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The ANSO Report (1-15 January 2011)

The ANSO Report (1-15 January 2011)

The NGO Safety Office Issue: 65 1-15 January 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 Once again a regular feature the wounding of an NGO externally, with efforts that 7 Northern Region of the security landscape in staff member in a shooting include brazen exposure Western Region 13 CENTRAL, a suicide attack incident in Takhar on the and disarmament of the within was recorded 4th for reasons that appears populace. AOG have at- Eastern Region 15 this period. As in previous unrelated to his employ- tempted to counter the Southern Region 20 incidents, a suicide attacker ment. On the 6th, this time high tempo of IMF opera- (SVBIED) targeted a security in Sar-E Pul, road instability tions within the region 24 ANSO Info Page force transport (NDS) which came to the fore when an (including Nangarhar and resulted in numerous casual- NGO vehicle was fired Paktya), primarily through ties, including civilians. The upon after passing through IED placement. Tensions YOU NEED TO KNOW opening weeks of 2010 have an AOG checkpoint. between local and exoge- recorded low overall incident Lastly, a criminal robbery of nous AOG have risen to • Regular suicide attacks volumes in Wardak and an NGO clinic in the fore in Kunar, though against security forces n Logar, IMF and security occurred on the 7th. Re- the full impact of this dy- Kabul force operations dominated gion-wide, security force namic remains to be seen. • Geographically and com- reporting from these prov- operations (i.e. ‘Ebtekar’ in For this period in the positionally diverse NGO inces. While unseasonal Balkh & ‘Jadid’ in Baghlan) SOUTH, it wasn’t the in- incidents within the North weather patterns have en- were the key drivers shap- cident rate that warranted sured accessibility to the ing the context over this attention, rather the inci- • AOG migration from the western portions of the re- period. dent severity. The BBIED South into the Western gion, the migration of and Central Regions In the WEST, the deploy- attack in the Spin Boldak Uruzgan-based AOG into ment of IEDs remained the District of Kandahar southern Daykundi is a trend primary expression of AOG proved to be the deadliest to monitor in the upcoming presence within the region. attack for the period, with ANSO is supported by year. The usual quiet of the In Farah, the cross-district 17 were killed and a further Panjshir Valley was disrupted coordination of AOG ef- 29 wounded. As in other by the unusual detonation of forts, in conjunction with regions, IMF have contin- a makeshift explosive device. out of region support from ued to pressure AOG ele- While speculation in regards Helmand, resulted in a ments through a consider- to this incident abounds, the marked shift in the opera- able operational tempo, likeliest explanation relates to tional template. In addi- resulting in numerous ar- internal political machina- tion, the recent arrest of rests, cache finds, and a tions. the Bakwa DSG completed substantial number of IED In line with 2010, the the picture. discoveries. What long NORTH continued its The uncontested dynamics term effects the dominance of NGO incident of Nuristan in the EAST is ‘reconciliation’ efforts reporting, recording 4 inci- likely to change in the up- within Helmand (Sangin dents from 4 different prov- coming months in light of specifically) will have on inces this period. Starting on IMF intentions to re-engage the overall context of this the 3rd in Kunduz, an NGO there. Juxtaposing this volatile province is unclear staff member was temporar- intent, AOG elements have at present. Unfortunately, ily detained and his vehicle been consolidating their the positive veneer is often was stolen in a criminal inci- control both internally and tarnished by the underlying dent. This was followed by motives in such actions. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Incident volumes remained rather 40 low in , with 25 of Darulaman. With figures ex- 30 total, a fifth of which were AOG- trapolated from the last two years, 20 initiated. Although very low in the three suicide attacks recorded 10 since November 2010 in Kabul absolute numbers, AOG activity 0 still came to the fore this cycle accord with the long term trend with a dramatic suicide motorcy- of 1 strike per month for the last 25 months. 90% of these attacks cle-mounted IED strike against KABUL AOG KABUL Crime NDS employees in Darulaman, an were conducted against security forces or high-profile venues/ attack that exploited the vulner- routes of the city. abilities in their morning com- premises directly associated with mute patterns along with an effec- GOA. The avoidance of security A series of AOG and IMF strike/counter- tive IED blast near an ANP targets during the early to mid- strikes were again reported from Tangi Abre- checkpost in Puli Muhammad morning hours is the primary shum, reinforcing a concerning outlook for Khan (PD 1). Continued ‘hit and mitigation strategy recommended overland accessibility between Kabul and Jala- run’ operations along the Kabul – as this is when the vast majority of labad for 2011. Of note to NGOs, one such Highway have chal- such attacks occur. The afore- AOG attack resulted in a follow-up IMF op- lenged the supply of strategic mentioned vulnerabilities on the eration some 90 minutes after the initial strike, freight traffic as well as the con- side of the security forces will re- with one NGO party caught on the highway in trol of access into Kabul by the main an attractive target for AOG the proximity of IMF firing positions. ANSO security forces, and for many, rais- operatives in 2011, particularly in encourages NGOs to adhere to the recom- ing doubts about eventual out- the context of a changing political mended 0900 – 1500 hrs travel timings be- comes of the gradual handover of environment, which may bring tween Kabul and Jalalabad, as well as to seek security responsibilities for Surobi particular motivations for ele- an up to date assessment before setting out on from the French contingent to ments inside various AOG to road missions. The combat operations in Su- ANSF anticipated in the spring of stage ‘spectacular attacks’ within robi were seconded by unconfirmed accounts 2011. Kabul. Intelligence reports con- of the sacking of the District Shadow tinue to feature AOG willingness Governor by the leadership in Quetta. The resumption of AOG suicide to conduct strikes inside the city, Whether that is true, and to what extent such activity in Kabul dates back to the although the major strategic posi- development will impact on AOG will and November SVBIED against an tioning of AOG has consistently capabilities to challenge the security forces in IMF convoy in the southern part been along the eastern access Surobi, is yet to be seen.

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 12th of January 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 0 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Only four AOG initiated attacks 80 were reported from Wardak dur- Saydabad, Nirkh, Chaki Wardak 60 and Jalrez, along with the newly ing the first ten days of 2011. Out 40 of these, three were IED strikes added areas outside of Maydan 20 against security force-related tar- Shahr. A combined 10 cases of gets. In one, a technological up- such operations were reported 0 grade was noted with the occur- from the province and have in- cluded a variety of AOG ele- rence of a magnetic device deto- WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime nating under a ‘jingle’ truck in ments. While such a campaign may lead to temporary gains to Maydan Shahr, however causing Of note, perceptions of increased insecurity, only limited damage to the vehi- IMF strategic momentum over AOG planners, the past months mainly linked to the large freedom of move- cle. If utilised in a more effective ment of AOG, and blurred lines between pro- manner in the future, as seen in have shown that such gains are mostly short-lived, and well below GOA security forces and independent, largely those devices deployed on the criminal, armed groups, consistently come outskirts of Jalalabad, magnetic the task of challenging AOG en- trenchment in the province. from Jalrez and converge on the main district IEDs may add weight to the al- road towards Hajigak. Recent reporting also ready impressive portfolio of Another strand of political con- included another NDS – ANP operation in flict represents the infighting AOG tactics in the province. Be- Esmail Khel, located on the road further to the among AOG for strategic posi- sides being an effective weapon east, during which 2 AOG were arrested and tions in Nirkh. While more details against the traffic of military an assortment of weaponry and ammunition cargo, ‘sticky bombs’ are also a need to be corroborated, prelimi- seized. Due to the multiple risks varying from nary reporting from the district concern for personnel ensuring illegal AOG checkpoints to roadside criminal- includes intensifying attempts by the perimeters of protected facili- ity, NGOs are advised to refrain from non- the IEA District Shadow Gover- ties, namely military bases. essential movement along this route. For over- Recent conflict patterns have nor at mobilizing local support land access to Bamyan, the Ghorband Road against the dominant HIG ele- largely been driven by IMF presents a less exposed alternative for essential ments, with this cycle noting an ‘capture/kill’ operations targeting NGO road missions. AOG leadership in the most armed escalation between the two prominent AOG hubs, namely groups.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 2 ANP discoveries/seizures 40 opened ANSO 2011 data collec- (Eshpusta and Anar Dara Areas) 30 tion for Bamyan. In Bamyan cen- with the last record dating back to 20 ter, an old anti-personnel mine the ambush of an IMF convoy in 10 the former area on 3 August. With was discovered on the Baghlan – 0 Yakawlang Road in Nawabad by a yearly drop in AOG incidents of ANP. While the device was safely 84%, Bamyan rated as the least defused by an EOD team, the impacted province in the on-going BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime circumstances of the discovery conflict. NGO vulnerability remains pri- have not been communicated so kary Valley, which stretches across Kahmard marily linked to banditry along the far. Recent reporting also included and Shibar. another ANP operation in Ghar- main road as criminality ac- wan Area, which resulted in the counted for 55% of all incidents Road accessibility continues to be a concern seizure of 22 RPG launchers and recorded, a further half of these for NGOs, particularly in light of the arrival of an assortment of heavy machine being armed robberies by organ- the year’s first snowfalls. However, as of mid- gun rounds. In 2010, all four ised groups. These were equally January all main roads remain open and readily AOG initiated attacks concen- split between the strategic passes accessible. trated in in Panjab and the areas in the Shi- THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 0 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 In Logar, the on-set of the winter 40 tions by 7.5% with 285 entries fighting break was reflected in a 30 significant drop in incident vol- against 265, although it is also 20 umes, with just a dozen combined assumed that a significant number entries during this cycle. Quite of IMF special operations went 10 unusually, two thirds of the secu- unreported. Overall, AOGs in 0 rity incidents were concentrated in Logar accounted for every fifth Charkh. On 7 January, AOG set AOG attack in CENTRAL in up an ambush on the access route 2010; combined to the 511 AOG LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime towards the IMF Combat Out- initiated strikes in Wardak, the two neighbours jointly ensured AOG checkpost in Porak, only to be released post Charkh (close to the DAC), some three hours later after a thorough ques- engaging a joint IMF-ANSF de- that only every third AOG attack in CENTRAL happened outside tioning. In this case, a pre-arranged cover tachment returning from a routine story corroborated by a ‘friend on the phone’ patrol with IEDs and SAF. Dur- of these two provinces. While strategic routes, namely the Kabul combined to the staff’s local identity, and his ing the attack, 2 IMF and 2 ANSF ability to coolly manage the situation led to his were killed, and an additional 3 – Gardez Highway and the pri- mary access routes into the dis- safe release. The remaining two cases pertained IMF and a local civilian sustained to the temporary detentions of NGO staff injuries. The account of AOG tricts, traditionally bear the brunt of combat operations, 2010 also members by IMF during combat and search casualties has not been confirmed operations. so far. According to IMF, Special witnessed a spike of violent esca- Forces retaliated the next morning lations in major population cen- A steady growth in incident volumes should be in the Jawzjay area (to the south ters. For instance, the District expected in 2011, alongside with more direct from the scene of attack) and ar- Administrative Centers were the actions undertaken by national security forces rested a suspected AOG com- setting for every seventh AOG including the Afghan Local Police, rolled-out mander and three operatives alleg- attack in the province in 2010. in the province recently. Military information edly responsible for conducting Despite the high incident volumes gathering programs, such as ‘Citizens Watch’ the attack. On at least five differ- and a steady presence of NGOs, will further blur the lines between non- ent occasions, joint IMF-ANSF members of the NGO community combatants and security forces, as will the con- teams took AOG by surprise re- were affected in only 5 docu- tinued ‘hearts & minds’ strand of IMF COIN sulting in multiple mid-rank lead- mented cases in 2010, of which operations, increasingly taking shape of com- ership arrests and killings in the just a single one - a killing of an munity-based ‘humanitarian’ and developmen- areas of Charkh, Baraki Barak NGO security guard during an tal interventions, make it increasingly difficult (Argan), and Mohammad Agha IMF operation in Charkh - re- for the locals to distinguish between military (the Zarghun Shahr area, which sulted in a fatality. The only delib- and humanitarian actors. IMF’s cooperation also saw a comprehensive IMF erate action targeting an NGO with NGOs, and the latter’s’ participation in operation in the previous cycle). program was an arson attack the IMF’s funding schemes, may ultimately against an NGO clinic in Khar- result in the shrinking of humanitarian space in A brief look into 2010 reveals a the longer term. Humanitarian actors will most 40% increase in AOG initiated war, for which doubts persist as to the motives and identity of the likely face continued pressure from both sides incidents, hand in hand with a of the conflict for coordination, or alignment steady flow of security force attackers. Besides several attacks against schools with indirect ties of their programming and presence (even in ‘capture or kill’ operations. Ac- negative terms of restricted access) with the cording to ANSO data, pro-GOA to NGOs, the north of witnessed an NGO employee be- various military and political agendas, by defi- security forces outweighed AOG nition exogenous to the humanitarian cause. in the absolute number of opera- ing singled out from other passen- gers and taken from a bus at an THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 During 2010, sporadic excursions 40 of AOG from Helmand and largely dictated on the develop- 30 ments in these neighbouring prov- Uruzgan into the southern flank 20 of the province, as well as rein- inces. To illustrate, an AOG de- forcement of pro-GOA forces tachment crossed over from 10 reflected in the establishment of Baghran (Helmand) to Kajran and 0 IMF combat outposts and the roll attacked a police checkpoint in -out of the Afghan Local Police Bala Dasht, a cluster-village lo- program in Kajran and Gizab, cated on the main road to/from DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime completed a security picture that Uruzgan. IMF units based in the was otherwise dominated by local Kajran DAC responded, and IMF the risks of exposure to combat operations, power-struggles and road-side close air support was called in. NGOs with operations in the southern dis- criminality. NGOs should expect The clash evolved into a three- tricts should be prepared for the eventuality of these trends to continue in 2011, hour military operation with ac- a confrontation with transiting AOG, who, with criminality and factional ten- tive involvement of the Kajran since foreign to the areas, may prove averse to sions remaining the main risk ar- Afghan Local Police (ALP). Ac- local community agreements. cording to the provincial ANP eas for NGO operations in the Vehicular accessibility will remain of concern, northern districts. In the South, in HQ, three ALP servicemen were killed and an additional four were although this year, the delayed on-set of the particular along access routes to/ winter season has not brought major complica- from the provinces of the South- wounded during the initial phase, while 9 AOG fighters were tar- tions so far. The rehabilitation of the Nili air- ern Region, NGOs will also con- strip (allowing for fixed-wing aircraft) will also tinue to encounter low intensity geted during the counter-strike. The casualties on the ALP side improve the overall accessibility of the prov- combat operations, the frequency ince. and volume of which will be resulted from ‘friendly fire’ initi- ated from IMF air assets. Besides

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 The winter lull in security inci- 30 dents continued in Kapisa, with Looking back on major trends in only a combined 6 incidents re- 2010, the AOG imprint in the 20 ported, these being in Tagab (3), province experienced a slight in- 10 crease of AOG initiated incidents Nijrab (2) and Koh Band (1) dur- 0 ing the first two weeks of January from 116 in 2009 to 129 in 2010. 2011. With the exception of 2 In the respective annual collec- tions of data, AOG attacks clearly IED incidents, all of the above KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime were kinetic attacks against secu- concentrated in the eastern dis- rity forces. tricts, with 78% and 86% of AOG initiated strikes registered respec- often informed by the interests and identity of For IED activity this cycle, a rare tively in 2009 and 2010. Six out the sources, especially those associated with occurrence in Koh Band involved of ten attacks in Kapisa were security forces. a local civilian motorcyclist. staged in Tagab (a total of 74 in The 2011 outlook will most likely comprise an While travelling to Kabul, he 2010, reflecting a 40% annual in- intensification of the conflict volumes in the struck a pressure plate device in crease compared to 2009). AOG east. Amongst the expected developments Dized Dara and subsequently died attacks in Nijrab increased by include an IMF offensive in Tagab, as a part of of his wounds. In the east, IED 35% over the same period, while the progressive handover of the province to placement took its toll in Joybar, Alasay was the only eastern dis- national security forces, as well as increased north of Tagab DAC, where an trict with an annual drop in inci- AOG cooperation with exchanges of fighters, ANP ranger drove into a victim- dents from 20 in 2009 to 15 in materiel and knowhow amongst the groups operated IED on the main road, 2010. Featuring a very light pres- active in situ and those in the adjacent Surobi resulting in the injury of one ser- ence of NGOs, reporting from district of Kabul and Laghman. viceman. the eastern districts is scarce and THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 0 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 A combined 13 incidents opened 40 completed the cocktail of political the Parwan records for 2011, re- 30 flecting a sustained tempo of and criminal violence in the prov- 20 AOG operations, mainly IDF ince. The Qalakhel incident, for activity largely concentrating on which the AOG hypothesis pre- 10 the Bagram Airfield Base (2 effec- vails over a criminal or factional 0 tive and 2 foiled) with an addi- targeting of the school that has tional 2 discoveries of weapons been ruled out by mediated ac- caches. In another hotspot of counts of local witnesses, is remi- PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime AOG activity with an ANP shoot- niscent of another case recorded ing and arrest of a suspected in the district in 2006. What is as well as in the areas to the north of Chahari- AOG member in Qalatak, the unique for the 2011 burning is the kar. All threats combined, the most apparent Siyagerd area in Ghorband wit- ANP claim that a fire fighting unit risk to NGO security and safety in Parwan will nessing an IED discovery by secu- sent in response to the attack, remain criminality, as well as exposure to rity forces, and an ANP discovery came under an AOG fire before AOG IDF attacks against pro-GOA forces of a weapons’ cache in Chaharra, taking control of the situation, and IED placement along the access road to these last two incidents occurring while the local accounts refuted Bamyan and in the dense road network that in the vicinity of the Kabul – the SAF component, emphasizing surrounds the Bagram Airfield Base to the Bamyan Road. Badarkhel IED rather that the perpetrators fled east. In the short term, a police operation in placement and its subsequent dis- the scene immediately. The final Quli Hir, a cluster area in the central covery by ANP during the routine account of the incident is yet to Ghorband Valley and an AOG hotspot, may morning check of the district be corroborated. be anticipated, although its chances for success roads, an intimidation in the form For the 2011 picture NGOs will are limited unless accompanied by a more per- of a hand grenade hauled inside a likely face a) continued IED activ- manent reinforcement and training of local local residence in Mian Shah of ity in the Ghorband valley and ANSF, the ANP in particular. For overland Chaharikar with underlying crimi- Shomali plain, namely in the vicin- access to Bamyan via Ghorband, NGOs are nal motives (a well-entrenched ity of the Bagram Airfield Base advised to limit the movements to essential tradition even in the usually (BAF); b) elevated risks of inaccu- only. As a part of security protocols, avoidance peaceful parts of CENTRAL), rate IDF attacks in Bagram (BAF of security targets (in particular alongside the and an arson attack against a again) and Kohi Safi (BAF and on-going road rehabilitation project) where mixed, boys’ and girls’ primary the DAC); and c) criminal inci- possible and daylight travel times are recom- school in Qalakhel of Kohi Safi dents inside the provincial capital mended.

NGO Incidents Following these recent escalations, speculative PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 accounts of a persistent though very limited This Report Period 0 presence of HIG elements, allegedly en- The legacy of Panjshiri internal trenched in the valley since the Soviet era, disputes, which occasionally esca- ous blast recorded in mid- came to the fore. ANSO maintains that local- late into rare and usually harmless December. This time, however, ized clan-based conflicts are much more likely incidents, will likely continue in local ANP reacted promptly and the drivers of any instability than an implausi- 2011. Following hand grenade and detained a party of four young ble AOG resurgence in an area that enjoys a IED explosions in the previous men attempting to flee the scene strong representation amongst the circles of cycle, the vicinity of the Provincial in a Toyota Corolla, one of which power in the current establishment, particularly Council Office in Bazarak saw holds a previous criminal record. inside the security forces. another makeshift device detonate The conclusions of the police in- on 5 January with the location, vestigation have not been revealed timing and the device itself so far. strongly reminiscent of the previ- THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 0 BALKH 50 This Report Period 1 This period, the overall level of 40 security incidents recorded across where NGO programs or facilities 30 dropped signifi- can be perceived as ‘soft’ and 20 valuable targets. For NGO staff cantly compared to the previous 10 report. However, one NGO- the best practice when confronted 0 direct incident of armed robbery by armed individuals is compli- occurred on 7th of January in ance, to avoid the risk of confron- Zulquwat Village of Kishindih tation or escalation. BALKH AOG BALKH Crime District. During the night, six In Chimtal and Chahar Bolak dis- armed men entered a NGO-run tricts, ANSF have established four being reported, none of the key AOG leaders clinic, assaulted the staff on duty FOBs (Forward Operating Base) have been ‘removed’ during the operation, and stole a mobile phone, a solar as a result of the ‘hold’ phase of indicating that the vast majority of fighters panel, an amount of cash and the operation ‘Ebtekar’. Along migrated towards neighbouring areas, a com- drugs. ACGs are known to oper- with the existing IMF out post mon AOG tactic when faced with uneven tac- ate in the district and the circum- located in the vicinity of Ali Zayi tical odds. A concurrent return of AOG ele- stances of the incident do not sug- Village, these additional bases are ments to Chimtal and Chahar Bolak during the gest that the intrusion was AOG supposed to improve the security downscale of security forces in the area along initiated. It is worth noting that in the area, and particularly along with a concomitant renewal of AOG/ACG this is only the second NGO- the main Mazar-e Sharif – Shibir- activity can be anticipated in the short direct incident to occur in the dis- ghan Road. As the bulk of ANA term. Two incidents have been already re- rd trict with the first being an abduc- and ANP units have already with- ported in the area this period, on 3 of January tion that took place on 29 Octo- drawn from the area, ANSF is in Sahib Tepa Area of , three ber 2009. In this incident, an reportedly handing over the re- unknown armed men stopped two private ve- NGO employee was taken along sponsibility for the area to local hicles and robbed passengers of their cash and with a taxi driver, two government militia forces. ANSF plans for the valuables. According to the report, the perpe- employees and the head of the coming weeks are still unclear but trators fled towards the Alburz Mountains, an area’s Community Development it seems that some ANP units will AOG stronghold in the area. In addition, on Council (CDC) by a group of 5 remain in the area, probably at 12 of January in Chahar Bolak, Ahmad Abad armed men in Shamrak Area. In least until the local forces become Village, AOG attacked a local militia check regards to the aforementioned fully operational. As mentioned in post during the night. intrusion at the NGO-run clinic, previous reports, although the the incident underlines that armed security situation along the Ring robbery is a potential risk in any Road remains calm for the time locale, particularly in remote areas being, with no significant clashes THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 0 KUNDUZ 100 This Report Period 1 An NGO direct incident was re- 80 ported during this cycle in Khana- same location, and robbed the 60 bad District, Chawni Area on the passengers of their cash. In re- 40 Khanabad – Aliabad Road. On gards to the latest incident, the 20 3rd of January at around 1000 hrs, perpetrators’ modus operandi seems 0 an NGO driver was travelling in a to indicate criminal motivation. In marked, white Toyota Land addition it indicates once again the KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime Cruiser when he was stopped in presence of armed men and the risk of robberies in the area. the aforementioned area by five portedly linked to the Islamic Movement of armed men riding in a Toyota In the past two weeks ANSF/ Uzbekistan (IMU). Prior to this on 3rd of Janu- Saracha. The NGO driver was IMF operations were concen- ary, the Shadow District Governor of Imam assaulted, tied up and put in the trated in clearing up AOGs Sahib District was killed during an operation. back of the NGO vehicle. After- strongholds in the northern Cha- Usually such operations result in short term wards both vehicles rode in con- har Dara and particularly in limitation of AOGs’ tactical capacity. Often, voy towards . It Gortepa Area of . ‘removal’ of AOG leaders from the field re- seems that the abduction of the Although important AOG resis- sults in a decrease of direct attacks, and a par- NGO staff was just a sort of secu- tance has been expected in both allel increase in IED deployment. In addition rity measure as the perpetrators areas, besides extensive IEDs de- the province may see an increase in AOG ac- released the staff member shortly ployment, ANSF/IMF did not tivity and/or some changes in AOG tactics, as afterwards on the road. The NGO encounter a strong opposition, newly appointed commanders will try to assert staff eventually managed to reach indicating that the majority of the their leadership. For the NGOs the immediate a village in the area, however the fighters withdrew towards sur- effect may mean disruption of previously ne- vehicle has not been recovered rounding districts, particularly gotiated access and guarantee of safety to areas yet. This is the first NGO direct towards Dasht-e-Archi and Iman under AOG control. Furthermore, in keeping incident to occur in the district Sahib. In parallel, IMF launched a with past practice, in the since 22nd of August 2010, when series of air strikes and arrest tar- presence of external AOG elements usually an NGO convoy was travelling geting several AOG key leaders increases in areas where AOG leaders are fre- also on the Khanabad-Aliabad across the province. In Chahar quently targeted. External fighters have often Main Road, while the first vehicle Dara, an IMF air strike targeted showed that they are more ideologically ori- was stopped in Chahar Tut Village the Provincial Shadow Governor ented and less reliant on local community ac- by four armed men who robbed of Kunduz. On 9th of January in ceptance, therefore creating a more difficult the vehicle of two VHF handsets. Archi District, 15 AOG members environment for NGOs to operate. The background of the incident in were reported killed during an August was most likely criminal as IMF raid, including the Shadow the armed men had previously District Governor of Khanabad stopped three other vehicles at the and a high level commander re- THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents S AR- E PUL Year to Date 0 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 The standing threat along the 40 strategies when facing such situa- main Shibirghan-Sar-e Pul Road 30 tions. When confronted with ille- has been highlighted once again 20 gal check points or armed robber- this period, with an incident in- 10 th ies, the best and most prudent volving an NGO. On 6 of Janu- 0 ary, five NGO staff members course of action for NGO staff is compliance rather than resistance. were travelling in a private Toyota SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime Corolla from Sar-e Pul to Shibir- As comparable incidents across the country have shown, while ghan, when at around 1245 hrs greatly challenged by the security forces, NGO interactions at illegal check they faced an AOG illegal check NGOs may anticipate reoccurrence of security points have resulted in abduction point manned by three armed incidents along this road in the near future. men in the area of Howz-e Haji or robbery, the large majority of In Kohistanat, AOG attacked the DAC with Mohammad Omar. The NGO such incidents ended in the staff SAF and RPGs on 6th of January. ANP re- vehicle failed to stop at the check being released unharmed. In ad- sponded to the attack and the fire fight contin- point and the gunmen opened dition, the main mitigation meas- ued for almost one hour and half but did not fire. Several bullets impacted the ures they should be applied for result in casualties. On a positive note though, vehicle, wounding the NGO areas with potential risk of afore- on 2nd of January, AOG released four ANP, driver slightly, though he managed mentioned incidents is to travel in who had been captured on 24th of December to drive away from the scene of low-profile vehicle and ensure in Jurghan Village of fol- the attack. Given the continuing that the staff are sanitized of lowing an intervention by local elders. Further- threat of illegal check points along NGO related documents. As more, seven ANP who had previously been this road, the incident should AOG activity has been increasing reported as missing also returned to their du- serve as reminder to NGOs of the throughout the province and ties. necessity to brief and train their given that AOG freedom of staff regarding risk mitigation movement does not seem to be

ANNOUNCEMENT: ANSO STAFF CHANGES

We are pleased to introduce Mr. Brian Laguardia as the newest member of the ANSO team. Brian will be taking over responsibility for the Northern Region shortly and the support of the NGO community during this transition, as always, is greatly appreciated. Brian can be contacted by email at [email protected] and by phone at 0799 404 617.

In addition, Mr. Peter Dimitroff, the Southern Region RSA, will be concluding his time with ANSO at the end of January. I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of the community to thank him for his dedication, hard work, and keen observations on the ever changing security dynamics in the south. We would like to wish him all the best in his future endeavours. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 The ongoing military operation 40 ‘Jadid’ in Dahana-I-Ghuri District continues to affect other district 30 is continuing into its second roads. This reporting period an 20 th month, the main objective being armed clash took place on 4 of 10 January between an ANP patrol to ensure security along the Pul-e 0 Khumri - Mazar-e Sharif main and an AOG in Jar-e Khushk area along the Baghlan – Kunduz Main road. Activities within the opera- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime tional areas have decreased with Road. Two incidents have also no significant clashes reported in been reported along the Kelagai- In Baghlani Jadid District a noticeable incident the past two weeks. The single Pul-e Khumri main road. On 5 was reported on 1st of January, when four notable event occurred on 2nd of January in the Maktab-e-Kelagai armed men opened fire on local civilians while January during an ANSF search Area, a group of armed individu- they were praying at a mosque in Hassan Tal operation, when four suspected als set up an illegal checkpoint and Area, Charcha Village. Reportedly, the incident AOG members were detained in robbed passengers of their cash resulted in four local civilians killed and two Dand-e Ghori and Naqellen Ar- and valuables. Further incidents others wounded. On a different note, on 2nd of eas. As some of ANA units have demonstrating the risk of criminal January ANP stopped a private vehicle at a already withdrawn from the area, activity in this area occurred four checkpoint and arrested four suspected AOG the operation will most likely con- days later, when a private vehicle members in Chesham-e-Sher Area. Reportedly, centrate on the ‘hold’ phase, in- was stopped by several gunmen. a suicide vest was also seized during the search, cluding the establishment of addi- The perpetrators released the oc- highlighting the potential threat of suicide at- tional check points. Although the cupants unharmed but stole the tacks in the region. last reported incident along Pul-e car, which was eventually located Khumri – Mazar road occurred the same day in Namberdo Area on 6th of December, insecurity of Pul-e Khumri City.

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 0 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 Activity in 40 during this reporting period was civilian was wounded as a result of 30 primarily criminal in nature. The an armed clash that occurred be- 20 most significant incidents were tween two groups believed to be 10 quite dispersed, occurring in Ba- ACGs in Darayim Payan area. 0 harak, Kuran Wa Munjan and This reporting cycle also wit-

Shahri Buzurg districts. In Ba- nessed also the use of explosive BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime harak on 4th of January, unknown devices in two instances. In No- individuals attacked a fuel station sai District, an RCIED detonated the province has recently witnessed the arrival with a hand grenade and SAF. outside the compound wall of the of new district police chiefs, the possibility that The fuel station is located in the DAC without causing casualties political tensions surrounding this issue have vicinity of the Baharak ANP HQ or damage. Another RCIED was exacerbated local rivalries should not be ex- and reportedly the ANP HQ was located on the road leading from cluded. collaterally damaged. The same the Darayim DAC to Haji Pahla- day in Kuran Wa Munjan, a local wan Village on 3rd of January. As THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 In Jawzjan Province AOG activity 40 primarily affected Shibirghan, district significantly increased in 30 Darzab and Qush Tepa districts. 2010. Another incident of note 20 th This reporting period more than occurred on 5 of January, when 10 an IED detonated in Beksar Vil- 80% of all AOG initiated inci- 0 dents were direct attacks against lage of , seri- DACs and ANSF personnel. In ously wounding a teenager. JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime one of the more notable incidents, In the neighbouring district of AOG attacked with RPGs and Darzab, the DAC was the AOG Area. It seems that the recent increase in ac- SAF two ANP checkpoints lo- target for the second consecutive tivities in the area, in spite of the ‘winter cated in the area of the Qush reporting period. The most recent pause’, could be related to the changes in Tepa DAC. This represents the AOG attack took place on the AOG leadership and their more active posture. first attack on the Qush Tepa 10th, and resulted in a two hour In Shibirghan, AOG attacked an ANP check DAC since 14th of October 2010, long fire fight with ANP during point located in Barmi Shakarak area, approxi- when AOG attacked the DAC which an AOG member was mately 10 km south of Shibirghan City. Finally, with RPGs and mortar rounds. It killed. Similar to Qush Tepa, an ANSF/IMF led a joint operation in Chelik Kol is worth noting that although the IED related incident was reported and Chelik Yaz Khan Areas of Murdyan Dis- said DAC had already experienced on 9th in Darzab, when a remote trict in order to clear the areas of AOG pres- attacks and intimidation efforts in controlled device was located on ence. 2009, AOG activity across the the main road leading to Gardan

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 0 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 1 In line with previously observed 40 trends, criminally motivated inci- that either AOGs or the staff’s 30 dents continue to affect Takhar employment with the NGO were 20 Province. This period, an NGO motives behind the attack. For 10 related incident was reported in instance, another targeted attack 0 Taluqan City on 4th of January. An following a similar modus operandi off-duty NGO staff member was occurred the following day, when shot and slightly wounded by two a local civilian was shot and in- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime unknown individuals riding on a jured in District 3. were robbed of their cash and valuables by a motorcycle as he was walking with In addition, armed robberies group of armed individuals. A similar incident a group of people in District 2. along roads remain the concern took place in Qara Parchaw Area, when three The perpetrators approached the across the province. On 2nd of gunmen attacked a private vehicle on the Talu- group and fired a single shot at January a private vehicle while qan – Baharak Main Road. the victim, fleeing the scene im- travelling on the Taluqan – mediately afterwards. At this stage Badakhshan Road was stopped in there is no evidence suggesting Gawmal Area and its passengers THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 0 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 The security situation in Faryab 40 th this period was characterised by check point on 7 of January. It 30 AOG activity focused in Qaysar, is interesting to note that this is 20 Bilchiragh, Dawlatabad and the first IMF attempt to counter 10 Qaramqol and an IMF operation the growing AOG threat in this 0 in Meyan Dara area of Pashtun area since 14 June 2010, when a joint ANSF/IMF operation . In the latter district, FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime IMF launched an operation sup- marked the first use of aerial sup- ported by an air strikes on 29th port in . mainly in Qaysar and Bilchiragh districts. In December, killing three AOG Targeting of electricity/ Qaysar, as it was the case in the early Decem- members and injuring one. In ad- telecommunication facilities ber, AOG activity focused on the area of Sin- dition, IMF arrested another two across the province observed dur- jetak Village. This period, AOG attacked an AOG members along with their ing last reporting period contin- ANP check point on the 11th. In addition, two weapons. An additional IMF op- ued with another three incidences. separate RCIED blasts caused the deaths of an eration in Meyan Dara was re- On 4th of January in Qaysar Dis- ANP and one pro-government militia member ported on 3rd of January and re- trict, AOG attacked a telecommu- and injured of another ANP serviceman. Fur- sulted in the deaths of six AOG nication tower compound in the thermore, targeted killing of personnel related members, and the injuries of an area of Taphay Qulah. Two days with the GOA and ANSF presence has contin- additional three. Some reports later, AOG set on fire a telecom- ued across the province. A pro-government suggest that these operations were munication tower located in Salt militia member was ambushed and killed in the imminent cause of an AOG Mine Area in Dawlatabad. Finally, , Kata Wolang area, and a fam- surrender of ten fighters, includ- another tower was targeted and ily member of another militia member was ing two commanders, to security damaged by a RPGs attack in shot and killed by purported AOG in Khair forces two days later. Despite the Dashti Oghon Area of Qaramqol Abad Village of on 5th of effects of the operations, AOG in District on the 9th. January. Meyan Dara continued their activ- In line with familiar patterns, ity and briefly attacked an ANP AOG direct attacks concentrated

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Reported activity in Samangan 40 Province was minimal in the past between Dara-e Suf Payan and 30 two weeks, however peripheral Dara-e Suf Bala districts. It 20 information suggests the Dara-e should be noted that the security 10 Suf Payan District is currently situation has deteriorated, particu- 0 witnessing a significant AOG in- larly in Dara-e Suf Payan District over the past three years. Accord- filtration, with occasional report- SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime ing of illegal taxation of the local ing to ANSO data, 21 AOG initi- population or transiting vehicles. ated incidents occurred in 2010, as ANSF personnel and facilities (nearly 50%), It is worth noting that Samangan compared to 10 in 2009 and 3 in with abduction and IED deployment follow- was considered the quietest prov- 2008. Regarding the province as ing. ince in the northern region until a whole, the bulk of AOG initi- late June 2010, when a new armed ated incidents reported last year group emerged on the border area consisted of direct attacks against THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents Year to Date 0 HERAT 80 This Report Period 0 70 The northern districts, Kushk and 60 Kushki Kuhna, of ghanistan –enforce a further shift 50 continue to see AOG activities 40 to this supply route via 30 which were focused on direct at- Turghundi. 20 tacks during this reporting cycle. A typically calm area, the the 10 st 0 On 1 of January, AOG attacked western Ghoryan District also saw an ANBP checkpoint in Gala a direct attack against an ANP HERAT AOG HERAT Crime Chah Area with a second attack checkpoint on the main road to th taking place on the 9 , when the District Administration Centre AOG set a private fuel tanker on saw again an IED strike, this time in Saberae (DAC). Although 2009 had seen Bala Area of . The previous IED fire in Khalawakha Area on the several direct attacks on ANSF, main Herat – Turghundi Road. strike took place on 31 December in the there were none in 2010. How- neighbouring Turk Abad Area, targeting ANA. Although AOGs have already ever, this latest incident is likely to been concentrating on this north- In addition, the north-western District be isolated and there are no indi- had two IED discoveries this period, and since ern supply route for the Western cations at present that an in- Region, it will become even more 2010 recorded only two discoveries and five creased AOG activity in this area detonations, these recent events seems to sup- strategically important for both is to be expected. sides if increasing restrictions at port reports about AOG intentions to increase the Iranian border – especially in The main road between Herat and IED activity in this district. regard to fuel trucks entering Af- Obe, which witnessed increased AOG activity in late December,

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 After the previous reporting pe- 40 riod saw a short-term shift of groups in Gulistan and Bakwa 30 AOG activities towards the usu- who are in turn supported by 20 ally quieter districts of Anar Dara, AOGs in Helmand. 10 Qala-I-Kah and Shib Koh, AOGs Further disruption of the AOG 0 once again focused their efforts command and control structure in on the traditional areas of Bala Bakwa occurred this period when FARAH AOG FARAH Crime Buluk, Bakwa, Gulistan and Pusht ANSF/IMF arrested the present Rod. Whereas IED activity was Shadow Governor District. concentrated in Bala Buluk and (DSG) during a search operation As expected, ANSF/IMF operations occurred Pusht Rod, direct AOG attacks th on 9 of January in the Kohestan in Bala Buluk, Bakwa, and Pusht Rod with were focused in Gulistan. This Area of . This these efforts likely to continue into at least the shift may in part be linked to re- follows the killing of the previous short term. ports regarding a stronger pres- DSG in November during an ence and coordination between ANSF/IMF operation in Bakwa THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 70 Generally, saw a 60 gest a commander killed in De- 50 high number of AOG attributed 40 incidents, accounting for 70% of cember (responsible for IED pro- 30 duction and emplacement in 20 the period’s total. These were 10 concentrated in the hotspots of Badghis) has since been replaced 0 Murghab, Ghormach and Muqur. and is now becoming active. Al- though Qadis has seen relatively In Qadis District, tensions be- little IED activity thus far (in BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime tween local elders and the District comparison with other districts) Governor rose to the fore as eld- an increase in the near term can combination of IED/direct attack – were ers expressed concern about areas nd th be expected. again recorded on the 2 as well as on the 10 selected by the governor for the in Ghormach District with ANSF/IMF opera- distribution of winterization items IED emplacement was focused tions expected to continue during the coming by a Private Development Organi- on Murghab and Ghormach dur- weeks in the same. ing the last two weeks. Of note, sation (PDO). While an agree- ANSF/IMF operations focused on Qadis and ment was reached due to the me- IED related incidents made up 45% of the total, whereas the Murghab during this reporting period. Qadis diation of the Deputy Provincial Districts saw an airstrike on 1st of January in Governor; general political ten- usual main tactic employed by AOGs across the province, direct Qarachaghi Village, after witnessing airstrikes sions in the area reportedly still already in November and December 2010. exist, with this incident demon- attacks, accounted only for 39%. The majority of direct attacks This indicates an increasingly unstable security strating the importance of conflict situation since the noted deterioration evident -sensitive implementation of de- took place in Muqur District dur- ing this cycle. Complex attacks around the parliamentary elections last Sep- velopment projects. Also in tember. Qadis, unconfirmed reports sug- against ANSF/IMF – such as a

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 0 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 Whereas the first days of 2011 40 were quiet in regard to AOG ac- District are to be 30 tivities, ANSF operations came to expected. 20 the fore as searches for suspected Reports of AOG migration from 10 AOG members took place, first the Murghab Area southwards 0 on 5 January in Khodi Village, into Dawlat Yar are supported by one day later in Kandival Village, the latest reported inter-AOG GHOR AOG GHOR Crime and on 12 January in Chaghcharan clash that occurred on 6 January City, a recurrent effort for this in which two AOG groups, both stabilizing factor. latter area as seen in December from Murghab, though linked to Charsada once again saw a civilian killed as a 2010. The arrest of two suspects different commanders, clashed in result of an ANP search operation. of a private in Kandival Village reportedly Tilak Village. As such, some form house. While the exact course of events is un- resulted in information on IED of a stronger presence of AOG clear in the latest case, the owner of a private emplacement on the main road, from the Murghab Area of house was shot and killed during an operation with IEDs being discovered and is to be ex- launched after ANP were informed that armed safely defused on the 7th of Janu- pected in Dawlat Yar – especially men/ weapons were insitu. In a similar search ary. Reports suggest that Ghor’s in the northern part –as these operation in December, a house owner was Governor was the intended target commanders attempt to expand also killed when ANP engaged AOG located since he was expected to visit the their areas of influence and com- within his compound. village that day. Further search pete for the same, though this operations and AOG activities in rivalry may serve as a further de- THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 0 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 Nangarhar presented a mixed pic- 80 ince’s southwestern conflict has ture, with AOGs making notable 60 been focused during this reporting gains in the districts surrounding 40 Jalalabad, but some ANP success period. Both occurred on the 20 in curbing these gains. It is in Bati main road leading to 0 Kot particularly where signs of DAC, each striking and damaging much stronger local AOG pres- IMF convoys and the latter killing an IMF soldier. As a result of this ence at visible, with reports of NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime AOG patrols, door-to-door re- activity, IMF conducted an opera- th quests for donations, and illegal tion starting on the 10 in the danger of passing through Sherzad. And fi- vehicle searches, all after dark. area, with a number of kinetic nally in Chaparhar, IMF conducted raids on The IMF have responded to these engagements causing a number of the 13th, with no details available at the time of developments by starting daytime deaths, and warnings given to the writing. As such, these facts point to the sus- foot patrols in the district’s vil- community through the local eld- tained presence of AOG fighters in these four lages for the first time, and we ers that any further anti-IMF ac- troubled districts in spite of IMF operations, may see some nightraids over the tivity would result in a large op- and that AOG-IMF conflict there is likely to coming months in the district. eration akin to recent operations remain a significant concern throughout the Moreover, during this period in Sherzad being launched. On year. the night of the 11th in the ANP discovered a number of To the east of the province, there have been IEDs in the district, including a Qailagho area of Khogyani, IMF began air strikes on the village, recent political efforts in Dur Baba by the new VBIED on a bridge along the District Governor to have the local tribes on main Jalalabad-Torkham Road killing at least 3 people (reported by locals to be civilians). Also on both sides of the border take a lead on declar- and an IED on the secondary ing its opposition to AOGs, including the offer road leading to the Chardeh area. the 11th, AOG fighters engaged an IMF OP in the district. to local men to act as self-sufficient commu- More broadly, an unusually high nity police (distinct from the IMF-led village number of IEDs (12) were dis- In Sherzad itself, IMF operations police initiative) and by promising to punish covered and defused in Bihsud, also continued, with a focus on those aiding them according to Pushtun tradi- Chaparhar, Rodat and Bati Kot, Markikhel, Tutu and Nokurkhel, tion. Illustrating this initiative, when ANP precisely those districts which during the latter discovering and caught an AOG fighter planting an IED in the AOGs are currently tipping in destroying a heroin processing Tawda China area a week later, local elders their favour. Worth noting was factory. Other information sug- subsequently decided to burn his home down. that one of these, discovered in gests ANP will soon ramp up However, violent opposition to these cross- Bihsud’s Maulawi Khalis Colony, poppy eradication efforts in the border anti-opposition efforts by the main was another VBIED, showing the district too, thus making further Khyber AOG, and reports of a new AOG ongoing security problems in that drugs-related conflict likely in the training camp being established just across the community. However, these IED near term. And in Hesarak, AOG border, suggest that such efforts may result in discoveries are also evidence of fighters attacked an ANP convoy, local elders being targeted for assassination in enhanced ANSF effectiveness, at the firefight leading to the death cross-border AOG operations, and the wider least in this specific dimension of of 1 AOG fighter and the deten- district – a key cross-border transit route for their work. tion of 7 others; this being the smuggling and AOG members – seeing an first direct attack in the district Of those 4 IEDs that did deto- intensification of conflict over the coming since October 1st, as it had been nate, 2 occurred in the Memla months. off limits to ANSF due to the area of Khogyani, where the prov- THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan witnessed just a small 40 number of security incidents con- forceful disarmament of commu- 30 centrated at the very beginning of nities in that area, in what seems 20 the report period. On Jan 1st, to be an effort to ensure that they 10 three rockets were fired at the retain their monopoly of violence 0 Kala Gosh PRT, missing the base after the embarrassment of the and causing no damage – and per- initial incident. This incident also

haps making up for the lack of serves as a counterpoint to the NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime New Year’s fireworks, the follow- view that as AOGs move further ing day, in a more unusual attack, into quasi-governance activities; as uncropped facial hair. AOG fighters in the area their behaviour will necessarily launched a direct attack on an moderate as they seek legitimacy In both Bargi Matal and Kamdesh, moreover, ANP CP near to the PRT, which from the local population. significant numbers of AOG fighters were catalyzed a firefight that killed one reported in the first few days of the year to IMF have also indicated that they have established illegal CPs, some of which opposition fighter. More insight- plan to expand their presence ful than these incidents, however, saw AOG fighters dressed in ANA and NDS back into the east of the province, uniforms. Most of these fighters were also was the contextual information which was effectively ceded to the about AOG activity that also reported to be under the command of the various AOGs in 2008, after ap- Nuristan PSG, therefore providing a second emerged from this isolated prov- proximately 30 months of intense ince. piece of evidence of a further strengthening of fighting. Indeed, during the re- AOGs in these eastern districts. As such, the First, following the stand-off be- port period in Wanat village of IMF policy of ceding the centre and east of the tween the local community and a , the scene of one province and focusing upon the west has only number of AOG fighters in Bargi of the single largest killings of allowed for AOGs to strengthen their hold on Matal reported during last period IMF soldiers in the history of the these districts, and the rise in air strikes in – which was driven by attempts to war, AOG fighters under the Waygal and marking of the first ground opera- forcibly disarm a local ANP – command of the Nuristan Provin- tion in Kamdesh during the last reporting pe- reports have come in of AOG cial Shadow Governor were re- riod also provide evidence for this assessment. fighters following up on this fatal ported to have entered the village Thus, in the coming months there may be a clash by abducting 4 members of and hung the IEA flag in the vil- reemergence of a military conflict dynamic in the community that offered armed lage bazaar, as well as preaching that part of the province. resistance to them. Moreover, the anti-IMF and GOA messages in same fighters have announced the local mosque and enforcing that they will shortly engage in the some common social codes such

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 0 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 0 Kunar remained volatile during 150 this period, with a high number of same moment as a SBBIED at- 100 both AOG direct attacks and IMF tack on NDS officials in Kabul operations, but beyond the ordi- also suggests it was part of the 50 recent escalation in simultaneous nary pattern of the conflict, there 0 were a number of important targeting of high value/profile events occurring internally with ANSF and GOA across the coun- the main AOGs of the province. try. KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime First, the IEA Provincial Shadow Perhaps more significant as a long Governor of Kunar was reported term gauge of community-AOG ing mechanism in the face of concerted IMF killed by an IMF airstrike in Ko- dynamics, and thus more relevant operations. rengal on the 7th. However, an to NGOs, was a report received IEA spokesman denied this was from Chapa Dara concerning the Moving back to the more familiar pattern of the case, and it was confirmed on detention of a Pakistani AOG conflict in the province, we have seen a sub- the 10th by the GOA that he was commander in the district, not by stantial number of direct attacks occurring in in fact still alive. Other reports IMF or ANSF but by a local op- the usual districts – Ghaziabad, Manogai and indicate that he was not killed but position group angry with the for- Wata Pur in particular – similar to, but a was only wounded, and reliable mer’s activities. In particular, slightly higher volume, than last period, when accounts suggest that in fact he what was seen as excessive taxa- we saw the re-emergence of direct attacks in has already been replaced with tion and harassment of locals, districts that had been the focus of IMF opera- another PSG. including at illegal CPs that occa- tions earlier in the winter. Furthermore, Marawara, Khas Kunar and Sirkanay, as well as Five days later on the 12th, in the sionally spring up on the main Chawkay and Narang, each saw higher num- Tesha village on the outskirts of district road leading to Nuristan. bers of attacks – direct and indirect – likely due Asadabad, an IED struck the ve- This is an interesting occurrence to increased infiltration across the border from hicle of the second deputy of the of a familiar dynamic between Bajaur Agency, where Pakistani AOGs have re Kunar NDS (responsible for op- Pakistani and local AOGs, the -emerged in the last two months stronger than erations) as he was moving from latter of which much more fre- they have ever been. Of concern, the Gato his home in the village to his of- quently value local legitimacy Kala area of Chawkay, on the main Jalalabad- fice in the morning, killing him rather than basing their relations Asadabad Road, remained the hotspot for at- and his driver instantly and injur- with local communities solely tacks on that roadway, but this is not a new ing his two bodyguards. This may upon coercion. It is also an inter- development and otherwise road safety was have been a tit-for-tat for the tar- esting counterpoint to the current, good across the province, with no reports of geting of the PSG, but the fact prevalent view that AOGs in illegal CPs and few IEDs. that it occurred at precisely the Kunar are increasingly cooperat- ing amongst themselves as a cop- THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 0 KHOST This Report Period 1 120 IEDs were the feature of the con- 100 flict that dominated the security Amir to Khost City. 80 landscape in Khost during this These incidents can be taken in 60 40 reporting period, with 10 detona- the context of the wider regional tions and 25 discovery/disposals. 20 SVBIED campaign, which was 0 And it was this dynamic that was focused on Khost during the Au- at work in the only NGO incident tumn but which has expanded to recorded during this period, the capitals of the other Loya Pak- KHOST AOG KHOST Crime where a magnetic IED was dis- tya provinces, as well as to Kabul covered attached to the vehicle of and Nangarhar. Moreover, days fused, with half occurring in Khost City and the provincial director of a na- after the interceptions of these the rest focused on Mando Zayi (3), Sabari (4), tional NGO in Khost City, and explosive-rigged vehicles, Gurbuz and Tere Zayi (each 3). safely defused by an ANP EOD SVBIED threats focused on Other forms of AOG attack were distinctly team. However, this incident is Gardez City (but also mentioning thought to be unrelated to AOGs, lower than previously, with just 2 cases of Khost City) were received by a IDF, one on the Khost Governor’s compound given the nature of the NGO’s number of sources, which led to work, and is much more likely that injured two children. There were also just the temporary lockdown of IO 5 direct attacks, on a mix of targets ranging connected to provincial political staff in the two capitals. More- rivalries, as the individual in ques- from an off-duty ANA soldier in Mando Zayi, over, there was one successful to a PSC guard in Sabari, to SAF attacks on a tion is well connected to one of SVBIED registered during the the region’s prominent parties. Tani ABP base, a telecoms tower in Shamal period, against an IMF convoy on and the Qalander DAC. A number of disruptions of (S) the main Gardez-Khost Road on VBIED operations also fit into the morning of the 6th. From the IMF side, significant operations tar- geting higher ranking AOG leaders continued this IED picture, with two sepa- Other IED detonations in the rate incidents involving a total of in Sabari, Bak Tere Zayi and the environs province comprised blasts against around Khost City, although at only 8 during 3 VBIEDs occurring in Gurbuz ANSF and PSC targets in Khost district, both in the district centre the period this comes in at a lower rate than City, one which hit and killed oc- th of Shaikh Amir. The first oc- previously. On the 14 in Khost district, IMF cupants in a private vehicle in the captured a commander and some of his fight- curred on Dec 31st, when 5 AOG city, and single detonations in fighters escorting a vehicle full of ers, who were reported to be actively coordi- Tani, Shamal and Mando Zayi. In nating a spectacular attack in the province. In explosives were confronted and Tere Zayi, where reports of large detained by ANP, and the vehicle Sabari there were 4, two of which killed high numbers of AOG fighters coming value AOG targets, and another of which cap- was control detonated shortly af- across the border from Kurram ter. The second incident, involv- tured 3 further commanders. In Bak on the Agency were received, the only 12th, AOG fighters were killed and a AOG ing two Sarachas laden with ex- two IED incidents were one dis- plosives and being escorted by 4 commander detained in a raid, while in single covery and one premature detona- search operations in Khost City and Gurbuz a AOG fighters, occurred the fol- tion, which killed the 4 AOG lowing day, and again the opposi- total of 3 AOG suspects were taken into cus- members planting it. And beyond tody. tion fighters were detained and these detonations, as mentioned the vehicle control detonated. above, a very large number (25) of These were particularly concern- IEDs were discovered and de- ing given the proximity of Shaikh THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 0 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 Paktya continued to demonstrate 80 the substantially lower incident elevated level of alert to the dan- 60 volume that had characterised ger of spectacular suicide attacks 40

December, with a further drop in the southeast. Finally, and as 20 noted this period, a drop primarily further evidence of AOG intent in 0 attributable to the weather. Ap- this direction, two days after the proximately half of the incidents credible threat was received, ANP

were concentrated on Gardez dis- discovered a rocket poised to be PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime trict, including 4 IED discoveries fired at the Paktya Governor’s and 2 IMF operations. One of compound. the immediate aftermath and were absent in these operations, in the Khataba Outside of Gardez, significant the previous report period, these incidents to- area, led to the arrest of approxi- security incidents in the province gether with the reports of resurgent AOGs mately 35 suspects, while another focused on Zurmat and Wuza suggest that this was only a temporary lull. the following day in Nazi Kala Zadran. In the former, AOG and Salam Khel detained 5 AOG fighters staged a direct attack on In Wuza Zadran, two IED incidents occurred, fighters, including one IED facili- the ANA OP in the Sahak area one on the 3rd where an IED being defused by tator. with SAF and RPGs on Jan 4th, ANA detonated prematurely, which fortu- During this period, however, without significant consequence, nately caused no harm, and the second the there was also the second credible while the following day in the following day where an IED detonated on a threat of suicide attack against Char Qala area an IED struck an sub-road as a PSC vehicle passed by, again national and international govern- IMF vehicle, which was swiftly causing no harm. These came days after re- mental facilities in Gardez City in followed by an attack with SAF ports were received of a new IED cell belong- 10 days (with Khost City men- and RPGs from AOG fighters ing to the main regional AOG moving into the tioned also), causing various agen- that had lain in ambush. One areas the detonations occurred, but perhaps cies, including NGOs, to respond. IMF soldier was wounded in the unexpectedly no other incidents occurred in These reports were received in the event. More broadly, reports were the 10 days following. context of the recent campaign of received shortly after these inci- Finally, in Ahmadabad and Lija Mangal, the suicide attacks on IMF and ANSF dents of a large number (approx. two remaining significant incidents were re- targets in Loya Paktya, the suc- 500) of AOG fighters across a corded. In the former, an AOG fighter threw cessful disruption of a number of number of distinct but collabora- a grenade into the home of an ANP officer, SVBIEDs in Khost, as well as one tive groups rearming and planning causing no damage, and, more seriously, an successful detonation during this for attacks in the district, which IED/direct attack ambush on an IMF convoy period (see Khost provincial as- was the focus of the majority of occurred in Lija Mangal’s Ali Khel. An ANP sessment). When the recent sui- IMF capture/kill operations that QRF was called in the assist the under-fire cide attacks in Kabul are also occurred during the November/ IMF, and the subsequent firefight led to the taken into account, it is clear that December push in the province. death of one ANP and the injury of two IMF NGOs would be wise to retain an While incidents in Zurmat fell in soldiers. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 0 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Laghman was quieter than normal 40 Kamar area, AOG fighters during this period, with only 4 30 AOG-initiated incidents recorded. dressed in ANA uniforms set up 20 In Alingar, ANP discovered an illegal CPs at midnight and IED planted on the main road to searched for GOA employees, a 10 the DAC, a reasonably common tactic more commonly seen on 0 occurrence, which was safely de- secondary roads in remote dis- fused. And in Alishing, AOG tricts such as Dawlat Shah or east- fighters attacked an IMF/ANA ern Nuristan (as happened in LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime convoy in the Salaw valley with Bargi Matal and Kamdesh in the area at 1900 hrs, which is likewise an important SAF and heavy weapons for about same week). While it will not reminder of the dangers of being caught on the 20 minutes, again a reasonably have any effect on NGOs, who highway after dark. Finally, there was an inef- common occurrence in that dis- avoid travel after dark, it is an- fective rocket attack on an ANP CP in the Kas trict. other indication of AOG attempts to strengthen their position on the Aziz Khan area. Moreover, on the Surobi sec- In terms of security along the Ka- Highway. tion of the road, a number of significant inci- bul-Jalalabad Highway, three nota- dents occurred and for more information This incident was followed the ble incidents occurred on the Qar- please refer to the Kabul provincial assess- next evening by a direct attack on ghayi side. The first and perhaps ment. most significant, in the Mashala an IMF convoy in the Surkhakan

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Defying expectations that last 80 months’ raids by IMF/ANSF the southern district of Chahar units would ensure some respite Burjak, and could suggest a strug- 60 from AOG activity, the province gle over the control of the numer- 40

hosted a number of serious secu- ous smuggling routes in both Iran 20 rity incidents during the report and Pakistan. 0 period. Another worrying trend which

AOG made their presence felt in emerged this report period is the NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime Chahar Burjak, attacking the area increase in cross-border incidents of Rabat twice over the last two with Iran. In the Khabagh area of District. Lastly, also in , Iran police shot weeks. The first prolonged ex- , Iranian border another three Afghan civilians as they tried to change resulted in one ANP and police shot and wounded an Af- cross the border. This spate of incidents is two AOG killed, with another two ghan civilian; an investigation is somewhat ironic as they follow a series of high AOG wounded and detained. underway. In addition, Iranian level exchanges between Iran and Afghanistan The second attack, also targeting border police shot and killed three which resulted in pledges to broaden security an ANP post, resulted in two Afghan civilians as they were ille- cooperation on the border issue. ANP and one AOG killed. Such gally crossing the border into Iran an aggressive operation is rare in near the area of Dihrais in Kang THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 0 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 continues to 150 BBIED attacks during the report defy the general decrease in secu- 100 rity incidents region-wide; in addi- period, and in the most notable of tion to a stream of IED strikes in these, an individual equipped with 50 the city and surrounding districts, a BBIED entered a public bath- 0 large scale attacks were also con- house in and ducted, most prominent being a detonated his device. Reports BBIED attack on the Spin Boldak indicate that 17 civilians including KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime bathhouse which turned out to be a senior ANBP commander were one of the bloodiest in many killed and another 29 civilians boy for ransom, unknown men threw hand months. wounded. This incident is no doubt part of a stepped-up effort grenades into a civilian family’s compound, RCIEDs were the primary means by AOG to attack the ANBP, and there were three incidents of civilians of AOG attack, with a total of including its commander, the shooting other civilians, for both personal and five successful strikes, mostly rather notorious yet staunch IMF business reasons. Whether this is a reflection against ANSF vehicles. Within ally Colonel Abdul Razzik. of returning fighters settling various old scores, Kandahar City, Districts 4, 5, 6, or the beginning of a general increase in crime Another feature of the report pe- and 9 were host to IED detona- remains to be seen. tions, with a total of four ANP riod was the increase in criminal wounded. There were two activity. In Kandahar City alone, armed men kidnapped a young

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 was host to an 80 enormous number of security in- munition, hand grenades and 60 cidents this report period, how- small arms. These seizures, along ever the vast majority of these with other raids which netted ra- 40 were IMF/ANSF initiated opera- dios and other communications 20 tions; with AOG largely inactive, equipment could be large enough 0 except when engaged by IMF/ to affect AOG operations in the ANSF units. near-to mid-term, depending on URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime the conditions of the supplies The provinces’ growing impor- ANP, two IMF and five civilians killed. In one tance as a storage/staging area routes from Pakistan over the next few months. such incident, in the Chinarto area of Tirin was underlined once again by the Kot District, a roadside IED struck a truck vast number of weapons caches IEDs were prominent over the contracted by the implementing partner of an discovered by IMF/ANSF search last two weeks, however the ma- IO, killing the three contractors riding inside. operations. Tirin Kot, Dehrawud jority of these were discovery and There are no indications that the attack tar- and Chora Districts were sites of disposal operations conducted by geted the vehicle due to its relationship with major finds, with IMF seizing a IMF/ANSF. There were excep- the IO, or that the IED was remote controlled. substantial quantity of rockets, tions, however, and IED strikes artillery shells, heavy mortars, am- accounted for a total of four THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 Incidents levels in Helmand Prov- ince during the report period were as well as in Marja, wherein IMF 150 extremely high, as it appears both soldiers managed to kill six of 100 IMF/ANSF and AOG were de- their attackers in a poorly planned termined to seize some sort of ambush. 50 momentum in the key parts of the Matching this tremendous work- 0 province. There was almost con- rate, IMF/ANSF launched a re-

stant friction as AOG units en- ported 18 separate operations, HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime countered IMF patrols and vice focusing on the districts of Nawa- versa. i-Barak Zayi, Nad Ali and Sangin. or injury. Unfortunately, an exception to this AOG launched attacks against In total, these operations resulted was an incident in Nahri Sarraj District, IMF patrols on over 30 occasions, in the detention of over 15 AOG, wherein a roadside IED hit a civilian Town-ace displaying a level of determination and the deaths of seven more. Of vehicle, killing 14 occupants and wounding unexpected at this point of the note is the capture of a mid-rank another four. year. SAF ambushes occurred in commander who had responsibil- One of the key developments in the province the districts of Garmser, Nad Ali ity for the area of Trikh Nawar, in has been the rumored ‘reconciliation’ of a sig- (multiple times), Nahri Sarraj Nawa-i-Barak Zayi, along with six nificant number of AOG fighters in the areas (multiple times), Sangin (multiple of his men. near Sangin; it is too early to gauge the sincer- times), Naw Zad, Marja, Nawa-i- The other major activity of IMF/ ity of these efforts, on both sides, and it is Barak Zayi and Lashkar Gah – ANSF was the discovery and dis- worth recalling other situations, mostly in the essentially throughout the entire posal of an enormous number of north and in the east, which have had counter- province. Prolonged clashes oc- IEDs. 36 separate IED incidents productive results. curred in Cha-e-Mirza village, were reported, with the vast ma- wherein three ANSF were killed, jority disposed of without death

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 Security incidents in Paktika Prov- 100 ince decreased over the past two Dila, Barmal, Yahya Khel, Omna, weeks, with only 32 incidents re- Mata Khan, Jani Khel, and Gayan 50 corded, the vast majority of these were all recipients of either direct being direct and indirect AOG or indirect attacks. What is sig- 0 attacks on the province’s various nificant is the relatively low casu- DACs. alty totals (one ANSF killed and two AOG) which indicate a lack PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime This concentration on only the of commitment in some of these most high value targets during this attacks on the part of the AOG, period probably indicates that this ANSF units. breaking off engagements rela- is part of a ‘rest and recuperation’ tively quickly. Lastly, three IMF search operations in the for the local AOG units, while Spina area of Omna and the DACs of Gomal mid-level commanders wish to IEDs continued to play a minor and Yosuf Khel yielded in total 12 AK47s, 5 continue operations to maintain role in the security profile of the RPGs, and some explosive materials. morale, cohesion, etc. province, with only four incidents recorded, all being discovery and To this end, the DACs of disposal operations by IMF/ Khushamand, Gomal, Urgun, THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Security incidents in the province 80 seven civilians accused of receiv- decreased slightly during the re- 60 ing fertilizer from GoA. Two of port period, with AOG largely 40 confining their activity to attacks the abductees were released on 20 on cell phone antennas and con- the same day while the remaining struction sites. IMF, on the other are still in captivity. 0 hand, appear intent on pressuriz- IMF/ANSF conducted at least

ing AOG cells by launching a sub- seven separate operations during ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime stantial number of operations in the report period, concentrating the area. on the districts of Mizan, Shahjoy nak Wa Jaldak District, in the area known as Both in Qalat and Shahjoy cell and Qalat. A raid near Shahr-e-Safa, wherein IMF/ANSF units en- phone towers were set on fire; Torghondy village in Qalat netted gaged with an AOG force for a prolonged fire- whether these attacks are related a wide variety of grenades, fight. As a result, one AOG member was to AOGs’ use of extortion from AK47s, RPGs and other explosive killed and another 19 AOG members were cell companies, or just plain de- materials. Similarly a raid in arrested. The joint forces seized five weapons, structive mayhem, is yet to be Zadro village of the same district one RPG launcher and some ammunition determined. In the most serious produced some 40 lbs of explo- from the location of the battle. AOG incident, fighters abducted sives. The largest of these opera- tions however took place in Tar-

NGO Incidents Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250

Overall incident levels decreased 200 in , with a responsible to be handed to them. marked drop in the use of indirect A day earlier, a demonstration was 150 attacks by AOG. Civilian unrest held in Ghazni City, attended by 100 appears to be increasing in Ghazni approximately 1,000 people and 50 Province, however, not for rea- led by tribal elders from the 0 sons related to the recent elec- nearby village of Mangor. The tions. Rather, three separate dem- demonstration was in protest of GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime onstrations took place during the an IMF Special Forces raid on a report period in response to IMF/ local house the evening before, Owing to the relative lack of movement by ANSF raids on private homes, as during which a local mullah was AOG over the past two weeks, IEDs were not it appears IMF units are using the detained, and three other guests particularly troublesome and there were only lull in AOG activity to up the also arrested. two such incidents recorded. In the Chowk-e- tempo of search and seizure op- IMF/ANSF maintained this pace Sulh area of Ghazni City an RCIED was set erations. of operations by launching an- off as an ANP officer began to examine the In , IMF killed other 11 separate operations, tar- device. Four ANP along with their com- three civilians during an opera- geting AOG safe-houses and stor- mander were wounded in the blast. In As- tion. Following this operation, age facilities. In total, 15 AOG pandi Village, also in , IMF/ approximately 400 civilians took were detained, another 9 killed, ANA located and safely defused an IED and the corpses of the victims to and a variety of weapons were seized some 7.62mm ammunition in the area. Nawabad village of Ghazni City, seized. protesting and demanding those THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 N/A NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)

Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we contact: do not know enough [email protected] about the area to EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) comment on the sig- Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 nificance of the inci- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 ANSO is managed by an NGO dents occurring Board. If you have any there. SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) feedback, good or bad, let Peter Dimitroff - [email protected] 0796 688 416 them know on: If you can help us Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 [email protected] understand the prov- ince better, please ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) contact us.

Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Protection Forces (local depu- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA)

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