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Result Report Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation Dominic Kudlacek, Matthew Phelps, Stephanie Fleischer, Laura Treskow, Ehiaze Ehimen, Dianne van Hemert, Tom Hueting, Benjamin Kraus, Kamila Labuda, Fer- nando Miró Llinares, Gaëlle Lortal, Brendan Marsh, Rebeca Bautista Ortuño, Ste- phen Purcell, Maja Halilovic Pastuovic, Magda Rooze, Francisco Javier Castro To- ledo, Daniel Wagner & Thomas Görgen Res u l t R e p o r t Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation KRIMINOLOGISCHES FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT NIEDERSACHSEN E.V. This report provides an overview of the current measures used for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation in selected European countries. The countries taken into account have shown a diverse range of prevention measures. Gen- erally, these countries have initiated programmes and projects that tackle different forms of extremism. However, the countries differ in their theoretical approaches and their implemen- tation (a detailed description of the country-specific approaches can be found within chapter 4 and 5). Although the countries provide preventative measures, various improvements are still needed. One key issue includes the lack of proper scientific evaluations being performed on preven- tion measures. Moreover, the majority of the preventive measures analysed in this report were developed as a reactive approach to terrorism and often exist as short-duration projects or programmes. However, long-term measures are needed to effectively prevent the onset of terrorism and radicalisation. Furthermore, it appears promising to enhance the collabora- tion between national practitioners as well as to expand on the number of Islamic counselling services in correctional centres. The report is the first of a sequence of three reports that together will produce policy recom- mendations for the prevention of radicalisation in Europe. Authors: Dominic Kudlacek Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany Matthew Phelps Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany Stephanie Fleischer Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany Laura Treskow Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany Ehiaze Ehimen Future Analytics Consulting, Ireland Dianne van Hemert Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, The Netherlands Tom Hueting Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, The Netherlands Benjamin Kraus German Police University, Germany Kamila Labuda Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany Fernando Miró Llinares Miguel Hernández University, Centro Crímina, Spain Gaëlle Lortal Thales, France Brendan Marsh Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Rebeca Bautista Ortuño Miguel Hernández University, Centro Crímina, Spain Stephen Purcell Future Analytics Consulting, Ireland Maja Halilovic Pastuovic Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Magda Rooze ARQ Psychotrauma Expert Groep, The Netherlands Francisco Javier Castro Toledo Miguel Hernández University, Centro Crímina, Spain Daniel Wagner German Police University, Germany Thomas Görgen German Police University, Germany Coordinator: Dr. Dominic Kudlacek Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony Lützerodestraße 9, 30161 Hannover, Germany Mail: [email protected] This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 740773 Document Evolution: Version Date Note of Modification V1.1 24.08.2017 First version of the report V1.2 24.09.2017 Second version of the report Proposal for citation: Kudlacek, D. et al. (2017): Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries. A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation. Hannover: Kriminolo- gisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 9 2 Approach ........................................................................................12 3 Previous results from European comprehensive projects .........13 3.1 SAFIRE: Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators of & Responses to Radicalisation ................................................... 13 3.2 IMPACT Europe: Innovative Method and Procedure to Assess counter-violent-radicalisation Techniques in Europe ... 15 3.2.1 Inventory of state of the art ........................................16 3.2.1.1 Interventions ..............................................16 3.2.1.2 Evaluations ................................................17 3.2.1.3 Conclusion of the inventory ........................18 3.2.2 IMPACT Europe toolkit ..............................................19 3.3 RAN – Radicalisation Awareness Network .............................. 19 3.3.1 RAN Working Groups ................................................20 3.3.2 The Ran Collection ....................................................21 3.3.3 RAN Manual: Responses to Returnees .....................21 3.3.4 The Centre of Excellence ..........................................22 4 Primary research: general prevention programmes in selected countries..........................................................................23 4.1 Belgium ................................................................................... 23 4.1.1 Overview of the current situation in Belgium ..............23 4.1.2 BOUNCE Resilience Tools ........................................24 4.1.3 Drop Out Prevention Network and Fostering Cooperation between Local Authorities and Schools. ....................................................................24 4.1.3.1 Athena-syntax Where Art and Education Meet ..........................................................25 4.1.4 Family Support ..........................................................26 4.1.5 The Prevention Pyramid ............................................27 4.1.6 Identity and communication - Based on the Logical Levels from Bateson ..................................................29 6 4.2 Bosnia ..................................................................................... 30 4.2.1 Overview of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina ..............................................................30 4.2.2 The strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for prevention and combating terrorism ..........................32 4.2.3 Summary ...................................................................35 4.3 Denmark ................................................................................. 36 4.3.1 Extremism in Denmark – numbers and facts – The Intelligence Risk Assessment ....................................38 4.3.2 Prevention measures – The Aarhus Model ................38 4.3.3 Exit programme – The Aarhus Model ........................39 4.4 France .................................................................................... 39 4.4.1 Introduction of the situation in France (graph indicating latest terrorist attacks could be beneficial ..40 4.4.2 Short Modern History of extremism problem and prevention .................................................................40 4.4.2.1 Description of the public .............................42 4.4.3 General prevention programmes deployment on religious extremism ...................................................45 4.4.3.1 Setting-up of a national programme: ..........45 4.4.4 Genesis of the DAP programme ................................47 4.4.4.1 Experimentation and set up .......................47 4.4.4.2 Grouping programme description ...............48 4.4.4.3 Grouping programme and dedicated units called into question ............................49 4.4.4.4 Current strategy .........................................49 4.4.5 Structure of the French national programme for preventing radicalisation in 27 DAP infrastructures ....51 4.4.5.1 Team and participants ...............................51 4.4.5.2 Tools ..........................................................52 4.4.5.3 Actions .......................................................54 4.4.6 Evaluation of an experimentation ..............................55 4.4.7 Conclusions on needs on general policy in France ....56 4.5 Germany ................................................................................. 57 4.5.1 Current situation on right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremism .....................................................58 4.5.2 Radicalisation in prison .............................................59 7 4.5.3 Reviewing of prevention programmes and projects in Germany................................................................62 4.5.3.1 Demokratie leben! ......................................64 4.5.3.2 Violence Prevention Network (VPN) ..........67 4.5.3.3 EXIT-Germany ...........................................69 4.5.3.4 ”The national programme against right- wing extremism for democracy and human rights” .............................................70 4.6 Ireland ..................................................................................... 71 4.6.1 Overview of the situation in the Republic of Ireland ...71 4.6.2 Anti-extremism Initiatives ...........................................72 4.6.3 Summary ...................................................................74 4.7 Netherlands ............................................................................ 74 4.7.1 Interventions
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