Robber Barons Rising: the Potential for Resource Conflict in Ghazni, Afghanistan Matthew P

Home , Andar District, Nawur District

Dearing, M and Braden, C 2014 Robber Barons Rising: The Potential stability for Resource Conflict in Ghazni, Afghanistan.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 9, pp. 1-14, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.dg

RESEARCH ARTICLE Robber Barons Rising: The Potential for Resource Conflict in Ghazni, Afghanistan Matthew P. Dearing* and Cynthia Braden†

Security and governance in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan are threatened by resource conflict dynamics: groups focus on exploiting lootable resources in the short term while weak institutions and conflict persist. Elements within the Afghan government and insurgent organizations alike expand their power and influence in this manner. Understanding how criminal organizations operate within the regional political economy is essential to reducing the leverage these networks, associated criminal syndicates, and corrupt government officials have on the community. We proffer three hypotheses for development and stability practitioners to monitor as transition approaches in 2014, as well as recommendations for mitigating the onset of resource conflict in Ghazni as the province experiences a downgrade in foreign security forces. Adopting effective, anti-insurgency policies will be fundamental to mitigating the malicious effects on the population and providing incentives for peace, rather than continuing conflict.

‘War is the Continuation of Ghazni are valued at approximately US$30 Economics by Other Means’ billion; not including the Katawas Gold Area Ghazni Province may be the richest provin Andar District. Together with other newly ince in Afghanistan. It contains four official discovered deposits countrywide, Afghani- Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) stan’s mineral wealth is estimated between tenders, in addition to significant amounts US$1–3 trillion, with Ghazni holding a large of other marketable resources, such as chro- percentage of that wealth (Risen 2010; Lefty mite, gold, and land. The United States Geo- 2012; Najafizada 2011). logical Survey (USGS) assessments indicate Since 2005, the USGS Mineral Resources that the corridor along Highway 1, between Project has worked with scientists from Kabul and Kandahar, may be one of the Afghanistan Geologic Survey to develop richest mineral regions in the world. Brine open source analysis of Afghanistan’s non- lakes in Nawer and Nawa districts of Ghazni fuel resources. Their work culminated in an Province are thought to contain some of the unprecedented wealth of detailed reporting world’s largest known lithium deposits. Gold consisting of area summaries, hyperspectral and copper deposits in the Zarkashan area of mapping analysis, geohydrologic summaries, and information packages in a readily available and accessible format. It is unclear to what * PhD Candidate, Naval Postgraduate School, extent this information has been circulated United States [email protected] inside Afghanistan. However, general knowl- † Social Scientist, U.S. Army, United States edge of the location and value of mineral [email protected] resources has been highly publicized in inter- Art. 9, page 2 of 14 Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising national media since the release of the USGS organizational behaviors. Second, we address reports. While these studies draw attention to Ghazni’s resource conflict issues more specif- the fact that resources have been exploited ically with regards to illicit seizure and trade throughout the civil war and the Taliban era of lootable resources. Finally, we develop rec- for individual and insurgent profits, they ommendations for mitigating increased risk have also contributed to the predatory behav- of resource conflict in Ghazni. This study is ior exhibited by regional power brokers and based on reflections of our combined expe- political institutions. Institutional arrange- rience of over two years in Ghazni Province ments and clientele networks linked to the conducting interviews with Afghan local resource sector may shape the political envi- nationals and government officials as embed- ronment through the creation of a repres- ded researchers with US and NATO forces. In sive security apparatus and by rewarding a addition, our argument and analysis is sup- close circle of supporters (Le Billon 2001). ported by secondary, open-source research.1 For example, Anyak–the first mine tenured Understanding the role of natural in November 2009–was granted to China resources in the Ghazni Province conflict Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) after may allow stability and foreign policy prac- then Minister of Mines Ibrahim Adel received titioners to better negotiate a sustainable a US$30 million bribe. On another occasion, end to regional violence and corruption. In Mahmoud Karzai (the President’s brother) many conflicts it is common to find that par- and a small group of Ghori Cement investors ticipants are inspired by more than ideology; ‘won’ the rights to all cement in Afghanistan countless stakeholders benefit from violence for 30 years (NYT 2009: 2012). The primacy and have an economic interest in certain of informal relationships presents myriad outcomes or the continuation of conflict. opportunities for corruption and danger- Approaching the conflict from a political ously unregulated competition. economy perspective can mitigate the poten- Ghazni’s security industry does not hold tial rise in violence and facilitate a sustain- the promise of its mining industry. While able resolution of conflict. Highway One splits the province in half ‘Peacemaking requires not only political and serves as a halfway point between the negotiations, but transforming the war econ- growing metropolises of Kabul and Kanda- omy into a peace economy and creating insti- har, it remains a volatile zone with highway tutions for accountability over economic and bandits, charred convoys, and craters from political decision making’ (Rubin 2000). insurgent improvised explosive devices. While improvements have been made and The War Economy in Afghanistan the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ‘War is the continuation of politics by other are becoming increasingly self capable and means.’ This renowned statement by Carl sufficient, there are still significant gaps in von Clausewitz in the early 19th century has security throughout the province, namely been rephrased by 21st century scholars: ‘War the limited spread and influence of ANSF, is the continuation of economics by other particularly outside of urban areas. means’ (Kaldor 1999). Instability and vio- In this article, we assess the conflict in lence often provide economic incentives to Ghazni through the lens of political economy, individuals and groups to perpetuate con- focusing on the greed over grievance argu- flict. Examples of such resource conflicts ment as potentially creating the conditions abound, from conflict diamonds in Sierra for greater levels of conflict as foreign secu- Leone, to oil extraction in Indonesia, to for- rity forces complete their withdrawal. First, estry depletion in the Philippines. Research we assess the theoretical basis for resource has shown that certain types of resources conflicts and how these conflicts influence such as minerals, gemstones, and narcotics Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising Art. 9, page 3 of 14 tend to prolong or expand the geographi- ethnic grievances, few will mention personal cal scope of pre-existing conflicts (Fearon wealth accumulated in the wars that ensued. 2004; Buhaug & Gates 2002). In conflict However, these networks and informal sup- zones where opportunity to extract new ply chains served the interests of the pow- resources exists, entrepreneurs may direct erful in a war economy and in many cases violent actors to control these rich areas in expanded the conflict to new levels. order to secure alternative profit-generating Regional strong men, former mujahe- mechanisms or run shadow state economies deen commanders, and Taliban continue to (Reno 1998; 2000). Studies have shown that take advantage of established commercial rebel groups tend to be more violent when networks, while working within the newly they operate in environments rich with natu- established political system (Giustozzi 2003; ral resources or with resource endowments 2009). They exploit cross-border trading derived from outside funders, whereas those networks, regional ethnic groups, and legal groups which emerge in limited resourced commercial entities, each of which may areas tend to use violence more ‘selectively have a vested interest in the continuation and strategically’ based on the need to main- of conflict and instability. These individuals tain social capital (Reno 2010). Hence, the make rational, cost-benefit analysis decisions nature of economic endowments an area intended to maximize not only efficiency holds can shape the structure and character and resources, but also their social capital of violent organizations as well as the con- within society. While rewards are often mate- flict itself. rial in nature, in Afghanistan, non-material During thirty years of civil war, Afghani- incentives such as prestige, acceptance, and stan developed a substantial war economy the ability to exercise power and influence that continues today. Supply routes estab- in one’s community hold significant leverage lished during the anti-Soviet resistance, over a strongman’s decision-making process which supplied weapons and humanitarian (Polyani 1958; Wood 2004; Weinstein 2007). aid, ‘laid the foundations for the regional- The interests of regional strongmen often ized war economy’ that was to emerge in conflict with the institutional drive of the the 1990s (Goodhand 2005). The Afghan Afghan government and its international economy was informal and decentralized. partners, such as the International Security When the Taliban came to power in 1996, Assistance Force (ISAF), which advocates for- they did not have the capacity to manage the mal and fair market institutions Afghan economy, although they technically All wars evolve uniquely, as many include controlled most of Afghanistan. They gov- multiple conflict zones that vary signifi- erned each region through administrative cantly in terms of geography, demography, proxy, namely by use of local authorities that or institutional structures; this is particularly allowed the extraction of payments by local true of Afghanistan. Each region supports its commanders and predatory economic activi- own networks, social groups, and economic ties. These economic activities and networks incentives, which require micro-level inves- became entrenched over thirty years of civil tigation to understand how they function war and remain intact in much of Afghani- within their community. Beyond the scope stan today. While the wars in Afghanistan of this article, a stakeholder analysis of each were fought over a variety of local, national, of these regional economies is necessary to and international issues, there is little evi- understand how they come together within dence to suggest that resource acquisition and beyond the borders of Afghanistan. In served as a primary cause of these conflicts. order to prevent or mitigate a war economy, And, while most rebels and government rep- it is important to understand what indi- resentatives will recite years of inter-tribal or vidual, organizational, and societal motives Art. 9, page 4 of 14 Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising and incentives are for participating in it. Are ments. While looking at Ghazni as a micro- groups seeking funds to fight for an ideal, case, this study could have a broader com- amass personal wealth, or just trying to sur- parative impact throughout Afghanistan, of vive? What incentives do groups have to seek which we draw inferences to particular cases. peace? Addressing these questions will help develop more targeted policies of conflict Organization and Motivation in resolution and offer stakeholders a better Resource Conflict Areas understanding of the human and resource Organizations rely upon and fall under geography in Ghazni and the rest of Afghani- institutional constraints such as rational, stan. A separate study should address these sociological, and historical institutionalism. questions, but first we assess the political Rational institutions focus on efficiency economy of war in Ghazni. maximization; sociological institutions con- centrate on appropriate behaviors and social Focus & Method norms that guide action; and historical insti- We focus on conditions that may gener- tutions address path dependent norms, rules, ate a resource conflict in Ghazni, utilizing and precedents (Hall & Taylor 2008; Powell & three simple hypotheses as guidelines. The Dimaggio 1991). Key to these three theoreti- hypotheses focus on organizational behav- cal paths is that they are not mutually exclu- ior in a changing environment, changes in sive but interdependent explanations to how resource architecture, and a weak land ten- organizations behave. As economic behavior ure system. There are additional hypotheses is embedded in societal institutions, the val- that could have informed this study, but we ues (whether real or not) of profit and risk are have chosen these three as most practical, constructed in a culturally specific manner. based on our tours in Afghanistan and the Hence, organizations may be guided by the existing body of scholarly research profit motive, but limited by socially accept- Hypothesis 1: Organizations operating able behaviors. By the same token, historical under conditions of resource scarcity will norms can explain past and future behavior, adapt their ideological and social patterns to but also change or be changed by what is fit emerging economic realities. If statutory socially acceptable. Furthermore, changes in structures do not allow for licit economic activ- the social or economic environment (such as ity, groups will use illicit networks and build new mining tenures, land rushes, or exter- partnerships with criminal and insurgent nal oversight) may force organizations to organizations. adapt and evolve to new conditions. A good Hypothesis 2: If new resource opportuni- example of this is the evolving character of ties develop in conflict areas, and regula- the MoMP in Afghanistan since 2009 from tory institutions are too weak to address the as one organization calls an ‘implementing change, then competition and conflict based owner-operator to a policy-making regula- on resource capture will increase. tor’ (Guardian 2013). This transition in the Hypothesis 3: Structures of land ownership midst of violent conflict and an imminent without local support will likely increase con- gold rush to Afghanistan’s most viable flict and decrease the legitimacy of the provin- resource market is an important one, but can cial and national government. it withstand pressures driven up from the We address these hypotheses in the fol- local level to ensure extraction benefits soci- lowing sections as we discuss the nature ety more equitably? And who decides the of organizational behavior in resource rich nature of equitable distribution in a highly areas, how state actors conspire with insur- contested environment? gent actors for resource exploitation, and the The combination of western rule of law emergence of land mafia in conflict environ- and economic standards with a tribal/ Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising Art. 9, page 5 of 14 religious insurgency in Afghanistan is one the government. For example, local villagers example of the forced adaptation organiza- with a chromite mine in vicinity will be part tions may need to undergo. While Afghan of an elaborate agreement between equip- government and business leaders may oper- ment operators, truckers, policemen, govern- ate with western partners and acknowledge ment officials, insurgents, and international western legal standards, they are also bound terrorist organizations such as the Haqqani by traditional institutions at the village Network to drill, extract, protect, and trans- level–systems which regard patronage, cli- port the resource through the supply chain entelism, and collective behavior as vital and to the international market place. Each part routine (Roy 1987; Rubin 2002). Thus, while of the supply chain falls in line with social Kabul may implement formal, western-style patterns and economic realities within local standards, they may not actually be carried areas–a process the government has cho- out. From one perspective, this, discrepancy sen to outsource, given the complexity and ensures less fair and more corrupt practices historical realities of state. Formalizing the take hold, enriching individual clients over extractive industries requires upsetting the communities, and potentially building a status quo, which we suspect is a significant new era of ‘robber barons’ in Afghanistan. reason for the slow transition. In addition, From another perspective, it ensures that the effort to bring the estimated 1,800 ille- resources are shared more equitably through gally operated mines under MoMP control the leadership of local service providers will be a daunting task.2 (Giustozzi 2009). Either way, without formal and objective oversight, it’s typical that clear Lootable vs. Unlootable Resources winners and losers emerge in the equation as in Conflict Areas warlords and their patrons distribute to loy- The classic definition of lootability is a natu- alists and punish enemies by shutting them ral resource that can be extracted and trans- out. If institutions are weak from above, ported with ease by groups or individuals the incentive to follow international norms (Ross 2003). The importance of lootable and business practices may only be effective resources to the perpetuation of conflict when they bubble up from below. We should is that these resources serve as commodi- also bear in mind that, if warlords are able ties that are highly amenable, can be taxed to spread the benefits of the Afghan state at one or more points in the supply chain, more equitably than outside corporations and allow for mobility (Le Billon 2001). We and their western practices, then our label of expand the definition of lootable resource ‘warlord’ should be adjusted to ‘service pro- to include land. While land is not extracted viders’ (Giustozzi 2010). or transported, it is easily traded, gifted, and When international regulatory bodies are seized, making it amenable; it is treated as a weak or fail to act, as they have in Afghani- valuable commodity in Afghanistan where stan, we may view the existence of informal one’s social standing is often judged based on networks conducting business as rather land ownership; and it has the potential for efficient. Over the last thirty years, most taxation or rent – a thriving market in urban processes of the extractive industry’s sup- and rich agricultural areas of Afghanistan. In ply chain have been conducted without for- some cases, land is the most valuable lootable mal oversight, taxation, or regulation by the resource in Afghanistan, as it provides access Afghan state. While the status quo is small in to secondary lootable resources such as min- scale compared to what U.S. and the Afghan eral sites, poppy fields, or lumber forests. MoMP anticipate could be a booming indus- Both state and non-state actors benefit (often try, it operates illicitly and with benefit to mutually) from lootable natural resources; as networks both supportive of and opposed to such, it is necessary to consider each actor’s Art. 9, page 6 of 14 Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising role in the acquisition, protection, and expan- to Sterling Mining Company), the Katawas sion of the lootable resource market. Gold Area of Interest in Andar District, and Lootable and unlootable resources have the Dashte-e Nawur in Nawur District (MoM been used for insurgent and government 2012). Given the current limited institutional enterprise throughout the long history of and technological infrastructure for Afghani- civil war. In addition, lootable resource con- stan to begin work on its unlootable assets, flicts often display some of the more brutal non-state and autonomous organizations forms of predation on civilian populations have relied upon the ‘lootable’ portion of (Azam & Hoeffler 2002). There is strong evi- valuable minerals in Ghazni and throughout dence that currently both insurgents and Afghanistan. The following section continues government officials in Ghazni Province the focus on the obstacles associated with benefit financially from smuggling chromite lootable resource and security architectures collected from old Soviet mines in southern in Ghazni Province. Ghazni City, Muqur, Gelan, Zanakhan, Deh Yak, and Andar districts (ICG 2011). Examples War is Hell, but Business is Booming of lootable natural resources in Afghanistan In order for insurgent or criminal groups to include harvesting, such as narcotics, gem- meet the demands of recruitment, control, stones, and lumber; or occupying, a category and credibility they need resources. Due which includes land that may come with to structural barriers such as regulations such secondary benefits as oil and gold, or and international regimes preventing state access to urban marketplaces where rents or resource endowments from reaching illicit other allowances are gained. organizations, groups must evolve to identify Unlootable natural resources are those and exploit alternative funding streams. In resources that require infrastructure and the post-Cold War era, state-funding towards investment to exploit, such as copper, gold, terrorist and insurgent organizations has and petroleum. Conflict surrounding these declined or, in many cases, shifted to new unlootable resources is usually a result of states, resulting in a ‘new’ conflict economy environmental pollution and socio-cultural that seeks to gain from natural resource disruption, such as the influx of foreign work- wealth and illicit businesses (Giraldo & ers or the displacement of the population. Trinkunas 2007). For example, in Colombia, The profits from the exploitation of unloota- paramilitaries and leftist insurgent groups ble resources generally accrue to the gov- continue to benefit from narcotics traffick- ernment and foreign companies that bring ing (Felbab Brown 2010; Sanin 2008). And the capital and technology to develop them there are a variety of examples of Iran, North (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005). Where cor- Korea, Pakistan and other states supporting rupt and unaccountable governments fail to insurgent or terrorist factions (Levitt 2007; share the profits and provide public services Gamba & Cornwell 2000). In many instances, with local communities, violence against the the role of evolving resource architectures government or targeted communities that also forces the participating organization appear to be the main recipients of wealth is to adapt its own tactics, strategy, and funda- often a primary recourse of the community. mental ideology. For example, the evolving Unlootable resources found in Ghazni Prov- nature of opium production, distribution, ince include copper and gold in the Muqur and sales has led to varying forms of ‘Taliban’ and Andar Districts, and lithium in the Nawur organizations in Afghanistan that are moti- and Nawa Districts. The Ministry of Mines vated less by ideology and more by profit and Petroleum has tender packages for the (Peters 2009; Dupee 2010). Zarkashan Copper and Gold Area of Interest The Haqqani Network is a case study in (AOI) in Muqur (which was recently awarded organizational adaptation to this new eco- Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising Art. 9, page 7 of 14 nomic paradigm. After international funding Arabia, and other Arab countries in Ghazni flows to the mujahedeen declined precipi- City through well established hawaladars tously with the collapse of the Soviet Union, (Peters 2012).3 Jalaluddin Haqqani supplemented funds One can assume that the deep roots the from Persian Gulf donors with kidnapping Haqqanis and their broad network holds in and smuggling operations (Dressler 2012). Ghazni province is well known to the Afghan The organization also exploited chromite government and Taliban shadow government smuggling from eastern Afghanistan, which given the volume and extent of resource flows has been especially profitable, as well as through the provincial capital. Recent reports transporting illegally harvested timber to suggest the US Congress will soon compel markets in Pakistan (NYT 2011). Chromite is the White House to implement a compre- mined from Logar, Ghazni, and Khost with hensive strategy against the network, notably the assistance of local tribes and businesses targeting its financing capabilities (Foreign and smuggled across the border into Paki- Policy 2013). In addition, previous Ghazni stan. Chromite (or chromium oxide) is a rare government officials have been implicated earth element that brings a price between in chromite smuggling and it is well known US$280–700 per metric ton on the global among Ghazni residents that current GIRoA market (there are nearly 1 million tons of officials continue to participate in illicit min- chromite in Logar and Khost alone) (ToI ing and smuggling of chromite (NYT 2008; 2012). Criminal syndicates may also out- 2009; Kendall 2011). Outside of Ghazni, the source chromite smuggling operations to the nexus of illicit mining and state sponsorship Haqqanis or allied insurgent groups in Paki- is prevalent and well documented. Amongst stan such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) local Afghans we interviewed, the question of and other cross-border affiliates. In 2009, illegal mining was usually approached with smugglers in Ghazni paid between US$400 a chuckle; acknowledging the plight with a and US$2,000 per truck in protection money hint of sarcasm. to government security forces (Dupee 2012). The tales of corruption we heard in 2012 Given the heavy weight of chromite, it is were nothing new. A 2009 New York Times often hidden within timber convoys. report provided a list of corrupt practices by The network has also expanded into licit GIRoA officials and security forces in Ghazni markets that are well established in Ghazni that disturbed US soldiers: City. Fabric and clothing traders from Paktia province operate large shops that are impor- Police officials who steal truckloads of tant facilitators for moving network funds gasoline; judges and prosecutors who and providing cover for network members make decisions based on bribes; high- transiting through Ghazni province north ranking government officials who towards Kabul or south towards Kandahar. reap payoffs from hashish and chro- In addition, there are many other busi- mite smuggling; and mid-level secu- nesses that support the network in south- rity and political jobs that are sold, eastern Afghanistan, particularly in Ghazni sometimes for more than 50,000 dol- City. A well known supporter of the network lars, money the buyers then recoup maintains several electronics and auto parts through still more bribes and theft. shops in the transit center of Ghazni that provide support for the vast transport indus- In addition, an incredible analysis of the Tajik try owned by the family. In addition to ties mafia and insurgent connections with recon- to these licit businesses that support opera- struction contracts in Ghazni came from tions, the network transfers and launders a 2009 Center for Army Lessons Learned large amounts of money from Dubai, Saudi report (Kendall 2011). The author noted that Art. 9, page 8 of 14 Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising

Ghazni Tajiks, which maintained a virtual Province; however, the Ministry of Interior monopoly on development projects in the released a statement soon after release of province, realized a need for maintaining the report that illegal chromite extraction in ‘a certain level of instability’ to pay off the Khas Kunar was halted (Khaama 2013). The monthly US$150,000 insurgent tax as well efforts of TFBSO to support the ALP com- convince U.S. and coalition sponsors of the mander and his village, while sincere, ran need for even more projects. While deployed into the bottleneck of Kabul bureaucracy to Ghazni, we continued to hear complaints that on one hand facilitates corrupt patron- from Afghans regarding the continued cor- age networks, while, on the other, prosecut- ruption of certain members within the Tajik ing with diligence. community and the Afghan government. Understanding how criminal organizations Many viewed the conflict in Ghazni with an operate within the regional political econ- existential glaze—as a system where the few omy is essential to reducing the leverage could accumulate vast quantities of wealth these networks, associated criminal syndi- and power with no repercussions. cates, and corrupt government officials have The unintended consequences of US and on the community. Adopting policies that international relationships with corrupt respond to the realities that allow an insur- political figures is the loss of military and gency to survive is fundamental to mitigating diplomatic credibility and the prevailing the malicious effects on the population and view among Afghans that the US and its providing incentives for peace, rather than partners, at best, support criminality, and continuing conflict. Moreover, it makes our at worst, the insurgency itself. The focus on effects as stability practitioners more stable ‘transition’ from US to Afghan sovereignty and long lasting. Stability practitioners have likely increased the reliance on officials irre- a tough job when the conflict itself serves spective of their notorious backgrounds or as the means and mechanism for access and patronage networks and our own process of exploitation of profit. The following section willful ignorance shielded us from the nega- looks at how land compounds this problem tive consequences to follow, namely a broken and serves as a lootable resource in conflict. system based more on corrupt networks than the benevolent institutions we sold in brief- Land as a Lootable Resource in Ghazni ings and press reports (NYT 2013). Integrity In intra-state conflicts, land is often given as Watch Afghanistan presented a scathing a prize or gift to loyal soldiers, sympathizers, report in April 2013 that accused a Khas and patrons in exchange for their support Kunar Afghan Local Police Commander of (Unruh & Corriveau-Bourque 2011). Conflict running an ‘illicit’ chromite extraction ring presents opportunity for land seizures to with support from the Task Force for Busi- occur as people are displaced from territory, ness Stability Operations (TFBSO). The lat- opponents are marginalized, and strategic ter’s explanation of the strategy (noted in regions are occupied by violent actors. For the Integrity Watch report) seemed to match example, in Sri Lanka, East Timor, Sudan and much of US stability practices over the last Syria, insurgent and counterinsurgent forces ten years: identify and support practical attempting to control strategic territory dis- grassroots business opportunities that work placed residents of various ethnic or sectar- at the local level, even though they may ian identities. not necessarily fit the institutional archi- In Ghazni, land mafia operating with their tecture established within the new minis- own militia forces evicted residents from tries in Kabul. TFBSO acknowledged in the over 150,000 acres of government owned report that they were actively looking at property (out of 800,000 acres or nearly 20 implementing a similar program in Ghazni per cent of government-owned land), forg- Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising Art. 9, page 9 of 14 ing official documents, and bribing public re-seize government land have thus far been officials to legitimize the seizure of pub- inadequate, with only ten per cent brought lic land (Ghaznavi 2012). Oftentimes, the back under government control. Most of the very land seized is used as a bribe to pay off seized land was allocated to serve as town- groups or individuals. We anticipate those in ships to house schoolteachers, police officers the land mafia are creating a patronage net- and administrators; however, to date, no land work inside and outside the government in has been distributed outside the land mafia. preparation for coalition departure that can The problem is not limited to Ghazni: benefit key individuals and groups. We often throughout Afghanistan, land seizures have heard from our Afghan colleagues that when been taking place for years (BBC 2007; Ariana certain governing decisions or processes 2011; Wakht 2012). The High Office of Over- need rejection or validation, elites within sight and Anti-corruption (HOOAC) stated the land mafia could sway decisions in their that land mafia seized 16,308 acres in the favor by promising, gifting, or appropriating first six months of 2012. In 2007, the Afghan land. Accusations were ripe from governing Urban Development Minister stated that authorities to private citizens that powerful land was appropriated at a rate of two square figures within the Ministry of Interior or posi- kilometers per day (BBC 2007). The seizure tions of authority such as district governors of land often sparks clashes, as occurred were recipients of seized land. Afghan land between Kuchi nomads and Hazaras in Kabul authorities and citizens have complained and Wardak Province, (Wily 2008). The case publicly that government-owned land was study of the Aynak Copper Project is one seized in nearly every district in Ghazni. As where ‘major legal and regulatory issues’ accusations were so prevalent, it seemed a were ignored regarding the exercise of emi- futile effort to try to decipher the identity nent domain and the forced resettlement of or truth behind the land mafia. The land people (Stanley & Mikhaylova 2011). selected was typically valuable in that it held Another consideration is that land itself a canal system or agricultural potential, sat may only be a symptom of the real problem— on a historical site, or was located near strate- weak rule of law that cannot effectively medi- gic lines of communication such as Highway ate conflict resolution (Ross 2004). Land is One. US personnel attempting to track and merely the object, but the process of seizure manage the situation found it an impossible and the failure of government action is the task and one best left to the future governing key issue. Given weak institutions, historical bodies of Afghanistan. animosities, and the ambiguous structure The power of the land mafia in Ghazni is of land holdings in Afghanistan, it is often strong and new Afghan institutions may find difficult to determine who owns what in a it a staggering task to cope with. A previous particular area. During our field research, we judicial director, Abdul-Razaq Azizi, noted in were often told that strongmen exploit and the press that he cannot identify or discuss manipulate land registries to acquire land. members of the land mafia without putting With a weak legal system, an evicted resident his life at risk; however ‘most land grabbers (notably termed a ‘squatter’ in the Afghan have important positions within the Ghazni press) has virtually no recourse. In addition, local government’ (Ghaznavi 2012). In our land tenure proceedings may be conducted interviews, a number of Afghans warned that in a number of different systems: statutory, they could not go public with information customary, or Shariat (Wily 2003). These regarding land grabs, also fearing for their institutions are separate from each other, lives.. In one case, twelve land mafia figures and allow for individuals to try each system were arrested according to Ghazni’s director until a positive outcome is achieved. Since of agriculture, but later released. Attempts to the systems do not work together, one court Art. 9, page 10 of 14 Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising may hand down a positive decision while may not be possible to prevent a new era of another hands down a negative one. Often- robber barons from rising up amidst the con- times, each individual disputing land seizure flict and opportunity environment, however has written documentation legitimizing his external actors may be able to mentor, moni- claim, making it difficult to determine valid- tor, and mitigate individuals, organizations, ity. Government officials sometimes give and resource conflicts before they reach a land to patrons and document the transac- tipping point. We offer six recommendations tion as legitimate, adding a further layer of for mitigating the onset of resource conflict bureaucracy to the problem.4 In some cases, in Ghazni. government officials abuse their position and exploit the inefficiencies of govern- 1. Assist the Afghan Land Authority ment to plan, document, and legitimize the (Arazi), in developing and standard- seizure of public property for personal gain. izing linkages between statutory Like mining laws, many within the govern- and customary law systems so both ment lack the incentive to fix the system as sides are aware of rule of law judg- they continue to benefit from weak and inef- ments and guidelines on the village, ficient bureaucracy. district, and provincial levels. 2. Empower the state’s formal legal Conclusion system by incorporating anonymous While we do not argue Ghazni is currently prosecutors and judges (with exter- facing a resource conflict, we recognize con- nal oversight) that can prosecute ditions that may bring about one. With 2014 illicit mining and land mafia opera- here, and the drawdown of foreign security tions without fear of retaliation. forces looming large in the minds of Afghans, 3. Encourage and support journalistic it is still not clear how the country will fare accounts focused on land grabbers, in political, security, and development are- the narratives of evicted residents, nas. Some predict the country will fall into and the role of government and civil war, and at a minimum, voice concerns nongovernment institutions in pre- similar to Felbab-Brown that, ‘fundamental venting illicit land seizures. questions about the efficacy of stabiliza- 4. Enhance the relationship between tion efforts in Afghanistan continue to lack TFBSO and the MoMP to further clear answers’ (2012). The 2013 US National assist with developing a legal sys- Intelligence Estimate reportedly declares tem for artisanal, small-scale min- that with a US drawdown in troops and aid, ing so that the Afghan government the ‘situation [will] deteriorate very rapidly’ can track and tax activity that is a and Kabul institutions will lose influence as daily livelihood for many Afghans, warlords enrich and empower themselves minimizing the role of illicit mining (Washington Post 2013). As the international and removing a valuable revenue community minimizes its presence and role stream from insurgents. in Afghanistan, it appears all the ingredients 5. Assist the MoMP with the develop- are in place for a dire situation in Ghazni ment of Afghan-run interagency Province, particularly as local resource archi- development teams co-located with tecture continues to develop to exploit the village stability operations in areas supply chains of resources such as copper, where the lootable resource archi- gold and lithium. tecture is a part of the economic International military and diplomatic offi- supply chain. These teams should cials work closely with many of the elite indi- try to incorporate or co-opt current viduals that play a direct or indirect role in community labor structures, while land mafias and illicit mineral extraction. It developing licit value chains that Dearing and Braden: Robber Barons Rising Art. 9, page 11 of 14

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How to cite this article: Dearing, M and Braden, C 2013 Robber Barons Rising: The Potential for Resource Conflict in Ghazni, Afghanistan.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 9, pp. 1-14, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.dg

Published: 18 February 2014

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