The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 65 1-15 January 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 Once again a regular feature the wounding of an NGO externally, with efforts that 7 Northern Region of the security landscape in staff member in a shooting include brazen exposure Western Region 13 CENTRAL, a suicide attack incident in Takhar on the and disarmament of the within Kabul was recorded 4th for reasons that appears populace. AOG have at- Eastern Region 15 this period. As in previous unrelated to his employ- tempted to counter the Southern Region 20 incidents, a suicide attacker ment. On the 6th, this time high tempo of IMF opera- (SVBIED) targeted a security in Sar-E Pul, road instability tions within the region 24 ANSO Info Page force transport (NDS) which came to the fore when an (including Nangarhar and resulted in numerous casual- NGO vehicle was fired Paktya), primarily through ties, including civilians. The upon after passing through IED placement. Tensions YOU NEED TO KNOW opening weeks of 2010 have an AOG checkpoint. between local and exoge- recorded low overall incident Lastly, a criminal robbery of nous AOG have risen to • Regular suicide attacks volumes in Wardak and an NGO clinic in Balkh the fore in Kunar, though against security forces n Logar, IMF and security occurred on the 7th. Re- the full impact of this dy- Kabul force operations dominated gion-wide, security force namic remains to be seen. • Geographically and com- reporting from these prov- operations (i.e. ‘Ebtekar’ in For this period in the positionally diverse NGO inces. While unseasonal Balkh & ‘Jadid’ in Baghlan) SOUTH, it wasn’t the in- incidents within the North weather patterns have en- were the key drivers shap- cident rate that warranted sured accessibility to the ing the context over this attention, rather the inci- • AOG migration from the western portions of the re- period. dent severity. The BBIED South into the Western gion, the migration of and Central Regions In the WEST, the deploy- attack in the Spin Boldak Uruzgan-based AOG into ment of IEDs remained the District of Kandahar southern Daykundi is a trend primary expression of AOG proved to be the deadliest to monitor in the upcoming presence within the region. attack for the period, with ANSO is supported by year. The usual quiet of the In Farah, the cross-district 17 were killed and a further Panjshir Valley was disrupted coordination of AOG ef- 29 wounded. As in other by the unusual detonation of forts, in conjunction with regions, IMF have contin- a makeshift explosive device. out of region support from ued to pressure AOG ele- While speculation in regards Helmand, resulted in a ments through a consider- to this incident abounds, the marked shift in the opera- able operational tempo, likeliest explanation relates to tional template. In addi- resulting in numerous ar- internal political machina- tion, the recent arrest of rests, cache finds, and a tions. the Bakwa DSG completed substantial number of IED In line with 2010, the the picture. discoveries. What long NORTH continued its The uncontested dynamics term effects the dominance of NGO incident of Nuristan in the EAST is ‘reconciliation’ efforts reporting, recording 4 inci- likely to change in the up- within Helmand (Sangin dents from 4 different prov- coming months in light of specifically) will have on inces this period. Starting on IMF intentions to re-engage the overall context of this the 3rd in Kunduz, an NGO there. Juxtaposing this volatile province is unclear staff member was temporar- intent, AOG elements have at present. Unfortunately, ily detained and his vehicle been consolidating their the positive veneer is often was stolen in a criminal inci- control both internally and tarnished by the underlying dent. This was followed by motives in such actions. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Incident volumes remained rather 40 low in Kabul Province, with 25 of Darulaman. With figures ex- 30 total, a fifth of which were AOG- trapolated from the last two years, 20 initiated. Although very low in the three suicide attacks recorded 10 since November 2010 in Kabul absolute numbers, AOG activity 0 still came to the fore this cycle accord with the long term trend with a dramatic suicide motorcy- of 1 strike per month for the last 25 months. 90% of these attacks cle-mounted IED strike against KABUL AOG KABUL Crime NDS employees in Darulaman, an were conducted against security forces or high-profile venues/ attack that exploited the vulner- routes of the city. abilities in their morning com- premises directly associated with mute patterns along with an effec- GOA. The avoidance of security A series of AOG and IMF strike/counter- tive IED blast near an ANP targets during the early to mid- strikes were again reported from Tangi Abre- checkpost in Puli Muhammad morning hours is the primary shum, reinforcing a concerning outlook for Khan (PD 1). Continued ‘hit and mitigation strategy recommended overland accessibility between Kabul and Jala- run’ operations along the Kabul – as this is when the vast majority of labad for 2011. Of note to NGOs, one such Jalalabad Highway have chal- such attacks occur. The afore- AOG attack resulted in a follow-up IMF op- lenged the supply of strategic mentioned vulnerabilities on the eration some 90 minutes after the initial strike, freight traffic as well as the con- side of the security forces will re- with one NGO party caught on the highway in trol of access into Kabul by the main an attractive target for AOG the proximity of IMF firing positions. ANSO security forces, and for many, rais- operatives in 2011, particularly in encourages NGOs to adhere to the recom- ing doubts about eventual out- the context of a changing political mended 0900 – 1500 hrs travel timings be- comes of the gradual handover of environment, which may bring tween Kabul and Jalalabad, as well as to seek security responsibilities for Surobi particular motivations for ele- an up to date assessment before setting out on from the French contingent to ments inside various AOG to road missions. The combat operations in Su- ANSF anticipated in the spring of stage ‘spectacular attacks’ within robi were seconded by unconfirmed accounts 2011. Kabul. Intelligence reports con- of the sacking of the Taliban District Shadow tinue to feature AOG willingness Governor by the leadership in Quetta. The resumption of AOG suicide to conduct strikes inside the city, Whether that is true, and to what extent such activity in Kabul dates back to the although the major strategic posi- development will impact on AOG will and November SVBIED against an tioning of AOG has consistently capabilities to challenge the security forces in IMF convoy in the southern part been along the eastern access Surobi, is yet to be seen. NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 12th of January 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 0 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 Only four AOG initiated attacks 80 were reported from Wardak dur- Saydabad, Nirkh, Chaki Wardak 60 and Jalrez, along with the newly ing the first ten days of 2011. Out 40 of these, three were IED strikes added areas outside of Maydan 20 against security force-related tar- Shahr. A combined 10 cases of gets. In one, a technological up- such operations were reported 0 grade was noted with the occur- from the province and have in- cluded a variety of AOG ele- rence of a magnetic device deto- WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime nating under a ‘jingle’ truck in ments. While such a campaign may lead to temporary gains to Maydan Shahr, however causing Of note, perceptions of increased insecurity, only limited damage to the vehi- IMF strategic momentum over AOG planners, the past months mainly linked to the large freedom of move- cle. If utilised in a more effective ment of AOG, and blurred lines between pro- manner in the future, as seen in have shown that such gains are mostly short-lived, and well below GOA security forces and independent, largely those devices deployed on the criminal, armed groups, consistently come outskirts of Jalalabad, magnetic the task of challenging AOG en- trenchment in the province. from Jalrez and converge on the main district IEDs may add weight to the al- road towards Hajigak. Recent reporting also ready impressive portfolio of Another strand of political con- included another NDS – ANP operation in flict represents the infighting AOG tactics in the province. Be- Esmail Khel, located on the road further to the among AOG for strategic posi- sides being an effective weapon east, during which 2 AOG were arrested and tions in Nirkh. While more details against the traffic of military an assortment of weaponry and ammunition cargo, ‘sticky bombs’ are also a need to be corroborated, prelimi- seized. Due to the multiple risks varying from nary reporting from the district concern for personnel ensuring illegal AOG checkpoints to roadside criminal- includes intensifying attempts by the perimeters of protected facili- ity, NGOs are advised to refrain from non- the IEA District Shadow Gover- ties, namely military bases. essential movement along this route. For over- Recent conflict patterns have nor at mobilizing local support land access to Bamyan, the Ghorband Road against the dominant HIG ele- largely been driven by IMF presents a less exposed alternative for essential ments, with this cycle noting an ‘capture/kill’ operations targeting NGO road missions.