Trust and Balance: an Illinois Guardsman in Afghanistan with Polish Task Force White Eagle

Trust and Balance: An Illinois Guardsman in Afghanistan With Polish Task Force White Eagle

A Monograph by Captain Dustin W. Cammack Illinois Army National Guard

Maneuver Captains Career Course Maneuver Center of Excellence Ft Benning, Georgia 2011

DEDICATION

I dedicate this monograph to my Dad, Mark – a Navy Chief Petty Officer taken before his time. I miss you, and hope I have made you proud.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge those who have stood by my side and supported me throughout my career in the Illinois Army National Guard. I feel this monograph is the culmination of the supportive efforts and steadfastness of those around me.

To my mother, Catherine, my brothers – Daniel and DeWayne, my sister, Diana, and close personal friends. Your support and encouragement has been a significant contribution in me achieving my military goals. I love you all.

To my American and Polish comrades – working with you overseas and stateside has been a career and life‐changing journey. It has been an honor serving with all of you.

Special acknowledgement goes to Lieutenant Colonel Scott Swinford. You passed onto me a plethora of knowledge during our tour – I will not forget those lessons (winner, winner, chicken dinner!).

It would be remiss of me not to acknowledge my Honorary Editor‐in‐Chief, Mary‐Lou. Your tutelage helped shape my thoughts into written word – and you challenged me to reflect and search for the true meaning of my deployment in Afghanistan. Thank You.

Most importantly, to my wife, Kate – I love you. Your patience and strength through the deployment has been an inspiration to me. Because of you, I now understand battles are not only fought overseas on‐the‐front, but on the home‐front as well. As an Army wife, you deserve more recognition than you have received – the sacrifices you have made are great, and for that I am deeply indebted. Thank you for holding down the fort.

TABLE of CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

THE BIG PICTURE ...... 1

BUILDING TRUST ...... 6

OVERCOMING DIFFERENCES ...... 11

POLISH TRAGEDY ...... 15

POLITICAL PRESSURE ...... 17

BATTLE SPACE CONFLICT ...... 18

CONCLUSION ...... 22

ANNEX 1 – BEST‐A4 Roster and Duty Positions ...... i

ANNEX 2 – Maps ...... ii

ANNEX 3 – State Partnership Program...... iv

ANNEX 4 – NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan ...... vi

ANNEX 5 – My Responsibilities ...... viii

ANNEX 6 – T‐shirt Design ...... x

ANNEX 7 – Bibliography ...... xii

INTRODUCTION

As an Illinois National Guardsman, my experience in the Profession of Arms has been a life‐changing adventure – sometimes hazardous and uncertain, but always exciting and personally fulfilling. I enlisted in 1996, and was commissioned in 2002. I have served two combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and was mobilized for one State Active Duty humanitarian mission. My experience in war zones and homeland defense has taught me that success is not measured in body‐count alone, but rather by how well we balanced the aspects of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multicultural (JIIM) environments. A key component in

finding this critical balance – and achieving success – lies in building trust not only with the host nation for which we assist, but within the coalition forces as well. It is within this framework of balance and trust that I will describe my involvement in Afghanistan with Polish Task Force

White Eagle from November 2009 to May 2010.

THE BIG PICTURE

In late October 2009, I was assigned to Illinois National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters

(JFHQ‐IL). I deployed with the fourth rotation of the Bilateral Embedded Support Team (BEST‐

A4) as a part of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan one month later. (See ANNEX 5 for more on NATO/ISAF.) The 18‐member team was comprised of 10 commissioned officers and eight noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with various military backgrounds and skills. Our mission was to stand side‐by‐side with Polish Task Force White Eagle (TF‐WE) at the brigade (BDE), battalion

(BN), and company (CO) levels to effectively coordinate, mentor, and advise the Polish staff on

U.S. Army capabilities and doctrine. This included everything from logistical support, to tactical

planning, to participating in combat missions. For this rotation, TF‐WE was comprised of the

21st Mountain Brigade (Podhale Rifles), commanded by Brigadier General Janusz Bronowicz.

Higher command was Regional Command‐East (CJTF‐82), commanded by Major General Curtis

Scaparrotti – 82nd Airborne Division. BEST‐A4 was commanded by Colonel Paul Fanning, Illinois

Army National Guard (ILARNG).

A year prior to our arrival, the Polish Land Forces (PLF) assumed responsibility for the security of Ghazni Province in Afghanistan. The Polish rotation with whom I deployed was the sixth rotation of Polish troops to Afghanistan. The BDE totaled approximately 2,000 troops, including two Infantry battalions, a brigade‐level headquarters, and support units (International

Assistance Security Force, 2011). Prior to

October 2008, Polish involvement was

restricted to operations around the

village of Sharana in Paktika Province,

east of Ghazni – and limited to a

battalion‐sized force (Morgan, 2011).

The Illinois National Guards

My first CH‐47 Chinook ride in to FOB Ghazni, Afghanistan November 11, 2009 involvement in the NATO/ISAF mission is

based on its State Partnership Program (SPP) and the relationship we share with Poland. Under the Illinois SPP program, we were placed throughout the Polish brigade at various echelons based on our individual talents and strengths. One important focus of this program is to emphasize the importance and trust the U.S. forces place on the NCO Corps, so it was important for the BEST‐A4 commander to balance our team between officers and enlisted. This

allowed the BEST‐A4 commander to place senior NCOs in key leadership positions, showcasing the strengths and necessity of the rank they held (See Annex 3 for an explanation of the SPP.)

At the brigade level, BEST‐A4 Commander Colonel Fanning, was the senior American officer on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ghazni, and General Bronowicz’s lead advisor and facilitator of American capabilities within the province. The BEST‐A4 commander was also the

American link to the NATO/ISAF coalition higher headquarters, CJTF‐82. The S3 and S3‐Air worked side‐by‐side with the Polish S3 and his staff to plan and track operations. Best‐A4

provided the Polish BDE Operations Cell

with an Operations’ Sergeant Major, three Battle Captains, and an Intelligence

Officer – all Illinois Guardsmen. This group worked in the BDE Tactical

Operations Center (TOC), located at FOB

Ghazni, directly with their Polish counterparts tracking and reporting TF‐WE Brigade Tactical Operations Center operations in real time. Logistical and FOB Ghazni April 23, 2010

communications support for the BDE was handled by the Support Cell – we provided an S4, two

NCOs, and an S6 to assist that cell.

The BDE had two battalions, referred to as Battle Groups (BG), located in different locations. Battle Group Alpha, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Zenon Brzuszko, was collocated with the BDE at FOB Ghazni. Battle Group Bravo, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Wieslaw Lewicki, was located in the southern district of Gelan at FOB Warrior (Morgan, 2011).

One BEST‐A4 officer and two NCOs were assigned to each BG.

I was assigned to BG Alpha to serve as the personal advisor to the Polish commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko, and his

staff on U.S. capabilities and doctrine,

and to act as battle captain within the BG

TOC. I was responsible for the

coordination and planning assistance

between the BG and the various multi‐

national forces located in northern

Ghazni. My role was also to facilitate, LTC Brzuszko and MG Scaparrotti meet during a holiday visit FOB Four Corners December 31, 2009 † coordinate, and assist in acquiring U.S. resources in support of his mission. (See ANNEX 6 for more detail on my responsibilities.) The

BEST‐A4 NCOs were to function just like the BDE teams, providing logistical and tactical support on a smaller scale – my two NCOs were assigned to FOB Four Corners located ten miles south of

FOB Ghazni. (See ANNEX 1 for roster and duty positions.)

During this time, Afghanistan was divided into five Regional Commands (RC): RC‐North,

South, East, West, and Capital. Each RC was further divided by province and assigned a Battle

Space Owner (BSO). RC‐East contained 14 provinces: Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar,

Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshir, Parwan, and Wardak. TF‐WE was the BSO for Ghazni Province – further divided into 19 districts: Ab Band, Ajristan, Andar,

Dih Yak, Gelan, Ghazni, Giro, Jaghori, Jaghatu, Khugiani, Khwaja Omari, Malestan, Muqur,

Nawa, Nawur, Qarabagh, Rashidan, Waghaz, and Zana Khan (See ANNEX 2 for maps.)

RC‐East covers over 46,000 square miles – about the size of Pennsylvania. In the northern and western parts of RC‐East, the Hindu Kush Mountains dominate the landscape –

the Safed Koh Mountains in the southeastern portion. RC East shares a 450‐mile border with

Pakistan to the east (Institute for the Study of War, 2009). Historically, RC‐East has been a hot‐ bed for insurgent activity with most of the attacks occurring in the districts along the path of

Highway 1 – one of the only improved roads in Afghanistan. This highway is a vital travel and supply route for the country, connecting the major cities within the region. Ghazni Province was listed as the most violent province in Afghanistan with 461 reported attacks in 2009 and 1540 in

2010 (The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2011).

FOB Ghazni is located along Highway 1, five miles south of Ghazni City – the capitol of

Ghazni Province. Due to the threat level, movement by helicopter throughout the province was the preferred method of travel for troops – which made travel in

and out of FOB Ghazni sporadic and unpredictable. At some points during the winter months weather conditions made it nearly impossible to travel by ground Winters in Afghanistan can be harsh – our winter was “mild” FOB Ghazni January 27, 2010 or air – we were essentially isolated from outside support.

My Battle Group’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) was the northern portion of the province and consisted of approximately 5,000 square miles, 11 districts and 800,000 people from multiple ethnic groups. Highway 1 passes through the AOR from Ghazni through Gelan districts.

The primary mission of TF‐WE was to maintain freedom of movement along this highway to ensure it remained trafficable for both coalition forces and the Afghan populace.

BUILDING TRUST

When I deployed, I was unsure what my role was going to be and what to expect when I arrived. I had no prior knowledge of the SPP Program or of the Illinois‐Poland relationship in

Afghanistan. My team did not benefit

from the pre‐training with our

counterparts that the BEST teams

following us received, so we arrived in

Afghanistan with no knowledge of the

people with whom we were to serve.

This mission would take me out of my

Operation Thunder IX – ANA, Polish OMLT and ANP comfort zone, challenge my perceptions Andar District January 2, 2010 of the Polish forces, and teach me many lessons about teamwork, trust, leadership, and relationship building.

I would describe our BEST‐A4 mission as 90 percent relationship building and 10 percent tactical knowledge. As NATO/ISAF soldiers and Coalition partners, we had no direct authority over the Polish – or even U.S. forces on the FOB for that matter. Building trust was our weapon

of choice. Unfortunately, this was sometimes hindered by external forces – and sometimes those external forces were our own internal prejudice. On several occasions, I witnessed what I describe as the “ugly American syndrome.” I saw this as a tendency for American forces outside of foreign commands, with little to no direct experience with them, to disregard or belittle the

efforts of the other Coalition partners. I have been guilty of this prejudice in the past, but my work with the Polish while in Afghanistan taught me to be less judgmental, more tolerant of cultural differences, and certainly more aware and sensitive to the complexities of operating in a multinational environment.

When talking to my American peers while deployed in Afghanistan and, later, back in the States, the perception of the Polish force was less than stellar. I heard negative comments, off‐color jokes, and a general disdain towards TF‐

WE – our Polish allies. The prevalent Operation Garden Roses – Polish JTAC and I in an observation post theme was that the Poles were lazy and Galan district December 12, 2009 ineffective soldiers who did not want to or have the ability to fight. This was not my experience. I participated in multiple combat missions with the Polish – never once did I have a reason to question their desire, willingness, or ability to fight the fight. In fact I would – and I did – trust them with my life. One mission stands in testimony to the many I witnessed when the Polish soldiers displayed their competence.

On December 21st, 2009 – two months into my tour ‐ I was participating in Operation

Sharp Talon and traveling with elements of BG Bravo, conducting presence patrols in Gelan district. I was assigned to assist the Polish Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) with fixed wing close air support (CAS) and rotary wing close combat attack (CCA) command and control.

While conducting patrols on the south side of Latif village, a Polish Rosomak (an eight‐wheeled, armored infantry fighting vehicle) struck an improvised explosive device (IED) on the front left of the vehicle. The blast blew off the two front left tires, penetrating the undercarriage armor. I

was traveling behind the Rosomak in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP) – the concussion rocked my vehicle back and forth.

My vehicle moved away from the immediate danger zone, allowing the Polish soldiers on board to dismount and establish ground security. The JTAC and I immediately contacted the two Apache attack helicopters on station to provide overwatch on our position and scan for possible insurgent activity or mortar firing positions – a common insurgent technique. The IED blast seriously Operation Sharp Talon – Presence patrol through a village injured the Polish driver, and a 9‐line Air Gelan District December 21, 2009

MEDEVAC request was transmitted by one of the soldiers. The Polish ground commander

radioed FOB Warrior, and the ground quick reaction force (QRF) was dispatched to assist us in recovering the disabled vehicle and provide additional security.

Two hours into the recovery operation, we received mortar fire. The rounds landed 100

meters from my location. The CCA was

off station at that time; however, we

were supported by Air Force CAS. The

JTAC and I once again contacted the

fighter pilot to provide overwatch and

scan for the point of origin. No other

rounds were fired at our position. We

successfully recovered the damaged Operation Sharp Talon – Polish Air MEDIVAC Gelan District December 21, 2009 Rosomak and moved back to FOB

Warrior without further incident.

The Polish ground commander had total situational awareness and was in constant contact with base throughout the entire operation. The JTAC performed his duties flawlessly, ensuring we received air coverage when needed. The Polish QRF responded quickly, and Air

MEDEVAC arrived on station within ten minutes. The dismounted Polish infantrymen were always in a defensive position, providing security. I was the only American embedded with the

Polish on this mission. At no point did I feel my life was in any more danger being with the

Polish forces than had I been with American forces. I witnessed the Poles in action firsthand, and never once did my trust in their ability and competence waiver. Their performance in action was superb.

Admittedly, my positive experiences with the Polish did not mean that daily

communications between U.S. Military and Polish leadership went smoothly all the time. I

personally witnessed American cautiousness at some of the daily Commanders’ Update Briefs

(CUB). Typically, the RC‐East commander, Major General Scaparrotti, would make comments and ask questions of each of the American Task Force commanders and then give direct guidance and feedback – either good or bad. Invariably, the Polish TF‐WE commander, Brigadier

General Bronowicz, would get general guidance and almost never publicly receive criticism from the CJTF commander. Any negativity or corrective guidance would be given to the BEST‐A4 commander, Colonel Fanning, to address with the Polish General off‐line. Instead of treating the Polish commander like any other U.S. task force commander, TF‐WE was handled more delicately.

It seemed to me that there was a fear on the American side of causing an “international incident” should a misunderstanding occur. This behavior was blatant enough for the TF‐WE commander to comment on it and question the reason behind it.

Colonel Fanning did his best to explain to the Polish General why it was important for

CJTF not to portray the Americans as over‐reaching their authority over the Polish. From my perspective – operating in this joint environment – it seemed CJTF‐82 was more concerned about maintaining a balance of power between the two allies and less about fostering a meaningful command relationship. This approach seemed to backfire as the Polish General interpreted the communication differently. It appeared to him that the level of trust between

CJTF‐82 and TF‐WE was not solid enough to allow for the type of constructive criticism and feedback American task force commanders were afforded.

OVERCOMING DIFFERENCES

In the beginning, I found it difficult to engage with my Polish counterpart at the BG level

– Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko. I now believe the problem was due to a combination of personality differences, language and cultural barriers, rank structure, and the uncertainty of how to use each other. The language barrier was very hard to overcome. His English was broken, and my Polish was limited to greetings and salutations. Sometimes meaning and intent were simply lost‐in‐translation from both sides. His command‐style was “old‐school Soviet” – direct and authoritative in nature. He was a loud and boisterous man, and it was a challenge to

perform my role and inject myself into his command structure without feeling underappreciated or even ignored.

Rank in the Polish force is very important and strictly followed. It was rare for me to see

Polish subordinates interject opinions or offer dissenting points of view to superiors. This is in

contrast to the U.S. military philosophy where opinions are welcomed and encouraged. Our command philosophy requires a free flow of ideas from our subordinates and doctrine dictates commanders at all echelons foster an environment that allows juniors leaders to take initiative on observed opportunities. As I was a Captain, and he was a Lieutenant Colonel, I always got the feeling my input was not always welcome because of the disparity in rank.

Engaging the BG Alpha staff, on the other hand, was a completely different experience.

They trusted me and my abilities. For whatever reason, the communication barriers that were evident between me and the BG commander did not exist between me and his staff. The TOC was staffed with 15 Polish officers, warrant officers and enlisted. I dealt directly with the Chief of Staff (a Major), the battle captains (Captains and Warrant Officers), and the various other

staff elements within the TOC. Working with these individuals on a daily basis, I was able to build relationships with them that enhanced our productivity and effectiveness.

It was easier to make friendships in this working environment. In the lulls between

operations, discussions about our lives at

home were the norm. We talked about

politics, our families, sports and hobbies.

I formed real friendships with these

men. The general feeling amongst the

BG staff was that we were peers.

Because of these personal and

BG Alpha Battle Staff ‐ my peers and comrades professional bonds, I know that the level FOB Ghazni April 26, 2010 of communication and sharing of information developed between us was key to our overall effectiveness.

The ability of the BG to communicate effectively under fire was tested many times. No more so than during a high risk mission to retrieve a disabled vehicle from an outlying FOB. The route chosen to send the convoy was known to have multiple IEDs and insurgents in the area –

a very dangerous route. One of the assets available to the mission was an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capable of broadcasting live full motion video back to the command post. One of my responsibilities was to assist with the employment of this asset. While I did not have direct

physical control of the UAV, I was the direct line of communication to its operators via internet relay chat (IRC). During the mission, the TOC had a live video feed of the UAV, communication

to the UAV operator via me, and communication with the Polish ground commander via their

communication systems.

During the 22‐hour mission, the convoy struck several IEDs and soldiers sustained injuries before reaching its destination. Because of the level of cooperation and trust developed between me and the staff, information flowed freely and efficiently from the unit on the ground, to the TOC, to the UAV operators, creating synergy within the mission. Because of this synergy, we were able to provide the Polish ground force commander with a high level of situational awareness otherwise unavailable, allowing him to conduct recovery operations and ultimately reach his destination.

On reflection, this was my first experience functioning as a liaison to a foreign military, and as such I was very unsure of my role and how I was to interface with the Battle Group

Commander. Engaging Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko proved difficult – until a confrontation

actually brought us together. It was four months into the deployment before I was able to effectively connect him and directly assert myself and offer assistance.

The turning point came in March of 2010 after Operation Edelweiss. On March 3rd, a

large cordon and search operation was conducted near FOB Four Corners in an area of Andar district known to sympathize with the insurgency (Roggio, 2011). The operation was conducted by the Polish company located on the FOB along with the BEST‐A4 NCOs and other U.S. units. A

Shura (a meeting with the village elders) was planned after the operation took place. The tactical portion of the operation went well. However, during the Shura, miscommunication and a lack of trust between BEST‐A4 NCOs and the Polish company commander resulted in an escalation of tensions between them. Specifically, the commander refused to join the Shura.

Knowing this was bad protocol and potentially insulting to the local villagers, my men took exception to this tactic and voiced their concern at the time – but their input was not well received by the commander.

Because of the importance of this mission, Brigade General Bronowicz requested an

After Action Review (AAR) to be

submitted to BDE at the conclusion of

the operation. My two NCOs submitted

to me some rather pointed comments

about the mission, directed specifically

towards the Polish company

commander. (The NCOs had had

A true Coalition – ANA, ANP, U.S. and Polish soldiers previous run‐ins with the company Operation Edelweiss, FOB Four Corners March 3, 2010 commander – in fact, over the course of

the deployment they became a sounding board for the Polish soldiers at Four Corners who would often air grievances and a general dislike for their leader to them.)

In support of my NCOs and having had made the same observations myself on earlier missions, I backed their critical comments and sent them forward. The AAR was conducted at the BDE level involving the TF‐WE General, the BG commanders and staff, and members from

BEST‐A4. Needless‐to‐say, when the comments were made public, the BG Alpha commander – my direct counterpart – was less than enthused. To the credit of Brigadier General Bronowicz,

instead of escalating the issue and possibly further complicating the situation, he stressed the

need for open dialogue, trust, and cooperation between the Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko and me.

I didn’t make the decision lightly to publicly criticize the company commander – and, indirectly, my own BG Alpha commander. In fact, I had sought guidance and consulted my own chain‐of‐command before moving forward with my decision. The initial fallout seemed scandalous in the eyes of the Polish BG and CO commander; however, as a result of the AAR,

Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko and I developed a more forthcoming rapport for the remainder of the deployment. This was proven when he invited me to participate in weekly staff meetings – this was the first time I had been asked to be involved.

In hindsight, a better course of action might have been to address the matter with

Lieutenant Colonel Brzuszko before submitting the comments. This might have set the ground work for an even stronger relationship between us, but as it was, the AAR was the stepping stone to our finally being able to engage in open and free dialogue.

POLISH TRAGEDY

On April 10th, 2010, the Nation of Poland suffered a great tragedy. Polish Air Force flight

Tu‐154 crashed near the Russian city of Smolensk, Russia, while en route to the 70th anniversary memorial of the Katyn massacre. The accident killed all 96 passengers on the flight.

The deceased included Polish President Lech Kaczynski and his wife. Also killed in the crash were the chief of the Polish General Staff, senior Polish military officers (including Polish officers directly involved in the SPP and BEST program), Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister,

President of the National Bank of Poland, members of the Polish parliament, Polish clergy,

other Polish government officials, and relatives of victims of the massacre (Gray & Tkachenko,

2010). This event had a profound effect, not just on the nation of Poland, but the Polish and

U.S. military serving in Ghazni as well.

From the moment the tragedy occurred, serious questions arose regarding how

Poland’s role in Afghanistan would be affected. The President and other military officials,

including General Tadeusz Buk

(Commander of Land Forces), were

instrumental in supporting Poland’s

involvement in the war. Poland’s

opposition party, however, was not. The

opposition would now have a controlling

interest in foreign policy. Speculation

Polish memorial to their fallen civilian and military leadership began immediately about whether or not FOB Ghazni April 12, 2010 Poland’s military involvement in

Afghanistan would come to an abrupt end. Not only were the Polish soldiers in Ghazni deeply mourning the loss of their President and chiefs of staff, but they were faced with the uncertainty of their future involvement in the war effort. Operations virtually stopped the day

of the crash, as almost every Pole in Ghazni watched the various satellite feeds for updates. It was a very dark day for the Polish people, and all we could do from our perspective was console our brethren and wait for the eventual outcome. Ultimately, Poland’s role in Afghanistan

remained consistent, and the battle waged on.

POLITICAL PRESSURE

Even before the National tragedy, the Polish Land Force (PLF) had been in a difficult

situation. Ghazni Province was the only aspect of Operation Enduring Freedom that Warsaw was responsible for – and all eyes in Poland were watching the actions of TF‐WE. This created a precarious environment for the Polish ground commanders in Ghazni to operate in because

every move was scrutinized by their homeland – the Polish media, political and military officials, and fellow countrymen.

In my opinion, in many ways, this scrutiny at home limited the amount of risk they were willing to take in Ghazni. I believe that fear of reprisals from the leadership in Warsaw was a complicating factor in many of the decisions the Brigadier General Bronowicz made. An incident that occurred at FOB Four Corners is one such example. One night in late February, the Polish company reported to the BG headquarters on FOB Ghazni that it was observing what appeared

to be two suspected insurgents

emplacing an IED near a village within

visual range of the FOB, in a location

known to have IEDs. The Polish company

commander deployed two snipers to the

water tower located on the FOB,

established positive identification, and

A view of FOB Four Corners from the water tower FOB Four Corners, April 23, 2010 requested permission to engage from the

BG.

The request was escalated to the Polish BDE level and denied. The reason given from

BDE was the FOB was not in immediate danger from the emplacing team. As opposed to engaging the targets, BDE decided to send a U.S. Explosive Ordnance Disposal team (EOD) at first light to neutralize and destroy the IED. However, the incident was not reported accurately, and EOD was not notified until well into the next day. The IDE site was eventually exploited and rendered safe, but much later than it could have been.

This action was counter to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that U.S. forces followed at

that time. While I do not know the exact reason why the Polish General denied the request, I do know U.S. forces would not have needed that level of approval. The influence of the Polish higher command made for a more risk‐adverse climate on the ground than needed, potentially putting Coalition lives at risk. I never got the feeling that this attitude was inherent to the Polish soldiers, but rather a product of political and social pressures placed on the ground force commanders. Many of the challenges BEST‐A4 encountered were of this nature, and it was our task to minimize these occurrences. Yet, despite our best efforts, many on the outside looking in only saw the end result of these situations and not the root cause, thus inaccurately surmising the Polish were unwilling to fight.

BATTLE SPACE CONFLICT

Balancing the interests of both the CJTF‐82 commander and Polish battle space owner in

this environment was a challenge as those interests sometimes conflicted. This balance, and

BEST‐A4’s effectiveness and ability to influence our Polish partners, was put to test one day in

April, 2010.

Our deployment was coming to an end – BEST‐A4 was seven days from leaving Ghazni.

Our team was in the process of conducting Relief in Place (RIP) operations with the incoming team, BEST‐A5, while TF‐WE had already sent a large bulk of soldiers back to Poland receiving replacements as they rotated out. As part of the RIP process, the outgoing unit would train the new unit over a two‐week period and share the various lessons learned in preparation for the transfer of authority (Phase I: we teach them what we know; Phase II: they take the seat and run the operations with us watching.) The Polish used a similar process. This was a very chaotic period of time for everyone as the amount of personnel essentially doubled. Overall, operations turned inward, focusing on knowledge sharing and teaching the specific tasks and processes of each staff element as opposed to continuing offensive goals. In contrast, CJTF‐82 was mid‐tour,

and still very much focused on the fight.

In the early hours of April 19th, 2010, members of American Special Forces Task Force 49

(TF‐49) conducted an air assault operation in the village of Bagi Kheyl, Qarabagh District, Ghazni

Province. Various intelligence sources suggested an insurgent stronghold and an arms cache would be located in the village. Upon arriving at the objective, the Special Forces team

encountered resistance from a force much larger than anticipated. It found itself pinned down, out‐gunned, and with wounded comrades – one of whom later died from his wounds. An exfiltration order was given, and the team was pulled from the objective. (The BSOs are briefed ahead of time, so TF‐WE knew the operation was going to take place.)

Major General Scaparrotti ordered TF‐WE to secure the village of Bagi Kheyl and conduct a cordon and search. He wanted to own that space, and own it quickly. As the battalion‐level U.S. liaison officer, I personally observed reluctance to this idea from my Polish

counterparts. The Polish General and his staff hesitated; they believed the time needed to effectively plan and execute the mission was too short and the operation too risky. The mindset of most of the Polish at this point in the deployment had noticeably shifted from conducting aggressive offensive operations to packing up and getting home.

The challenge for the BEST‐A4 commander was to overcome this mentality and convince the Polish command of the urgency and importance of this mission. The more time that was lost, the greater likelihood the cache would be moved and the insurgents would relocate. Colonel Fanning pressed the issue that not supporting CJTF‐82 would reflect poorly on Task Force White

Eagle and negatively affect future relationships, not only for the current BG but for the incoming BG as well. The Operation Sudden Storm – LTC Lewicki and the HQ element Qarabagh District April 19, 2010 Polish had an opportunity to show CJTF‐

82 they could be trusted when called upon. By focusing in on the idea of “one team, one fight,”

Colonel Fanning was able to persuade General Bronowicz that it was in his best interest to oblige.

In that moment, Operation Sudden Storm was born. Lieutenant Colonel Lewicki, Battle

Group Bravo commander, was tasked as the ground commander for the operation. A

combination of approximately 200 soldiers from BG Bravo and U.S. elements from FOB Ghazni were organized for the mission. Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA)

were used to ensure combined action and to reinforce the troops on the ground. The Polish headquarters element, to which I was attached, was airlifted one kilometer away from the objective on top of a hill for command and control.

As the U.S. ground liaison officer for the operation, I was the information hub for

Lieutenant Colonel Lewicki. I filtered U.S. attack air information as well as direct communication

with the U.S. Special Forces team. Both

ground and air operations were

conducted simultaneously. U.S. AH‐64

and Polish MI‐24 attack helicopters

provided close‐combat attack support,

U.S. fighter jets provided close air

support, and area surveillance was

Operation Sudden Storm –Stolen ANP vehicle provided by tactical blimp and an Qarabagh District April 19, 2010 †† unmanned aerial vehicle. Soldiers from

BG Bravo established an outer cordon, while U.S. and Polish Special Forces, civil affairs, and

Afghan National Police searched the village. As a result of the search, a substantial cache of

IEDs, ammunition, stolen ANP uniforms, and a stolen ANP vehicle discovered. Local villagers told the civil affairs team that the insurgents were caught off guard by the massive force that converged on the village and had no choice but to retreat. At least four mid‐level Taliban insurgents were killed in the Special Forces’ raid that morning, and four individuals were detained for questioning during the resulting operation (Lublin Independent Journal Online,

2010).

The 14‐hour operation was a considerable achievement for Task Force White Eagle and

BEST‐A4 – the Task Force proved its ability, commitment, and dedication to the war effort; the members of BEST‐A4 were able to successfully balance the interests of both commands; and both elements capitalized on the operation and used it as an example for the incoming teams as a baseline on how to conduct operations. Through trust, respect, and the combined effort of multiple organizations, conditions were set for the Polish Forces to succeed that day. Not only did we successfully conduct one of the largest missions in Ghazni Province, we did it under adverse conditions in a time‐sensitive setting.

CONCLUSION

Through these opportunities as a NATO/ISAF officer in Ghazni and as an ILARNG SPP participant, I was able to see, experience, and learn from the multi‐faceted and complex nature of the environment in which I found myself. These experiences, for me, quantified and humanized the act of balancing those elements. Most importantly, these experiences fostered my personal growth as a leader – and I attribute much of that growth to working with the Polish in war zone in Brigadier General Bronowicz and I on my last day in Ghazni FOB Ghazni April 26, 2010 Afghanistan as a BEST‐A4 team member.

I did not have any preconceived notions about the Polish Army, but my willingness to

step across the international boundary and engage in team‐building and cooperation, at least initially, was inhibited by my lack of trust in our Coalition partner. American soldiers all possess a certain bit of arrogance, and I certainly am no different. I believe this attitude is a natural reaction to being the Superpower we are, but if not kept in check, arrogance can negatively affect how we interact with our allies – the apt‐named “ugly American syndrome.”

Once I stepped out of my comfort zone and engaged in dialogue with my Polish brethren, in particular the battle staff, a level of trust was formed that transcended nationality.

By the end of my time in Afghanistan I truly believed in the “one team, one fight” mantra. I respected their work ethic enough to submit two of my counterparts for the Army Achievement

Medal. They respected our contributions

enough to award five members of my team with the Polish Army Medal

(awarded to foreign personnel for distinguished service to the Polish Army).

I was one of those five and was incredibly honored to receive it.

Upon returning from Afghanistan,

Five members of BEST‐A4 receiving the Polish Army Medal I joined select members of BEST‐A4 to Polish Military Compound, Bagram April 28, 2010

participate in the Bagram VIII exercise in Poland the in the fall of 2009. We were able pass the knowledge gained from our time in Ghazni to the next BEST and Polish rotation to Afghanistan.

The Polish Army has earned my respect as leaders and soldiers. I learned firsthand that the Polish are a polished fighting force, deeply‐committed to the NATO cause, and a proud and patriotic people. Further, despite the difficulty of the environment and the external political, social, and cultural pressures that impacted the Polish Army in Ghazni, my eye witness opinion is that TF‐WE managed to make remarkable strides in furthering the NATO/ISAF mission to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multicultural environment.

ANNEX 1 – BEST‐A4 Roster and Duty Positions

BEST‐A4 Headquarters – Brigade BEST‐A4 Commander Colonel Paul Fanning * BEST‐A4 Deputy Commander/S3 Lieutenant Colonel Scott Swinford * BEST‐A4 S3 Air Captain Joe Bright *

Operations Cell BEST‐A4 Operations SGM Sergeant Major Tamy Kuzel BEST‐A4 Battle Captain First Lieutenant Aaron Fannon BEST‐A4 Battle Captain Master Sergeant Diane Rogers BEST‐A4 Battle Captain Sergeant First Class Loendri Rodriguez BEST‐A4 S2 Captain Cesar Garcia

Support Cell BEST‐A4 S4 Major Jeff Jiannoni BEST‐A4 S4 Master Sergeant Rebecca Carter BEST‐A4 S4 Master Sergeant Timothy Kessler BEST‐A4 S6 Chief Warrant Officer Michael Clemens **

Battle Group (BG) Alpha ‐ Battalion BEST‐A4 BG A Battle Captain Captain Dustin Cammack ** BEST‐A4 BG A NCOIC Master Sergeant Scott Todd BEST‐A4 BG A NCO Master Sergeant James Frick

Battle Group Bravo (BN) BEST‐A4 BG B Battle Captain Captain Jerry Rhoton BEST‐A4 BG B NCOIC Master Sergeant Michael Robertson BEST‐A4 BG B NCO Sergeant First Class Abraham Weatherby

* Received Polish Army Medal, Silver ** Received Polish Army Medal, Bronze

ANNEX 2 – Maps

RC North

RC RC Capital West

RC East RC South

Afghanistan – Regional Commands 2009‐2010

FOB Ghazni

FOB Four Corners

FOB Warrior

Ghazni Province (districts not shown: Khugiani, Khwaja Omari, Rashidan, Waghaz)

ANNEX 2 – Maps (cont.)

HWY 1

Highway 1 ‐ Afghanistan Highway 1 (part of the Asian Highway Network) is a 2,200 kilometer highway network in Afghanistan connecting the cities of Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad, Delaram, Islam Qala, and several other cities along the route (Wikipedia, 2011).

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ANNEX 3 – State Partnership Program

In 1993, The National Guard established the State Partnership Program (SPP).The program was created to foster partnerships between foreign countries and National Guard

States to advance security, stability, and prosperity around the globe. The primary goal to the program is to enhance bilateral relations on military‐to‐military, military‐to‐civilian, and civil

security activities (National Guard Bureau, 2010). The SPP is a global initiative spanning all five major commands – United States European, African, Southern, Pacific, and Central Commands.

To date, 63 foreign nations are partnered with 48 American states and two territories (Puerto

Rico and Guam), and Washington DC (Office of the Governor of Iowa, 2011).

Within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of operations alone, 20 states have partnered with 21 countries (United States Army, 2011). Since the program’s inception in 1993,

the Illinois National Guard has

participated in the SPP with its sister

country, Poland. This partnership was

one of the first three SPP relationships

initiated between the National Guard

and the former Soviet Eastern Bloc

countries (Illinois National Guard, 2010).

JFHQ‐IL/BEST – logo designed by CSM Kuzel Illinois is one of the only States to have FOB Ghazni April 26, 2010 deployed and fought next to their SPP partner, and I had the distinct honor and privilege to be among the few Illinois Guardsmen to

have done so.

ANNEX 3 – State Partnership Program (cont.)

At the time of my deployment, Polish tours were six months in length. Beginning with

BEST‐A4, Illinois aligned with this timeline in an attempt to foster continuity between the U.S. and Polish forces. Prior to this, tours for Illinois National Guard soldiers in support of the SPP mission were 12 months in length. Starting with BEST‐A5, Illinois Guardsmen received pre‐ training with their respective Polish Battle Group, culminating in a final certification exercise called the Bagram Exercise conducted in Kielce, Poland (Munson, 2010). The intent of the pre‐ training is to build trust and efficiency between the U.S. and Polish before arriving in theater. I participated in Bagram VIII – along with other select BEST‐A4 members – upon returning from my tour.

ANNEX 4 – NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan

In October 2003, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1510 expanded the International Security Assistance Forces area of responsibility beyond Kabul. The previous resolution (UNSCR 1386, establishing ISAF on December 20,

2001) limited ISAFs involvement in Afghanistan to maintaining security in the city of Kabul only. Under the command authority of the United Kingdom and comprised of 18 countries, ISAFs new mission was to support and assist the

Afghan Interim Authority in exercising its authority and influence across the entire country (Institute for the Study of War, 2009).

In August 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), commanded by NATO

Supreme Allied Commander‐Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, assumed command of the

ISAF mission in Afghanistan. An expansion of ISAFs involvement in Afghanistan resulted in the establishment of Regional Commands (RC) North, South, East, and West. In August 2006, a fifth

RC was created from the existing Kabul Multi‐National Brigade located in Kabul (Institute for the Study of War, 2009).

Countries involved in ISAF as of April 13, 2009: Albania, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan,

Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Georgia, Germany, Greece, Herzegovina, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxemburg, Republic of Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,

Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, U.K. ,Ukraine, and USA (Institute for the Study of War, 2009).

ANNEX 4 ‐‐ NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan (cont.)

ISAF Mission Statement

“In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations

in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio‐economic development in order to provide a secure

environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population” (International

Security Assistance Force, 2011).

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ANNEX 5 – My Responsibilities

My role was to facilitate, coordinate and assist in acquiring U.S. resources in support of

TF‐WEs mission. The available resources

located on FOB Ghazni alone were

diverse: Texas Agribusiness Development

Team (ADT), Navy Provincial

Reconstruction Team (PRT), Explosive

Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD), Route

Clarence Package (RCP), Special Forces,

Basan Village Shura – BG Alpha and FOB Ghazni Navy PRT aviation assets, and medical assets to Andar District, March 8, 2010 name some. My two NCOs were located at FOB Four Corners (Andar district, approximately 10 miles south‐east of FOB Ghazni) and provided the Polish company located there with logistical and tactical support.

I was also used in other ways across the

BDE. On multiple occasions, I was sent on

missions with BG Bravo to assist with command and control of U.S. air assets. I provided an American point of contact for the battle space handovers (BHO) FOB Four Corners Team – myself, MSG Todd and MSG Frick FOB Ghazni April 23, 2010 between U.S. Special Forces

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ANNEX 5 – My Responsibilities (cont.) operations and the Polish BSO. I was also involved in the planning and coordination of operations between Polish Operational Mentorship and Liaison Teams (OMLT), U.S. assets, and the Afghan National Police and Army.

In a joint environment, various complicating rules and restrictions were placed on both

U.S. and Polish personnel regarding contracts and funding as the monies involved came from multiple agencies, depending on the intended purpose and use of the funds.

One of the many tasks for BEST‐A4 was to assist the Polish Support Cell in the process of procuring needed support from higher levels. All construction – current and future – FOB expansions, troop increases, and every‐day supply Thunder IX – Planning meeting with ANA, OMLT, and RCP ANA Compound Ghazni, December 30, 2009 needs in the province – both American and Polish – were handled by the Support Cell. It was a major undertaking. While I was not involved directly with the major supply chain, I did have a role ensuring FOB Four Corners supply issues were dealt with accordingly. Civilian contractor maintenance support, food and water requests, and building material requests were channeled through the Contracting

Officers Representative (COR) on the FOB. One of my NCOs was assigned this additional duty.

His role was an essential component of maintaining the operational status and readiness of the

FOB.

ANNEX 6 – T‐shirt Design

One of the skills I possess is graphic design. Throughout my military career, I have offered my talent for design by creating challenge coins, t‐shirt designs, and logos for the various units in which I have been assigned. During this deployment, I saw an opportunity to develop a logo for a t‐shirt that embodied the essence of the partnership developed between the state of Illinois and country of Poland.

My goal was to somehow merge national symbols from both countries into one unified, singular symbol. My

MSG Carter, MSG Kessler and myself selling t‐shirts idea was to juxtapose the main element FOB Ghazni March 28, 2009 of U.S. Army emblem – the Bald Eagle – with the main element of the Polish Army emblem – the White Eagle. I chose elements to represent our time in Afghanistan: the National Guard

Minuteman statue, a Polish phrase used by the 21st Podhales Rifles – “Jakby co, kieby co, to my

som” (roughly translated to “always there, always ready”), the dates of the deployment, and the flags of America, Poland, and Afghanistan. The resulting design was so well received I sold more than 1,000 shirts to both Polish and American soldiers in TF‐WE (the profits were used to

purchase BEST‐A4 unit coins). I took that as a compliment, not only to my abilities as an artist,

but to the camaraderie felt amongst the Polish Soldiers in Ghazni Province and the BEST‐A4

team.

ANNEX 6 – T‐shirt Design (cont.)

Logo I designed for the Task Force White Eagle ‐ BEST‐A4 t‐shirt (2010)

ANNEX 7 – Bibliography

Gray, M., & Tkachenko, M. (2010, April 11). Poland mourns president's death in crash. Retrieved June 5, 2011, from CNN International: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/10/poland.president.plane.crash/index.html?hpt=T1

Illinois National Guard. (2010). Illinois National Guard State Partnership Program. Retrieved March 20, 2011, from Illinois National Guard: http://www.il.ngb.army.mil/SPP/index.asp

Institute for the Study of War. (2009). REGIONS: REGIONAL COMMAND EAST. Retrieved June 16, 2011, from Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional‐command‐east

Institute for the Study of War. (2009). THEMES: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF). Retrieved June 16, 2011, from Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/international‐security‐assistance‐force‐isaf

International Assistance Security Force. (2011). ISAF Placemat Archives. Retrieved 05 20, 2011, from Afghanistan ‐ International Assistance Security Force: http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf‐placemat‐ archives.html

International Security Assistance Force. (2011). About ISAF. Retrieved June 16, 2011, from Afghanistan ‐ International Security Assistance Force: http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html

Lublin Independent Journal Online. (2010, April 22). The operation in Ghazni ‐ killed four major Taliban. Retrieved March 20, 2011, from Lublin ‐ Independent Journal Online: http://lublin.com.pl/artykuly/pokaz/6344/text

Morgan, W. (2011, April). Afghanistan Order of Battle. Retrieved June 16, 2011, from Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/files/afOrbats_combinedApr11.pdf

Munson, C. S. (2010). Bagram VII helps prepare Polish, American Task Force for Afghanistan. Retrieved June 16, 2011, from US Army Official Homepage: http://www.army.mil/article/35912/bagram‐vii‐helps‐ prepare‐polish‐american‐task‐force‐for‐afghanistan/

National Guard Bureau. (2010). National Guard Posture Statement 2010 ‐ America's Indispensable Force. Retrieved April 17, 2011, from National Guard Bureau Legislative Liaison Congress Reports: http://www.ng.mil/ll/Congress_Reports/2010%20National%20Guard%20Posture%20Statement.pdf

Office of the Governor of Iowa. (2011, March 23). Now it’s 63: National Guard State Partnership Program pairs Iowa, Kosovo. Retrieved April 17, 2011, from National Guard: http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2011/03/032311‐Kosovo.aspx

Roggio, B. (2011, Janurary 26). 'Foreign trainers' active in southeastern Afghan province. Retrieved May 15, 2011, from The Long War Journal: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/01/foreign_trainers_act.php

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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. (2011, January). ANSO Quarterly Data Report. Retrieved May 15, 2011, from The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office: http://www.afgnso.org/2010Q/ANSO%20Quarterly%20Data%20Report%20(Q4%202010).pdf

United States Army. (2011, March). ARNG State Partnership Program (SPP). Retrieved 2011 17, April, from 2011 Army Posture Statement: https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/information_papers/Poste dDocument.asp?id=307

Wikipedia. (2011, March 12). Highway 1 (Afghanistan). Retrieved June 16, 2011, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highway_1_(Afghanistan)

All photos were taken using my personal digital camera unless otherwise noted:

† Taken by CJTF‐82 Public Affairs Office during FOB Four Corners holiday visit †† Taken by Polish Civil Affairs Team during Operation Sudden Storm

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