September 2019 Terrorism in America 18 Years After 9/11 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, & Melissa Salyk-Virk Last edited on September 16, 2019 at 2:35 p.m. EDT Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank New America interns Sumaita Mulk, Robin Bradley, and Ian Wallace for their research support on this paper. Former New America Senior Program Associate Emily Schneider provided a deeply informed copyedit of the paper. The authors also like to thank those who co-authored or worked on prior years’ assessments which form the basis of much of this report. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 2 About the Author(s) Peter Bergen is a journalist, documentary producer, vice president for global studies & fellows at New America, CNN national security analyst, professor of practice at Arizona State University where he co- directs the Center on the Future of War, and the author or editor of seven books, three of which were New York Times bestsellers and four of which were named among the best non-fiction books of the year by The Washington Post. David Sterman is a senior policy analyst at New America and holds a master's degree from Georgetown’s Center for Security Studies. Melissa Salyk-Virk is a senior policy analyst for New America’s International Security program. About New America We are dedicated to renewing America by continuing the quest to realize our nation’s highest ideals, honestly confronting the challenges caused by rapid technological and social change, and seizing the opportunities those changes create. About International Security The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 3 Contents Introduction 6 The War on ISIS and Other Extremist Groups 7 The Territorial Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq 7 Limits to ISIS’ Defeat in Syria and Iraq 8 ISIS Beyond Syria and Iraq 9 The Resiliency of al-Qaeda 11 Underlying Instability and the Resiliency of Jihadism 12 U.S. Targeted-Killing Program and the Evolution of Counterterrorism Policy Under President Trump 15 What is the Threat to the United States? 21 A Limited Threat 21 The Most Likely Terrorist Threat: Individuals Inspired by a Range of Ideologies and White Supremacy 25 The Jihadist Threat in the United States Is ISIS-Inspired and ISIS- Enabled, but Not ISIS-Directed 29 The Threat in the U.S. Is Homegrown and Not Infiltration from Countries Affected by the Travel Ban 30 What Is the Threat to the United States From Returning Foreign Fighters? 36 Prison Releases 36 newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 4 Contents Cont'd What Is the Threat to Europe? 37 Foreign Fighters 39 Jihadist Networks 41 Marginalization and Anti-Muslim Feeling 41 Geographic Proximity 44 Key Trends in Terrorism 45 Low-Technology Attacks: Firearms, Knives, and Vehicles 45 Continued Absence of Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear Attacks 47 The Use of Armed Drones by Terrorist Groups 48 newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 5 Introduction Eighteen years after the 9/11 attacks, the terrorist threat to the United States and around the world looks very different than it did on that day when 19 foreign hijackers who had entered the United States on temporary visas killed almost 3,000 people in a matter of hours. The jihadist terrorist threat to the United States today is relatively limited. Since the 9/11 attacks, no foreign terrorist organization has successfully directed and carried out a deadly attack inside the United States. With the territorial collapse of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the threat posed by the group has receded. It has been more than a year since the last deadly jihadist terrorist attack, and the number of terrorism-related cases in the United States has declined substantially since its peak in 2015, though there will almost certainly be an uptick in cases this year. However, “homegrown” jihadist terrorism including that inspired by ISIS is likely to remain a threat. As this threat is not inherently tied to ISIS’ possession of territory, policymakers should not expect a substantial shift in the nature or extent of the threat of ISIS to the United States. Rather than jihadist attacks from abroad, the most likely threat to the United States today comes from terrorists inspired by ideologies across the political spectrum, including jihadist, far-right, and idiosyncratic strains. These individuals tend to be radicalized on or via the internet, and they take advantage of the availability of weapons, particularly semi-automatic firearms, in the United States. Of particular note, in the last few years, white supremacist extremism has posed a particularly significant threat. While the jihadist threat to the United States remains relatively limited, the United States continues to face a resilient jihadist terrorist threat across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Europe also faces a more severe jihadist threat than the United States. Yet, the United States has demonstrated its capability to deal military defeats to jihadist groups that seize territory. newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 6 The War on ISIS and Other Extremist Groups The United States has demonstrated its ability to deal substantial military defeats to jihadist1 groups that take territory. In March 2019, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) congratulated the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the “elimination of Daesh’s self-proclaimed territorial caliphate.”2 The territorial defeat of ISIS3 illustrates the stark limitations to jihadist efforts to establish long- term safe havens. However, instability and social conditions in the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of South Asia combined with the connecting power of social media ensure that jihadist militancy—including but not limited to its expression in the form of ISIS and al Qaeda—will remain a resilient regional and local threat. These conditions suggest the need for a foundational evaluation of U.S. goals in its counterterrorism wars, and what is achievable at what cost. Under the Trump administration, the United States has escalated many of these wars and continues to backtrack on the already limited transparency surrounding these wars, making the ability to assess the true impact of the Trump administration’s policy changes difficult in this environment. The Territorial Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq Over the past year, the United States and its partners have successfully eliminated all of ISIS’ territory in Iraq and Syria. In March, the U.S.-backed SDF liberated ISIS’ last piece of territory in Syria in Baghuz. However, in effect, ISIS’ territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria had already collapsed. The group lost Raqqa, the capital of its self-proclaimed caliphate almost two years ago in October 2017 when the SDF took the city.4 A month later, ISIS lost its last populated territory in Iraq.5 In early 2018, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported that ISIS “lost control over all remaining urban areas [in Iraq and Syria].”6 By March 2019, all that remained was the 1.5 square mile of ISIS territory in Baghuz liberated by the SDF that month.7 The loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria dramatically undercuts ISIS’ claim that it is the caliphate, because the caliphate has historically been a substantial geographic entity, such as the Ottoman Empire, as well as a theological construct.8 Not only did it hold vast territory and theological significance, but the so-called caliphate allowed the organization to have a constant infux of money through its vast crop and oil holdings, in addition to its income from antiquities sales, ransoms, and taxation.9 newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/ 7 As ISIS’ territorial caliphate collapsed, there has been a noticeable decline in its propaganda capability. Key propaganda outputs including ISIS’ English-language magazine Rumiyah appear to have ceased publication.10 According to Europol’s 2019 report, ISIS’ losses “had a significant impact on its digital capabilities,” leaving its weekly Arabic Al-Naba newsletter as its only regular output.11 Likewise, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s January 2019 report assessed that ISIS’ “media production fell during the course of 2018 as did the quality of its output and the reliability of its claims for responsibility for attacks.”12 In addition to an increased number of false claims of attacks, there has been confused messaging on ISIS’ part regarding the structure of its provincial and affiliate network.13 The Sanctions Monitoring Team’s January 2019 assessment mirrors its February 2018 assessment that “the propaganda machinery of the ISIL core is further decentralizing, and the quality of its material continues to decline.”14 Limits to ISIS’ Defeat in Syria and Iraq While ISIS’ territorial collapse represents a major success for the counter-ISIS coalition, this is not the first time that ISIS has been dealt substantial tactical defeats. The group remains capable of exploiting current and potential future instability in Iraq and Syria to improve its position. The UN Sanctions Monitoring Committee in February 2019 assessed that in Iraq, the group’s transition “into a covert network is well advanced” and that ISIS poses a “major threat” in the form of assassinations of ofcials and “frequent attacks” on civilians.15 Indeed, ISIS has previously demonstrated its ability to continue operations in areas where it has lost territory during the so-called “surge” that began in 2007 and in areas previously liberated during the current counter-ISIS campaign.16 In Syria, security conditions in Raqqa remain poor.