The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 76 16-30 June 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1 This period was defined by inclusion of this period, city where armed opposi- 7 Northern Region two key elements: the contin- 2011 incident levels in Hel- tion elements are able to Western Region 13 ued reporting of high conflict mand have now surpassed express their presence related incident volumes and the total recorded for 2010 more freely. In addition, Eastern Region 15 a similarly high volume of (see graph p.21). A further Ghor once again reported Southern Region 20 NGO incidents (see graphs testament of this extreme an NGO incident, now p.8 & p.16 respectively). volatility was the reporting accounting for almost 70% 24 ANSO Info Page While any correlational rela- of 2 NGO incidents of the total for this region. tionship is unclear, the end of (involving deminers) in this While Khost remains one the period noted AOG inci- same province, both of of the most kinetic prov- YOU NEED TO KNOW dent levels reaching relative which resulted in national inces in the EAST, incident parity with May (with both staff fatalities, though in volumes from Paktya have • Numerous suicide/complex surpassing the 2010 peak) very distinct and diverse attacks within Kabul continued to rise, close in along with the highest NGO circumstances. line to those of last year. • Helmand remains most ki- incident volume noted this As has been the case This was also the case for netic province in the country year. throughout 2011 (see graph Kunar, a somewhat surpris- • Continued high NGO inci- The context in CENTRAL p.17), the NORTH ac- ing dynamic in light of the dent rate for June this period was dominated by counted for the majority of reorientation of IMF ele- a series high profile suicide NGO incidents this period. ments from such heavily • 2 NGO national staff fatali- and complex attacks which Of the total 7, 4 were in contested areas as the Pech ties this period occurred in various provinces Balkh, 2 in Jawzjan, and the and Korengal Valleys. A and resulted in large casualty final one in Badakhshan. previously reported NGO volumes. While the attack The RCIED strike against abduction case was also against the Intercontinental an INGO vehicle, an appar- resolved in Kunar this peri- ANSO is supported by Hotel was the highest profile, ent case of errant targeting, od with the safe release of the attacks at a market in was the most significant 3 while Paktya also report- Kabul and the District Hos- and resulted in the injuring ed the temporary abduc- pital in Logar resulted in the of a national staff member. tion of NGO staff. Lagh- highest casualties. Local Beyond the varied NGO man reported the periods strife resulting from the year- incidents in Balkh, that final NGO incident for the ly influx of nomads into province is also exhibiting a ER, this involving the Wardak also came to the steady increase in incident theft, and swift return, of fore, dominating the report- reporting, accounting for a an NGO vehicle in what ing from this province this 75% increase over the vol- was a purely criminal event. period. umes reported last year. With the inclusion of this Unlike Kabul, there have While Herat City in the periods incidents, the East been no spectacular attacks WEST had no reported remains second to the within Kandahar for several AOG activity this period, North for overall NGO weeks, though the standout the province itself recorded incident rates, at present dynamics in the SOUTH one of its highest monthly accounting for 30% of the remain the extensive AOG volumes thus far. This was years total which has been activity reported from Hel- primarily driven by districts almost exclusively driven mand and Ghazni. With the to the west and south of the by Nangarhar and Kunar. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 A spectacular, complex attack 40 along with two other suicide at- of 28 June, when a commando of 30 tacks (one high profile, one failed) 8 well armed attackers (their gear 20 in the capital were the AOG ri- including suicide vests, small arms 10 & hand grenades) stormed the poste to the discourse of security 0 gains and progress on the battle- GOA owned Intercontinental field pushed forward by GOA and Hotel and fought an extended the IMF as security transition ap- pitched battle with security forces. KABUL AOG KABUL Crime proaches. The clash went on for several hours, ending when helicopter- The first attack, on 18 June short- borne IMF snipers eliminated the time entries by the media, marking a turning ly after mid-day, involved 3 opera- remaining 3 attackers who had point when the military effectiveness of the tives equipped with BBIED vests taken position on the rooftop of AOG action stopped being the primary con- hidden under ANA uniforms who the hotel. A conclusive casualty sideration. The AOG squad on the roof-top assaulted the police station in the count has yet to be fully corrobo- were by then playing their part for the ‘graphic’ Mandawi Market of Kabul City rated, though ANSO has so far dimension of the attack. (PD 1). Including civilians from accounted for two dozen casual- For suicide attack trends in 2011, 10 out of 14 the market and the adjacent tax ties, with security force personnel AOG suicide missions recorded in the Central collection office, the attackers representing at least two thirds of Region have been concentrated in Kabul Prov- managed to kill 3 ANP, 1 NDS the victims. ince (9 in the city and 1 SVBIED in Musayi), and 5 civilians while a further 2 while 3 out of the remaining 4 missions in the ANP and 8 civilians received inju- While the strike in the Mandawi Market was a remarkable demon- provinces have occurred recently, in a span of ries. Following this, in the even- 10 days starting 15 June. ing hours of 25 June, a lone stration of AOG economy of BBIED detonated when its own- force, noteworthy also for yet an- While suicide strikes dominated attention this er, with the full gear on, was ap- other exploration of deception period, they were seconded by two stand-off proaching the entrance to the tactics (the use of ANSF uni- attacks in the capital, first when PD 15 wit- Bustane Kabul, a park in PD 17. forms) and an apparent willing- nessed a typical indirect fire attack where the The absence of any target in the ness to cause civilian casualties intended trajectory linked Deh Sabz to KAIA area at the time of the blast pro- (the attack was staged in a highly (an average of 1.3 IDF fire attacks per month vides the ground to assume that frequented market place where in Kabul City since 2006). The second, more the detonation was premature, a the use of the BBIED component atypical attack, was a rare IED detonation plausible last step in the prepara- would inevitably lead to a high against an ANP road check post on the ‘Forty- tion of a strike against a training number of civilian casualties), the Meter Road’ in PD 11, marking only the fourth session for ANP district deputy- second event was an eye-and-ear such attack this year. The last incident of note, chiefs and administrators which catching exhibition of AOG force this time in neighbouring Musayi, involved 8 was scheduled to take place in the projection, reminiscent of the re- attackers wearing ANA uniforms who execut- park the next morning. The final, cent complex attack in Herat. ed an ANP informant, an action reminiscent of and most dramatic, attack oc- Night-time flares and explosions similar efforts in Wardak, Logar and Kapisa. curred during the overnight hours were covered in dramatic prime- NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 29th of June 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 4 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 The conflict paradigm in Logar 40 the driver misidentified the wulus- appears to be one of a symbiotic 30 growth. The increased frequency wali/ANP HQ with the hospital. 20 of ANSF-IMF initiatives, such as So far, there has been no corrobo- the on-going Operation Omeide rated evidence that would support 10 8, and the roll-out of the ALP has or rule out any of the plausible 0 appeared to stimulate a growth in scenarios and motives. No AOG the number of AOG incidents. network has claimed responsibility Whereas the June incident vol- and the community has remained LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime umes (all incidents combined) silent as to whether the attack could be linked to a specific mo- criminal networks, and basically all major do- grew by 14% compared to those mestic AOG networks. in May, AOG-initiated activity tive or warning. increased by 30% over the same Obviously, the immediate proxim- A less tangible, yet important development, period (33 AOG-initiated attacks ity of the hospital to the gover- has been noticed recently throughout Logar in June). Adding the IEDs dis- nor’s compound provides a very regarding frequent ANSF and AOG actions covered and neutralized by securi- conspicuous factor and suggests a inside medical facilities. While the AOG usu- ty forces (10 cases in June) on the case of poor targeting.