WE SHALL NOT LEAVE WXTHOUT A FIGHT': THl3 CONSERVA-
AND THE PRUSSLGN FRANCEaSE, 1917-1918
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Guelph
In partial Witof requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
December, 1998
O Adam Sumun, 1998 National Library Bibliothèque.nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 355 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawatON K1AW OrtawaON K1AW Canada Canada
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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othenirise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. 'WE SHALL NOT LEAVE WITHOUT A FIGHT': THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE PRUSSIAN FRANCHISE, 19 17- 19 18
Adam Sumun Advisor: University of Guelph Professor Eric G. Reiche
This thesis is an examination of the Prussian Conservatives' opposition to the equai suffrage during the years 19 17- 19 18. This study was designed to demonstrate that the Conservatives, despite the increasing need for reform created by the war and the sacrifices of the Germans. clung to the three-class franchise which they believed to be the most efficient way in preserving their privileged position in Prussia, and Pmssia's dominant position in the Empire.
The findings of this study indicate that the Conservatives used dl possible methods and tactics to delay reforms, when possible; and if not, to favour any compromise that did not include equai suffrage. Not only did they denounce the actions of the Social-Democrat Party (SPD)on the question; they also openly opposed the government. The arguments brought forward by the
Conservatives demonstrate how out of touch they were with the political and social situation of twentieth century Europe. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
Glossary
(xAFrER ONE INTRODUCTION: "The Signïficance of the Russian Franchise Question"
CHAPTER TWO: 'The Kaiser Speaks. The Franchise from the Easter Message to the Jdy Decree."
CHAPTER THREE: "Changesin the ChanceUonhip, but the Course Remains the same. From July to December 19 17."
CHAPTER FOUR: "From Hope to Defeat. The last Year of the War. "
C)iAPTER FTVE: Conclusion
Bibliography Abgeordnetenhaus: Pnissian Lower House.
Alldeutscher Verband: Pan-German League
Bund der Lundwir~e(BdL): Agrarian League founded in 1893 to defend agridniral interests of The League was controiied early on by the Conservatives, but was more radical that the Conservative Party dwing the war.
Burgfreden: Political tmce apdupon by al1 political parties at the outbreak of the war.
DCG: Deputy Cornmanding General, military comrnanders of Germany's districts.
DKP ( Deutschkonservarive Parter?: Gelman Conservative Party-
Herrenhaus: Prussian Upper House.
Junker: Landed nobility of East Prussia.
Kriegpresseamt: War Office Press established in 1915 to regdate the press.
Landrag: Prussian legislative Houses that included the Herrenhaus and Abgeordnetenhaus.
Minelstand: German comparable term for middle-clâss.
OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung): German Amy High Command.
Oberzensurstelfe:Supreme Censorship Office established in 19 14 to control the press.
Reichstag: Federai House of deputies.
SPD (SozialdernokratischePartei Deutschlands): German Social Democratic Party.
USPD ( Unabhkgige Sotialdernokrarie Partei Derfiscfan&):Gennan Independent Socialist Party that split from the SPD in April of 1917.
Vorwarts: SPD's main newspaper.
Wahlkreise: EIectoral districts.
Wahlmiinner.In Pnissia state elections were indirect; eligible voters in each class elected the Wahlmanner who in hum elected deputies of the Abgeordnerenhaus. mRONE INTRODUCTION: "TEE S1GNIFI:CANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN FRANCHISE QU]ESTION"
In the years preceding the First World War no political refonn was more debated and
controversial in Pmssia than the the-class franchise. Based on one's annual income, the
franchise used to elect deputies of the Lower House (Abgeordnetenhuus) conferred mure voting
power on the weakhiest members of society. Introduced in 1850 in response to the Revolution of
1848, the suffrage did not correspond, on the eve of the First World War, to the econornic, social
and political situations of a predorninantly industrialized state like Prussia.' Reforming the
hanchise was not only dernanded by the parties of the ~eft~,but the Pmssian govemment also
recognized continuation of the status quo was not acceptable and proposed different refonn
proposals in the two decades preceding the war.' The governrnent's proposals were not
satisfactory to the SPD which was, with the Progressive Pw,the only puty advocating an
equal, direct and universal franchise; however, even minor reforms were considered too radical
by the Conservative Party which used its strength in the Abgeordnetenhaw (with the help of
other political parties) to successfully oppose any significant changes. Thus. on the eve of the
war the fmnchise divided the political actors in Prussia between those who opposed reforming
the fianchise and those who wanted changes, but could not agree on their extent.
The outbreak of the war in August of 1914 significantly influenced the debates on the
Prussian franchise. The govemment and the political parties agreed to put their differences aside and show a united front on the war effort. By 1915 the SPD, believing that refom would be the
I The eastern provinces of Pnissia were predominantiy rurai (with the exception of Silesia) but the most populous States in Western Prussia (Westphaiia, Rhineland and the surroundings of Berlin in Brandenburg) were indusûialized and with large cities. 'The Social Dernocrat Party (SPD),the Progressive Party and to a certain extent the left fraction of the National Liberal Party (NL), See pp. 7- 10. reward for its support of the war effort, demanded changes to the franchise but the Pnissian
govemment was at first only willing to ailow general discussions on the suffrage. The
Revolution in Russia and the overthrow of the Tsarkt monarchy worried the Pnissian
govemment and, fearing radicalization of the workers, the Minister-President (and Reich
ChancelIor) Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg convinced the King to announce in his Easter
Message of 1917 that the suffrage would be refomed. The Conservative Party did not
acknowledge the need for these reforms and was confident that it had enough support in the
Abgeordnetenhaus to oppose changes that would include an equai franchise. The war made the
party less willing to compromise and they interpreted good news from the front as having the
effect of increasing the prestige of the rnonarchy, the myand the ruling elite, and thus
rendenng reforms unnecessary, just as the victorious war of 1866 against Austria had solved a
sirnilar political crisis. When the rnilitary situation worsened, the Conservatives, under the
impression that their privileged position in Prussia was threatened, opposed changes to the
the-class suffrage more vehemently. Thus. the Conservatives' view of the rnilitary situation left
no room for compromises or substantial reforms. The unwiilingness of the government to take
radical measures in reforming the franchise. such as the dissolution of the Abgeordnetenhaus,
had the consequence that the Conservatives remained intransigent until the very 1st week of
October 1918. In doing so the Conservatives not only weakened the monarchy but were also
partially responsible for the abdication of Wilhelm II in November.
The study of the Pmssian threeclass franchise has been the object of a few studies by
historians. Reinhard Patemann, who in his book looked specifically at the franchise during the
war, provides the most thorough analysis by giving a good and balanced account of the
involvement of the government, political parties, army and interest g0u~s.5Fritz Klein's
4 Patemann, Reinhard, Der Kampf um die Preussische Wahlrefonn im Ersten Weltkrieg, Düssetdorf, 1964. collection of essays includes an article by Helmuth Wekr on the suffrage in 1917-1918.' In a short and concise manner the author surrimarizes the question of the fianchise. Helrnuth Weber's
Manrist view rnakes him cntical of the political actors in the debate; not surprisingly. his most vehement attacks are airned at the SPD, accusing the party as more interested in cooperating with the govemment than figfiting for an equai franchise in Pmssia. Thomas Kuhne recently wrote two books on the Pmssian franchise. The fmt one covers the years 1867-19 14 with nothing on the war; while the second work, though covering the period 1914-1918, is more a statistical analysis of the voting process with information on the percentage of voters in each class, the voting share each party received and the name of elected deputies6 Those are essentiaily the only works that focus primarily on the three-class suffrage.
Recent studies on imperid Germany and Pmssia largely ignore the suffrage question and tend
CO leave out the important years of the war. Volker Berghahn's recent study of the Wilhelmine era is a clear example of an omission of the years 1914-1918.~Even the inclusion of the war years in gened studies of hperial Germany does not necessady mean more attention is paid to the franchise. Wolfgang Mommsen touches the question of the franchise in less than one paragraph in his book on Imperial ~erman~?Thomas Nipperdey gives a good summary of the question of politicai refom during the war, including the democratization of the Reich institutions and reform to the Russian fran~hise.~However, the space allotted to the three-class suffrage is short when compared to the length of the two volumes. Studies on Prussia not only lack any noticeable mention of the franchise, they too tend to totally ignore the period of the
Weber, Helmuth, "Zum Problem der Wahlreform in PreuBen wahrend der JAre f 9 17- 19 18" in Klein. Fritz, Politik im Krîeg. Studien zur Polirik der deutschen herrschenden Ktassen im ersren Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1964. Kühne, Thomas, DreikIassenwahlrechr und Wohkultur in Preum. 1867-1914. Düsseldorf. 1994 and Handbuch der Wahlen zum Preuflischen Abgeordnerenhaus. 1867- 1918, Düsseldorf. 1994. 7 Berghahn, Voiker Rolf, ImperiaI Germany 1871 - 1914, Providence, 1994 * Mommsen. Wolfgang J.. Imperial Gemny 1867-1918. London, 1995. 9 Nipperdey, Thomas, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, 2 Vol., Munich, 1993. war- 10 Haffber's study is a general history of PNssia, but surpnsingly the oniy pend not mentioned is the Wilhelmine era For him 1871 marks the end of Prussia and interestingly enough, the last chapter, dealing with the period following the Gennan unification, is entitled
'The Slow Demise". Koch, on the other hand simply declares that he considers the creation of the Empire to be the end of hssia as a state thus ending his book in 1871. Feuchtwanger's study of Prussia inciudes the Irnperial era but he nevertheless only briefly mentions the Pmssian franchise before the war?
Most disturbing however is the absence of the franchise issue in recent studies of German
Consenativism. Geoff Eley's study of the German Right inchdes the nationalist pressure groups of the right during the Wilhelmine era but he too ends his study with the year 1914 with little mention of the fmchise cpestion." Jones and Retdlack's recent collection of essays on German
Conservatism is informative but includes no single essay on the Prussian franchise or
Consenatives during the war.') The sarne criticism applies to the collection of essays edited by
Stegmann; though more space is given to politics, there is nothing on the franchise or the war period.14Finally, Retallack's study of the Conservative Party is a good and informative account of the party from its foundation in 1876 to its dissolution in 19 18 describing the organization of the Party, its program, the relationship with the govemment and other conservative
~r~anizations.'~Retallack gives a good but btief surnmary of the effects of the war on the
Conservatives' attitudes - a~,analysis that accounts for Iess than ten pages in his book.
'O Haffner. Sebastian, The Rise and Fali of Prussia, London, 1980. Koch, H.W., A History of Prussia, London, 1978. " Feuchtwanger, W.. Prussia: Myth and Realiw Chicago. 1970. l2 Eley, Geoff, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change Afer Bismarck New Haven, 1980 l3 Jones. Larry and Retailack, James (rds.). Between Rdom Reaction and Resistance. Studies in the Histoiy of Gennan Conservatisrnfrom 1789 to 1945, Providence, 1993 l4 Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt and Peter-Christian Witt (eds.). Deutscher Konrerwatbmus im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert, Bonn, 1983. l5 Rettaiack, James. Notables of the Right, Boston. 1988. The absence of studies on the Russian franchise or even the brief mention of the franchise in recent work on German Conservatism, Prussia and Germany is difficult to understand. The question of reforming the franchise and the democratization of Reich institutions was of major importance during the war. Why then is it largely ignored? One reason rnight be that the emphasis on socid history leaves little interest among historians to political history such as the suffrage. There is also more emphasis placed on regional history and a better understanding of other German States during the Wilhelmine era such as Bavaria, Saxony, Baden and
Würtemberg, thus leaving little attention for Prussia, However, the reaI reasons of the Me interest for the hssian franchise are unclear and as a result, there is a need for more studies on the franchise and the Conservative Party in order to improve our understanding of Pnissia and
German y.
The subject of this thesis is the actions of the Conservative Party in opposing reforms to the hssian franchise in the last two years of the war. It is my contention that the party, despite the increasing need for reform created by the war and the sacrifices of the Germans, clung to the three-class franchise which it beIieved to be the most efficient way in preserving their privileged position in Pnissia, and Pnissia's dominant position in the Empire. Considering the suffrage to be of such vitai importance to their own position, the Conservatives perceived any reform as too radical and used al1 methods to oppose changes. Their opposition will be analyzed by looking at three aspects of the debate from the Conservatives' point of view. The first component is their relationship with the government because the Conservative Party still considered itself to be a
"govemment's and expected the latter to work in its interest. ït was dso assurned that the
16 In Prussia the ministers and Minister-President were appointed by the king and were onty responsible to him and not the Abgeordnetenhaus. Most ministers were prominent oficials in the Pnissian administration and did not corne from the Conservative Party whose deputies's hinction was to defend the king's prerogatives and opposing democratization, not parliamentary responsibility. By 19 17-19 18 the party was much more conservative than the Pnissian government which, as a government of "al1 hians", did not work solely for the interests of the eiectorate of the Party. See also Feuchtwanger. p.200. govemment would not initiate any legislation on the franchise that did not have the approval of the Conservatives. Consequently the Consetvatives were unhappy when the Kaiser first announced in his Easter Message that the franchise was to be reformed. How did the
Conservatives react? How did they perceive the government and their relationship with the government after April of 1917? Did the Conservatives oppose the govemment? Was it an open attack on the government's intentions or did they use their influence behind closed doors? How did the relationship evolve in the last two years of the war?
The second aspect I wilI discuss is the Conservatives' perception of the Social Democratic
Party's role in reforming the suffrage. Previous to the war the Conservatives vehemently attacked the SPD and its ideals of revolution, democracy, equality, political and social refonris- The outbreak of the war in August 1914 changed the political life in Germany and Prussia; no general elections were held during the conflict and politicai differences had to be put aside to create a united front against the enemy. It was in this logic that the Burgfrieden (political tmce) was pmclaimed and the Kaiser announced that "1 know no more parties, I only know ~ennans.""in the initial stages of the war the SPD ceased its demd to reform the Prussian franchise, but by
19 15 the party renewed its cails for changes when it becme clear that the Conservatives* opposition made the govemment hesitant to implement reforms. The Easter Message was the signal for the Social Democrats that it was time for the government to gant a more democratic franchise. How did the Conservatives react to the SPD's demands? Did the Burg.fneden play any role in their relationship with the SPD? How did the Conservative perceive the SPD's role on the franchise?
The last aspect 1 intend to analyze is the arguments used by the Conservatives in opposing reform to the suffrage. By 19 17 the pressure for reforms was so great that even the Conservative
17 Kaiser Wilhelm II, speech Eorn the throne in the Royal Palace. Berlin, August 4, 19 14 in Luu, H.W. (ed.), The Fall of the GemnEmpire. New York, 1969, vo1.2, pp.7-9. Party could not reject al1 proposais and favour the statu quo. How then did the Party oppose reforms? What strategy and tactics did the Consenratives use? Since the Party did not have a majority in the Abgeordnetenhaus what was the relationship with other political parties? Was it an easy task for the Conservatives to convince other parties to share their point of view?
Furthemore, did the Conservatives have any concrete counter proposais or did they simply reject any changes to the franchise?
The Conservatives' perception of the government's role in reforming the franchise, their view of the SPD on the sarne question and their arguments to oppose reforms are, as already mentioned, the three main aspects that will be studied throughout this thesis. The fmt chapter goes from the proclamation of the Easter Message in Apnl of 1917, in which the king Wilhelm II promised to reform the franchise, to the July Decree when he mentioned that the suffrage was to be equal. Also discussed in the chapter will be the Apnl strikes, what part the franchise played in the strikers' demands and how the strikes subsequently influenced the debate on the franchise question. The second chapter deals with the period frorn the resignation of Bethmann-Hollweg as
Chancellor to the end of the year and the introduction of a suffrage bill in the Prussian
Abgeordnetenhaus by the govemment. The role of the Army High Command is aiso part of the analysis of the chapter. Finally the last chapter is on the franchise debate dunng the last year of the war and also discusses the January strikes, women's suffrage and the country's war aims.
The different aspects affecting the Pnissian suffrage will also be analyzed from the
Conservatives' point of view, HISTORY OF THE FRANCHISE
The three-class Pmssian franchise was adopted on 30 May 1849 following the Revolution of
1848 that shook Pmssia and ~uro~e?Though the Revolution was not successful. the King of
Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm NTcould not ignore the demand for a Constitution and a new
Assembly. The ruling elite (nobility, big landowners, army officiais, higher civil servants and the
high clergy) was not in a conciliatory frame of rnind after the Revolution. Fearing democratic
reforms and the masses, it tried in vain to oppose the creation of an elected Parliament.
Therefore, the newly adopted Constitution limited the roIe of the new assemblies and was
successful in confming political refom to a minimum.19 The King was assigned considerable
political power: ministem were only responsible to him, he was the sole executive authority, he
was the Supreme Commander of the amy and he shared the legislative power with both Houses.
Members of the First Chamber, the Herrenhaus, were predominantIy frorn the nobility who had
hereditary rights as members, and the King appointed the remaining members. The Second
Chamber, the Abgeordnetenharrs, was elected by al1 Prussian males over the age of twenty-five
with an income. The suffrage was universal, but indirect and unequal since it was a three-class
franchise.
The inequality and complexity of the Pmssian franchise was to be the centre of many debates until the very last day of the German Empire in 1918. Al1 males over the age of twenty-five were considered eligible voters and were divided. in each eiectoral district, into three classes depending on the amount of their taxable income." The biggest taxpayers were part of the first class and together paid the first third of the sum total; the second class paid the second third of the sum total, and the third class the last third. In this system voters with properties were
" Hu ber. Ernst Rudolph, Detmche Verjiàssungsgeschichre seir 1789, vol. Di, p.79 l9 Koch. H.W.. A Constitutiond Himry of Germany in the Nineteend and Twentieth C'nrunès, New York, Longman, 1984, pp.79-83. Holbom, Hajo,A Modern Historyof Gennnny, 1840-1945, New York, 1969. considered to have more social and political responsibilities and were thus given more voting
power. l- 1 Voters in Class 1 1 Voten in Class 2 1 Voters in Class 3 1
The above table" clearly demonstrates the inequality of the franchise. In 1903 the voting power
of a man belonging to the first class carried twenty-five times the weight of someone from the
third class. In 1903 three percent of the voters belonging to the first class carried the same power
as eighty-five percent of the voters in the third class. Furthemore, the first and second class
encompassed fifteen percent of the voters in 1903 but in any given election could outweigh any
candidate that had a rnajority in the third class.
Another aspect denounced by opponents to the three-class franchise was the indirect election
of deputies. In every district, each class elected one third of a group of voters called Wahlmünner
who in tum met and together elected the deputy of the district." This system was another
safeguard of the hssian Constitution against any radical outbreak that would favour radicals
and parties of the Left at eIection time.
Since the introduction of the Prussian Constitution in 1850, industrialization and urbanization
had reinforced even more the inequality of the franchise since the electod districts were not
modified to reflect the mobility of the population. By 1910, the 4 largest electorai districts in
Pmssia had a combined population of 3 million and elected only 3 deputies while the 40 srnallest
" Huber. vo1.3. p.9 1 73 - For those more famiiiar with the eiectorat system in the United States the Wahlmünner corresponded to the Electors of the Electoral College and they too elected the candidate, the deputy in Pnissia and the President in the United States, districts with the same combined population of 3 million elected 66 deputies? This clearly favoured the Conservahve Party which was strongest in the curai eastern districts of Pmssia.
Table 2 (p.20) indicates the distribution of seats in the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus by region
( 19 13) and shows that the four provinces with the lowest population per deputy were the eastern provinces, and that is where the Conservative Party was strongest (table 3, p.21). The part. had no intention of changing the essence of the threeclass franchise, but dso opposed modification of the electorai district boundaries.
The results of the Pnissian election of 1913 (see table 4, p.22) reveal that the Conservative
Party greatly profited from the three-class franchise since a popular vote of only 14.8 percent resulted in 34 percent of the seats in the elections of 1913, By contrast, the suffrage and the boundaries of the electotal districts prevenred the SPD from full representation in the
Abgeordnetenhaus. The SPD had the strongest popular vote, almost double that of the
Conservatives but managed to have only IO deputies elected - compared to 15 times more for the
DKP. The inequdity of the three-class franchise generated a low turn out among third-class voters. Although participation among the third class doubled between 1893 and 19 13, it was only at 29.9 percent while it remained stable in the fmt class at around 50 percent and slightly increased for the second class from 32.1 to 41.9 percent.24 Furthemore, despite a decrease of
Conservatives' popular support from 25.3 to 14.8 percent (table 3) there was no significant change in the number of Conservative deputies elected,
Though the Conservative Party greatly profited from the three-class franchise, electing far more deputies than its electord support, it should be mentioned that it never resulted in a majority of seats in the Abgeorànetenhaus. Table 4 (p.22) shows that in the election of 19 13 the
Conservative Party was the strongest with 147 seau but felf short of a majority, which was 222
" Huber. vo1.3, p.90. seats. The Conservatives could however count on the support of the Free Conservatives and its
delegation of 54 deputicsX Together they had 201 deputies and only needed the support of 21
deputies from either the National Likrals or Centre Party to have a majocity in the House. The
rnistake the SPD and the govemment made early on in the war, and until the very end, was CO
believe that a rnajority could be found in the Abgeordnetenhtzus without the support of both the
Conservatives and the Free Conservatives. The Centre party and a rnajority within the National
Liberal Party were in essence conservatives and, as the debates on the Franchise will prove in the
last year of the war, the Conservative Party could gather enough support CO defeat the govemment's bill.
METHODOLOGY
To answer the questions posed earlier 1 will use the Conservative newspaper, Neue
Prerrssische Zeitung, better known as the Kreuzzeitung (KZ)since it had an iron cross as its emblem, The KZ was founded in 1848 by the brothers von Gerlach to unite the Conservatives and serve as a Conservative voice in opposing the radicals during the ~evolution.~The KZ had a daily publication of around 10,000~copies, but the strength of the newspaper resulted from its influence in society and the influential positions held by its readers: higher civil servants, the nobility, higher members of the clergy, army oficids, large landowners and members of the government. However, the Kreuzzeitung's criticism of the govemment's policy gradually reduced its influence on civil servants and offrcers; and during the war the latter predominantly read another conservative newspaper, the Deutsche ~o~eszeitun~."While the KZ had harsh a The average tum out for the Russian elections of 19 13 was 32.7 per cent. In conuast the tum out in the the Reichstag elections was significantly higher at 86.4 percent. Suvai, Stanley, Elecroral Politics in Wilhelmine Germuny, London, 1985, pp.233-234. Fricke,Dieter, Die Bürgerlische Parieicn in Deutschland, Vol. II, Leipzig. 1970, pp.561-579. M Koszyk, Kwt, Deutsche Presse im 19. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1966, pp. 130- 139. " Fncke, Dieter. "DeutschkonservativePartei", Die Bürgerlichen Parieien in Deutschland, Leipzig, 1968, p.674. a Koszyk, p. 133. words for the goveniment, it clearly supported the monarchy and the king's prerogatives against democracy and parliament and this is clearly demonstrated by the paper's motto "Vorwarts mit
Gott für Konig und Vaterland" (Forward with God for the King and the Fatherland).
The Kreuueitung was also the main newspaper of the Conservative Party and the close reiationship is evident in the paper. The Conservative Party leaders, Heydebrand and Westarp, were regular writers in the paper, furthemore, the space allotted to the Conservative Party is also a clear indication that the two were closely working together and sharing the sarne policies.
At the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, a State of Siege was prodaimed in Gennany under the Prussian law of 185 1.29 Under that law, the Deputy Comrnanding Generals (KG) of the Empire were given the task of rnaintaining public safety and one of their main tooIs was controlling hedom of the press and censorship. The control of the press and censorship was, in theory, shared between the DCG, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior which had separate censonhip organs? However, in reality the Deputy Comrnanding Generals had full power in their districts and acted mostly without supervision from the government. During the fmt months of the war only military activities were, for security reasons, the object of censorship: troop movements, the transport of rnaterials, ship movement and other mtters of military importance. When it became apparent that the war was to be longer than expected, the adaptation to a total war meant that the DCG's gradually extended their definition of public safety to include everything reiated to the political, economical, CU~K~and social life of the country." In other words, for the Deputy Commanding Generals, al1 aspects slightly related to the war effort were considered to be public safety, thus subject to censorship.
hiring the war, different measures were adopted to restrict what the press could publish. In
October of 1914 the Supreme Censorship Office, Oberzensurste~ie,was established and was
------
29 Feldman, Amy. Indurtty and Lobor in Germuny, 1914-1918. New Jmey, 1966, p.3 1 Y> Huber. p.59. ?' Ibid. cepreseated by military officiais and the War Ministry but its decisions could only serve as guidelines? In October 19 15 the War Press Office. Kriegpresseamt, was created. Under the direct control of the OHL, it had however, to cooperate with civilian leader^.'^ The Reich
Chancellery and the federal Ministry of Interior also had press offices that controlled the press but the rnost effective in controlling the information available to the public were the agencies that were under the OHL and censorship practice by the Deputy Cornrnanding Generals.
The problern of censorship, though relevant, is not a factor when looking at the KZ since its position was rnostly in accordance with the military and the govemment. 1 am not aware of the
KZ being under the censors' scrutiny when debating the Pmssian franchise and the main problem facing the KZ was how to effectively influence the government.
The KZ is my main primary source but not the only one. R.H. Lutz has compiled a large number of contemporary documents, newspaper articles and diary scriptsY. and the influence of the military on politics is well documented in Deist's collection of documents and Ludendorff s accounts of the war." The KZ is a good source for the Conservative's point of view on the franchise since it was the main newspaper of the Conservative Party. 1 will ask my sources the same questions outlined on pages 3-4. The limitation of this approach is obvious; one major source, though giving us a good idea of the Conservatives' view, could not encompass the different point of view expressed by the Conservative Party at that time. Lutz's books would be of great value in giving a gened view of the war since dl major topics related to the war are covered. The limitations are that the documents cited are diverse and do not cover the whole question of a topic, thus only giving an overall view of several topics dunng the war.
3' Koch, 189. " Fischer, Heinz-Dietrich, Pressekonzentration und Zrnsurpraxis im Ersren Weirkneg, Berlin. 1973, pp.239-240. Y Lutz. R.H., FaIl of the Gemn Empire, 1914-I918,2 vol. New York. 1969. " Deist, Wilhelm (ed.), Militar und Innenpolitik im Weitkrieg, 1914-I918, Dusseldorf, 1970: Ludendorff. Ench, The General Stafanù ifs Probiems, New York, 1920. Though timited in the primary sources, it is my hope that this Master's thesis will contribute to a better knowledge of the German Conservative Party and in doing so Pmssian conservatism.
As noted previously, the past decades have seen few studies on the Party and Prussian conservatism and the recent emphasis on social history has resulted in even fewer studies on political issues such as the hssian franchise. Finaily, studies on the Conservative Party have neglected the importance of the war, the year 1914 seem to be the limit of recent studies. My research will hopefully bring new Iight to those aspects of the DKP and political debates during the First World War. Even though this is not the object of this study, it could bring new information to the general historiographicai debate on impenal Gemiany: questions such as the place of the Conservatives in society, how much influence they still had on the govemment and how much control they had.
The debate on the reform of the Pmssian franchise cannot be isolated from the events of the war. It is therefore important to also discuss the military events, the econornic problems, the food supply, the political life in Prussia and Gennany and the social changes. in so far as these developments are relevant to the debate on the Pmssian franchise they will be scrutinized, For exarnple, I will not mention ail the rnilitary battles or economic problems but only those affecting the question of the franchise - for example the spring offensive or the January strikes of 1918.
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the proposais for reform and the resulting debates on the suffrage that occurred in the last two years of the war, more precisely from April of 19 17 until the end of the Empire in November 19 18. The reasons are that during the first three years of the war the suffrage was only debated in general ternis and the SPD was the only party advocating substantial reforms. This changed with the Easter Decree of the Kaiser in April 1917, quickly followed by the July Decree and the introduction of the government's proposal in the
Abgeordnetenhaus at the end of November. It was only after those events that the politicai parties of Pmssia started deliberating the question and had to cake a stand. This coincided with the debates on reforms to the Reich institutions during the Iast two years of the war. The
Reichstag did not face the problern of an equal franchise since it was granted in the Constitution of 187 1, but it did face the more general question of reform and dernocratization, especially the question of ministerial responsibility. 1 will mention this only briefly to demonstrate that political refonns were not limited to Prussia but affected the whole ~m~ire.~
Since this study focuses on the Conservative Party and the question of reform to the Pmssian franchise, I will now clarify the policies and attitude of the Conservative Party during the war."
In Notables of the Right, James Retallack describes the party's attitude and the policies as foll~ws.'~Fint, a major shift occurred towards radical nationalist and extrerne war aims to conclude a V~C~O~OUSpeace with annexations in both the east and West, Second, there was increasing resistance to, and rejection of, any democratization of the Reich, to changing the
Pnissian franchise and preserve monarchical institutions. Third, an effort was made to establish a mass party of the Right. Fourth, the party resisted the increasing influence of the SPD and tried to exclude it from the political estabIishment. The second point is in direct relation to this thesis but, as we shall sce, a victorious peace and opposing the SPD were also Iinked to reform of the
Pnissian suffrage- These policies, and the defense of the Pnissian franchise. were cIearly tied to the Conservative Party's determination to preserve Prussia's dominance in the Empire, and the dominant influence of conservatism in Pr~ssia.~~Furthemore, the declining strength of the party in the Reichstag from a peak of 80 in 1887 to only 43 seats in the elections of 1912 led to the
" The political reforms facing the other German states will not be discussed here because the question concemed most German states during the war. " It should be fint mentionned that the term "conservative" was not lirnited to the Conservative Party. other political parties in Prussia had mostiy conservative policies - the Free Conservatives, the right-wing of the National Libeds and the Centre Party. See Puhle, Ham-Jürgen. "Conservatism in Modern Geman History", Journal of Contemportzy History, London. Vol. 13, 1978, pp.693-694. Redlack, Notables of the Right. p.216. " Pec k, Abraham. Radicais and Reactionaries: nie Crisis of Comervatism in Wilhelmine Germany, Washington, 1978, pp. 139- 140. Conservative Party's retreat from the Reich to concentrate on preserving their privileges in
Prussia, the three-class suffrage king the key instmment.
The question then is who was Conservative, who voted for the party and who where the members of the party. It is generally assumed that the supporters of the Conservative Party in both Prussia and Gemywere predominantiy the nobility, the large East Elbian landowners, clergy oficials, higher civil servants and army officiais." Highly influentid in Prussia, they nevertheless represented only a srnall portion of the population. The party had to appeal to a
Iarger section of the population in order to elect members in the Abgeordnetenhaus. There is no singie study of the supporters of the Conservative Party and who voted for it at election time.
The East Elbian nobility's stronghold on their estates and the paternalistic attitude towards agricultural workers had the direct result that the vote could be easily influenced in favour of the
Conservative ~arty.'"Furthemore, Russian elections were not by secret ballot but conducted in public, thus leaving the large landowners and governrnent oficials with latitude in pressing the agricui~raîworken on their estate to vote the way they were told."
The Conservative Party made some attempts to attract the industridists and the rniddle class
(Mitelstand) to the party. By the middle of the 1870's, the large landowners and the industrialists felt unprepared to sustain foreign competition in the Gemmarket and demanded the imposition of protective tariffs." The Conservative Party's prograrn adopted at Tivoli in
1892 mentioned the need for both industries and agriculture to be protected from foreign competition by imposing tariff duties on impon products. However, German industry was more cornpetitive by the early twentieth century and the need for protective tax-iffs was less important.
The real intentions of the Party, however, were not to be found in its program but the actions
" Ibid. pp.5-6. Kocka, Fucing Total War. GemnSociety 1914- 1918. Cambridge, 1984. 117 ff. *' Suval. p.234. " Hendenon. W.O.,nie Rise of Germun Indust~ZPower. 1834-1914. Los Angeles. 1975.2 12ff. Fricke. pp.682-683. taken in protecting agriculture. In 1899 a Canal BiI1 was introduced in the Abgeordetenhaus and was primarily intended to facilitate commerce between the Eastern and Western provinces of
Pnissia. It was also aimed at helping agriculture by improving drainage and irrigation. The East
Elbian landowners perceived the construction of the canal in a different way, as a mode of transportation for the distribution of import products and therefore the Conservative Party in
Russia rejected the bill? The negative effects of industrialization was an argument the
Conservatives also used in their attempt to attract the Mittelstand. Theû actions were mostly aimed at the Old Mittelsrand, artisans and srna11 tradesmen, who found it increasingly difficult to compte with the bigger modem industries.& However, it is believed that the Minelstand as a whole divided their votes arnong the Free Conservatives, National Liberah, the Centre and
Conservative Parties. This partly explained the support the Conservative Party had in the
Abgeordnetenhaus in resisting the introduction of an equal suffrage in Pnissia. The attitude of the Minelstand on the franchise will be briefly discussed in the third chapter.
Another way of understanding the voters and membership of the Conservative Party is to look at its representation in the ~b~eordnetenhaus."The rnajority of the party's deputies was part of the nobility (82 of a total of 149) and came predorninantly from rural areas (IO9 deputies). Not surprisingly, the largest share of deputies were large landowners, followed by higher civil servants, administration officiais, clergymen, teachers and professors, pensioners and civil servants. An analysis of the party's delegation in the Abgeordnetenhaus is not an exact indication of their supporters during elections; however, it is a good indication of the values, interests and policies voters could identify with.
'' Rettalack, Notables. p. 134ff. 56 Kocka, "The Fit World War and the Mittelstand: Geman Artisans and White-CoIlar Workers Journal of Contempora~History, 1973, IO1- 107. " The following numben are fiom 1913 as found in Mann, Bernhard, Biographkches Handbuchfür dns Preussische Abgeordnetenhaus 1867-1918, Düsseldorf. 1988, pp.2541. Thus, on the eve of the Fust World War the Conservative Party was desperately fighting to maintain their influence in Gerrnany and hssia, and perceived the three-class suffrage as their last remaining buIwark. The party was stmngly rejecting the equal franchise and was prepared at rnost, to consider minor reforms such as the plural suffrage. The example of the
Reichstag's universd and equai suffrage, which had allowed the SPD to becorne the strongest party in parliament, was the Conservative Party's greatest fear. Prussia was the party's last stronghotd and if it was to remain influential in Pnissia and the Empire it had to resist significant refonn to the franchise. TABLE 2 - Distribution of seats in the Pnissian Abgeordnetenhaus by region ( 19 13)
1 Population per deputy East hsia I 32
West Pnissia 22 I I 'O3 474 1 n400 Silesia 66 I 1 225 962 1 79100 Saxony Hannover I 36 1 2 942 436 1 81700 Schleswig-Holstein 19 1621 004 85300
r Hessen-Nassau 26 2 221 021 85400
Brandenburg 50 6 163 873 12330 TABLE 3 - Strength of the Conservative Party by region, 1898 and 19 13.
~898~
Province Total % DKP % Total seats DKP no. Totai % DKP 46 Total seats DKP no. Tum-out of vote AvailabIe seats Turn-out of vote Available seafs
East Pnissia
Pomerania
Ponan
West Pnissia
Silesia
Saxony
Hanover
Schleswig-
Holstein
Hesse-Nassau
Rhineland
Westphalia
Berlin
Brandenburg
Hohenzollern
Total Prussia
48 Ritter, GA., Niehuss,M., Wahlgeschichrliches Arbeitsbuch. Munich, 1980, p. 148 in Retallack, p.250. TABLE 4. PRUSSIAN ELECTION, 1913,
Party PopuIar Vote % of Total Seaîs % of Total
Consewatives 402 988 I4,8 147 33,2
Free Conservatives 54 583 2,O 54 12.2
National Liberals 370 575 13,6 73 16,s
Progressives 183 452 67 38 8,6
Centre Party 451 511 16,s 103 23,3
National minorities2 15 506 7,9 12 2-8
Social Democrats 775 17 1 28.4 10 2.3
Source: Orlow, Dietrich, Weimar Pmsia 19 I8-/925, Pittsburgh, 1986, p. 14. CHAPTER 'IWO:'THE KAISER SPEAKS'. THE FRANCHISE FROM TBE -TER MESSAGE TO JULY DECREE
In the fmt three years of the war and uatil the spring of 1917, the Prussian fianchise was
not a priority on the political agenda. The SPD was the only political party' advocating changes to the suffrage and, as early as 1915, expressed its disappointment on the handling of the
franchise. Early in 1915, the SPD's main newspaper, the Vorwarts, mentioned that the
Abgeordnetenhaur devoted Iittie attention to this important question.' The first achowledgement by the hssian govemment and the king of the issue occurred in Wihelm II's preparation for his speech fiom the throne of January 1916. The Conservatives' opposition was so vehement that the speech was changed to only include vague assurance of reforms:
The spirit of mutual understanding and confidence will continue to work in cooperation of the whole people in state affairs likewise in times of peace- It will pemade al1 our public institutions and will find active expression in our administration, our Iegislation. and the establishment of foundations for the representation of the people in our legislative bodies."
Such vague intentions of reform did nothing to satisfy the SPD; however, even this was too radicai for the Conservatives. The Prussian Minister of Interior. Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell, was one of the most ardent conservatives in the government and did not waste any time in declarîng that discussions on the franchise would only take place after the war." The Conservative
Party went even further and rejected the whole idea of reforming the suffrage.
In early 1917 the Conservatives in the Herenhaus inadvertently reopened the debate on the Prussian franchise. The government and the Abgeordnetenhaus agreed on a travel allowance for deputies of the House allowing them free access to the railway system in Prussia. The bill was sent to the Herrenharis but was rejected on the basis that it gave unlimited access to the trains for
' With the notable exception of the Polish Party. Vorwiirts March 3, 1915 in Lu=, R.H. (ed.),nic Fa11 of the GemEmpire 1914%-1918, New York, 1969, Vol.11. pp.411413. ' The Speech fiom the Throne, Vowürrs. January 14. 19 16, Luu, pp.4 13-4 14. ' Huber. E.R.. Deutsche Ve~c~ssungsgeschichte,1914-1919, Stuttgart, 1978,Vol. V. p.153. a period of five years? Members of the Herrenhaus rejected the concept of full-time paid
poiiticians and the travel aiiowance was perceived as a first step in that direction. The rejection of
the travel allowance was met with a unanimous outcry from the government and politicai parties
in the ~b~eordnetenhaus!On March 14 the Chancellor and Prussian Minister-President,
Bethmann-HoUweg, responded in the Lower Houe by expressing his views on political reforms.
...For the Gentlemen on the Left the cardinal point in their wishes regarding the internat policy is the reform of the Russian Government. The Government .. . has repeatedly said .. . that it would not propose such a reform, which would undoubtedly lead to bitter intemal disputes, and which could not be undertaken at a time when we are stiIl confronting the extemal enemy and consequently could not afford interna1 quarrels. The Gentlemen who have especially radical wishes regarding the suffrage should think panicularly of that7
For Bethmann-Hollweg it was out of the question, as late as March of 19 17, to debate the
question of the franchise during the war. In another part of his speech he nevertheless recognized
that the war should bring about changes.
Woe to the statesman who believes that .-.afier such catastrophe he can simply start where he left off, that he can pour new and young wine into old containers without bursting hem! Woe to that statesman!
Bethmann-Hollweg's cautious approach to reform and wiilingness to satisS both the Left and the
Etight would suffer a setback with the Russian Revolution.
Between March 8 and 12 the Russian capital, Petrograd, was the scene of Street demonstmtions fiom Russians workers protesting the war and the deteriorating economic situation? When the troops refused to repress the strikes on March 15 and instead sympathized with the demonstrators, the tsar, having little support, decided to abdicate. When, on the
following day, his brother renounced the throne, it signaled the end of the Romanov dynasty and the monarchy in Russia. The news of revolution in Russian spread quickly and had irnmediate
Herrcnhaus session of March 9, 19 17 in Lutz, Vol. II, pp.4 17-4 19. Pateuemann, Reinhard Der Kampf um die prem$che Wahlrefonn im Ersten Weltkrieg. Düsseldorf, 1964, pp.50-5 1. LW. vom, pp.4 19-23. effects in Gennany, and on the issue of the Russian franchise. The Social Democtats were particularly excited by the Revolution and in March Philipp Scheidemann, SPD deputy in the
Reichstag, warned the Russian goveniment and the monarchy that should reforms be postponed too long they too could face the sarne fate? Bethmann-Hollweg, while criticizing such radical views, was fully aware of the effects the Russian Revolution had on the country. A letter to the military advisor Freiherr von Grünau sumrnarized his view on the question.'0 He believed that the monarchy was strong and had the support of the Gerrnans but at the same tirne he was concerned that the movemnt for democratization and reforms rnigfit take an anti-monarchical stand. To counter such a possibility the Chancellor became convinced of the need for reforrn during the war, since the longer the war would last, the greater would be the effects of the Russian
Revolution on Gerrnany and Pmssia. He concluded that without giving in to nervous voices, the government should avoid doing "too little too late".
The Russian Revolution convinced Bethmann-Hollweg that the best way to prevent revolution from spreading to Gerrnany was to have the emperor issue a proclamation promising reforrn to the Pnissian franchise. Furthemore, the United States had just entered the war against
Germany and President Wilson was trying to detach the Gerrnans from their Kaiser by accusing
Wilhelm II of absolutisrn." The Chancellor believed that a proclamation on the franchise would also bring the Germans closer to the monarchy, thus effectively countering American propaganda.
The Chancellor was conscious of the need to resurrect the spirit of the Burgfrieden and was so convinced of the necessity of reform that on March 31 he met with his domestic advisors
a Bernstein, Serge and Milza, Pierre (eds.), Histoire. La Guerre et la Crise, 1900-1939, Paris, 1982, pp.94- 9s. 9 Scheidemann, Philip, The Making of New Germany: Memirs of a Social Democrat, New York, 1970 ( 1929). VOL1, pp.308-309. 'O Deist, Wilhelm (ed.). Militar und Innenpolitik irn Weitkneg 1914-1918, Düsseldorf. 1970, Vol-II. p.694. II Dorpalen, Andreas, 'The German Conservatives and the Parliamentarization of Imperia1 Germany", Jouml of Central European Aflairs, Jul y 195 1, Vol. 1 1. No.2, pp. 196- t 97. Hellfench and Roedern and the under-Secretary of the Intenor ~rews.'~Afkr discussions, they agreed that the time had corne for substantial political refonns and on the necessity to introduce the Reichstag franchise in Prussia. The next and most important step was to convince the Kaiser of the necessity of such reform and the next day Bethmann-Hollweg traveled to army headquarters for a meeting with Wilhelm II- The presence of the Kaiser's rnilitary entourage and their hostility to aitering the Prussian franchise prevented the Chancellor from even mentioning the introduction of an equal suffrage; but he did persuade WiiheIm II that reform should be discussed, This vague assurance of the Kaiser was, in Bethmann-Hollweg's view, Micient to initiate work on a message to be proclairned by WilheIm II in his Easter address to the Germans.
The extent of reforms in the drafted proposais was, as Konrad Jarausch put it, "a sweeping program for a revolution frorn above."13 It contained an equal franchise for election of the
Abgeordnetenhaus, refonn of the Herrenhaus, Iiberalization of local administration, the abolition of the exceptionai laws and several other changes. When the Kaiser became aware of the extent of his Chancellor's reform program he protested that Bethmann-Hollweg had never spoken to him of an equd suffrage, Furthemore, the Conservatives and the OHL were by then infomed of the Chancellor's program and naturally opposed the changes. In the Prussian Cabinet meeting of
April 5 the Minister of Interior Loebell led the Conservatives' attack on the Chancellor. in the end, the ministers were equaily divided on the question and, given the reluctance of Wilhelm ïI about an equal franchise, it was decided that the Easter Message would only mention reforming the suffrage without being specific.
The settlement of differences behind the front, which are unavoidable by a definite change of the Constitution, must be postponed in the highest interest of the Fatheriand until the time of our soldiers' retum has corne.. .We have at heart, especially the change of the Prussian Landtag and the release of our whole political life at home from this problem.. . After the great achievements of the whoie people in this temble
" The events leading to the Easter Message are discussed in Jarausch, Konrad H., nia Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann-Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Gennany, New Haven. 1973, pp.33 1-334 and Huber, Vol.V, pp. 154-156. l3 Jarausch, p.332. war, there is in ou.opinion no more room for the three-class franchise in Pnissia The bill, furthemore, ought to provide for direct and secret election of the rcprerentatives.'"
Bethmann-HolIweg believed that the Easter Message and the prornised reform of the franchise would be sufficient to satisfy and appease the workers. The events in the following two weeks would prove him wrong and show how much he underestimated the workers' discontent.
THE APRIL STRiKES
For many Germans, especially those in urban areas, inadequate officiai food rations and poorly organized distribution created constant concerns and hardships." The official food ration was not sufficient to cover minimum daily donc intakeL6and was far lower rhan pre-war con~umption.'~Funhermore, because of the scarcity of food the population was not even receiving the promised food ration." Thus most Gerrnans resorted to the black market to supplement their food supply, but these pnces were significantly higher than the official market.I9
It is no surprise that when a reduction of the bread ration was announced for Aprif 15, it was followed by Street demonstrations and strikes throughout Germany, with Berlin as the centre of the protests.3DThe main grievance of the workers was nanirally the reduction of the bread ration and an insufficient food supply. The government promptly reacted to the strikes and
lJLU&, v01.n. pp.423-a. I5 Bonzon, Thierry and Davis, Belinda, "Feeding the Cities" in Winter, lay and Robert, Jean-Louis, Capital Cities at War. Paris. tondon. Berlin 1914-1919, Cambridge, 1997, p.3 16. I6 In Düsseldorf. the weekly ration provided 11.20 calories which is below the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN'S minimum intake of 21,000 calories for a man. See Tobin, Elizabeth, "War and Working Class: The Case of Düsseldorf 19 14- 19 18" in Central European History, No.3, September 1985, p.284. " The meat ration corresponded. in 19 17. to 20 percent of pre-war consumption; eggs to 13 percent: lard 1 1 percent; butter to 2 1 percent; cheese 4 percent; only potatoes were sufficiently available reaching 94 rcent of pre-war consumption. See Bonzon, p.3 17. 'Marwick, Arthur. War and Social Change in the Twentieth Ccnrury. A cornparorive Srudy ofBdain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, London, 1974, p.3 1. '' It is estimated that between 12 to 15 percent of potatoes, 25 to 33 percent of dajr products and 33 to 50 percent of eggs were acquired through the black market at up to ten times their pre-war levels. See Bonzon, p.32û-32 1. Feldman, Geraid, Army and Indusrry in Gennany,1914- 1918, Princeton, 1966, pp.337-340. Armeson. Robert, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor. A Study of the Military-industrial Complex in Germany duririg World War 1, The Hague, 1964, pp. 1lû- 1 13. promised the workers that they would receive an increase in their meat ration to compensate for the reduction of the bread ration. Satisfied with the govemrmnt's promise, on Apd 17 the strikers in Berlin voted to rem to work the following &yt However, the strike took anoîher turn with the involvement of radicds and the USPD. Their actions were especially successful in convincing the Leipzig workers to maintain their strike (despite the cetum to work voted by the workers in Berlin) and to add politicai reforms to their initial demands. The most notable addition was the introduction of an equal, direct, universal and secret franchise for elections at all govemrnent levels in the ~rn~ire."Nevertheless, on Apnl 18, the Leipzig worken decided to go back to work when employers promised a reduction of working hours and a raise in wages. In
Berlin, the workers were influenced by the political demands put forth in Leipzig and most refused to resume work in the factories." Nevertheless, the strikes ended the following day when the Deputy Cornrnanding General took strong measures to force the workers back to work: the
of assembly was even more restricted, factories were occupied by the army and strikers were threatened with fines and imprisonment. By April23 the strikes were over.
How can the Apnl strikes be explained and what role did political demands play in the workers' claims? There is no doubt that a radicalization of the Left occurred in early 1917. The creation of the USPD on Easter Sunday put the SPD on the defensive and the party was more aggressive on the question of political refonns, peace and strikes." The SPD was nevertheless against the idea of strikes during the war and did their best to prevent them. The party believed that the strike was a direct response to the reduction of the bread ration and the detenorating econornic situation but did not deny the roIe played by politicai demands and the longing for peace.
" Also demanded was the supplies of cheap provision, the conclusion of peace, the abolition of the maniai Iaws, the right of public meeting and assembly, Iiberation of al1 politicai prisoners and a repeal of the cornpuIsory Iaws regulating employees-workers relation. " Feldman. p.339. The choice of the date and the fact that the movement had grown out of the masses themselves show clearly where the chief reasons for it are to be sought April 16 is the day when the new regdation of food supply, together with a reduction of the bread ration, is to take effect.. . But these are not the only motives which 1ed CO the rnovement,, .The great majonty of the people arc as one in believing that there shodd not be any pst-ponement of the announced refonns of interna1 policy.. . As a third factor, undoubtedly, the deep desire for vace plays a decisive role..
For the OHL the strikes were mostiy politicai and the best proof was in the demands for reforms
of the Prussian franchise. Ludendorff mentioned in his mernoirs that the Easter Message
radicalized the Left and, perceiving the government's indecision on the question, becarne even
more excited and responded with sûüces and political claimsu
It is dificult to assess the role played by politicai demands and the food supply in the
April strikes. The causes of the strikes were complex and highIighting one reason would not
satisfactorily explain why workers waiked off their jobs. However. the promise of an increased
food supply and higher wages was sufficient to convince the workers in Berlin to vote for a retum
to work on April 17. This clearly demonstrates that despite the involvement of the USPD and
demands for political reforms, the main concern of the workers was first and foremost an
improvement in their standard of living and for a sufficient food supply. The workers' discontent
was clearly related to the constant deciine of real eamings (wages less inflation) since the
outbreak of the war. On average, real earnings for males in March 19 17 fell to 64 percent of what
they had been three yean before while women's fell slightiy less to only 67 pcent? To
intensiQ matters the simple fact of having money did not guarantee foodstuffs for the workers
since there were increasing food shortages in stores? The food shonages were caused by the
Droz, Jacques. Histoire Générale du Sociulirme, Vol.II, 1875- 19 18. Paris, For the split within German Social Democracy see Schorske, CarI, Gennan Social Democracy, 1905-1917. The Development ~fthe Great Schisrn, Cambridge, 1983 (1955), pp.3 12-3 16. aVonu(in~,Aprïl 17. 1917.L~c~,V0l.II,p.221. 25 Ludendorff, Erich, Ludendofls own Story, Augusr 1914-November 1918, New York, 19 19, pp53-54. ai Kocka, Jürgen, Facing Tora1 War. GemnSociety 1914-1918, Cambridge. 1984. p.23. In his table Kocka uses the average earning of workers in 370 enterprises. Ibid, p.24. diversion of food from the official to the black market, the Engiish blockade and Gennany's
concentration on war-related industries, Increasingly dissatisfied with the official market, the
workers started putting more emphasis on wage increases since they relied more and more for
their food on the black market.
On the other hand, the rote played by political demands and the longing for peace cannot
totaiiy be ruled out. The strikers cleariy dernanded the introduction of an equal fianchise for
elections in the Empire and for the fit time during the war a strike was used as a tool to promote
refomis.18 The other clear outcome of the strike was that the simple promise of refonn was not
sufficient to satisfy the workers, and after dmost three years of war, only concrete and definite
reforms could appease them. In the following months the Social Democrats' incessant demands
for reforms, and not the suikes, were of great concern to the Conservatives in Prussia.
THE SPD, THE PRUSSIAN FRANCHISE AND THE CONSERVATIVES
As we have aîready seen, following the Russian Revolution the SPD became more
insistent in its demands for changes to the three-class franchise, The party's first reaction to the
Easter Message was mostly positive since it was the first time that Wilhelrn II recognized the
need for reforms? However, the Social Democrats soon becarne dissatisfied when they realized
that the government would content itself with vague promises and refùsed to make any specific
cornmitment. Vague promises were indeed unacceptable to the SPD who believed that the Easter
Message should result in an equal franchise in Pru~sia.~By then the party was starting to express doubts over the Pmssian government's real cornmitment to the Easter Message. On April 11 the
Social Democrat Lensch stated that no one in Pmssia should forget that the Conservatives who
suddenly seemed to embrace changes were the same group who had criticized refonns not long
" Though the importance of politicd dernand would be greater in the January strikes of 19 18, it never set a recedent. 'Jarausch. p.334. 30 Patemann. p.63. before." The SPD doubted thai an equal suffrage franchise could be voted by the
Abgeordnetenhaus and proposed instead to amend the Reich Constitution by including an article requiring al1 States to make the equal franchise mandatory for state and local elections." By this strategy the Sociai Democrats wanted to override the Abgeordnetenhuus and either have the equd franchise granted by royal decree or voted by the Reichstag - where a majority was more likely."
The SPD was dso dissatisfied with the government's tirnetable for refom: the party believed that waiting until after the war would send an inappropriate message to Germans fighting the war both at home and on the front. For the Party, the suffering of the people during the war was a reason for the govemment to consider al1 Gennans to be equal and "citoyens à part entière".
Anyone familiar with the three-class franchise at the time would have expected strong opposition to reforms from the Conservative Party since it greatly profited from it. Surprisingly, the Conservatives' initial response to the Easter Message was, on the whole, moderate and compromising. The Kreuzzeitung mentioned in mid-~~ril"that the Lefi had ken urging the
Conservative Party not to withhoid its cooperation in framing a new franchise. The Conservative
Party thus felt obliged to state its official position on the suffrage: it was prepared to cooperate in its improvement." At the same time the KZ was against any intervention from the Reichstag and believed that discussions shouId be lirnited to the Abgeordnetenhaus since it was a Prussian matter. On April 15 the papd6 once more declared the Conservatives' cooperative attitude and inclination not only towards political reforms but also social and military reforms. As far as the franchise was concerned, the newspaper was vague on specific changes, but nevertheless made it
- -- -- " Ibid. p.76. '' %id. p.64. 33 There was no provision in the Reich constitution granting the Reichstag the righi to introduce an equal suffrage for di state elections in the Empire. Any change to Prussian electoral law had to be approved by the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus. Herrenhaus and the King. It is not clear what motivated the SPD in such request and under what constitutional basis. Y Kremeitung, April 13, 19 17. '' On April 10 and 1 1 the Conservative Party leader in the Abgeordnetenhaus Heydebrand also mentioned in Nuremberg and Stuttgart that the Conservative Party would be cooperating in reforming the franchise. Westarp, Kuno Friedrich, Konservative Politik im lemen Jahrzehnr des Kaiserreiches, Berlin, 1935, Vol.iI, p.267. clear that it was against the equal suffrage. The Kreuzzeiiung was of the opinion thai chaos and
politicai and social tmnoil would arise should an equal vote be introduced in Prussia. It would
lead to an increase in sociaiist policies, since the SPD would be stronger with an estimated 90
deputies in the Abgeordnerenhaus - cornpared to only 10 after the last elections of 19 13.
The KZ was also criticd of the Social Democrats' handling of the debate, particularly
their rejection of any reform proposal that did not include an equal vote, and their refusal to work
with the Conservative Party in finding a solution to the problem of political change." By their
actions, the Social Democrats were seen as destroying the spirit of the BurgFieden and for the
newspaper this was further proof that they were untnistworthy. This lack of confidence in the
SPD was the result of Conservatives' suspicion in regard to the Left's main objective in politics.
They had doubts whether the Social Democrats would be satisfied with onIy an equal vote in
Prussia and, despite the Left's clairn that it did not seek to overthrow the monarchy, the
Conservatives maintained the SPD's ultimate goal was the establishment of republican governments in Pmssia and Gerrnany .
The Conservatives, who were strong supporters of the monarchy, naturally condernned democracy and the republic." It was believed that a democratic Gemy would be politically unstable and divisive and that the only ones who wouId benefit from it were the country's enernie~?~It tas clear to the KZ that the SPD was not hlIy aware of the implications of having a democratic country. In the paper's opinion, the Social Democrats could never form a competeiii govemment since its program was unrealistic, included short-term views and a utopian vision of the world.
36 KZ, April 15. 1917. '' KZ, 6 May. 1917. One has just sto nmember the Kreuzeinurg f leitmotiv "Fonvard with god for the king". 39 KZ, May 17, 1917. TEIE COURSE OF TEE FRANCHISE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING TEE WTER MESSAGE
The initiai response to the Easter Message was genedy positive in Russia and
Germany. However, Bethmann-HolIweg was conscious that general promises of reform would not guarantee the permanent support of political parties to the government on the question and on the war effort. More had to be done. While the SPD declared its support for reform and the
Conservative Party prornised full cooperation, the role of the National Liberals and Centre Party was crucial in securing a mjority in the Abgeordnetenhaus. The Centre Party's Reichstag faction supported an equal franchise for Ehssia, but it was the right wing and opponent of the equal suffiage that controlled the party in hssia? During the fmt half of 1917 the Prussian caucus did not yield in its opposition despite the war, the Easter Message and the Russian ~evolution?
Instead, the Centre Party in Pmssia supported a plural franchise that would give additional votes to certain categories of voters**, thus preventing the SPD fiom becoming the largest party in the
Abgeordnetenhaus. Since the SPD wanted to reduce the influence of the Church in society it was perceived, by the Centre Party, as a danger to Church and clerical education policies. The same divisions over the Prussian franchise tore the National Liberal Party apart. the more conservative deputies. opposed to reform. were in command in the ~b~eordnetenhaus-43
More troubtesome to the partisans of reform was the attitude of the Kaiser foIlowing the
Easter Message. In May the Reichstag created a cornmittee to study political reforrns and one of its dernands was to have a voice in the nomination of military officers. in a letter to the chancellor
Wilhelm II fumed against the intrusion of the Reichstag in his prerogatives. He criticized the role of parliament and gave the exmple of what he considered to be the flaws of parliaments in
-- - " Evans. ElIen. 7he GemnCentre Pany, 1870-1933. Carbondale. 1981, pp.214-215. '" Zeeden. John K-.''The German Centre Party During World War 1. An Intemal Study ", Catholic Historical Review, January 1957, p.457. An additional vote was promked to men over 50, men with families, men with specified amount of roperty and men with education. 'Huber. Vol. V. pp.158-159. France and England, They were autocratie and even dictatorial forms of govenunent since they
gave control to a few who were rnembers of ~ommittees.~Wilhelm II was also against the
Reichstag's intention of Iimiting his prerogative in nominating and dismisshg ministers as he
wished. Furious at such demaods the Kaiser was not in a mood to compromise or to understand
the importance and necessity of political reforms. He concluded his telegram by mentioning thai
'The Easter Message will be implemented - afier the war - under no circurnstances shd I go
f~rther.'~'
The Conservative offensive against the franchise was again led by the Pnissian Minister
of hterior Loebell. To jeopardize the Chancellor's effort in reforming the suffrage, he pmposed
his own formula that had the support of the rnajority in the Abgeordnetenhaus. This proposal
included one vote for dl, but up to five additional votes were given to qualified voters: one to
those with high income or wealth, one to heads of family with children over the age of 14, one to
the educated one to older votes and one to independent workers? With opposition coming from
the OHL,the Abgeordnetenhaus and the Prussian Ministers, Bethmann-Hollweg could only count
on the support of the Reichstag. However, any direct involvement of the Reichstag was not
desirable for the Chancellor since it would have weakened his position even more in face of his
opponents who regarded the franchise strictly as a Prussian matter. The onIy solution left was to
convince the Kaiser of the necessity of changing the suffrage based on the equality of dl voters.
Before persuading Wilhelm II, Bethmann-Hollweg was faced with the necessity of
compromising with the Reichstag. At the end of June the Reich Secretary of the Treasury stated
that the war credits would soon be exhausted and the Reichstag would have to vote new credits."
The SPD (and the Reichstag) was increasingly against the war and Bethmann-HoIlweg was
conscious that something would have to be given in exchange for the granting of new war credits,
44 Wilhelm II's telegram to the Chancellor, 12 May, 19 17 in Deist, VoI.11, pp.748-750. 45 Translation in Jarauxh, p.336. 46 Huber, Vol. V, p. 160. mostly the promise of an quai franchise in Piussia Senshg the govemment's difficulties, the
Social Democrats announced at the end of June that the granting of new war credits would be
dependant on the introduction of an qua1 fianchise in Pnrssia. In the SPD party meeting that took
place on June 27 Scheidemann made it cIear wbat shouId be the tactic in regards to the war
credits. ".. . the foahcoming War Credit Bill must be rejected if the ChanceIIor did not clearly
declare his war policy or promise reform at home.'" Thus. at the end of June Bethmann-Hollweg
was under great pressure from both the Right and the Lefi, the latter's demand for refonn made
the Conservatives more resolute in resisting changes.
The Chancellor's fint action to regain the initiative on the franchise question was to
persuade the Pmssian Ministers of the necessity of substantial refonns at a Crown CounciI held
on July 9." In addition to the Russian govemment, Reich Ministen were also present when the
Pmssian franchise was discussed because Bethmann-Hollweg requested their presence for two
reasons. The Chancellor believed the suffrage to be a Reich matter and Reich Ministers were
more favourable to reform. He was of the opinion that the suffrage problem could not be Iimited
to hssia since the state was by far the biggest in the Empire and ail decisions taken in Prussia
had a direct influence al1 over the countxy. " 1 regard it as the duty of every parliament in the
German Reich, be it the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus or Herrenhaus, or any other charnber, to conduct a policy of ~rn~ire."~The presence of Reich Ministers at the Crown Council clearly put
the balance in favour of the reformers. The Pmssian Ministers were evenly divided on the equal franchise when a vote was taken and this would not give the ChanceIIor the ammunition he needed to persuade the Emperor and the opponents to change - only the vote of Bethmann-
Hollweg gave a rnajority of six to five in favour of the equal sufige. On the other hand, the
" Kitchen. Martin. The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Conunand under Hindenburg adLudendo6 1916-1918, London, 1976, p. 130. " Scheidemann. VoLiI. p.358. 49 A the sarne tirne Bethmann-Hollweg was trying to win over the Kaiser and the Russian Ministers. the question of the franchise (and political reforms in Gemany and Prussia) became linked with the Reich Minîsters were in favour of an equal suffrage at four to one, so among the politicians
present at the Crown Councii, there existed a rnajority of ten for and six against reforms. Thus,
Bethmann- Hollweg had the rnajority he wished for, but the suffrage question was Far from
settled.
After the Crown Council, the Chancellor had to persuade the one person whose support
was essential. the ~rn~eror."Bethmann-Hollweg spent the evening in the Company of Wilhelm II
but no decision was made at the time. They spent more time the next &y discussing the suffrage
and it was only after the Kaiser had met the Crown Prince that WiIhelm 11 findly announced that
he was in favour of the equd franchise. Bethmann-Hollweg cleverly convinced the Emperor of
the necessity of reforms by appealing to the opportunity for him to be a Kaiser of the people.
Furthemore, throughout the war Wilhelm II could be easily influenced on a question depending
on how the military situation was and how his entourage influenced him.5' in May. following the
Reichstag's dernands to have a voice in the nomination and dismissal of ministers". the Emperor
was in no mood for compromises and reforms. Bethmann-Hollweg skillfully isolated the Kaiser
from his entourage, which was predominantly against serious changes to the Prussian suffrage,
and prevailed over the latter objections and doubts. However, the Chancellor's victory would be
short-lived and the Emperor's entourage and opponents were at work to get his dismissal.
On July 1 1 Bethmann-Hollweg announced the Kaiser's decision to the Pmssian Ministers
and unable to support the equal franchise five of them resigned, including ~oebell?The same day the July Decree of the Kaiser was made public.
Upon the request of our State Ministry rendered in consequence of ou.decree of Apd 7.1 hereby decree, in pursuance thereof.
Reichstag's attempt in drafting a Peace Resolution and the effort of the Chancellor's opponent to get his dismissai. See p. 43ff. " Bethmann-Hollweg in the Abgeordnetenhaus. Mah, 19, 1917 in Lutz, Vo1.n. p.420. Huber. VoI.V, p.302. '* The Kaiser's entourage was split between military and civilian leaders, the latter consisted rnostly of the chancellor, the chief of the Civil cabinet and the representative of the Foreign Office. Hull, Isabel, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm 11. 1888-1918, Cambridge, 1982, especiaily p. 1 1,284 ff. 53 ~eep. 1 I. Y Jarausch, p.345. that the draft bill conceming an amendment of the su&age for the Abgeordnetenhous, which shaii be submitted to the Landtag of the rnonarchy for decision, shdbe drawn up on the basis of equal suffrage. The bill is to be submitted, in any case, as early as possible, so that the next elections may be held according to the new suffrage right"
TIIE CONSERVATIVES AND THE GOVERNIMENT
The relationship between the govemment and the most important group supporting the
Conservative Party, the Prussian un ken^, dated back to the eighteenth century. At the time the
Pnissian king Friedrich II was in desperate need of new sources of revenues in order to build a strong amy? In exchange for estate-based taxation hmthe Junkers the king gave preferential treatrnent to the nobility in the army and state bureaucracy and total control of their property and the peasants Living on them. The nobility's increasing presence in the state apparatus led to its increasing influence on the govemment and the King. The industrialization of Prussia in the nineteenth century resulted in reducing agriculture's share in the state's economy, but the Junkers managed to retain the essence of their privileges. The peasants were still econornically dependent on the Junkers, the nobility had almost total control over the rural administrative districts and had disproportionate representation in the higher positions in the myand the b~reaucrac~.'~Thus. on the eve of the First World War, the Conservatives believed that the king's and his ministers' role was to defend these pnvileges.
The appointment of Bethmann-Hollweg as Reich Chancellor and Minister-President of
Pnissia was not welcomed by the Conservatives. in 1905 the Conservative leader in the
Abgeordnetenhaus, Ernst von Heydebrand made the following comment to the then Chancellor
Bernhard von Bülow when hearing of Bethmann-Hollweg's nomination as Minister of Interior.
- - -- '' Lue Vol.II, p.425. The term Junker refened to the landed nobility of East Russia. 57 Schlisser, Hanna, 'The Junkers:Notes on the Social and historical Significance of the Agrarian EIite in Pnissia", in Moetler, Robert G., Peasants and brdr in Modern Gennany: Recent Studies in Agricultural Hisrory, Boston, 1986, p.27. Aiso Carsten, Francis Ludwig, A History of the Prussian Junkers, London, 1989, pp. L -22. ""Asa minister of interior we need a man with a strong hand and backbone.. .. Instead you give us a philosopher."P> Bethmann-Hollweg did not have a good opinion of the Consemative Party either. He nevertheles believed that he could eniighten the party to the new reality in hssia and
Germany and this in tum prevented Bethmann-Hollweg from breaking al1 ties with the Party?
The war years had not improved the relationship between Bethmann-Hollweg and the
Conservatives. The Chanceilor even confessed in 19 16 to his brother-in-law Count Kessel that
"the Conservatives have no intention of changing the personai and practical objectives of their policy. My fail is and remains cheir fmt and foremost aim."' The Conservatives* tactic in opposing Bethmann-Hollweg was to accuse him of not defending the Crown's prerogatives against the Left and democratic ideas. On the hssian franchise the Conservatives' arguments used in defending the King's rights couId not hide the Conservatives' real agenda, that they were in reality fighting for their own rights and privileges - though it is true that a diminution of the
Crown's rights wouId affect theirs.
We have already looked at the Conservatives' opposition to Bethmann-Hollweg's refonn proposds in March and their initial response to the Easter Message: the Conservatives were willing to cooperate and in favour of reforms." However, soon after the Easter Decree the
Kreuueitung adopted a more radical position - Bethmann-Hollweg now became the main objec t of its attacks. The paper and the Conservatives were moving toward the position that the
Chancellor's removd from office would strengthen their influence on the govemment and stop refom. In adopting this attitude the Conservatives for the first time openiy opposed the govemment? Before the Easter Message the Conservatives only clashed with the govemment on
'' Pühle. Hans-lürgen. in Mwller. Robert, Peasants and Lordr in Modem Germcny:Recertt Studies in Agricultural History, Boston, 1986, p.84ff. " Retailack. James. 'The Road to Philippi: The Conservative Party and Bethmann-Hollweg's "Politics of Diagonal" in Jones, Larry Eugene and Retallack, James N. (eds.), Benveen Reform, Reaction and resistance. Studies in the History of German Comervatismfrom 1789 to 1945- Providence, 1993, p.260. " Ibid. pp.266.270.291.296. This is a constant theme in Retailack's article. 6 1 Quoted in Jarausch, p.363. 62 See pp. 4,9. 63 Dorpden, pp. 197- 198. specific questions and never publicly expressed doubts or criticism The Krewzeiitung first
warned the Chancellor in mid-April that it did not share his point of view on the proposeci
changes to the suffi-age." The paper also stated that the Conservative Party had taken an
independent position fiom him and the govemment in the pst, and that it would not hesitate to do
so again if it felt it necessary- The Conservatives were also suspicious of Bethmann-Hollweg's
promise that reform would only be implemented afler the war. The KZ mentioned that the
Chancellor had already gone back on his promise of not reforming the franchise at al1 and that as early as ~arch?The paper also constantly reminded its readen of Bethmann-Hollweg's promise
to oniy change the franchise after the war?
CloseIy related to the Consewatives' cnticism of the government's policy on the
franchise was the relationship between the govemment and the Social Democrats. Even before
the war Heydebrand and the Conservative Party leader in the Reichstag, Count Kuno von
Westarp, were of the opinion that the hostility between them and the Chancellor had roots in the
latter's willingness to cooperate with the Social ~ernocrats.~'The war and the Chancellor's role
in the proclamation of the Easter Message did nothing to alter the Conservatives' point of view.
Westarp viewed the Easter Decree as an example of the Chancellor constantly giving in to demands from the Left and thus giving more considerations to Reich matters than those of
Prussia." Furthemore, to the Conservatives, the promise of refom in Apnl and July were added proof that Bethmann-Hollweg was, by nature, a pessimist about the war and that this influenced
his views on the war and Russian politics? The promise of reforms, as the SPD demanded, made the Kreuzzeitung ask whether the Pmssian govenment wanted to collaborate with the
0) KZ, 15 ApriI, 1917. " Ibid. Bethmann-Hollweg change of hem was closely rclated to the Russian Revolution. See pp.2-3. 66 KZ 3 May, 25 May. 13 June, 19 17. '' Retallack, "Road to Philippi", p.295. " Westarp, 279. The SPD's demands for reforms came mostly from the Reichstag since the party was represented by 1 10 deputies but by only 10 in the Abgeordnetenhaus. " Interestingly enough Westarp and Heydebrand mentioned that they could not figure out if the Chancellor's inclination to reforms and democracy was the resdts of personal convictions or due to indecisiveness and Iack of fighting spirit. See Retallack, Road to Phillippi.p.297. Conservatives or with a party advocating stdces, Face without annexation, and policies detrimental to the state and country." In an exchange of lettea that took place between Westarp and Arnold Wahnschaffe, Chief of the Imperial Chanceliery, Westarp mentioned that Bethmann-
HolIweg was against the Conservative Party, was driving them into a corner and that he supported the democratic ieft." This proved how seriously the relationship between the Conservatives and the government had deteriorated by mid-19 17, The KZ had no confidence in the government and was becorning increasingly frustrated with the Chancellor's attempt to reach a compromise with the Social Democrats.
Bethmann-Hollweg on the other hand was even more dissatisfied with the Conservatives and believed that the latter's unwillingness to adapt to the new economical, social and political realities excused him from cooperating with them. As early as 1914 he had explained his reasons for not relying soleIy on the Conservatives for his policies.
Whoever.. ... not only f~lsto spare the cabinet, but directly attacks it in an hour of need, and whoever, alleging chat the regime does not sufficiently defend public authority, undermines it as the Conservatives ceaselessly do, has Iost his right to a special position."
It was the Chancellor's aide, Kurt Riezler, who best described the reasons the Conservative Party was increasingly opposed to Bethmann-Hollweg and the govemment.
Because everybody believes that we are at the end, intemd struggles are becoming hotter by the day. The present ruling classes feel economically and politicaiIy threatened by the govemment's cooperation with the ~ocialists."
In their opposition to the Chancellor and his reform proposais, the Conservatives had the support of Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg. Their appointment as Supreme Cornmanders of the army on August 26, 1916 marked a new departure not only from a rnilitary point of view but
'O KZ, 29 April 1917. " Westarp. 8 Apnl 1917 in Westarp, p.265. Reiallack. Road to Phifippi. p.266. " Riezler's Diary, 25 February 1917 quoted in kausch, p.328. from a political one. The new OHL, under the impression that the war was a total one, beiieved that the army should not limit its role to strictly mfiitary questions, but shouId consider everything that could have an impact on the railitary's ability to win the war, Thus, the OHL graddy got involved in the country's foreign poiicy, the economy and intemal politics." Ludendorff and
Hindenburg were especidly opposed to reforming the franchise on an equai basis, Written evidence of their opposition is scarce since they did not want to be perceived as rneddling in politics, which was the prerogative of the Chancellor and govemment. in his memoirs,
Ludendorff even made the incredibte comment that he was not interested and involved in politics during the war.
I heard of it (the Easter Message) only afier publication. Neither the Ernperor nor the Imperid ChancelIor, Von Bethmann, ever spoke to me about intemal affairs. Nor was it my business to originate discussions on these subjects, as internai politics had nothing to do with me.7s
The -y's opposition to reforming the Prussian franchise was however clearly expressed by the
Deputy Commanding General of Konigsberg, Wolfgang Kapp. in a secret memorandurn dated
May 19 16, he expressed his views on the war, the government and food supply. Of interest to us are his comments on the Prussian suffrage.
[the army's] highest aims lies not in exaggerated constitutional demands for the introduction of a radical suffrage law in Pmsia. And so much the more easily would it be possible to bring about a Prussian suffiage reform on the basis of a direct, open, automaticaily working plural vote by raising the age within the limits of the cornmon interests of the tat te.^^
Here, before the proclamation of the Easter Decree, is the essence of the army's idea of reform to the Pmssian suffrage, a plural franchise giving more voting power to certain categories of voters.
Shortly after the Easter Message the OHL complained that it was not informed of the discussions in preparation to the decree." Bethmann-Hollweg, aware of Ludendorff's and
74 Kitchen, p.45ff. " Ludendorff. p.52. 76 Kapp, May 1916 in Lutz, Vol. 1, pp.8 1-106, especiafly p.106. n Kitchen, pp. 129- 130, Hindenburg's opposition, did not take the risk of having them interfere in the debates and kept the generals in the dark- In his mernoirs Ludendorff stated that the Easter Message and the Jdy
Decree were ili advised at the time hma rnilitary point of view since they affixted the war effort at home and on the front? They revealed to the enemy that the home front was weak and divided and gave the Allies the impression that they only had to hold on until Germany wculd collapse by itself. The Easter Decree also reinforced the OHLTsconviction that the Chancellor would Iead the country to defeat. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were more than happy to use the Easter Message as a weapon in forcing the Chancellor's dismissal. The OKL's opposition culminated in the July crisis and it was at that time that the Generals' real intentions and involvement in politics were revealed- Hindenburg even stated that the army should be involved in the country's and Pnissia's politics.
In case of necessity Main Headquarter should not be lefi unheard if questions are discussed which affect the military situation and the spirit of the army. 1 consider it my duty to say so, and particularly to point out that every decision on intemal political questions means development in our quarter.. ...79
Thus, despite their daim that the OHL never meddled in politics, Ludendorff and Hindenburg could not conceal what was even obvious to contemporaries. that they were clearly against refom to the Pmssian franchise proposed by Bethrnann Hollweg. As we shalI see, this in tum led to the direct involvement of the OHL in the July cnsis and was an important role in the
Chancellor's dismissal.
THE CONSERVATWES' ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSING REFORMS
For the Conservatives, defending their privileges and preventing radical reforms to the hussian suffrage were important prionties. In attacking radical changes they used different
78 Ludendorff, Ludendofls ûwn Story, p53. 79 Hindenburg's Telegram to the Chief of the Militacy Cabinet, 9 July 1917 in Ludendorff, Ench Von, The general Staff and its Problem The History of the Relations between the High Command and the Gennan Imperia1 Govemment as Revealed by Wcial Documents, New York, 1971 (1920). Vol. iI, p.459. tactics and arguments. One of them was to refer to a declaration of support for Pnrssian values
and the Constitution of f 85 1 but their arguments were anything but onginal and convincing. For
the Kreuzeitwrg the fact that the the-class franchise had constitutional legitimacy was a
sufficient reason not to alter the voting ~aw.~The paper also claimed the constitution included
provision for a strong and authoritarian monarchy, and it was the sarne constitution and monarchy
that had made hssia strong in the past and wouId allow the country to win the war. The
Conservatives pointed out that even the enemies of the Reich had recognized that Prussia's
traditional source of strength lay in its monarchical and military institution^.^' A strong monarchy
was aiso what had distinguished Pmssia from other German states. However, the Conservatives
were apprehensive of the pressure originating from other German states that had more demoçratic
voting Iaws and that wanted the Pnissian franchise to be refonned. It was also the example of
reforms in another Gerrnan states that gave arguments to the Conservatives to reject the equal
franchise. In Saxony the the-class suffrage that had existed had been modified in 1909 to a
plural franchise that resulted in more seats for the SPD." The Conservatives apprehended the
likelihood of the same happening in Prussia. If an equal franchise would have negative impacts in
Russia so would the introduction of government responsibility in the ~eichsta~~~,especially
since the Chancellor was aiso Minister-President of ~russia.~This would make the chief member of government in Prussia subordinate to the Reich and the Reichstag, something that was unacceptable to Conservatives in Prus~ia.~'They believed Russia was above the Reich and were
~0 -15 April 1917. Ibid. " in the first voting law proposai 42 deputies were elected by a direct and secret voting and 40 by an indirect vote in the eIectoral districts. The number of deputies would be increased to 91 in the finaf draft bill that came into law. In the 1910 etections it resulted in 27 deputies for the Consemative Party, 26 for the Nationai Liberals and 26 for the SPD. See Huber, Vol. TV, pp.408-410. " For a more thorough analyzis of Parliamentarization in the Reich see the nnxt two chapten. " KZ, 27 May 1917. " The sepmtion of the positions of Chancellor and Pnissian Minister-President was considered at several occasions during the Empire. It was even a reality in 1873 when Albrecht von Roon took over as Prussian Minister-President and, during the final two years of Leo von Caprivi's chancellorship between 1892 and 1894, when Botho Eulenberg assumed the same position. However, the separation did not have positive results because of the conflicts it created with the Chancellor- See Koch, H.W.,A Constitutional History of still, in 1917, not totally at ease with the unification of 18'71 and the incorporation of Pnissia in the ~rn~ire.'In the sp~gof 19 17 the Consenratives were feamil that pressure from the Empire and Reichstag would influence the Chancellor and the Russian govemment to adopt the equal and direct suffrage, the same suffrage useci to elect deputies of the Reichstag.
Another argument used by the Conservatives and the Kreuueitwrg in opposing changes was to praise the three-class franchise as benefiting both hssia and the Empire. As Westarp put it in 19 16, "We. my political friends, have spoken of the total recognition and appreciation in the supreme supenority on the basis of the three-class franchise: that is true, the basis is good and stands out, its positive outcorne is undeniab~e.'~Not surprisingly, the Conservatives were of the opinion that the positive aspects of the suffrage would be destroyed if changed in a more democratic rnanner. The reason was simple. They believed that only a srnall portion of the population possessed the necessary skills and capacities to play an active role in politics." Those qualities were believed to be experience, judgement, self-conmi, knowledge and wisdom. The plural suffrage that the Consenratives were willing to accept and which gave more votes to certain groups was directly influenced by this belief.
The Conservatives also realized the best tactic to prevent radical refonns was to be part of the process aiming at changing the suffrage. At first the Conservatives were successful in their efforts and a compromise rejecting the equal suffrage had the suppon of the Rvssian Minister of interior LoebelI and the four main political parties in the Abgeordnetenhaus, Conservative, Free
Conservative. Centre and National ~iberal." The Kre-eitung pointed out that the reform proposal was the result of months of negotiations and debates that originated even before the
Gennany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Ceniuries, New York 1984. p. 126. Dwing the war, this separation would again be considered in the FaII of 19 17 when Hertling, a Bavarian, becarne Chancellor, but this was in the end rejected and he assumed both positions. 86 In 1870- 187 1 the Conservatives were divided over the unification but were mostly against it. They feared Pnissian tradition and history were at risk if the state was to be incorporated in the Empire. See Rettallack, James, Notables of the Right. The Conservative Party and Political Mobilization in Gennany. 1876-1918, Boston, 1988, pp. I3ff.. 16 1- 163. " KZ, 25 April 1917. " KZ, 17 May 1917. prodamation of the Easter Message, thus emphasizing the Conservatives' recognition that
reforms were needed. Westarp mentioned that the Conservatives' willingness to cooperate and
their support of the plural suffrage was one of the biggest concessions the party had ever made?
He believed the plural suffrage was itseif a giant democratic step since it would resdt in the
election of sixty-five SPD deputies in the Abgeordnetenhaus compared to oniy nine.
The perception of changes and the extent of reforms evidently varied depending on one's
political views. The proposed plural franchise was more democratic than the three-class suffrage
but to claim, as the Conservatives did, that it was a dant democratic step was to exaggerate. Tme,
the SPD would have had a greater representation with the plural suffrage but the franchise would
still have ken far from king democratic. Based on 28 per cent of the popular vote the SPD
received in the 1913 elections in Prussia, the party would have elected 126 deputies if the
suffrage were proportional - as it would be during the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, to the
same Conservatives that would have preferred the status quo on the question of the suffrage, the
plural franchise was a democratic step and it was a big one to them.
WAX AIMS AND THE JULY CRISIS
In every conflict the belligerents set up war airns, what they hoped to achieve and at what conditions peace should be concluded. In Wodd War One Germany the question of war airns was closely reIated to the debate on political reforms. The Conservatives and the opponents of politicai reforms hoped that a victorious peace with large annexations would enhance the prestige of the existing political institutions and silence the supporten of change to the Prussian suffrage?
The hope of victory and its impact on politicai reform was clearly expressed by the Deputy
- - -- a' See p. 12. " Westarp. p.268. '' Gatzke, Hans W.. Germany 's Drive to the West- A Study of Germany 's Wor Aim during the First World War, Baltimore, 1950, p. i 88. Commanding General Kapp in 19 16 in the previously rnentioned secret memorandum in which
he actacked the govemment, the Left, the Reichstag and political reforms.
Our brave nation, which in this struggle for its nationai existence has borne incomparable sacrifices with never-wanting, selfdenying inspiration, expects the most of this peace. It dams not be deprived of the reward for these sacrifices. It has a valid daim to the magnificence whose development is opened by the victocies of our arms. Should it be disappointed in its lofty expectations, the destructive results to our internai political life and their reaction upon the Reich's foreign policy would be enormous- And irremediable reduction of the Kaiser's position and with it a weakening of the prestige of the government would take place which would immensely strengthen the parliament and wodd endanger the future of the German Empire [would be the consequence] .. . On the other hand, the more glorious the peace the higher the price of victory for ail sacrifices of the Fatherland, the tieer and mightier the development of the Geman nation.. ..Only then shall we escape from the democratic swamp into which we should undoubtedly be drawn afier a lukewarm peace."
Thus, one would expect the Conservative Party to support strong war aim during the war.
However, it was only reluctantly and gradually that the party came to accept the program of extreme war airns proponents.
Until the spnng of 1917 the Conservatives opposed the partisans of annexation Iike the
Bund der Lundwirte (BcL) and the Aifdeutscher Verbond (ADV).~~The Conservative Party's leaders were more interested in econornic demands that would strengthen Germany's agriculture since the rnajority of its supporters were landowners. The party's war aims consisted mostly of annexations in the East (Poland, the Baltic provinces and Lithuania) that would be advantageous to the Junkers and landowners in the eastern provinces of Pnrssia. Howtver, the party's official program did not have the endorsement of ail its members and the extreme war airns movement aiso had supporters within the party." One of the main points of contention was whether England or Russia should be portrayed as the main enemy of the Reich. For the pw's leaders such as
Heydebrand and Westarp, England was felt to be the main point of their attacks not for military or
- - 92 Kapp's Memorandum, 1916 in Lutz, Vol. 1, pp.8 1-106. " Peck, RJ. Radicals and Renctionaries: Eic Crisis of Conservatisrn in Wilhelemine Gennany, Washington., 1978, pp. 149- 152. 94 Ibid, pp. 184- 185, 190. economical considerations but for political and ideological rasons. In the ktyears of the war the Conservatives had to moderate their attacks on the Socid Democrats due to the BurgFieden,
By attacking and defeating England, the war becarne a fight against democracy and parliarnentarization and was to demonstrate that ody a country with a strong monarchy can successFully end the conflict?
Heydebrand and Westarp, who were of the opinion that the annexation movement made unrealistic demands that were not advantageous to the country, led the opposition to extreme war airns.% The pressure from mernbers of the BdL and the ADV on the Conservative Party to adopt more ambitious war aims was enormous. By fighting for their war aims prograrn Heydebrand and
Westarp were conscious that they were also fighting for the predominance of their party in
Germany. It was, however, the events of 1917 that would play a decisive part in the party's official war aims.
The proclamation of the Easter Message was a signal to the Conservatives and opponents to reforrn chat something had to be done to regain the initiative on the Pmssian franchise. The
Conservative Party was conscious that its officid war aims policy was not unanimously supported by its mernbers and wouId have to be modified. However, the first change on the question came from the Kaiser's actions following his promise of reform. Under the impression that the Chancellor forced the Easter Decree upon him, Wilhelm II wanted to atone for its impact by taking a strong stand on war aims? The OHL, against the idea of a compromise peace, did not waste any time in exploiting the Kaiser's new insistence on more arnbitious war airns. Ludendorff and Hindenburg were by then pressuring the Chancellor to clearly express his war airns. as demonstrated by some telegram exchanges chat took place in ~~nlP8Hindenburg wanted the
Ibid, p. 182. " Retallack Notables. pp.2 17-2 18. 97 Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Amy, 1640-1945, Oxford, 1964. p.325. " Hindenburg to Bethmann-Hollweg, Apri15. 19 17 in Scherer, André and Gmnewaid. Jacques. L'Allemagne et les Problèmes de la Pair Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale, Documents Extraits des Archives de l'ojjïce Allemand des Affaires Errangères, Vol. II, Paris, 1966, Doc.49, p.80; Bethmann- Chancellor to publicly state his war aims and have Germany state its conditions before agreeing to signing any peace treaty. Bethmann-Hollweg on the other hand mentioued that it would not be advantageous for Germany to state its minimal and maximai war aims since it would make it almost impossible to sign a separate peace. The disagreement between the military and political leaders on war airns could not be maintained and a conference was cailed for April23 to settle the matter.
The conference took place at Kreunach and the OHL's memorandum of December 23,
1916, was used as a base for the formulation of the country's war aims." In the end the OHL prevailed over the Chancellor and it was the army's more extreme program that becarne
Germany's oficial war airn~.'~However, Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Foreign Minisûy, shortly after the conference, that he did not felt himself to be bound to these war aims. It seems that nothing was solved at Kreuznach and that the opposition between the Chancellor and the
OHL was to be a major point of contention that would be fatal to Bethmann-Hollweg.
Like the Chancellor, the Conservative Pxty was under constant pressure to alter its officia1 war aims policy.'*' However, the Easter Decree, the OHL's war aims and the Reichstag's increased demands for a peace of understanding had tremendous impact on the Conservative
Party. In the end, it was the Reichstag Peace Resolution that finally convinced Heydebrand that the party should also embrace more ambitious wai- aims. The Kreuzzeitung's war aim policy was, not surprisingly, in agreement with the Conservative party.'" However, the paper did occasionally take a more independent and radical view on the question. In April, the SPD put
Hollweg to Hindenburg, 16 April 1917, Doc. 7 1, pp. 114- 1 15; Hindenburg to Bethmann-Hollweg, 20 April 1917, Doc. 81, p.132. 99 Fischer, Fria, Gemny'sAims in the First World War, New York, 1967, pp.347-350. '00 In the East. the appropriation of Livonia and Estonia were added to the OHL's mernomdum. In Poland Gennany was to establish complete miiitary, economical and political domination of the state. In the West, Belgium would be a vassal state and would have to cede part of its coastai land for the construction of a naval base. Luxembourg wouid becorne a federal state of the Reich and some frontier rectification would take place from French temtory. 101 Retallack, Notables, pp.2 16-2 17. forward its peace program based on "no annexations, no indemnities" and this was criticized by the KZ which rnentioned that a future peace treaty should guarantee Germany's eastern and western frontiers.lm The thought of another war in which Germany could be attacked on two fronts was a serious concem in both military and conservative circles. For the KZ, the conclusion of "peace without an increase of power and a war indemnity is equivalent to distress and oppression." Thus, by mid 1917, the Conservatives finally embraced the extreme war aims that were galvanizing most elernents of the Right.
The events leading to the July Crisis and the proclamation of the Iuly Decree are discuwd in the following Of importance here are the war airns and their impacts on the political life and the dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg as Reich Chancellor and Pnissian Minister-
President. The incident that reopened the question of war aims was the speech in the Reichstag made on July 6 by the Centre Party deputy Matthias ~rrber~er.'~In it Erzberger pointed out that
Gerrnany's military situation was not as favorable as assumed and could only detenorate in the following months, leading him to state that he was in favour of a peace without indernnities and annexations. The speech had tremendous impact on the Reichstag and politicians because
Erzberger had the reputation of having inside information.'" Erzberger's speech put the government, and Bethmann-HolIweg, in a difficult position. The next day the Chancellor appeared before the Reichstag Main Cornmittee to reassure the deputies that the country was not
lm In 19 15 the foreign affairs column was put in the han& of Rofessor Otto Hwtzsch who gave it a pro- Russian orientation. Heydebrand's view on war aims seems to have been influenced by Hoetzsch. See Peck, pp. 163, 165. 103 KZ, 23 April 1917, in Lutz, Vol. 1, pp.353-354. '04 See pp.48-50. lM Fischer, pp.396-398. 106 Klaus Epstein explained Erzberger's reasons for demanding the conclusion of peace as follow: the effects of the submarine warfare on England had ken overestimated, discussions he had with General Hoffmann (Commander of the Eastern front) and Colonel Bauer (Ludendorffs assistant) who gave a gloomy assessrnent of the rnilitary situation; Austria could not sustain its war effort much longer; the centre Party's support to the papal peace initiative; his desire to strengthen the Reichstag influence and the desire to maintain the SPD's support to the war effort KIaus Epstein, Manhius Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy, New York, 197 1, pp. l8S-lg3. waging a war of conquest, thus rejecting the idea of a Reichstag peace re~olution.'~After the proclamation of the July Decree, Bethmann-Hollweg had hoped that the promises of reform to the
Pnissian franchise would appease the Reichstag and the deputies would forget the idea of a peace resolution.
Meanwhile, the Crown Prince, after having only reluctantly accepted Bethmann-
Hollweg's arguments on the equal franchise, was at work with the OHL to bring about the
Chancellor's dismissal. The conspiracy was even more evident when Colonel Max von Bauer convinced the Crown Prince to meet deputies of the Reichstag to discuss the Chancellor's fate."
The meeting took place on July 12 and the minutes drawn up by Bauer revealed that the
Progressive Party deputy Friedrich von Payer was the only one clearly supporting the
~hancellor.'~The SPD deputy Eduard David stated that his party would oniy support Bethmann-
Hollweg if he approved the equal franchise and the principle of a peace without indemnities and annexations. The other deputies present"O clearly rnentioned that a change of Chancellor was desirable since Bethmann-Hollweg did not have their confidence. Thus, it seems that the position of the Chancellor was precarious at that time, he could not count on the support of the Reichstag and the only dly he had left was the Kaiser.
While the Crown Prince was convincing the Reichstag deputies that the Chancellor had to go, the OHL was also pressunng WilheIm II to dismiss him. On the day of the meeting,
Ludendorff and Hindenburg both sent telegrams to the Kaiser announcing that since cooperation was impossible with Bethmann-Hollweg, and that the Fatherland would suffer from the absence of cooperation between the military and civilian leaders, the only solution lefi to them was to
lm Fischer, p.397. " Kitchen. pp. 133- 134. '" Minutes of the July 12 Conference of Deputies with the Crown Rince as drawn up by Bauer in Ludendorff, General Stug, pp.463-468. 110 Westarp (Conservative Party), Gustav Stresemann (National Liberai), Mertin (Agricultural Union) and Erzberger (Centre Party), resign from their positions."' However, their threat of resignaüon was purely a tactical maneuver
to force Wilhelm II's han& and have him dismiss the Chancellor. Most diswing in
Ludendorff's telegram announcing his resignation was that after mentioning the lack of
cooperation between the OHL and Bethmann-Hollweg he said, "the fact that Yow Majesty
ultimately decides cannot prevent it."'12 This is a clear indication of the OHL's and Ludendorff's
uifnngement on the Kaiser's prerogatives. According to the constitution, the Kaiser was the
Supreme Commander of the Army and the Chancellor was only responsible to him. If
disagreements ocmd between the military and civilian leaders, he was the one making the
ultimate decision.
Wilhelm II's fmt reaction to the generds' threat of resignation was to mention that if
Bethmann-Hollweg had to go, he might as well abdi~ate."~He was also outraged at what he
perceived as an attempt by the Generals to force his hand. However, before the Kaiser could
make any decision the Chancellor relieved him of an untenable position by resigning.
What role did the Conservative Party play in the Chancellor's resignation? There is no
doubt that the Conservatives were soliciting his dismissal because of his position on the Pmssian
suffrage and, to a lesser extent, his peace program. In the meeting that took place between the
Crown Prince and the Reichstag deputies on July 12, Westarp clearly expresseci the reasons why
Bethmann-Hollweg should be demoted
Count Westarp considers the replacement of the ChanceIlor unnecessary on Constitutional grounds. But he considers him an unsuitable man to cope with the difficuit position in which we find ourselves placed. Westarp is against the equal suffrage in Pnrssia, which he regards as a disaster for hsiaand Germany...... He regards any ChanceIlor as impossible who could approve the Reichstag's Peace Resolution, and cannot support hirn ...He (Westarp) Regards hirn as quite unfitted to conduct the business of government.1'4
"' Kitchen. pp. 134135. Ludendorff. 12 Jdy. 19 17 in Ludendorff. Generui Stafi p.46 1. "'Balfour. Michael. rite Kaiser and his Times, New York, 1974, p.379. II4 Westarp, Minutes of the July 12 Conference of Deputies with the Crown Prince as drawn up by Bauer in Ludendorff. General Stafi p.463. Westarp and the Conservative Party had the difficult task of stating tbat the Chancellor should be dismissed, but at the same time did not want the Reichstag to be the decisive force in such an important politicai decision. It was feared that if it appeared that the Kaiser was giving in to the
Reichstag it could represent a dangerous step towards parliamentarization.
The Kreueinuig also voiced the Conservatives' conviction that Bethmann-Hollweg was not the man for the situation. After his resignation the paper mentioned, 'The national circles of the country will be greatly rdieved that the man who for eight years directed the fates of Pmssia and Germany with a rare rneasure of incapability and mishap has ken removed from his po~t.""~
Thus, the problems Bethmann-Hollweg had on the war aims and the Reichstag's Peace
Resolution were used by the Conservative Party as a stratagem in removing the man mostly in favour of reform to the suffrage.
Thus, the three months following the proclamation of the Easter Message were a succession of setbacks for the Conservative Party. The Russian Revolution convinced Bethrnann-
Hollweg that political reforms were necessary to appease the Prussians suffenng from the war but the workers in Berlin responded by going on strike in April and the movement spread to many major cities in Germany. Though political demands were part of the workers' demands, especially after the involvement of the USPD, the strikes were mostly to protest the shortage of food. The Conservative Party and the Kreuzzeitung perceived the strikes mosdy as a result of the
Russian Revolution and the SPD's actions to radicalize the workers. They concluded that the proclamation of the Easter Message was a mistake; instead of satisQing the Left and the workers, it only led them to further radicalization. Thus, the Conservatives rejected early on any changes to the three-class franchise; modifying it meant the end of their domination not only in the
Abgeordnerenhaus and Pmssia, but in the Empire. Their desperate situation explained the arguments of the Kreuzzeitung in opposing reform to the suffrage: Pnissian tradition, the prestige of the monarchy and its institutions, its conviction that only few possessed the necessary skills to be fully involveci in politics, the danger of democracy, and their fea.of a domination of the SPD in the Abgeordnetenhazu. A closer cooperation between the govenunent and the SPD thus had resulted in the Conservative Party entering in opposition to the govemrnent over the Russian suffrage. The party became convinced that a change of chanceilor, the question cf reform king associated with Bethmann-Hollweg, would suffrce to delay changes until the conclusion of a
V~C~O~OUSpeace. However, the party and the Kreuzzehg were wrong in thinking that the demand for reforms was the result of only one man, and the following months would prove not even a change of chancellor could put the Pnissian suffiage in the background.
"* Kre-itung, Iuly 15. 1917. translation in Lutz, Vol. II, pp.278-279. CaAPTERTHRm: "CHANGES IN THE CHANCELLORSHIP BUT THE COURSE REiMAINS TEE SAME: FROM JULY TO DECEMBER 1917."
The second half of 1917 marked a tuming point in the war. Germany's abiiity to win the war became a more remote possibility. Poiitically, the resignation of Bethmann-Hollweg represented a major victory for Ludendorff and Hindenburg, and the OHL was by then dictating the country's major poiicies. It is paradoxical that the "silent dictatorship" of the Army High
Comrnand occumd when the need for peace and poiiticai refonns becarne acute. The possibility of a peace of understanding evaporated with the increased power of the OHL - as the Papai peace effort and the peace taiks with the Bolsheviks would prove. On the military front, the Russians starteci an offensive in early hly.' It would however end less than two weeks later and from then on the Russian army would be in constant retreat. The disintegration of the Russian army by the end of October and the Bolshevik Revolution in November led Russia to seek an armistice that was accepted by Germany. The conclusion of hostilities on the eastem front was expected to reIieve troops that were desperately needed on the western front. Within Germany, the financial and economic burden of the war intensified the demands for political reform in the Reich and
Pmssia. The reform of the Russian franchise could not be ignored after the Kaiser's July decree.
Despite tremendous opposition hm the Consematives, the government introduced a reform proposai in the Abgeordnetenhaus in December. As we shall see, it was the Conservatives* misconception to believe that the resignation of Bethmann-Hollweg was the end of theû problems on the question of the Prussian suffrage.
Asprey. Roben B.. The Germon High Comnurnd at Wac Hindenburg and Ludendo@ Conducr Wortd War Il New York, 199 1, pp. 333-354. 'ITE NEW CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS
Bethmann-Hollweg's forced resignation left everyone scrambling to fmd a successor.
Surpnsingly, among al1 the parties involved in Bethmann-Hollweg's dismissal, most did not have
a suitable successor to propose. The most prorninent candidates were not senously considered for
different reasons? When the name of Georg Michaelis was fîtbrought up to the Kaiser, the
latter did not even know who he was since Michaelis had not held prorninent positions in the
Russian administration? He was chosen as a compromise between the High Command and the
Reichstag, someone not too radical for the latter and not too reformïst for the former. A man of compromise was not the person needed at a tirne of deep political and econornic crises; he wanted
to work closely with both the left and right, to cooperate with the OHL and the Reichstag. He
was for peace but at the same time favored the preservation of Gemiany's dominating position in
FRANCHISE DISCUSSIONS IN THE PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
in the Prussian govemment, Michaelis' nomination as Minister-President was the prelude to more changes. On August five, five new ministers were swom in. Of the twelve ministers foming the Russian govemment, six had just ken n~rninated.~The task of studying the question of the Russian franchise fell upon the Minister of Interior Drews and throughout the surnmer and fa11 of 1917, he presented severai draft proposais to members of the government. One of Drews'
The candidacy of former chancellor Bulow was rejected because of the Kaiser's aversion for him. The Bavarian Prime Minister Hertling refused the nomination because of his age and disagreement with the OHL. Admiral Tirpitz was considered too radid and Prince Max von Baden did not have sufficient support. See Koch, H.W.. A Constitutional History of Cermany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, New York, 1984, p.22 1. Rior to his nomination he was under secretary in the Prussian ministry of finance and Commissioner for food supplies, See Fischer, Fritz, Gennany's Aims in the First World War, New York, 1967, p.401. 4 Huber, ER., Deutsche Verfarsungsgeschichte, 19 14- 19 19, Stuttgart, 1978, p.3 15. ' Besides Michaelis. five new ministen joined the govenunent on August 5: Drews as Intenor Minister. Hergt as Finance Minister, Spahn as Justice Minister, Schmidt-Ott as Culture Minister and Eisenhart-Rothe as Minister of Agriculture. first conclusions was that an equal Franchise had to be instituted according to the Reichstag
franchise - universal and equd. The issue of an equal franchise in Pnissia codd not be ignored
since Wilhelm II had approved of it in the July decree and Michaelis also recognized the
necessity of an equal suffrage. Though the Reichstag peace resolution was the first task for
Michaelis, he could not avoid the question of the Russian franchise in his fmt address to the
Reichstag. After mentioning that he could not express himself exhaustively on the matter, this
king only his fifth day in office, he stressed, "As a rnatter of course, 1 stand upon the ground of
the Imperia1 Rescript of July 1 1 conceming the franchise in hssia7*
Besides the demands on the Prussian franchise, the Left also insisted on changes pertaining to
the electoral districts (~ohlkreise).' in the introduction we noticed the discrepancy of eligible
voten between electoral districts of rural East Russia and big cities8, and how this disparity
benefited the conservatives who drew rnost of their support fiom aman districts. In Drews'
view, changes to the franchise combined with a reorganization of the electoral districts could have perilous effects on Prussian political life, for the Abgeordnetenhaus would then bc dominated and controlled by the SPD~.Faced with this 'dreadful possibility' he began to consider alternatives to resuict the powers of a radical Abgeordnetenhaus, such as increasing the powers of the Herrenhaus to counterbalance the Lower Chamber and extending the length of state residency required to be an eligible voter.1° Drews regarded those limitations as necessary because he encountered strong opposition to his proposals from other ministers in the Prussian government.
Most ministers (notably Breitenbach, Sydow and Helfferich) could not accept fundamental
6 Lutz, H.W. (ed.), The Fa11 of the GemnEmpire 1914-1918, New York, 1969, Vol. iI, p.290. ' Though the Wahlkreise question was mostly related to the Reichstag elections, it was ais0 a debated question in Pnissia 8 The urbanization of Pnissia resulted in enormous differences of population between eIectoral districts in the countryside and the ones in major cities. See p.9 Prussian Ministen pointed out that an equal franchise would see the number of seats of the Conservative Party sinking From 143 to 63 while the SPD would increase its deputation from 10 to 134. 10 Weber. Helmuth, "Zum Pmblem der Wahlreform in PreuBen wahrend der Jahre 19 1 7-19 18" in Klein. Fritz, Politik im Krieg. Studien zur Politik der deutschen hen-schenden KIassen im ersren Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1964, pp. 196- 197. changes to the voting systeml' The Consewatives felt the govemment should not act solely because of war constraints and demands from the SPD; but as ministers of the king, who proclaimed in the Iuly Decree the notion of vohg equality, they could not opedy oppose reforms. Hence, while accepting the principle of an equal Franchise, hussian ministers and rnembers of the Abgeordnetenhaus were considering limitations to water down its impact The more conservative ministers went as far as to reject reforms to the Herrenhaus arguing changes were not needed. Furthemore, Drews stated that any solution to the franchise question was doubtful at the present and any reforms would have to wait untiI after the war.
The Pmssian cabinet received the fmt draft of the proposed law on October 2. The fmt article of the bill Iimited eligible voters to those with a minimum of three years residency in
Prussia while the second article granted the voting right to males of at least 25 years of age who had been in the electoral district for more than one year.'2 Article three provided for the introduction of an equal franchise in Pmssia.
Drafting a bill was the easiest part, but more difficult was overcoming the opposition to the bill. First, divisions within the govemment had to be overcome and opposition was also expected from the Prussian administration." The civil servants' approval was not necessary, but their influence in the population and among the Conservatives had to be taken into account. Drews did not want the civil servants to oppose the suffmge but expected at best their "passive loyaIty".'" It is evident that even before the bill was introduced in the Abgeordnetenhaus strong opposition to an equal franchise was expected within the Russian government and administration.
" The situation was weil summarized by the Vowans, though the opposition of Pnissian Ministen to the franchise existed, not al1 opposed it. "The course of procedure is al1 the easier for the Conservatives because, on the whole, not a single member of the Pnissian State Ministry wishes at the bottorn of his heart the msfer of the Reichstag franchise to Pntssia. It is true the Ministers, as obedient servants, wili comply the wi11 of their royaI master. They will bring forward and advocate the Franchise Bill; but it is one thing if somebody is heart and sou1 in the matter, and another thing if he makes himself the executor of somebody else's will, yielding to an extemal force.. ..." VorwWs, August 1. 1917, quoted in Lutz. Vol.II, p.440. l2 Patemann, Reinhard. Der Kampf um die Preussische Wahlrcfom im Ersten Welrkrieg, Dusseldorf, 1964, .108-109. P'Ibid. P'Ibid. p. 105. l4 Ibid, 109. TBE CONSERVATIVES AND TETE GOVERNMENT
Opposition and divisions within the goveniment wouId pmve not as significant as the obstruction corning From the Abgeordnetenhaus. Few politicai parties in the Lower House were in favor of an equal franchise. While opposition from the Conservative Party and Free
Conservatives was anticipated. the attitude of the NationaI Liberals and the Centre Party was unclear and their approval was necessary since they had respectively 73 and 103 deputies in the
~b~eordnetenhaur.'~More important*and as critical for the govemment, was the collaboration of the Conservative Party. For ideologicalt6 and practical reasons, the govemment could not consider the introduction of nich an important bill without the approval of the Conservative
Party-
The Kreuueimg welcomed the nomination of Michaelis as chancellor dthough they did not know him well - relief at Bethmann-Hollweg's resignation probably explains their enthusiasm. The paper stated that, "Under-Secretary Dr. Michaelis, the newly appointed
Chancellor. is an inwardly composed personality of deep seriousness. rich knowledge. great experience and. what is the main thing. a strong will. He is rooted in the best tradition of Prussian officialdom"." However, it did not take long before the Conservative Party retumed to a critical assessment of the govemment's policy on the franchise. The party's perception of the govemment's action on the franchise can be summarized in three words: contradiction, cooperation and opposition. The KZ accused the govemment of king inconstant and always contradicting itself: what it was saying one day could change the day after.18 Furthemore, the paper noted that various members of the Pmssian govemment had different views on the extent of reform to the franchise, but the party believed that the govemment should not take the radical step
l5 The Abgeordnetenhaus was composed of 443 deputies. Thus the majority was 222. Since conservative parties (the Conservative Party and Free Conservative) accounted for 203 deputies, a modest opposition from the National Liber& or the Centre Party codd derail the passing of the bill. See Mann, Bernhard, Biographisches Hamibuch jùr dm Preussische Abgeordnetenhaus 1867- 19 18, Düsseldorf, 1988, p. 1 7. 16 For the relationship between the Conservatives and the monarchy see p.35. 17 KZ July 15, 19 17. Ln Lutz, Vol. II, pp.278-79. of introducing the Reichstag franchise for Prussian e~ections.'~Another reason for Conservatives'
fiutration with the govemment was the latter's tirnetable for implementing reforms. in several
speeches Michaelis mentioned that reforms to the Russian franchise would only be irnplemented
after the war and the Prussian authorities had repeatedly stated since the Easter Message chat no changes were to be expected during the conflict? Ending the conflict was the first and most
important priority for the Pmssian and Reich govemments. The Conservatives became
increasingly furious when the JuIy decree mentioned that "[the] bill is to be submitted, in any case, as early as possible, so that the next election rnay be held according to the new franchise right"." For the Kreu~eitung,the July decree was now contradicting the Easter Message; the reforms might become law before the end of the war.= However, while the govemment was pushing for the introduction of the new voting law during the war, reforms, and new elections, would only be implemented after the war. This misunderstanding shows how deep was the rift and mistrust which existed between the government and the Consenratives in 19 17.
The Conservatives faced another dilemma in deciding whether they shouId cooperate with the government in reforming the Pmsian suffrage or simply opposing changes. The introduction of an equal franchise would represent a big step toward the end of the Junkers' domination in Pmssia. Still a remote possibility in April, the threat of an equal franchise came closer with the July decree and this forced them to take a stance on the Pmssian franchise?
Entering into opposition to the king would prove to be ideologicaily probletnatic because of their attachment to the monarchy; however, resisting the govemment did not prove as difficult. In rnid-
July the Herrenhaus deputy von Puttkamer served a waming to MichaeIis in the Kreuzzeitung by pointing out that Bethmann-HoIIweg's downfaii had resulted from bad policies and political
l8 KZ, 12 August 1917. l9 Ibid Patemann, p. 100. " Lu&. Vol. iI. p.425. "KZ 12August 1917. Patemann. p.99. misjudgment." The papa also reminded the Chancellor that it was his duty to work in presenring
the authonty of the state and the rights of the crown. Ironically, the same Conservatives who were
underminhg the monarchy by refusing reforrns proposed by the King, were telling the chanceilor
and govemment to work for the best interest of the Crown - that is, from their perspective.
The Conservative Party did not want to be perceived as uncomprornising and thus
decided to be part of future discussions on the franchise in order to derail changes. A strict
opposition was not an option, as it would have isolated the Party even more. The Conservatives
wanted the government to cooperate with the Abgeordnetenhnus (in which they were the largest
party) in order to fmd a compromise. However, cooperation did not ensure that the process would
nim in their favour. In early 0ctobeP the Kreuzzeitung complained of undue govemment
pressure on the Abgeordnetenhaus to accept an equal franchise and believed that such an
important question needed sufficient tirne to be thoughtfbIly discussed. The paper was also under
the impression that the Prussian cabinet was considenng advising the king to dissolve the
Abgeordnetenhaus if it failed to pass ~heequal franchise. In doing so the government could have
the king promulgating critical legislation such as the equa. franchise without the consent of the
Russian Landtag (Abgeordnetenhaus and ~errenhaur)? Distrust of the govemment was
undoubtedly reaching unprecedented levels. The Pnissian govemment however, never seriously
considered the dissolution of the Abgeordnetenhaur if it failed to pass the equai franchise."
24 KZ 15 July 1917, No.406. '5 EU 7 October, 19 17. " In the Prussian Constitution of 1850, still in effect in 1917, the Iegislative power was equally shared between the Lundrag and the king. The right to promulgate decrees was solely the prerogative of the king. Thus, the Constitution contained no provisions in which the king could alone sanction and promulgate legislation. Therefore, it is unclear to me what was the basis of the Kreuzzeirung's fear. See Huber, Vol. III, ~57-58. Despite ail the difference of policies the Pnissian and Reich governments had with the Conservative Party they still considered the latter to be a "govemment's party" and only reluctantly passed legislation that did not have the Conservative Party's approvaI. Mile in the Reich the support of the party was not necessary considering the few deputies it had in the Reichstag, the strong representation in the Pmsian Abgeordnetenhaw made the party's support almost essential. See Weber, p. 198 and previous chapter. . From early October onward Michaelis' position becarne inmasingly difficult with the
majority parties in the ~eichsta~?Problems with the Pnissian franchise, the end of the Papal
peace process, and a naval mutiny" were the causes of the discontent arnongst the National
Liberals, the Centm, the kogressives and the SPD who demanded the chanceIIor's resignation
since he did not have their confidence any more. The request of the Reichstag was a radical action
since the chancellor was only responsible to the Kaiser and Wilhelm II insisted that he would
fight for his prerogatives." In the end. Michaelis relieved the Kaiser and the Reichstag of a
politicd crisis when he resigned on October 26.
The country was again lefi without a chancellor and Pmssia without a Minister-President.
Mer turning dom the chancellorship in July, Hertling seriously considered the position this time
but before accepting, he wanted to discuss his nomination and the country's policies with the politicd parties of the ~eichsta~."Hertling was of the opinion that the Reichstag could not be kept out of major political decisions any longer. Hertling secured the nominations of Friedrich von Payer (a Progressive) as Vice-chancelIor and Robert Friedberg (a National Liberal) to the government in order to overcome the Reichstag's initial reservations on his nomination. The nomination of two mernbers of the Reichstag to government positions represented a move closer to parliarnentarization, and one that clearly upset the Conservatives and the OHL. As evident from Ludendorff's memoirs, they saw the danger of the Reichstag having a pater Say in the country's policies.
At the end of October Count von Hertling succeeded Doctor Michaelis. He was the first Chancellor to be nominated by the Crown with the consent of the majority in the Reichstag, so far had the balance of power altered in favor of Parliament, and the same process was
- -- - 2s Koch, pp.225-227. t9 In August a naval mutiny occuned in Wilhelmhaven when sailors, faced with boredom poor quaiity of their diet and low spirit, took their grievances to tom. The invoivement of the USPD, though unclear but most likely limited, was severely denounced when the Reichstag reassembled on September 26, Michaelis attacked the USPD with such furor that led the SPD to defend the Independent Socialists. See Herwig, Holger H., The First World War. Gennany and Austna-Hungary 1914-1918, London, 1997, pp.376-377. Koch, 227. " Koch, pp.227-228. Shortly after taking office Heding was faced with the question of the hussian franchise, and king a Bavarian made his task even more difficu~t?~The chancellorship cnsis had few impacts on the suffrage and only delayed the govemment's work. On November 25 the Prussian government presented to the Pmssian Landtag its refonn proposal based on the Kaiser's Juiy decree and the principle of an equal and direct franchise. An eligible voter was considered to be any deof at Ieast 25 years of age who had ken in Pnrssia for more than three years and had one year of residency in the electoral dist~ict.~The Herrenhuus was also to be reformed, but the most noticeable changes were to increase the number of representatives to 550 and the composition of the House was clearly outlined. The composition of the Upper House remained an amalgam of prominent Pmssian citizens like noblemen, industrialists, mayors of big cities, representatives of town and country districts, professionai corporations and church officiais, but the nominations were not the sole prerogative of the king." This was a clear indication that the
Upper House was to remain under the control of conservatives who, if needed, could oppose a more radical Abgeordnetenhaus elected by the equai franchise. Furthemore, the Herrenhaus was given more political powers such as equal legislative powers to be shared with the Lower House.
And in case of disagreement between the two Houses over the budget or any piece of legislation, a joint committee would be formed to settie the differences.
" Ludendorff, Erich, Ludendotfs Own Srory, Augusi 1914-November 1918, New York, 19 19, p. 146. 33 At first Herrling did not consider taking the position of Minister-Resident of Pmsia. He believed that a Russian who couId address Pnissian problems should fil1 the position but nonetheless accepted both positions, as they were so juxtaposed. However, Heding left the Minister of Intenor Drews in charge of the Franchise probably believing that it would be bener handled by a Pmsian thus avoiding any criticism on the question since he wu Bavarian - the same kind of criticism that the Vice-Chancellor von Payer, a Würtemburger, faced in 19 18 (see next chapter). Y Huber, Vol. 5, pp.479-483. '' Th* six seats each to mayon of big cities, the Ianded nobility and big industrialists: sixty seau to the upper nobility; seventy six seats to representatives of cities and electoral districts; eighty four seats to The new session of the Abgeordnetenhaus opened on December 5 with latest developments on the eastern front uppermost on the deputies' mind, the Bolshevik Revolution king less than a rnonth old." in the night of November 6-7 the Bolsheviks took control of strategic buildings in Petrograd and when the governrnent failed to regain control of the situation it became clear that the Bolshevik Revolution was initially successful. One of the first decisions of the Bolsheviks was to proclaim their willingness to end the war and, on November 26, Russia requested an armistice with the Central powers that was accepted twenty-four hours later. The prospect of peace was welcomed by both the Left and the Conservatives, but for different reasons? The Left believed the peace negotiations with Russia to be a step toward the end of the conflict in Europe, white the Conservatives were womed that the Russian Revolution might influence the Left and the German people in radicalizing their demands for politicai reforms.
When the reforrn proposal was introduced in the Abgeordnetenhaus, the SPD rejected it dernanding instead a lowering of the age and state residency requirements. Furthemore, they dernanded modifications to Russian electoral districts and supported women's right to vote38. In the House, Drews spoke of the peopIe's sacrifices during the war and that the time had corne to gant the equal franchise. In his first address to the Abgeordnetenhaus on December 5 Hertling mentioned the need for change and the hope that the House would approve and pass the govemment's bill.
1 found myself faced with the duty of fulfilling a promise often and solernnly given by the King. 1 shall endeavor to fulfill that promise to the utmost of my power. I shdl do so with full Conviction.. . You must, if need be, dso be courageously resohed to put your hands to new things when the needs of the people and the political situations demand it. That this is the case at present is my fm conviction,. . The suffrage system on which Bismarck expressed his opinion fifty years ago is no longer defensibie. It is indefensibie in view of the actual changes which the composition of the mass of the people has undergone.. -1hoId that you will be professional corporations; 32 seats to the Church and higher learning institutions; and the king had the rerogative to name up to one hundred fifty members. Koch, pp.8 1,234. P6 Renouvin. Pierre. La Crise Européenne et In Premiire Guerre mondiale, Paris, 1962. ppS14-530. " Droz. Jacques Le Socialirme Démocrorique 1864-1960, Paris. 1966, pp. 147-163. See next chapter. doing the greatest service to the Fatheriand if, afier due consideration and examination, you give to it yow constitutional appmval?
With these words Hertling put the faith for the equd franchise in the hands of the
Abgeordnerenhaus. Though obiigated by to do so by the constitution, it would prove disastrous to
the suffrage and the Empire.
CONSERVATIVES AND POLITICAL REFORMS
The nomination of Hertling as Chancellor and Minister-President of Prussia represented a
new departure in German politics since he was not Pmssian but Bavarian. In Bavaria, Hertling
govemed with a Parliament that was elected according to an equal franchise, and this represented
a serious problem for the Conservatives in Pmssia who were unhappy about his nomination as
Minister-President of their state. They disliked the idea that Hertling could, as a Bavarian, look at
the Pnissian franchise fiom a Reich perspective when they considered this to be strictly a
Pmssian matter. The Kreuueitung also pointed out that king non-Prussian, it would be difficult for him to refonn the suffrage? Since their party was the stmngest in the Abgeordnetenhuus the paper claimed that the Minister-President should be a ~onservative? Taken to its logicai end.
this argument could have far reaching consequences. It would mean that a SPD member should fil1 the position of Chancellor since it was the strongest party in the Reichstag. It is doubeful that the Conservatives ever considered this prospect.
During the war the question of political reforrns was not limited to Prussia; democratization of the Reich was also on the agenda. Mainly, the majority parties in Reichstag wanted the government to be responsibte to the House and the role it played in Bethmann-Hollweg's dismissal was interpreted as a big step toward parliamentarization."ZHowever, the Reichstag was never consulted when Michaelis was considered for the positions of Chancellor and Minister-
39 HertIing in the Abgeordnetenhaus, 5 December 19 17, quoted in Lutz, Voi. II, p.3 19. a KZ, 1 t November 19 17, No.576. '' KZ, 4 November 19 17, No.563. president. Furthemore, Michaelis was only prepared to improve cooperation between the
Reichstag and the govemment and did not consider his policies to be subject to the deputies' approval; he rejected any step toward parliamentarization. As well, the chanceIIor mentioned in first address to the Reichstag on July 19 that cooperation was only possible if "the other side recognize that the constitutional right of the Imperia1 administration to conduct our policy must not be narrowed. I am not willing to permit the conduct of affairs to be taken from rny hands.'"
Eminent Conservatives also voiced their dismay of parliamentarkation. In his mernoirs
Ludendorff described the political life in the surnrner of 19 17 as follow,
The internai conditions in Germany continued to develop unsatisfactorily. In the Reichstag the stmggIe for power between the parties and the Government became more acute. This vice of parliarnentarïzation camied on by professionai politicians and concealed under catchwords of every kind, grew every day more naked and unashamed, Dr. Michaelis opposed it with determinacion and thus very soon became the victim of his own actions. He wore out his strength in this struggle and had no time to work for the war.
THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE SPD ATTITUDE TO THE PRUSSIAN FRANCHISE
The SPD welcomed the Kaiser's JuIy Decree realizing, however, that there would be a long wait bef0~any elections could take place under a new, equal franchise. On August 1" the
SPD' main newspaper provided an excellent assessrnent of the political situation and the question of the franchise?
Nothing would be more fatal than to believe that the substitution of the uniform. equal, direct and secret franchise for the Prussian three-class franchise is already a fait accompli due to the Easter Message and the decree of July 1 1. On the contrary, no one familiar with the parliamentary history of Prussia, and especially no one who knows the history of the franchise, would expect, in view of the structure of the Abgeordnetenhaus, that it would surrender without a stiff fight. For the Conservatives much more than the franchise is at stake - the beginning of the end of their domination in the greatest German state. By their power in Prussia they
. . ------42 The term parliamentarization referred to mainly two measures to make the parliament "more responsible": removal of article 9 of the Constitution that prohibited members of the Reichstag to heId a fovemment position and the chanceIIor and ministers to be responsible to the Reichstag. Koch. p.233. Michaelis' inaugural address to the Reichstag. 19 Juiy 19 17, in Lutz, Vol. II. pp.285-290. " Ludendorff, pp. 142- 143. ISVonviins, August 1, 19 17. Quoted in Luu, p.440. have known to influence not only the Government of Pnrssia but also that of the Reich; ... and it is entirely out of question that they abandon the field voluntary,
The Vorwarts accurately sumrnarïzed the problems faced in the introduction of an equal franchise in Pnissia: the opposition of the Abgeordnetenhaus, the opposition of the Conservatives and what the three-class suffrage represented for thern.
The govemment's indecision made the SPD suspicious of its real intentions. The government was clairning that nothing but the adoption of an equal and direct franchise would be acceptable but, on the other hand, it was well aware that the Conservatives opposed the equal franchise vehemently. The SPD maintained that the government had to consider different options that were not popular among conservatives: pressuring the Abgeordnetenhaus to adopt the franchise, considering the possibility of dissolving the house of deputies and holding new elections, and even the radical step of governing without the house? The Conservatives claimed they were prepared to cooperate and willing to refom; but the SPD soon redized that they were actually obstructing the introduction of a new franchise?'
The Conservatives and the Krerrzzeitung mentioned that it was no surprise that the SPD supponed the new franchise. However, the papa not only criticized the Social Democrats' actions but resented pressure fkom the socialist party leaders urging the adoption of the equal franchise? It argued that a qiiick adoption of the suffrage would not benefit the country and ctaimed that such an important question needed time to be discussed and debated. Again, this was a favourite tactic of the Conservatives, to use al1 possible means to delay refom. They feared the predictable result of an equal franchise would be an increase of SPD deputies. The KZ considered
Pnissia as the last bastion against social democracy and feared the worst with a new suffrage.49
* Weber, p. 198. " Patemann, p. 10 1. KZ, 7 October 1917. 49 KZ 11 August, 1917. The paper predicted dreadful consequences for hssia in the area of bureaucracy, taxes, large estates and pnvate property.m
Ako disturbing for the Conservatives was the development of the relationship between the govemment and the SPD. They felt that the SPD was gaining political strength and more influence on the govemment. The Consemative Party and the KreuzzeituBg were irritated by this tum of events for, despite the tensions of the war, the party still saw itself as the govemment's party. The KZ claimed the govemment that the SPD could not be tmsted; catchwords such as cooperation and BurgFieden were ody used to hide the SPD's ultirnate goai, the creation of a
Repubiic in ~ex-man~.''Furthemore, the Conservatives could not accept the SPD's tactic of approving war credits in retum for changes to the three-class franchise; the Social Democrats* support of the war should be unconditional.
Since no general elections were held during the war in Gerrnany it is diff~cultto assess which parties profited politically from the conflict. However, the fmt state elections that took place afier the war resulted in the SPD's higher share of the popular vote; thus demonstrating an increase support for the party? Surprisingly, the Kreuneitung assessed the political situation differently; it interpreted the decrease in membership of the SPD as a sign of decline." The number of SPD members declined from 1 million in 19 14 to 243,000 in 19 17. This Ioss had one simple explanation: soldiers sent to the front were in large part composed of workers who represented the SPD's core supporters. The paper acknowledged this but was not convinced that the war mobilization explained the whole picture. The KZ maintained that the main reason for the
SPD's decline in membership was its loss of influence amongst German workers and that the
JO Osten-Warnitz, 6 August 19 17 in Westarp, Kuno Friedrich Viktor. Konservarive Politik im letzren Johrzehnr des Kaiserreiches, Berlin, 1935 '' KZ, 12 August 1917. The paper's view did not represent the SPD's political views, see p.86. 52 In the Rissian elections of 19 13 Ihe SPD received 28,4% of the popular vote and in 19 19 36,496. The SPD elected 145 deputies in 19 19 but only 10 in 19 f 3 - the disparity of seats can be explained by the existence of the three-class franchise before the war and proportional representation in 19 19. Had the proportional representation existed in 19 13 that party would had elected 126 deputies. See Orlow, Dietrich, Weimar Prussia 1918-1925, Pittsburgh, 1986, pp. 14- 18. 53 KZ 12 August 1917. party did not have a promising future. This anaiysis of the situation in the summer of 1917 is not
really convÿicing. The question is whether the Conservatives honestly beIieved it, or wanted to
convince themselves that the SPD was losing influence.
The Conservatives were also opposing the SPD's other main political demand of
parliamentarization of the federal institutions. At the SPD meeting that took place in WWburg
between October 14' and 2ohexpressed the party's optirnism. ui his view, the question was not
whether Gerrnany would have a parliamentary regime but when-
...three years of war have meant an increased influence of the left and the workers. German dernocracy - I say it quite frankiy - has become a Party with a direct prospect of supremacy in the State. The Parliamentary system will carry through this or that, and Germany afier the War will be a Parliamentary democratic State. And it will be with us, as it is with England, that the Party which possesses a rnajority seats in Parliament will have to set up the Govemment and be mponsible for it.. ...%
Not surprisingly, those comments alarrned the Conservatives even more. The Kreuzzeitung
denounced parliamentary responsibility as vehementIy as they opposed changes to the Prussian
franchise since they felt it would also have negative impacts on ~erman~."For the paper, a
responsible government would weaken the Crown's powers and have disastrous impacts on the
authority of the state. The increased influence of the SPD in the Reichstag would then mean that
the party and their leader Scheidemann would act as a dictator. Scheidemann's leitmotiv would
then be "the people to govern, the people to give orders, the people to nominate and fire chancellors and rninisters, the people to decide on war and peace". This in turn would mean more powers to the people, the conclusion of a peace of understanding and possibly the end of the monarchy.
Y Scheidemann, Philip, The Making of New Gemny: Mernoirs of a Social Denrocrat, New York, 1970, Vol. II, pp.416-419. At the time, Michaelis was facing mounting criticism from the parties in the Reichstag and the NationaI Liberais, Progressives, the Centre and the SPD were asking for his resignation and were confident of the outcome. The parties were aiso confident that the Reichstag would have Say in the nomination of any future chancellor and ministers. See Koch. p.227. The Reich govemment never senously considered the introduction of a parfiarnentary
system for the country. Yet, as with the Prussian franchise, the question of parliamentarization
could not be ignored by the government. However, in contmst to the Prussian fianchise bill, the
govemment introduced no bill on parliamentarization. Nonetheless, the situation was more
alarming for the Conservatives since the Consecvative Party was not the strongest party in the
Reichstag, and therefore did not control its agendas6 Control of the Lower House in Prussia made
it possible for the Conservatives to control debates on reforming the Pnissian franchise while the agenda of parliamentarization in the Reichstag was out of their hands. The fight against parliamentarization should thus be seen in conjunction with the stmggle for an equal franchise in hssia. The Conservatives rejected any political reforms chat would give the SPD greater politicai powers, However, the statu quo and superficial changes were no options and the war accelerated the need for political reforms.
THE OEIL AND THE PRUSSIAN FRANCHISE
In their fight against social democracy and political reforms the Conservatives could rely on the support of the OHL. Though the military had interfered in politics before the conflict, the war greatly incrûased the OHL's influence in politics.n Decisions regarding peace, war aims, the stmggle against reforms, the fight against the let? and intervention in the economy were ail subjects of the High Command's interference. The OHL's successful removaI of Bethmann-
HolIweg from office only increased their influence on the chancellor and the government and in the next year two senior politicians (the chief of the Prussian Civil Cabinet, Rudolph von
Valentini and the Reich Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlrnann) ais0 had to resign because of
------55 KZ, 11 Auglust 1917. " In the Reichstag elections of 19 12 the Conxrvative Party had only 43 seau. Berghahn, Volker Rolf, Imperia1 Gennany 1871- 1914, Providence, 1994, p.336. Craig, p.328. disagreements with the OEIL, In his mernoirs Ludendorff expressed his aversion for politicians who, according to him, were incompetent.
The path of our interna1 development had not afforded scope for the growth of strong personaiihes. It was quite striking to see how the officer class, the members of which were always thought to be rnost narrowminded, had produced men of decisions, while the civil officiai class, on the contrary, had, unfortunately, so conspicuously failed in this respect.. ,. Our politicai systern had not produced new creative brains, and by its barrenness it pronounced its own sentence."
The Prussian suffkage was a major concem for the German High Command. Despite its daim of non-intervention in intemal politics, the OEIL played a major role in the question of reforming the franchise. Although the OHL was careh1 to keep a Iow profile, Ludendorff's and
Hindenburg's involvement is unquestionable. On December 8 Ludendorff wrote to the Prussian
Minister of Interior Drews stating his views that refonns were not needed.
Your Excellency seems to show that the refusai of universal. direct, equal and secret sufige might provoke strike movements on a large scale and thereby involve the 105s of the war.. . In my view the danger of general smkes or considerable disorders does not exist.. . The great majority of the nation is much too intelligent and patriotic for that. .. we have no reason whatever to allow ourseIves to be infiuenced in question of policy by the fear of gcnerai strikes.. . the war has reaIly given us no grounds for a move towards dernocratization and parliamentarization."
This letter clearly demonstrates the OHL's optirnistic view of the situation. The strikes were then a real possibility and one month later the workers would prove Ludendorff wrong.
Ludendorff's personai thought on the reform proposa1 is unambiguous, as evident from a letter sent to a fiiend in December 19 17.60
1 still hope that the franchise falls through. If 1 did not have this hope, 1 wouId recommend any peace. With this franchise I cannot Iive. The Kaiser is not a factor. The government supports the bill.. . The Herren- haus and Abgeorhetenhaus have to take a stand, as they wish on our Constitution. The Herrenhaus and Abgeordnetenhaus are full actors, they have the duty to express their opinion regardless of the Kaiser and govemment.
j8 Ludendorff. Ludendofls own Story, pp.64-65. '' Ludendorff. Erich, The General Staff and its Problemr. New York, 197 1. pp.372-374. Ludendofi to Wheneten, 16 December 1917, quoted in Knesebeck, G. von Dem, Die Wahrheii iiber den Propagandafel&ug und Deutschlands Zusammenbruch, Munich, 1927, pp.63-65. This is probably the most revealïng quote of Ludendoms view on the Pnissian franchise, making it clear that he rejected the notion of equality. Furthemore, he rnentioned one good reason to pursue the war, the danger of a new franchise for Prussia. The Conservatives hoped, as the possibility of a new franchise was becoming a reaiity, that a rnilitary victory would somehow increase the prestige of the army and the Kaiser and silence demands for refomd' The
Conservatives also believed that by their actions they were actuaily saving the monarchy, even though Wilhelrn II carne to believe that reforms to the Pnissian franchise were needed.
TH33 ECONOMY AND THE SUFFRAGE
The burden which the war placed on Germany's economic and financial situation further increased the demands for reforms. We have already seen in the April strikes that the economic situation and the food supply were linked to political demands.
Three years of war, the allied blockade and a declining food supply from neutral counuies made Germany's econornic situation precarious in the second half of 1917. The war was stretching the country's economic capabilities to its lirnits and the situation was discussed on
September 4 at a hssian Crown ~ouncil. Michaelis womed about the coming winter and considered the coai supply a serious problem; the food supply was expected to be suffkient but not the supply of fodder and raw materials The Pnissian Minister of Labour, Pau1 von
Breitenbach, considered the economic situation to be so serious that food shortage rnight lead to agitation and demonstrations from the masses. The Reich Treasury Minister, Siegfried Graf von
Roedem, was particularly alarmed at Germany's financiai situation. The war debt was estimated at 28 billion marks, yet the war loans only covered 12 to 13 billions, leaving Germany with a floating debt of 15 to 16 billions. Possible new sources of taxes were estimated at 6 billions.
" Feuchtwanger, E.J., Prussia: Myrh and Realiry. île Role ofPrusria in German History, Chicago, p.220. " Scherer, André and Grunewald, Jacques, L'Allemagne et les Problèmes de la Pair Penhnt la Première Guerre Mondiale. Documents Extraits des Archives de l'wceAllemand des Aflaires Etrangères, Vol. lI, Pans, 1966, pp.39 1-406. Considering that the direct cost of the war was estimated at 7 to 75 billions a yeara, the best
possible scenario left Germany with an annual deficit of 1 to 15 billion a year on top of the existing debt. Roeàem's conclusion was that the govemment should consider entering in peace
negotiations and end the war. For Pmssian Minister of Commerce, Reinhold von Sydow, the country's situation was worsening not only from a military point of view but economically and
financialIy as well. He acknowledged that the longer the war lasted, the harder it would be for the govemment to resist the Reichstag's demands for parIiamentarization. Here is an
acknowledgement by a Prussian Minister of the link between war, the econornic situation and the dernand for political reforms.
More serious for the government was the situation of the food supply and the critical effects this had on the population. Numerous reports on the food supply were sent to the government during the war and one of them was the NeukOln municipal memorandum of December 3." Their main criticisrn was not related to the food shortages but the price paid for food despite price limitations on basic necessities since the city had to buy food on the black market in order to feed its citizens. More disturbing was the exorbitant price asked for foodstuff (corn, flour, vegetables. fruits, mik,) and the prices of potatoes. vegetables and cheese (among othen) though lirnited by law to a maximum price, were actuaiiy sold well above it. The city council expected the governrnent to remedy to these problerns in the near future fearing an aggravation of the situation.
...A expects that in view of the present intolenble state of things - one that mua inevitably precipitate a catastrophe - the War Food Department will adopt suitabIe measures, at the eatliest possible moment, to insure the alleviation of the causes of discontent.
" This amount included the interest on the war loans. pensions to war disabled. pensions to widow and orphans. Ibid. " Lu% Vol. iI. pp.177-186. PRIVILEGES
The Kreuzeitwrg defended the ttiree-dass franchise by ail possible means, and in the second haif of 1917 they asserted fïve main arguments to justa its opposition. Eirst, it deciared the
Conservatives' wiIlingness to cooperate in reforming the franchise- Second, it stressed Pnissian traditions and values. Third, it tallced about the vices of democracy. Fourth, it mentioned the destructive influence of the masses in politics and society. And fifth, it claimed that it was their constitutional duty to examine and study any reform proposal.
The first argument, cooperation, was related to their relationship with the government and other political parties and the Krercueitung's leading argument here was that it was not against reform per se. The paper mentioned that the Conservatives "will seriously cooperate in improving the franchise and the composition of the ~emenhauî.'~~65 the other hand, the paper was adamant in objecting to an equal and direct franchise for Prussia; it was convinced that a radical suffrage for the Abgeordnetenhaus would be a mistake. The KZ regarded the IuIy decree as a big step toward radicalization of the country and was more cornfortable with the Easter Message in which reforms were mentioned, but only in gened terms. In the fall, the Conservatives started working on their own reform proposal in complete denial of the government's plan. The
Kreuzzeitung rejected the equal franchise and advocated a plural suffrage instead. The more educated groups, industrialists and civil servants were to get an additional vote in this system.' In the last months of 19 17, the Conservatives were advocating their plural franchise in order to delay and even prevent an equal suffrage. However, serious and concrete proposais would only corne in the last year of the war and the opening of a new session of the legislature in Pnissia.
For the Kreuzeitung, cooperation was only possible between the Abgeordnetenharrs and the g~vernment.~'The SPD was not to be included in the discussions on the Pnissian suffrage since the party oniy had 10 seats in the Abgeordnetenhaus, insufficient to have any effects on any vote
65 KZ, I 1 August. 1917. " KZ 16 Septernber 19 17. in the Lower House. The paper was of the opinion that an agreement could be reached with the
Centre Party, the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals in the Abgeordnetenhaus. Since the KZ considered the franchise to be stnctiy a Pnrssian matter, it rejected any involvernent of the
Reichstag. Thus, divisions within the Centre and National Liberal parties among the Reichstag and Pmssian caucuses were not a con~ern.~~What rnattered was that the Centre and National
Liberal parties of the Pnissian Landtag were against an equal fmchise. For the Conservatives and the Kreuzzeirung, the word cooperation meant working with people and political parties who would agree with their agenda; thus rejecting the involvement of the SPD and the USPD in the process.
The argument advanced by the Kreueirung in the second half of 1917 was to appeal to
Pnissian values and traditions, the sarne values and traditions their domination of Prussian society was based upon- rnainly a pre-industrial era where land was the principal source of wealth. The paper reacted strongly to the govemment's proposal of December 569; it did not perceive the necessity of radicai refom to the franchise. "The old system has proved itself' was one of the
KZ's favourite arguments. It believed that changes shouid only be made to correct minor flaws in the franchise. The best way to prove the value of the present system was to mention the
Conservatives' earlier contributions to Pnissian society that made it so strong. The Conservatives considered that it was their contribution that had made Pnissian society so strong, thus there was no reason to change the system. The KZ credited the Conservatives for positive contributions to the Pnissian suffrage, the construction of an extended railway system, and the hssian school
67 KZ, 11 November 1917 68 The Nationai Liberal party was divided on the question of the equd franchise. WhiIe the Reichstag fraction supported the principle of the equal suffrage, the position of the Landtag fraction was more ambiguous. In a party discussion that took place on November 14, of the 14 deputies who expressed their opinion on the equd hchise, eight were against it and six in favour. The Landtag fraction wanted the question of the franchise to be left out of the Reichstag, it considered it to be a Pmsian matter. See Patemann, pp. 120- 121. 69 The bill was introduced in the Pnissian Landtag on December 5 but most of its content was known at the end of November. and education ~~stern.~The KZ and the Conservatives were nostalgie for the "old" pre-industrial
Prussia that they had dominated. This argument demonstrated how wiprepared and fearfd they were for the age of industrialization; they could not accept the end of their dominance in Prussia and fought desperately to maintain their privileges.
The third argument focused on the negative impact of Western democracies on society. For the Kreuueinuig, democracy created political instability. It claimed chat in France deputies and rninisters had a short political 1ife7' and the frequent change of govemment in chat country made it impossible to have long-term policies. Decision-making was also a long process in both France and England because everything had to go through commissions, debates and negotiations. The
Conservatives aiso believed that the administrations of democratic countries were weak and cormpt.
The fourth argument was closely related to the previous one, the danger of the masses with the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 stiU on Conservatives' mincis in 19 17. Ttiough the German
Social Democrat Party was by then more reformist than revolutiona#* the Conservatives and the Kreuueitung were convinced that giving power to the masses would lead to sirnilar revolution. For the Conservatives the masses could not be trusted and dreadfizl consequences were predicted if Germany and hssia were to give more powers to the populace. The masses could not be misted for the simple reason that they had poor knowledge of politics.73in a quick survey the Kreruzeitung conducted among soldiers on the front, they were asked about their views on politics, the war and Germany. Eight to ten percent did not know the name of the
Kaiser, five percent did not know the countries they were fighting (thirty percent said nothing of
Japan), sixty percent thought that they were fighting Napoleon and forty percent did not know who was the chief of the general staff. Ordinary people knew more about what affected their life
KZ, 16 September 1917. 71 KZ, 7 October 1917. 72 See Schorske, Carl, Gennan Social Democracy, 1905-191 7. The Development of the Great Schism, Cambridge, 1983 ( 1955). p.284ff. on a daily basis: famiers about agriculture, workers about industries; they only know about what they felt and experienced. Politics were of remote interest to the masses; their political imrnaturity meant that they were not ceady to have a bigger Say in politics. Hence, there was no need to give the masses more influence by changing the Prussian franchise. For the Conservatives political knowledge was a coroilary of wealth and land ownership, only educated and prosperous people had the intelligence and political matunty to be full participants in the country's political life.
Finally, their fifth and last argument in opposing reform was the notion of duty. The
Conservatives could not deny that an equal franchise had the consent of the king, nonetheless, the
Kreuueitung mentioned that the Abgeordnetenhaus also had constitutional duties, such as the obligation to study the proposals based on their political views? The paper pointed out that an equal fianchise in hssia wouId create an Abgeordnetenhaus dominated by the SPD and this would lead to the creation of a parliarnentary regirne. At this point the KZ mentioned that the
Conservatives were not ready to acquiesce to Wilhelm II's dernand, that the king had no absolute right. More important, their defiance was based on the Pmssian constitution, a constitution that had proved its worth. The Conservatives never went this far in opposing Wilhelm's II policies and this proves how further apart the two were at the end of 19 17.
The Conservatives welcomed the resignation of Bethmann-HoIlweg and the nomination of
Michaelis as Chancellor and Minister-President; and the Kreuueitung believed that the question of reform to the Prussian franchise would be put aside until the end of the war. They failed to redize that despite Bethmann-Hollweg's clear involvement with refonn, the question of reform was not merely the affair of one man, the need for changes was realized among a Iarge portion of the population. The Prussian Minister of Interior, Drews, was clearly in favour in an equal suffrage and he worked arduously to convince both members of the govemment and of the
Abgeordnetenhaus of its necessity. Though opposition rernained within the government, a bill
73 KZ, 3 December 19 17. '' 2 Decernber, 19 17. was presented to the Lower House for the election of deputies based on an equal, direct and
universai suffrage. When the Conservatives realized that the new Prussian government kept the
same course on the franchise, they re-entered in opposition to Michaelis, and latter Hertling. The
nomination of Hertling as Minister-president was especidy cnticized and king a Bavarian, it
made his position even more dificult. The Conservatives were also disturbed at the increased
cooperation between the govemment and the SPD. They believed the latter to not only work for
the implementation of an equal suffrage in Pmssia, but for the overthrow of the monarchy and the
establishment of a republic. With the equal suffrage the SPD, by controlling the government,
would be able to do just that. However, the Conservatives were not alone in opposing changes
and could count on the support of a powerful ally in the OHL.
The implication of the OHL became even more noticeable on the question of the franchise, despite Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's claims of the contrary. Fially, the Conservatives became
increasingly on the defensive on the suffrage and this is clear from the arguments used by the
Kreuueitung for not changing it: Prussian tradition and values, the vices of democracy, the danger of the masses and democracy and the Abgeordnetenhaus' constitutional nght to reject the government's bill. Despite the gravity of the military and economic situations, it would take ten
more months, defeat and collapse of the monarchy for the Conservatives to finally accept reform to the franchise. However, at the end of 1917 the Conservatives' "last hope" was put in the armistice with Russia and the next military offensive that was to finally defeat the enemy. As stated on numerous times, a victorious peace was the Conservatives' hope that victory would silence demands for refom. However, the promised victory by the OHL would not materialize in 19 18 and instead of making the Conservatives more willing to compromise, they adopted a radical stand on the suffrage fearing a lost of their influence in Prussia and Germany. aiAPTl3R FOUR: "FROM HOPE TO DEFEAT: TEE LAST YEGR OF 'IlE WU9'
THE JANUARY STRIKES AND THE FRANCHISE
At the beginning of 1918 the Amy High Cornmand and the governrnent were optirnistic
regarding the rnilitary situation. They were confident that the end of hostilities with Russia would
dIow the country to concentrate on the Western front and defeat the Aiiies. Despite the promise
by their leaders that the war was close to a conclusion, the population had reasons to be
unsatisfied, especiaiiy with regard to the econornic and food situations. Their discontent focuses
on the avaiiability of food at a reasonabie price since the official food ration was in constant
decline and left the population with no choice but to buy food on the black market, The exorbitant
price paid on the black market infuriated the workers and the municipal authorities alike that
helped feed its inhabitand It was in that criticai econornic situation that the workers took their
discontent to the Street at the end of January.
Throughout the fmt month of 1918 the radical Left (USPD and the Spartacus League)
was making intense preparations for a general strike by using the discontent with the slowness of
peace negotiation with Russia and the minimal progress made on political reforms.' The attitude
of the SPD on the possibility of a general strike was ambiguous and indecisive. The party did not approve of any preparations for a walkout by the workers but at the sarne time agreed with their demands. On January 28 between 200 000 and 400 000 workers in Berlin left their workplace and
began a general strike. The movement quickly spread out and other cities followed the Berlin workers, Hamburg, Kiel, Cologne, Bochum Nuremberg-Fürth, Altona, Magdeburg and ~reslau.'
' See previous chapter, p.70. 'Ritter. Gerhard, The Sword and the Scepter. nie Problem of Militarism in Gennany, Vol. IV. Coral Gables, 1973, p. 119-28 and Baitey, Stephen, 'The Berlin Strike of January 1918", Central Ewopean History, 1980, pp. 158- 174. It is estimated that the same number of workers went on strü 1. The speedy bringing about of peace without annexations and indemnisations.. .. 2, Delegates of the workers.. .to participate in the peace negotiations 3. More Iiberal food supply .. . 4. The immediate revocation of the state of siege 5. The abolition of the military control of industrial undertakings 6, The immediate release of al1 persons convicted or arrested for political action 7. The drastic democratization of the entire state organisrn in Germany. beginning with the introduction of the gened, direct and secret vote for al1 men and women over 20 years for the Prussian ~iet.~ The fast demand of the Strike Directorate is a clear indication that the war and the sacrifices from the population led to a radicalization of the workers and the request for political reforms. It is clear from the workers' demands that the econornic demands were linked to political ones and, unlike the strüces of Apnl 1917-', the political connotation of the strikes was unambiguous - only one demand referred to the food situation. Politicai demands were among the strïkers' requisition in April 19 17 but the strike was mostIy a response to the reduction of the bread ration and the miserable living conditions! One example was the demand to reform the Prussian franchise. It was on the strikers' agenda dunng both strikes but camed more weight in January 19 18 because the objective of the strikers was mostly political.' In the following days the governrnent tried to resolve the situation by adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the strikers. in an officia1 statement the government rnentioned that the Strike Directorate requested reforms of the political institutions but that at the sarne time it could not accept the opinion that it was not comrnitted to changing the Prussian franchise. 'Vonvans 29 Ianuary 19 18 in Lutz. R.H. (ed.), The Fail of the GemnEmpire 1914-1918. New York. 1969, Vo1.U pp.232-233. Kocka, Iürgen. Facing Total War. German Society 1914-1918. Cambridge, 1984. pJ7 See ,pp.26-29.. 7 The radicalization of the workers during the strike is to be found in the involvement of the Left radical, Spartacus Croup, war weariness and the longing for peace and an even worse food supply than in 1917. Bailey. pp. 160-f 6 1 . So far as they ( demands for reforms) are the expression of a doubt as to the determination of the Govenunent to execute the domestic reforms that were pmmised, the strikers proceed hman entirely enoneous presumption.. .' The government aiso mentioned that it was only willùig to talk with representatives of the workers either fiom among trade unions or members of the Reichstag, thus rejecting the legitimacy of the Strike Directorate. This made any red progress difficult and onIy one meeting took place, on February 2, in the presence of rnembers of the SPD, but without any representative of the Strike Directorate. The meeting did not produce any significant result and fearing the consequences of the strike on the war effort, the goveniment and the OHL did not wait any longer and took actions to force the workers back to work. The OHL proceeded quickly by rnilitarizing the plants involved in the strikes, having some strïke leaders brought to court, sending the more militant workers to the front, and by declarïng martial law? These actions produced the desired effects and the stritces ended in less than a week without having any of the workers' demands The handling of the situation by the OHL proved again how out of touch it was with the frame of mind of the workers and the High Command's underestimation of the political situation. Less than a month before the strikes Ludendorff had mentioned to the Minister of Interior Drews that in his opinion the fear of a strike by the workers was ~nfounded.'~ ....the danger of generai strikes.. ..does not exist.. ..the nation is too intelligent and patriotic for that. The only requisite is that the Government itself remains firrn.. .Thus in my opinion we have no reason whatever to dlow ourselves to be influenced in questions of policy by the fear of general strikes. The lesson learned by the workers proved to be a harsh one and, despite the detenoration of the econornic and rnilitary situations. they did not dare to strike again until the last days of the - 'Official Statement in Lutz, pp.23 1-32. 9 Ritter, p. 125 and Herwig, p.379. war. The strikes did however radicalize and politicize the working class which was more than ever conscious of its strength as a group." The failure of the strikes did aot in any way rnake the workers and the Left less detennined in demanding an equai fianchise in Pmsia. The strikes did however put the SPD in a difficult position. The party supported the war effort and pledged to its members that in return for that support they would get the government's support for the adoption of a new suffrage." The rniddle course adopted by the party during the strikes drew cnticism from al1 sides. The Conservatives and the government accused the party of disturbing the war effort while the radical left blarned the SPD for the failure of the strikes. The Social Democrats were nevertheless satisfied with the effects of the strikes in bringing question of reforms to the forefront of the politicai debate in Pnissia and Germany, and used them as a weapon to convince the govemment that refonn of the franchise was urgently needed. Shortly after the strikes the SPD appeared confident that it had secured the approval of the hssian government on the question. On Febmary î.5 Vice-Chancellor von Payer in a speech in the Reichstag reaffirmed the government's conmitment to politicai reforms." For von Payer, debates and discussions on the franchise could not be tirnited to oniy the state of Pmssia since it had great effects throughout the Empire. He also rnentioned that for this reason the Reichstag should be part of the process and, though the Imperial government would not meddle in Prussian affairs, he stated "that it is my firm conviction that it is certain the franchise provided for in the bill will come; there is also reasonable hope that it will come soon." The purpose of the speech was clearly to reassure the SPD and retain the party's support of the war effort. The Social Democrats reacted positively to von Payer's speech. The SPD leader Scheidemann mentioned in the Reichstag on February 26 that "we are glad of the decision with 'O Ludendorff,Erich Von. The Generaf Smand its Problemr. The Histoy of the Relations Berneen the High Command and the German Imperial Government us Revealed by Oficial Documents, New York, 1971 ( 1920)' Vol. IIpp.372-374. " Ryder. AJ., nie GemnRevolurion of 1918. A Study of Gemurn Socialism in War and Revoit, Cambridge, 1967, 1 18. " Ibid. and Bailey. p. 167- 169. which Hem von Payer ranged himseif on the side of the equal franchise yesterday. We trust that the whole Imperia1 government will do the same."14 While the govemment was working at maintainhg a good relationship with the SPD, the Social Democrats adopted a more conciliatory attitude in early 1918 to regain credibility lost during the strikes. The party was especially anxious to dernonstrate to the govemment and non-socialist political parties that it was "responsible" and behind the country's war effort." This defensive position is ooticeable in Scheidemann's speech. He mentioned the "legitirnate" reasons the worken went on strike and that the strikers were not traitors to the Fatherland. Furthemore, unions that were not afFiliated with the SPD (mostly unions associated with the Centre Party) also took part in the srrikes and the strikes were used as an excuse to persecute the SPD. Thus, while expressing confidence in the government in reforming the Pnrssian suffrage, the party was, for the next month, more moderate in their dernands for reforrns. However, the following months and the debates in the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus rnake it evident that even the support of the government was not enough to secure the passage of the equal franchise. The obstruction of the Abgeordnetenhaus against the govemment's franchise bill made the SPD suspicious of the government's real commitment to an equd suffrage and it was not long before the party went back to a more insistent attitude in dernanding refom. The Prussian government rnentioned again, on several occasions, that the supporters of refonns had its full support. In May the Vice-President of the Ministry Friedberg even declared that The state Govemment, now as before. fdyadheres to the equal sufhge right and is determined to bring into play for its realization dl constitutional means.. . Accordingly. the Herrenhaus aiso will have to deai with the bill. Should this procedure. ....not lead within a definite period CO a final adoption of equai Franchise, then the dissotution of the House will follow at the earliest moment the Govemment deems compatible with the state of siege.16 l3 Statement of von Payer in the Reichstag on internai refonns. 25 February 1918 in Lutz, Vol. II. 330-339. l4 Scheidemann before the Reichstag, 26 February 19 18 in Lun. pp.253-256. '' Ryder, p. 1 18. The SPD however became more and more fnistrated with the govemment and did not believe that it had the necessary will to carry out the reforms. The party was of the opinion that only strong actions would force the Conservative Party to appmve the equal suffmge. Instead of appealing to the people, the Govenunent appeais to the hvssian Herrenhaus! It is hard to Say with what measures of confidence the great masses follow ihis procedure, the hian Herrenhaus is long known to hem as the repository of fieedom and progress- They wiil fix it al1 Rght! However, if nothing happens even there, then - what then? Then the government will dissoive - at once? No? As soon as it will be compatible with the state of siege after dutifd consideration! .. . It is clear that the Government steers toward a compromise. It has an indescribable fear of the supposed dangers of a new election. In order to avoid a dissoiution, it is inclined to make. God knows, al1 kind of promises.'7 The last two statements from the goveniment and the SPD clearly demonstrate the problems they faced in regard to the franchise. Both were unwiliing to take any radical steps to attain a cornmon political objective, the introduction of an equal suffrage. The government was never prepared to force the adoption of a new franchise that did not have the support of the Conservatives- Despite the latter's obstruction to the bill, the government never seriously considered the dissolution of the Pmssian Legislature since it still considered the Conservative Party to be a "govemment's From the SPDTspoint of view, cooperating with the govemment was more important than any radical actions such as strikes, Street demonstration or refusing to vote for the war credits. The Social kmocrats still believed in the govemment, or wanted to believe, that their support of the war effort would bring about a democratization of the Reich, The SPD's shift from a revolutionary to a reformist policy that would gradually bring about reforms had ken confirmed during the party's congress that took place in Würzburg in October 1917. The policy of coIlaboration with the government and political parties was seen by most party members as the best way to insure political reforms in Prussia and the Empire, refom that would corne gradually 16 Friedberg before the Abgeordnetenhaus, 14 May, 19 18 in Lutz, p.450. l7 VorwaN, 14 May, 19 18 in Luu, pp.450-45 1. 18 Weber, Helmuth, "Zum Problem der Wahlrefonn in PreuBen wiihrend der Jahre 1917-19 18" in Klein, Fritz, Politik irn Krieg. Studien zur Politik der deutschen herrschenden Klassen irn ersren Welrkrieg, Berlin, 1964, p.202. but surely.19 This explains why as late as June of 1918, and despite the constant mjection of the equal franchise in the Abgeorcùzetenhau, the Social Democrats stiU had faith in the govemrnent's intentions. The King has realized that the suffrage injustice which makes possible such an unequal representation of the people cannot exist any longer. The Goverurnent is of the same opinion and hss therefore introduced a comsponding bilLm The events would however prove that only the fear of RevoIution wouid force the government and the OHL to fmally grant the equal franchise in Prussia. POLITICAL REFORM AND THE ENFRANCHEMENT OF WOMEN The question of granting voting rights to wornen was also debated when the Pnissian franchise and the democratization of the Reichstag were discussed. UnIike most industrialized countries, the fight for the women's vote was carried out not by middle-class women but by working women belonging to the SPD." On this question the women's movement had the full support of the leaders of the party who not only considered women's vote as a "naniral justiceTT but something that was not confined to sociaiist issues. Neither at the federal nor the state level, including Prussia, did women have the right to vote. The SPD's strategy at the federal level was simple; the party dernanded the female suffrage to comptement the male universal and equal suffrage that existed. In hssia, however, the SPD's attitude was more arnbiguous - officidly it regarded the fight for an equal franchise also as a fight for women's vote. During the second reading in the Abgeordnetenhaus the SPD proposed changes to the bill to include women as 19 Ryder, pp. 106-109. " Scheidernann in the Vonvdrrs, June 14. 19 18 in Lutz, p.446. Evans, Richard. "German Social Dernocracy and Women's Suffrage 189 1 - 19 18 ". Journal of Conternporary History, Vol. 15, 1980, p.534 ff. voters. "Every German without distinction of sex has the right to vote in the Pnissian community where he dwells. afier completing the age of t~ent~."~ However, the question of women's vote represented an additional problem for the SPD, the women's movement. and anyone who favoured the inclusion of the fernale suffrage in the bill proposai discussed in Pmsia at the tirne.= The SPD's leaders debated on two different strategies. The first was to secure an equal franchise; once it was assured, the party would fight for women's vote - a two-step strategy. The other strategy was to pressure the government to propose both reforms at the same time. The Revisionist fraction within the SPD favoured the first approach on the basis that it would be too difficult and unrealistic to ask for both at the sarne tirne? They favowed a policy dictated by gradua1 steps that in the end would gram the voting right to women. Nevertheless, the niajority in the party shared the view that a democratization of the Russian franchise should, at the same tirne, grant women the right to vote. However, only the threat of revolution in late October finally convinced most political leaders of the necessity of the enfranchisement of women. The question of enhchising women resurfaced at the end of October when rnilitary defeat was imminent and political refonns were king introduced in Pnissia and the Empire. In early November the politicai parties in Pmssia were discussing the modalities on the introduction of the equal suffrage and it became clear that the Cenue Party and the National Liberals were opposed to women franchi~e.~in turn. this made the SPD examine its own strategy and. surprisingly, the party's leaders agreed to remove the wornan franchise from the bill in order to secure the equal suffrage, which they believed was more important. However, before any final -77 Vonvans 30 April 1918 in Lutz, p.438. " The SPD was not the only political party that was divided on the inclusion of the women suffrage in their demands, the Progressive Party was so spiit that the it never adopted a clear position. See Evans, Richard, The Feminist Movement in Gennany 1894-1933, London, 1976, pp.224-225. 24 Evans, Richard, "German Social ûemocracy and Women's Suffrage 189 1- 19 18", pp.547-549. Evans, Richard, The Feminist Movement. p.552. decision was made Germany was swept by Revolution and Street demonstrations and this convinced the political parties in Pnissia to finaliy grant women the right to vote. THE CONSERVATIVES' \TEW OF THE SPD The last year of the war did not see any changes in Consenrative attitude toward the SPD, even though the military and political situations required compromises on their part. The January sûikes, the failure of the spring offensive and the prospect of defeat actually had the opposite effect on the Conservatives and made them even more resolute to resist reforms. Moreover, they used the "victorious" peace with Russia and the early success of the spring offensive as an argument that the present political system had proven its value and to silence the SPD. Thus, the Conservatives found arguments in either way to resist reforms. As we have already seen, the question of reforming the Prussian franchise included granting women the right to vote. The Conservatives ~inambiguouslyand adarnantly opposed the women's franchise. The Krewzeitung stressed that they had the support of Prussian governrnent on that issue. According to the newspaper, the Minister of Interior Drews decIared that his opposition to the expansion of the suffrage to women was based on the consideration that women's duties were in the house and the farni~~.~~The Conservatives also had the full support of the OHL who let it be known through Colonel Bauer that granting an equal Franchise based only on age would be a Mstake because women's vote could then not be denied." The Kreuzzeitung's arguments in opposing the women's franchise were very cleat- and paternalistic. The newspaper perceived women's vote as another step towards radicalization of Prussian institutions? Furthemore, aithough controlled and written by men, the KZ went so far as to claim that it spoke for women mentioning that the majority of women did not want to have " KZ 15 February 19 18. no.83. " Bauer, 6 June 19 18 in Deist, WiIhelrn (ed.). Wilhelm Militiir und Innenpolitik im Weitkneg, 1914-1 9 18, Düsseldorf, 1970, p. 1222. " KZ 15 February 1918, no.83. the right to vote. Their opposition to the womeds franchise was clearly expressed in an article published in une? Their arguments, encompassing ten points, rnay be summarized as foiiows: the women's vote will only serve the interests of the SPD, it will weaken and even destroy the monarchical elements of Pnissia, and wornen do not have the ability to vote. The fmt point was clearly demonstrated, according to the KZ, by the fervour of the SPD on the question since the Sociai Democrats (and to a lesser extent the Centre Party) would be the main beneficiary of the granting of the suffrage to women." The newspaper pointed out that one only had to look at the mernbers OF the feminist movement who were also mernbers of the SPD- And once they received the right to vote, the Kreuaeitung believed that those activists, and women in general, wodd not think of the general interest of the state when casting their ballot but those of their Party. The second argument of the newspaper was rdated to the first. What was believed to be Pmssia's strength would be destroyed by the actions of women and the SPD: the Conservatives' privileges would be abolished, the monarchy would have a diminished role and the importance of the army would not be recognized. Lastly the Kreuzzeitung asserted that wornen were incapable of sound judgment and did not have the abilities to vote. Women should not be involved in politics because they were not suitable for politics and confrontation. They should instead find satisfaction in what were their strengths in socid, materna1 and domestic duties; while their involvement in politics would destroy the tranquility and harmony of the family. It should be added that in the early twentieth century such arguments were common in most industRaiized countries and by no means confined to Conservatives. 29 Though the KZ might have exaggerated in claiming that even women were against the right to vote, divergence existed among wornen and women's movements. As Evans put it, "propertied women were just as determined as propertied men to resist the democratization of the Pnrssian Franchise. .." Evans, "German Social Democracy and Women's Suffrage", p.548. Even newIy founded feminist movements, such as the Alliance of Conservative Women, opposed the women sufige. See Evans, The Feminisr Movemenr in Gennany, pp. 196- 197. KZ, 3 June I9 18, no.278. 31 The SPD however had a different opinion and believed that women would mostly vote for the Consemative and National Liberal parties. See Evans, p.50. On the specific question of the equai franchise, the main argument of the Conservatives and the Kreuzzeitung in opposing the SPD remaùied the sarne staied in 1917: that it would not satisfy the Social Democrats; it was merely a step towatds even more radicalized actions such as revolution and the ovenhrow of the monarchy? The papa and the Conservatives could not bring in new arguments supporting their opposition to the SPD and the equal suffrage simply because they failed to realize the moderate course adopted by the Social Democrats during the contlict." DEBATES IN T'Hl3 ABGEORDNETENHAUS AND TEFE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT Between the end of April and Iuly 4, the Abgeordnetenhaus held four readings on the Russian franchise reform bill. Rior to the second reading, the main objective of the Consemative Party was to prevent the introduction of an equal franchise through reaching a compromise with the other political parties of the Abgeordnetenhaus. The Conservatives' compromise was to accept, in their view, the notion of an equai Franchise. At the sarne time an extra vote was granted to specific voters such as those over the age of 50 with at least three children, anyone with an income of at least 3000 Marks, individuais with higher education, or those paying extra taxes on their property.Y By having the fmt vote of this compromise based on the equal suffrage the Conservatives were hoping chat the supporters of it would agree with their compromise. However, this was cleady a plural franchise in which it was most IikeIy to negate the additional vote to those they feared the most, workers, peasants, agricultural workers and Iow income salaries. The SPD was not duped by the Conservatives' real intentions. '' KZ 10 February 1918, no.74. The SPD was theoretically for the establishment of a republic. However, in a meeting that took place on November 6, 19 18, between Generai Groener, Ludendorff's successor as quartemaster-generai, and SPD's leaders, the latter told him that Wilhelm II must abdicate, but they were for the accession of one of his son to the throne. The SPD was ready to work with a parliamentary monarchy. Thus, it was wrong to say, as the KZ did, that the SPD was for the overthrow of the monarchy. The KZ and the Conservatives failed to recognize the moderate course adopted by the party during the war. Only WiIhelm II insistence to rernain in power and the threat of revolution finally convinced the SPD that the monarchy should abolished and, on November 9, Scheidernann proclairned the republic from the Reichstag. See Ryder, p. 1 35ff. 33 See Ryder on the SPD, pp.258-259- The economically independent have two votes, for it is ho@. through keeping them in the rniddle class, to retain them for the parties of the Right, The leaders of industrial establishments have two votes, for their posiaon bcings them in opposition to the workers, and relegate them '?O the other side of the barricades".. ..In short, two votes are given to anyone who may be presumed to vote the Consemative or National Liberals way for one reason or ano~her.~' The Conservatives' opposition to the equal franchise was aggravated by the govemment's role in preparation for the second reading. The govemment claimed that it could accept nothing but an equal franchise; however, it did not go funher than that unial rhetoric and never took more radical actions such as advising the king to cal1 for dissolution of the ~b~eordnetenhniu?The Russian goveniment rnaintained in oficiai statements the importance of the July decree and its unconditional desire to carry out the Kaiser's wishes." The Conservatives, convinced that the govemment's policies were dictated by the SPD. perceived this attitude as arrogant and un~om~romisin~.~~The govemment's usuai response was to point out that the need for refom went beyond the simple wish of pleasing the SPD. The government does not regard the introduction of the equal franchise as a mesure the carrying out of which depends on the good behaviow of the Social- Democratic parties, but as the inner political result of the willing self-sacrifice, the loyal and patient attitude of the whole people during the difficult years of distre~s.~~ The government was well aware that the war had created such hopes and promises that a rehtrn to the pre-war situation was impossible. The Kaiser's decree of July 19 17 and the promise that the next election would take place under an equai franchise couid not be ignored. For those reasons, Y KZ, 13 Febmary 19 18, no.80. 35 Vonvarrs, 30 April 19 18 in Lum. p.437. 36 The Russian Constitution of 1850 clearly stated that only the king coutd cail, dissolve, prorogue and close not only the Abgeordnetenhaus but also the Herrenhaus. This represented a powerful weapon the king had when facing opposition from the Houses, Koch, H.W., A Constirutional Hisrory of Gemny in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, New York, 1984, p.82. " Official statement, Norddeutsche Allgcmeine Zeirung, April 30, 19 18 in Lum. p.437. 38 KZ 3 May 1918, no.223. 39 Drews, 5 March 1918. KZ, March 5, 1918 in Lutz pp.43 1-432. the government could not accept the Conservatives*proposai of a plural franchise since it ignored the principle of equaiity. The govemment however could not ignore the Conservatives* power and infiuence since their support was essential in securing the adoption of the bill in the Abgeordneterzhaus, and adopted two different approaches when deaiing with the Consemtive Party. Most frequently the government used a conciliatory attitude in getting the party to discuss the reform bill. The introduction of an equd Franchise in Prussia calls for no small sacrifice of political traditions on the part of great parties which have rendered mernorable services to the Pnissian state. The Government requires this sacrifice but knows that it cannot be made light-heartedly, or by a spontaneous resolution, but must be settied by pre~rvingexchange of opinions." The government still beiieved (or wanted to believe) in the Conservative Party's good faith and sense of responsibility. This attitude was mostly prevalent in early 19 18 when al1 political actors were getting ready for the debates in the Abgeordnetenhaus. However, when it becarne clear that the Conservative Party would not soften its stand on the proposed franchise and presented instead a plural franchise, rnembers of the govemment were warning the party of the coiisequences of such attitude. This was clearly expressed by Hertling in a speech before the Abgeordnetenhaus. Equal franchise wiIl come, if not today, then within a measurable length of time [Quite right - Lefi]. It mut come either without disturbance or after serious interna1 conflicts. The question is now: What attitude will you adopt toward this? WilI you not accept an understanding which will enable us to avoid serious disturbances and to provide securities which will aven the possibie injurious effects in the future? Or will you take the responsibility for the perilom consequences which would fotlow the rejection of the proposa1 without attaining the object you desire? [Enthmiastic applause on the ~efi]" This speech was delivered on April 30 on the fmt day of the second reading in the House. By now it was evident that the Conservative Party was not prepared to acquiesce in the government's " Ofticid statement. February 15, 19 18, Norddeutsche Ailgemeine Zeirung in Lutz. p.426-428. " Hertling in the Abgcordncrenhaus, 30 April 1918 in Lutz, pp. 435-436. proposal and was instead proposing one of its own that would preserve the same kind of inequality contained in the three-class franchise. THE FRANCHISE DEBATES IN 'l'HE ABGEORDNETENRXUS AlVD HERRENE4US (30 Aprii- November Revolution) The second reading of the govemment's proposed franchise bill took place between 30 April and May 2. The debates took place in a confident Germany, confidence that the early success of the Spring Offensive was the prelude to a general victory. On March 2 1, after months of preparation, the German anny attacked with the objective of separaring the French and British amies. Surprised by the attacks, the Allied forces were in disarray but managed an orderly retreat. On April5 Ludendorff stopped the general offensive that saw the German army rnaking a 60 kilometer advance into French territory. Four days later the German arrny launched another offensive and, though successful, it could not make the desired breakthrough. Nevertheless, confidence was on the German side and it influenced the Conservatives during the debates. mile the attitude of the Consemative Party was crucial, the position of the two parties that held the key to the introduction of any reforrn proposal was equally important. The Centre party mentioned that reforms were inevitable in the present state of affairs and stated their approval of an equal franchise for Pr~ssia.~~The January strikes had, nevertheless. a negative effect on the party which had some reservations about a radicalization of Pnissia and the country. The main concem of the Centre Party was that an increasing influence of the SPD might jeopardize catholic rïghts-religious education, religious practices and freedom. The patty was seeking safeguards that were to be included in the Prussian Constitution, mostly that any constitutionai changes should required a two-third majority of the Abgeordnetenhaus. Those safeguards did not have the approval of either the Conservative Party or the SPD and were latter abandoned by the Centre Party. 42 The account of the Sprbg Offensive and foilowing military battles are from Herwig, pp.392-432. 43 Evans, Ellen, The Gennan Centre Party, 1870-1933,Carbondaie, 198 1, p.2 15. 90 The position of the National-Liberal Party was more ambiguous, mostly because of interna1 divisions. The negotiations with the other political parties were rendered even more dificult since negotiations also took place between the various fractions within the Party- To dethe matter even more compiicated, different points of view also existed between the national party in the Reichstag and the one in Pnissia. The National-Liberals in the Reichstag were in discussion with the Prussian caucus and constantly tried to convince them to approve the notion of the equai franchise. .. .. We consider it to be an historical necessity to accept the equal franchise as prornised and proposed by our King, and thereby to fiIl the mass of the peopIe, which is suffering heavily under the war, with the consciousness of their equality of status in our political life.. ,We therefore request our deputies in the Russian Diet to oppose al1 obstruction of the franchise refom and, patriotically suppressing their intelligible misgivings, to place thernselves on the ground of the principle of equality proposed by the ~overnment.~ In preparation for the second reading, the Pnrssian fraction of the National Liberal Party met and decided by a vote of 419 against 129 to approve an equal franchise and their deputation in the Abgeordnetenhaus was pressed to follow the same policy. When discussions opened in the Abgeordnetenhaus on April 30 the House was debating whether to approve an equal franchise, the govemment's bill, or the plural franchise advocated by the Conservative ~arty.~'The Conservative Party stressed that it was willing to consider an equal franchise if constitutional guarantees were included to safeguard their interests against a radical House dorninated by the SPD. The main provision was the granting of a veto power to the Herrenhaur to any legislation coming from the Lower House. The government's proposai of December 5, 1917, calied for changes to the composition of the Herrenharw but maintaining the 44 Manifesta of the National-Liberal Party on the Pnissian franchise, Norddeufsche Allgemeine Zeifung, Ianuary 3 1, 19 18 in Lutz, pp. 425-426. " Huber, E.R., Deutsche Ve@assungsgerchichte, 19 14- 19 19, Stuttgart. pp.486-488. predominance of Conservative elernents in Prussia? Furthemore, the Conservatives wanted any future modification to the Constitution to require a two-thirds majority in the Abgeordnetenhaus. Those safeguarâs were however not seriously considered because of the government's opposition and in the end the House voted on two different proposals, the equd and piurai franchise- The Abgeordnetenhaus rejected both proposals in the second and the third reading that twk place two weeks later (13-14 May). Thus, the equd and plurai franchise was once again rejected. The Kreuzzeitung's account of the second reading demonstrated the paper's confidence that the equal suffrage would remain a remote possibility and emphasized the errors of the government and the SPD in pushing for it, since it did not get a majority vote from the ~b~eordnetenhauc?'The vote was a victory for the Kreurzeitung and the Conservatives and the satisfaction was apparent in the subsequent editions of the paper with the adoption of a confrontational attitude towards the government. According to the Russian Constitution the approval of the Abgeordnetenhaus was required for the adoption of any legislation, and in the debates the Minister-President Hertling spoke in favour of the equal suffrage but also stated that it was the Lower House's right to reject ita4 The KZ blamed Hertling and the Russian govemment for its stand on the suffrage, but aiso expressed the view that the cause of al1 this "mess" was the former chancellor ~ethmann-~ollwe~?~If he had not insisted in dernanding an equal suffrage, a compromise could have been attained. For the Kreuzzeitung, the divisions in the country resulting from the franchise debate just proved how wrong had the govemment been to initiate reform proposals during the war." Thus, the vote of the second reading gave the Kreuzzeitwtg confidence that the equal suffrage did not have sufficient support in the Abgeordnetenhaus and it showed no inclination to compromise and accepts the principle of equaiity. - - " For the composition of the Herrenhaus see the govemment's proposal of December 5.19 17 see p.6 1. " KZ 3 May 19 18, no.223. j8 KZ, ibid- 49 KZ, 5 May I9 18, no.227. " KZ, 12 May 1918. no.239. The rnilitary developments dwing the foilowing month would once more exert a strong influence on the subsequent debates in the Abgeordnetenhaus. On May 27 Germany had launched another general offensive on the French front with the objective of forcing French military leaders to transfer troops they maintained on the British front." Once the British troops were deprived of Frerxh support, Ludendorff intended to launch a large-scde operation with the objective of defeating the British arrny. The attack on the French army was such a success that, realizing the possibility of a reai breakthrough, Ludendorff changed his initiai plan two days later and ordered a general offensive. On the 31" the situation of the French army was so desperate that it considered a gened retreat in order to avoid a catastrophe- The lack of suficient reserves in men and material prevented the German army from achieving decisive military success and on June 1 1 the general offensive was stopped. It was in this euphoric mood that the fourth reading took place on June 1 1-12. The Conservative Party, sensing that a rnilitary victory was a reai possibility, was even less prone to compromise on the Pnissian fianchise. The party was working on a compromise; however, it was basically the same proposed earlier where additional votes were to be given based on age and occupation". but this time the proposal was accepted by a majority in the House on June 12. The govemment was however unsatisfied with the result and ordered the Abgeordnetenhaus to discuss their proposal in a fifih reading. The Kremeitung rejected the government's attitude and was also defiant of the Pnissian ministers supporting the equal suffrage by rerninding them that the last politician who supported reforrns so strongly and maintained that he would stand or fail for it was Bethmann-Hollweg. Though not clearly stated, this was a strong warning to Ministers like Drews that they could face the same fate if they persevered in fighting for the equal franchise?' " Herwig. p.4 15ff. " The additional vote was given to any men over the age of 50. independent workers, civil servants with more than ten years of service and workers with more than ten years experience in a private Company. See KZ June 1 1, 1918, no.292. KZ 16 June 19 18, No.302. The fia and last reading on the Pmssian franchise bill took place on Juiy 4. The same conclusions were reached. the House adopted the plural franchise but the govemment decided to ignore the vote. In closing the debated and despite the senousness of the issue. the Abgeordnetenhaus decided to adjourn from IuIy 12 until September 20 and sent their proposai to the Herrenhaus for discussions. The government was hoping that the Herrenhaus would modi@ the bill and accept its equal franchise, but as the Vorwarts put it, ft is certain that in the Herrenhaus a majority for an equal Franchise does not exist, For the rnasters of the Right, every parliament, even one based upon the old three-class suffrage systern, is a kind of Jacobinal scare. and from their standpoint the difference be tween the compromise decisions of the chamber and the equai suffrage bill of the Govemment might indeed be very small. It is characteristic of the conception which prevails in a large part of the Herrenhaus that recentiy during a debate about plural suffrage someone yelled, " That we don? want either."'" Thus, the prospects of the adoption of an equal franchise were indeed doubtful. The debates in the Herrenhaus occurred between July and September. B! the rnilitary situation had detenorated and the initiative and advantage were clearly on the Allies' side with the constant arriva1 of Arnerican troops in Europe. On Iuly 15 Ludendorff launched what was to be the last major offensive of the German army." Contrary to the Spring offensive the outcome was totally different; on August 8 an offensive by the French and British amies led to a general retreat of the Gemüui army. A week later Ludendorff and Hindenburg finally adrnitted that the country could not win the war. On September 3 Ludendorff again ordered a general retreat of the army in order to Save what was left of it. From then on dl the German troops were capable of was to contain the constant attacks of the Allies and it did not take long before Germany called for an armistice, While the early success of the spring offensive reinforced the Kreuzeitung and Conservatives' opposition to refom, the desperate military situation in the summer did not make -- Y Vorwarts. 5 July 19 18 in Lutz. pp.448-450. the Conservatives more disposed to consider refomis to the Pnissian franchise? Shoaly after the Mure of the July 15 offensive the KZ published an article summarking the developrnent of the Russian franchise in the previous year.fl Though it was an account of the main events related to the suffrage, the events on the battiefield had litde impact on the newspaper's thoughts, the sarne unwillingness to endorse reforms is noticeable. The paper mentioned that it had cooperated with the "bourgeois" parties in reaching a compromise based on the Easter Message but the then chanceIlor, Bethmann-Hollweg, put the country and the monarchy in a difficult situation with a July Decree proclaiming the notion of equality? The fidl extent of the Kreweitung's opposition to the equal suffrage, in the summer of 1918, was clearly expressed in another article it published late july.Y>For the paper, the introduction of the equal franchise in Prussia would, by the election of new members in the Abgeordnetenhaus, favour the growth of democratic ideas and this in turn would eventually lead to the drafting of a democratic constitution that includes a parliamentary system of government. It dso criticized the government's cornmitment and unconditiond support for equal suffrage, so much so that Bethmann-Hollweg and the subsequent governments rejected any proposal that did not include the notion of equality. The Kreuzzei~ungbelieved that the equal franchise would likewise have repercussions on local govemments by depriving the propertied class of its wedth and introduce the notion of equaiity in every day life. For example, local govemments would be forced to offer free schooling to al1 children, and free hedth care to al1 in the cornmunity and this was prejudicial against the propertied cIass. Thus, at the end of July, the paper was still clearly against the equal suffrage in Pmssia. It was using the same arguments - - . - - - . - - . -- -- " Henuig, p.4 16ff. 56 Huber 492-496. KZ, 21 July 19 18, no.367. " The KZ also mentioned that the political parties in the Abgeordnetenhaus continued working on a refom proposal; that the franchise is a Prussian rnatter, the Reichstag had no right intervening; the divisions over the suffrage just proved how wrong it was to discuss it during the war; idthe goverriment was showing an increased tendency to satisQ and coilaborate with the SPD, and the introduction of the equd suffrage would make the govemment even more dependent of the Social Democrats since the parti would gain a majority in the Lower House. " KZ, 23 July 19 1 8, no.37 1. Ibid. brought forward in the past year that with property and wealth came more responsibilities, knowledge and privileges. When the hian franchise was frnally debated in the Herrenhaus its members rnentioned that they were willing to reach a compromise with the government and discuss two proposais: the plural suffrage and a Franchise where a second bailot was to be reserved to people over 50:' For the fmt tim the government seemed willing to consider sotnethhg different than an equal franchise but the desperaîe ditary situation in the fall and the political tumoi1 were to change any plan. THE CONSERVAT][VES9 VIEW OF TICFE GOVERNMENT ROLE ON THE FRANCHISE The debates on the Prussian franchise exacerbated an aiready tensed relationship between the Government and the Conservatives. The Conservatives* opposition to the govemment has been described throughout this chapter6' but one last point should be mentioned. One of the most misleading arguments the Conservatives used in opposing changes was to mention that they were fighting to protect their king's constitutional prerogatives. 'The Conservative Party fights for the constitutional rights of the emperor to nominate and dismiss rninisters at his own ~ill.'~~This argument could however not rnask the Conservatives' real intentions, rnainiy that the equal franchise threatened their privileged position in society. In a meeting held in February a Conservative participant clearly stated their reai motives. "We wish for the maintenance of the German and Pnissian monarchy not for the sake of the dynasty, but for our own sake. Gemany will be monarchical. or she will not be at dl.'" 61 Huber, Vol. 5,392493. " See pp.12-13 and 17. " KZ 27 lanuary 19 18, No.48. di Berliner Tageblart, 19 February 19 18 in Gatzke, p.250. WARAIMSANDPEACE The discussion of war aims and peace were intrinsically Iinked to the debate of reforming the Prussian franchise. The Conservatives believed that an unfavorable peace would be a blow to their privileges in Pnissia They aggressively pursued a strong war aims' policy that included annexations in both the east and West in the hope of increasing their prestige and those of the Crown to silence the cal1 for refom. This was clearly mentioned in Colonel Bauer's memorandum in the spring when he stressed that the govemment should not hope that the SPD would give them a free hand on war aims in exchange for the introduction of an equal hgein Pru~sia.~'The OHL also saw a "strong peace" as a guarantee for German frontien. As Ludendorff put it, "peace should result in such a strengthening of the German people and such an improvement in its fiontiers, that our enemies would not dare to let loose another war for a long time to corne." Thus, until the last month of the war the OHL and the Conservatives maintained their strong war airns in the West because even a negotiated peace was not in their interest. As the historian Gatzke put it, "... to most of the beneficiaries of the Hohenzollern regime, the Ioss of thosc privileges (among them the three-class fmchise) was at lest as vital a threat as the military defeat of their country.'" We will now analyze and describe the tactics used by the Conservatives in the last year of the war in delaying the introduction of an equal franchise in Prussia. As already mentioned in this chapter, the Conservative Party proposed their own refonn proposal, the introduction of a plural franchise, in order to take the initiative on the question and convince the government and the Abgeordnetenhaus that it was an acceptable compromise. The main objective was without a doubt Fischer, Friiz. Germny's Aim in the First World War. New York, 1967, p.619. 66 Ludendorff, Erich. Ludendoms own Story, August 1914-November 1918, New York, 19 19, p. 17 1. 67 Gatzke, Hans W., Gemny's Drive to the West. A Stu& of Gennany 's War Aims during the First World War, Baltimore, 1950, p.273. to derail the inaoduction of an equai franchise io favour of one thaî would not seriously aiter their influence in Pnissia. The main difference here with the previous year was that the Conservative Party was forced to put forward concrete pmposals since the govemment's bill was debated in the Abgeordnetenhaus. For the Conservatives the tenn cooperation did not mean unanimous support for the plurd franchise, but only to get a majority in the House - thus excluding any cooperation with the Social Democrats. The Conservative Party was the largest in the House with 149 deputies and a majority in the House required the approval of 222 depulles? Since the Free Conservatives had 54 deputies and their support was secured, the Conservatives needed the support of only 19 deputies from other parties. The Kreuzzeitzmg was well aware of the importance of the other parties on the Conservatives' own proposal. It mentioned that the party had been working hard with the National Liberals and Free Conservatives in reaching a compromise that would respect the Easter ~essa~e.~Interestingly enough, the newspaper preferred to mention the Easter Message instead of the July deme since the former only made vague promises of reform while the latter explicitly referred to an equd franchise. One other argument that the Conservatives advanced in opposing reforms was that an equal franchise would bring injustice to non-sociaiists and too much influence of the masses and the workers. The Kreuzzeitung used the example of the State of Saxony to demonstrate the flaws of the equal suffrage.70In that state, the SPD had a huge rnajority in seats (70 deputies of a total of 9 1) with only a slight majority of the popular vote. The Kremei~cngclaimed that the SPD took advantage of the spIit vote among "bourgeois parties" and even when the latter agreed to present one common candidate the SPD stiil managed to get a majority. By taking into account the nurnber of votes the parties received (292 8 16 for the "bourgeois parties", 34 1 398 for the SPD alone), this meant that evecy deputy of the SPD received on average 4877 votes while the 68 Mann. Bernhard. Biographischcs Hamibuch für dPr Preussische Abgeorcinetenhaus Düsseldorf, 1988, p. 17. " KZ 24 February 19 18, No. 100 70 KZ 3 January 19 18. NOS number was 13 943 for the 'bbourgeoisparties". Thus the voting power of a SPD supporter camed three times that of a "bourgeois" voter and this led the Kreuzzeitung to the following comment. "Such a franchise (equal franchise) is not right, it is more than an injustice, it is an absurdity." There is no doubt that even a universal and equal franchise couid not be totally representative of the vote, but the KZ was criticizing a suffrage that was by far more representative than the the- class franchise. One surprishg and ironic argument the Kreuizeitzmg mentioned was that the Conservatives were against the domination of one class because when it is in power (as it believed the workers would be with an equal franchise), it uses the political institutions for its own advantage? The influence of the workers would then have a negative impact on the country by making the shop owners and industriaiists dependent on hem and by having the higher civil servants at the mercy of their subordinates. Furthemore, the worken would threaten the monarchy and the government's policies, the landowners' interests in the East and the Christian character of the State. The Conservatives were quite obviously applying a double standard since they were the main beneficiaries of the threeclass fmchise. Their answer was to point out the moderating role played by the country's institutions. For the Kreuzzeitwtg the country's political Iife was characterized by the opposition between Left and Right and, in the Constitutional monarchy, the Kaiser was the regulator between the two fractionsn If the govemment was to be subject to parliamentary control, it would then be compted and pursuing the sole interests of the majority in the House. The Kremeinutg believed that the present Constitution was serving Gennany in a satisfactory rnanner with the civil servants and the government as decision-makers - and one could mention outside of any parliamentary controf. The Conservatives dso disliked the idea of discussing political reforrns when the country was engaged in a total war. They beIieved that the debates on the franchise were disturbing the " KZ 17February 1918,No.87. " KZ, 20 March 19 18, No.145. war effort and the unity of the country. The same basic arguments were used in 1917, with the difference that in 19 18 the person they blamed for it was not Bethmann-HolIweg, but the Minister of htenor Drews- The OHL and the Kreuzzeitung were speaking with one voice when they basicdly blamed Drews for most of the problems facing ~nissia? The KZ hirthermore mentioned that such a change to the franchise should be thoroughly debated and examined because the consequences wodd not only be felt in the next year but for generations to corne7' The Conservatives believed that the strikes, the SPD7sdemands, the economic hardship and the war were not sufficient reasons to radically change the franchise. POLITICAL REFORMS IN THE LAST M0NT)I OF THE WAR Menthe new session of the Abgeordnetenhaus opened at the end of September it was in a totally different political and rnilitary situation. It was by then cIear that Gerrnany could not win the war and political reforms were urgently needed to avoid political turmoil in the country. The fight for the equal franchise was however ovenhadowed by the need to democratize the Reich instit~tions.~~The fmt reform occurred on August 24 when the Reichstag adopted the government's bill reforming the Reich's electoral districts. The changes reflected the urbanization of the country that led to electoral districts in big cities king "overpopulated" in the sense that some had twice as many inhabitants as niral ones. The bill was to correct this discrepancy by fu had twice as many inhabitants were given more representation in the Reichstag. In the last two months of the war the question of parliamentarization was of great importance not only because of the intemal political situation, but because it was also one of the conditions demanded by the Allies before initiating peace talks with Gerrnany. The deciding -. . n KZ, 10 February 19 18, No.74. 74 Bauer 21 February 1918 in Deist, p. 1 199. 75 KZ, 2 1 April I9 18, No.20 1. " Evans, EIIen, p.2 16. factor in democratizing the political institutions would surprisingly come from the OHL itself? Their motives had nothing to do with "doing the right thing", but the OHL finally came to the realization that Gennany was about to lose the war and wanted to put the burden of defeat on the civilians? FoUowing the dernand hmthe OHL, Henling mentioned to the Kaiser that he could not, as a chancellor, approve parliarnentarization of the country and therefore offered his resignation on September 29. The following day the Kaiser made a proclamation on a democratization of the political institutions and on October 4 the first parliamentary govemment was a reality with the inclusion of deputies from the SPD - the previous day Prince Max von Baden had been swom in as the new chancellor, The first task of the new govemment was to delïberate on Constitutional reforms. After three weeks of discussions, Constitutionai reforrns were signed by the Kaiser and the main ones were as follow: the govemment and the chancellor were responsible to the Reichstag and not the Kaiser, deputies could enter the government without losing their seat in the Reichstag and the declaration of war and the signing of peace treaties required the approval of the Reichstag. The Reichstag, with the notable exception of the Consemative Party, adopted these changes. Despite the seriousness of the situation in Germany, the Conservatives could still not accept such reduction of the Emperor's powers and the end of their privileges. The party's leader in the Reichstag, Count Westarp, stated the party's opposition to reforrns. Gentlemen, my fiiends and 1 cannot regard the intemal potitical development of conditions which are up for discussion today as a step forward. Rather we see in it a dangerous tum, out of which, we think, will arise grave dangers to the future of the German democracy and the wish of our enemies will have been achieved: the selection and dismissal of the Chancellor and Secretaries of State are withdrawn from the predorninant decision of the Kaiser and are transferred to the decision of the Majority parties of the Reichstag. And the thus-selected n Koch, p.233. 79 Kitchen, Martin, The Silenr Dicrutorship. The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendo# 1916-191 8, London, 1976, pp.î55-257. 79 This in turn is what, after the war, gave risc to the stab-in-the back legend. Germany was not defeated by the enemy but by the newly formed government, ministers are no longer to pursue the Kaiser's policy, but that of the Majority parties., ..Therefore we cannot approve the proposds that occupy us today and which will occupy us in the near future and which are designed to legally carry out the results of rhis development. ..m The debate over reforming the Prussian franchise posed even more problems to the Conservative Party who was by then divided on the question.8' Until the very end the party's Ieaders (Heydebrand and Westarp) opposed the introduction of an equal suffrage in Pnissia. The rank-and-file of the party however realized that it was time to abandon their oppo~ition.~'The problem facing the Party, and this was recognized by some Conservatives, was that in order to play any significant role in the new Germany it had to recognize the new poIitical situation. This was rnentioned by severai Conservatives, arnong them a Fatherland Party deputy. I am of the opinion that the present nini in our domestic politics is permanent and that the Conservatives must accept it. If not, there will certainly arke a new Conservative Party and, without a doubt, it will be directed against the the old Pnissian aristocracy. In my opinion, the party needs 1. A new program and 2. Another organizational and propaganda plan that will allow elements of property, right-wing National Liberals, Free Conservatives and right-wing element in general to be drawn in.. ..83 The Krem7eitung also tried to oppose the introduction of the equai suffrage in Pmssia until the very end. One important speech on the question of the franchise was made by the Vice- Chancellor Payer in his native Stuttgart on September 12'!' Though most of his speech regarded the criticai military situation and the question of peace, he expressed the following on the suffrage, Westarp before the Reichstag 22 October 1918 in LUE, pp.388-389. Peck, R.J. Radica fs and Reacrionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Gerrnany, Washington., 1978, pp.226-32. Dorpalen, Andreas, 'The German Conservatives and the Parliûmenrarization of Imperia1 Germany", Journal of Central European Affairs, JuIy 1951, Vol. 1 1, No-2pp.198- 199. " Hoemch, 6 October 1918 in Peck, p.228. 8.4 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 September, 19 18 in Lutz, Vol. II, 365-374. In respect to this I should like to refer to the fate of the Prussian Franchise Bill, a matter which has long ago ceased to be a Pnissian question. but has pum to be an eminently German one.. .I think we may take it that the Pnissian Government has made its decision. Shouid the Cornmittee of the Herrenhaus not decide for universai suffrage, it will be dissolveci.. .If those opposed to the bill will listen to the demands of the times and look at the growing popular movement in the country, they will hasten to an agreement- It will be for their own good; but they must put aside al1 hope of king able to alter or extend the bill for the worse. The next day the KZ answered the Vice-Chancellor's cal1 for reform and once more expressed its view on the Pnissian su~a~e.~'The paper mentioned that on the franchise question it strongly opposed the Vice-Chancellor since the matter did not concern him. Moreover, the Kreuzzeinuig denounced what it considered as an attack on the Herrenhaus' prerogatives to debate and study the franchise bill. At the same time, any decision reached by the cornmittee of the Herrenhaus rnight not be approved in plenary session of the House. The last point ctearly demonstrated that the Conservatives might resort to their usuai tactic of not only opposing reforms but doing everything they could do to delay the introduction of changes. Two days later the Kreuzzeitung denounced once more von Payer's speech but this time the main reason given was that he was not hssian? The papa mentioned that as citizen of Würtemburg the Russian question did not concern him. Furthemore, he was the Reich vicechancellor and did not hold any position in hssia. He was not a hssian rninister, nor a representative of the Minister-President, nor a rnember of the Prussian govemment. Between the response to the Vice-Chancellor's speech until the middle of October, the Kreuueitcutg only briefly rnentioned the question of the Russian suffrage. As we have already seen, the parliarnentarization and democratization of the Reich institutions becarne more important than the Pmssian franchise- The question of peace was ais0 of greater importance and the Kreuzzeitwg's coverage reflected this. On October 15', the Kreuueitwrg published the EZ13 September. 19 l8.no.468. franchise resolution of the Conservative Party's caucus in the ~6geordneredzaus.~Although the party was against a radical refonn of the Pntssian Constitution, it demonstrateci its patriotism by abandoning its opposition to the equal suffrage. However, the KZ stated four days later that after the approvd of the equal sufige by the Abgeordnetenhaus it was then the right of the Hemenhaus to discuss and deliberate on the question.88 Again, the Upper House used the disagreement with the government over the residency eligibility of voters, electoral district delimitation and the size in population of the electoral districts to delay the introduction of equal su fffage. A last attempt was made by the Consemative Party to regain some sort of influence when it mentioned in October that it was willing to be part of a coalition government. The actions taken were however too IittIe too late and the Conservative Party was by then totally discredited. During the Revolution and the abdication of the Emperor on November 9, Heydebrand and Westarp realized that they no longer had any influence on the events and went away on vacation. Thus, at first, the Conservatives viewed the year 1918 with hop. The end of the eastem front and preparations in a Spring offensive convinceci the Conservatives that the end of the war was in sight, and with it the end of the equal suffrage. When it becarne evident that the offensive was a failure, the Conservatives maintained their opposition fearing dreadfbl consequences to their privileges if the franchise was approved. Thus, when the Abgeordnetenhaus finally passed the legislation on the equal suffrage, it was however too late. By then the monarchy was discredited and with it privileges of the Junkers and Conservatives. EU, 15 Septernber 19 18, "0.47 1. g7 KZ, 15 October 1918, no.525. EU, 19 October 1918, no.534. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION This study of the Conservatives' attitude on the Pnissian franchise during the last two years of the war was designed with the objective of demonstrating the latter's opposition to any radical refom. The suffrage was of great importance to their privileged position in Pnissia, and Pmssia in the Empire. The effects of the Russian Revolution and the overthrow of the tsarist rnonarchy did not go unnoticed by Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor feared that political reform, if too long deIayed, could threaten the existence of the Hohenzollern monarchy; he then embarked on a reforrn course, He convinced WilheIm II to announce in his Easter address that the Pmssian three-class suffrage was to be reformed. The Kremeitung 's and the Conservatives' first reaction to the Easter Message was mostly moderate, they stated their willingness to coopemte with the government. However, when it becarne clear that the Chancellor was suppoting an equal franchise, they entered in direct opposition to the Prussian govemment and to the man they held responsible for the proposal, Bethmann-Hollweg. While the Conservatives' aversion for him dated back to the pre-war years, he was by now the main target of their attacks. By working for his dismissal they believed that his departure would signal the end of reform, or at least of equal suffrage. Therefore, when in July of 1917 the Chancellor convinced WilheIm 11 that specific reforms were required to appease the Rissians and Gerrnans, and the latter proclaimed in the July Decree that the new Prussian suffrage would be an equal one, the Conservatives became convinced that Bethmann-Hollweg had to go. The Conservatives welcomed Bethmann-Hollweg's resignation and the nomination of Michaelis as Chancellor - though they knew little of him or his views on the Russian suffrage. However, what they failed to realize was that equal suffrage had more support in Prussia, and Michaelis followed the sarne course on reforms of his predecessor. The Conservatives criticized the nomination of Hertling as Chancellor and Pmssian Minister-president since he was from Bavaria; they believed that a non-Prussian could not solve this important question. It was. however, the Russian Minister of Interior, Drews, who was assigned the task of cirafting a proposal that was completed at the end of November, and incroduced in the Abgeordnetenhaus on December 5. The Conservative Party used its strength in the Lower House to delay and curtail refom by al1 means. The party's favourite strategy was to cooperate with the other parties in the Abgeordnetenhuur, which predorninantly rejected equal suffrage, in order to draft their own proposal that had the support of a rmjority in the House. Several bills were presented in the Lower House in four consecutive readings that took place between April 13 and July 4; readings that saw the rejection of equal suffrage and the adoption of the Conservative Party's plural Franchise- The bili was sent to the Herrenhaus for discussions, but the debates were overtaken by the military situation that led to defeat and the adoption of equal suffrage by the A bgeordnetenhaus. Not surprisingly, the Conservatives were strongly opposed to the SPD and the party's role in the adoption of an equd sufige. Despite the ~urgfkieden'.the Conservatives did not hesitate to condemn the SPD since it was the biggest threat to the the-class suffrage and Conservatives' privileges in Prussia. While the Conservative Party cooperated with the "bourgeois" parties in the Abgeordnetenhaus in finding a compromise; it never considered discussions witb the SPD, and instead tried to isolate the Social Democrats- The Conservatives criticized the SPD for what they considered to be an uncompromising attitude; mainly that the party would accept nothing but an equal suffrage. The Conservatives were aiso convinced that the SPD would not be satisfied with the mere introduction of an equd franchise; it only represented a step toward the party's ultimate objective, the abolition of the monarchy for a republican regime. Thus, it came as no surprise that the Conservatives did not welcome the increasing cooperation between the govemrnent and the SPD with much enthusiasm. They believed the It should however be mentioned that. even if no political parties repudiated the concept of the BurgFieden, by 1917 it showed serious signs of faIling apart, govemment's favourable inclination toward reforrns could be explaùied by the influence of the Left. It was especially dificult for the Consematives to see the goveniment pay more attention to the Social Democrats when they still considered themselves to be "a govemment's party". When opposing equal suffrage, the Kreuzzeitung put forth several arguments. The paper believed that debating reforms during the war was a mistake, al1 energy should be put in defeating the Allies. Once the war won, then discussions on Franchise could occur. Furthemore, having discussions during the war demonstrated to the Allies how divided Germany and Pmssia were, and reinforced their willingness to fight. The KZ also disrnissed democratic regimes (associated with the equal suffrage) since they were, in the paper's opinion, controlled by the working class that used its control of the govenunent to promote its sole interests and not those of the state. The Kremeitung instead pointed out the strength of Pmssia, its values and the benefit of a monarchy that attached equal importance to all individuals in society. The same monarchy was a regulator between al1 opposite forces in the state, between right and Ieft. Furthermore, granting equal suffrage to dl (male) citizens would be a rnistake since only few possessed the necessary qualities to play a greater role in politics, qualities such as knowledge, wisdom and rnaturity. Naturally, the paper perceived those having these qualities as king the landed group, the educated, individuals with properties, army officers and the higher ciergy. It became clear, after the July Decree and the introduction of a bill in the Abgeordnetenhaus, that reforms could hardly be avoided. The paper and the Conservatives were also against any involvement of federai politicians; they considered the franchise to be stnctly a Prussian matter. The Conservatives knew too wetl that any involvement of non-Pmssians would strengthen the support for equal suffrage. Furthermore, by limiting the debate to Prussia the Conservatives could rely on a strong representation in the Abgeordnetenhuus and, with the support of opponents of equal suffrage, had a majority in the House. The Conservatives and the Kreuzzeiwg also adopted a tactic consisting in delaying changes. They wanted the Prussian Herrenhaus and Abgeordnetenhaus to study what they considered to be an important bill, to conduct research and have it debated. This snidy also demonstrates the importance of the war on the question of the Russian suffrage. When the Conservatives stated that the whole debate should be shelved until the end of the war, it was their hope that victory would enhance the prestige of the monarchy and, by demonstrating its s~peri~rityover democracy, the mistake of having an equd sufige. Thus, when in 19 17 and early 19 18 the Conservatives believed the military situation to be favourable, they resisted reforms waiting for a quick and successful conclusion of the war. However, the fadure of the Spring offensive in 1918 did not make the Conservatives more compromising; now that the support for reform was increasing, and fearing even more for their privileges, they resisted changes with even more determination. This study relied extensively on the newspaper Kreuzzeirung for the Consenratives' point of view on the Pmssian suffrage. Although helpful in understanding the Conservatives' opposition to an equal suffrage and the significance of the three-class franchise for the preservation of their privileges in Pmssia, it is nevertheless one source among many. More extensive research could include a broader look at Conservatives' opposition by using diverse sources such as other conservative newspapers and, mostly, transcript of the debates in the Abgeordnetenhaw. Ako, in order to limit the scope of this study, several aspects have only ken mentioned briefly. For example, a study of the Amy High Cornmand's role in the franchise would throw more Iight on the failure to introduce an equal suffrage. Here however, detailed archival research of surviving OHL and army high comrnand files would be necessary; moreover, since the OIU was careful not to be perceived as meddling in politics, such a study would probably have to rely to a considerable extent on secondary sources, diaries and rnemoirs. Also of interest would be the relationship between the High Command and the Conservatives. To be sure the two were in agreement on the Prussian suffrage, but how far did cooperation go? How did the Conservatives perceive the OHL, and the latter the former? Primary Sources and Memoirs Deist, Wilhelm (ed.), Militar und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg, 19 14- 1918, Düsseldorf, 1970. Ludendorff, Erich, Ludendofls own Story, August 1914-November 1918, New York, 1919. Ludendorff, Erich, The General Staffand its Problem. The History of the Relations Benveen the High Codand the German Imperia1 Govenunent as Revealed by WcialDocuments, New York, 1920. 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