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The Role of the Polish Military Contingent in the Reconstruction of Ghazni Province

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The Role of the Polish Military Contingent in the Reconstruction of Ghazni Province Przegląd Strategiczny 2020, Issue 13 Mirza SABAWOON DOI : 10.14746/ps.2020.1.8 Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1829-8354 THE ROLE OF THE POLISH MILITARY CONTINGENT IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GHAZNI PROVINCE Several months after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, in March 2002, Pol- ish troops went there as part of the US Operation Enduring Freedom. Their involvement was made possible by a decision issued on November 22, 2001 by the President of the Republic of Poland on the engagement, as part of the Allied Forces, of a Polish Military Contingent in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan as well as in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The decision permitting the engagement of a contingent of 300 troops (Postanowienie Prezydenta, 2001: section 1) was associated with the provisions stipulated in the Law of December 17, 1998 on the Rules of Engagement or Deployment of the Polish Armed Forces Abroad, which permits Polish troops to be deployed in third countries. According to the law, “the engagement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland outside state borders means participation in an armed conflict or in strengthening the forces of an allied state, participation in a peace- keeping mission or participation in preventing acts of terrorism or their consequences” (Ustawa, 1998: Art. 2.1). It was agreed that the deployment of the Polish armed forces outside the country could involve participation in military training and exercises, rescue, search or humanitarian actions, as well as in ceremonial undertakings (Ibid.: Art. 2.2). This article aims to present the activities of the Polish army within NATO in Af- ghanistan, in particular to analyze humanitarian aid and indicate the most important areas of support. This will be supplemented with a presentation of the projects imple- mented and their impact on the reconstruction of the province and the city of Ghazni. Due to the limited length of this article, the military involvement of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) is not described in detail (names and numbers of Polish troops, type of weapons used, retaliatory actions by the Taliban and their military potential, etc.), since this would require a separate study. The article is based primarily on documents and reports on the PMC in Afghanistan.1 MISSION DESCRIPTION Initially, the Poles were stationed mainly in Bagram,2 but they were also present in Kabul, Kandahar (Qandahar), Sharan (Paktika) and Mazar-i-Sharif. The sappers, 1 Several research methods are employed in the article, namely the comparative method, systemic method and genetic explanation. All of them make it possible not only to investigate the processes but also to understand the chronology of the changes. 2 In 2002–2006 Polish troops were mainly stationed in Bagram, in 2007–2009 mainly in Paktika, and from 2008 – in Ghazni. 130 Mirza SABAWOON logisticians and commandos serving as Group One of the PMC OEF, called the Pol- ish Task Force (Polskie Siły Zadaniowe), were sent to the Bagram Air Base in Parwan Province, which is located about 60 km north of Kabul (Jureńczyk, 2016: 232). Their tasks included protection of the airfield, construction of bridges and other infrastruc- ture elements indispensable for the operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and, first and foremost, the removal of mines (Polakow, 2012: 34–36). The Brzeg-based First Engineers Brigade, the Opole-based 10th Logistics Brigade, the Brodnica-based Fourth Anti-Chemical Warfare Regiment, and the Puławy-based Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology all served in Afghanistan (Gaj, 2012: 50–52). Initially, the Polish contingent in Afghanistan was ca. 120 troops strong. Over time, a total of 1,200 troops and military personnel served in Afghanistan within the OEF (Jureńczyk, 2016: 232–235). The contingent operated as the Polish Task Force in 2002–2007, and in 2008–2014 it was stationed in Ghazni as part of the ISAF structure called Task Force White Eagle (Siły Zadaniowe Biały Orzeł). From April 25, 2007, the command of the tenth tour of the PMC EFO was taken over by the first tour of PMC Afghanistan operating within the ISAF. This was the largest military contingent in the entire history of Polish Army peace and stabilization missions. It comprised of a total of over 2,600 soldiers and military personnel, and a further 400 soldiers and military personnel in the reserve on the territory of the Republic of Poland (Ibid.: 238–239). At the peak of the mission, the Polish forces included, among others, 21 platoons (in- cluding 18 motorized platoons, two reconnaissance platoons and one PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) protection platoon), the Independent Air Group, Task Force 49 and Task Force 50, eight Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) dealing with police training, five POMLTs responsible for military training, and the Civil-Military Cooperation Support Team (CIMIC) (Podsumowanie, 2015). At the time when the ISAF mission in Afghanistan was most active, Polish forces were responsible for security in Ghazni Province. Poland allocated ca. USD 27 million for this purpose. The operation of the Polish peacekeeping mission in Ghazni lasted six years, from mid-2008 to mid-2014. During this time, over 130 tons of various humani- tarian aid resources were handed over to the local population (Ibid.). POLISH PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM IN GHAZNI PROVINCE US military officers were responsible for the security of Ghazni Province from 2001 to 2008. Later on this task was handed over to Poles and a small number of Ukrainians who were part of the Polish contingent. The operations of the contingent in Ghazni were inaugurated in mid-2008 under the command of Lt. Col. Wiesław Pyć (Polakow, 2012: 34–37). Polish troops could begin their operations in Ghazni by virtue of the decision issued on October 9, 2007 by the President of the Republic of Poland on the extension of the period of engagement of the Polish Military Contingent in the Islamic State of Afghan- istan. Its size was estimated at 1,200 soldiers and military personnel (Postanowienie The Role of the Polish Military Contingent in the Reconstruction of Ghazni Province 131 Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007). The PMC had the following main tasks in Ghazni Province: – to ensure security and stability in the province; – to train the Afghan National Security Forces; – to reconstruct civil infrastructure; – to implement development programs; – to assist in the distribution of food for the inhabitants of the province (Jureńczyk, 2016: 257–259). As mentioned above, the Polish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) started its official operation in mid-2008. It consisted in providing military assistance in the field of security in the province, reconstruction and construction of infrastructure in the region, and organization of humanitarian actions, including appropriate health and educational care. These activities were inaugurated at an official ceremony, attended by representatives of local authorities headed by the governor, representatives of the central government from Kabul, members of the Polish Embassy in Kabul, Polish sol- diers from the military base stationed in Bagram, and representatives of the American military forces.3 Ghazni Province is located in central Afghanistan. It is one of the provinces inhab- ited by a large Taliban population. In 2013, Ghazni was elected the Cultural Capital of the Muslim World. At an official ceremony in Tripoli, Libya, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Islamic Educa- tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) nominated three cities, Medina in Saudi Arabia, Ghazni in Afghanistan and Kano in Nigeria. The city of Ghazni was eventually chosen, the history of which dates back to the 10th century, when this area came under the rule of the Gaznavid dynasty of Turkic origin. At that time, Ghazni was not only the political hub of the region, but also an important place for the develop- ment of scientific activities. Many scientists from various fields were gathered at the Gaznavid court, which, among other things, contributed to the cultural development of the region and the establishment of many schools (Korzeniewski, 2006: 32). In this context, the following eminent scientists, writers and poets can be mentioned: Abu Ra- jhan Biruni, Nabolqasem Ferdousi, Al-Bajhaki, Al-Hakim ibn Sanai, Al-Hariri, Masud Sa’d Salman, and Farukki Sistani. The city still features nearly 40 monuments dating back to Gaznavid times. The choice of Ghazni as the Capital of Culture of the Muslim World was to show that, although Afghanistan suffered enormous damage during the hostilities, the inhabitants and the country itself have a rich history. If it were not for wars and terrorism, the city would continue to play an important role in the develop- ment of culture and education in the Muslim world to this day. The official ceremony of awarding Ghazni with the title of Cultural Capital of the Muslim World took place in April 2013 (Ghazni Rasman Paytakht, 2013).4 3 When Polish operations began in the province, the author of this article was employed by the governorate, as secretary in the governor’s office. At that time, this office was held by Musa Khan Akbarzada. Working there, on an everyday basis the author had the opportunity to observe the activi- ties carried out by the Polish armed forces. 4 3,700 guests from Poland and abroad attended the ceremony. Musa Khan Akbarzada (Governor of Ghazni Province) emphasized that receiving this title was a source of pride for all of Afghanistan 132 Mirza SABAWOON The global celebration of Islamic culture, planned to take place in Ghazni, gave the city and the province an opportunity to develop, including economic development, and raise the standard of living of inhabitants.
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