The NGO Safety Office Issue: 76 16-30 June 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1 This period was defined by inclusion of this period, city where armed opposi- 7 Northern Region two key elements: the contin- 2011 incident levels in Hel- tion elements are able to Western Region 13 ued reporting of high conflict mand have now surpassed express their presence related incident volumes and the total recorded for 2010 more freely. In addition, Eastern Region 15 a similarly high volume of (see graph p.21). A further Ghor once again reported Southern Region 20 NGO incidents (see graphs testament of this extreme an NGO incident, now p.8 & p.16 respectively). volatility was the reporting accounting for almost 70% 24 ANSO Info Page While any correlational rela- of 2 NGO incidents of the total for this region. tionship is unclear, the end of (involving deminers) in this While remains one the period noted AOG inci- same province, both of of the most kinetic prov- YOU NEED TO KNOW dent levels reaching relative which resulted in national inces in the EAST, incident parity with May (with both staff fatalities, though in volumes from Paktya have • Numerous suicide/complex surpassing the 2010 peak) very distinct and diverse attacks within continued to rise, close in along with the highest NGO circumstances. line to those of last year. • Helmand remains most ki- incident volume noted this As has been the case This was also the case for netic province in the country year. throughout 2011 (see graph Kunar, a somewhat surpris- • Continued high NGO inci- The context in CENTRAL p.17), the NORTH ac- ing dynamic in light of the dent rate for June this period was dominated by counted for the majority of reorientation of IMF ele- a series high profile suicide NGO incidents this period. ments from such heavily • 2 NGO national staff fatali- and complex attacks which Of the total 7, 4 were in contested areas as the Pech ties this period occurred in various provinces , 2 in Jawzjan, and the and Korengal Valleys. A and resulted in large casualty final one in Badakhshan. previously reported NGO volumes. While the attack The RCIED strike against abduction case was also against the Intercontinental an INGO vehicle, an appar- resolved in Kunar this peri- ANSO is supported by Hotel was the highest profile, ent case of errant targeting, od with the safe release of the attacks at a market in was the most significant 3 while Paktya also report- Kabul and the District Hos- and resulted in the injuring ed the temporary abduc- pital in Logar resulted in the of a national staff member. tion of NGO staff. Lagh- highest casualties. Local Beyond the varied NGO man reported the periods strife resulting from the year- incidents in Balkh, that final NGO incident for the ly influx of nomads into province is also exhibiting a ER, this involving the also came to the steady increase in incident theft, and swift return, of fore, dominating the report- reporting, accounting for a an NGO vehicle in what ing from this province this 75% increase over the vol- was a purely criminal event. period. umes reported last year. With the inclusion of this Unlike Kabul, there have While City in the periods incidents, the East been no spectacular attacks WEST had no reported remains second to the within for several AOG activity this period, North for overall NGO weeks, though the standout the province itself recorded incident rates, at present dynamics in the SOUTH one of its highest monthly accounting for 30% of the remain the extensive AOG volumes thus far. This was years total which has been activity reported from Hel- primarily driven by districts almost exclusively driven mand and . With the to the west and south of the by Nangarhar and Kunar. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 A spectacular, complex attack 40 along with two other suicide at- of 28 June, when a commando of 30 tacks (one high profile, one failed) 8 well armed attackers (their gear 20 in the capital were the AOG ri- including suicide vests, small arms 10 & hand grenades) stormed the poste to the discourse of security 0 gains and progress on the battle- GOA owned Intercontinental field pushed forward by GOA and Hotel and fought an extended the IMF as security transition ap- pitched battle with security forces. KABUL AOG KABUL Crime proaches. The clash went on for several hours, ending when helicopter- The first attack, on 18 June short- borne IMF snipers eliminated the time entries by the media, marking a turning ly after mid-day, involved 3 opera- remaining 3 attackers who had point when the military effectiveness of the tives equipped with BBIED vests taken position on the rooftop of AOG action stopped being the primary con- hidden under ANA uniforms who the hotel. A conclusive casualty sideration. The AOG squad on the roof-top assaulted the police station in the count has yet to be fully corrobo- were by then playing their part for the ‘graphic’ Mandawi Market of Kabul City rated, though ANSO has so far dimension of the attack. (PD 1). Including civilians from accounted for two dozen casual- For suicide attack trends in 2011, 10 out of 14 the market and the adjacent tax ties, with security force personnel AOG suicide missions recorded in the Central collection office, the attackers representing at least two thirds of Region have been concentrated in Kabul Prov- managed to kill 3 ANP, 1 NDS the victims. ince (9 in the city and 1 SVBIED in Musayi), and 5 civilians while a further 2 while 3 out of the remaining 4 missions in the ANP and 8 civilians received inju- While the strike in the Mandawi Market was a remarkable demon- provinces have occurred recently, in a span of ries. Following this, in the even- 10 days starting 15 June. ing hours of 25 June, a lone stration of AOG economy of BBIED detonated when its own- force, noteworthy also for yet an- While suicide strikes dominated attention this er, with the full gear on, was ap- other exploration of deception period, they were seconded by two stand-off proaching the entrance to the tactics (the use of ANSF uni- attacks in the capital, first when PD 15 wit- Bustane Kabul, a park in PD 17. forms) and an apparent willing- nessed a typical indirect fire attack where the The absence of any target in the ness to cause civilian casualties intended trajectory linked Deh Sabz to KAIA area at the time of the blast pro- (the attack was staged in a highly (an average of 1.3 IDF fire attacks per month vides the ground to assume that frequented market place where in Kabul City since 2006). The second, more the detonation was premature, a the use of the BBIED component atypical attack, was a rare IED detonation plausible last step in the prepara- would inevitably lead to a high against an ANP road check post on the ‘Forty- tion of a strike against a training number of civilian casualties), the Meter Road’ in PD 11, marking only the fourth session for ANP district deputy- second event was an eye-and-ear such attack this year. The last incident of note, chiefs and administrators which catching exhibition of AOG force this time in neighbouring Musayi, involved 8 was scheduled to take place in the projection, reminiscent of the re- attackers wearing ANA uniforms who execut- park the next morning. The final, cent complex attack in Herat. ed an ANP informant, an action reminiscent of and most dramatic, attack oc- Night-time flares and explosions similar efforts in Wardak, Logar and Kapisa. curred during the overnight hours were covered in dramatic prime-

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 29th of June 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 4 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 The conflict paradigm in Logar 40 the driver misidentified the wulus- appears to be one of a symbiotic 30 growth. The increased frequency wali/ANP HQ with the hospital. 20 of ANSF-IMF initiatives, such as So far, there has been no corrobo- the on-going Operation Omeide rated evidence that would support 10 8, and the roll-out of the ALP has or rule out any of the plausible 0 appeared to stimulate a growth in scenarios and motives. No AOG the number of AOG incidents. network has claimed responsibility Whereas the June incident vol- and the community has remained LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime umes (all incidents combined) silent as to whether the attack could be linked to a specific mo- criminal networks, and basically all major do- grew by 14% compared to those mestic AOG networks. in May, AOG-initiated activity tive or warning. increased by 30% over the same Obviously, the immediate proxim- A less tangible, yet important development, period (33 AOG-initiated attacks ity of the hospital to the gover- has been noticed recently throughout Logar in June). Adding the IEDs dis- nor’s compound provides a very regarding frequent ANSF and AOG actions covered and neutralized by securi- conspicuous factor and suggests a inside medical facilities. While the AOG usu- ty forces (10 cases in June) on the case of poor targeting. However, ally seek treatment or medical supplies, the top of direct AOG activity, AOG in assessing this incident consider- ANSF occasionally perform targeted arrest provided the impetus for 70% of ation of events leading up to the operations inside medical facilities as a result. all incidents recorded. Disregard- attack is required. The strike On the AOG side, the explicit targeting of a ing the claims made by both sides closely followed recent IMF- civilian hospital would constitute a clear outlier as to their respective gains on the ANSF operations which essential- (in opposition to military medical facilities, battlefield, the communities (and ly marked the first GOA-IMF which had been targeted in the past) as the by extension, the NGO commu- attempt at introducing a police evidence from Logar or elsewhere in Afghani- nity) tend to bear the brunt of the force of scale into Azra, and a stan does not provide the data to conclude that violence as the rare SVBIED spectacular attack against a GOA- any of the major AOG networks would sys- strike against the district hospital related target would be in line temically target civilian medical facilities on in Azra illustrated. with the track of AOG ripostes of purpose. In the mid-morning of 25 June, an similar initiatives elsewhere. The Overall, attacks with a suicide element are an SVBIED attacker drove at high effort also coincided with recent extremely rare TTP for AOG in Logar, and speed thru the district center, past recruitment efforts for ANP in- represent a mere 0.54% of all AOG-initiated the access leading towards the side the community, but more incidents in Logar recorded since 2006. Of governor’s compound and ANP visibly, with the roll-out of the note, all four previous cases targeted security station, and entered the next-door Afghan Local Police Program forces and occurred between 2006 and 2007. compound of the clinic thru a (ALP) in the area. In total, 120 Azra also came to the fore earlier in the period gate which was at the time guard- ALP members have been recruit- with the abduction, and subsequent release, of ed by two uniformed ANP. In ed in the community, and as- the Governor along with a group the ensuing blast, 23 people were signed to man checkpoints of GOA VIPs at a midnight AOG checkpoint killed and an additional 27 re- throughout the district. The re- on the Qarghayi (Laghman) section of the ceived injuries, many of which cruitment was preceded by the Surkhakan highway. It is plausible that the were victims trapped inside the introduction of the program in- release, an atypical feature for GOA VIPs cap- hospital which had collapsed after side the community, and formally, tured by AOG networks, was secured along bearing the brunt of the shock by the endorsement of the pro- the friendships and political networks dating wave. Among the casualties, 1 gram by the district Shura. On a back years to the HIG party. In addition, NGO national staff member was general note, Azra district stretch- shortly after the SVBIED attack, additional killed, and an additional 5 NGO es on the intersection of AOG reports were received of AOG taking positions staff members received injuries. routes between Pakistan, Paktya, at checkpoints on the Hisarak – Azra Road. Mush speculation arouse regard- Logar and Nangarhar and the dis- One such report was confirmed on 27 June ing the intended target of the at- trict’s complex social environment when two passengers, including an ANA med- tack, in particular whether or not encompasses numerous tribal ic, were abducted in Spindokay. conflicts, the presence of armed THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 A report late in the period came to the fore detailing the release of fatally) when they were caught up 30 the two French journalists held in in the cross-fire during a firefight 20 captivity since their abduction in on the main road. On the IMF 10 side, the new French contingent December 2009. Under circum- 0 stances yet to be elucidated, the continued targeted night-strikes in journalists were voluntarily re- Tagab, as with reports from Shah- leased by their kidnappers, walked zad and Adezai which result- KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime into the Tagab Valley, and driven ed in the killing of 4 AOG, in- by car towards the IMF base. cluding a lower-rank commander. tions) this year. These incidents indicate a On 20 June in the provincial capi- Otherwise, overall low incident continued, though light AOG imprint in Ko- tal, the investigation into the re- volumes were recorded in Kapisa histan I & II and Kohband. during this cycle. AOG activity cent SVBIED strike (15 June, Ku- From a long term perspective, the volumes of comprised of three close-range ratas Road) lead security forces to AOG-initiated attacks recorded so far in 2011 attacks against IMF patrols on the a compound close to the check- remain some 15% below the volumes recorded main roads in Tagab and Alasay point where the attack occurred last year (reminiscent instead of the trend-lines with an additional IED prema- and in the consequent night-raid in 2009) while in counter-point IMF have sus- turely detonating in Niyaz Khel of the compound, the force seized tained the momentum established with the on the Tagab – Alasay road in the some 190 kg of explosives and operations earlier this spring. In Tagab, the night of 21 June, likely emplaced arrested four suspected AOG combined number of all incidents recorded to hit another IMF patrol. Typi- members. In Karim Khel of Ko- this year by the end of June equals 70% of the cally for the province, the strikes histan I, ANP discovered and year sum recorded in 2010. NGOs may expect remained infrequent but lethal. neutralized an IED on the district a stable growth in incident volumes to contin- The most significant of these, on road at 0800 hrs., the incident ue for Tagab, Nijrab and Alasay for the weeks 20 June in Nawruz Khel, resulted marking the fifth such discovery to come. in two civilians being injured (one (combined to at least two detona-

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40 Two recent escalations in the north (Miramor at the beginning of aid. Later in the cycle in Sang 30 Takht a former HIG commander of June and Sang Takht this cycle) 20 demonstrated the precarious sate escalated an altercation with a of the rule of law in the province, local Malik in the Dashtak - Jawzi 10 which still falls prey to the war- area, which ended up in the com- 0 lord networks, while in the south, mander shooting his opponent the pro-active engagement of an dead on the spot. The back- AOG unit transiting thru Gizab ground of this killing is thought to DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime by ALP broke the recent lull in be related to their political rival- incidents. ries as the Malik was an out- trict on their way to Helmand on 23 June. spoken opponent of the com- The first from the north occurred mander, himself an unsuccessful Overall NGOs enjoy a permissive operational in Miramor (3 June) when a con- candidate for the post of the dis- environment in the province, although physical tractor, charged with the delivery trict governor last year. ANP de- accessibility remains the primary issue of con- of stationary to local schools (part ployed to the area and arrested the cern. Running operations in the districts also of an assistance package provided commander and his bodyguard. requires a thorough monitoring of the plethora by an international organization) Meanwhile further south in Gizab, of local stakeholders and related power- got into a physical altercation with an ALP commander tracked down struggles, as security concerns rarely relate to the wuluswal, who was eager to and arrested a unit of 7 AOG anything other than local political and criminal exert control over the allocation members transiting thru the dis- developments. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Reporting from the Behsuds and 80 Daymirdad did not allow for three Hazara residents were killed 60 in another armed altercation (no much optimism at the beginning 40 of this cycle as a peaceful resolu- casualties recorded on the Kuchi tion in the Hazara/Kuchi conflict side), whereas the next day a two- 20 appeared unlikely as ANSF and hour firefight erupted in Dara 0 GOA authorities appeared slow to Kajao resulting in five participants react to the rising tensions in this killed and eight injured, with the WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime peripheral part of the region. The losses almost equally shared fact that in the second week of among the two camps. On 20 and 21 June, clashes occurred in continued stability of such arrangements re- this cycle one third of all security mains suspect as the fact remains that the Ku- incidents in Wardak related to the Tazak ( II) with similar localized clashes ongoing until 27 chi migration led large portions of the Hazara issue of Kuchi-Hazara enmities communities in the said districts to relocate, attests to this. However, a last June, when a precarious stalemate was reached with the Kuchis oc- putting extreme economic pressure on their moment ANA deployment to the households. area after a week of sporadic cupying the highlands and the clashes created a buffer between anchored around the For the rest of the province, June incident vol- the communities, though there main population centers in the umes remained largely at par with May (nearly has been no political resolution so two Behsuds, Daymirdad and Na- 90 incidents recorded for each month), though far and sizeable militias remain wur (Ghazni). Reports from the the ratio of AOG-initiated attacks fell by 10% mobilized on both sides. two Behsuds and Daymirdad indi- (to 60% for 2011). This drop in AOG activity cated that several hundred of men was mainly noticed in Saydabad (with AOG The report cycle commenced with at arms remain on each side and at incidents falling by almost 50% between May the continued influx of Kuchi this stage in the developing situa- and June), while IMF-ANSF operations in the nomads and countered by a mobi- tion, the conflict parties appeared district maintained constant levels. Besides lization of Hazara militias. This neither willing nor able to dis- Saydabad, Chaki Wardak experienced intensive dynamic, along with the absence lodge their rivals from their re- IMF-ANSF operations, including an air-strike of any sizable security force, al- spective positions, though a tem- which killed three and injured an additional lowed the tensions to degenerate porary stabilization was clearly two AOG members in Shah Qalandar. In into violence. On 16 June, the achieved due to the deployment turn, the district witnessed 5 AOG attacks in- communities clashed in Sabz Ab, of the ANA’s 21st Division. The cluding 2 multiple IDF against the district cen- (Ghazni), resulting ANA set up a base in Dahane ter and the beheading of a former ANA mem- in at least 7 fatalities. The same Soiasang, much to the dissatisfac- ber, leaving no doubts as to the AOG resolu- day, a Hazara militia retaliated in tion of the locals, whose leaders tion to retain control over the district. Taking Dara Kajao (Behsud II), attacking requested the army to push the a broader look, the trend-line of AOG-initiated a settlement of the Shanozai and Kuchis out from the their lands. incidents for Wardak in 2011 maintains an im- tribes and claiming to Current developments seem to pressive growth rate, coming very close to the have detained three Pakistani have deescalated and most NGO levels of the extremely kinetic 2010. Last year, AOG in the camp (the claim was observers agree that the ANA the growth in AOG attacks commenced in confirmed by local authorities, but deployment actually eliminated May and persisted until mid-fall, a develop- could not be verified). On 18 the possibility of a full scale erup- ment that is likely to be replicated again this June in Dashte Khawat (Behsud tion of the conflict. However, the year. II, bordering Nawur in Ghazni), THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 Another dynamic period was wit- 40 group of three suspected AOG nessed in Parwan as a rare BBIED 30 attack Chaharikar seems to have who were found in possession of 20 been staged to introduce the ap- two BBIED-vests, a compelling pointment of a new IEA PSG for incident as AOG suicide missions 10 Parwan, while in the Ghorband are extremely rare in Parwan. In 0 Valley, an influential local IEA addition, it is typical for suicide commander involuntarily surren- attackers to be used in strikes tar- dered to a joint IMF-ANP force. geting the IMF base and IMF/ PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime An IEA District Shadow Gover- ANSF convoys in Bagram with nor was also introduced to Kohi three such cases recorded since responded with a simultaneous triple IDF at- , though his entree was limited 2006 (June 2006, February 2007, tack timed at 2300 hrs. against ANP premises to an IDF attack against the DAC July 2010). in three different locations of the Shinwari and and an arson attack against a tele- Overall, Chaharikar District has Siyagerd DACs. More concerning than such a communication antenna mast. experienced an uptick in AOG demonstration, local reports expressed con- At 1100 hrs. on 21 June, a BBIED related violence this year (13 cases cern that the arrest may motivate AOG net- attacker wearing civilian clothes so far) compared to 2010 (6 AOG works to stage abductions for the purposes of identified the vehicle of the pro- -initiated incidents recorded a prisoner eschange, a conflict vector which vincial governor among a convoy throughout the year), although could hamper NGO movements along the leaving the Governorate. The this increase is mainly due to the main road in Ghorband. While such a devel- attacker walked towards the vehi- emerging trend of IDF attacks opment cannot be ruled out, the AOG pres- cle and detonated his charge, kill- against the IMF base in Jangal ence on the road to Bamyan remains extremely ing himself, the driver (ANP) and Bagh (11 out of the 13 incidents). rare during the daylight hours. An abduction a thirteen-year old girl on her way Reports from the community sug- was in fact reported this cycle in Siyagerd from school. While two ANP gest that the IDF attacks are occa- though this was related to a businessman (and also sustained injuries in the at- sionally staged by local command- landowner) visiting his relatives in Do Ab are tack, it failed to impact the Gover- ers to exert pressure on their ri- resulted in the individual being released un- nor who was not in the vehicle vals inside the GOA-ANSF struc- harmed following negotiations with the family when the attack occurred. The tures, and are not necessarily relat- and a likely payment of a ransom. As of yet, attack obviously required prelimi- ed to the predominant AOG net- there is no evidence to suggest that the NGO nary surveillance, and the prepara- works. security paradigm has changed over the last tions were likely underway since An early morning move on 23 four weeks. Nevertheless, military actions are mid-April when chatter on a June by an IMF-ANP force up becoming more frequent (but kept away from planned suicide attack against the into the Wazgher Valley (Siyagerd) the main road in Ghorband), while AOG net- governor ‘in the near future’ circu- was the first tangible police opera- works continue to display strength and confi- lated throughout the community. tion in the Ghorband Valley fol- dence. It is highly likely that IMF-ANSF will Somewhat in relation to this was lowing the killing of Ahmad Ja- be interested in replicating the success of the the incident that occurred previ- wad Zohak. While the operation recent operation in Wazgher in the short term, ously on the night of 17 May resulted in the capture of a local while AOGs continue their campaign against when IMF & ANP raided a pri- IEA commander along with his the local security forces. vate residence and arrested a 14 men, three days later AOG THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 8 BALKH 50 This Report Period 4 In comparison to the first half of 40 2010, Balkh witnessed a 75% in- of wheat storage facilities. In the 30 crease in security reporting over first, 129 bags of wheat were 20 burnt, while in the second, the fire the first 6 months of 2011, with a 10 total of 241 security incidents (as was extinguished before causing 0 opposed to the 139 recorded over significant damage. It remains the same period in 2010). This unclear who was behind these reporting period tallied 4 NGO attacks and why, with conflicting BALKH AOG BALKH Crime incidents—although not all of reports as to whether this was them occurred between the 16th done by local or non-local perpe- ghania in Nahri Shahi, the increased volume and the 30th—with 2 targeted trators. An IED was also discov- appears consistent with trends noted in other attacks against NGO food storage ered along a main road in the dis- parts of Balkh and Jawzjan, where AOGs have facilities in , and trict during the day on the 30th, been entering new areas to spread their influ- 2 separate physical attacks on representing an active cycle for ence. These AOGs have been anecdotally NGO staff members (Dawlatabad the most northern district of linked to Chimtal and Chahar Bolak districts and Mazar). This 2 week period Balkh. (and potentially the Tri-Provincial Area). This also saw increased insecurity in Just south of Shortepa, in Dawlat- dynamic is likely working in conjunction with Sholgara (including a night raid in abad District, anecdotal reports of the fact that Operation “Ebtekar 2,” launched Zard Kamar, the disappearance of AOG movements in both the to clear the main road, is pushing AOGs from a main power broker from east of west and east continued to - Chimtal and Chahar Bolak further north. the river, and the robbery of 4 face. Amongst these was a con- Mazar City saw a number of significant inci- commercial trucks along the main firmed account of an AOG break- dents, including the brief assault of an NGO Mazar-Sholgara road) and notable ing up a wedding ceremony, and member by ANA soldiers near the Blue activity in Mazar-e Sharif City. physically beating an NGO staff Mosque (for not allowing their convoy to Shortepa, historically one of the member who was calling for the pass), the accidental shooting of an IO staff quieter districts in the province, AOG to stop harassing wedding member during a failed abduction attempt on witnessed its’ first and second guests. The staff member’s affilia- the son of a gas station attendant in PD#2, a NGO related incidents when 2 tion with the NGO appears to threatening phone call to an IO staff member, similar attacks occurred on 2 sepa- have been unknown and unrelated and the detonation of a small IED on an ANA rate NGO food storage facilities to the perpetrator. While local shuttle. While none of these incidents alone in the Toqi area, both of which GOA sources have blamed the represent any strong shift to the security para- were run by the same NGO. insecurity in Dawlatabad on a digm in Mazar City, as a group they are worth Both attacks involved the burning group coming out of Sharek Af- noting, and play to the existing trend of in- creased security reporting.

ANSO ANNOUNCEMENT: Please see the last page of this report for an announcement regarding the transfer of management of ANSO. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Compared to 2010, Kunduz has 40 seen only a minor increase (22%) AOGs continued heavy reliance 30 in overall security reporting in on IED use in the wake of 20 2011, with 337 incidents recorded months of IMF/ANSF military 10 operations deteriorating their thus far in 2011, as opposed to 0 276 over the same 6 months in physical presence. The prolifera- 2010. This is greater than—but tion of IED attacks and discover- relatively similar to—some of the ies continued this reporting peri- KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime od, with 12 of the 37 recorded other provinces of the Northeast the detonation which occurred in the Khana- incidents being IED related. No- (specifically Baghlan and Takhar), bad District Center on the 24th. The IED was table amongst these was a VBIED and represents the highest volume the first ever recorded to detonate directly in that detonated on an IMF convoy of security reporting in the region. the district center, and detonated in front of a in Kunduz City on the 19th The relatively consistent volume civilian shop, allegedly targeting the District (killing 2 and injuring 9, including of reporting in the Northeast (and Chief of Police (DCOP) who was scheduled to a passing IO staff member), an particularly in Kunduz) is logical, be passing by at that time (but was not). The IED found in Kunduz Cityon the as unlike the rest of the North, blast caused 9 deaths and at least 30 injuries. 20th, an IED detonation in the where insecurity has crept into Although multiple sources have stated confi- Khanabad District Center on the previously peaceful areas dently that this was an AOG attack (likely 24th (detailed below), an IED (resulting in notable increases to against the DCOP), local sources suggest an detonation on an ANSF convoy security reporting), Kunduz has alternate narrative, with this being the result of on the Kunduz-Khanabad main been heavily contested for over a conflicting power brokers. Either conclusion road on the 25th, and on the 27th, year. At this point, fluctuations in fails to explain the location of the IED in a when 2 IEDs were discovered on Kunduz’s security usually depend largely civilian area, where a large number of a secondary road just outside of on changes to tactics rather than civilian casualties would be predictable, and no Kunduz City en route to Khana- volume. direct ANP/local power broker structure exist- bad. Most notable within Kunduz’s ed. Further assessment behind the source and current security paradigm is Amongst these, no IED caused target of this IED is required. more casualties this period than

Country Level AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006-1011 (the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks) 1800

1571 1600 1541

1400

1200 1092

1000

800 634 600 405 400 335

200

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN APR APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 2 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 2 Representing one of the more 40 dramatic shifts in security in the was the intended target. While no 30 North, Jawzjan Province recorded information has surfaced of pre- 20 existing threats or any suspect 135 security incidents over the 10 history, it appears likely that the first 6 months of 2011, denoting 0 an increase of approximately NGO, which had been working in the province for a number of 180% over the previous year’s JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime first half total of 48. Much of this years, may have been caught by a has been the result of increased new (or returning) AOG in the tional company). The checkpoint in Mardyan AOG activity and military opera- area which was trying to make occurred along the Mardyan-Qarqin Road, and tions taking place in the Tri- their presence felt. Also of note, resulting in the deaths of 4 civilians who were Provincial Area (TPA)—which a “Night Letter” was received in caught in the crossfire between ANP and saw 8 security incidents this peri- the same district (Aqcha) which AOGs (as well as the deaths of the 4 AOG od—but there has also been a made no threat, but asked the re- members who had established the checkpoint). recent trend towards increased cipient NGO to make a donation This represented the first illegal checkpoint incident reporting in Northern to the AOG. Initial investigations ever recorded in Mardyan District, but fits into Jawzjan over the past 2 months. have been inconclusive as to the trend of recent insecurity throughout east- whether this letter is tied to actual Directly affecting the NGO com- ern Jawzjan noted above. AOG elements in the area, or is munity this reporting period, an Finally, also in eastern Jawzjan, an IED deto- just the work of a potential op- RCIED detonated against a red nated on the 23rd, killing the DCOP and 4 of portunist. NGO Toyota Hi-lux late on the his fellow policemen while they were on patrol morning of the 16th which result- Mardyan and Khwaja Du Koh along the Mingajik-Aqcha road. This made for ed in injuring the driver. The ve- (KDK) both saw rare illegal 2 IED detonations in districts which had been hicle did not have the physical checkpoints. KDK had seen 2 quiet thus far in 2011 (Mingajik and Aqcha), appearance of a GOA or security prior illegal checkpoints along the together combining for only 11 prior security vehicle, and was not travelling main road this year, with this be- incidents (with no IED detonations in either along the main road when the ing the second to result in a sub- district). The sum of all the above confirms detonation occurred, nor was it in sequent abduction, this time of 3 weeks of anecdotal reporting that AOGs had an area often patrolled by ANP or international engineers along with been spotted in the eastern districts. The arri- other security forces. The combi- 2 nationals. One of the prior val of new (or returning) AOGs, often with nation of these factors make it checkpoints (March 10th) had weak or non-existent ties to the community, highly likely that the NGO itself also resulted in an abduction (4 usually marks a more volatile period as the nationals contracted to an interna- balance of power is shuffled and sorted.

GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 29th of June 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Although it is difficult to assess 40 significant long term shifts in se- Khumri (where there had never 30 curity within Samangan due to the been IED detonations before), 20 exceptionally small sample size of the maturing of the AOG infra- 10 recorded security incidents, by the structure in Dar-e Suf Payin, and a 0 numbers Samangan demonstrated disagreement between Aybak civil society and the small PRT which a 150% increase in recorded secu- SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime rity over the first 6 months of had been located there, which 2011 (compared to the first 6 subsequently resulted in the PRT’s this marked the 2nd IED incident ever record- months of the previous year). relocation out of Aybak City. ed along that stretch of road, with the first oc- However, in reality, this translated The most significant incident this curring only 2 weeks prior (when an RCIED to a mere 30 incidents thus far in period was the detonation of an detonated just after a convoy had passed its’ 2011, as opposed to the 12 inci- IED between 2 fuel tankers that location). Samangan remains the most peace- dents which occurred between were pulled over along the main ful province in the North, making the detona- January and June 30th of 2010. road in Aybak District on the tion of 2 IEDs along the oft used main Aybak While it would be difficult to draw 16th. The IED was apparently – road significant, but also likely meaningful conclusions from such attached to a bicycle (a common an outlier. At present, it appears more likely a small sample size, it is worth North Region TTP this reporting that these IEDs are the work of AOGs operat- noting that Samangan has actually cycle) and the detonation caused ing near the Samangan/Baghlan border, and recorded some significant devel- one of the tankers to explode, associated more with the increasing activity in opments this year in relation to killing the driver, and setting the Baghlan, than the result of activities by AOGs security. These included the deto- other 3 tankers on fire. In total, 3 operating throughout the Province (for in- nation of 2 IEDs along the main of the 4 tankers ended up com- stance, in Dara-I Suf Payin), but further assess- road between Aybak and Puli pletely destroyed. As noted above, ment may be required.

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 4 FARYAB 50 This Report Period 0 Faryab recorded a total of 274 40 security incidents over the first that has occurred along the main 30 half of 2011, representing a signif- road in northern Faryab. The 20 icant 72% increase in volume over Jungal area in Qaramqol is directly 10 the 159 recorded in 2010. This linked to the Jungal area in the 0 reporting period was characterized more kinetic , by a large volume of recorded and 5 of the 10 incidents that FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime security incidents (36) with nota- have been recorded in Qaramqol ble concentrations in Pashtun Kot this year have taken place there. Also on the main road, but further south, a (12) and Maymana (6), as well as Dawlatabad District just north of fuel tanker was hit with SAF in Khwaja Sabz multiple incidents along the main Qaramqol had seen 7 incidents Posh (KSP) on the 26th. The SAF was re- Maymana – Andkhoy road. occurring over the first half of sponsible for the death of the tanker driver June, but witnessed only 3 inci- On the 16th of June, in and caused the fuel tanker to ignite and burn. dents this period, the most nota- Quaramqol District, just South of This was particularly notable in that it took ble of which was a SAF attack on Dawlatabad, 6 AOG members set place in the middle of the day at 1345. Alt- a civilian vehicle in the Shaikh Ha up an illegal checkpoint on the hough KSP has historically witnessed relatively Area on the 28th. Generally main road in the Jungal area, and little recorded insecurity, 4 of the last 6 inci- speaking, AOG initiated insecurity fired at a civilian vehicle that dents that have occurred there were AOG ini- along the Maymana – Andkhoy failed to stop for them. Although tiated, suggesting an irregular but existing road has appeared to increase in Qaramqol has not seen the high AOG with ties to the area. Further supporting conjunction with the launching of level of insecurity that Dawlatabad this, the most recent incident took place in the ANSF led/IMF supported Opera- has, this does not represent a new same location (Qara Shikhi) as an illegal check- tions “Wahdat 2” and “Wahdat trend, but rather fits into the re- point that occurred there on the 1st, and where 3” (to clear this road) rather than cent surge in incident reporting 4 incidents occurred last year. diminish. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Issues in the Tri-Provincial Area 40 (TPA), along the Sar-e Pul – of those 5 being AOG initiated). 30 Shibirghan Road, and even just Amongst these were an 11th ille- 20 outside of Sar-e Pul City suggest gal checkpoint along the Sar-e Pul 10 – Shibirghan Road on the 29th, that this Province has witnessed 0 perhaps the greatest deterioration and 2 attacks on pro-government militia checkpoints in Panjshir in security of any in the North. SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime Although Sar-e Pul has not seen a Village and Qadam Jai village. As statistical increase equal to that of noted in the previous reporting general was a relatively quiet month for the Sar Jawzjan, over the first 6 months period, attacks on arbakis are like- -e Pul – Shibirghan Road, anecdotal reporting of the year, Sar-e Pul has wit- ly to continue in Sar-e Pul. This is from the area suggests that not all illegal nessed 90 security incidents, especially true in and around the checkpoints are being recorded, and that AOG which represents a 120% increase TPA, where the strong AOG presence and activity along this road remains over the 41 that were recorded presence in Sayyad (and neighbor- relatively consistent and active beyond what is over the same period in 2010. A ing Qush Tepa and Darzab) com- recorded. The TPA, which nearly borders this large portion of these incidents petes with the GOA for control road, remains one of the most significant represent the struggle between of AOG strongholds and influ- AOG strongholds in the entire Northern Re- GOA and AOGs in the province, ence among the communities liv- gion. AOGs carrying out activities in other deriving from insecurity along the ing there. districts/provinces (such as insecurity on the main Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road Unconfirmed claims arose this main road through Sar-e Pul, and the abduc- and AOG activities within the period that a group of armed men tion which occurred this reporting period in TPA. on motorcycles were seen loiter- Jawzjan) are often linked to the AOGs operat- Although this reporting period ing around the main Sar-e Pul - ing there. The TPA is widely considered under was not particularly active, 5 of Shibirghan road in the vicinity of the direct control of AOGs, and is likely to the 9 incidents that occurred took Zaka Village early on the morning continue to be a source of insecurity for the place in Sar-e Pul District (with 4 of the 26th. Although June in short to mid-term.

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 Baghlan was one of 2 provinces 40 (Takhar the other), which saw an such, AOGs have refocused oper- 30 insignificant change to the volume ations and assets on Kunduz, 20 leaving Baghlan and Takhar to of security when comparing the 10 receive less attention/assets. first 6 months of 2010 and 2011. 0 In 2010, Baghlan recorded 144 This period saw 5 security inci- security incidents over the first 6 dents recorded in Baghlani Jadid, BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime months of the year, while for night raids in Burkha and Puli 2011 the province has recorded an Khumri, the establishment of an Mosque. GOA sources further suggest that almost identical 148. This rela- illegal checkpoint in the Bano sub the junior officer then fled and has allegedly tively stable volume of incident -district of Andarab (a rare occur- joined an AOG. reporting—unlike the majority of rence for that area), and the killing IED detonations and discoveries continued at provinces in the North—is likely of the head of NDS for Tala-Wa a low but developing pace in Baghlani Jadid, due in part to ties and priorities of Barfak. In this last incident, the where one RCIED was found, and another AOGs operating in the Northeast. head of NDS had approached one detonated on an ANP vehicle near Ab Qol For much of the first half of 2011, of his junior officers to confront village. Prior to the previous reporting period, continuing military efforts in him with allegations that he was IED related incidents had become rare in Baghlan and Kunduz have kept cooperating with AOGs and Baghlan for an extended period. However, AOGs busy and unable to expand warned him to cease all activities should AOGs begin to re-establish themselves into Takhar (a secondary priority immediately. In response, the after months of IMF/ANSF military opera- to Kunduz), or conduct regular accused NDS officer shot and tions, like in Kunduz, it would likely be via the missions in Baghlan (where they killed the head of NDS in the use of IED attacks until they are able to re- were under constant pressure due middle of the day on the 18th as build their physical presence. to “Operation Nowruz”). As he was en route home from the THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 6 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 1 Badakhshan has recorded 118 40 security incidents over the first 6 of incidents, all of the above ap- 30 months of 2011, demonstrating peared to be criminal acts by 20 approximately a 50% increase largely known actors following 10 over the 79 security incidents that relatively established trends, with 0 were recorded over the same peri- no new actors or hot spots surfac- od in 2010. Although Badakh- ing. BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime shan remains a province with The NGO community suffered a many largely operable environ- 4th security incident in Baharak tinued instability as a bargaining tool to in- ments for NGOs, insecurity con- District, which has continued to crease their influence. tinues to flourish as a result of demonstrate a high volume of In Warduj, members of an AOG ambushed an shifting power brokers (GOA and insecurity primarily in the vicinity ANSF convoy that included the Provincial ACG) and drug related crime. of the District Center. In this Governor, the head of NDS, and the Provin- These are 2 elements that are un- latest incident, unknown individu- cial Chief of Police while they were travelling likely to disappear in the near fu- als hurled a hand grenade into the from Ishkashim District to Fayzabad City ture. living residence of an NGO staff along a well known trafficking route. This member on the night of June The second half of June witnessed incident—the second to take place in Warduj 17th. This marks the 6th NGO a number of notable incidents, this reporting period—occurred in the Ba- incident in Badakhshan this year, although most of them fit within shond area, which has seen a significant and the 2nd in Baharak to affect the anticipated security paradigm amount of insecurity in the past (although this this particular NGO. Although for the drug harvesting season in is the first incident recorded there this year). Baharak has made up the majority what is essentially the drug capital The attack came following the receipt of anec- of NGO-related incidents in the of the Northern Region. Note- dotal reporting (noted the PRP) about armed province (4 out of 6, or 66%), the worthy amongst these were a men in the area, and occurred in the middle of insecurity in Baharak has mostly hand-grenade thrown into an the day (1100 on June 20th). As previously appeared aimed at destabilization NGO compound in Baharak, the noted, the area where this attack took place is and intimidation rather than sys- Provincial Governor’s convoy key to controlling drug trafficking access be- tematic targeting with intent to being attacked in Warduj along a tween Badakhshan and Tajikistan, and as such, injure. As stated in previous re- main drug trafficking route, an is likely to continue to see insecurity in the ports, these attacks consist pri- escalation of conflict between 2 coming months as members from multiple marily of random violence con- local groups in Kishim, and multi- parties (AOG, ACG, GOA) seek to assert con- ducted by known ACG actors ple RPGs fired at Fayzabad City. trol over that access. However, despite the wide variety who wish to use the threat of con-

TAKHAR 50 40 30 20 10 0

TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 4 HERAT‐2011 50 This Report Period 1 Reminiscent of an incident report- 40 ed last period in which a commer- AOG efforts against the Parlia- 30

cial convoy transporting INGO mentary Elections), June has post- 20 items came under AOG attack, ed the highest monthly volume in this period another INGO convoy AOG attributed incidents. This 10 (transporting foodstuffs) was in- period has continued an upwards 0 volved in an incident. While the trend in activity that has marked previous incident occurred in 2011 which was particularly evi- HERAT AOG HERAT Crime Adrasksan, this recent case oc- dent during the past few months. curred in Obe and involved one While much of this activity has HERAT‐2010 of the convoys ANP escort vehi- manifested itself in the districts 80 cles striking an IED. It is likely surrounding the city, Obe to the 70 60 that in both cases it was the com- west and Shindand to the south 50 position and appearance of the (bordering volatile Farah) are 40 convoys that attracted the attack standouts, with the latter account- 30 20 rather than a concerted effort to ing for the highest volume (30% 10 target NGOs. Taking into ac- of the months AOG total). 0 count the presence of an armed Following the complex attack escort, from distance it is unlikely against the PRT in Herat City at HERAT AOG HERAT Crime the responsible parties could dif- the close of last month, armed ferentiate these vehicles from se- opposition activity reported from these actions but also likely represent efforts to curity force logistical convoys, a the city has been almost nonexist- present an image of stability in light of the common target of opportunity for ent. Not surprisingly, the majority pending transition. The exception to this was AGO countrywide. of incident reporting has been criminally motivated murder of an ANP of- With the exception of the some- from the security force side, the ficer in District 11, a case which has been at- what anomalous volumes from earlier event the likely impetus for tributed to a personal dispute. September last year (a result of

NEW WESTERN REGION RSA: ANSO would like to welcome and introduce the newest member of the team, Mr. Taro Yamagata. He is a welcome addition, coming to us with experience from both the NGO community generally and Afghanistan specifically. He will be arriving during the first week of July and an announcement will be made once he has taken over responsibility for the Western Region and based in Herat City. You will be able to contact him at [email protected] or 0799 322 192. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 9 GHOR 50 This Report Period 1 There was one NGO incident 40 reported this period (but occur- od, there was an almost equal dis- 30 ring at the end of the last) in tribution between criminal and 20 which an NGO program served conflict related events (5 & 6 re- 10 as the foundation for what be- spectively). From the criminal 0 came a local dispute. An individu- side, the ongoing disputes be- al, unhappy at not being a benefi- tween the two sides in Du Layna GHOR AOG GHOR Crime ciary of the program, armed him- resulted in 6 people killed in 3 self and threatened local leaders separate recorded clashes. This near the border to and in- which resulted in local ANP re- has been a long standing issue and volved 2 armed clashes between AOG and questing the NGO to cease its there are no present indicators ANP and one IED detonation. In the IED activities. This ultimately led to a that it will be resolved in the near incident, the sole victim was a civilian, unlikely temporary cessation of activity by future. In addition to these, there the intended recipient of the attack. The last the NGO until the issue can be was a case of kidnapping as well two incidents (from Charsada & ) resolved. Ghor has consistently as an attack against a lone ANA were linked and resulted in a case of rough accounted for the majority of soldier who adroitly managed to local justice. An ANP officer abducted on the NGO incidents reported in the foil whatever the attackers intent 22nd of June was subsequently executed by West, recording almost 70% of was. AOG on the 24th. In retaliation for this act, the incident totals. As for the conflict, 3 of the inci- the family of the victim sought out the perpe- There was little change this period dents were reported in Shahrak trators, and ultimately killed an individual be- regarding the dynamics noted for with a further 2 in Charsada and a lieved to have links to those responsible, Ghor throughout 2011. Of the 12 final one in Chaghcharan. For the though this has not been confirmed. total incidents reported this peri- incidents in Shahrak, all occurred

BADGHIS FARAH 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10

0 0

BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime FARAH AOG FARAH Crime THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 9 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 In late June the overall level of IED discoveries including of note 80 security incidents in Nangarhar 60 Province increased slightly as an IED which was located on the 40 compared to the previous cycle. main road leading to the DAC in However AOG initiated incidents Hashemkhel area. In Bihsud Dis- 20 decreased, accounting for only 22 trict on 22nd, an IED was located 0 % of all recorded incidents, a fig- in the vicinity of Saracha Bridge. The said district also experienced ure that is 10% less than the pre- NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime vious period. the sole recorded incident related to deployment of magnetic IEDs. A considerable period of quiet shown by the later SAF attack on ANP escort- On 26th, in the Customs Area, continued in the provincial capital ing a Kuchi owned truck. ANP located and subsequently with no spectacular inci- defused a magnetic IED attached In addition, AOG intimidation tactics re- dents recorded since the end of to a fuel tanker. mained a concern. On 16th June in May. This period ANSF conduct- two civilians and an off-duty ANA soldier ed several operations in Zone 3 Tensions have resumed over a were killed by a group of individuals wearing and 4, which resulted in detention long-standing land dispute in ANA uniforms. Also in Khogyani several days of at least 8 suspected AOG between the Sepai later, AOG abducted three local civilians who members indicating GOA efforts and Ali Sher Khel sub-tribes of had reportedly spoken publicly against the to disturb AOG cells operating the Shinwari, with an armed clash AOG in the area one day prior to the event. within the city. Although on the that occurred on 16th June. The Another incident of note took place in Karm decline this period, IED-related clash killed 4 tribesmen from Ali Khel area (still in Khogyani), where on the incident remained a concern Sher Khel and wounded 12 with 28th an armed group abducted 3 national staff across the province. In the last an additional 2 persons from Se- employed by a for-profit international develop- fortnight there were at least 16 pai also injured. Despite GOA ment organization (PDO). They were released IED initiated incidents, both det- attempts at negotiation, tensions after three hours due to the mediation of tribal onation and discoveries. In re- between the two parties persist in elders. gard to the geographical distribu- the area as attested by the later clash on the 24th. Another land Apart from an active AOG presence, criminal tion of IED related incidents, the groups continued to be a distinctive problem districts of , Khogyani, dispute erupted into a fire fight on the 22nd in Bati Kot, Lalma area, in the province. In this reporting period, in Bihsud, Bati Kot, Pachir Wa the Akhunzada Saheb area of Bihsud, a group Agam and Achin saw incidents this time between locals and Ku- chis, killing one person and of armed robbers performed a search of pri- where the large majority of them vate vehicles during the night on the main road were discoveries and only a third wounding another five. Although there were no reports of further leading to Chaparhar and robbed the occu- detonated. No casualties were pants of their valuables. The said incident reported. This period Sherzad clashes, the situation remains tense between the two parties as highlights once again the realities the increased District recorded four separate risks of travelling after sun set.

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 7 KUNAR 150 This Report Period 1 Compared to the previous period, 100 Kunar experienced an increase in denying involvement of the inci- dents, reports continue to be re- the overall volume of incidents, in 50 particular those that were AOG ceived of numerous civilian casu- alties as well as the movement by initiated. This period, the AOG 0 presence manifested itself primari- segments of the population trying ly in Wata Pur, Nari, Manogai and to leave the bordering areas in Bar Kunar districts, with a signifi- fear of further escalation of the KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime cant number of direct attacks - situation. AOG’s preferred TTP in the area. The security environment in which experienced 5 IDF occurrences. Alt- Yet, in the last fortnight, the secu- Kunar remains highly kinetic with hough the usual intended targets of these at- rity landscape in Kunar was a familiar pattern of ANSF/IMF tacks are mainly military or GoA facilities, giv- shaped by the situation along the – AOG direct engagements. In en the lack of accuracy of the weaponry, civil- border with Pakistan. Although the last two weeks the rate of ian casualties are frequent, with this period cross-border incidents are not AOG direct attacks has increased being no exception. In Bar Kunar DAC Area, uncommon, occurrences in Kunar compared to the previous cycle, one child was wounded when a mortar round sporadically surface, and during with at least 38 events. These impacted in a residential area. Also in Bar this reporting period they reached were focused on Wata Pur, Nari Kunar, a mortar round detonated in the an unusual scale and intensity. and Manogai districts. Whereas Chaichan Sar area, killing a teenage girl and IDF attacks from the PakMil have one civilian and two ANA soldiers wounding another five civilians. been reported on numerous occa- were wounded following an AOG sions in Sirkanay (4), Dangam (4), attack on a military convoy in La- AOG abductions and intimidation efforts con- Shegal (3), and Nari / Khas ram Katis area of Manogai, a tinued in this period underlining the extent of Kunar (1). Prior to this series of noteworthy incident was reported AOG freedom of movement. For instance, cross-border attacks, which were from Asadabad. On 20th June, 2 on the 17th in the Sirkanay, Barogai area, allegedly aimed at AOG positions, ANA and 11 AOG were reported AOG abducted a civilian. On a positive note reports had surfaced about a large to have been killed in a prolonged though, the three NGO staff who were ab- scale attack of an Afghanistan armed clash in Saigai Area. ducted on 11 June in Asadabad were eventually based AOG into the Bajaur tribal Along with a number of direct released on 28th following mediation efforts of region, targeting several villages attacks, AOG were able to con- the community elders. At this stage, further inhabited by Mamond tribesmen. duct around 10 IDF assaults. In details surrounding their release have not been While the issues have taken a po- this period these attacks were revealed. litical dimension, with both sides mainly focused on Bar Kunar

COMBINED (AOG/Criminal) NGO INCIDENTS : 2006-2011 (the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks) 30 27

25 24 22

20 17 17 15 15

10

5

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB APR APR APR APR APR APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 3 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 With around 99 security incidents (50% AOG initiated), Khost re- tion of AOG tactics continued 100 mains one of the most ‘active’ across the province, in particular, province within the Eastern Re- a significant increase in the num- 50 gion. In line with previously ob- ber of direct attacks has been rec- 0 served patterns, massive IED de- orded as compared to the previ- ployment continues to shape the ous cycle with at least 24 AOG security environment in the prov- initiated direct attacks recorded. KHOST AOG KHOST Crime ince as in the last two weeks there The districts of Musa Khel, Saba- were at least 12 detonations and ri, Shamal and Tani accounted for IDF assaults have also continued across the 21 discoveries. This reporting a majority of them. Although the province with a focus on Tere Zayi (4 attacks), period Khost City was once again favoured AOG targets were Spera (3) and Sabari (2). Lastly, ANSF/IMF an area of concern in regard to ANSF/IMF patrols, district cen- maintained high tempo of operations through- IED emplacement, with almost tres constituted another target of out the province with 14 documented opera- 33% of all recorded IED incidents choice. For instance, during this tions. In the last fortnight operations in Khost occurring within the city. Among reporting period the Musa Khel City, Musa Khel, Tani and Sabari resulted in the 11 reported incidents in the DAC came under AOG attack 5 numerous suspected AOG detentions. In Sa- city, 4 devices detonated though times. Worth noting is that direct bri alone, 9 documented operations were car- no casualties recorded. attacks accounted for the majority ried out resulting in the detention of 26 sus- The primary targets of IED of casualties reported this period. pected AOG members. Of note, in Tani Dis- strikes across the province were For instance, in a single incident trict, IMF/ANSF conducted an operation in ANSF/IMF and PSC vehicles and that occurred on the 21st June in the area of Laghori Peran Village. As a result, convoys. In the last fortnight Borgai area of Shamal, following a former ANA soldier, who shot and killed an three PSC guards were killed and an AOG attack on an ANA con- IMF soldier in on 30th May, two ANA soldiers were wounded voy four locals, including a fe- was killed and three other suspected AOG in such incidents. The diversifica- male, were killed. were arrested.

NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS-2011 REGIONAL DATA CENTRAL 13%

NORTH 36%

EAST 30%

WEST SOUTH 17% 4% THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 1 Despite the rather low overall 40 tions in regards to the NGO and volumes of incidents (10 incidents 30 their assistance program. total, 5 AOG initiated), the prov- 20 ince did witness an opportunistic In another unusual event, four criminal incident which represent- GOA VIPs with backgrounds in 10 ed the first direct NGO incident Logar (including the District Gov- 0 since April 2010. ernor of Azra) were abducted by a On 18 June, five national staff sizeable AOG unit (reports vary LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime members of an INGO involved in between 30 to 40 men) at a night- time checkpoint on the Azizkhan the health sector went to Sengara saw some fairly intensive combat operations), Khas section of the highway in (Alingar) for a monitoring visit. an AOG staged a close-range attack against an Qarghayi shortly after mid-night After the staff left, the driver was ANP CP, which went on for 30 minutes be- on 18 June. The incident took a alone their vehicle when five fore the attackers disengaged. For the rest, surprising turn when local elders, armed individuals showed up, Alingar ( and Sangar) accounted for 2 and possibly old friendships based overpowered the driver, and AOG close-range attacks against patrolling on HIG-forged andiwal networks, drove away with the INGO vehi- security forces while 2 IEDs were recovered helped secure the release of the cle. The community quickly iden- from Wati Jabarkhil (Alingar) and Karnjawa hostages, marking an atypical end- tified the perpetrators and had (Alishing). An IMF operation also targeted an ing for abductions involving gov- them return the vehicle by the AOG compound in Mihtarlam (Ghar Moni, 20 ernment-related VIPs in the re- evening of the next day. Accord- June), and resulted in the detention of two gion. ing to the NGO’s assessment, the AOG members. Of note, AOG-authored inci- seizure was criminally motivated, In Bad Pash, a newly created dis- dents in Laghman dropped by 40% between and no evidence has been suggest- trict which underwent several sig- May and June; a trend-line to monitor as the ed that the incident would be nificant IMF clearing operations province approaches transition. linked to any negative connota- earlier this year (the area actually

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 3 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 1 An NGO temporary abduction in 80 District towards the end tions, including the 21 May tem- 60 of the cycle topped the events in porary abduction of thirty NGO 40

Paktya, highlighting that access deminers in Tandan Area (Gardez 20 along the major roads, rather than – Logar Highway) and an incident 0 work in program areas where an from the previous cycle when NGO is well-entrenched, repre- AOG confiscated VHF handsets

sent the principal issue of concern and other communication material PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime for the community. from an NGO demining site. Around mid-day on 26 June, a During this cycle, AOG in Paktya June, another air-strike in Gardez resulted in group of 6-7 gunmen kidnapped a sustained their momentum with the elimination of a Haqqani commander, and party of three INGO national the amount of AOG-authored in a consequent IMF comment linked the staff members in the Shikhan Shi- incidents equaling the surge in commander to the attack against the Intercon- kawa area. While the NGO li- AOG activity during May. The tinental Hotel in Kabul one day earlier, though aised with the community to re- AOG contribution represented this has not been corroborated. An ANP op- solve the issue, the kidnappers 70% of all incidents and a look at eration in Gardez identified AOG supporters demanded material support in the TTP split of AOG attacks among the security forces, with three individu- exchange for the safe release of reveals a continued prevalence of als (an ANP HQ officer, another police QRF the staff members, a request close-range attacks (25 cases, member, an ANA ambulance driver) being strictly rejected by the NGO and 60%) over stand-off IDF (14 cas- arrested. Jani Khel received a portion of the the community. The kidnapped es, 34%) and IED strikes (5 cases, AOG combined SAF/RPG attacks in a string staff members were eventually 12%). In relation to the latter of five such incidents over 10 days. In released unharmed in the evening, figure, an additional 7 cases of , mortars were used on three differ- although the abductors retained IED discovery by the security ent occasions to shell the IMF base and the the NGO’s (rented) vehicle. forces were reported. DAC. Meanwhile, Sayed Karam hosted the AOG requests for material or fi- Among significant developments, highest concentration of AOG initiated attacks nancial support (‘to finance jihad’ the night of 25 June witnessed a per district (8). Despite all of this, NGOs con- in another case recently communi- ground and air IMF-ANSF offen- tinued to report a ‘better-than-usual’ access in cated to ANSO from Jani Khel) sive in Khake Faqir, which result- the province though NGO operational areas are a part of the local landscape, ed in the killing of three AOG north of Gardez City, towards Sayed Karam, in particular for networks which members including a mid-rank the districts bordering Pakistan, and the road operate along the main roads. commander, and the injuries of an to Khost have been singled out as an area Prior to the abduction, the only additional 3 members. IMF also worth monitoring in close detail due to their two NGO direct incidents were released information that on 29 extremely volatile nature. related to de-mining organiza-

ANSO Staff Orientation Service: Due the arrival of 2 new staff during the month of July we will be unable to conduct an NGO International Staff Orientation Service until near the end of month. Once a date has been confirmed, an announcement will be made via email and you will be welcome to register any newly arrived (within the last few months) staff . Our apologies for the delay and any inconvenience this may cause. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 1 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 Although in the past several 150 tions and conducts activities that weeks Kandahar City has not ex- 100 perienced any spectacular AOG differ from typical NGOs and has attacks, insecurity nonetheless also been the target of numerous 50 continues to affect the city itself attacks in both Kandahar and 0 as well as the province as a whole. Helmand provinces. Although as mentioned, isolated criminal act This reporting period, AOG activ- remains a possibility, it should be KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime ities affected in particular the dis- noted that past incidents clearly tricts of Zhari, Panjwayi and Kan- indicate that AOGs are capable of dahar City. In addition to the distinguishing between private tribal elder while he was praying in a mosque. prevalence of IED deployment in development organizations or While the tribal elder survived the attack, four the city and surrounding districts, affiliated and impartial, independ- other civilians praying in the same mosque in the last fortnight AOG re- ent NGOs, and there is no cur- were also wounded. mained focused on targeted kill- rent indication that this has IED related incidents remained another key ings of both local leaders and changed. feature of this reporting period. At least 56 ANSF/GoA personnel. Apart IED initiated incidents were recorded, the ma- from these usual targets, an inci- Further targeted killings occurred jority of which occurred in Zhari, Panjwayi and dent of note took place on the in District 9, where a member of Kandahar City. Within the city, two civilians 24th June in the Loya Wala area the Arghandab District Council were killed in District 5 when their vehicle of District 4, when two individu- was killed and in the area of the struck a roadside device though the most dead- als riding on a motorcycle shot Red Mosque where an ALP com- ly incident was recorded in and killed a local employee of an mander (also from Arghandab) when an IED that hit a local tractor machine, INGO based in Kandahar City. was shot and killed by a ‘hit team’ killing four civilians (three women and one While at this stage a criminal mo- riding on a motorcycle. Another man) and wounding three others (two men and tivation for the attack remains a incident of note occurred in Dis- one woman). possibility, the organization’s as- trict 1, where the Provincial Di- sociation with the IMF rector of the Hajj and Religious The second week of this reporting period also ‘stabilization efforts’ constitutes a Affairs Department was killed in saw two ineffective IDF attacks against Kan- strong case as to the eventual the vicinity of his residence. Out- dahar Air Field. On the 22nd a single rocket AOG implication. The affected side of the city, a noteworthy inci- impacted in the vicinity of KAF, whereas two organization has a profile similar dent took place in Zhari when days later two rockets detonated in an open to private development organiza- AOG operatives opened fire on a area also in the proximity of KAF perimeter.

PAKTIKA URUZGAN 100 150 80 100 60

50 40 20 0 0

PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 2 HELMAND This Report Period 2 350 In addition to a huge number of 300 incidents, Helmand experienced is the first such incident reported 250 two NGO direct incidents, both in the Southern Region this year. 200 150 involving fatalities. On the 23rd In the second incident, on 29 June 100 June in Deh Mazang area of Nahri in Naw Zad District, an RCIED 50 Sarraj District an IMF patrol shot struck an NGO de-mining vehi- 0 and wounded a de-mining NGO cle, killing one de-miner and

national staff member. The victim wounding two others. Peripheral HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime was hospitalized in a local clinic, reporting surrounding this inci- but subsequently died of his inju- dent seems to indicate that the trict saw a BBIED incident on 20th June, ries. Despite grey areas surround- organization was most likely mis- when an AOG member was killed while strap- ing the shooting, details of the takenly targeted. Preliminary re- ping explosives to his body in a residence prior incident seem to indicate that the ports further suggest that an IMF to conducting an attack. In this reporting peri- NGO worker was likely seen as a convoy passed through the same od Nahri Sarraj District came to the fore with suspected AOG and consequently area just prior to the IED detona- a significant number of IED related incidents targeted. According to corrobo- tion. While this suggests that the and AOG direct attacks, both tactics in line rated elements the incident oc- NGO may not have been the pri- with previous patterns with generally ineffec- curred in the proximity to an IMF mary target, it should be noted tive direct attacks and IED deployment, in base in the area known for AOG that there are two key dynamics at particular in urban centres, remaining a distinc- activity and although the play; the first being the sheer tive concern. As previously observed, IED demining team had been working scope of demining activities discoveries outnumbered detonations by more previously in the area on several throughout the country which has than 50%, nonetheless with massive IED de- occasions, another element played a concomitant exposure risk and ployment civilian casualties are frequent across possibly a role. During their ac- the second being that demining the province with this reporting period being tivities, the staff members were activities may at times run counter no exception. On the 18 June in Safiyano Vil- usually wearing clearly identifying to AOG objectives. One or both lage of Lashkar Gah District, a roadside IED clothing; however, on the day of of these may have had a role in detonated against a local vehicle, wounding the incident, the victim was wear- this and previous incidents. four occupants. The provincial capital-Lashkar ing plain civilian clothing and was In the last two weeks AOG activi- Gah City- also saw a significant incident, when working in the area with a GPS ties were focused on the usual two days later, on the 20th an IED that was device. The case of mistaken hotspots of Sangin, Marja and placed in a hand-cart detonated in the Bazaar identity of NGO workers by IMF Nahri Sarraj districts. Marja Dis- area, wounding seven civilians.

Helmand AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006‐2011 (as of 29 June 2011)

1600 1408 1430 1400 1200 1000

800 622 600 448 400 175 181 200 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 In Zabul, both ANSF/IMF and 80 AOG have increased their activi- weeks, with 12 resulting in deto- 60 nations. The most notable inci- ties as compared to the previous 40 period. In the last fortnight Shah- dent related to IED deployment 20 joy, Shinkay and Qalat accounted took place in Qalat City on 29th for the majority of AOG initiated June, when an RCIED detonated 0 incidents and these mainly took against the vehicle of the Qalat ANP Security Chief. As a result, the form of IED deployment; a ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime continuing feature in the security the official was wounded along landscape in the province. How- with three of his body guards. Of 22 June, in the DAC area of Shahjoy, AOG ever, direct attacks seem to be on note, the victim of this incident shot and killed an ANP official who was on a the rise across the province in had already been a target of an foot patrol while prior to this, on the 18th in comparison to the previous re- assassination attempt involving , AOG abducted a 17-year old port. There were at least 21 re- similar TTPs when on 13 June, an boy from his house. The victim was subse- ported AOG direct attacks, pri- RCIED detonated against his ve- quently shot and killed allegedly over the accu- marily taking place in the afore- hicle in Shahr-e-Naw Area of sation of spying for the IMF. Qalat City. While the earlier at- mentioned districts. In regard to ANSF/IMF on the other hand appeared intent direct assaults, the AOG targets tack took place in the vicinity of the ANP officer’s house, he es- on pressuring AOG operating in the province of choice remained ANSF/IMF by launching several noteworthy operations. patrol and convoys, followed by caped unharmed. Further IED initiated incidents recorded across In the past two weeks besides the districts of ANP check posts. Whereas one Qalat and Daychopan, Tarna Wa Jaldak experi- PSC guard was killed and another the province caused a total of three ANP fatalities and wounded enced the majority of military operations. In wounded during one of AOG the said district among 5 documented opera- direct attacks, the vast majority of another two ANP along with one IMF soldier. tions, the use of air assets were reported on casualties recorded this period in three occasions. As a result of these opera- Zabul resulted from IED deploy- Similar to other southern provinc- tions, a total of 16 AOG members were killed ment. At least 30 IED initiated es AOG intimidation efforts con- and another 7 were detained. incidents occurred in the past two tinued in Zabul this period. On

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 In this reporting period the securi- 80 ty environment in Nimroz contin- IED deployment continues to be ued to follow a familiar pattern. the main threat in the area with 60 On the one hand, reporting from this period recording 5 IED relat- 40 the province remained relatively ed incidents, of which 2 resulted 20 limited with 10 incidents record- in detonation. On 18th June, in 0 ed; whilst on the other hand it’s the area, a roadside IED geographical distribution has not hit a road construction company NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime changed, with Mazda truck, seriously wounding as a constant ‘hotspot’ in the one civilian. Another IED strike against ANP check posts and one against an province. In the last two weeks was reported on the 29th in the IMF patrol. A noteworthy incident took place this affirmation was once again same area, targeting this time an on 27th June in Landi area, where IMF/ANA backed by data as Khash Rod dis- IMF vehicle but causing no casu- engaged with an AOG during a joint operation trict accounted for 100% of all alties. In addition, 3 separate and IMF air support was called in. As a result, reported incidents, with 80% oc- AOG direct attacks have been five AOG members (a mid-level commander curring in the Delaram area alone. reported in the district. Two and four foreign nationals) were killed. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 A comparative 20% drop in AOG 200 -initiated attacks between May and Following the arrival of an ANP June did little to change the over- reinforcement, a dispute between 150 all security paradigm of Ghazni, ANP and PSC guards degenerated 100 with over 200 AOG incidents into a fire-fight (due to the death 50 being recorded for both. 74% of of the civilian) and as a result, 0 the June incident levels pertained three ANP and three PSC guards to AOG-initiated attacks, with were killed and eight PSC guards GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime Highway 1 and DAC attracting and one civilian were wounded. the core of significant incidents. In an odd conclusion to the inci- cently) at 0800 hrs. on 27 June. The blast Close-range attacks constituted dent, the following day, the PSC killed four passengers and wounded and addi- 60% of AOG activity recorded in unit was disarmed and their weap- tional two occupants. ons handed over to DIAG. June (116 attacks) with the dis- IMF and ANSF bases attracted 29 IDF attacks tricts of Ghazni, Qarabagh and Civilian casualties remain a con- and it is the proximity of the bases to popula- hosting the majority of stant feature of the conflict in tion centers (a common feature in the region) these attacks (60% combined). Ghazni, and largely result from collaterally exposes the population to an addi- Targeting patterns indicate that a AOG stand-off attacks. This tional significant threat. Indeed, another attack significant proportion of the at- TTP represented 86 incidents in involving civilian casualties was due to a single tacks were dedicated to PSC es- June with 65% being IED detona- rocket strike aimed at the DAC in Ab Band, corts ensuring the IMF freight tions (57 cases, with a further 36 which impacted in a residential area. As a re- traffic along Highway 1, with over devices being neutralized by secu- sult, two residents were killed and an additional 20% of all close-range recorded in rity forces). A considerable por- civilian was wounded. Of note, the Andar Ghazni in June related to this spe- tion of the devices were emplaced DAC alone hosted 40% of all IDF strikes in cific category. For instance, one in the population centers and as a June. In a more direct case of AOG targeting, such attack closed the highway in result, 12 civilians were killed in 8 ANP recovered the bodies of two male civil- the Shah Baz area (an area which separate IED detonations during ians executed over the accusations of spying was the scene of a similar incident the month of June (4 in for the government in Tangi Nazar Khan of last period) on the morning of 30 Qarabagh, 3 in Ghazni and 1 in Gelan. June, locking a PSC escort in an Gelan and Deh Yak each). The hour-long engagement which re- heaviest toll among these oc- The risk linked to the AOG stand-off attacks, sulted in 9 PSC casualties (5 killed, curred when a public transporta- namely IED emplacement, incl. victim- 4 injured). This area was also the tion flying coach drove into a operated devices, and inaccurate IDF strikes scene of another AOG attack on a pressure plate device on the High- against the military installations in the district PSC convoy on the 3rd of June, way in Kotale Zardalu (the area centers represent the most significant risk fac- which resulted in one civilian cas- where an ANP-ANA check post tor for the civilian population and, concomi- ualty as a result of the cross-fire. had been recently established re- tantly, the NGO community. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by the Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 International NGO Safety Organisation Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 (INSO) Bamyan Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Takhar Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Badghis To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 Farah contact: Nuristan [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) Paktika Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Uruzgan Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242 ANSO is managed by an NGO This is because we Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) do not know enough feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 about the area to them know on: comment on the sig- Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 [email protected] nificance of the inci- dents occurring ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) there. Taro Yamagata - [email protected] - 0799 322 192

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces If you can help us / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) understand the prov- Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 ince better, please Police / ANCOP-Afghan Nation- contact us. al Civil Order Police / AOG- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Armed Opposition Group / Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised mili- tias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghani- stan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: Dear Colleagues, mortars) / IED-Improvised Ex- Please note that as of the 1st of July 2011 management of the ANSO project will per- plosive Device / IMF- manently transfer from Welthungerhilfe (formerly known as GAA) to the International International Military Forces / NGO Safety Organisation (INSO). NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- On behalf of all those who have benefitted from ANSO since 2006, I would like to Previous Reporting Period / publically extend the deepest gratitude to Welthungerhilfe for their tireless and selfless PSC-Private Security Company efforts behind the scenes for the greater good of the NGO community in Afghanistan. / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / Without their encouragement, support and organisational flexibility ANSO would not VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- have been able to develop in to the independent organisation it will become tomorrow. vised Explosive Device / PDO- We are all in their debt. Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police I take the opportunity to reassure all ANSO stakeholders that the transfer, which has / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / mostly occurred already, will not result in any disruption of normal service. Additional- IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- ly, there is no requirement to reregister for any of the distribution lists. ANSO will stan () / PSG-Provincial remain named ANSO. Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA) / APRP-Afghan Peace and Re- Kind Regards, integration Program Nic Lee Director Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)