An Assessment of Current Counterterrorism Efforts in Spain and France: What’S Changed?

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2019-09 AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SPAIN AND FRANCE: WHAT’S CHANGED?

Valenzuela Balderas, Diego Emmanuel

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63514

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SPAIN AND FRANCE: WHAT’S CHANGED?

Diego Emmanuel Valenzuela Balderas

September 2019

Thesis Advisor: Cristiana Matei Second Reader: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) September 2019 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SPAIN AND FRANCE: WHAT’S CHANGED? 6. AUTHOR(S) Diego Emmanuel Valenzuela Balderas 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In order to determine best practices in response to a continually changing security environment, this research assesses how the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks carried out by the group’s terrorist cells and self-radicalized individuals have affected the independent and collective counterterrorist efforts of Spanish and French security agencies. Identifying the evolution of and outlining proposals for refining Spanish and French anti-ISIS counterterrorist measures revealed that it was their long-time histories of fighting against ethno-nationalist and jihadi terrorist organizations, rather than terrorist attacks by ISIS or its affiliates, that helped the security institutions of Spain and France to adapt plans, strategies, and policies for confronting ISIS from a holistic perspective. Based on these conclusions, policymakers in Spain, France, the United States, and Mexico will benefit from the application of the findings provided by this work's analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Spanish and French counterterrorism policies. In addition, the thesis offers recommendations for countries facing other terrorism-related security issues, such as organized crime or drug trafficking.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Spain, France, ISIS, Mexico, counterterrorism, jihad, terrorist attack, intelligence, PAGES law-enforcement, homeland security, domestic security policies, counterterrorist policies, 119 counterterrorist strategies, counterterrorist laws, organized crime, Mexican domestic security 16. PRICE CODE policies 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SPAIN AND FRANCE: WHAT’S CHANGED?

Diego Emmanuel Valenzuela Balderas Commander, Mexican Navy B.S., Mexican Naval Academy, 2001

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2019

Approved by: Cristiana Matei Advisor

Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar Associate Chair for Research Department of National Security Affairs

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iv ABSTRACT

In order to determine best practices in response to a continually changing security environment, this research assesses how the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks carried out by the group’s terrorist cells and self-radicalized individuals have affected the independent and collective counterterrorist efforts of Spanish and French security agencies. Identifying the evolution of and outlining proposals for refining Spanish and French anti-ISIS counterterrorist measures revealed that it was their long-time histories of fighting against ethno-nationalist and jihadi terrorist organizations, rather than terrorist attacks by ISIS or its affiliates, that helped the security institutions of Spain and France to adapt plans, strategies, and policies for confronting ISIS from a holistic perspective. Based on these conclusions, policymakers in Spain, France, the United States, and Mexico will benefit from the application of the findings provided by this work's analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Spanish and French counterterrorism policies. In addition, the thesis offers recommendations for countries facing other terrorism-related security issues, such as organized crime or drug trafficking.

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vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION...... 2 B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 2 C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 1. Terrorism in Spain and France before ISIS ...... 3 2. Islamic Terrorism in Spain and France ...... 5 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ...... 6 4. Countering Terrorism ...... 8 D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...... 10 E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 10 F. THESIS OVERVIEW ...... 10

II. THE SPANISH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BEFORE ISIS ...... 11 A. FRANCISCO FRANCO (1939–1975) ...... 11 B. ADOLFO SUÁREZ (JULY 1976–FEBRUARY 1981) ...... 12 C. FELIPE GONZÁLEZ MÁRQUEZ (DECEMBER 1982–MAY 1996) ...... 14 D. JOSÉ MARÍA AZNAR LÓPEZ (MAY 1996–APRIL 2004) ...... 16 E. JOSÉ LUIS RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO (APRIL 2004– DECEMBER 2011) ...... 19 F. CONCLUSIONS ...... 24

III. COUNTERING TERRORISM IN FRANCE BEFORE ISIS ...... 25 A. THE FIRST STEPS (EMERGENCY, 1950s–1960s) ...... 25 B. THE SANCTUARY AND ACCOMMODATION ERAS (1970s– LATE 1980s) ...... 27 C. THE SUPPRESSION ERA (EARLY 1990s) ...... 29 D. THE PREVENTION ERA (LATE 1990s–PRESENT) ...... 32 E. CONCLUSIONS ...... 36

IV. SPANISH ANTI-ISIS POLICIES ...... 39 A. ISIS AND ISIS-INSPIRED ATTACKS IN SPAIN...... 39 B. THE COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLUTION IN SPAIN...... 41 1. Coordination and Information Exchange ...... 42 2. Counterterrorist Laws ...... 45 3. Strategic Alliances ...... 46 4. Long-Term Strategies ...... 47

vii C. CONCLUSIONS ...... 49

V. FRENCH APPROACHES AGAINST ISIS ...... 51 A. THE ISIS ATTACKS ON FRANCE ...... 51 B. THE CURRENT FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ...... 57 1. Improvement of the French Security Forces ...... 57 2. Adjustments to French Law ...... 61 3. French Strategic Alliances and Plans ...... 63 C. CONCLUSIONS ...... 65

VI. CONCLUDING STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 67 A. FINDINGS ...... 67 B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 69 C. APPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO ...... 70

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 77

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...... 101

viii LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Suarez’s counterterrorist measures and reactions...... 13

Table 2. Felipe Gonzalez’s counterterrorist measures...... 15

Table 3. Counterterrorist measures during the Aznar´s administration ...... 16

Table 4. Zapatero’s counterterrorist measures...... 20

Table 5. Spanish security plans 2004–2011 for preventing terrorist attacks...... 22

Table 6. Terrorist actions/counterterrorist reactions during de Gaulle’s administration...... 26

Table 7. Counterterrorist strategies and reactions during the Sanctuary and Accommodation eras...... 28

Table 8. Counterterrorist strategies during the Suppression era...... 30

Table 9. Evolution of the counterterrorist strategies from 2002 to 2014...... 33

Table 10. ISIS and ISIS-inspired terrorist events in Spain ...... 40

Table 11. Political events with effects on Spanish domestic security policies...... 42

Table 12. ISIS terrorist attacks in France since 2014...... 52

Table 13. The French security forces’ improvements taken against ISIS...... 58

Table 14. Evolution of the French legal framework against ISIS...... 62

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x LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AI Amnesty International ANSSI Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (National Agency for the Security of Information Systems) AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb API Advance passenger information

BCRP Bureau central du renseignement pénitentiaire (Central Penitentiary Intelligence Bureau

CDSN Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale (Defense and National Security Council) CEMU Comité Ejecutivo del Mando Unificado de las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado (Executive Committee for the Unified Command of the State Security Corps and Forces) CESID Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa (Superior Defense Information Center) CICO Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen Organizado (Centre for Intelligence against Organized Crime) CIPD Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance (Inter-Ministerial Committee for Delinquency Prevention) CITCO Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado (Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime) CNIL Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (National Commission on Information Technology and Liberties) CNCA Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista (National Counterterrorist Coordination Center) CNCIS Commission Nationale du Contrôle des Interceptions de Sécurité National (Commission for the Control for the National Security Wiretaps) CNCTR Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement (National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques) CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Center) CSPPA Comité de Solidarité avec les Prisonniers Politiques Arabes et du Proche- Orient (Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political Prisoners) xi DCRG Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (Central Directorate of General Intelligence) DGSI Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (Domestic Security General Directorate) DST Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Territory Surveillance Directorate)

EMOPT Etat-major opérationnel de prévention du terrorisme (Terrorism Prevention Operational High-Staff) ETA Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque homeland and freedom)

FATF Financial Action Task Force FIS Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) FLN Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) FSPRT Fichier de Traitement des Signalements, de la Prévention de la Radicalisation à caractère terroriste (Identification File for Preventing Radicalization of a Terrorist Nature)

GAIOE Gabinete de Información y Operaciones Especiales (Information and Special Operations Cabinet GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) GIA Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group) GSPC Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (Salafi Group for Call and Combat)

IED Improvised explosive device ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MICG Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group MULA Mando Unificado para la Lucha Antiterrorista (Counterterrorist Fight Central Command)

NGO Non-governmental organization

OAS Organisation de l’ Armée Secrète (The Secret Army Organization) xii PCE Partido Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Party) PDEC Partido Demócrata Europeo Catalán (Catolonian European Democratic Party) PEN-LCRV Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta (National Strategic Plan to Fight Radicalization) PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PNR Passenger Name Record PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) PP Partido Popular (Popular Party) PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party)

RAID Research, Assistance, Intervention, and Deterrence

SCLAT Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (Counterterrorist Fight Coordination Service SDAT Sous-direction Antiterroriste (Counterterrorist Sub-directorate) SDECE Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter Espionage Service) SGDSN Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale (General Secretariat for Defence and National Security) SICOA Sistema de Coordinación de Operaciones Antiterroristas (Counterterrorist Operations Coordination System)

UCD Union de Centro Democratico (Democratic Centre Union) UCLAT Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (Counterterrorist Fight Coordination Unit) UIP Unité Information Passagers (Passenger Information Unit) UN The United Nations UNODC The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

WMD Weapons of mass destruction

ZEN Plan Plan Zona Especial Norte (North Zone Special Plan)

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xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My sincere gratitude goes to a number of people who supported me as I finished this research. I would like to begin by thanking the Mexican Navy (Secretaría de Marina – Armada de México) for granting me this magnificent opportunity to study at the Naval Postgraduate School and increase my academic knowledge and critical thinking in benefit of my country and institution.

Next, I express my admiration to the U.S. Navy, NETSAFA, the IGPO’s members, which includes Director Captain Alan Scott, Kathi Noyes, and their amazing staff, for supporting my family and me during our wonderful stay in this country.

Particularly, I am grateful for the overwhelming assistance I received from Professor Francesca Nice in order to finish this research. I also offer a special thanks to my thesis advisors, Professor Cris Matei and Professor Rodrigo Nieto. Furthermore, my sincere gratitude goes to my professors Maria Rasmussen, Anne Clunan, Tristan Mabry, Robert E. Looney, and to the rest of the Department of National Security Affairs’ faculty and staff, for sharing their knowledge and expertise on their respective specialties.

And, most importantly, I thank my wife and daughters for supporting me with their love. I will always remember how you literally “held my foot” in order to finish this thesis. In addition, I want to acknowledge my father-in-law, who shared his knowledge with me on national security affairs. Finally, I am grateful to my parents, my mother-in- law, siblings, siblings-in-law, and extended family for supporting and encouraging me throughout this awesome experience.

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xvi I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism resembles a cruel, never- ending tennis match, played out on a court that is a country’s territory. The ball is each player’s respective political message(s). On one side, terrorists launch violent acts to express their grievances, imposing their conditions on society through fear. On the other, democratic governments respond using security institutions, domestic policies, and strategies to protect society.1 Every shot represents the terrorists’ dreadful actions or the (sometimes) repressive authorities’ responses. In this match, the media, academics, and general population have a twofold role: as the audience watching the shocking plays and as the judges assessing and ruling on both players’ actions. Over time, every shot in the cycle of engagement reaches throughout society. Although there could be a winner, in the end the people’s suffering produced by the struggle will dominate.

Spain and France’s governments are currently confronting this complex and risky match against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claiming its grievances over Spanish and French soil.2 ISIS uses its “ability to change form continually,” camouflaging itself by adapting its organization, tactics, weapons, and behavior in order to perform successful terrorist attacks.3 For example, in 2014 the ISIS propagandist Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, incited ISIS militants to commit terrorist attacks against Western

1 According to the Dictionary of Legal Terms, a public policy is “that which is best for society as a whole; a subjective determination by an individual such as a judge or governor, or a group such as a township committee or state legislature or what is for the general good of all people.” Dictionary of Legal Terms, s.v. “public policy,” accessed December 13, 2017, http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/barronsgkwm/public_policy/0.

2 Although known by several different names, for the purpose of consistency and clarity, this thesis will use the designation ISIS. See Michaela Martin and Hussein Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and Its Funding,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 4, no. 1 (February 28, 2017): 18–49. See also: Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava, and Eric C. Martin, “Terrorism as Formal Organization, Network, and Social Movement,” Journal of Management Inquiry 24, no. 1 (June 24, 2014): 47–60.

3 “Islamic State Changing Terror Tactics to Maintain Threat in Europe,” EUROPOL, accessed November 16, 2017, https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/islamic-state-changing-terror-tactics- to-maintain-threat-in-europe. 1 countries’ citizens, with any conceivable weapon.4 One of the many responses incited by this speech happened on 14 July 2016, when one terrorist drove a cargo truck into the Bastille Day celebration crowd in France, killing 86 people and injuring more than 400.5 This tragedy shows the multiple variables that any government has to face in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

Against the background of this threat, Spain and France have developed and adapted effective counterterrorism policies.6 These countries have also striven to strengthen the effectiveness of their security institutions dedicated to fighting terrorism— mainly, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In this context, this research investigates the progress of Spain’s and France’s counterterrorism laws, policies, and strategies.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions:

 How have ISIS (and ISIS-inspired) attacks influenced the domestic counterterrorism policies of security agencies7 in Spain and France?

 What impact have these policies had on the effectiveness of these agencies?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis contributes to the literature on terrorism by assessing how ISIS- inspired terrorist attacks carried out by religious extremist organizations and self-

4 Pamela Engel, “ISIS and Al Qaeda Have Specifically Called for the Type of Attack That Just Happened in London,” Business Insider, March 22, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-al-qaeda- london-attack-2017-3.

5 Michel Carles, Jacques Levraut, Jean François Gonzalez, François Valli, Loic Bornard, “Mass Casualty Events and Health Organisation: Terrorist Attack in Nice,” The Lancet 388, No. 10058 (November 12, 2016): 2349–50.

6 This research employs the terms “counterterrorism policies” and “counterterrorism efforts” interchangeably.

7 In this thesis, I consider “security agencies” or “security institutions” as public institutions (formally created by an officially recognized government) with the main legal objective of providing security to their citizenry, notably: military, police departments, intelligence services, and other public entities integrated thoroughly against this menace. 2 radicalized individuals have affected the single and collective counterterrorist efforts of Spanish and French security agencies. Empirical evidence reveals that terrorist groups transformed their methods of attack over time to achieve their goals.8 Thwarting terrorist groups’ efforts calls for policymakers to develop effective counterterrorism policies and establish competent security agencies. Spain and France have had serious domestic security crises in their fights against ISIS. This research analyzes the evolution of Spanish and French counterterrorism policies stemming from the ISIS-inspired attacks, and their possible application in the United States and Mexico.

This research identifies the evolution of and outlines proposals for refinement of Spanish and French counterterrorist laws, policies, and strategies for countering Islamic terrorism and organized crime. Policymakers of these key U.S. allies will benefit in that the research provides an analysis of their counterterrorism policies’ strengths, weaknesses, and gaps. The conclusions and recommendations for counterterrorism policies also have implications for the national defense and homeland security interests of both the United States and Mexico. Finally, the research further proposes recommendations for any countries with terrorism-related security issues, such as organized crime or trafficking.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review discusses the evolution of terrorism with special focus on ISIS in Spain and France. An explanation on how to better evaluate counterterrorism efforts follows.

1. Terrorism in Spain and France before ISIS

The period of ethno-nationalist terrorism in Spain began during the Franco regime

8 Daniel L. Byman, “What the Manchester Attack Shows Us about How the Terrorism Danger Has Evolved,” Brookings, May 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/24/what- the-manchester-attack-shows-us-about-how-the-terrorism-danger-has-evolved/. 3 and continued during Spain’s transition to democratic rule.9 The Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) was the deadliest terrorist group in Spain. According to Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “[u]ntil the massacre perpetrated in Madrid by radical Islamists on 11 March 2004, the real problem has been that of ETA.”10 Emerging against the Franco dictatorship in 1959, this Basque Nationalist Party violent faction’s “final aim [was] the full independence of four northern Spanish provinces, three of them (Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya) being totally Basque and one (Navarra) only partially Basque.”11 ETA produced its first attack in November 1967, when the group detonated a bomb in a TV relay station in Bilbao.12 In 1974, the ETA separated into two subgroups, the ETA political-military division and the ETA military wing. As their names indicate, the first was the political façade of the organization, while the latter executed its guerrilla operations.

Academics agree that, like in Spain, traditional terrorism in France has been a constant menace to domestic security. Antonio Vercher explains that although France has experienced terrorism from a political perspective,13 “[o]nly on one occasion in the history of the Fifth Republic, as a result of the Algerian War (1954–62), did the president of France invoke the emergency of powers provided in Article 16 of the Constitution.”14 Nevertheless, the French “civilizing” foreign policies implemented toward their former colonies in North Africa share a significant responsibility for the emergence of Islamist

9 Fernando Reinares and Oscar Jaime-Jimenez, “Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy: The Case of Spain,” in European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, edited by Fernando Reinares (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), 119–46.

10 Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2005): 265–78.

11 Antonio Vercher, Terrorism in Europe: An International Comparative Legal Analysis (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1992), 163–71.

12 Vercher, 163–71.

13 Vercher, 163–71.

14 Vercher. 4 extremism in the Maghreb.15

Before ISIS, French terrorist organizations aimed to force the French government to address policies associated with French-African colonies and ethno-nationalist issues. For example, in 1972 the right-wing anti-Arab Charles Martel Group, left four dead and 20 injured after its attack on the Algerian consulate in Marseille.16 Other prominent, traditional-style terrorist groups in France include the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the French Israeli Liberal Union, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.17 Finally, the right-wing terrorist—and at some point state- sponsored—Organisation de l’ Armée Secrète (OAS, the Secret Army Organization) had the French government maintaining control of the Algerian colony as its political purpose.18 The foremost goal of all these terrorist organizations was destabilizing the French government.

2. Islamic Terrorism in Spain and France

Scholars concur on two separate points about Islamic terrorism in Spain. First, global terrorism is not a new challenge for security agencies. Fernando Reinares argues that the Spanish security forces had experience with jihadist terrorist activities, yet they were “badly prepared to face the risks and threats of current global terrorism.”19 The author expresses that Spain’s security agencies did not have enough resources to protect its citizenry against Islamic terrorism, even though they had arrested jihadist terrorists before the Madrid bombing.20 According to Reinares, between January 2001 and the

15 Megan G. Oprea, “How France Grew Its Own Terrorists,” The Federalist, January 16, 2015, http://thefederalist.com/2015/01/16/how-france-grew-its-own-terrorists/.

16 Marie-Estelle Pech, “L’attentat Le plus Meurtrier Depuis Vitry-Le-François En 1961 [The deadliest attack since Vitry-le-François in 1961],” Le Figaro, January 7, 2015, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite- france/2015/01/07/01016-20150107ARTFIG00178-historique-des-attentats-en-france-depuis-1994.php.

17 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Terrorist Incidents in France, accessed December 5, 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

18 Vercher, 163–71.

19 Fernando Reinares, “After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 5 (May 1, 2009): 367–88.

20 Reinares, 367–88. 5 Madrid bombing, the Spanish government had arrested and convicted persons linked to al-Qaeda terrorist activities.21 Despite the intelligence collected from those arrested, however, it did not prevent the Madrid bombing from happening.

Second, terrorist organizations like the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group or al- Qaeda in Iraq aim to spread fear among the population to force governments to make decisions and take actions they would not have otherwise.22 Brian Forst claims that al- Qaeda considered the Madrid attack a victory because it forced the Spanish government to terminate its military support for U.S. anti-terrorism operations.23 According to Forst, before the attack Spain had been one of the strongest supporters of U.S. war operations; however, in the aftermath, the Spanish government withdrew more than 1,300 Spanish forces from Iraq as a measure to prevent more attacks.24

3. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

One terrorist organization menaced the Western countries’ domestic security from 2014 to 2018: ISIS. ISIS’s state-like military capabilities permitted it to control populations, territories, and lines of communication between Iraq and Syria, turning it into a “continually evolving threat.”25 These same conditions allowed ISIS to get funding for their terrorist attacks from the Iraqi Central Bank’s assets, tax revenues, public services fees, non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) donations, and illegal sales of oil,

21 Reinares.

22 The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group allegedly was the author of the Madrid bombing. Daniel Cassman, “Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,” Mapping Militant Organizations, accessed May 26, 2018, https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/129.

23 Brian Forst, Terrorism, Crime, and Public Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 221.

24 Some authors also refer to this tragic event as the 3–11 attack. See Forst.

25 Jessica Stern and John M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 281; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March 2015): 87–98. 6 natural gas, antiquities, gold, phosphate products, and cement.26 ISIS used these funds to control its networks in order to produce terrorist attacks around the globe.

ISIS is a dangerous threat because its leaders and supporters have adapted the group’s radicalization tactics to the Western way of life, strengthening its ranks with local and foreign supporters. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created ISIS from the remnants of the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization, Tanzim al-Qaeda wal Jihad fi Balad al-Rafidain, also known as the al-Qaeda in Iraq.27 This terrorist organization was weak at the beginning, but after Syria’s civil war in 2011 and the Sunni uprising movement in 2012, al-Baghdadi recruited more than 1,000 alienated jihadi groups.28 ISIS’ preachers took advantage of their freedom of speech to address Muslims’ grievances in mosques, universities, and prisons.29 Besides, ISIS cell leaders coordinated terrorist attacks in Western countries from their headquarters in Syria.30 ISIS recruiters also disseminated their invasive online radicalization propaganda in many different languages, through Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and other social media platforms.31 This set of tactics made ISIS an increasing menace for any Western country.

Furthermore, ISIS’s links to other terrorist groups such as the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC, Salafi Group for Call and Combat), or the

26 Renad Mansour and Hisham al-Hashimi, “ISIS Inc.,” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/isis-inc-islamic-state-iraq-syria/. See also: Financial Action Task Force, Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Paris, France: FATF, 2015), 12–20, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist- organisation-isil.html.

27 Luís Tomé, “The «Islamic State»: Trajectory and Reach a Year after Its Self Proclamation as a «Caliphate»,” JANUS.NET E-Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2015): 117–19.

28 Tomé, 118.

29 Humberto M. Trujillo, Javier Jordán, Jose Antonio Gutiérrez, and Joaquín González-Cabrera, “Radicalization in Prisons? Field Research in 25 Spanish Prisons,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 4 (September 16, 2009): 560. See also: James Brandon, “British Universities Continue to Breed Extremists,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 1 (2010).

30 Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria (New York: Soufan Group, 2014), 7.

31 Rukmini Callimachi, “A News Agency with Scoops Directly from ISIS, and a Veneer of Objectivity,” The New York Times, January 14, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/middleeast/a-news-agency-with-scoops-directly-from-isis- and-a-veneer-of-objectivity.html. 7 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, allowed al-Baghdadi to recruit fighters from different countries in Africa and Europe.32 As of 2015, ISIS’s forces had grown its lines with almost 31,500 foreign fighters from European countries, such as Spain and France.33

This increasing presence compelled the world governments to work actively towards thwarting terrorist attacks. For instance, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris provoked general anger against terrorism, and intensified social demands for reinforcing security.34 In the aftermath, France’s government handled proposals to its Parliament in order to strengthen the counterterrorist legal framework and increase the French police forces’ ranks, capabilities, and faculties.35

4. Countering Terrorism

Security institutions are the first counterterrorism shield. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw contend that the counterterrorism efforts of any democratized country are the set of plans, policies, strategies, and legal resources that the central governments establish through their institutions to stop terrorism.36 Specifically, these efforts aim to prevent, deter, or stop any criminal act committed on national territory intended to harm the population or to cause damage to strategic infrastructure or key resources.37

32 ISIS employed its media for three main goals: to radicalize more conscripts from Muslim countries and abroad; to provide confidence to its jihadis; and, to spread fear amongst its “infidel” enemies. Callimachi, “A News Agency with Scoops Directly from ISIS, and a Veneer of Objectivity.”

33 Jomana Karadsheh, Jim Sciutto, and Laura Smith-Spark, “How Foreign Fighters Are Swelling ISIS Ranks,” CNN, September 12, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/meast/isis- numbers/index.html. See also: Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo, “The Spanish Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 1 (January 31, 2014): 12–14.

34 Carried out by two members of the Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch and one ISIS militant. Randell Hansen, “Religion, Culture, and Pluralism,” in After the Paris Attacks: Responses in Canada, Europe, and around the Globe, Edward M. Iacobucci and Stephen J. Toope, eds. (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 3–12.

35 Nathalie Goulet, “#CharlieHebdo: France’s Response to Terror Makes Another Attack Likely,” Newsweek, January 7, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/charlie-hebdo-frances-response-terror-makes- another-attack-likely-412847.

36 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), v–ix.

37 Hoffman and Taw. 8 Hoffman and Taw point out that a national plan to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism should include four essential parts. First is an effective command and coordination structure to set the rules, responsibilities, and coordination points between security forces.38 Second, a precise and functional legal framework accompanied by governmental actions is needed to legitimize counterterrorist efforts.39 Third, a national plan must include coordinated intelligence services with rules for collection, analysis, and diffusion.40 Fourth, foreign collaboration and intelligence sharing among governments’ security forces is required.41

Academics differ on how to end terrorist organizations. Audrey Cronin, for instance, maintains that there are six ways for terrorist organizations to end: decapitation, negotiation, the terrorist groups’ success, the terrorist groups’ self-destruction, repression, and tactical reorientation.42 Daniel Byman assures us that governments might confront terrorism on five different fronts: rethinking the military’s role, changing terrorist ideology, strengthening intelligence, improving homeland defense, and enacting democratic reforms.43 Edwin Bakker, for his part, contends two contrasting theories on terrorism’s end: either terrorism is a phenomenon without end or counterterrorist forces might be able to reduce terrorists’ violence by finding ways for their goals and demands to be satisfied or by capturing them through employing intelligence and law enforcement agencies.44 Finally, I agree with Martha Crenshaw’s explanation that counterterrorist

38 Hoffman and Taw. This would be a high-level governmental entity under the control of the Executive branch.

39 Hoffman and Taw.

40 Hoffman and Taw.

41 Hoffman and Taw.

42 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). See also: Maria Rasmussen, “Review of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns by Audrey Kurth Cronin,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 2 (2011): 332–333, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538- 165X.2011.tb02137.x.

43 Daniel L. Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

44 Edwin Bakker, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice (Leiden, Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015): 183. 9 forces must employ a “more inclusive conception” of the terrorism phenomenon, what Bakker names as a “holistic approach,” oriented to assemble different public policies with the purpose to end violence by diminishing grievances.45

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Countries create their counterterrorist efforts in response to terrorist attacks, in accordance with their national or strategical interests. I assert that their respective long- time histories of fighting against ethno-nationalist and jihadi terrorist organizations has helped the Spanish and French security institutions to adapt plans, strategies, and policies for confronting ISIS from a holistic perspective. Since the advent of ISIS, the Spanish and French governments have refined their counterterrorism efforts to prevent, deter, or stop terrorist attacks conducted by religious extremist organizations and self-radicalized individuals.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis uses a qualitative analysis of Spanish and French counterterrorism efforts, using primary sources related to national plans or strategies, legal frameworks, directives, organizational manuals, reports, official discourses, public opinion polls, and public statistical information in regard to the fight against ISIS (its attacks, organizations, individuals). The collected information provides necessary data to build a timeline, and identify the most significant changes in Spanish and French policies and strategies to avoid Islamic terrorists and “jihadi wolf” terrorist attacks.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis has six chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis. Chapters II and III review the Spanish and French pre-ISIS (and ISIS-inspired) counterterrorism efforts. Chapters IV and V, respectively, discuss the evolution of the Spanish and French counterterrorist measures and policies against ISIS (and ISIS-inspired) terrorist attacks. Finally, Chapter VI answers the research question and provides recommendations.

45 Bakker, 183. 10 II. THE SPANISH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BEFORE ISIS

Prior to the advent of ISIS, Spain had already developed policies aimed at combating terrorism. These countermeasures evolved slowly, but mostly reactively, through the different phases of terrorism throughout the country´s history.46 This evolution goes from the use of the Spanish security apparatus as a repressive tool during the Franco regime to one “fully rel[iant] on law enforcement and intergovernmental collaboration” to combat terrorism.47 This chapter identifies the evolution of Spanish counterterrorism measures employed by each Spanish head of state from 1939 to 2014.

A. FRANCISCO FRANCO (1939–1975)

From 1886 to 1912, anarchist groups perpetrated more than ten terrorist attacks aimed at ending governmental oppression and capitalism against the Spanish military regime and civilian society.48 During this time, the Spanish government created its first Spanish counterterrorist law, the Ley para la seguridad del Estado (1941) that applied the death penalty to punish separatist ideology, outlawed Basque-language schools, and banned clergy support.49 The security forces’ use of violence to stop subversive movements drove the Basque society to form an armed resistance aimed to protect their homeland, customs, language, and religion.50

46 Reinares and Jaime-Jimenez, 119–46.

47 Fernando Reinares, and Rogelio Alonso, “Confronting Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Spain: Political and Coercive Measures against ETA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 115.

48 In 1897, anarchists plotted and conducted the killing of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the Spanish President of the Council of Ministers, in Guipúzcoa. Luis A. Aparicio-Ordaz González-Garcia and Maria Luisa Fanjul Fernandez, “La Primera Legislación Terrorista en España: La respuesta del estado español frente al terrorismo anarquista [The First Terrorist Legislation in Spain: The Spanish State's Response to Anarchist Terrorism],” Cuadernos de La Guardia Civil, no. 53 (2016): 5–20.

49 John L. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890–1986 (1988, Reprint, New York: Routledge, 2015), 2, 20–28.

50 Gutmaro Gómez Bravo, Puig Antich: La Transición inacabada [Puig Antich: The Unfinished Transition] (Madrid, España: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, 2014), 38. 11 Every authoritarian action ended with more attacks. Consequently, ETA triggered a vicious spiral of terrorist action and repressive police reaction.51 This terrorist organization kidnapped seven people and murdered 61 victims, including Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco, in 40 attacks.52 In response, Franco increased the legal faculties of military courts, and expanded penalties against terrorism-related offenders; and classified ETA’s activities as crimes against the regime.53 Franco’s death in 1975 made way for a democratic form of government, with less severe forms of counterterrorism measures.

B. ADOLFO SUÁREZ (JULY 1976–FEBRUARY 1981)

The Spanish democratic transition settled the path for the Spanish counterterrorist efforts. Several measures brought improvements, yet some were unproductive.54 The first step taken by the Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez González, from the Unión de Centro Democrático party (UCD, the Democratic Centre Union) was to legitimize democratic institutions, such as the Audiencia Nacional (National Audience).55 Providing autonomy to the Basque community gave ETA’s political-military faction a reason to abandon arms and conduct their grievances through the Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) party.56 Despite these gains, Basque separatists kept conducting kidnappings, bank robberies, street

51 Iker Casanova, ETA, 1958–2008: medio siglo de historia [ETA, 1958–2008: half a century of history] (Tafalla, España: Txalaparta, 2007), 100.

52 Luis De la Calle, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “La Selección de Víctimas en ETA [ETA’s Victim Selection],” Revista Española de Ciencia Política, no. 10 (April 2004): 63. See also: “ETA: Historia de 40 años de terrorismo [ETA: 40-year history of terrorism],” Ideal, 2006. http://especiales.ideal.es/2006/eta/historia.html.

53 Marino Barbero Santos, “El Bandolerismo en la Legislación Vigente [Banditry in the Current Legislation],” Anuario de Derecho Penal y Ciencias Penales 23, no. 2 (1970): 253.

54 Oscar Jaime Jiménez, Policía, terrorismo y cambio político en España, 1976–1996 [Police, terrorism and political change in Spain, 1976–1996] (Valencia, España: Tirant lo Blanch, 2002), 27.

55 Since its establishment, the Audiencia Nacional has investigated and tried terrorism-related cases through its six examining magistrates, in six juzgados centrales de instrucción (central instructing courts); each one is presided over by a three-judge panel. María José Castañón Álvarez, “Protección Penal de las Víctimas en los Delitos de Terrorismo [Criminal Protection of Terrorism Crime Victims]” (PhD diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2012), 24–26, http://eprints.ucm.es/16562/1/T33973.pdf.

56 Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla, “Agur a las armas. EIA, Euskadiko Ezkerra y la disolución de ETA político-militar (1976-1985) [Agur to arms. EIA, Euskadiko Ezkerra and the dissolution of ETA political- military faction (1976-1985)],” Sancho el sabio: Revista de cultura e investigación vasca, no. 33 (2010): 55–96. 12 violence, and collecting their own taxes.57 Furthermore, ETA’s nationalist newspapers, such as Deia and Egin, promoted its ideology in Spanish and Basque.58 As Table 1 indicates, Suarez responded by enacting several ineffectual counterterrorist measures, and ETA’s violence remained.

Table 1. Suarez’s counterterrorist measures and reactions.

Actions Reactions

Endorsement of the 1977 European In 1977, the Suarez administration Convention on the Suppression on relocated 97 ETA-affiliated inmates, Terrorism to enable extradition because of an alleged plan for a massive procedures,59 and regulation of the state of breakout.61 Convicts’ families organized exception in case of national emergency.60 two massive protests in San Sebastian, which ended up in violent conflicts.62

Created special counterterrorist delegates Security institutions fashioned by the old- within the law enforcement agencies.63 regime continued brutalizing arrested

57 Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2005): 265–78. See also: Fernández, “Agur a las armas,” 55–96.

58 Macario Hernández Nieto, “ETA y el Nacionalismo Vasco en la Transición. Análisis del tratamiento periodístico de la organización ETA en un periódico nacionalista vasco: Deia [ETA and Basque Nationalism during the Transition. Analysis of ETA’s journalistic processing in a Basque nationalist newspaper: Deia],” Espacio Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea, no. 17 (January 1, 2005), https://doi.org/10.5944/etfv.17.2005.3125.

59 Castañón, Protección Penal de las Víctimas en los Delitos de Terrorismo, 24–26.

60 As material support, the Organic Law No. 2/1981 meant terrorism funding, praising, and logistical provisions. Castañón.

61 Castañón.

62 Castañón.

63 Several Spanish security institutions had counterterrorist functions. Amongst them, the Basque Autonomous Community’s police (Ertzaintza), the Grupos Especiales de Operaciones (Special Groups for Operations) from the Cuerpo de Policía Nacional (National Police Corps), the Grupo Anti-Terrorista Rural (Rural Counterterrorist Group) from the Civil Guard, and the Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa (CESID, Superior Defense Information Center). Antonio M. Diaz-Fernandez, “Spain,” in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence; Volume 2: Europe, the Middle East, and South Africa, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 361–74. 13 Actions Reactions ETA members to get information on their Authorized 10-day preventive detention 64 for terrorist suspects; approved associates. warrantless, indiscriminate seizures; and, restricted detainees’ communication rights.65

C. FELIPE GONZÁLEZ MÁRQUEZ (DECEMBER 1982–MAY 1996)

In the early 1980s, society’s emerging discontent shaped diverse changes in the Spain’s domestic security policies. After the democratic transition, Spanish society turned to the social-democratic ideology of Felipe González Márquez, from the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), in an effort to transform Spain’s development and consolidate its democracy without violence.66 Gonzalez’s counterterrorist measures included coordination amongst security forces and political actors, negotiation, and ETA prisoners’ dispersion. Yet, from 1982 to 1995 (as summarized in Table 2) ETA’s “attrition war” resulted in more than 400 victims, mostly from car-bomb attacks.67 Again, this fight was an “action-reaction” phenomenon, with a large number of detainees and a significant number of innocent victims.

64 Alonso and Reinares, 268.

65 On 1 December 1980, Suárez enacted the original “Spanish Counterterrorist Act.” Castañón, 24–26.

66 Michiel de Jong, “Spanish Security Forces, Anti-Terrorism and the Internal and External Security of Spain, 1959–1992,” in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2016: Organizing for Safety and Security in Military Organizations, ed. Robert Beeres, Gwendolyn Bakx, Erik de Waard, and Sebastiaan Rietjens (The Hague, Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), 335.

67 Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro, ETA’s Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015 (New York: Routledge, 2016), 41. 14 Table 2. Felipe Gonzalez’s counterterrorist measures.

Measures Reactions Plan Zona  First plan designed to “embrace a multi-angled approach Especial Norte […] to isolate ETA from the Basque society.”68 The Mando (ZEN Plan, North Unificado para la Lucha Antiterrorista (MULA, Zone Special Plan) Counterterrorist Fight Central Command) headed coordination among security forces.

 Proposed police interaction with Basque citizenry, improved the police public acceptance, and pursued inmates’ rehabilitation and reintegration.69

Coordination with  Gonzalez enacted the Acuerdos de la Castellana (Castellana France’s Agreements) to detain ETA militants, decrease their authorities infrastructure, and interrupt their funding.70

Permanent  Two main agreements: The Acuerdo para la Normalización political y la Pacificación de Euskadi (Stabilization and Pacification negotiations to of Euskadi Agreement), also known as Pacto Ajuria Enea, enact and the Acuerdo por la Paz y la Tolerancia (Agreement for counterterrorist Peace and Tolerance), also known as Pacto de Navarra. measures  Negotiations aimed to the reintegration and dispersion of nearly 500 incarcerated ETA militants in prisons away from the Basque country.71

Augmenting  Enactment of the Organic Law on the Protection of Public terrorist Safety (The Corcuera Law, 1992), and the 1995 Reform to punishments the Spanish Penal Code (The Counterterrorist Law).72

68 De Jong, “Spanish Security Forces,” 337.

69 De Jong.

70 Reinares and Alonso, “Confronting Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Spain,” 126–127.

71 More than 200 ETA members, including Dolores Gonzalez Catarain “Yoyes,” got shortened sentences by renouncing ETA’s ideology. However, ETA’s leaders ordered Yoyes’ murder to show other arrested associates that there was no way to leave this terrorist organization. Alonso and Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” 274.

72 Fernando Celaya, “The Terrorist Threat Is Being Materially and Normatively Shaped by National and Global Institutions of Law and Order: Spain & Beyond,” Athena Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (2009): 14. 15 D. JOSÉ MARÍA AZNAR LÓPEZ (MAY 1996–APRIL 2004)

The Spanish President, José María Aznar López, from the Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party), assembled a five-pronged counterterrorist plan for fighting ETA: boosting political coordination, terminating ETA’s support, improving international cooperation, reinforcing the rule-of-law, and terrorism victims’ awareness.73 To do so, Aznar united political actors, judges, security forces, and the Spanish society, and consolidated a more efficient fight against terrorism, with public support and within legal parameters. Table 3 summarizes the counterterrorist actions and reactions during the Aznar´s administration.

Table 3. Counterterrorist measures during the Aznar´s administration

Actions Reactions  The Basque and Navarre societies, NGOs, and political parties produced close to 30 protests against Separatist violence.74

 In 1998, Aznar signed the Lizarrako Akordioa enactment Developing (The Lizarra Pact) with non-governmental organizations, political and some of ETA’s political factions, such as the Partido coordination Nacionalista Vasco (PNV, the Basque Nationalist Party), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), and Herri Batasuna, to tackle ETA’s grievances.75 But, ETA did not end its violence, which resulted in massive turmoil against the group.76  In December 2000, Aznar and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero signed the Acuerdo por las Libertades y Contra el

73 Additionally, the international community, guided by the United States, applied the post-9/11 counterterrorist strategy to block terrorism funding. “Lucha Contra ETA: Aznar, Zapatero, Rajoy [The Fight against ETA: Aznar, Zapatero, Rajoy],” Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos, February 3, 2014, http://www.gees.org/articulos/lucha-contra-eta-aznar-zapatero-rajoy.

74 María José Grech, “El Asesinato a Cámara Lenta de Miguel Ángel [The Murder in Slow Motion of Miguel Ángel],” Libertad Digital, July 9, 2012, https://www.libertaddigital.com/nacional/2012-07-09/el- secuestro-y-asesinato-de-miguel-angel-blanco-1276463394/.

75 Celaya, 14–15.

76 Carlos E. Cué and Tatiana Escarraga, “Más de Un Millón de Personas Dicen a ETA que con el Terror y la Coacción No Conseguirá Ningún Objetivo [More than One Million People Tell ETA that It Will Not Achieve Any Objective with Terror and Coercion],” EL PAÍS, January 24, 2000, https://elpais.com/diario/2000/01/24/espana/948668422_850215.html. 16 Actions Reactions Terrorismo (Pact for liberties and against terrorism) to force the EA and the PNV to finish their ETA support.77 Besides, the PSOE and the PP enacted the Political Parties Act (Organic Law 6/2002), to ban the Herri Batasuna party.78

 Aznar created the Comisión de Vigilancia de Actividades de Blocking Financiación del Terrorismo (Commission for Monitoring terrorism the Funding of Terrorist Activities) to perform financial funding, and investigations.79 improving  Aznar also fostered the use of the European Arrest Warrant, international and signed extradition treaties with the United States, cooperation Mexico, Venezuela, and Uruguay.80

 The National Court’s Judge Baltasar Garzón accused ETA of ethnic-cleansing crimes against more than 42,000 Basque non-nationalist citizens, and censored the Egin newspaper, the Ardi Beltza (Black Sheep) magazine, the Coordination Egin Irratia radio station, and the Herriko Tabernak (the between Basque Town Taverns).81 executive and legislative  This strategy also resulted in the detention of some ETA branches strategy devotees from the Alfabetatze Euskalduntze Koordinakundea (the Basque Culture Educational Institution), and from the Gestoras Pro Amnistía (Gestorak, Pro-Amnesty Promoters) social organization, which had financed ETA’s terrorist activities.82

77 Cué and Escarraga.

78 Reinares and Alonso, “Confronting Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Spain,” 123.

79 Fernando Reinares, “¿Estamos Más Seguros Frente a Al-Qaeda? Reformas en la Seguridad Interior Española y Prevención del Terrorismo Global, 2004–2008 [Are We Safer against Al-Qaeda? Spanish Homeland Security and Global Terrorism Prevention Policies Reforms, 2004–2008],” Real Instituto Elcano 2008, no. 40 (September 10, 2008): 12, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elca no/elcano_es/zonas_es/DT40-2008.

80 From 1996 to 2003, these Spanish allies arrested more than 300 ETA militants. Anna Ramos, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Spain,” in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed. Karin von Hippel (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 126–8.

81 Mikel Buesa and Thomas Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An In-Depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network and the Money It Handles,” Defence and Peace Economics 24, no. 4 (August 1, 2013): 320.

82 Buesa and Baumert, 329. 17 Actions Reactions

 From 1996 to 2003, the Secretaría de Esado de Seguridad (Secretary of the State for Security) detained more than 600 ETA members and supporters.83 Police forces also arrested six Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat members, and 11 Al-Qaeda members, including Imad Edin Barakat a.k.a. 84 Improving “Abu Dahdah.” Spanish  The Catalonian government reformed its police department counterterrorist Mossos d’Esquadra, to increase their capabilities to fight security terrorism.85 institutions  Aznar created of the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI, National Intelligence Center) to revamp the Spanish intelligence service, and improve its links between the intelligence community and the National Court.

 Unanimously, the Basque citizens, academics, journalists, and NGOs demanded governmental actions to stop ETA.86

Managing social  Aznar created the Oficina de Atención y Asistencia a las support for Víctimas del Terrorismo (Terrorism Victims Attention and ending terrorism Support Office) to provide information, assistance with judicial affairs, and economic endowments for terrorist- attack victims.87 This counterterrorist strategy significantly gathered public support for Aznar’s fight against terrorism.

83 Ramos, Jordán, and Horsburgh, 126.

84 Ramos, Jordán, and Horsburgh, 127.

85 “Funcions de La Policia de La Generalitat [The Police of the Generalitat Functions],” Mossos d’ Esquadra, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, accessed February 12, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20080227170603if_/http://www.gencat.net/mossos/cme/organitzacio/contingut pdf/FuncPGME.pdf.

86 Alonso and Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” 270–71.

87 José Rafael Rojas Suárez and Rosana de Andrés Díaz, Ministerio Del Interior: Dos Siglos de Historia [Ministry of Interior: Two Centuries of History] (Madrid, Spain: Catálogo de Publicaciones de la Administración General del Estado), 218. 18 Nonetheless, on 11 March 2004, the al-Qaeda’s terrorist cell Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, activated 13 improvised explosive devices (IED) on four Spanish high-speed trains.88 In the aftermath, Aznar’s Interior Minister, Ángel Acebes, announced ETA as the initial suspect. Al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Dujana al-Afghani subsequently claimed these attacks were a reprisal for the Spanish troops’ involvement in the 2003 Iraq war. As a consequence, the general turmoil against the Aznar administration made it possible for the PSOE’s candidate José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to win the elections.

E. JOSÉ LUIS RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO (APRIL 2004–DECEMBER 2011)

After the Madrid bombing attacks, Spanish society demanded Zapatero to employ more effective methods for countering terrorism. The tragic incident of March 2004 demonstrated that the Spanish security forces had focused their efforts on fighting homegrown terrorism; but mostly, there was a lack of coordination amongst intelligence and law-eforcement agencies.89 Thus, Zapatero designed counterterrorist strategies aimed at negotiating a ceasefire, augmenting terrorism punishments, improving security forces’ capabilities and coordination, impeding terrorism funding, fostering intelligence databases, and developing and revising security plans. Table 4 describes some of these strategies and their effects.

88 Fernando Reinares, Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 118.

89 Reinares, “¿Estamos Más Seguros Frente a Al-Qaeda?,” 4. 19 Table 4. Zapatero’s counterterrorist measures.

Actions Reactions

 Strategy started by the PSOE’s faction leader in the Basque country, Jesús María Eguiguren Imaz, and Negotiating ETA’s spokesman, Arnaldo Otegi.90 These meetings with ETA had the participation of international mediators, 2004–2006 including the Henri Dunant Center.91 ETA demanded Basque identity recognition, and independence from Spain and France.92

 Zapatero’s option to the abertzale left was to honor the Basque society’s decision to be self-ruling as an autonomous province, yet preserving the Spanish democratic institutions and the rule-of-law.93

 Zapatero ended this process when ETA detonated a bomb at Barajas airport. Terrorism victims and the Spanish people demanded harsher measures against terrorism.

 Zapatero granted the Civil Guard authority to execute Use of the military missions inside the Spanish territory during a Civil Guard, state of siege, or during any terrorist attack.94 and legislation  He also endorsed laws to protect critical improvement infrastructures, preventing theft of controlled 2010 resources (such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and

90 Imanol Murua, Ending ETA’s Armed Campaign: How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence (London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 51–8.

91 Aleix Romero Peña, “El proceso de negociación entre el Gobierno y ETA durante la etapa de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011) [The negotiation process between the Government and ETA during the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero administration (2004-2011)],” Historia Actual Online, no. 30 (2013): 39– 51, https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4197161.pdf.

92 Romero, 44.

93 Romero.

94 Gobierno de España, “Real Decreto 1438/2010, de 5 de Noviembre, Sobre Misiones de Carácter Militar Que Pueden Encomendarse a La Guardia Civil [Royal Decree 1438 / 2010 of 5 November, On Missions Of Military Character That Can Be Entrusted To The Civil Guard],” Boletin Oficial del Estado: Gaceta de Madrid, no. 269 (November 6, 2010): 93269. 20 Actions Reactions radiological materials), and for monitoring defense equipment and technologies.95

 With the Spanish Criminal Code Reform, Zapatero Enactment of included jihadi terrorism, recruitment, radicalization, terrorism- terrorist training, and Islamic extremist propaganda as related crimes terrorism-related offenses.96

 The Minister of the Interior created the Comité Ejecutivo del Mando Unificado de las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado (CEMU, the Executive Committee for the Unified Command), as the group responsible for creating a unified response to assess, prevent, deter, and stop terrorist attacks.97

Launching  The Minister of the Interior initiated operation of the institutions and Sistema de Coordinación de Operaciones systems to fight Antiterroristas (SICOA, Counterterrorist Operations international Coordination System) with information from identity terrorism documents, weaponry data, custom reports, digital fingerprints, and DNA samples.98

 Zapatero created the Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista (CNCA, the National Counterterrorist Coordination Center) linked to the General Directorate of Penitentiary Institutions and the autonomous police departments Mossos d’Esquadra and the Ertzaintza.99 This center also included the

95 Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER), Spain: Profiles on Counter-Terrorist Capacity (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Committee, May 2013), 1, https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680 64102c.

96 Manuel Cancio Meliá, “Armas Jurídicas Contra un Nuevo Enemigo [Legal Weapons against a New Enemy],” El País, October 2010, https://elpais.com/diario/2010/10/22/opinion/1287698414_850215.html.

97 Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, “The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality,” Intelligence & National Security 25, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 241.

98 Díaz Fernández, 266–67.

99 Luis De la Corte Ibánez and Javier Jordán, La Yihad Terrorista [The Terrorist Jihad] (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Síntesis, S. A., 2007), 266. 21 Actions Reactions Equipo Policial de Apoyo ante Grandes Atentados Terroristas (Backup Police Team for Major Terrorist Attacks).100

Planning actions against terrorism was a necessity. The increasing number of international terrorist attacks, and the remaining ETA threat, motivated the Spanish government to enact long-term strategies. As Table 5 explains, these plans contained similar strategies and methods to fight terrorism.

Table 5. Spanish security plans 2004–2011 for preventing terrorist attacks.

Date / Name Notes Author

2004 Consisted of five goals: detect terrorists José Luis Plan Especial de Seguridad (Special Plan for Security) and their means, prevent any type of Rodríguez terrorist attacks, protect citizens in Zapatero massive events, prevent and detect any IED, and secure large public transport, or facilities with high concentrations of people.101

2005 and Level one “Potential Risk for a Terrorist 2009 Nivel de Alerta Antiterrorista (Counterterrorist Alert Level) Attack,” level two “Probable Risk for a José Luis Terrorist Attack,” level three “Highly- Rodríguez Probable Risk for a Terrorist Attack,” Zapatero and level four “Imminent Terrorist Attack Risk.” Each level had different responsibilities for the Spanish security agencies; at the fourth level, the Spanish

100 CODEXTER, 6.

101 “Las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado Activan un Plan de Seguridad para Garantizar la Seguridad de los Ciudadanos [The State Security Forces Activate a Security Plan to Ensure the Safety of Citizens],” Ministerio del Interior, December 21, 2004, http://www.interior.gob.es/noticias/detalle/- /journal_content/56_INSTANCE_1YSSI3xiWuPH/10180/1171677?. 22 Date / Name Notes Author government could declare a state of siege.102

2011 This plan had four strategies: anticipate José Luis Estrategia Española de Seguridad: Una terrorist attacks with operational Rodríguez intelligence; involve the Spanish Zapatero responsabilidad de todos (Spanish Security Strategy: population in the fight against terrorism; Everyone’s Responsibility) protect the Spanish citizenship and national interests; ensure resilience and empower security agencies with resources and laws.103

2012 This strategy integrated the Spanish José Luis Estrategia Integral Contra el Terrorismo Internacional y institutions’ efforts in four main Rodríguez objectives for fighting Islamic Zapatero la Radicalización (Strategy for Preventing International extremism: prevention, protection, Terrorism and prosecution, and preparation. Each objective aimed to address three different Radicalization) arenas, domestic, international, and cyberspace.104 2013 This strategy embraced terrorism as a Mariano 2013 National Security constant menace for its national Rajoy Strategy security.105 Brey

102 “Las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado Activan un Plan de Seguridad para Garantizar la Seguridad de los Ciudadanos.”

103 Gobierno de España, Estrategia Española de Seguridad 2011 [Spanish Security Strategy 2011] (Madrid, España: Imprenta Nacional del Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2011), 33–38, 49–53.

104 Fernando Moure Colón, “Contribución del Ministerio del Interior en las Líneas de Acción de la Estratégia de Seguridad Nacional Española [Ministry of the Interior Contribution to the Spanish National Security Strategy Action Lines],” Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil, no. 48/2014 (2014): 137.

105 Javier Jimenez Olmos, “Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2013 [National Security Strategy 2013],” Cátedra Paz, Seguridad y Defensa, September 4, 2013, http://catedrapsyd.unizar.es/archivos/documentacion/javier_jimenez_esn_2013.pdf. 23 F. CONCLUSIONS

The evolution of these phases for fighting terrorism were influenced by political interests, society’s demands, and the response of governmental security forces. Every political party in power after Franco (UCD, PSOE, and PP) added its own perspectives on how to tackle terrorism. For instance, during the Franco regime penalties were augmented, providing the military regime more legal capabilities for punishing ethno- national terrorist violence. The democratizing post-Franco government abolished dictatorial laws, creating legal civilian bodies to judge and prosecute terrorism-related crimes. Finally, the current Spanish government has reformed the legal bodies involved in punishing terrorist organizations’ modus operandi. In all of these phases, the Spanish leaders have changed, nullified, or augmented legal responses to prevent, deter, or stop violence against its society and institutions.

24 III. COUNTERING TERRORISM IN FRANCE BEFORE ISIS

Before ISIS, the French government had built a strong set of plans, laws, and security forces to fight terrorism.106 According to Jeremy Shapiro, the French counterterrorist experience encompasses five periods: Emergency (1950s–1960s), Sanctuary (1970s to the first years of the 1980s), Accommodation (late 1980s), Suppression (early 1990s), and Prevention (late 1990s–present).107 During these periods, the French governments extrapolated their political agendas from their strategies in order to fight domestic and international terrorism. This chapter explains the evolution of the French strategies for combating terrorism.

A. THE FIRST STEPS (EMERGENCY, 1950s–1960s)

France created its first counterterrorist approach to combat two types of terrorism. While the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was looking for Algeria’s independence from France by conducting guerrilla attacks, the Organization de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) was trying to keep Algeria as a French colony.108 In response to these violent organizations, then-President Charles de Gaulle reacted with specialized courts, increased penalties, performed covert operations, and summary executions, in order to maintain “France’s territorial integrity, and […] the survival of the French political regime.”109 Table 6 shows the evolution of the terrorist actions and counterterrorist reactions during de Gaulle’s administration.

106 Jeremy Shapiro, “France and the GIA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 133–66.

107 Jeremy Shapiro, “French Responses to Terrorism from the Algerian War to the Present,” in The Consequences of Counterterrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 255–56.

108 Shapiro, 257.

109 Shapiro, 258. 25 Table 6. Terrorist actions/counterterrorist reactions during de Gaulle’s administration.

Terrorist France Counterterrorist Reactions Actions As of 1956, the  De Gaulle’s administration empowered military FLN (the main courts, such as the Haut Tribunal Militaire (High Maoist Military Tribunal), to judge any person allegedly insurgency responsible for “aiding directly or indirectly the rebels group) had in Algeria.”111 carried out more than 2,000  The Service de Documentation Extérieure et de terrorist Contre-Espionnage (SDECE, External Documentation 110 attacks. and Counter Espionage Service) performed covert operations to eliminate FLN’s weapon suppliers, including German arms dealers.112

 Further, French military forces relocated almost 3.5 million people from Algerian rural areas, and conducted bombings over FLN-supporting villages.113

 Ultimately, De Gaulle decided to give up Algeria.

Terrorist attacks  De Gaulle proclaimed “a state of emergency from the OAS. throughout France” in order to avert military coups, and created the Cour de Surete de I’Etat (State Security Court).114

110 Shapiro, 257.

111 Jean Kréher, “For the Rule of Law: Special Courts in France,” Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, no. 15 (April 1963): 17, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ICJ- Bulletin-15-1963-eng.pdf.

112 Thomas Riegler, “The State as a Terrorist: France and the Red Hand,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 6 (December 12, 2012): 23–24. See also: Mathilde Von Bülow, “Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–61,” Intelligence & National Security 22, no. 6 (December 1, 2007): 790.

113 As of 1957, 50 percent of male Algerian rebels had been detained by the French military. Shapiro, 258.

114 The OAS was a right-wing terrorist group infiltrated by high-ranking military officers and nationals. Kréher, 18. 26 Terrorist France Counterterrorist Reactions Actions  A non-official police force named barbouzes performed covert operations to infiltrate the OAS, and executed targeted-killings.115

These counterterrorist measures had two results. On the one hand, the FLN insurgency’s terrorism succeeded in achieving Algerian independence. On the other, de Gaulle’s efforts succeeded in blocking the OAS’ support and resources. In the aftermath, France’s left-leaning policymakers got the idea that averting terrorism was only possible by negotiating.116 The French governments applied this policy during the next era.

B. THE SANCTUARY AND ACCOMMODATION ERAS (1970s–LATE 1980s)

In an era of democrat, republican, and socialist policymakers running for the French government’s administration, Georges Pompidou (Union of Democrats for the Republic Party, 1969–1974), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (National Federation of the Independent Republicans, and later with the Union for French Democracy parties, 1974– 1981), and Françoise Mitterrand (Socialist Party, 1981–1986) employed very similar counterterrorist strategies. Although their ways of ruling differed, their methods for fighting international and domestic terrorism consisted of negotiating with terrorists, offering sanctuary, and conceding amnesties, in order to keep France out of terrorist attacks, and maintain the country’s relations with Arab countries. These policies, however, ended up failing to keep France safe from terrorist attacks.117 Table 7 displays these strategies and their consequences.

115 Shapiro, 259.

116 Shapiro, 260.

117 Shapiro, 263. 27 Table 7. Counterterrorist strategies and reactions during the Sanctuary and Accommodation eras.

Strategy Notes Reactions

Georges Pompidou began the Diplomatic conflicts arose with “sanctuary doctrine,” by granting Spain stemming from sanctuary safe haven to international provided to ETA members in the The terrorists.118 Basque region and Israel due to sanctuary some Hezbollah members being Valéry Giscard’s administration doctrine allowed residence.119 and kept foreign policies that included 121 negotiation selling arms to Arab countries. Retaliation attacks from antagonist terrorist organizations, such as the 1982 Rue Marbeuf attack.120

Secret This was the case with the Syrian As an outcome, “[t]he French negotiations deal in which Mitterrand’s foreign government withdrew from with officers arranged the release of six Lebanese affairs, scaled back terrorists hostages with Syrian authorities in dramatically its support to Iraq in Lebanon.122 the Iran-Iraq War, and settled its debts with Iran.”123

118 Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte Suzan, “The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism,” Survival 45, no. 1 (2003): 69–71, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/shapiro20030301.pdf.

119 Shapiro and Suzan, 69–73.

120 Shapiro, 262.

121 Michael M. Harrison, “France and International Terrorism: Problem and Response,” in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 113.

122 Shapiro and Suzan argue that in 1986 terrorist attacks from Hezbollah and the CSPPA ended because the French government negotiations “resulted in a deal whereby the Syrians would cease support for terrorism in France, secure the release of French hostages in Lebanon and provide intelligence on Lebanese terrorists in return for arms, economic aid and French diplomatic support.” Shapiro and Suzan, 73.

123 Shapiro, 266. 28 Strategy Notes Reactions

Amnesties Pompidou extended amnesties for France considers amnesties as the May 1968 protest participants “instrument[s] of national and for those who engaged in rural reconciliation after political and labor disputes.124 crises,”127 which helped May 1968 Giscard also extended amnesties in protesters to obtain their liberty, 1974, on those same issues.125 and other former terrorists to Mitterrand’s administration withdraw from extremism.128 released almost 6,000 terrorists.126

C. THE SUPPRESSION ERA (EARLY 1990s)

The failures of previous counterterrorist strategies compelled the French government to generate suppressive measures. In this period, terrorist attacks executed by international and domestic terrorist organizations increased the French society’s unrest and their demands for better security.129 In response, Mitterrand, while governing in cohabitation with Jacques Chirac (1984–1986), produced the first counterterrorist plan.130

124 République Française, “Loi no. 69–700 Du 30 Juin 1969 Portant Amnistie [Supporting Amnesty],” Journal Officiel de La République Française (July 1, 1969), 6675.

125 République Française, “Loi no. 74-643 Du 16 Juillet 1974 Portant Amnestie [Supporting Amnesty],” Journal Officiel de La République Française (July 17, 1974), 7443.

126 Shapiro, “France and the GIA,” 136. See also: Amnesty International, The Amnesty International Report 1982 (London, UK: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), 267–70.

127 René Lévy, “Pardons and Amnesties as Policy Instruments in Contemporary France,” Crime and Justice 36, no. 1 (2007): 551–90.

128 Michael Y. Dartnell, Action Directe: Ultra Left Terrorism in France 1979–1987 (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 78.

129 These included the CSPPA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the French Israeli Liberal Union, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Action Directe group, amongst others. Shapiro and Suzan, 71.

130 Cohabitation in France’s semi-presidentialist government happened when the President and Prime Minister were from different political parties. Hellmuth expresses that “[d]uring times of divided power, prime ministers are determined to claim their constitutional prerogative in policy-making.” Cohabitation has happened three times: President Francois Mitterrand – Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (1986–1988), President Mitterrand – Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (1993–1995), and President Jacques Chirac – Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1997–2002). Dorle Hellmuth, “Case Study IV: France,” in Counterterrorism and the State: Western Responses to 9/11, ed. Dorle Hellmuth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 183–87. 29 As of 1995, Mitterrand enacted tougher laws, reinforced the judiciary system, increased security forces’ capabilities, and established coordination amongst them to foil terrorism. Table 8 describes the counterterrorist strategies during the Suppression era.

Table 8. Counterterrorist strategies during the Suppression era.

Strategy Actions Notes

Reinforcing the The government enacted Law Mitterrand designed “trials by panels legal and judicial 86–1020 on the Prevention of of professional judges for serious apparatus Terrorism and State Security terrorism-related felonies in the Court Act. of Assize.”131

Strengthening Law 86–1020 also increased  This law allowed a 96-hour security controls police custody of terrorism- preventive detention. related offenders, augmented border controls, and allowed  The law further specified intrusive searches.132 mandatory visas for all non- European Union citizens (except Swiss).

Coordination The government issued the  Almost ten security institutions improvement and Vigipirate Plan with two alert had authority on terrorism- plan development levels: the simple alert related inquiries.134 (executed by police forces), and the reinforced alert  The Vigipirate Plan standardized (allowed French armed forces procedures, increased awareness, to operate inside France).133 and augmented information gathering between armed forces,

131 Judith Sunderland, Preempting Justice: Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures in France, (The United States of America: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 10. See also: Dorle Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 12 (December 2, 2015): 979–97.

132 Shapiro and Suzan, 71.

133 Alain Bauer, “La Experiencia Francesa ante el Terrorismo Internacional [The French Experience Against International Terrorism],” Boletín Elcano no. 96 (Madrid, Spain, 2007): 4.

134 Shapiro, 266. 30 Strategy Actions Notes police departments, customs, and intelligence agencies.135

Coordination Mitterrand created the Service The SCLAT and UCLAT improvement and pour Coordination de la Lutte decentralized local authorities and plan development Anti-Terroriste (SCLAT, established the French citizenry’s Counterterrorist Fight inclusion in a collective fight against Coordination Service), and terrorism.137 the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT, Counterterrorist Fight Coordination Unit).136

Intrusive Mitterrand created a covert This cell executed illegal surveillance Surveillance cell unofficially named as the against political and other public Employment Élysée cell.138 figures.139 He also regulated “In the only cases of necessity of communication surveillance. public interest provided by the law and within the limits fixed by it,” and in the case of national security matters.140

Understanding The government established This was an economic support the Fonds de Garantie des provided by the French government terrorism victims Victimes des Actes de for terrorist-attack victims.141

135 Nathalie Cettina, “The French Approach: Vigour and Vigilance,” in Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions, and Policies, ed. Marianne van Leeuwen (Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 2003), 76.

136 Shapiro, 268.

137 Cettina, 76.

138 Jean-Paul Brodeur and Nicolas Dupeyron, “Democracy and Secrecy: The French Intelligence Community,” in Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, ed. Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter Gill, and Dennis Töllborg (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 15.

139 Shapiro, “France and the GIA,” 137; Brodeur and Dupeyron, 14.

140 République Française, “Loi N° 91–646 du 10 Juillet 1991 Relative Au Secret Des Correspondances émises par la Voie des Communications Électroniques [On Secrecy of Correspondence Emitted by way of Electronic Communications],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 162 (July 13, 1991): 9161.

141 “Le Fonctionnement [The Operation],” Fonds de Garantie, accessed May 7, 2018, https://www.fondsdegarantie.fr/fgti/fonctionnement/. 31 Strategy Actions Notes Terrorisme (Guarantee Fund for Victims of Terrorism and Other Offences).

These measures helped French law enforcement agencies to thwart terrorist attacks. Yet, international terrorist organizations were still active on French soil. For instance, with Operation Chrysanthemum the French police captured and dismantled Mohamed Chalabi’s jihadist network. These strategies settled the path for a “new” era.

D. THE PREVENTION ERA (LATE 1990s–PRESENT)

Former Presidents Jacques Chirac (1995–2007), Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), and François Hollande (2012–2017) developed several strategies directed at preventing terrorism. These governments not only executed police operations, improved intelligence, and reinforced law-enforcement agencies, but also issued long-term policies as defense plans, and deradicalization programs to control Islamic extremism. Additionally, the French government combined intelligence and law enforcement agencies to work shoulder-to-shoulder with public prosecutors in terrorism-related investigations.142 These strategies evolved gradually. After the 1995–96 Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) attacks, Chirac enforced preventive detentions and improved international cooperation against terrorism.143 The greater changes happened from 2002 to 2012, as result of the relationship between foreign terrorism and the French governments’ political agenda. As Table 9 reveals, these changes aimed at reducing the Islamic terrorism menace.

142 Shapiro, “French Responses to Terrorism from the Algerian War to the Present,” 274.

143 Shapiro and Suzan, 82. See also: Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 282–86. 32 Table 9. Evolution of the counterterrorist strategies from 2002 to 2014.

2001: The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (Chirac) Establishment of the Conseil de Sécurité Intérieure (Domestic Security Council).144 Implementation of electronic surveillance at terrorism suspects. The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Territory Surveillance Directorate and the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (Central Directorate of General Intelligence) performed this measure.145 Connection of a CCTV system with cameras in the most “sensitive neighborhoods.”146 2001: The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (Chirac) Creation of the data repository ARIANE (Identification and Analysis Investigations Reconciliatory Application), which merged the National Police’s Recorded Offenses Treatment System and the Gendarmerie’s system for judicial and prosecuting information in one single database.147 Enactment of the Law 2001–1062 which ranked terrorism funding as a crime; and the LOPSI Law, that established the “links between crime and terrorism.”148 Enactment of the Law 2004–204 that adapted the French justice system to be more in line with the evolution of crime, and regulated undercover operations, telecommunication interventions, and the use of informants in counterterrorist investigations.149 2004: Madrid bombing by the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Chirac and Sarkozy) Creation in 2005 of a database with passengers’ information that transportation companies had to share with the National Police and the Gendarmerie. Employment of scanning devices for vehicle registrations and video installation in every French city.150 Growth of the DST, the DCRG, and the Judicial Police personnel by almost 500 agents.151

144 Chirac’s Prime Minister and the Socialist Lionel Jospin proposed this law during the second cohabitation. Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” 983.

145 This faculty included the execution of remote online searches of data from emails, financial history, governmental information, mobile lines’ providers, and so on. Jean-Patrick Courtois, Projet de Loi Relatif à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme et Portant Dispositions Diverses Relatives à La Sécurité et Aux Contrôles Frontaliers [Law on the fight against terrorism providing diverse dispositions for the border controls and security], Rapport no. 117 (Paris, France: Report on behalf of the Commission on Laws, Ordinary session 2005–2006, Annex to the Senate session record of December 6, 2005), http://www.senat.fr/rap/l05-117/l05-1177.html.

146 Hellmuth, “Case Study IV: France,” 199–200.

147 In 2011, ARIANE became the Judicial Antecedents Management System. République Française, “Loi N° 2002–1094 Du 29 Août 2002 D’orientation et de Programmation Pour La Sécurité Intérieure [On the Guidelines and Programming for the Internal Security Performance],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 1 (August 30, 2002): 14398.

148 Hellmuth, 201.

149 Gary J. Schmitt, “France: In a League of Its Own,” in Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism: American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2010), 43.

150 République Française, “Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité [On the adaptation of Justice to the evolution of Criminality],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 59 (March 10, 2004): 4567.

151 Courtois, Projet de Loi Relatif à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme. 33 2005: London bombing by Al-Qaeda cell (Sarkozy) Creation of 22 pôles régionaux de lute contre l’islam radical (Regional Centers for Combating Radical Islam) to monitor radical mosques and other places that could incite Islamist extremism.152 Enactment of the Law 2006–64, which authorized the Judicial Police to hold alleged terrorists in preventive detention up to six days, allowed the freezing of assets of any terrorism suspect for up to six months, and increased the time for depriving citizenship up to 15 years.153 Authorization by Law 2006–64 of the National Police, Judicial Police, Gendarmerie, the Central Directorate of General Intelligence, and the Directorate for the Territory Surveillance to gather personal information from users of transportation companies and compare it with the Schengen Information System registries, or with other records such as passports, driver licenses, and vehicle registrations. Enforcement by the Judicial Police of the requirement of internet service providers and internet coffee shops to hold clients’ internet data for at least one year, with the oversight of the Commission Nationale du Contrôle des Interceptions de Sécurité National and the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés. Creation of Direction central du renseignement intérieur.154 Creation of the Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN, Secretariat General of Defense and National Security) to evaluate the terrorist threat level.155 Creation of the Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale (CDSN, Defense and National Security Council), to provide “planning [for] major crisis responses, intelligence, [and] domestic security programming contributing to national security and the fight against terrorism.”156 Enactment of the Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme (The Government White Paper on Domestic Security Against Terrorism).157 Enactment of the Law 2011–267 to block online incitement of terrorism and racial-hate promotion.158 Authorization in 2011 of the Judicial Police to prosecute cyber criminality and to compel ISPs to block jihadi internet addresses.159

152 Foley, 289.

153 République Française, “Loi N° 2006–64 Du 23 Janvier 2006 Relative à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme et Portant Dispositions Diverses Relatives à La Sécurité et Aux Contrôles Frontaliers [On action against terrorism, containing various provisions on security and border checks],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 20 (January 24, 2006): 1129.

154 Later, the former President Francois Hollande renamed it Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (the Directorate-General for Domestic Security). Hellmuth, 984.

155 This department is currently responsible for the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI, National Agency for the Security of Information Systems), which includes cybersecurity crimes, such as online radicalization. Foley, 96.

156 République Française, “Décret N° 2009–1657 Du 24 Décembre 2009 Relatif au Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale et au Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale [On the Defense and National Security Council and the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 301 (December 29, 2009): 22561.

157 Hellmuth, “Case Study IV: France,” 198; Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, La France face au terrorisme [France facing terrorism - Government White Paper on domestic security against terrorism], https://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000275.pdf.

158 Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” 983.

159 Law 2011–267 is also known as LOPPSI-2011. République Française, “Loi N° 2011–267 Du 14 Mars 2011 D'orientation et de Programmation Pour La Performance de La Sécurité Intérieure [On Guidelines and Programming for the Performance of Internal Security],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 62 (March 15, 2011): 4852. 34 Finally, two terrorist attacks prompted a deeper change in the French counterterrorist approach. Mohammed Merah’s 2012 shootings in Toulouse and those by Alexandre Dhaussy in 2013 in La Defense compelled Sarkozy to focus his efforts on preventing these types of incidents by enacting Law 2012–351. This law obligated French institutions (by incorporating the notion that security was a collective task) to ensure the Republic’s domestic security, executing actions based on an all-hazards perspective.160

Sarkozy also granted legal protection for security institutions’ personnel, and enhanced the préfets, majors, departmental councils, and local police forces’ domestic security duties.161 He also regulated the purchase, acquisition, custody, protection, and transportation of weaponry and explosives.162 Finally, he ordered the installation of video protection systems in every critical infrastructure, air and maritime ports, public roads and transport, crowded places, and open spaces.163

As one of France’s main security concerns, foreign fighters compelled the French government to enact one more plan. During this time, almost 700 French citizens had traveled to Syria to become part of the Islamic State’s ranks.164 In April 2014, then- Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve presented Le plan de lutte contre la radicalisation violente et les filières terroristes (Combating Violent Radicalization and Terrorist networks Plan).165 This plan was the first holistic deradicalization process implemented

160 République Française, “Loi N° 2012–1432 Du 21 Décembre 2012 Relative à La Sécurité et à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme [Regarding Security and the Fight Against Terrorism],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 298 (December 22, 2012): 20281.

161 République Française, “Ordonnance N° 2012–351 Du 12 Mars 2012 Relative à La Partie Législative Du Code de La Sécurité Intérieure [Concerning legislative dispositions of the Code of Interior Security],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 62 (March 12, 2012): 4533.

162 République Française.

163 République Française.

164 “Le Plan de Lutte Contre la Radicalisation Violente et les Filières Terroristes [Combating Violent Radicalization and Terrorist Networks Plan],” République Française, April 23, 2014, https://www.gouvernement.fr/conseil-des-ministres/2014-04-23/le-plan-de-lutte-contre-la-radicalisation- violente-et-les-fi.

165 “Le Plan de Lutte Contre la Radicalisation Violente et les Filières Terroristes [Combating Violent Radicalization and Terrorist Networks Plan].” 35 by the French government, aimed at preventing extremist violence “at the earliest stages and also included an experimental program for reintegration against Islamic terrorism.”166

E. CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the French counterterrorist approaches, security forces have developed experience, capabilities, coordination, legal instruments, and social support to foil this threat. As the 2008 White Paper expressed “jihadism-inspired terrorism aims directly at France and Europe, which are in a situation of greater direct vulnerability.”167 In spite of it, France has proven its expertise in foiling terrorist attacks. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, French security forces had the information that helped Canadian and U.S. security forces detain Ahmed Ressam and Zacarias Moussaoui.168 As this chapter explained, France has improved its security institutions’ expertise, skills, and procedures to thwart terrorist attacks.

France’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies have also improved their capabilities with video surveillance, electronic monitoring systems, and police tactics to fight terrorism.169 Despite the fact that a large number of security institutions could have some lack of coordination among themselves, the Vigipirate plan has helped to cover those gaps.170 This same plan has also led to better interactions between French security forces and society in building the concept of security and protection for all and from all.171 Furthermore, coordination between the French judiciary system and policymakers

166 Hellmuth, 988.

167 Présidence de la République, Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale est publié [The French White Paper on Defence and National Security] (Paris, France: Odile Jacob), 5, http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc _sur_defense_875/index.html.

168 Cettina, 77.

169 Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, “Conclusion,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 573-4.

170 Cettina, 76.

171 Cettina. 36 has created useful provisions for gathering information on terrorist enterprises.172 France has successfully combined soft and hard counterterrorist policies, with short and long- term strategies to protect its society and institutions.

172 Cettina, 88. 37 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

38 IV. SPANISH ANTI-ISIS POLICIES

The Spanish government has designed an efficient set of domestic security policies destined to prevent any kind of terrorist threat, including those provoked by ISIS. As Chapter II explained, terrorism is not new in this country. Its long-time history of struggling against ethno-national terrorist organizations, such as ETA, or Islamic terrorist groups, like the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (MICG),173 has given this country experience, skills, and means to fight the terrorist menace. At the same time, ISIS’s goal “to control territory and create a ‘pure’ Sunni Islamist state governed by a brutal interpretation of sharia” makes one think that countries need a different approach to fight this terrorist organization.174 This chapter assesses how ISIS has affected Spanish domestic security policies to countering terrorism.

A. ISIS AND ISIS-INSPIRED ATTACKS IN SPAIN

ISIS threatens Spain for one tenuous reason: its alleged right to the former Muslim territory of al-Andaluz, lost from the ancient caliphate.175 In an online video in 2014, two ISIS jihadis Nouredin Majdoubi and Salahedin Ghaitun pronounced their demands to reclaim this, their ancestors’ land,176 as well as other regions such as Khorasan, Arabia, and the Maghreb.177 These claims were not new. The Islamic political

173 The MICG united al-Qaeda in 2007, and became the al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. Petter Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 31.

174 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (March 2015): 87–98.

175 Daniel L. Byman, and Jennifer R. Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” Brookings, February 24, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil- war/.

176 José M. Pérez Cornejo, “¿Personajes En Busca de Autor [Characters in need for author]?,” in Libro Blanco y Negro del Terrorismo en Europa [White and Black paper of Terrorism in Europe], ed. Mayte Pagazaurtundúa (Spain and Brussels: European Parliament, 2017), 50–53.

177 Ignacio Cembrero, “El Estado Islámico Sueña Con Conquistar Al Andalus [The Islamic State Dreams of Conquering Al Andalus],” El Mundo 4, September 9, 2014, http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2014/09/03/540768e0ca4741406e8b456b.html. 39 party Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al-Qaeda itself have claimed this same motivation since 2004.178 ISIS’s intent to merge Spain into its Caliphate lacks credible authority, but its intent to create fear amongst the Spanish population is clear and constant.

Since 2012, ISIS’s terrorist networks have represented an evolving menace to Spain with their mission to send Spanish citizens to fight in Syria.179 Furthermore, some of their cells have connections with others established in countries like the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France.180 From 2014 to 2017, these cells executed three interconnected attacks, which resulted in 16 people murdered and more than 140 people injured.181 As these attacks occurred after 13 years without any other terrorist-group incident, this shows their presence as the primary and constant menace to Spain.182 Table 10 describes ISIS and ISIS-inspired terrorist events in Spain.

Table 10. ISIS and ISIS-inspired terrorist events in Spain183

Date Description

5 January The National Police arrested Spanish-Moroccan Abdeluahid Sadik 2014 Mohamed in Malaga’s airport, after he returned from Syria. Karim Abdeselam Mohamed and Ismail Abdellatif al-Lal had radicalized Sadik in the Darkawia mosque. This ISIS cell had sent 29 volunteers to Syria since

178 Luis De la Corte Ibánez and Javier Jordán, La Yihad Terrorista [The Terrorist Jihad] (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Síntesis, S. A., 2007), 264.

179 Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo, “Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer: The Inside Story of the August 2017 Attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 1 (January 2018), 1– 11.

180 Javier Jordán and Manuel R. Torres, El Yihadismo en Europa: Tendencias y Evolución (Seville, Spain: Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2005), 6–9.

181 Carlos Igualada Tolosa, “Los atentados yihadistas en 2017 [The 2017 Jihadist Attacks],” in Anuario del Terrorismo Yihadista 2017 [Jihadi Terrorism Yearbook 2017], ed. María Jiménez Ramos (Gipuzkoa, España: Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo, 2018), 38.

182 Igualada Tolosa.

183 Reinares and García-Calvo, 1–11. See also: Analisis GESI, “Operaciones Policiales Antiyihadistas en 2014 [Law Enforcement Operations against Jihad],” December 31, 2014, http://observatorioterrorismo.com/operaciones-policiales-antiyihadistas-en-espana/operaciones-policiales- antiyihadistas-en-2014/. 40 Date Description April 2012 and had links with the Al Haraka Salafiya Yihadia group.

28 The National Police and the Moroccan General Directorate for the September Territory Surveillance detained Mohamed Said Mohamed who managed an 2014 ISIS recruiting cell in Melilla. The Spanish veteran jihadi Zakaría Said Mohamed, also known as Abu Nur al-Andalusi, had organized this cell.

16 August IEDs set off prematurely at a house in Alcanar, Spain, killing two men and 2017 wounding one. All three were members of the Ripoll cell, which used this house as a bomb factory. Their original plan was to detonate in Spain or France, more than 200 kilograms of triacetone triperoxide explosive and gas canisters, distributed in two vehicles.

17 August After the Ripoll cell’s IED plan failed, Moroccan Younes Abouyaaqoub 2017 (another Ripoll cell member) killed 13 people by driving a rented van down the Ramblas boulevard in Barcelona. He later murdered another person during his escape. The Mossos d’Esquadra killed Abouyaaqoub in Subirats.

18 August Five more members from the Ripoll cell crashed their car into a Mossos’ 2017 police vehicle. Wearing fake explosive vests, they then stabbed passersby with knives and an axe until the police eliminated them. One woman died in this attack.

B. THE COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLUTION IN SPAIN

ISIS (and ISIS-inspired) terrorist attacks have forced the Spanish government to revamp their counterterrorism efforts several ways. Nevertheless, as Table 11 explains, those changes were also influenced by political events with significant effects on Spanish domestic security policies. Spain has progressively consolidated a better set of counterterrorist approaches based on coordination and information exchange, laws, strategic alliances, and long-term strategies. These approaches provide Spain with modern procedures to counter ISIS.

41 Table 11. Political events with effects on Spanish domestic security policies.

Date Description

19 June 2014 The democratizing King Juan Carlos I abdicated as chief of the Spanish State, delivering the throne to his son, Felipe VI.

9 November Artur Mas i Gavarró called for an independence referendum by invoking 2014 the 2006 project of the Catalonia Autonomy Statute.

27 October Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó released the Catalonian Declaration of 2017 Independence. In response, then-President Mariano Rajoy Brey (from the Popular Party) asked the Spanish Congress to apply Article 155 of the Constitution, presenting charges against Puigdemont for rebellion, sedition, and misappropriation of public funds.

1. Coordination and Information Exchange

Spanish domestic security institutions have modified their coordination and information exchange processes since 2014. Before ISIS, the main security agencies with counterterrorist functions were the National Police Force, the Civil Guard, the CNI, the CNCA, the Unidad de la Policia Judicial para Delitos del Terrorismo (TEPOL, Judicial Police Unit for Terrorist Offences), and Mossos d’Esquadra. As ISIS improved upon the old tactics employed by other Islamic terrorist organizations, those Spanish security agencies were compelled to obtain more effectiveness in their functions.

One of these tactics was ISIS’s links with crime organizations. From 2009 to 2012, one out of three Spanish citizens involved in terrorist activities had a criminal background.184 Thus, in 2014, Rajoy created the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado (CITCO, Intelligence Center for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime), to “collect, integrate and analyze the strategic information available in the fight against all types of organized crime, terrorism and violent

184 Fernando Reinares, and Carola García-Calvo, “Los Yihadistas en España: Perfil Sociodemográfico de Condenados por Actividades Terroristas o Muertos en Acto de Terrorismo Suicida entre 1996 y 2012 [Jihadists in Spain: Sociodemographic Profile of Those Condemned for Terrorist Attacks or Dead during the Act of Suicide Terrorism between 1996 and 2012],” Documentos de Trabajo Real Instituto Elcano, no. DT 11/2013 (2013). 42 radicalism.”185 It merged the CNCA, the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen Organizado (CICO, Centre for Intelligence against Organized Crime), the TEPOL, and the National Office for Passenger Information to work as an information exchange hub with other countries for investigating the links between terrorism and criminal organizations.186

The 2016 Nice attack, the Brussels bombing attack, and the stabbing attacks across Europe by ISIS-inspired associates motivated Spain to promote the necessity of improving information exchange amongst the EU countries. During an EU Justice and Home Affairs Council’s meeting, Spain promoted the EU countries’ obligation to increase information exchange for terrorism prevention.187 Jorge Fernandez claimed that in order to keep borders secure and prevent foreign fighters’ returning, EU governments needed to improve their already interconnected systems, including the Schengen Information System II, the INTERPOL database, the asylum seekers’ fingerprint database EURODAC, and the Visa Information System.188 Fernandez also promoted the development of two more systems: the Entry/Exit Schengen borders’ system and the Passenger Name Record (PNR) system.189 The EU community agreed to face Islamic extremism with information sharing, law enforcement coalitions, and judicial

185 Gobierno de España, “Real Decreto 873/2014, de 10 de Octubre, por el que se Modifica el Real Decreto 400/2012, de 17 de Febrero, por el que se Desarrolla la Estructura Orgánica Básica del Ministerio del Interior [Royal Decree 873/2014 amending Royal Decree 400/2012, which develops the basic organic structure of the Ministry of Interior],” Boletin Oficial Del Estado: Gaceta de Madrid, no. BOE. 249 (October 14, 2014): 83375–83.

186 “Secretaría de Estado de Seguridad – Funciones [Secretary of State for Security – Functions],” Gobierno de España, accessed June 12, 2018, http://www.interior.gob.es/el-ministerio/funciones-y- estructura/secretaria-de-estado-de-seguridad.

187 “Jorge Fernández Díaz Advocates the Exchange of Information as One of the Priority Objectives that Requires the Greatest Commitment of All EU Member States,” Ministerio de la Presidencia, April 21, 2016, http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2016/20160421-exchange- informa.aspx.

188 EURODAC refers to the European Dactyloscopy system. “Jorge Fernández Díaz Advocates the Exchange of Information as One of the Priority Objectives that Requires the Greatest Commitment of All EU Member States.”

189 “Jorge Fernández Díaz Advocates the Exchange of Information as One of the Priority Objectives that Requires the Greatest Commitment of All EU Member States.” 43 cooperation.190

Coordination amongst international and local policymakers also affected Spanish counterterrorism. In 2014, Spain became a member of the International Coalition against Daesh and sent almost 300 soldiers to train the Iraqi armed forces.191 The Spanish government also conveyed counterterrorist measures inside the Spanish political arena. In 2015, then-President Rajoy and then-PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón signed the Agreement to Fight Islamic Terrorism.192 With this pact, Spanish political parties joined to enact legal instruments for unifying the security forces and public prosecutor’s efforts to eliminate the ISIS cells in Spain.193 The consensus taken by the Spanish political parties resulted in releasing law projects that classified “lone-wolf” terrorism, terrorism funding, and radicalization as crimes.194

The 2017 Barcelona and Cambrils attacks brought late changes and showed lack of coordination between agencies. After the 2016 Nice and Berlin attacks, CNI had prevented the use of barriers on city promenades.195 But it was subsequently that the Puigdemont government installed defensive bollards on street walkways and at monuments such as the Sagrada Familia church.196 Even with intelligence information in hand, the Catalonian government did not install barriers to avoid terrorist attacks, and did

190 “In Fight against Terrorism, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2322 (2016), Aiming to Strengthen International Judicial Cooperation,” United Nations, December 12, 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12620.doc.htm.

191 “La Lucha Contra Daesh: Un Compromiso Reforzado [The Fight against Daesh: A Reinforced Commitment],” Gobierno de España, accessed June 12, 2018, http://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala- prensa/lucha-contra-daesh-un-compromiso-reforzado.

192 Santiago F. Del Vado, “Lucha Contra el Yihadismo: Firmeza Frente al Terror [Combating Jihadism: Firmness Against the Terror],” Revista Española de Defensa, no. 314 (February 2015): 12–3.

193 Del Vado, 12–3.

194 Del Vado.

195 Redacción Barcelona, “El Documento con el que la Policía Recomendó Colocar Bolardos en Accesos a Lugares Concurridos [The Document with which the Police Recommended Placing Bollards in Access to Concurred Places],” La Vanguardia, last modified August 19, 2017, https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20170819/43665066008/documento-policia-recomendo-instalar- bolardos-accesos-lugares-concurridos.html.

196 Reinares and García-Calvo, “Spaniards, You Are Going to Suffer,” 8. 44 not cooperate with the Civil Guard and the National Police’s aftermath investigations.197 As a result, the National Court confirmed CITCO’s responsibility to centralize the Spanish counterterrorist efforts and stated Mossos’ obligation for sharing information with other police forces.198 Policymakers sometimes tend to override a country’s legal framework.

2. Counterterrorist Laws

Changes in the Spanish domestic laws happened in response to countering ISIS and to fix legal loopholes. In response to international demands to fight ISIS, Rajoy reformed Chapter VII of the Spanish Penal Code.199 This occurred after the U.N. Security Council adopted the S/RES/2178 resolution.200 The more significant points were: establishing a new definition of terrorism, punishing “face-to-face and on-line terrorism training,” punishing direct or unintended terrorism funding, punishing glorification of terrorism, and prosecution of hate-speech against terrorism victims.201 After the 2015 jihadi attacks in France, Rajoy issued National Security Law 36/2015 as a measure to

197 Reinares and García-Calvo, 9.

198 “Andreu Delimita el Papel de Mossos, Policía y Guardia Civil y Deja la Coordinación en Manos del CITCO [Andreu defines the role of Mossos, Police and Civil Guard, and leaves Coordination under CITCO Control],” Europa Press, August 24, 2017, http://www.europapress.es/catalunya/noticia- investigacion-ataques-centra-conexion-terroristas-extranjero-20170824161122.html.

199 Gobierno de España, “Ley Orgánica 2/2015, de 30 de Marzo, Por la que se Modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de Noviembre, Del Código Penal, En Materia de Delitos de Terrorismo [Amending The Organic Law 10/1995 Of 23 November, Of The Penal Code Relating To Terrorism Crimes],” Boletín Oficial Del Estado, no. 77 (March 30, 2015): 27177–85.

200 The UN Security Council’s S/RES/2178 resolution addressed an integral perspective on fighting ISIS. The main points were: condemning violent extremism; reaffirming the UN members’ obligation to fight ISIS; increasing information exchanges; preventing, deterring and stopping radicalization, recruitment, training, and foreign fighters’ travels; and encouraging fighting criminal organizations and their operational and logistical connections with terrorists, amongst others. “Resolution 2178 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7272nd Meeting, on 24 September 2014,” United Nations, September 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29.

201 Gobierno de España, “Ley Orgánica 2/2015.” 45 formalize the security forces’ responsibilities to fight terrorism.202 This law also instructed security forces to monitor Ceuta and Melilla because of their strategic situation and their illegal migration issues.203 Furthermore, it included the government’s commitment to remove the ISIS ideology from the Spanish population.204 Finally, the 2017 Ramblas attack exhibited legal loopholes in the controls for purchasing explosivesthe Ripoll cell showed how easy it was to obtain 500 liters of acetone to produce triacetone triperoxide.205 Therefore, Rajoy enacted Law 8/2017 as a measure to regulate the Spanish license system to buy explosives’ components.206 Spain reformed these laws to cover loopholes exploited by terrorists and to permit security forces to perform more efficient counterterrorist actions.

3. Strategic Alliances

Several strategic alliances with nearby countries reinforced the Spanish fight against ISIS. Differences between the Spanish and African countries’ per-capita gross domestic products, plus food insecurity, bad governance, and violence provoked by the ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups make European countries like Spain appear to be a “wonderland” for the Sahel and Maghreb populations.207 Almost 45.6 percent of the ISIS

202 Gobierno de España, “Ley 36/2015, de 28 de Septiembre, de Seguridad Nacional [Law On National Security],” Boletin Oficial Del Estado: Gaceta de Madrid, no. 10389 (September 28, 2015): 87106–17.

203 José Francisco Zamora Navarro, “La Ley 36/2015, de Seguridad Nacional [The Law 36/2015, On National Security],” Boletín IEEE, no. 2 (2016): 549–65.

204 Zamora Navarro.

205 Braulio García Jaén, “¿Cómo Pudieron Los Terroristas de Ripoll Acumular Cien Kilos de Explosivo? ["How Could Ripoll Terrorists Accumulate One Hundred Kilos of Explosive?"],” Vanity Fair, September 17, 2017, https://www.revistavanityfair.es/actualidad/articulos/terroristas-de-ripoll-kilos- explosivo-atentados-barcelona/26158.

206 Gobierno de España, “Ley 8/2017, de 8 de Noviembre, Sobre Precursores de Explosivos [On explosive precursors, and transposing Regulation (EU) No. 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosive precursors],” Boletin Oficial del Estado: Gaceta de Madrid, no. 12901 (November 9, 2017): 107702–13.

207 Amy E. Cunningham and Khalid Koser, “Migration, Violent Extremism and Social Exclusion,” in World Migration Report 2018 (Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2017), 7. See also: Alex P. Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4 (2016): 9, https://doi.org/10.19165/2016.1.04. 46 terrorists detained by Spanish security forces during 2013–2016 were from Morocco, living mostly in Ceuta and Melilla.208 Thus, in 2015, Spain signed an agreement with Niger for combating terrorism, organized crime, and illegal migration.209 Spain has also joined forces with Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco to improve border controls in order to combat ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups.210

4. Long-Term Strategies

The Spanish governments also identified the necessity to improve long-term strategies. For instance, Rajoy issued the Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha Contra la Radicalización Violenta (PEN-LCRV, National Strategic Plan to Fight Radicalization) as “an efficient tool for early detection and neutralization of violent radicalization.”211 This plan’s areas were domestic, international, and cyberspace, and focused on three functional areas: prevention, surveillance, and operations.212 In 2015, Rajoy updated the 2005 Plan de Prevención y Protección Antiterrorista (Counterterrorist Prevention and Protection Plan).213 With this plan, the Secretariat of State for Security modified the Alert

208 Fernando Reinares and Carola García-Calvo, El Estado Islámico En España [The Islamic State in Spain] (Madrid, España: Real Instituto Elcano, 2016), 25–9.

209 “España y Níger Estrechan Lazos Contra Terrorismo e Inmigración [Spain and Niger Strengthen Ties Against Terrorism and Immigration],” Republica/EFE, May 14, 2015, https://www.republica.com/2015/05/14/espana-estrecha-sus-lazos-con-niger-contra-el-terrorismo-y-la- inmigracion-ilegal/.

210 “The Sahel Programme: Strengthening the Sahel against Crime and Terrorism,” UNODC, accessed June 5, 2018, https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/newrosenwebsite/sahel- programme/sahel-programme.html.

211 Ministerio del Interior, Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta [National Strategic Plan to Fight Violent Radicalization] (Madrid, España: Ministerio del Interior, 2015), 5, http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642012/5179146/PLAN+DEFINITIVO+APROBADO.pdf/f8226631 -740a-489a-88c3-fb48146ae20d.

212 Ministerio del Interior, 10–17.

213 “El Nuevo Plan de Prevención y Protección Antiterrorista Nos Sitúa en el Nivel 3 de Alerta [The New Antiterrorist Prevention and Protection Plan places us at the alert level no. 3],” Campus Internacional para la Seguridad y la Defensa, May 27, 2015, https://observatorio.cisde.es/archivo/el-nuevo-plan-de- prevencion-y-proteccion-antiterrorista-nos-situa-en-el-nivel-3-de-alerta/. 47 Levels to improve counterterrorist awareness, by reclassifying them in five levels.214

The different attempts by some countries and non-state actors to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or chemical weapons compelled the international community to establish counter-proliferation strategies.215 Rajoy enacted the Plan de Acción Nacional para el cumplimiento de la Resolución 1540 (Action plan of Spain for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540) to impede the possibilities for non- state actors, like Daesh, to “acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”216 This Spanish strategy aimed to deter ISIS associates from obtaining WMD or chemical weaponry inside Spain’s territory.

The Spanish government developed one more counterterrorist strategy to prevent radicalization. In response to the 2015 Bataclan attack in France, the CITCO’s Centro de Coordinación de Información sobre Radicalización (Coordination Center for Radicalization Information) applied a media strategy called “Stop Radicalismos” (Stop Radicalization).217 This approach consisted of asking for the citizenry’s cooperation in reporting (via phone calls and web pages) cases of radicalization and terrorist

214 “El Ministerio del Interior actualiza el Plan de Prevención y Protección Antiterrorista para Reforzar la Capacidad de Respuesta a los Riesgos Derivados de la Amenaza Terrorista [The Ministry of Interior updates the Antiterrorist Prevention and Protection Plan to Strengthen Response Capacities against the Risks Derived from Terrorist Threat],” Ministerio del Interior, May 27, 2015, http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/noticias/-/asset_publisher/GHU8Ap6ztgsg/content/id/3967173.

215 Carmen Rengel, “Así ha usado el Régimen de Assad las Armas Químicas en la Guerra de Siria [This is how the Assad Regime has used Chemical Weapons in the Syrian War],” El Huffington Post, April 5, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.es/2017/04/05/asi-ha-usado-el-regimen-de-assad-las-armas-quimicas- en-siria_a_22026627/.

216 “National Implementation Action Plans: Action Plan of Spain for the implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004),” United Nations, May 27, 2015, https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national- implementation/national-implementation-plans.shtml.

217 “Más de Mil Avisos Ciudadanos a Interior En 2 Meses Para Frenar El Radicalismo [More Than One Thousand Citizen Notices “To Stop Radicalism” for the Ministry of the Interior In 2 Months],” EFE, February 21, 2016, https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/politica/mas-de-mil-avisos-ciudadanos-a-interior-en-2- meses-para-frenar-el-radicalismo/10002-2845793. 48 recruitment.218 This strategy also included the counter-propaganda campaign dubbed #DaeshVidasRotas, which presented testimonies from people who had lived in ISIS- controlled territory.219 Its results showed the union between Spanish society and the government for fighting this danger together.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The Spanish government’s counterterrorist measures have responded to and anticipated future terrorist attacks. The experience gained from fighting ETA’s ethno- nationalist terrorism exposes the Spanish security forces’ modernization. Over time, collective activities amongst the Spanish government and society terminated ETA’s struggle and improved the government’s abilities when having to respond to the later threats posed by ISIS. In designing these strategies, the Spanish security agencies had achieved enough experience and efficiency to improve and strengthen its counterterrorist efforts effectively. Reinares and Alonso explain that “[p]olice counterterrorist operations […] became much more efficient, discriminating, and selective.”220 Even when ISIS customized their tactics to the ongoing social and technological Western environment, the Spanish government developed better counterterrorist methods to contain it. Through changes in the legal realm, negotiations, and alliances with the international community (especially France), the Spanish government and society have built a state of cooperation and certainty within their territory and from abroad. Undoubtedly, the Spanish countermeasures against terrorism present a noteworthy template for other countries.

218 “Colaboración Ciudadana [Citizen cooperation],” Ministerio del Interior, Accessed June 6, 2018, http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/plan-estrategico-nacional-de-lucha-contra-la- radicalizacion-violenta/colaboracion-ciudadana1.

219 “Spain - Tackling Daesh’s Propaganda Machine,” The Global Coalition Against Daesh, June 7, 2016, http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/tackling-daeshs-propaganda-machine/.

220 Reinares and Alonso, “Confronting Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Spain,” 125. 49 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

50 V. FRENCH APPROACHES AGAINST ISIS

France currently has a complete complement of counterterrorist approaches to defeat ISIS. Since the GIA’s attacks in Paris between 1995 and 1996, the country has fought Islamic extremism with intelligence, a tight legal framework, security forces coordination, and international cooperation. Yet, through media communications, and with terrible assassinations, ISIS has made it clear that France is its perpetual enemy. Could ISIS terrorist actions have wrecked French domestic security policies? This chapter studies how ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks have challenged France’s current homeland security policies.

A. THE ISIS ATTACKS ON FRANCE

ISIS’s terrorist attacks have inflicted suffering on the French population on numerous occasions, but mostly with self-radicalized terrorists. In 2014, the Abu Mohammad al-Adnani’s speech motivated ISIS fanatics to plan and execute attacks against French institutions and society. Laurence Bindner found that ISIS terrorists executed, planned, or plotted 64 attacks against France during 2012–2017.221 The French Center for the Analysis of Terrorism revealed that approximately 244 out of 2,300 French citizens (10.6 percent) who traveled to jihadi wars, returned to France to radicalize and execute terrorist attacks on ISIS’s behalf.222 Table 12 depicts ISIS terrorist attacks in France since 2014.

221 Laurence Bindner, “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France,” The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 8, no. 7 (February 23, 2018): 2, https://icct.nl/publication/jihadists- grievance-narratives-against-france/.

222 Canell Beuze, Terrorist Attacks, Failed Attacks and Plots in the West Linked to the Syrian – Iraqi Context (2013-2016) (Paris, France: Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, March 2017), 8, http://cat- int.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Terrorist-attacks-Report-2013-2016.pdf. 51 Table 12. ISIS terrorist attacks in France since 2014.

Date Information

February French police arrested Ibrahim Boudina in Nice; a foreign fighter linked to 2014 the Cannes-Torcy terrorist cell, which had attacked a Jewish store in Sarcelles in 2012.223

May 2014 French law-enforcement officers detained 29-year-old French-Algerian Mehdi Nemmouche in the Marseilles railway station, six days after he killed four people during an attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels.224

20 20-year-old French-Burundian Bertrand Nzohabonayo attacked a police December station at Joue-les-Tours, assaulting three police officers with a knife while 2014 shouting Allahu akbar (God is great); soldiers shot him.225

21 40-year-old Frenchman Nasser Eddine Ben Abdelkader ran over 11 people December with his car in Dijon, France, while he screamed Allahu akbar (God is 2014 great).226 He claimed he did the attack because he was “acting on behalf of the children of Palestine.”227 Paris prosecutor Marie-Christine Tarrare classified this case as a non-terrorist crime on the grounds that Nacer presented psychological problems.228

22 Sébastien Sarron drove a van into a crowded public walkway at the December Christmas market in the Place Royale in Nantes.229 Prosecutor Brigitte 2014 Lamy concluded that the attack was a not terrorism-related crime because,

223 Timothy Holman, “The Swarm: Terrorist Incidents in France,” Terrorism Monitor 13, no. 21 (October 30, 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/the-swarm-terrorist-incidents-in-france/.

224 Petter Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 287.

225 “Burundi Arrests Brother of Suspect in French Police Attack,” France 24, December 22, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20141222-burundi-arrests-brother-suspect-police-knife-attack-nzohabonayo.

226 Louise Nordstrom, “French Prosecutor Rules out Terror Link in Dijon Car Rampage,” France 24, December 22, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20141222-dijon-attack-not-act-terrorism-says- prosecutor.

227 Nordstrom.

228 Nordstrom.

229 La rédaction de Nantes, “Il Fauche 10 Personnes Au Marché de Noël [Crazy driver in Nantes. He mowed down 10 people at the Christmas market],” Ouest-France, December 22, 2014, https://www.ouest- france.fr/pays-de-la-loire/nantes-44000/accident-place-royale-des-blesses-au-marche-de-noel-3076473. 52 Date Information like the attack in Dijon the previous day, the attacker suffered from mental issues and family difficulties.230 Sarron killed himself in the Nantes- Carquefou prison on 13 April 2016.231

7 January French-Algerians Saïd and Chérif Kouachi attacked the Charlie Hebdo 2015. magazine headquarters in Paris, killing the editor Stéphane Charbonnier and 11 more people, while claiming to be part of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.232 French police besieged and killed the Kouachi brothers two days later.233

7–9 January French-Malian Amedy Coulibaly, a friend of Kouachi brothers, shot a 2015 jogger and killed a police officer in Montrouge the same day of the Charlie Hebdo attack.234 Later, during the Kouachi brothers’ arrest attempt, Coulibaly took hostages in a Parisian Jewish supermarket.235 The Parisian police counterterrorist force killed the attacker after a nearly five-hour siege, but not before Coulibaly had killed four hostages.236

3 February Misfit and lone-wolf terrorist Moussa Coulibaly (no relation to Amedy) 2015 attacked three soldiers with a knife in Nice.237

26 June 35-year-old French Muslim Yassin Salhi killed and beheaded his employer in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier.238 The attacker had been radicalized in prison,

230 La rédaction de Nantes,

231 “Le Chauffard Du Marché de Noël de Nantes S’est Suicidé En Prison [The chauffeur at the Christmas market in Nantes has committed suicide in prison],” Le Figaro, April 13, 2016, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/04/13/97001-20160413FILWWW00128-le-chauffeur-de-la- camionnette-folle-de-nantes-s-est-suicide-en-prison.php.

232 Nesser, Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History, 289–94.

233 Nesser.

234 Nesser.

235 Nesser, 291.

236 Emeline Cazi, “Ce que l’on sait de l’agression d’un joggeur à Fontenay-aux-Roses [What is known about the aggression of a jogger in Fontenay-aux-Roses],” Le Monde, January 11, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/11/ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-agression-d-un-joggeur-a- fontenay-aux-roses_4553732_3224.html.

237 “Retour Sur Le Passé de Moussa Coulibaly [Back to the Moussa Coulibaly Past],” France Télévision, February 4, 2015, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/agression-de-militaires-a- nice/video-retour-sur-le-passe-de-moussa-coulibaly_815901.html. 53 Date Information 2015 and had links with the ISIS Forsane Alizza network. Security forces knew of his radicalization prior to the attack. Spanish-Moroccan Ayoub el Khazzani tried to execute a terrorist attack on 21 August 239 2015 a train traveling from Brussels to Paris. Fortunately, his rifle jammed during the attack, and three American citizens (two were former military) managed to tackle and subdue him, ending the attack.240 13 28-year-old Belgian–Moroccan Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Frenchman November Salah Abdeslam (both ISIS foreign fighters) devised, prepared, coordinated, 2015 and executed three-team attacks in Paris that killed 130 people and injured 430 more.241

1 January 31-year-old unemployed French citizen (with Tunisian roots) Raouf El 2016 Ayeb, rammed two French soldiers with his car in front of a mosque.242 After the attack, El Ayeb pulled a knife on the soldiers; they detained him after shooting him in the legs.243

7 January 20-year-old North African (possibly Moroccan or Tunnisian) Sallah Ali 2016 attacked a police station in Goutte d’O, on the first anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack.244 11 January A high-school aged Turkish boy attacked 35-year-old teacher Benjamin

238 Soren Seelow, “Yassin Salhi, La Surveillance En Pointillé D’un Salafiste Trop Discret [Yassin Salhi, the surveillance of a too discreet Salafist],” Le Monde, July 27, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/06/27/yassin-salhi-un-salafiste-surveille-en- pointille_4663108_3224.html.

239 Charlotte Piret, “‘J’ai Pas Pu Tuer:’ L’auteur de L’attentat Du Thalys S’explique Sur Les Faits [‘I Can not Kill’: The Thalys Attack Author Explains the Facts],” France Inter, May 9, 2018, https://www.franceinter.fr/justice/j-ai-pas-pu-tuer-l-auteur-de-l-attentat-du-thalys-s-explique-sur-les-faits.

240 Laure Mandeville, “Attaque Déjouée Du Thalys: ‘On N’a Pas Pensé, on a Juste Agi’ [Thalys Foiled Attack: ‘We did not think, we just acted’],” Le Figaro, August 23, 2015, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/08/23/01016-20150823ARTFIG00182-attentat-dejoue-du- thalys-on-n-a-pas-pense-on-a-juste-agi.php.

241 Jean-Charles Brisard, “The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 11, (2015): 5–8.

242 News Wires, “Man Who Rammed Car into French Soldiers ‘Not Linked to Terror Group,’” France 24, January 2, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160102-man-who-rammed-car-soldiers-not- linked-terrorist-group-valence-mosque.

243 News Wires.

244 News Wires, “Paris Prosecutor Casts Doubt on Identity of Police Station Attacker,” France 24, January 8, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160108-france-paris-prosecutor-casts-doubt-identity- police-station-attacker. 54 Date Information 2016 Amsellem with a machete in front of a synagogue in Marseille.245 25 year-old ex-convict ISIS-inspired Larossi Abballa killed two married 13 June 246 2016 police officers with a knife, at their home in Magnanville.

14 July 31-year-old Tunisian and French resident, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, 2016 killed 86 people and injured 434 with a 19-ton cargo truck on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, during the Bastille Day celebrations.247

26 July Malik Petitjean and Adel Kermiche (two ISIS-inspired terrorists,) killed the 2016 85-year-old priest Jacques Hamel and injured one more, during a hostage situation at a Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray church.248

3 February 29-year-old ISIS-inspired Egyptian Abdullah Reda al-Hamamy assaulted a 2017 soldier with two machetes at the Louvre Museum.249

20 April 39-year-old Frenchman Karim Cheurfi, also known as Abu Yusuf al-Beljiki 2017 (the Belgian), killed a French police officer, and wounded two more officers and one passerby, with a Kalashnikov at the Parisian Champs - Elysees boulevard, on the eve of the Presidential elections.250

245 “French Jewish Leader Asks Faithful to Avoid Skullcap for Safety,” France 24, January 12, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160112-france-jewish-leader-avoid-kippa-safety.

246 Le service Metronews, “Attentat à Magnanville: Victimes, Déroulement Des Faits... Ce Qu’on Sait Pour L’instant [Attack in Magnanville: Victims, Unfolding Facts ... What We Do Know for the Moment],” LCI Newsroom, June 14, 2016, https://www.lci.fr/faits-divers/attentat-a-magnanville-victimes- deroulement-des-faits-ce-quon-sait-pour-linstant-1513002.html.

247 “Attentat de Nice: Ce Que L’on Sait Du Chauffeur, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel [The Nice Attack: What Do We Know About the Driver, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel],” L’Obs, July 15, 2016, https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/attaque-de-nice/20160715.OBS4681/attentat-de-nice-ce-que-l-on-sait- du-chauffeur-mohamed-lahouaiej-bouhlel.html.

248 Simon Piel and Soren Seelow, “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: pourquoi l’un des auteurs de l’attentat avait été remis en liberté [Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: why one of the attack authors had been released],” Le Monde, July 27, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/07/27/saint-etienne-du-rouvray- pourquoi-l-un-des-auteurs-de-l-attentat-a-ete-remis-en-liberte-en-mars_4975134_1653578.html.

249 Emilie Blachère, “Attaque Au Louvre: Le Touriste était Un Terroriste [Attack at the Louvre: The Tourist Was a Terrorist],” Paris Match, February 13, 2017, http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Attaque-au-Louvre-le-touriste-etait-un-terroriste-1184744.

250 “Champs-Elysées: Armed Man Crashes Car into Police van in ‘Attempted Attack,’” The Local, June 19, 2017, https://www.thelocal.fr/20170619/breaking-police. 55 Date Information

6 June 2017 40-year-old Algerian-born Farid Ikken attacked a police officer with a hammer in front of Notre Dame cathedral.251

19 June 31-year-old Djaziri Adam Lotfi crashed his car against a Gendarmerie’s 2017 convoy on the Champs-Elysées boulevard. According to Paris prosecutor François Molins, Djaziri had an arsenal inside his car.252

March 2018 25-year-old French-Moroccan Redouane Lakdim executed different attacks in Carcassonne and Trèbes, killing five people and wounding 15.253

As history shows, ISIS has been a constant menace to France’s domestic security. France’s history of colonization of countries such as Algeria, in combination with its support to the U.S.-military-led wars to end jihadist movements, has made manifest ISIS’s goal of eliminating the French way of life.254 Furthermore, this terrorist group’s ideology reached the second and third generation of the North African immigrant population living in France.255 Nathalie Cettina explains “the consequences for [immigrant] communities badly in need of a [French integral] frame of reference have been dire, ranging from suburban violence […] to terrorism.”256 Islamic terrorist groups, ISIS included, will keep targeting France unless the country’s policymakers develop better counterterrorist strategies aimed at ending the grievances of French Muslims.

251 “Ce que l’on sait de l’agression à Notre-Dame de Paris [What we do know about the Parisian Notre-Dame aggression],” Le Monde, June 6, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/06/06/les- forces-de-l-ordre-ont-neutralise-un-homme-ayant-agresse-un-policier-sur-le-parvis-de-notre- dame_5139598_3224.html.

252 “Attentat Des Champs-Elysées Du 19 Juin : Un Arsenal Incroyable Retrouvé, Selon François Molins [The June 19 Attack of the Champs-Elysées: According to François Molins, An Incredible Arsenal was Found],” RT France. June 22, 2017, https://francais.rt.com/france/40115-attentat-champs-elysees- arsenal-incroyable-molins.

253 “Attaques Terroristes Dans l’Aude: Revivez Le Fil de Cette Journée Dramatique [Terrorist Attacks in Aude: Relive The Thread of This Dramatic Day], Le Parisien, March 23, 2018, https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/direct-coups-de-feu-sur-un-crs-et-prise-d-otages-dans-un-super-u-de- l-aude-23-03-2018-7624818.php.

254 Bindner, “Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France,” 4–7.

255 Shapiro, “France and the GIA,” 142. See also: Cettina, 75.

256 Cettina, 73. 56 B. THE CURRENT FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

ISIS’s terrorist attacks have pushed the French government to create and modify several homeland security policies. In more than 20 ISIS attacks, terrorist cells and “lone- wolf” actors have employed improvised explosives, firearms, trucks, cars, knives, or axes to strike at the heart of French society. But the issue of utmost concern from those attacks was that French security forces beforehand had criminal records or radicalization alerts for some of them.257 Thus, the French government changed its counterterrorist approaches aiming at the improvement of security forces’ intelligence, coordination, and functions; the adaptation of its laws; and the development of strategic alliances and plans.

1. Improvement of the French Security Forces

The French government has improved its security forces in order to fight ISIS by aiming to get better information exchange, operations coordination, and intelligence. Just after the first French armed forces’ strikes hit Daesh in Syria, ISIS’s spokesman Abu Muhammed Al-Adnani urged self-inspired ISIS terrorists to damage France.258 Since then, French security forces have escalated their investigative measures to collect passenger data, set stricter border controls, reinforce intelligence inside prisons, increase security budgets, and other measures. Only after the Bataclan attacks did security forces move on targets by performing 168 raids, detaining 30 people and seizing almost 600 weapons.259 The French government built up security forces with better faculties and capabilities to stop ISIS. Table 13 shows the French security forces’ improvements for combating ISIS.

257 “Une Nouvelle Section Zonale de Recherche et D’appui à Metz [Bernard Cazeneuve inaugurates the Metz zonal section for intelligence and support],” Ministère de l’Intérieur, February 12, 2016, http://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-actualites/2016-Actualites/Une-nouvelle-section- zonale-de-recherche-et-d-appui-a-Metz.

258 Jessica Lewis McFate, Harleen Gambhir, and Evan Sterling, “ISIS’s Global Messaging Strategy Fact Sheet,” ISW Institute for the Study of War, December 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/GLOBAL%20ROLLUP%20Update.pdf.

259 Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé, Le Terrorisme et Leur Financement: Discussion Assemblée Nationale [Fight Against Organized Crime, Terrorism and Their Funding: Hearing before the National Assembly], XIVe Législature (March 1, 2016), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2015- 2016/20160136.asp#P733550. See also: AFP, “Police Seize Arsenal of Weapons in 168 Raids,” The Local, November 16, 2015, https://www.thelocal.fr/20151116/police-seize-arsenal-of-weapons-in-150-raids. 57 Table 13. The French security forces’ improvements taken against ISIS.

Date Description Outcome ISIS announces its Caliphate June – The Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve * As of September 2014, security forces September instructed the National Police, Gendarmerie, had detained at least 110 extremists.261 2014 and the Direction générale de la sécurité * As revenge, the Algerian ISIS-affiliated intérieure, (DGSI, General Directorate for group, Jund al-Khilafa, beheaded French Domestic Security) to reinforce their citizen Hervé Gourdel on video.262 information exchange.260 26 Security agencies gained access to the PNR and Security agencies improved this system September the advance passenger information (API) data, in October 2015. 2014 through the Passenger Information Unit.263 The Boudina and Nemmouche cases 13 Hollande authorized security forces to impede NGOs and Hollande’s political November French citizens from traveling to ISIS- opposition argued these measures banned 2014 controlled territories.264 Security services could the freedom of movement.265 retain or invalidate any passport or identity card. The Charlie Hebdo attack January * Hollande activated the Vigipirate Plan’s * Hollande deployed more than 10,000 2015 highest alarm level, and ordered the Opération soldiers on French soil. Sentinelle (Sentinel Operation).266 * The Interior Ministry increased security * The French air force bombarded ISIS- agencies’ personnel by 1,400 and increased its counterterrorist budget to

260 Christophe Cornevin, “Cazeneuve: «La France N’a Pas Peur» Face à La Menace Djihadiste [Cazeneuve: ‘France does not fear’ against the jihadist threat],” Le Figaro, September 22, 2014, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2014/09/22/01016-20140922ARTFIG00125-menaces-terroristes-la- france-a-renforceson-niveau-de-vigilance.php.

261 Cornevin.

262 ISIS’s media operatives used this video as an ultimatum for removal of French military forces from Syria. Andrew Lebovich, “The Hotel Attacks and Militant Realignment in the Sahara-Sahel Region,” The CTC Sentinel 9, no. 1 (2016): 22–28.

263 République Française, “Décret N° 2014–1095 Du 26 Septembre 2014 Portant Création D’un Traitement de Données à Caractère Personnel Dénommé «Système API-PNR France» Pris Pour L’application de L’article L. 232–7 Du Code de La Sécurité Intérieure [Establishing a treatment of personal data referred to «France API-PNR System» adopted for the application of Article L. 232-7 of the Internal Security Code],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0225, no. 15 (September 28, 2014): 15777.

264 Hellmuth, 988.

265 Nicolas Boring, “France: Six French Citizens Prohibited from Leaving under New Anti-Terrorism Law,” The Global Legal Monitor, February 26, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france- six-french-citizens-prohibited-from-leaving-under-new-anti-terrorism-law/.

266 “L’opération Sentinelle, Qu’est-Ce Que C’est? [Operation Sentinel, What Is It?],” République Française, November 8, 2016, http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/lutte-contre-terrorisme- radicalisation/mesures-lutter-contre-terrorisme/loperation-sentinelle-quest. 58 Date Description Outcome controlled territory in Iraq, destroying a training €246 millions.268 camp and other targets.267 25 July * Enactment of Law No. 2015–912 Regarding * Granted police forces authority to 2015 Intelligence, to establish the French intelligence perform on-line surveillance and monitor services’ operation and coordination mobile phone calls.271 faculties.269 * Digital intelligence obtained from * Created the National Commission for the previous attacks did not help to prevent Control of Intelligence Techniques the Bataclan attacks.272 (CNCTR).270 The Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack June 2015 Creation of the Etat-major opérationnel de As of 1 March 2017, the French prévention du terrorisme (EMOPT, Operational government had created almost 17,400 Terrorism Prevention High-Staff) to coordinate warning files.274 The Minister of the domestic security forces’ operations and for Interior merged EMOPT with UCLAT in 273 monitoring radicalized individuals. 2018.275 The Bataclan attacks

267 “Chammal: Retour Sur Les Dates Clés de L’intervention Militaire Française Au Levant [Chammal: Back on the key dates of the French military intervention in the Levant],” Ministère de la Défense, April 19, 2016, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/operations/irak- syrie/chronologie/chammal-retour-sur-les-dates-cles-de-l-intervention-militaire-francaise-au-levant.

268 Hellmuth, 988. See also: “Fight against Terrorism/Handling of the Terrorist Attacks of 7–9 January 2015,” Embassy of France in Washington, DC, January 15, 2015, https://franceintheus.org/spip.php?article6437.

269 République Française, “Loi N° 2015–912 Du 24 Juillet 2015 Relative Au Renseignement” [Regarding Intelligence], Journal Officiel de La République Française 0171, no. 2 (July 26, 2015): 12735.

270 “Parliament Adopts the Intelligence Bill,” République Française, June 30, 2015, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/parliament-adopts-the-intelligence-bill.

271 République Française, “Loi N° 2015–912 Du 24 Juillet 2015 Relative Au Renseignement.”

272 “Terrorists on Telegram,” Counter Extremism Project, May 11, 2017, https://www.counterextremism.com/terrorists-on-telegram.

273 “Etat-Major Opérationnel de Prévention Du Terrorisme (EMOPT) [Operational Terrorism Prevention High-Staff],” Centre Français de Recherche Sur Le Renseignement, 2017, https://www.cf2r.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EMOPT.pdf.

274 Joachim Veliocas, “17 393 Individus Sont Inscrits Au Fichier Des Signalements Pour La Prévention de La Radicalisation Terroriste [17,393 Individuals are Registered in the Warning Files for the Prevention of Terrorist Radicalization],” Observatoire de l’islamisation, April 12, 2017, http://islamisation.fr/2017/04/12/17-393-individus-sont-inscrits-au-fichier-des-signalements-pour-la- prevention-de-la-radicalisation-terroriste/.

275 Nathalie Cettina, “Les Nouvelles Figures de Proue de La Lutte Antiterroriste [The New Head Figures of the Anti-Terrorist Struggle],” Centre Français de Recherche Sur Le Renseignement, Note de Réflexion N°24 (December 2017), https://www.cf2r.org/reflexion/nouvelles-figures-de-proue-de-lutte- antiterroriste/. 59 Date Description Outcome 30 * Enactment of the Law 2015–1556.276 Hollande granted security agencies the November * Prime Minister authorized the surveillance, authority to perform actions related to 2015 and commanded to keep collected data by four- digital surveillance, including telephone month periods.277 and internet bugs, data and metadata * The CNCTR have since then the mining, geotagging (to locate terminal responsibility for oversight of the intelligence equipment), and network forensics (such as identifying and isolating network services’ procedures.278 properties, software characteristics, and operating systems).279 3 June Implementation of legal resources for the The French prisons (like the Fleury- 2016 Bureau central du renseignement pénitentiaire Mérogis) are the perfect place for the (BCRP, Central Penitentiary Intelligence ISIS recruitment process.281 In October Bureau) to combat radicalization inside French 2017, the BCRP thwarted one ISIS attack 280 prisons. planned inside the Fresnes prison.282 The Bastille attack October * Hollande created the National Guard to The Naitonal Guard began with almost 2016 protect the French population and territory from 2,500 volunteers from the armed forces, ISIS.283 Gendarmerie, and National Police.284

276 République Française, “Loi N° 2015–1556 Du 30 Novembre 2015 Relative Aux Mesures de Surveillance Des Communications électroniques Internationales [Regarding International Electronic Surveillance Measures],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0278, no. 1 (December 1, 2015): 22185.

277 République Française, “Décret N° 2016–67 Du 29 Janvier 2016 Relatif Aux Techniques de Recueil de Renseignement [On Intelligence collection techniques],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0026, no. 2 (January 29, 2016).

278 Félix Tréguer, “From Deep State Illegality to Law of the Land: The Case of Internet Surveillance in France,” in 7th Biennial Surveillance & Society Conference “Power, Performance and Trust” (Barcelona, Spain, 2016): 42–43, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01306332/document.

279 Tréguer.

280 Eleanor Beardsley, “Inside French Prisons, A Struggle to Combat Radicalization,” NPR, June 25, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/06/25/534122917/inside-french-prisons-a-struggle-to- combat-radicalization.

281 Mohammed Merah, Mehdi Nemmouche, and Djamel Beghal were inmates there. Mathieu Delahousse, “Terrorisme: Le Renseignement Prend Ses Quartiers Dans Les Prisons [Terrorism: Intelligence Takes Its Quarters In Prisons],” L’Obs, October 15, 2017, https://www.nouvelobs.com/justice/20171013.OBS6007/terrorisme-le-renseignement-prend-ses-quartiers- dans-les-prisons.html.

282 “Deux Détenus de Fresnes Soupçonnés de Projeter Un Attentat Mis En Examen [Investigation on Two Fresnes Detainees Suspected of Projecting Attack],” L’Obs, October 10, 2017, https://www.nouvelobs.com/justice/20171010.OBS5765/deux-detenus-de-fresnes-soupconnes-de-projeter- un-attentat-mis-en-examen.html.

283 République Française, “Décret N° 2016-1364 Du 13 Octobre 2016 Relatif à La Garde Nationale [On the National Guard],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0240, no. 20 (October 14, 2016). 60 Date Description Outcome 2017 Nice’s governor, Christian Estrosi, installed This counterterrorist project cost was reinforced bollards that are able to resist €16.5 million.286 vehicle-ramming attacks (from even a 20-ton truck) all over the Promenade des Anglais.285 The Abu Yusuf al-Beljiki and Farid Ikken attacks June 2017 President Emmanuel Macron created the *This assesses terrorism-related Coordination nationale du renseignement et de information collected by the French la lutte contre le terrorisme (National intelligence and law enforcement Coordination for Intelligence and Combating services. Terrorism).287

2. Adjustments to French Law

The French counterterrorist legal framework evolved as ISIS’s attacks changed. In trying to stop French foreign fighters and returnees (such as Merah, Boudina, or Nemmouche), successive French governments have enacted laws aimed at establishing concrete legal measures to prosecute and punish ISIS leaders and associates. As Table 14 indicates, these laws were developed for codifying terrorism-related crimes, increasing punishments, and granting (sometimes extensive) powers to security agencies. Sadly, these laws could not deter ISIS associates from perpetrating their attacks.

284 “France to Form National Guard to Counter Terrorist Threat, Hollande Says,” France 24, July 28, 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20160728-hollande-france-form-national-guard-counter-terrorism- threat.

285 “France to Form National Guard to Counter Terrorist Threat, Hollande Says.”

286 Marianna Christou, “Protecting Europe from Vehicle Attacks,” Counter Terror Business, August 22, 2017, http://www.counterterrorbusiness.com/features/protecting-europe-vehicle-attacks.

287 Emmanuel Jarry, “France Creates New Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Notre Dame Attacker Identified,” Reuters, June 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-france/france-creates- new-counter-terrorism-task-force-after-notre-dame-attack-idUSKBN18Y12T. 61 Table 14. Evolution of the French legal framework against ISIS.

Date Description Outcome ISIS announces its Caliphate 13 Enactment of Law 2014–1353 renforçant les Human Rights Watch determined that November dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le this law punished intention and not a 2014 terrorisme (Strengthening Provisions on the committed felony.290 The French Fight Against Terrorism).288 Constitutional Council solved this It classified “lone-wolf” terrorism as a crime, contradiction by arguing that there are and expanded punishments to include on-line times when French society’s security terrorist recruiters and for those who could be matters more than some citizens’ preparing any terrorist activity.289 freedoms.291 The Charlie Hebdo attack 20 Law No. 2015–1501, Extending the Application It granted French security agencies November of Law No. 55–385 of 3 April 1955, Regarding capabilities for arresting any French 2015 the State of Emergency and Reinforcing the citizen suspected of being a terrorist, Efficacy of its Provisions.292 restricting any terrorism-related website, or disbanding any association suspected of engaging in terrorism-related offenses.293 The Bataclan attacks 3 June Law No. 2016–731, Strengthening the fight Investigative judges, prosecutors, and 2016 against organized crime, terrorism, and security forces obtained powers of

288 République Française, “Loi N° 2014–1353 Du 13 Novembre 2014 Renforçant Les Dispositions Relatives à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme [Reinforcing dispositions relative to the fight against terrorism],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0263, no. 5 (November 14, 2014): 19162.

289 République Française. See also: Hellmuth, “Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way,” 982–83.

290 Christopher Talib, “France Adopts Anti-Terror Law Eroding Civil Liberties,” EDRi, September 24, 2014, https://edri.org/france-adopts-anti-terror-law/.

291 Le Conseil Constitutionnel, “Décision n° 2015 – 490 QPC Article L. 224-1 du Code de la Sécurité Intérieur. Interdiction administrative de sortie de territoire [Decision No. 2015 - 490 QPC. Article L. 224-1 of the Internal Security Code. Administrative ban on leaving the territory],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0240, no. 76 (October 16, 2015): 19327.

292 République Française, “Loi N° 2015-1501 Du 20 Novembre 2015 Prorogeant L’application de La Loi N° 55-385 Du 3 Avril 1955 Relative à L’état D’urgence et Renforçant L’efficacité de Ses Dispositions [Extending the Application of Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 Regarding the State of Emergency and Reinforcing the Efficacy of its Provisions],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0270, no. 1 (November 21, 2015): 21665.

293 “State of Emergency in France: What Are the Consequences?,” République Française, November 23, 2015, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/state-of-emergency-in-metropolitan-france-what-are-the- consequences. 62 Date Description Outcome financing, and improving the efficiency and surveillance, information gathering, use safeguards of the criminal procedure.294 of force, and enhanced punishment for terrorists.295 TRACFIN received the authority and resources for prosecuting cultural properties’ “black market” sales, overseeing prepaid card transactions, and regulating payment systems.296 The Djaziri’s attack 31 Law No. 2017–1510, Reinforcing Domestic Amnesty International (AI) considered October Security and the Fight Against Terrorism. This that this law was needed to support the 2017 granted more powers to prefectures, created the National Assembly, Senate, and judges’ PNR System for air and maritime transports, faculties of oversight and make French and reinforced border security controls.297 security forces accountable. AI described this law as a perpetual state of emergency.298

3. French Strategic Alliances and Plans

France’s government has fought ISIS since the establishment of its self- proclaimed pseudo-caliphate. Presidents François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron have taken over the direct fight against ISIS’s extremist violence, as one of the most important

294 République Française, “Loi N° 2016-731 Du 3 Juin 2016 Renforçant La Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé, Le Terrorisme et Leur Financement, et Améliorant L’efficacité et Les Garanties de La Procédure Pénale [Strengthening Provisions for the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism, and their Financing, and improving the efficiency and guarantees of the Criminal Procedure],” Journal Officiel de La République Française, no. 129 (June 4, 2016).

295 For surveillance, this law granted communication intelligence with proximity technical devices, such as “the IMSI catcher,” and regulated human intelligence. Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé, Le Terrorisme et Leur Financement: Discussion Assemblée Nationale [Fight Against Organized Crime, Terrorism and Their Funding: Hearing before the National Assembly], XIVe Législature (March 1, 2016), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2015-2016/20160136.asp#P733550.

296 Lutte Contre Le Crime Organisé, Le Terrorisme et Leur Financement.

297 The French Constitutional Council declared this Law unconstitutional in December of that year. République Française, “Loi N° 2017-1510 Du 30 Octobre 2017 Renforçant La Sécurité Intérieure et La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme [Reinforcing Domestic Security and the Fight Against Terrorism],” Journal Officiel de La République Française 0255, no. 1 (October 31, 2017). See also: Nicolas Boring, “France: Special Security Measures Declared Unconstitutional,” The Global Legal Monitor, December 20, 2017, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/france-special-security-measures-declared-unconstitutional/.

298 Erika Asgeirsson, “French Anti-Terror Bill Threatens to Extend State of Emergency Abuses,” Just Security, August 2, 2017, https://www.justsecurity.org/43771/french-anti-terror-bill-threatens-normalize- state-emergency/. 63 public policies for their administrations.299 For example, on 29 July 2014, France began its counterterrorist operations as a member of the Global Coalition against Daesh, deploying its armed forces.300 Hollande launched the military operation “Barkhane,” sending 3,000 armed forces members to fight ISIS-affiliated groups (such as Boko Haram) from a French base in Chad.301 With this operation, France and the U.S. allies formed a defensive line against ISIS over the Saharian and Sahel countries.302

The constant traveling of French citizens to jihadi wars also compelled France to promote more severe border controls amongst the international community. On the domestic front against ISIS, during the 7272nd U.N. Security Council Meeting, France signed resolution 2178 (2014) to prevent foreign fighters’ travels, terrorism funding, and radicalization hotspots.303 As of August 2014, about 900 French citizens had traveled to Syria;304 by May 2015, the official numbers had nearly doubled to almost 1,800.305 As a consequence, Hollande’s government strengthened its domestic policies to include foreign fighters and radicalization.

299 François Hollande noted after the 2015 Paris attacks that “[w]e’re at war against jihadi terrorism” and Emmanuel Macron (in his first speech on foreign policy as President of France) said that “[p]roviding security for our citizens means that the fight against Islamist terrorism is [the French government’s] first priority.” Angelique Chrisafis, “Hollande Completes Transformation from “Marshmallow” to “Chief of War,” The Guardian, November 16, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/hollande- transformation-marshmallow-to-chief-of-war; AFP, “Fighting “Islamist Terror” Is France’s Top Priority, Says Macron,” The Local, August 29, 2017, https://www.thelocal.fr/20170829/fighting-islamist-terror-is- frances-top-priority-says-macron.

300 Michael Shurkin, “France Gets Tougher on Terrorism,” The Rand Blog, July 29, 2014, https://www.rand.org/blog/2014/07/france-gets-tougher-on-terrorism.html.

301 Celeste Hicks, “Operation Barkhane: Why France Chose Chad as Key Counter-Terrorism Partner,” African Arguments, September 3, 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/03/operation- barkhane-why-france-chose-chad-as-key-counter-terrorism-partner-by-celeste-hicks/.

302 Hicks.

303 “Resolution 2178 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7272nd Meeting, on 24 September 2014,” United Nations, September 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29.

304 Edouard de Mareschal, “En Syrie, Un Djihadiste Occidental Sur Trois Serait Français [In Syria, One out of Three Western Jihadist Would Be French],” Le Figaro, September 5, 2014, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/09/05/01003-20140905ARTFIG00012-en-syrie-un-djihadiste- occidental-sur-trois-serait-francais.php.

305 The Soufan Group, An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015), 12. 64 The number of French individuals susceptible to ISIS recruitment has grown steadily every year. As of 2015, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency had issued warnings for about 6,000 radicalized people.306 On 9 May 2016, Hollande launched the Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme (Action Plan against Radicalization and Terrorism) to double efforts for preventing radicalization of French citizens.307 This plan outlined more than seven courses of action;308 the detection of terrorist networks’ safe havens and hotbeds, surveillance and deactivation of terrorist cells, increasing the international fight against ISIS, mounting preventive measures, improving actions to counter the ISIS’s propaganda, increasing protection for critical infrastructure, and increasing security forces’ capabilities and general resilience.

C. CONCLUSIONS

French society relies on more protection while sacrificing more liberties. The country’s security agencies have augmented security resources and methods, such as telecommunication, video, and online surveillance to protect their citizens. As Shapiro expresses, the “counterterrorism apparatus is extraordinarily repressive and intrusive, and repressions fall heavily on specific groups, particularly Muslims of North African origin.”309 France, as with any other country, needs to adjust its homeland security and counterterrorist policies within their obligation to protect human rights.310

The French government’s experience with its domestic security policies’ evolution could help other countries. Hollande’s and Macron’s administrations have

306 Romain Quivooij, “The French Counter-Radicalisation Strategy,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, no. 301 (December 27, 2016): 1.

307 “Plan D’action Contre La Radicalisation et Le Terrorisme [Action Plan against Radicalization and Terrorism],” République Française, May 9, 2016, https://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/7050-plan-d- action-contre-la-radicalisation-et-le-terrorisme.

308 Milena Uhlmann, “France’s Challenges for Working out a Coherent Strategy against Violent Radicalization and Terrorism. A Broad (and Incomplete) Outline,” Sicherheits politik-blog, December 20, 2016, https://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/2016/12/20/frances-challenges-for-working-out-a-coherent- strategy-against-violent-radicalization-and-terrorism-a-broad-and-incomplete-outline/.

309 Shapiro, “France and the GIA,” 157.

310 Sunderland. 65 created stricter provisions for intensifying coordination and commitment of judges, public prosecutors, intelligence services, law enforcement and military forces. Additionally, the need to keep and protect human rights forced these governments to create entities responsible for preserving French citizens’ prerogatives, over those of the intelligence services. Both administrations further increased intelligence gathering efforts in prisons to prevent the possibility of ISIS radicalization that was so well-known that occurred there. France also increased the budget assigned to fight ISIS; however, when it is a matter of public security, any country’s government would willingly dedicate monetary and other resources if those public investments might save and protect lives from terrorist attacks. The experience gained by French security services might help U.S. allies, Mexico included, to produce better domestic security policies.

66 VI. CONCLUDING STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This tennis match of terrorism versus counterterrorism could end if governments apply multi-angle domestic policies. Edwin Bakker explains that terrorism is an undefined and under-studied threat with multiple interconnected variables.311 Therefore, any counterterrorist policy has to encompass these same constructs in order to succeed. These phenomena, however, have a never-ending cause-and-effect relationship: as terrorist organizations’ structures, weapons, means of funding, propaganda, and other elements evolve, governments tend to react by toughening their legislation and increasing authorities and resources for their security agencies, or establishing special antiterrorist courts.312 These repressive reactions then exacerbate the feelings of disenfranchisement from the people and the cycle escalates.313 Countries have to adapt their policies by combining soft and hard, short- and long-term strategies to diminish grievances, rather than “finishing” with their adversaries.

A. FINDINGS

In order to determine best practices in response to a continually changing security environment, this research assessed how ISIS and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks carried out by terrorist cells and self-radicalized individuals have affected the independent and collective counterterrorist efforts of Spanish and French security agencies. Identifying the evolution of and outlining proposals for refining Spanish and French anti-ISIS counterterrorist measures revealed that it was their long-time histories of fighting against ethno-nationalist and jihadi terrorist organizations, rather than ISIS or ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks, that helped their security institutions to adapt plans, strategies, and

311 Edwin Bakker, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice, (Leiden, Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2015), 192.

312 John E. Finn, “Counterterrorism Regimes and the Rule of Law: The Effects of Emergency Legislation on Separation of Powers, Civil Liberties, and Other Fundamental Constitutional Norms,” in The Consequences of Counterterrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 33–93.

313 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4, July, 1981: 396. 67 policies for confronting ISIS from a holistic perspective. Both countries have continually adapted their counterterrorist efforts to protect their citizens and interests.

Nonetheless, successful counterterrorist policies need limits and supports. As Ronald Crelinsten explains, counterterrorism cannot be reactive or coercive because that could create more grievances for terrorists and “trigger […] resentment and backlash that risks promoting terrorist recruitment.”314 Counterterrorism must be proactive, “looking ahead and trying to out-think the terrorist, and plan ahead, thinking preventively;” and persuasive to create empathetic lines of communication “convincing terrorists to abandon their destructive paths and supporters and sympathizers to seek other, nonviolent ways to achieve their goals.”315 Finally, as a whole, counterterrorism requires surrounding supports integrated by “political, social, cultural, and economic initiatives aimed at undermining the viral spread of radicalization and violence-glorifying ideas that fuel the use of terrorism in social and political life.”316 By driving these multiple variables, governments’ efforts might thrive in preventing terrorism.

Spain and France have progressively established their domestic policies under the influence of a “hybrid counterterrorism model” embedded in the criminal justice system.317 To foil terrorist enterprises, a hybrid model integrates laws and security forces, within their judicial and political consensus. For instance, since its struggle against ETA, Spain has used judicial, police, and surveillance instruments to fight terrorism.318 ETA’s terrorist attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombing, and the 2017 Barcelona attack brought together the main Spanish political parties to enact an effective collection of laws and cultural support to avoid and prevent terrorism. In comparison, since 1986, France’s

314 Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism (Understanding Terrorism) (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 235–36.

315 Crelinsten

316 Crelinsten, 236.

317 Crelinsten, 236.

318 Rafael L. Bardají and Ignacio Cosidó, “Spain: From 9/11 to 3/11 and Beyond,” in Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism : American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism, ed.Gary James Schmitt (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2010), 60–1. 68 policies rest in the use of judicial institutions working along with law enforcement and intelligence agencies to counter the terrorist menace.319 France’s centralized and strong executive branch has united French policymakers in common outlines to manage terrorist offenses.

Both countries have faced this security dilemma based on their unique terrorist experiences. The Spanish and French societies created more protection, yet sacrificed more liberties. They have gradually increased telecommunication and video surveillance by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Spain and France, like any other countries, need to balance their “duty to protect their population from acts of terrorism [with their] obligations under European and international human rights law to ensure that measures taken to counter terrorism are compatible with coexisting human rights protections, including the rights of those deemed to pose a threat.”320

In the end, the back-and-forth of the match will continue, but there are two more things to do. First, this clash between terrorism and counterterrorism efforts induces government authorities, scholars, and society to execute resilience and fear management programs.321 Terrorists obtain their strength and legitimization from their audiences, so countries have to shut down their sources of support. Second, government officials and policymakers must consult with academics in order to perform deeper research and develop better strategies towards these topics.322 Before heading on to the court, counterterrorist forces must understand what the game is about and who their opponents are.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

As previous chapters explained, the Spanish and French counterterrorist forces have designed and applied numerous forms of improving their de-radicalization processes as their most important tools for countering terrorist organizations within their

319 Shapiro, “French Responses to Terrorism from the Algerian War to the Present,” 276–80.

320 Sunderland,1–2.

321 Bakker, 212.

322 Bakker, 204. 69 homelands. Education and inclusiveness are the most powerful weapons to bring terrorism to an end. In order to prevent the radicalization process in some Muslim communities, I would make one proposal: the implementation of educational scholarships to Spanish and French Muslims living in the most vulnerable areas. Governments usually grant these allowances to a specific population group. In this case, universities, colleges, or academies (even from military and law enforcement forces) would offer a number of scholarships, directed to young Muslims, women and men, living within the cities and neighborhoods most prone to radicalization.

Ultimately, the goal is to enable Muslim societyespecially its youthto feel integrated into the Spanish and French cultures. Deradicalization should start inclusinve measures for Spanish and French Muslims to feel a part of the everyday life of the country rather than separating societies through repressive counterterrorist policies. In the words of Luis Aranguren Gonzalo, “Fomentar la sospecha frente al diferente crea miedos irracionales y criminaliza injustamente a ciertos barrios” (Encouraging suspicion in the face of differences generates irrational fears and unfairly criminalizes certain neighborhoods).323 In a divided country, pluralist and inclusive strategies are the highway to a more secure homeland.

C. APPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO

By taking the example of the Spanish and French struggles against terrorism, Mexican institutions have to combine efforts to solve domestic security issues. Both corruption as precursor and organized crime as reaction are Mexico’s main domestic concerns that threaten security in our society. The two social ills are hard to eradicate, but not impossible. This eradication demands a multidimensional joint effort in which every public official in the three government levels must work willingly and energetically for achieving the greater objective: the collective and individual security. It is a hard endeavor as these kinds of public policies require crossing barriers and overcoming

323 Luis Aranguren Gonzalo, “Educación e Islam: Estamos a Tiempo [Education and Islam: We Are on Time],” Alfa y Omega: Semanario Católico de Información, March 31, 2016, http://www.alfayomega.es/61418/educacion-e-islam-estamos-a-tiempo. 70 obstacles imposed by the same old-fashioned security institutions’ traditions of selfishness and protagonist syndromes.324 In this national effort, civil and military authorities have to redouble their determination and perseverance to produce parallel actions for the protection of Mexican society and interests.

It is necessary to count on a holistic approach in order to reduce crime. The application of multi-faceted policies aimed at improving education, health, and work shall support this national effort.

From my personal judgment, the keystone consists of tackling these strategies in hotbed areas, where criminal organizations’ tentacles might reach the work force. Targeting extremely low-income societies in Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas’s mountainous areas could be the first objective.325 Bringing these educational, health, and work services closer to our fellow citizens could provide them with the appropriate tools for their social, emotional, and educational development.326 At the end, officials in Mexico’s three-level government, as well as policymakers, need to create and apply multiple and inclusive public policies to boost homeland security and national development.

This quest demands the participation of judges and prosecutors. The improvement of citizens’ security requires that federal and state judicial branches, as well as prosecutors, lead law enforcement and intelligence agencies in order to reduce the crime index. In this same manner, federal and state prosecutors must support each other in order to update their judicial information on criminal organizations and their members’

324 Bernardo Aguilar Rodríguez and Martha Elisa Nateras González, “Bases Para El Análisis de La Problematización de La Inseguridad En México [Bases for the analysis of the problem of insecurity in Mexico],” Espacios Públicos 16, no. 36 (2013): 37–54.

325 Forbes Staff, “Los 10 Estados Con Más Pobres En México [The 10 states with the highest number of poor people in Mexico],” Forbes Magazine, December 30, 2017, https://www.forbes.com.mx/los-10- estados-con-mas-pobres-en-mexico/.

326 Diane M. Montgomery and Sandra P. Rosamond, “SEED Curriculum (Social, Emotional, Educational Development),” Journal of Correctional Education 38, no. 1 (1987): 12–16. 71 databases.327 With this knowledge, security forces would combine their personnel expertise with updated criminal databases and other means (like financial intelligence, HUMINT, or SIGINT) in order to produce effective and actionable intelligence products oriented to prevent crime and to improve public security. If this specialized judicial system worked, criminal prevention would be effective.

Nevertheless, just like in Spain and France, intimidation of state judges and prosecutors is increasing. At this point, Mexican judges and prosecutors cannot fulfill professional requirements to grant justice because either they execute repressive actions to procure justice,328 or do nothing because criminal gangs have threatened them or their families.329 Federal and state judges, and prosecutors as well, have to modify their culture and organization according to their experiences on criminal investigations in order to achieve the due process, send dangerous criminals to jail, while avoiding with this, retaliations from organized crime members.330

In Mexican public management, public security is a municipal-level function because of local law enforcement’s proximity with communities.331 Yet, the inefficacy of state and municipal law-enforcement institutions to maintain public security, combined with government officials’ corruption, has consequently increased criminal organizations’ control over these same police forces.332 The common response to these

327 Rubén Mosso, “Base de Datos Criminal, Al Servicio de Estados: PGR [Criminal Database, At the Service of States: PGR],” Milenio, June 18, 2016, http://www.milenio.com/policia/base-de-datos-criminal- al-servicio-de-estados-pgr.

328 Ana Laura Magaloni, “El Ministerio Público Desde Adentro: Rutinas y Métodos de Trabajo en las Agencias del MP [The Public Prosecutor's Office From Inside: Routines and Work Methods in PP’s Agencies],” Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE, no. 42 (December 2009).

329 Rubén Mosso, “¿Quién Era y Qué Casos Llevaba el Juez Asesinado en Metepec? [Who was he and over which cases did the murdered Judge in Metepec preside?],” Milenio, October 18, 2016. http://www.milenio.com/policia/quien-era-y-que-casos-llevaba-el-juez-asesinado-en-metepec.

330 Magaloni, 32.

331 Moreover, state and municipal governments, beside their regular budgets, receive federal funds for providing this public good.

332 Roxana Aguirre, “Por Caso Tierra Blanca, Giran Orden de Aprehensión Contra 15 Expolicías [Tierra Blanca Case: A Judge Issued Warrant Orders Against 15 Former Policemen],” Excélsior, September 21, 2018, https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/por-caso-tierra-blanca-giran-orden-de- aprehension-contra-15-expolicias/1266685. 72 problems is the creation of centralized federal and state police forces to preserve community order.333 Both state and municipally elected and appointed officials need to tackle and improve their public security duties. Mexican policymakers and society have to force state and municipal law enforcement agencies to achieve their public security functions.334

It is necessary for Mexico to create a strong civilian police force. Even by the civilianization of military units or by militarizing (or reinforcing) police forces, Mexican policymakers have to create strategies aimed at withdrawing soldiers from law enforcement functions. As John L. Clarke explains:

police exercise their law enforcement function on a daily basis; while soldiers spend most of their time preparing to employ force, not actually doing so. Moreover, police are trained to employ force, particularly deadly force as a last resort, whereas soldiers are trained to use force in the first instance.335

Hence, despite having trained military personnel in public security functions, it is necessary that Mexican government authorities and policymakers create a law enforcement agency under the control of civilian authorities and oriented toward reducing the criminal index in the most vulnerable areas.336 Again, it is not a new strategy.337 The population’s confidence in government, however, could increase just by stating that a civilian police force is working to reduce the crime rate in Mexico.

333 It is worth mentioning that in Mexico, municipal police forces are the primary community-conflict mediators. Gustavo Fondevila and Rodrigo Meneses Reyes, “El Rol del Policía Municipal en México. Trabajo Social y Mediación de Conflictos [The Municipal Police Role in Mexico. Social Security and Conflict Mediation],” Gestión y Política Pública 26, no. 1 (2017): 139–65.

334 Leonel Fernández Novelo, “La Policía Local es Fundamental para la Prevención Social del Delito [Local police is critical for Social Crime Prevention],” El Universal, March 2, 2016. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/blogs/observatorio-nacional-ciudadano/2016/03/2/la-policia-local-es- fundamental-para-la-prevencion.

335 John L. Clarke, What Should Armies Do?: Armed Forces and Civil Security (New York: Routledge, 2016), 55.

336 As in the United States, I tend to include in those civilian authorities any retired or in-license armed forces member allowed to occupy any public position outside of military affairs.

337 Marcos Moloeznik, “Organized Crime, the Militarization of Public Security, and the Debate on the ‘New’ Police Model in Mexico,” Trends in Organized Crime 16, no. 2 (June 2013): 177–94. 73 Civilian security forces could be the first line of defense, but they have not been ready because of weakness and corruption. It is a fact that federal, state, and municipal police forces are not strong enough to reduce crime rates. These police officers belong to the same towns in which criminal organizations have taken control, and are intimidated and controlled by these delinquents as they threaten the police forces’ families or their lives. Corruption in state and municipal functionaries block the means to acquire and form specialized police forces with proper equipment, driving this situation into a vicious cycle. Instead of preventing crime, unarmed and unqualified police forces provide support to criminal organizations and, therefore, military forces must take control and provide towns with public security.

Mexican military forces’ double role as national security sentinels and public security enforcers needs provisions and a deadline. Since the 1970s, Mexican military personnel have performed operations in order to eliminate criminal organizations and trafficking in an overlapping security area, conformed by national and homeland security.338 This is not necessarily a bad practice, though. Spain, through the Civil Guard,339 and France, through the Gendarmerie,340 have developed military-based units to diminish and foil domestic security threats (such as terrorism), integrating “them into the national crisis management structures.”341 These countries’ police forces started operating after civilianizing their military police units.

Granted, my thoughts might seem somewhat utopic in that in Mexico, as in any other country, political agendas have a direct influence on domestic security policies’ creation and implementation. However fanciful my ideas might seem, the fact remains

338 R. Evan Ellis, “Mexico’s Fight against Transnational Organized Crime,” Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, May 24, 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military- Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/May/Transnational-Organized-Crime/.

339 “Información Institucional: Conoce a la Guardia Civil [Institutional Information: Meet the Civil Guard],” Dirección General de la Guardia Civil, 2012, http://www.guardiacivil.es/en/institucional/Conocenos/index.html.

340 “Ordre Public: Sécuriser et Maintenir L’ordre [Public Order: To Secure and Maintain Order],” Gendarmerie Nationale, accesed April 25, 2018, https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/Notre- institution/Generalites/Nos-missions/Securite-publique/Ordre-public-securiser-et-maintenir-l-ordre.

341 Clarke, 134–41. 74 that Mexican society counts on the right to demand the three government-level authorities provide individual and collective homeland security policies, aligned with supportive strategies oriented to increase social and economical development in the most vulnerable areas within the country. Thus, by taking both Spanish and French experiences on fighting terrorism, Mexico might thrive in creating and achieving better domestic security policies for the benefit of its population and finally count on a safe and strong basis for social development on which to base itself.

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