations between the General Staff and the Ministry of War on the future development of the army. On 5 May 1914 the new Minister of War, Erich von Falkenhayn, had addressed the Reichstag on the progress of the improvements to the army. The army bills of 1912 and 1913, the Minister of War acknowledged, had not resulted in the "realization of compulsory military service" and around 38,000 able-bodied German citizens each year still did not receive training.7 Moltke quickly highlighted this shortcoming of army policy. The international situation had changed considerably since 1912. The French had reintroduced the three year service period in response to the German army increases. The Russians, meanwhile, would complete the organization of four to five new active army corps by 1917 and, in doing so, would expand their peacetime strength in an "unforeseen manner." The military strength of the Triple Alliance had consequently continued to decline. Romania could no longer be considered a potential ally and, conversely, would probably be aligned with Russia. The resulting need for Austria-Hungarian army to deploy considerable strength opposite the Balkans, moreover, meant that a larger portion of the Russian army would be concentrated against Germany. Moltke was convinced that a future conflict would be a "life and death struggle for the German people" and therefore once again advocated the training of all able-bodied men. The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that the 38,000 additional untrained men that escaped military service in 1913 corresponded to the strength of an entire active army corps. The necessary funds for such an increase, moreover, were available in Germany. "I only have to point out in this respect the immense sums that the German people spend annually for luxury goods such as liquor and tobacco." The necessary measures only had to be introduced. Even the method of allocating these additional trained men, either in existing units or through the creation of additional active formations, was not important. What instead mattered, Moltke argued,

7 Falkenhayn to the Reichstag, 5 May 1914, in Stenographische Berichte tiber die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages, XIII Legislative Period, 249th Session, vol. 294 (Berlin, 1914), 8455-6. 109 was ensuring that the accusation could not be raised that the army administration had "not done everything for the preservation of the German Reich and people." The response of the Ministry of War was predictable. Falkenhayn, writing to Bethmann Hollweg in early July 1914, outlined his proposals for the future development of the army. The Minister of War proposed additional training of reserve and Landwehr officers and measures for the training of able-bodied German citizens before they entered the annual recruit contingent. Most interestingly, Falkenhayn presented the outline of a program for the "realization of compulsory military service." The Minister of War prefaced his proposals by reminding the Reich Chancellor that the recent increases in the peacetime strength had resulted in a severe shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers. The army required a "period of calm" to reorganize and re-establish internal cohesion among the active formations. In any event, additional increases were impossible since the necessary financial means, in contrast to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, were not available and would have to be "covered" by new taxes, something that was not considered feasible after the Army Bill of 1913. The strength of the standing army already imposed a considerable burden on the government budget and no new military expenditures were advisable until after 1915. The Minister of War therefore proposed to begin preparations for training the entire available manpower only after the expiration of the existing Quinquennat in March 1916 and to implement the measures in the spring of 1917. The further development of the army, Falkenhayn emphasized, had to take into consideration not only the "preservation of our international situation," but also the prevailing domestic political circumstances.9 Despite the approval of the Army Bill of 1913, the conservative army policy of the Ministry of War had not changed.

Whereas the long-term program presented by Minister of War Julius von Verdy du Vernois had originally sought to re-establish Germany as a "nation in arms," such a program was never fully introduced before the First World War. The "full realization of

8 Moltke to Bethmann Hollweg, May 1914, printed in Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 192-3. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 364-5. 9 Falkenhayn to Bethmann Hollweg, 8 July 1914, printed in Berghahn and Deist, Rustung im Zeichen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik, 418-20; Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments to vol. 1, 193-5. See also Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 362. 110

compulsory military service," although initially rejected by Bismarck as politically inopportune, had been an attractive option for Caprivi following the cancellation of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890. The period of relative calm in international relations that followed served to dampen the enthusiasm of the government for such large-scale and expensive land armaments programs. The increased electoral support for the Social Democratic Party at the same time convinced the Ministry of War that any enlargement of the peacetime strength would invariably necessitate the induction of large numbers of potentially "tainted" socialist recruits, thereby accelerating a "democratization" of the army, the so-called "pillar of the monarchy." At the same time, the implementation of the "Tirpitz Plan" and the diversion of significant government funds to the construction of a first-class battleship fleet conveniently provided the Ministry of War with an excuse to reject long-term programs of army expansion. But the heightened international tension after 1899 and the succession of diplomatic crises that threatened to precipitate a general European conflict, together with the orientation of operational planning and the threat of a two-front war, ensured that the core principles of the "Verdy Plan" endured within the General Staff, and by 1911 even the Ministry of War was compelled to admit that certain numerical improvements were urgently necessary. Although the approval of two large supplementary army bills in 1912 and 1913 partially fulfilled these modest expectations, the army administration subsequently remained adamant that additional sudden and extensive increases in the peacetime strength demanded by the General Staff were out of the question for a combination of financial, political and social reasons.

But how did the failure to train the "entire able-bodied manpower of the Reich" affect the operational capability of the German army at the beginning of the First World War? Falkenhayn indeed remarked to Tirpitz in September 1914 that had the Reich Navy Office not embarked upon an ambitious program of naval expansion after 1897-8, the General Staff would have certainly had "two more army corps and not lost the Battle of the Marne."10 Such comments, however, cannot be taken seriously. The cancellation of contingency planning for a deployment solely against Russia by Moltke in April 1913 and the acceptance of a western offensive and the "Schlieffen Plan" as the only

10 Tirpitz, Der Aufbau der Deutschen Weltmacht, 267. Ill

operational solution to the problem of a two-front war ensured that enormous physical demands would invariably be placed upon the field army in the event of a European conflict. The possession of a few additional active army corps would therefore probably not have altered the final outcome at the Marne. The German army, exhausted from seemingly endless marching through Belgium and northern France, would still have proved ineffective against Joseph Gallieni's French forces east of Paris had the Ministry of War given in to the demands of the General Staff in 1912-13. What the consistent refusal to completely implement the core principles of the "Verdy Plan" in fact produced, on the other hand, was only widespread pessimism and a "war the sooner the better" point of view. When Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, the General Staff was consequently far more inclined to advocate a military solution than had the army administration decided to preserve the European balance of military power after 1893. This pessimistic sentiment was undeniably expressed when the Chief of the General Staff remarked to the Bavarian military plenipotentiary shortly before the First World War: The international situation "is from the military point of view favourable to a degree which cannot occur again in the foreseeable future."11

11 Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 172. 112

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Appendix A: The Balance of Military Power, 1887-1914 a) The Peacetime Strength of the German Army, 1887-19131

Year Officers NCOs and Men Total Population %

1887 19,294 468,409 487,703 47,540,000 1.03 1890 20,285 486,983 507,268 49,239,000 1.03 1893 22,458 557,093 579,551 50,778,000 1.14 1899 24,292 576,485 600,777 55,248,000 1.09 1905 25,722 591,517 617,239 60,314,000 1.02 1911 25,880 595,545 621,425 65,359,000 0.95 1912 27,267 623,351 650,618 66,146,000 0.98 1913 30,459 755,587 786,046 66,978,000 1.17 b) The Peacetime Strength of the Continental European Armies, 1904-1914 (including officers, non-commissioned officers and men)2

Year Austria-Hungary Italy France Russia

1904 361,770 221,085 575,000 1,900,000 1905 361,770 220,834 595,000 1,900,000 1906 362,398 249,816 590,000 1,000,000 1907 366,578 249,917 602,492 1,000,000 1908 365,742 247,000 610,923 1,000,000 1909 369,203 247,000 567,484 1,209,000 1910 370,510 238,617 574,342 1,303,000 1911 353,017 253,786 593,556 1,345,000 1912 391,297 256,000 611,709 1,332,000 1914 441,551 250,000 765,366 1,539,000

1 Reichsarchiv, Kriegsrustung und Kriegswirtschaft, attachments, to vol. 1, 469-509; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 1890-1914, 391. For population statistics see Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866- 1918, vol. 1,10. 2 Collenberg, Die Deutsche Armee von 1871 bis 1914, 112; Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, 234. 118

Appendix B: German Government and Military Expenditures, 1901-19133 a) German Federal Government Expenditures, 1901-1913 (in millions GM)

Year Military Administration Social Programs Total

1901 1162.9 94.8 28.1 1286.6 1902 1122.8 112.2 30.4 1265.9 1903 1105.7 109.1 33.7 1292.1 1904 1152.2 117.6 40.6 1310.4 1905 1233.5 116.9 42.0 1394.6 1906 1358.2 131.6 45.8 1535.6 1907 1631.1 121.7 90.7 1843.5 1908 1463.7 122.1 54.1 1639.9 1909 1593.6 134.6 58.2 1786.7 1910 1771.3 146.8 61.9 1980.0 1911 1707.5 152.4 66.8 1926.7 1912 1781.3 146.2 65.2 1992.9 1913 2406.4 176.0 87.9 2670.3 b) German Military Expenditures, 1901-1913 (in millions GM)

Year Army Budget Navy Budget Other Expenditure Total

1901 677.9 207.8 277.2 1162.9 1902 669.2 217.4 236.2 1122.8 1903 660.0 225.0 220.7 1105.7 1904 647.0 219.1 286.1 1152.2 1905 697.1 246.1 290.3 1233.5 1906 752.6 259.2 346.4 1358.2 1907 808.6 303.4 519.1 1631.1 1908 829.0 347.4 287.3 1463.7 1909 867.1 419.9 306.6 1593.6 1910 831.2 434.3 505.8 1771.3 1911 824.1 451.9 431.5 1707.5 1912 929.1 462.9 389.3 1781.3 1913 1467.0 480.1 459.3 2406.4

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