POLICY PAPER FULL-SCALE FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

Internal Security Program 2018

1.1. EUROPEAN VALUES THINK-TANK The European Values Think-Tank is a non-governmental policy institute defending liberal democracy. Our vision is that of a free, safe and prosperous Czech Republic within Central Europe that is an integral part of the West. We help to face aggressive regimes, radicalisation within the society, the spread of authoritarian tendencies and extremist ideologies including Islamism. Our work is based on individual donors. Use the form at: http://www.europeanvalues.net/o-nas/support- us/, or send your donation directly to our transparent account: CZ69 2010 0000 0022 0125 8162. www.europeanvalues.net [email protected] www.facebook.com/Evropskehodnoty

1.2. INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM The Internal Security Program of the European Values Think-Tank was created in reaction to worrying phenomena, such as the proliferation of Islamic extremism, mass migration and problems with the integration of Muslim populations. The focus of the Internal Security Program is on counter-extremism and counter-terrorism, tougher migration policy and more effective integration policy.

Editor • Jan Stehlík, Coordinator and Analyst of the Internal Security Program, European Values Think-Tank Contributors • Radko Hokovský, Founder and Chairman of the Executive Board, Head of the Internal Security Program, European Values Think-Tank • Jiří Blažek, Analyst of the Internal Security Program, European Values Think-Tank • Petr Jan Vinš, Analyst of the Internal Security Program, European Values Think-Tank • Radka Famfulová, Contributor to the Internal Security Program, European Values Think-Tank • Mario Nicolini, Advisor, Anton Tunega Foundation • Aleksandra Rybinska, Warsaw Institute • Bianka Speidl, Senior Researcher, Migration Research Institute • Abdessamad Belhaj, Researcher, Migration Research Institute • Rebecca Schönenbach, Chairwoman, Veto! Für den Rechtsstaat Foundation • Jan Wójcik, Member of the Board, European Issues Institute

Reviewers • Shmuel Bar, Founder and CEO, IntuView, Israel • Roberta Bonazzi, Founder and President, European Foundation for Democracy, Belgium • Olivier Guitta, Managing Director, GlobalStrat, United Kingdom • Usama Hasan, Head of Islamic Studies, Quilliam Foundation, United Kingdom • Arndt Künnecke, Professor, Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences, Germany • Miroslav Mareš, Professor in the Department of Political Science, Masaryk University; Member of the Editorial Board of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network, Czech Republic • Alexander Ritzmann, Fellow, Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security; Co-Chair of the Communication and Narratives Working Group of the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network, Germany • Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, Heritage Foundation, United States • Lorenzo Vidino, Director, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, United States • Members of security forces and public institutions

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the Internal Security Program and do not necessarily reflect views and opinions of the contributors and reviewers. Image copyright: page 1 - By Jamie Kennedy [CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons; page 11 - By Gareth Davies from walthamstow, london, Uk (GGD_9487) [CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons; page 18 - By Collectorofinsignia [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)] , from Wikimedia Commons

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The challenge of countering Islamic extremism in liberal democracies continues to vex policy makers, the security community and the wider public. The purpose of this document is to offer policy makers in liberal democracies a comprehensive but triaged set of recommendations to build a full-scale response to Islamic extremism and minimise its influence. The term ‘Islamic extremism’ (ISLEX) is defined as any III. Aggression: Islamic extremist groups attain set of ideas based on an interpretation of Islam and sufficient popularity to consolidate into broader aimed at the removal of fundamental principles of networks or movements, reach financial self- the democratic rule of law and the suppression sustainability and diversify their activities beyond of basic human rights. This definition is consciously proselytization to accomplish their strategic objectives. subjective from the point of view of the liberal IV. Domination: Islamic extremist movements conduct democratic state. large-scale and protracted activities to replace the Actors engaging in Islamic extremist behaviour are existing order with one based on the ideological tenets disaggregated by the type of activity into those who of Islamic extremism. practice political violence, those who engage in non- In response to the threat of Islamic extremism, and with violent political activism, and those who engage in non- a view to improving the existing measures against it, a political activities violating basic human rights of other comprehensive model of countering Islamic extremism individuals. This gives rise to three categories: is proposed. The model consists of three pillars, with I. Jihadism: political violence (e.g. terrorist attacks, each pillar serving a different purpose and containing violent insurgencies) different measures. Together, the three pillars target the entire dynamic of Islamic extremist proliferation and II. Islamism: non-violent political activism (e.g. extremist provide a comprehensive model for elimination of political parties, parallel legal systems) Islamic extremism in any EU state. The three pillars are: III. Islamic Fundamentalism: non-political extremist I. Prevention and Remedy: measures to increase activities (e.g. domestic violence) resilience against Islamic extremism and engage Each of the three categories has its circles of hard-liners, radicalised individuals (e.g. counter-narratives, exit followers and sympathisers, with varying ratios from one programmes) actor to another. II. Law Enforcement: measures against hard-line Islamic While the exact process of advancement of Islamic extremists (e.g. arrests, kinetic operations) extremism is always dependent on context and the III. Countering Extremist Ideology: measures to particular group in question, common traits of the minimise the influence of the ideological tenets of advancement in Western European countries are Islamic extremism (e.g. training of imams, content identified. These include activities which are already management) ongoing, and those activities which are only envisioned. The resulting model may be broken down into four The definition and conceptualisation of the threat and broad stages: the formulation of appropriate responses to it give rise to a set of policy recommendations. The core I. Infiltration: Nascent efforts by Islamic extremists to recommendations are primarily intended for penetrate a territory where they hitherto wielded little governments, while measure-specific recommendations or no influence. are intended for relevant institutions and stakeholders. II. Expansion: Islamic extremists succeed in establishing When combined, the recommendations stemming from permanent organisational structures and turn to the three pillars undercut the sources, proliferators and maximising potential for further growth. reception of Islamic extremism and hamper its long- term survival in the territory at hand.

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INTRODUCTION The challenge of countering Islamic extremism in liberal extremism in the EU. This led to the conclusion that the democracies continues to vex policy makers, the existing measures do not address the entirety of the security community and the wider public. The purpose threat and a comprehensive system of countering of this document is to offer policy makers in liberal Islamic extremism is necessary. The dominant democracies a comprehensive but triaged set of approaches typically respond to the issue as part of the recommendations to build a full-scale response to ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE) rubric, which Islamic extremism and minimise its influence. offers an expanded menu of options for dealing with those extremists who embraced violent means to The policy paper is not a contribution to the ongoing achieve their strategic objectives. However, very little academic debate. Rather, it builds on the findings of this attention is paid to addressing non-violent forms of debate to offer specific, practical policy prescriptions extremism and the inherent ideological roots of Islamic with a view to improving the current situation regarding extremism in particular. 1 This is contrary to the ever- the advancement of Islamic extremism. growing expert view that the primary causal factor While the proposed framework may be adapted and behind Islamic extremism is ideological, and that non- applied in liberal democracies in other parts of the violent Islamic extremism is inherently linked to violent world, it is primarily designed for the institutional extremism and fosters a climate where violent Islamic environment of EU Member States. As a result, the extremism can flourish. policy recommendations stemming from the document Viewing the issue through the prism of ‘radicalisation are tailored to fit into the ongoing work of policy makers towards violent extremism’ is also limiting. This engaged in countering Islamic extremism on the approach, particularly popular in the European debate, national and European levels within the EU. The emphasises the processes which precede an individual’s framework may be used to improve existing national embrace of extremism. However, the dominant focus is strategies against Islamic extremism in Western again on violent manifestations of extremism, while European countries or build such strategies in countries non-violent extremism is addressed only marginally. where they are absent. Moreover, the process of radicalisation is only one part The proposed full-scale framework consists of a of a wider problem of extremism, which also includes definition and conceptualisation of Islamic extremism, the activities of extremist groups as they strive to reach an analysis of advancement of Islamic extremist actors in their objectives and the impact of such activities. A sole Western Europe and a categorisation of proposed focus on radicalisation may limit the future growth of counter-measures based on a model inspired by public extremist groups, but does not adequately address their health practice. The framework is complemented by current activities. background research of existing measures against The framework proposed in this publication rectifies Islamic extremism in select EU countries. this inadequacy by addressing Islamic extremism in its As a whole, the framework is designed to minimise the entirety, including in its non-violent manifestations. influence of Islamic extremist individuals and groups, Action is proposed at three fronts simultaneously to both violent and non-violent, in the territory of any EU increase the resilience of populations at risk of Member State. The intention lies strictly in the radicalisation, combat the activities of hard-line Islamic perimeter of counter-extremism and the document extremists and limit the influence of the Islamic does not venture into wider discussions about the place extremist ideology. of Islam in Europe, immigration from Muslim-majority This approach is unique when compared to existing countries and integration of European Muslim models, which typically fall short of going beyond the populations. narrow focus on counter-terrorism and counter- The need for constructing an effective system of radicalisation measures. These are part of the proposed countering Islamic extremism was identified after system, but also included are other measures which are conducting a review of the existing expert debate and identified as necessary components of an effective and evaluating the existing policy measures against Islamic holistic system of countering Islamic extremism. The

1 There are some notable exceptions to this trend, such as the strategic documents of the United Kingdom which emphasise the necessity to tackle non-violent extremism. See Home Office (2018): Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) 2018; Accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism- strategy-contest-2018. Also see Home Office (2015): Counter-Extremism Strategy; Accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter- extremism-strategy.

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proposed new system thus goes above and beyond existing approaches to tackle Islamic extremism. The first chapter provides a definition and conceptualisation of Islamic extremism and an analysis of advancement of Islamic extremist actors in Western Europe. The chapter approaches Islamic extremism as a whole, including both its violent and non-violent manifestations. Subsequently, the second chapter describes the newly proposed counter-extremism model. The model is inspired by established public health practice of countering infectious diseases. This analogy is not original – it has already been used in previous research. However, the proposed model goes beyond preventive measures and so expands on existing links between public health practice and counter- extremism. Finally, the third chapter lists the recommendations which stem from the proposed model.

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Jihadism centralises the idea of violent jihad and derives from the belief that armed struggle should precede any non- violent political attempts to establish Islamic rule.

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THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM For the purpose of this publication, the term ‘extremism’ is defined as any set of ideas aimed at the removal of fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law and the suppression of basic human rights. The term ‘Islamic extremism’ (ISLEX) is defined as any set of ideas based on an interpretation of Islam and aimed at the removal of fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law and the suppression of basic human rights. 2 The above definition of Islamic extremism is consciously word ‘Islamic’ with the word ‘Islamist’ and denying any subjective from the point of view of the liberal connection between Islam and extremism. democratic state. Two key characteristics must be met The term ‘Islamic extremism’ does not attempt to avoid for an individual or group to be considered Islamic the admittedly difficult debate over the role of religion extremist: 1) they seek to remove fundamental in sparking extremist movements. Rather, it merely principles of the democratic rule of law or suppress basic describes those actors which are a) extremist and b) human rights, and 2) this desire stems from a set of ideas inspired by an interpretation of Islam, however based on an interpretation of Islam. erroneous this interpretation may be in the eyes of The definition leaves out specific ideological religious scholars. The term ‘Islamic extremism’ is thus characteristics of contemporary Islamic extremist deemed more accurate in describing the entire groups, such as the rejection of secular social and spectrum of movements under discussion. political order, belief in Muslim supremacy, rejection of It should be emphasised that acting against Islamic subjection of Muslims to non-Islamic political and legal extremists does not equate to acting against Muslims order and rejection of legal, social and political merely because of their religion, much like acting against developments not grounded in the life and deeds of the right-wing or left-wing extremists does not equate to Prophet Mohammad. These and other tenets are acting against those in favour of right-wing or left-wing promoted by various Islamic extremist groups to varying policies. The key determinant for action from the point degrees. However, what makes any group or individual of view of liberal democracies is whether a particular ‘extremist’ in the liberal democratic legal tradition are actor engages in extremist behaviour. not necessarily these specific characteristics but the desire to remove fundamental principles of the 1.3. Conceptualisation of Islamic Extremism democratic rule of law or suppress basic human rights, as they are well defined in constitutional legal traditions Islamic extremism has a long history of development of liberal democratic states. Where this desire is derived and appears in a variety of forms. It is difficult to from an interpretation of Islam, the group or individual ascertain specific ideological positions which would be falls into the category of ‘Islamic extremism’. shared by the entire spectrum of Islamic extremist individuals and actors. However, Islamic extremist actors Some researchers and practitioners prefer the use of the may be disaggregated by the type of activity into those term ‘Islamist extremism’ to describe the entire who practice political violence, those who engage in non- spectrum of this form of extremism. However, the term , and those who engage in ‘Islamist extremism’ opens the doors to the argument, violent political activism non- violating basic human rights of other utilised widely by populist movements in the West, that political activities the state refuses to correctly name the threat out of fear individuals. of sounding politically incorrect by supplanting the

2 The definition of the term ‘extremism’ differs among states. The UK Counter-Extremism Strategy provides the following definition of extremism: „Extremism is the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.“ Home Office (2015): Counter-Extremism Strategy; London: Home Office. Germany has a working definition of ‚political extremism‘ as „characterized by the fact that it rejects the democratic constitutional state and seeks to eliminate or restrict its democratic or constitutional component“ („Der politische Extremismus zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass er den demokratischen Verfassungsstaat ablehnt und beseitigen oder ihn einschränken will – die demokratische Komponente und/oder die konstitutionelle.“). Federal Agency for Civic Education: „Extremismus“; Accessed at http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/202019/extremismus. For a more detailed discussion about the definition of ‚extremism‘, see Schmid, Alex (2014): „Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?”; ICCT – The Hague; Accessed at https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf.

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This gives rise to three categories: Their ideas were put into practice by a variety of individuals, such as the long-time spiritual leader of the I. Jihadism: political violence (e.g. terrorist attacks, Taliban Mullah Omar, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq violent insurgencies) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the American-Yemeni lecturer II. Islamism: non-violent political activism (e.g. extremist Anwar al-Awlaki and the Al-Qaeda leaders Osama Bin political parties, parallel legal systems) Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. 9 Most recently, the Jihadist tradition was continued and expanded under III. Islamic Fundamentalism: non-political extremist the banner of the Islamic State. It bears noting that some activities (e.g. domestic violence) historical figures, such as the 15th century warrior and Each of the three categories has its circles of hard-liners, writer Abu Zakaryya al-Dimashqi al-Dumyati (Ibn followers and sympathisers, with varying ratios from one Nuhaas)10, could also be considered part of the Jihadist actor to another. At the same time, the objectives of tradition. specific actors differ considerably, particularly at the A violent Islamic extremist tradition also exists in Shia operational and tactical levels. However, actors in all Islam, most notably in connection to Iran and the Islamic three categories are classified as Islamic extremist revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini. 11 Khomeini’s because their ideas and practices are derived from an approach is quite distinct compared to the above interpretation of Islam and aimed, wholly or in part, ideologues, but nevertheless satisfies the key definitional at the removal of fundamental principles of the components of Islamic extremism. Both Khomeini’s democratic rule of law and the suppression of basic movement and the Iranian regime make an extensive human rights. Let us examine each category in turn. use of political violence in support of their goals. 1.3.1. Jihadism: Political Violence The theories of Jihadism not only spawned numerous violent organisations over time, but also served as a Jihadism, as the name suggests, centralises the idea of violent catalyst for certain Islamic fundamentalists and violent jihad and derives from the belief that armed Islamists, who adopted violent Jihad as one of the struggle should precede any non-violent political possible ways to impose their ideas and goals. attempts to establish Islamic rule. Typical in Jihadist Supporters of Jihadist doctrines thus present a literature is the idea that armed struggle is the most significant risk to national security. important duty of every Muslim but is neglected by both non-violent Islamists (who seek out the establishment of 1.3.2. Islamism: Non-Violent Political Activism Islamic rule by non-violent political means) and non- political Islamic fundamentalists (who emphasise da’wa Islamism includes theories and practices based on the and the theological aspects of Islam). Jihadist ideologues desire to implant principles of Islamic religious law into motivate their followers to commit acts of violence common law or secular law and thus effectively turn the against Muslims who are perceived as ‘apostates’ and politics of a particular state into Islamic politics. Islamist against infidels; not only a means to a political end (the actors typically perceive Islam not just as a religion, but establishment of a Sharia-based political order), but as a as a practical guide for reordering and directing society personal duty justified by recourse to theology. in ways which de facto suppress individual rights and freedoms in the name of establishing divine rule. The contemporary Jihadist tradition was popularised by Typically, the ultimate goal of Islamism is to establish a Muhammad Abdussalam Faraj in his pamphlet The political order based on Islamic principles and laws, Neglected Duty3, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in his This without any secular or non-Islamic interferences. is Our Aqeedah4, Abu Basir al-Tartusi5, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam6, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir7, Abu Musab al-Suri8 The precise tenets and activities of Islamist movements and other theoreticians. vary across regions and nations. In the Arab world, prominent Islamist thinkers include the founder of the

3 Johannes J.G. Jansen (1986): The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East; New York: MacMillan. 4 Wagemakers, Joas (2012): A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5 Lohlker, Rüdiger (ed.) and Tamara Abu-Hamdeh (2014): Jihadi Thought and Ideology; Berlin: Logos Verlag. 6 McGregor, Andrew (2003): “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone’: 'Abdullah 'Azzam and the Islamist Revolution”; Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2. 7 Winter, Charlie and Abdullah K. Al-Saud (2016): „The Obscure Theologian Who Shaped ISIS“; The Atlantic; Accessed at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/isis-muhajir-syria/509399/. 8 See Cruickshank, Paul and Mohannad Hage Ali (2007): „Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda“; Studies in Conflict & Terrorism; Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1- 14. Also see Hamid, Mustafa and Leah Farrall (2015): The Arabs at War in Afghanistan; London: Hurst Publishers. 9 Kepel, Gilles (2006): Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris. 10 See Maher, Shiraz (2016): Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea; London: Penguin Books. 11 For a profile, see Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2014): A Crititical Introduction to Khomeini; New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna12, the founder of 1.3.3. Islamic Fundamentalism: Non-Political the Hizb ut-Tahrir group Taqiuddin al-Nabhani 13 and Activities the Islamic theorist Sayyid Qutb14. In Pakistan and wider Islamic fundamentalists typically share many of the South Asia, Islamism was championed by the founder of theological and ideological characteristics of their Jamaat-e-Islami Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi 15 and Islamist counter-parts, but do not engage in political others.16 activities to attain them. The Islamic fundamentalist While the above figures differ in some details of their interpretation of Islam is typically based on a literal teachings, they share the desire to implant principles of understanding of Islamic sources, a rejection of other Islamic religious law into the political system of their interpretations of the faith and a practical application of countries of residence irrespective of and often in perceived Islamic prescriptions irrespective of their opposition to secular and liberal democratic values 17. compatibility with the principles of individual liberty, For Islamists, the Islamic state should not merely impose human dignity and equality before the law as its rule and legal system, it should also transform the conceptualised in liberal democratic constitutional mentality and spirit of the people. 18 Islam is thus systems. perceived as a political ideology as well as a form of This leads some Islamic fundamentalist actors to engage spiritual faith.19 As a result, it ceases to be matter of inner in activities which fit the definition of extremism, albeit relationship between God and man and becomes also a outside of the political arena. For example, domestic relationship between man and society. violence and abuse of women justified by recourse to The Islamists’ approach to democracy differs from one Islamic scripture, or promotion of hatred of a group of actor to another, with some groups openly rejecting the people with recourse to Quranic verses. concept altogether 20 and others accepting it as a Also included in this category are groups which, while legitimate form of consultation which is however rejecting the use of violence and staying out of politics, subordinate to the Sharia.21 In practice, the Islamist view nevertheless reject Western liberal democracy and of Islam fosters societies where individual rights and engage in behaviour which has a detrimental effect on freedoms, as conceptualised in liberal democratic social cohesion in an open society.22 constitutional systems, are suppressed if not compatible with the Islamists’ interpretation of Islamic norms. Islamic fundamentalist individuals and organisations Islamism presents a totalitarian ideology where Islam is often reject the use of violence 23 and may prefer the dominant element not only in politics, but also in religious activities to political activism. However, every sphere and every aspect of human life. For this through their propagation of anti-democratic and anti- reason, Islamist individuals and organisations present a pluralist tenets of Islamic extremism and their clear risk to public order. Where their teachings delve legitimisation in the public and religious discourse, into undermining the security of the liberal democratic Islamic fundamentalists undermine the legitimacy of order, they also present a risk to national security. liberal democracy and provide a fertile soil for the growth of Islamism and Jihadism. Islamic fundamentalism thus poses a risk to public order. The relationship between the three categories is illustrated in a pyramidal scheme (see Fig. 1). Islamic

12 El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah Muhammad (1998): “Emergence of a Militant Leader: A Study of the Life of Hasan al-Banna, 1906–1928”; Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1. 13 Baran, Zeyno (2004): Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency; Washington DC: Nixon Center. 14 Musallam, Adnan A. (2005): From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism; Westport, CT: Praeger. 15 Larson, Warren Fredrick (1998): Islamic Ideology and Fundamentalism in Pakistan; Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 16 For a more expansive overview of Islamism, see Akbarzadeh, Shahram ed. (2012): Routledge handbook of political Islam; London: Routledge. 17 Many of the above figures operated in illiberal and non-democratic contexts. Nevertheless, their teachings, which continue to be propagated by Islamic extremists, are in clear opposition to fundamental principles of liberal democracy. 18 Some scholars point out the similarity of this tenet with the Marxist-Leninist idea of “making the new human” and “raising the consciousness” of the workers. See Hansen Henrik and Peter Kainz (2007): “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism”; Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 8, No. 1. 19 See also “Chapter 7: The Principles of Shariah: Shari’ah — The Universal And Eternal Law”; in Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1980): Towards Understanding Islam; London: UK Islamic Mission. 20 For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir. See for example Hizb ut-Tahrir (2010): „Democracy in Crisis“; a pamphlet by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain; Accessed at http://www.hizb.org.uk/resources/whitepapers/democracy-in-crisis/. 21 For example, the Muslim Brotherhood. See Vidino, Lorenzo (2010): The New Muslim Brotherthood in the West; New York: Columbia University Press. 22 For a discussion about such groups in Salafism, see Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2006): “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement“; Studies in Conflict & Terrorism; Vol. 29, pp. 207–239.

23 Although not always. Some Islamic fundamentalists may call for the use of non-political violence, e.g. domestic violence against children or women.

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fundamentalism builds on Islamic discourse to present systems. Tolerant European Muslims require particular an interpretation of Islam that is incompatible with protection of their safety and freedom of conscience, as individual liberty, human dignity and equality before the they often become the target of both Islamic extremists law. Islamism applies the interpretation presented by (who seek to recruit them to their cause or else attack Islamic fundamentalists in political activities. Jihadism them as heretics) and anti-Muslim extremists (who applies Islamic extremist principles using political falsely view all Muslims as potential terrorists). This violence. Jihadism thus presents the most visible part of necessity is even more acute in the case of former Islamic a wider threat. It should be noted that Fig. 1 presents a extremists, who face threats from their former disaggregation of Islamic extremism by activity type, not associates. the typical path of radicalisation. Individuals and groups in all three of the above 1.4. Advancement of Islamic Extremist categories – Jihadism, Islamism and Islamic Actors in Western Europe Fundamentalism – frame their activities as legitimate Taken as a whole, Islamic extremism presents one of the practices dictated by pious adherence to the religion of most serious threats to liberal democracy. Its key Islam. While Islamic extremists draw on the same ideological tenets are inherently opposed to religion as the wider Muslim population, they do not fundamental liberal democratic principles and its represent Islam as a whole, which is practiced by millions adherents have demonstrated they possess the capacity of non-extremist European citizens in agreement with to undermine – both directly and indirectly – the liberal democratic principles. foundations of the democratic rule of law. The diversity of non-extremist expressions of Islam is But how do Islamic extremists gain influence in any illustrated here through the bottom category of tolerant given territory? While the exact process of advancement Islam. This category includes any interpretation of Islam of Islamic extremism is always dependent on context that tolerates the existence of alternative interpretations and the particular group in question, common traits of as well as other religions and world views and is practiced in line with the principles of individual liberty, human dignity and equality before the law as conceptualised in liberal democratic constitutional

Figure 1: Conceptualisation of Islamic Extremism Differentiation of Type of Extremism by Primary Actor Activity

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The term ‘Islamic extremism’ (ISLEX) is defined as any set of ideas based on an interpretation of Islam and aimed at the removal of fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law and the suppression of basic human rights.

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the advancement in liberal democracies may be Finally, the model does not account for the activities of identified. These are illustrated in a model (See Fig. 2) actors who legitimise and aid, directly or indirectly, the and include those activities which are already ongoing, proliferation of Islamic extremism without themselves and those activities which are envisioned. conducting Islamic extremist activities. The influence of such actors is strongly context-dependent and varies The envisioned activities of Islamic extremists are wildly. identified through a study of eminent theoretical and prescriptive writings underpinning Jihadism, Islamism The model may be broken down into four broad stages: and Islamic fundamentalism as described in the previous infiltration, expansion, aggression and domination. section, and by reflection of real-world activities of Islamic extremists in third countries. The resulting 1.4.1. Infiltration model covers the entire process of advancement of The first stage, infiltration, contains nascent efforts by Islamic extremist actors, from the commencement of Islamic extremists to penetrate a territory where they small initiatives to the formation of structured groups hitherto wielded little or no influence. and the build-up of broad movements with considerable influence. During the infiltration stage, the pool of supporters of Islamic extremism tends to be minimal, and the Islamic It should be noted that this model does not portray the extremists themselves do not possess the power to process of individual radicalisation toward adopting affect the dominant religious or political direction of the Islamic extremism. This process has been described in country. Instead, they focus on setting up a permanent detail elsewhere.24 For the same reason, the model does presence, attracting a small core of hard-line supporters not deal with individual-level factors conducive to to fulfil basic tasks and finding a sustainable source of radicalisation, such as psychological problems or financing. Such activities are often limited to the work of personal grievances. These factors are relevant in turning single individuals or small groups. single individuals towards extremism and violence, but do not by themselves cause the growth and proliferation There are various ways in which outside sources of of massive, ideologically-driven movements. The model Islamic extremism may infiltrate into a new territory. constructed here depicts common activities of Islamic Common tactics include the arrival of foreign religious extremist groups after they have been radicalised, authorities who subscribe to Islamic extremist tenets25, irrespective of the individual factors which drove them the provision of outside financial support for nascent to extremism. activities of domestic Islamic extremists 26 or the dissemination of Islamic extremist propaganda, both At the same time, the model does not illustrate the online and offline. application of counter-measures, which vary wildly in different contexts and limit the advancement of Islamic Outside sources of Islamic extremism may originate extremist actors. Instead, proliferation of Islamic with individuals, private organisations or even whole extremism is presented here as it applies when states. Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed organizations are insufficient counter-measures are adopted. considered to be one of the most active supporters of Islamic fundamentalist organizations. 27 While the

24 For an authoritative overview of the academic research of individual radicalisation, see Borum, R. (2011): ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories’; Journal of Strategic Security; Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 7-36. For a more recent overview, see for example Bondokji, Neven, Kim Wilkinson and Leen Aghabi (2017): „Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers“; West Asia – North Africa Institute. 25 In the UK, Egyptian Abu Hamza, Jamaican Abdullah El Faisal, Egyptian Abu Qatada, Syrian Omar Bakri and Egyptian Hani Al Sibai were linked to preaching Islamic extremism and inspiring terrorist attacks. See Rachel Bryson (2017): “For Caliph and Country: Exploring How British Jihadis Join a Global Movement”; Tony Blair Institute; Accessed at https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/how-six-islamist-ideologues-shaped-jihadi-activity-britain. In 2017, Denmark banned several foreign Islamic preachers (American Kamal El-Mekki, Jamaican-born Canadian Bilal Philips, Saudi Arabs Mohamad al-Arifi and Salman al-Ouda, and Syrian Mohammad Rateb al-Nabulsi) from entering the country on grounds of hate speech. See Reuters (2017): “Denmark bans six 'hate preachers' from entering the country“; Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-denmark-security-religion-idUSKBN17Y1N9. 26 For example, financing from countries in the Middle East and North Africa proved crucial in setting up early activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the world’s largest Islamist organisations, in Europe. See Johnson, Ian (2008): “The Brotherhood's Westward Expansion“; Hudson Institute; Accessed at https://www.hudson.org/research/9853-the-brotherhood-s-westward-expansion. For foreign financing of Islamic extremism in the United Kingdom, see HJS (2017): “Foreign Funded Islamist Extremism in the UK“; Henry Jackson Society; Accessed at https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/foreign-funded-islamist- extremism-in-the-uk/. 27 For example, the König-Fahd-Akademie in Bonn, sponsored by Saudi royal family, was reportedly using books with anti-Semitic and anti-Western teachings. See Deutsche Welle (2016): “Reports: Gulf States supporting ultraconservative Islam branch in Germany”; Accessed at http://www.dw.com/en/reports-gulf- states-supporting-ultraconservative-islam-branch-in-germany/a-36746943. The Academy was closed in 2017 after long-lasting criticism. According to some sources, the closure was linked to the reform approach of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. See Deutsche Welle (2016): “Controversial Saudi school in Bonn to close”; Accessed at http://www.dw.com/en/controversial-saudi-school-in-bonn-to-close/a-19511109. For the wider issue, see Wilson, Tom (2017): Foreign Funded Islamist Extremism in the UK; Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism Research Paper No. 9; Henry Jackson Society; Accessed at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Foreign-Funded-Islamist-Extremism-final.pdf. The report names Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait

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contemporary Saudi position on the matter may Doha is Bilal Philips, a Jamaican-born Canadian preacher undergo a transition spearheaded by Crown Prince who espouses Islamic extremist views and has been Mohammad bin Salman, previous decades saw Saudi accused of inspiring acts of terrorism in the West.32 money reach a number of Islamic extremist groups. The Meanwhile, the Shia populations are faced with a Saudi-backed Muslim World League (MWL) 28 and particular brand of Islamic extremism promoted by Iran. World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) are A well-known proxy arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran considered to be global promoters of the Wahhabist is Hezbollah. The movement is based in Lebanon but has branch of Sunni Islam.29 been active in proliferating Islamic extremism Another country linked to Islamic extremism is Qatar, internationally, including in Europe. 33 While many which has a long history of leniency towards Islamic activities of Hezbollah may be classified as Islamist, the fundamentalist, Islamist, and at times even Jihadist organisation also dabbles in Jihadism. For example, it actors. 30 The country provides shelter to Egyptian appears to have been involved in the 2012 attack on preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Israeli tourists in Bulgaria.34 Muslim Brotherhood who has a long history of spreading his ideas in the EU, both directly and using third parties. Al-Qaradawi has a long track record of Islamic extremist statements and regularly calls for violent jihad and suicide attacks against Israel and Western targets in the Middle East.31 Also sheltered in as one of the main supporters of Islamic extremism in the United Kingdom. Similar claims were raised by Susanne Schröter of Frankfurter Research Center for Global Islam. See Deutsche Welle (2017): “Saudi Arabia exports extremism to many countries - including Germany, study says”; Accessed at http://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-exports-extremism-to-many-countries-including-germany-study-says/a-39618920. According to a leaked intelligence report, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar were supporting extremist Islamic groups in Germany. These extremist Islamic groups were mostly involved in missionary activities (da’wa), funding mosques, schools and radical preachers. See Independent (2016): “Saudi Arabia and Gulf states 'support Islamic extremism in Germany', intelligence report finds”; Accessed at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabia-gulf-states-fund-islamic-extremism-germany- salafism-wahhabism-qatar-kuwait-islamists-a7473551.html. The Home Office report on funding of extremism in the UK, commissioned by former Prime Minister David Cameron in 2015 and allegedly highly critical of Saudi Arabia, has not been published and will likely remain classified. See Guardian (2017): “Rudd's refusal to publish full report into extremist funding 'unacceptable'”; Accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/12/uk-terror-funding-report-will-not- be-published-for-national-security-reasons. In 2015, in an unusually open way, the German vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel openly accused Saudi Arabia of sponsoring Islamic extremism. See Telegraph (2015): “German vice-chancellor accuses Saudi Arabia of funding Islamic extremism in the West”; Accessed at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12035838/German-vice-chancellor-accuses-Saudi-Arabia-of-funding-Islamic-extremism-in-the- West.html. In 2017, a former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia accused Saudi Arabia of funding mosques and promoting Wahhabism. See Guardian (2017): “Saudi Arabia boosting extremism in Europe, says former ambassador”; Accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/13/saudi-arabia-boosting- extremism-in-europe-says-former-ambassador. 28 The MWL considers as one of its main objectives to disseminate da’wa and has institutional and personal links to the Islamic extremist milieu, including one of the leading authorities of Islamism and Muslim Brotherhood Yusuf al-Qaradawi. A senior official of the MWL in Pakistan Wa'el Hamza Julaidan was designated as a person who supports terror by the US department of treasury for his links to Al-Qaeda. See US Treasury Department (2002): “Treasury Department Statement on the Designation of Wa’el Hamza Julidan“; Accessed at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3397.aspx. For more information, see Levitt, Matthew (2002): Combating Terrorist Financing, Despite the Saudis; The Washington Institute; Accessed at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/combating-terrorist-financing-despite-the-saudis. For a discussion on da’wa, see Levitt, Matthew (2006): Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, Yale: Yale University Press. 29 The WAMY appears to have been providing relief in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it was engaged in the civil war in Bosnia, where it provided assistance to Bosnian Muslim fighters. See Hedges, Chris (1992): “Muslims From Afar Joining 'Holy War' in Bosnia”; The New York Times; Accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/muslims-from-afar-joining-holy-war-in-bosnia.html. According to some sources, the WAMY continues to engage in Southern Europe. See Michaletos, Ioannis (2013): “World Assembly of Muslim Youth in the Balkans“; RIMSE; Accessed at http://www.rimse.gr/2013/01/world- assembly-of-muslim-youth-in.html. Apart from serving as a proxy instrument of Saudi Arabian influence, the WAMY and the IIRO appears to have provided assistance to the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas in early 2000s. See Dore Gold (2003): Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism; Washington DC: Regnery Publishing. Also see Levitt, Matthew (2002): Combating Terrorist Financing, Despite the Saudis; The Washington Institute; Accessed at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/combating-terrorist-financing-despite-the-saudis. 30 For Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood activities in the UK, see David Rich (2010): „The Very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood“; in Barry Rubin ed. (2010): The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement; Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. For Qatar’s leniency towards prosecuting terrorism, see FDD (2017): Qatar and Terror Finance“; Foundation for Defence of Democracies; Accessed at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/david-weinberg-qatar-and-terror-finance/. According to Koen Metsu, a member of the Belgian parliament and president of the Belgian Temporary Parliamentary Committee for the Fight Against Terrorism, Qatar has provided massive financial support to Muslim Brotherhood activities in France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Denmark. See Arab Weekly (2017): „Qatar accused of financing Muslim Brotherhood activities in Europe“; Accessed at https://thearabweekly.com/qatar-accused-financing-muslim-brotherhood-activities-europe. 31 For a profile, see Counter-Extremism Project: Yusuf Al-Qaradawi; Accessed at https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/yusuf-al-qaradawi. For a more recent example of Al-Qaradawi’s problematic views, see Memri (2018): „Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradawi Calls For Resistance, Jihad And Martyrdom Following Trump's Recognition Of Jerusalem As Israel's Capital“; Accessed at https://www.memri.org/reports/sheikh-yousuf-al-qaradawi-calls-resistance-jihad-and- martyrdom-following-trumps-recognition. 32 Bilal Philips has been banned or deported from a number of countries including Australia, Bangladesh, Denmark, Kenya, Germany, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a profile, see Counter-Extremism Project: Bilal Philips; Accessed at https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/bilal- philips. 33 Azani, Eitan (2011): Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God; From Revolution to Institutionalization; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 34 Reuters (2013): „Bulgaria says clear signs Hezbollah behind Burgas bombing“; Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-hezbollah- idUSBRE96H0XI20130718.

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1.4.2. Expansion public to embrace extremist views, making them more susceptible to the anti-establishment messaging of The expansion stage begins when Islamic extremists Islamic extremism.36 Third, anti-Muslim extremism may succeed in establishing permanent organisational increase the susceptibility of domestic Muslim structures and turn to maximising potential for further populations to messaging which portrays Islamic growth. This involves the proliferation of Islamic extremist groups as righteous advocates for victimised extremist content to attract new followers and Muslims. 37 These complementary push factors supporters. contribute to the wider issue of susceptibility of target In the early stages of advancement in a given territory, audiences to Islamic extremist propaganda. This Islamic extremists typically rely on outside support from dynamic is particularly acute when Islamic extremist third countries. Upon the establishment of permanent groups are better funded and better organised than domestic networks and organisations, outside support non-extremist Islamic groups and are thus able to becomes less crucial over time as the domestic cells tend position themselves as the dominant representatives for towards self-sustainability. Islam as a whole. In their efforts to attract new followers, Islamic Without effective counter-measures, the proselytization extremists target a broad range of populations in any of Islamic extremist groups stimulates growth in the given area. However, some target audiences are key. number of Islamic extremists and their sympathisers. These are: Islamic extremist organisations tending towards Islamic fundamentalism typically enjoy relatively greater • Muslim populations operational freedom than organisations tending • Youth towards Islamism, especially when the latter are open about their objective to create parallel legal systems • Immigrant and refugee populations based on strict adherence to Islamic religious law. The • Prison populations least common are organisations tending towards Jihadism, which prefer armed combat in the name of • Socially excluded populations Islam to the laborious and often inconclusive political The wider public is also targeted, typically through and religious struggle. However, it should be noted that broader propaganda strategies. even notable minority support for Islamic extremism enables operational efficiency and the preparation of Islamic extremists also routinely attempt to introduce large-scale campaigns in support of Islamic extremist their voice in the mainstream political, religious and objectives.38 social debate. Misusing the religious freedoms of European societies, Islamic extremist groups typically portray their views of Islam and society as mainstream – and therefore acceptable and even respectable. When unchallenged, this leads to a legitimization of Islamic extremist norms, particularly within groups susceptible to radicalisation. The potential for Islamic extremists to grow in number is amplified by several push factors which may complement the ideological appeal of Islamic extremism. First, some recipients of Islamic extremist propaganda may be drawn closer to extremism as a result of individual psychological or cognitive problems. 35 Second, the presence of anti-system attitudes in society may drive large sectors of the general

35 See ICCT (2017): „Mental Health and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: A Case Study from the Netherlands“; ICCT – The Hague; Accessed at https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICCT-Paulussen-Nijman-Lismont-Mental-Health-and-the-Foreign-Fighter-Phenomenon-March-2017.pdf. 36 This is particularly noticeable in illiberal, non-democratic settings with low popular legitimacy. For example, Islamist groups in Turkey became primary anti- system actors following the military coup in 1980. See Altınordu, Ateş (2016): „The Political Incorporation of Anti-System Religious Parties: the Case of Turkish Political Islam (1994–2011)”; Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 147–171. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood gained popularity in Egypt as a loud critic of the Mubarak regime. See Albrecht, Holger (2013): Raging Against the Machine: Political Opposition Under Authoritarianism in Egypt; New York: Syracuse University Press. 37 For a detailed discussion about reciprocal radicalisation, see Ebner, Julia (2017): The Rage; London: I.B. Tauris. 38 See Schmid, Alex (2017): „Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS“; ICCT – The Hague; Accessed at https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf.

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Figure 2: Advancement of Islamic Extremist Actors in Western Europe: Common Traits Across Specific Actors and Countries

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Islamist groups use their popularity to enter public 1.4.3. Aggression institutions and lobby for political change in support of The aggression stage begins when Islamic extremist moving towards a sharia-based political order. groups attain sufficient popularity to consolidate into Eventually, they may aim to paralyse the existing public broader networks or movements, reach financial self- sector by infiltrating key political positions.42 sustainability and diversify their activities beyond The strongly secular character of the EU’s constitutional proselytization to accomplish their strategic objectives. system presents a difficult challenge for the Islamists, The specific activities of groups which began to who have so far been unable to introduce any explicit consolidate and engage in aggression differ by the type protections for Islamic jurisprudence. However, Islamist of group in question. groups have more opportunities to organise than their Jihadist groups typically become more visible at this Jihadist counter-parts, especially when they openly stage, as they now possess the influence and resources to reject the use of violence. For example, this is the case for engage in ever-larger violent campaigns – both in the the Muslim Brotherhood.43 given region and abroad. Hate crimes, violent crimes and Islamic fundamentalist groups at this stage of terrorist attacks are perpetrated and raise the public advancement engage in normalising Islamic extremist profile of the Jihadist threat significantly. norms among their target audiences. Such norms are Fortunately, the opportunities for Jihadist groups to typically enforced informally through social pressure, consolidate and engage in aggression is severely limited and eventually imposed through parallel legal in the EU through considerable counter-terrorism structures. 44 Without counter-measures, the Islamic architectures of its Member States. While some cases fundamentalist interpretation of Islam threatens to exist of semi-organised groups 39 , Jihadism is typically become widely accepted – both by Muslims and non- proliferated in Western liberal democracies through Muslims – as the standard and correct interpretation. decentralised, horizontal networks which are more This aids the further growth of Islamic extremism, but difficult to police but may be less effective in delivering also of anti-Muslim extremism, as non-Muslim strategic objectives. 40 As a result of the significant populations begin to associate Islam with extremist constraints imposed on their activities, European narratives.45 Jihadists either resort to limited attacks against soft When multiple Islamic extremist groups enter the targets or leave EU territory to join established Jihadist 41 aggression stage, they may decide to cooperate or organisations in third countries. compete. There are cases of either scenario occurring.46

39 For example, the UK-based Al-Muhajiroun prior to 2004. For Al-Muhajiroun ties to terrorism, see Stuart, Hannah (2017): „Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015)“; Henry Jackson Society; Accessed at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Islamist-Terrorism-preview-1.pdf. 40 See Europol (2016): „Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited“; Europol; Accessed at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes- in-modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-revisited. For the impact of organisation on effectiveness, see Heger, Lindsay, Danielle Jung and Wendy H. Wong (2012): „Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence“; Terrorism and Political Violence; Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 743-768. Also see Kilberg, Joshua (2012): „A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure“; Studies in Conflict & Terrorism; Vol. 35, No. 11, pp. 810-830. Also see Gray, Phillip W. (2013): „Leaderless Resistance, Networked Organization, and Ideological Hegemony“; Terrorism and Political Violence; Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 655-671. 41 For a detailed discussion about the evolution of Jihadist groups in Europe and the United States, see Vidino, Lorenzo, Francesco Marone, Eva Entenmann (2017): „Fear Thy Neighbor. Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West“; ISPI; Accessed at https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor- RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf 42 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Islamism, see Hamid, Shadi and William McCants (2016): „Rethinking Political Islam“; Brookings Institute; Accessed at https://www.brookings.edu/research/rethinking-political-islam/. 43 Friedland, Elliot (2015): „The Muslim Brotherhood“; Clarion Project; Accessed at https://clarionproject.org/muslim-brotherhood-special-report/. Also see Vidino, Lorenzo (2010): The New Muslim Brotherthood in the West; New York: Columbia University Press. 44 For the popularity of Islamic fundamentalist attitudes in select EU countries, see Koopmans, Ruud (2014): „Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe“; Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies; Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 33-57. For Wahhabist activities in South Asia, see Pillalamari, Akhilesh (2014): „The Radicalization of South Asian Islam: Saudi Money and the Spread of Wahhabism“; Georgetown Security Studies Review; Accessed at http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/12/20/the-radicalization-of-south-asian-islam-saudi-money-and-the-spread-of-wahhabism/. For Wahhabist activities in East Africa, see Ali, Abdisaid M. (2016): „Islamist Extremism in East Africa“; Africa Center for Strategic Studies; Accessed at https://africacenter.org/publication/islamist- extremism-east-africa/. For a discussion of the links between Salafism and the financing of armed groups, see Moniquet, Claude (2013): The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World“; European Union; Accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf. 45 For a detailed discussion about reciprocal radicalisation, see Ebner, Julia (2017): The Rage; London: I.B. Tauris. For a discussion about the association between Islam and Islamic extremism, see Von Sikorski, Christian, Desirée Schmuck, Jörg Matthes and Alice Binder (2017): „‘Muslims are not Terrorists‘: Islamic State Coverage, Journalistic Differentiation Between Terrorism and Islam, Fear Reactions, and Attitudes Toward Muslims“; Mass Communication and Society; Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 825-848; Accessed at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15205436.2017.1342131. 46 For an example of competition between Jihadist groups, see the deterioration of relations between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq before 2014. Byman, Daniel L. and Jennifer R. Williams (2015): „ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s global civil war“; Brookings Institute; Accessed at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms- global-civil-war/. For an example of cooperation between Jihadist groups, see Phillips, Brian J. (2014): „Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity“; International Studies Quarterly; Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 336–347; Accessed at https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/58/2/336/2963248. Also see Horowitz, Michael C. and Philip B. K. Potter (2014): “Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality“; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 199-225.

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If the aggressive activities of Islamic extremist unprecedented victory in the 2012 presidential election movements are left to fester, they may escalate to the in Egypt.51 Islamist parties also gained ground in recent point where they begin to affect the rule of law and basic years in Morocco 52 , Indonesia 53 , Malaysia 54 and state functions. Skirmishes between the Islamic Bangladesh55. extremist movement and the anti-Muslim extremist This stage has never been reached by any Islamic scene become more common and inter-cultural 47 extremist group in the EU. However, Islamic extremist violence becomes the norm rather than the exception. movements that reached the domination stage in third countries may conduct activities in the EU. For example, 1.4.4. Domination the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, which The final stage of advancement is domination. This stage delivers weekly sermons and religious advice to contains large-scale and protracted activities by Islamic hundreds of mosques in the EU, adopted a number of extremist movements to replace the existing order with Islamic fundamentalist norms since the Justice and one based on the ideological tenets of Islamic Development Party came to power in Turkey in 2002.56 extremism. The threat of foreign Islamic extremist influence is Experience from third countries offers ample examples clearly visible in the case of Jihadist organisations such as of Islamic extremist movements gaining sufficient the Islamic State, which poses a serious threat in the EU57 influence to destabilise the existing order, emerging despite not having a permanent presence in any EU victorious in the final power struggle and taking full country. The Islamic State also inspired a number of control over the given society. The rise of the Islamic terrorist attacks in Western Europe without the direct State in parts of Iraq and Syria exemplifies a Jihadist involvement of its operatives.58 48 organisation reaching the domination stage. It is therefore necessary to institute sufficient counter- An example of an Islamist takeover is the 1979 measures not only against the potential of domestic revolution in Iran. The Islamic fundamentalist groups to grow, but also against the foreign influence of movement led by Rudollah Khomeini developed Islamic extremist actors in third countries. EU Member Islamist tendencies during the 1970s, eclipsed other States have implemented a number of safeguards to political factions and eventually assumed absolute prevent Islamic extremist groups from advancing their control over both state and society.49 To this day, the proliferation agendas. As a result, no Islamic extremist Islamic Republic of Iran enforces Islamic extremist actor has yet advanced into the late aggression stage, norms at home and proliferates them abroad.50 let alone the domination stage. The existing measures against Islamic extremism in selected EU countries are In some countries, Islamist groups seek to affect the discussed in the following chapter. existing order through the democratic process. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood achieved an

47 This dynamic is famously envisioned in Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of Savagery, wherein he describes how mass violence should be employed to create a sharia- based political order. See Naji, Abu Bakr (2006): The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass; Translated by William McCants with funding from the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. 48 Oosterveld, Willem T. and Willem Bloem (2017): „The Rise and Fall of ISIS: From Evitability to Inevitability“; The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; Accessed at https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20ISIS.pdf. 49 For an overview of the Islamic Revolution, see for example Molavi, Afshin (2005): The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Struggle for Freedom; New York: W. W. Norton. 50 For the broad issue of Iran’s foreign activities, see for example Bar, Shmuel (2009): „Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‚Export of Revolution‘“; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya; Accessed at http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf. For Iran’s activities in the EU, see Levitt, Matthew (2014): „What Is Hezbollah Doing in Europe?“; The Atlantic; Accessed at „https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/what-is-hezbollah-doing-in-europe/374973/ 51 Laub, Zachary (2016): „Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood“; Council on Foreign Relations; Accessed at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egypts-muslim-brotherhood. 52 Fakir, Intissar (2018): „Morocco’s Islamist Party: Redefining Politics Under Pressure“; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Accessed at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP319_Fakir_FNL.pdf. 53 Varagur, Krithika (2017): „Indonesia’s Moderate Islam is Slowly Crumbling“; Foreign Policy; Accessed at http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/14/indonesias-moderate-islam- is-slowly-crumbling/. 54 Weiss, Meredith I. (2017): „Islamism In Malaysia: Politics As Usual?“; Hoover Institution; Accessed at https://www.hoover.org/research/islamism-malaysia-politics-usual. 55 Anis Ahmed, K. (2017): „Bangladesh’s Creeping Islamism“; New York Times; Accessed at https://nyti.ms/2k3tH1R. Also see Barry, Ellen and Julfikar Ali Manik (2017): „To Secular Bangladeshis, Textbook Changes Are a Harbinger“; New York Times; Accessed at https://nyti.ms/2kgNs5X. 56 Erdi Öztürk, Ahmet and Semiha Sözeri (2018): „Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria“; Politics and Religion; Vol. 33, pp. 1- 25. Also see Economist (2018): „Turkey’s religious authority surrenders to political Islam“; Accessed at https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21735032-diyanet-thinks- bitcoin-immoral-divorce-text-message-fine-turkeys-religious. Also see Çitak, Zana (2017): „National conceptions, transnational solidarities: Turkey, Islam and Europe“; Global Networks; Vol. 12. 57 For example, the coordinated attacks in Paris in November 2015. See Brisard, Jean-Charles (2015): „The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France“; CTC Sentinel; Accessed at https://ctc.usma.edu/the-paris-attacks-and-the-evolving-islamic-state-threat-to-france/. 58 Carafella, Jennifer (2017): „ISIS’s Expanding Campaign in Europe“; Institute for the Study of War; Accessed at http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isiss-expanding-campaign-europe.

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Efforts to prevent Islamic extremism must be complemented with proactive measures against hard-line Islamic extremists who proliferate the ideology behind Islamic extremism to advance their agenda and are not willing to cooperate with prevention practitioners.

APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL TO COUNTERING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM In response to the threat of Islamic extremism described above, and with a view to improving the existing measures against it, a comprehensive model of countering Islamic extremism is proposed. Some attempts were already made to connect the dots vector-borne diseases by limiting the disease-spreading and build a counter-extremism model based on public vector) and by reducing the severity of the disease health practices.59 However, the existing approaches are pathogen itself. either limited in their scope (typically by only focusing A three-pillar model was constructed, with each pillar on violent extremism), overly general in their serving a different purpose and containing different application, or focused on non-EU countries. In measures. Together, the three pillars target the whole contrast, the approach presented in this paper is a dynamic of Islamic extremist proliferation and provide a tightly integrated model of counter-extremism which comprehensive model for elimination of Islamic includes not only preventive but also law enforcement extremism in any EU state. The three pillars are: measures aimed at eliminating Islamic extremism from EU Member States. I. Prevention and Remedy: measures to increase resilience against Islamic extremism and engage The proposed model is inspired by the public health radicalised individuals (e.g. counter-narratives, exit practice of countering diseases on three fronts programmes) simultaneously: by increasing resilience of vulnerable populations and curing those who were infected, by II. Law Enforcement: measures against hard-line Islamic controlling the spreading of the disease (in the case of extremists (e.g. arrests, kinetic operations)

Figure 2: The Three-Pillar Model of Countering Islamic Extremism for National Strategies

59 For example Byrne-Diakun, Robert Morgan ed. (2016): „Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model“; National Security Critical Issues Task Force, Georgetown University; Accessed at http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering- Violent-Extremism.pdf. Also see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017): Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop; Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

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III. Countering Extremist Ideology: measures to radicalisation occurs. Primary prevention strategies minimise the influence of the ideological tenets of target entire communities of people to address social, Islamic extremism (e.g. training of imams, content political, economic and other group factors behind the management) proliferation of Islamic extremism. The end goal of primary prevention strategies is to ‘inoculate’ the wider The entire model is illustrated in fig. 3. Let us discuss each public against extremism to the extent that the pillar in turn. potential pool of new recruits is brought to a minimum. 2.1.1. Prevention and Remedy Secondary prevention addresses on-setting The Prevention and Remedy pillar is inspired by the radicalisation. It may involve practices such as engaging with youth deemed to be at risk of radicalisation, public health practice of increasing resilience to disease among susceptible populations. The overall key counter-messaging programs directed toward individuals and groups targeted by Islamic extremists distinguishing feature of the Prevention and Remedy pillar is that the measures contained in this pillar are and training of Muslim populations to recognise and reject the activities of Islamic extremists. The end goal of used with the voluntary consent of the targeted group or secondary prevention is to remove the identified risk of individual. In cases where treatment is rejected or not exposure to Islamic extremism and thus hinder applicable – for example, when the subject refuses to radicalisation. cooperate or engages in violent activity – tools contained in the Law Enforcement pillar must be utilised Tertiary prevention engages radicalised groups and instead. individuals. It includes measures such as exit programmes for disillusioned extremists and de- Prevention and Remedy work is tackled in three tiers: radicalisation programmes for convinced extremists. primary, secondary, and tertiary. The end goal is to minimise the number of Islamic Primary prevention of Islamic extremism seeks to extremists through de-radicalisation. Crucially, tertiary increase resilience against extremism before prevention is only directed at those who are willing to

Figure 3: Prevention and Remedy of Islamic Extremism Differentiation of Measures by Target Group

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cooperate. Those who are not willing to cooperate must At the same time, the distinction illustrates the level of be dealt with using law enforcement measures. threat in any given state. Those states where Islamic extremism is relatively widespread must divert Secondary and tertiary prevention tiers address, among substantial resources to law enforcement and tertiary other things, the individual-level factors behind prevention, while states without substantial presence of radicalisation towards Islamic extremism. This includes Islamic extremists can focus on secondary and primary personal grievances resulting from socio-economic prevention strategies. disaffection or experience with racism and anti-Muslim hatred which may drive some individuals to the hands In general, states should aim to work downward in the of extremist recruiters. pyramid, minimising cases in the upper levels as a priority. Of course, attention must be paid to all three There is a wide array of non-state actors who might take prevention levels at the same time, but the end goal is to part in the prevention and remedy of Islamic extremism. effectively counter and minimise the influence of Islamic Media and news outlets play a role in countering extremism in a given territory and thus reduce the need extremist narratives. Schools and universities are for tertiary and secondary prevention. positioned to identify signs of radicalisation in their pupils and students. Civil society and community 2.1.2. Law Enforcement Pillar organisations can likewise aid in detecting ongoing radicalisation. Tolerant Muslim organisations play a The law enforcement pillar is inspired by the public similar role, in addition to their opportunity to directly health practice of controlling vectors which allow the counter the ideology of Islamic extremism with disease to spread. Similarly, efforts to prevent Islamic interpretations of Islam which are compatible with extremism must be complemented with proactive liberal democracy. Former Islamic extremists are measures against hard-line Islamic extremists who particularly useful in countering attempts to proliferate proliferate the ideology behind Islamic extremism to the ideology of Islamic extremism and gain new recruits. advance their agenda and are not willing to cooperate The state should work with all of above sectors of society with prevention practitioners. to effectively prevent and remedy radicalisation efforts. Hard-line Islamic extremists are persons who could have The three-tiered distinction of Prevention and Remedy been approached with preventive tools earlier but are measures (illustrated in Fig. 4 together with Law now so radicalised that prevention is no longer an Enforcement measures, which are to be used against option because it will be rejected by them, or because non-cooperative groups and individuals) is useful they engage in violent extremist activity. because it conceptualises diverse prevention measures This mandates a different approach (illustrated in Fig. 5), into an effective overall strategy of extremism one based not on voluntary prevention and remedy but prevention. on involuntary control of the extremists’ reach of influence using law enforcement tools.

Figure 4: Law Enforcement Against Islamic Extremist Actors Role of Domestic and International Actors

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In practice, as the name of the pillar suggests, measures including civil society organisations, private sector contained within it are primarily carried out by law organisations and law enforcement services. enforcement services and intelligence services. Other Given the sensitive nature of combating a set of ideas, arms of the state, such as finance ministries, diplomatic the role of the state is more limited than in the other two services and defence forces are also involved in pillars. Outright censorship of ideas, no matter how cooperation with other states and international bodies, radical, is unacceptable. In this vein, it bears noting the as well as domestic actors who play a complementary key judgement of the European Court of Human Rights role in identifying hard-line Islamic extremists. regarding freedom of speech: 2.1.3. Countering Extremist Ideology Pillar “The right to free expression “is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or The Countering Extremist Ideology pillar is inspired by regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but the public health practice of controlling the disease also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any pathogen. Unlike the Prevention and Remedy pillar, sector of the population.”60 which contains measures targeting specific groups and individuals exposed or infected by the pathogen, this Furthermore, the type of measure to be used depends pillar seeks to minimise the influence of the ideological on the type of content that is being addressed. General tenets of Islamic extremism in and of itself. Countering religious content is a legitimate part of the public Islamic extremist ideology is neither voluntary nor discussion and no specific counter-extremist measures involuntary, as it is not aimed against individuals and are envisaged to limit or counter its propagation. groups but against the sources, symbols and tenets Content which causes controversy or is deemed radical behind Islamic extremism. Specific measures stemming by some sectors of society may be subjected to social from the pillar are carried out by a wide variety of actors, pressure from civil society organisations and even public bodies, but not obstructed as it remains protected by

Figure 5: Countering Islamic Extremist Ideology Differentiation of Extremist Content by Severity

60 Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 1976, § 49. Cited in European Commission (2016): “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online”; Accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_en.pdf

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free speech laws. Social pressure may take a myriad of Finally, if the content is deemed illegal, it should be forms, with possible inspiration from campaigns against removed. Various ways of removal are possible right-wing extremism, racism, anti-Semitism and even depending on the situation in question: for example, if drug use. the content is posted on online social media sites or published in book form. At the same time, removal In the case of obviously extremist content which methods will vary from one jurisdiction to another. The contains clearly identified ideological attitudes that above distinctions may be aggregated into a four-level deviate from constitutional norms, carry elements of pyramid (Fig. 6). intolerance and attack constitutional democratic principles, an expert review should be conducted to Of course, the state cannot be expected to carry out an assess its legality under existing legislation. expert review for every piece of extremist content. This is why identification of key sources of Islamic extremism If the content under review is deemed legal, it cannot be is so crucial, so as to allow for a separation of truly removed using law enforcement means. Nevertheless, influential extremist sources from the sea of content. circulation of the content may still be limited by private actors involved in its dissemination if it breaks their It also should be noted that content review and content terms and conditions of service. Publishing houses, removal may be conducted in conjunction with law online social media sites and other private actors should enforcement measures against the author or publisher therefore be cognisant of the harm done by extremist of the content. Such measures fall into the Law content and remove it from their platforms. Enforcement pillar.

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POLICY MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS The three-pillar model gives rise to a number of policy recommendations that will set the groundwork for constructing a truly comprehensive system of measures against Islamic extremism. The recommendations are particularly suited to EU Member States, although they may also be useful for application in liberal democratic states outside of the EU. Some of the key policy measures and and thus serves as a meta-descriptor of the wider recommendations can only be successfully threat. implemented if the fundamental values of the state are 2. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL made explicit by national governments. These are the REPRESENTATIVES: Reject attempts to constrain fundamental values which all citizens are expected to the political debate. An effective fight against Islamic assimilate, irrespective of their religion. In EU Member extremism necessitates the conduct of an honest States, this framework would essentially consist of the debate about this threat and its causes. Avoiding this values of individual liberty, human dignity and equality debate strengthens far-right populist movements, before the law. which exploit the inability of mainstream political While the recommendations are listed here as parties to properly name and discuss Islamic applicable to all EU Member States, there is strong extremism out of fear of breaking political correctness. variation in existing national counter-measures Furthermore, legitimate voices against Islamic between individual Member States. Consequently, extremism are sometimes targeted by certain sections some of the following recommendations are already of the political spectrum and unjustly accused of practiced in some Member States, but not others. racism and ‘Islamophobia’.61 The term ‘Islamophobia’ Policy makers should therefore adopt those is particularly damaging, as it confuses the difference recommendations which have not yet been between anti-Muslim extremism (a real issue which implemented in their national setting. must be tackled) and criticism of Islam, which is a legitimate part of the public discussion. Mainstream At the same time, the policy recommendations are not political representatives must recapture the discussion necessarily listed here in a chronological order. The from the radical fringes of the political spectrum and specific timeline of adoption is expected to differ from so regain lost support from the concerned public. one country to another according to its needs and national policy context. Nevertheless, all EU Member 3. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL States should strive to eventually adopt, in whole or in REPRESENTATIVES: Expand your focus to include part, all of the recommendations listed below. non-violent Islamic extremism. A system of prevention of Islamic extremism must account for the 3.1. Core recommendations aforementioned diversity of the phenomenon. Failing to respond to any one of the three elements of Islamic 1. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL extremism – Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism and REPRESENTATIVES: Adopt a comprehensive Jihadism – would undermine the effectiveness of the conceptualisation of Islamic extremism. entire strategy. This calls for an expansion of focus from Acknowledging the role of Islamic extremism as a key what is often referred to as ‘violent extremism’ to driver of extremist radicalisation and mobilisation include even non-violent political forms of Islamic does not strip other factors of their importance. extremism (Islamism) and non-political forms of Multiple push and pull factors play a role in Islamic extremism (Islamic fundamentalism), which radicalisation and mobilisation to extremism, and all often serve as a stepping stone and platform for the should be addressed. However, particular attention violent form (Jihadism). Violent extremism is only the should be paid to the ideology behind Islamic tip of the iceberg, the most visible part of a wider threat extremism, as it typically functions as an enabling force which must be tackled in its entirety. for other radicalising factors to take effect. Islamic extremism is conceptualised as encompassing Islamism, Jihadism as well as Islamic fundamentalism,

61 For example, former Islamic extremist and campaigner for tolerance Maajid Nawaz was accused of anti-Muslim extremism by the Southern Law Poverty Center. See Mehta, Hemant (2018): „The SPLC Has Removed Its Controversial Page Listing “Anti-Muslim Extremists”; Patheos; Accessed at http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2018/04/19/the-splc-has-removed-its-controversial-page-listing-anti-muslim-extremists/.

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4. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL 3.2. Prevention and Remedy REPRESENTATIVES: Diligently monitor Islamic Recommendations extremist actors and raise public knowledge about the extent of their advancement. Each state should 3.2.1. Primary Prevention Measures be conscious of the activities of Islamic extremists on its territory. While intelligence services typically 7. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Tackle Islamic successfully identify active Islamic extremist networks, extremist propaganda targeting the wider public. their findings must be followed by proactive measures Following the end of the Cold War, strategic aimed at increasing both covert and public knowledge communication was often wrongly portrayed as an about the type of Islamic extremism at hand, the outdated and unfit tool for the 21st century. Given the symbols and other content characteristic of it, the ongoing proliferation of extremism enabled by the populations which are at risk of exploitation by internet, strategic communication is more important extremists and the network of sympathisers which than ever. Both civil society and governmental efforts may aid extremist activities. should play a role in directly countering the propaganda of Islamic extremists which targets the 5. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL population at large. REPRESENTATIVES: Establish the role of a national counter-extremism coordinator. This may take the 8. EDUCATION SERVICES: Organise counter- form of a single person in a coordinating role, or the extremism workshops in schools. Young people form of an inter-departmental task force depending on should be educated about the perils of Islamic national requirements. The role of the coordinating extremism. This is analogous to teaching young people institution would be to manage and carry out counter- about minimum hygiene and disease transmission to extremism tasks as defined in the national strategy, as prevent disease outbreaks. Analogous programmes well as to coordinate strategic communications exist in the case of far-right extremism and can be used directed at various domestic and foreign audiences. It for inspiration. would also supervise other relevant and specific 9. POLICE SERVICES: Implement best practices counter-extremism actors in their duties to fulfil their from ‘community policing’ models. Community role. The coordinating institution should be supervised policing approaches are useful in counter-extremism by the Ministry of the Interior or equivalent, in close because they improve communication with the target cooperation with the Ministry of Justice or equivalent. group on suspected cases of radicalisation and thus 6. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL facilitate timely referral of critical situations, enhance REPRESENTATIVES: Build a national strategy police understanding of the target group and thus against Islamic extremism. Existing efforts in this field open the door to better cooperation. Community should take the form of a long-term, comprehensive policing also helps identify and address community strategy. This could take the form of a strategy safety issues and grievances and so improves relations specifically aimed at Islamic extremism, or one tackling between the police and groups which are otherwise the broader issue of extremism as such. Strategies for difficult to reach. Community policing plays a combating terrorism are aplenty, but national preventive role in that it seeks to educate and mobilise counter-extremism strategies are rare, with only a few people before a problem has festered. Effective EU Member States having adopted them. community policing involves establishing and Governments do enact tactical responses against sustaining enduring relationships with the target Islamic extremism, but these should contribute to a group. clearly defined strategic purpose. National strategies provide a foundation for a common understanding of the threat and a systematic approach to countering it. A national counter-extremism strategy should also make clear which areas are broadly relevant and which are specific for countering Islamic extremism and identify a clear leadership structure for counter- extremism matters. Counter-extremism roles and responsibilities of governmental departments and partners should be clearly defined.

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National governments should establish the role of a national counter-extremism coordinator. The role of the coordinating institution would be to manage and carry out counter-extremism tasks as defined in the national strategy.

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3.2.2. Secondary Prevention Measures 15. SOCIAL SERVICES, CIVIL SOCIETY/RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS: Engage in counter-narratives 10. POLICE SERVICES: Build expertise to recognise targeting at-risk populations. In cases where the Islamic extremist influence. One of the avenues extremist speech is not criminal but may lead to through which Islamic extremism is proliferated within further extremism, it should be actively contested by Muslim populations are literature, school curricula, governmental and non-governmental organisations direct communication with Islamic extremists and alike. Online counter-narratives should be other horizontal connections which are often complemented with offline support for vulnerable overlooked. Attention should be paid to these less individuals and groups. The quality of counter- noticeable but influential facilitating methods. narrative campaigns may be increased through 11. POLICE/PROBATION AND MEDIATION contests and grassroots funds. Traditional and social SERVICES: Compile a national resource list of media companies may play an important role in this intervention-ready stakeholders. Especially when area by amplifying legitimate counter-narratives budgetary constraints hinder the establishment of a developed by grassroots initiatives. permanent counter-extremism body on the local level, 16. PENITENTIARY SERVICES: Train prison staff to a list of trained and vetted governmental and non- detect signs of radicalisation. As prison governmental entities, religious and community environments are one of the key places for Islamic service organisations, psychologists, social workers, extremists to proliferate their ideology, the prison staff opinion makers and other stakeholders is useful to should be well trained to recognise Islamic extremist select the best resources for a potential intervention. symbols and literature, and to detect signs of 12. POLICE/EDUCATION/SOCIAL SERVICES: radicalisation towards Islamic extremism. Establish clear communication channels between 17. ASYLUM/SOCIAL SERVICES: Implement schools, social services and the police (SSP reporting, intervention and support mechanisms Channels). Schools, social services and the police must for refugees. Asylum centres are often targeted by have a clear channel of communication at the ready to Islamic extremists, who seek to recruit refugees to their quickly exchange information about identified cause. As part of preventive efforts, clear mechanisms individuals or groups at risk of turning to Islamic should be put in place to allow identification of extremism. Some states (e.g. Denmark) made headway refugees at risk of radicalisation. in establishing such channels, which should be adopted elsewhere as well. 3.2.3. Tertiary Prevention Measures 13. POLICE SERVICES: Establish clear notification 18. ASYLUM/PENITENTIARY/POLICE SERVICES: channels for all relevant actors. Ensure that channels Monitor radicalised individuals in penitentiary are available for parents, teachers, youth, club workers, institutions, refugee and detention centres and outreach workers, social workers and other other at-risk areas. Upon identification of individuals radicalisation spotters to give notifications about who subscribe to Islamic extremism, measures should suspected radicals within their scope. This may take be taken to de-radicalise them, or use appropriate the form of a single designated individual as a point of action to prevent further spreading of Islamic contact, or InfoHouses as used in Denmark. Upon extremism in the given institution. Inaction in this area notification, staff at the InfoHouse decide on a proper allows Islamic extremism to spread freely, leading to course of action which is most likely going to lead to a substantial problems in the long-term. positive outcome. The professionals who run intervention programs need clear guidance on the 19. POLICE/PROBATION SERVICES: Establish a legal threshold for a “duty to warn.” national extremism response team. Some Islamic extremists may be disillusioned or open to dialogue 14. EDUCATION/SOCIAL SERVICES: Ensure that about their convictions. This presents an opportunity radicalisation spotters are well trained and for de-radicalisation, which must be conducted by equipped. Train education and supervision staff to well-trained mentors with experience in psychology, better understand radicalisation and be able to spot it rhetoric, theology and other relevant areas. Especially in early stages of development. This substantially when budgetary and other constraints hinder the lowers the occurrence of false alarm notifications and establishment of permanent counter-extremism ensures that actual cases of radicalisation are not structures on the local level, a national team of trained ignored. Schools should have clear procedures on how social workers, psychologists, religious leaders, opinion to deal with potential cases of radicalisation. makers and law enforcement personnel can help local groups overcome outbreaks of extremism. In carrying

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out targeted interventions, the national team may relevant institutions have tested and effective utilise the list of other intervention-ready stakeholders contingency plans, crisis management and (see Primary Prevention recommendations). interoperability procedures for the event of a terrorist attack. This particularly applies to those states which 20. POLICE/PROBATION SERVICES: Establish an have not yet experienced a massive terrorist attack and exit programme. Exit programmes are designed for therefore have only limited experience with this kind disillusioned extremists who did not break the law and of scenario. do not pose a security risk. If an exit programme is approved as feasible, the case should be passed onto a 24. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE/BORDER SERVICES: task force to assess which specific services should be Deport foreign Islamic extremists residing in the offered to the individual in question. A written exit- EU. When a third-country citizen proliferates Islamic process cooperation agreement is made in extremism within the EU, they should be deported to collaboration with the individual, who will then be their country of origin. There is no reason to delay this offered help as regards employment, education, process or fail to engage it at all. Deportations of housing, psychological counselling or medical care, foreign Islamic extremists should be stepped up as part with a view to a successful exit process and inclusion in of broader efforts to lower their number in the EU. society. Numerous countries already adopted exit 25. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE/BORDER SERVICES: programmes for various forms of extremism and their Stop foreign Islamic extremists from entering the experience may be used for inspiration for others. EU. Upon identification of a foreign Islamic extremist 3.3. Law Enforcement Recommendations attempting to cross the external (Schengen) border, they should be detained by immigration authorities 21. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Expand the and returned to their country of origin as they present possibilities for criminalization of expressing public a risk to public order. support for Islamic extremism. The activities of 26. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Compile a Islamic extremists are enabled by a wider pool of national list of domestic Islamic extremists and sympathisers. This pool must be drained as part of share it with other EU Member States. Even if all efforts to minimise the resources which are at the foreign Islamic extremists are deported from the EU, disposal of Islamic extremists. The approach to there will remain thousands of Islamic extremists with minimising the number of sympathisers should be EU citizenship. These must be identified by national based on effective value integration of local Muslim authorities and placed on a list of known Islamic populations, in combination with direct extremists. The list should then be shared with discouragement of cooperation with Islamic national authorities of other Member States, so that all extremists and efforts to inoculate European Muslims EU states are cognisant of the wider European Islamic against the hateful propaganda with which they are extremist scene. targeted. Those who publicly sympathise with Islamic extremist groups, condone their illegal activities and 27. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE/BORDER SERVICES: recruit others to do the same should be prosecuted. Limit the freedom of movement of Islamic extremists from other EU Member States. Upon 22. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Increase prison identification of Islamic extremists from another EU terms for crimes related to Islamic extremism. In country, national authorities should refuse their entry many EU states, charges related to Islamic extremism across the internal border or deport them on the are worryingly low. Particularly Jihadist operatives grounds of risk to public order. While this must face harsher sentences, including life in prison. recommendation raises some legal and technical Otherwise there will come a time when the challenges that must be overcome, the measure would perpetrators of contemporary terrorist attacks and substantially limit the scope of operations of Islamic foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State will be extremists in the EU. released and pose a renewed threat to society. 28. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Proscribe 23. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Ensure tested Islamic extremist organisations. Clearly extremist counter-terrorism procedures for the event of an organisations should be proscribed proactively and attack. It is unlikely that jihadist terrorist attacks will before they manage to spread their hateful messaging become a thing of the past following the fall of the to target audiences. More attention to the formation Islamic State. For this reason, it is crucial to remain of such organisations is necessary across the board. The vigilant against terrorism and other unlawful violent passive approach of only investigating those groups actions stemming from the presence of Islamic which advocate the use of violence is insufficient. extremism in Europe. All states must ensure that all

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29. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Minimise of the state over legal and judicial matters must be financing of Islamic extremism, particularly from stopped at the earliest opportunity. Effective international structures have outside the EU. 33. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE/BORDER SERVICES: been set up to counter terrorist financing. However, Detect Islamic extremists posing as asylum seekers. the financing of non-violent Islamic extremism Multiple incidents of jihadists entering the EU as continues largely unabated. While some states have refugees were recorded in recent years, and in some taken proactive measures to respond to this problem, cases led to terrorist attacks on European soil. This others choose to ignore the financing of Islamic phenomenon is very damaging to the legitimacy of the extremism at their peril. The transparency of religious European Union as a whole as it underlines its failure organisations and NGOs which may have ties to to resolve the migration crisis and guarantee security Islamic extremists should be increased considerably, and stability on the continent. Diligent monitoring of especially in the case of cross-border transactions. refugees by the law enforcement and intelligence Foreign funding of mosques and Islamic associations services is necessary. At the same time, staff working in should be better supervised and prohibited when asylum and detention centres should be trained to there are grounds to believe that Islamic extremism is recognise Islamic extremist content or follower. Those being sponsored. migrants and refugees who are identified as law- 30. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Cut off abiding and willing to help in countering Islamic cooperation with non-violent Islamic extremists. extremism should be enlisted in tracking possible fake When attempting to communicate with local Muslim asylum seekers. populations, some governments have resorted to 34. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE/ASYLUM SERVICES: working with self-appointed ‘community leaders’ Prevent extremists from gaining access to asylum irrespective of their views. The hard-learned lesson is centres. Experience from abroad shows that large that such cooperation is counter-productive in the asylum and migrant detention centres can become key long-term, as it allows Islamist and Islamic breeding grounds for Islamic extremism. Such a fundamentalist actors to easily influence the rest of the phenomenon must never appear on EU soil, lest it Muslim population and ingratiate themselves with allow Islamic extremism to fester further. Identified public institutions. Any ties with such persons, beyond Islamic extremists should not be allowed anywhere covert actions by the intelligence community, should near asylum and migrant detention centres to prevent be cut off. Islamist-affiliated organisations which offer their spreading the pathogen among the refugees and insincere projects against radicalisation with the goal migrants. of establishing themselves in a given population should be ignored. A supplementary recommendation, which 3.4. Countering Extremist Ideology should be obvious but has been broken by a number of governments in the past, is not to make deals with Recommendations jihadists. This only aids their activities and buying lives 35. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Identify popular in one situation endangers many more lives elsewhere. sources of Islamic extremism. Islamic extremist movements rest their legitimacy on a specific set of 31. POLICE SERVICES: Profile suspicious individuals sources. The precise makeup of the list of sources for links to Islamic extremism. In a world of limited differs from one group to another, but some sources resources and real and substantial threats from Islamic repeatedly appear in Islamic extremist literature. extremism, police services must be able to conduct Besides Islamic scripture, this includes a specific set of criminal profiling of suspicious individuals based on publications which shaped the face of Islamic visible outward signs of allegiance to Islamic extremist extremism in the past century. Such publications groups. Full rights of the person under investigation should be identified and their radicalising potential must be respected at all times and the profiling must assessed. adhere to national and international regulations. 36. JUSTICE SERVICES: Conduct expert reviews of 32. POLICE/INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Identify and identified sources of Islamic extremism. Clearly proscribe attempts to install parallel legal systems. extremist content should be evaluated for its legality. One of the key strategic objectives of Islamism is to This will enable further steps towards controlling for its create parallel legal and judicial systems as a stepping distribution. The evaluation should be conducted by stone to undermining the legitimacy of the state, legal experts and respected scholars of Islamic disintegrating the liberal democratic order and extremist content. replacing it with a regime based on Islamic extremist ideals. For this reason, attempts to split the monopoly

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37. JUSTICE/POLICE SERVICES: Remove illegal 41. EDUCATION SERVICES, RELIGIOUS extremist content. This measure differs from counter- ORGANISATIONS: Do not use translations of the narratives in that its objective is not to increase Quran distributed by Islamic extremists. resilience of a particular group of people, but to Translations of the Quran vary wildly, both in their remove the source of radicalisation. When extremists meaning and tone. Some translations of the Quran are call for acts of violence or produce content which is for used by Islamic extremists to support their narratives any reason illegal, appropriate action should be taken and should therefore be discouraged. In general, by law enforcement authorities. A public discussion Islamic scripture should be accompanied with should be encouraged for European states to reach a explanatory notes and other material from recognised common definition of ‘illegal content’ on the internet. scholars so as to minimise its potential utility for In general, states should aspire towards applying a Islamic extremist propaganda. single standard both offline and online when 42. EDUCATION SERVICES: Establish national encouraging or conducting content removal. At the courses to train domestic imams and Islamic same time, governments should be cautious not to scholars. In recent decades, becoming an imam has censor legitimate speech or remove content which is typically meant travelling to Egypt or Saudi Arabia to better contested by counter-narratives. attain a degree and subsequently returning with the 38. POLICE SERVICES: Set up a national referral unit type of Islam approved in those countries. This has led to cooperate with internet service providers. to a dramatic increase in popularity of Salafism in Irrespective of the current level of cooperation on the Europe and elsewhere. EU Member States should side of the internet giants, it must be recognised that encourage efforts to diversify interpretations of Islam their resources are not endless and they may not be and elevate those interpretations which are capable of identifying and removing all illegal content compatible with fundamental European values. One on their domains in due time. For this reason, national measure towards this objective is setting up national referral units should be set up to help internet service curricula to train domestic imams, as in Austria. The providers discover extremist content and objective of this measure is not to increase the subsequently remove it if it breaks their content resilience of certain populations, but to decrease the guidelines. National referral units may also cooperate popularity of Islamic extremist narratives within the with existing bodies at the international level (e.g. EU wider Islamic discourse. Internet Referral Unit at Europol). 39. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Regulate internet 3.5. Complementary Recommendations service providers to reduce the online presence of 43. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Train all relevant Islamic extremism. Facebook, Twitter, Google and actors about the basics and current threat of other similar companies pledged to counter Islamic extremism. Effective detection and fight extremism on their domains, but the results of self- against Islamic extremism is impossible if it is not regulation are unconvincing. Islamic extremist groups recognised. The state must take extra care to organise continue to use online social media to grow in expert training sessions for the police forces, numbers. The internet giants are receptive to pressure immigration services and other departments so they from governments and should not be allowed to play are quick to recognise instances of Islamic extremism. even an indirect part in enabling the proliferation of The judicial community must also be well-trained to Islamic extremism. National governments, ideally recognise Islamic extremism in court and issue through EU-level institutions to ensure EU-wide appropriate judgements. compatibility, must urgently adopt such regulations as to enforce the rule of law on the internet. 44. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: Enable and task intelligence services 40. CIVIL SOCIETY/RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS, with increasing the knowledge about Islamic PRIVATE SECTOR: Only distribute content with extremism among other key state actors. While the radicalising potential with explanatory notes. A intelligence services typically possess comprehensive large portion content promoted by Islamic extremists knowledge about the activities of Islamic extremist falls into the grey zone between legitimate religious actors at home and abroad, very little of this discourse and clearly illegal content. Such content may knowledge is utilised to increase understanding of the be protected by laws governing freedom of speech but threat in other departments. This is counter- should only be distributed with explanatory notes productive, as it creates room for misinformation, from recognised scholars to remove their radicalising error and passivity among otherwise key counter- potential. extremism actors. The intelligence services should be

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enabled to share their view of the bigger picture and approach and adjusting it in case it proves inefficient. inform key counter-extremism actors and the public Evaluation of counter-extremism should be about the developing situation. independent to maximise objectivity. Processes should be developed to track progress in accomplishing 45. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Acquire staff with explicitly stated counter-extremism goals. Tracking appropriate language skills. Instances of Islamic narrow indicators of programme implementation may extremism in the EU are often found in distinct not provide sufficient understanding of effectiveness: minority populations which speak a different language good evaluation strategies will contain an element of (e.g. Arabic, Farsi, Turkish etc). Tackling Islamic contextual, qualitative measurement. In evaluating extremism is impossible without understanding it. counter-extremism, there is a need for transparent and National governments should therefore provide honest relationships between researchers, policy resources to relevant counter-extremism actors for makers and practitioners. staff with appropriate language skills. 49. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Increase funding 46. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Ensure that your for non-governmental counter-extremism foreign and migration policy does not play into the initiatives. Efforts to prevent and counter non-violent hands of Islamic extremist actors. Some foreign extremism are often woefully underfunded. Funding policy activities may bolster Islamic extremist groups streams need to be created so that the provision of abroad and even increase their capacities and resources is commensurate with the nature of the recruitment potential at home. At the same time, lax threat. migration policy may be exploited by Islamic extremist groups for logistical or travel purposes. An unregulated 50. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Increase funding influx of migrants may also inadvertently increase the for research of extremism and the possibilities for pool of potential supporters of Islamic extremism. The countering it. Expand cross-disciplinary research that necessity to evaluate the impact of migration policy leverages social scientists in academia, as well as and foreign policy on Islamic extremist actors is an government resources. Lessons can be drawn from additional reason for structured coordination of public across the spectrum of extremist ideologies to consider bodies in the form of a national counter-extremism cross-application. coordinator. 47. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Engage in bilateral and EU-level cooperation on countering Islamic extremism. Islamic extremism is not specific to a particular territory and groups often transcend national boundaries. States must cooperate to successfully counter joint threats to their national security. On a bilateral level, such cooperation may take the form of joint exercises, joint expert groups, informal and formal meetings between officials, permanent communication pathways between relevant departments, intelligence exchange and the like. On the European level, national counter- extremism coordinators should cooperate within existing multilateral formats on assessing EU-wide developments and improving existing counter- measures applicable to the EU as a whole. Governments should also utilise non-EU multilateral frameworks to include other regions affected by Islamic extremism. 48. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: Establish clear counter-extremism evaluation processes. Counter- extremism metrics and evaluation are necessary in creating an effective, evidence-based approach to countering extremism. An evaluation strategy should be developed in tandem with the counter-extremism strategy to allow for effective evaluation of the chosen

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CONCLUSION

The above model, and the policy recommendations Even then, the fight against Islamic extremism may be which stem from it, provides a clear path towards expected to be a long-term, protracted effort spanning countering Islamic extremism. The threat must be generations. However, the Islamic extremists have tackled on all three fronts simultaneously through themselves demonstrated that they pose a serious measures to increase the resilience of populations threat that must not be ignored, lest it grow to susceptible to Islamic extremism, measures against unmanageable proportions. It is therefore imperative hard-line Islamic extremists and measures against the that Islamic extremism is countered on all fronts. ideology of Islamic extremism itself. When combined, the three pillars undercut the sources, proliferators and reception of Islamic extremism and hamper its long-term survival in the territory at hand. Of course, application of the model must be connected to national policy practice. Some EU Member States have already implemented some of the recommendations offered above, while others lag behind in terms of recognising the threat of Islamic extremism in the first place. State-specific recommendations are therefore necessary, which are not included in this paper but available on the side. At the same time, effective elimination of Islamic extremism in one EU Member State is hardly going to last if the threat continues to fester in neighbouring EU Member States. For this reason, it is imperative that all affected EU Member States engage Islamic extremism at all three fronts and limit its possibility for further advancement. Furthermore, fight against Islamic extremism must become an integral part of the EU Member States’ foreign policy, particularly in countries neighbouring the EU. The EU’s neighbourhood is increasingly destabilised, with Islamic extremist organisations exploiting the chaos to achieve their goals. It is imperative for EU Member States to find trustworthy partners in those regions and help build local counter- extremist architectures.

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The Islamic extremists have themselves demonstrated that they pose a serious threat that must not be ignored, lest it grow to unmanageable proportions. It is therefore imperative that Islamic extremism is countered on all fronts.

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