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Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN) Weekly Election Coverage Newsletter, Aug 27-Sep 2

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Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN) Weekly Election Coverage Newsletter, Aug 27-Sep 2 Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN) Weekly Election Coverage Newsletter, Aug 27-Sep 2 Wishing anonymity, an official at the Independent Election Commission (IEC) said representatives of the commission, UN and Change and Continuity team were in discussions on resuming the process. A Pajhwok Afghan News journalist reported at around 10:30am that representatives of the Reform and Unanimity team could not be seen on IEC premises. But UN, IEC and Ahmadzai representatives are yet to comment on the latest development. A day earlier, the Reform and Unanimity team, led by presidential candidate Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, warned of boycotting the ongoing vote audit if its technical demands were not meet. Fazal Ahmad Manawi, a member of Dr. Abdullah’s camp, Afghan leaders need hard compromise: Obama said they would not be part of the ongoing ballot audit By Lalit K Jha Aug 27, 2014 - 10:51 anymore. He alleged the process had been politically hijacked. WASHINGTON (PAN): Amidst a lingering dispute over He said the Reform and Unanimity team had some the auditing of votes, US President Barack Obama on reservations about the vote-invalidating procedure. The Tuesday said the leaders of Afghanistan needed to make process had been set in motion at the time when the two hard compromise for the sake of their country's future and sides had not agreed on invalidation benchmarks, he security. claimed. Though Obama did not name anyone during his public Around 72.6 percent of votes have been audited so far as speech in North Carolina, yet his remarks were directly part of the scrutiny that started on July 17 after the aimed at the two presidential candidates – Dr Abdullah electoral process hit an impasse due to severe differences Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. between the candidates. “As Afghans continue to work towards the first democratic Manawi charged most of ballots from a single polling transfer of power in their history, their leaders need to station had been marked by one individual and did not make the hard compromises that are necessary to give the have signatures or stamps, but they were still entered into people a future of security and progress,” Obama to the system. observed. In addition, he said, ballots from 190 polling stations that He added: "As we go forward, we'll continue to partner had been closed due to security concerns on the Election with Afghans so their country can never again be used to Day had also been entered to the system and counted as launch attacks against the United States.”. legal votes. Obama justified his decision to pull out troops, insisting it The former election commission chief explained one of was the right thing to do. Subsequently, he said, his their unmet demands was that the voters’ list should be administration had refocused efforts in Afghanistan and overseen by both teams. The issue had been raised several went after al Qaeda's leadership in the tribal regions in times with the United Nations, which did not pay any Afghanistan and Pakistan. attention, he said. “In just four months, we will complete our combat mission Since the runoff on June 14, Abdullah’s team has twice in Afghanistan and America's longest war will come to a boycotted the IEC and the election process, creating a responsible end. And we honor every American who deadlock, but it resumed cooperation with the commission served to make this progress possible...” he concluded. after mediation by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Ballot audit halted again the UN. By Pajhwok Report Aug 27, 2014 - 11:04 The next president is supposed to attend the upcoming KABUL (Pajhwok): The presidential election vote audit NATO summit to be held in early September. The Wales process was halted yet again on Wednesday morning, a meeting will discuss future cooperation with Afghanistan. new setback to efforts at concluding the process in time, an official said. http://www.pajhwok.com Page 1 http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/www.vote.af Pajhwok Afghan News Election Coverage Newsletter He urged Abdullah team to reverse his decision so that the audit started moving forward under the unchangeable procedure he had earlier agreed to. He pointed out the UN and IEC were yet to receive any suggestion from Abdullah’s team. Mohammad Halim Fidaee, who earlier spoke on behalf of Ahmadzai’s team, said no more changes in the volte invalidation procedure were acceptable. After a final agreement, UN’s listening to demands from Abdullah would raise questions about its neutrality, he warned. 25 complaints filed against vote invalidation By Abasin Zaheer Aug 27, 2014 - 16:33 KABUL (Pajhwok): As the stop-start vote audit process hit Ghani accepts UN call as Abdullah walks out a new snag, the Afghan-led election watchdog announced By Khwaja Baser Ahmad Aug 27, 2014 - 12:32 receiving 25 complaints from the Change and Continuity team against invalidation of bogus votes. KABUL (Pajhwok): The Change and Continuity team, led The announcement comes a day after the Independent by Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, on Wednesday announced Election Commission (IEC) said it had invalidated votes shifting to the United Nations its responsibility to overseen from 72 polling centres cast during the June 14 presidential the vote audit. runoff election. The UN mission’s demand came as Dr. Abdullah Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) Abdullah, leader of the Reform and Unanimity team, spokesman Nadir Mohseni told reporters in Kabul the refused to send his observers to the IEC to monitor the Change and Continuity team, led by Ashraf Ghani ballot scrutiny. Ahmadzai, had submitted 25 complaints against A day earlier, Abdullah had warned of boycotting the invalidation until 5pm on Tuesday. ongoing audit if its technical demands were not meet. One He said the complaints included seven from southeastern of his supporters alleged their views were not accorded Paktika province, six from Kandahar and the rest from any importance. other provinces, where the votes had been cast. Daud Sultanzoy, speaking on behalf of the former World Mohseni said the complaints would be addressed before Bank economist, said the UN had asked them to withdraw noon tomorrow at an open hearing, asking the Change and their representatives from the Independent Election Continuity team and the IEC to send their representatives to Commission (IEC). the hearing. He told journalists: “We have positively responded to the To a question, Mohseni said: “If the Reform and Unanimity United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s call team had any complaint that should have been filed, but we and from now on, we will stay away the audit process.” have not yet received any from their side.” Sultanzoy said ensuring overall transparency and presence Abdullah’s team earlier in the day pulled out of the vote of FFEFA and TIFA representatives in the process were audit process, saying its technical demands had not been among key conditions set by the Ahmadzai camp. The endorsed regarding the invalidation procedure. UN proposal has been accepted by his team, he reiterated. The campaign claimed no prior agreement had been “We will closely observe the situation. If we see signs of reached with it on the UN-proposed invalidation method, a any deviations by UN and international observers that claim the IEC dismissed. The IEC says the two sides had could tarnish our national interests, we will hold them earlier agreed to the procedure. accountable,” he vowed. Mohseni urged the IEC to publish online on its website the At a news conference in Kabul, IEC deputy chief Abdur outcome of invalidated votes as soon as possible. Rahman Hotaki said the audit would proceed in the He said the outcome of the vote recount and scrutiny was absence of representatives of both candidates. The process being reassessed and the electoral teams could submit at will resume soon. every stage their complaints within 24 hours. As per the UN decision, Hotaki said, the audit would Abdullah had previously boycotted the vote count process, continue in the presence of national and international citing massive fraud in the runoff election, but later agreed observers. Representatives of the Change and Continuity with his rival Ashraf Ghani on the formation of a unity team would be kept away as long as the Reform and government. Unanimity team did not rejoin the exercise, he promised. http://www.pajhwok.com Page 2 http://www.elections.pajhwok.com Pajhwok Afghan News Election Coverage Newsletter About the final result from the provincial council polls, He also noted the organization’s continuing active Mohseni said it would be announced next week by the engagement with both campaigns to hear and address their IEC. technicalconcerns. About the tape recording attributed to second ‘Underlining this request was a realisation that the audit Vice-President Karim Khalili, the IECC spokesman said must not only have integrity, it must be seen to be the matter had been referred to the judiciary. even-handed by all Afghans,” said Haysom. “The process The Reform and Unanimity has also released a similar will now proceed to its conclusion without the direct audio recording claiming to be former IEC secretary Ziaul engagement of representatives of either presidential Haq Amarkhel. Both Amarkhel and Khalili have called the candidate." recordings as fake. He believed that both the 100 percent nationwide audit and Mohseni said they had requested the UN to help confirm the formation of a government of national unity were vital the authenticity of Amarkhel’s voice, but the world body pillars to achieve the credible electoral outcome and a said sorry. He said letters had been sent to the Ministry of peaceful transfer of power that millions of Afghans had Interior, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and voted for.
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