Understanding CONTEST

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Understanding CONTEST Understanding CONTEST: The Foundation and The Future Introduction CONTEST, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, was made publicly available in 2006, and revisions followed in 2009 and 2011. It is split into four work streams – Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. In light of the recent attacks in Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, this research briefing provides a short and contextual summary of each of the four Ps within the CONTEST strategy. By doing so it illustrates concerns within the strategy that can, and should, be considered by the UK government as it works to counter extremism, radicalism and terrorism in the years to come. 1 1. Prevent 1.1 Background Prevent is the UK’s counter-radicalisation strategy, which seeks to safeguard vulnerable individuals who are at risk of being drawn into extremism. As of 2015, a statutory duty was placed on public bodies – including schools, universities, hospitals, prisons and local authorities (LAs) – to deliver Prevent. This includes training staff to understand and identify radicalisation, and to ensure that public venues and resources are not used as a platform for hosting extremist speakers or for disseminating extremist content. Prevent was first created as a strand of the wider CONTEST strategy in 2003.1 It was further developed and updated when CONTEST was publicly launched in 2006, following the 7/7 London bombings. At that stage in its evolution, the delivery of Prevent was the responsibility of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) subsequently amended Prevent to provide a more comprehensive understanding of, and approach to, the process of radicalisation. However, in the 2009 review of CONTEST, it was recognised that the preventative element of the strategy was the least developed of the four strands. In 2011, following the coalition government’s review of Prevent, tackling extremist ideology was made a core part of the overall counter-radicalisation strategy. The review acknowledged that, initially, Prevent delivery had conflated the promotion of integration with the needs of counter-terrorism.2 The revised Prevent duty then identified working with public sector institutions where there was a risk of radicalisation as a key area of work. 1.2 The Evolution of Prevent Following the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013, the Prime Minister’s Taskforce on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism was established. The Taskforce found that greater disruption of extremists was needed, and that extremism had to be effectively challenged in civic and public spaces. On 23 March 2015, Home Secretary Theresa May announced the establishment of a new Extremism Analysis Unit to inform the government’s counter-extremism strategy. As part of a wider counter-entryism plan, the strategy would also inform which individuals and organisations the UK government and public sector should not engage with. 2015 saw the UK government define extremism more clearly. The Counter-Extremism Strategy of October 2015 defined extremism as: The vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.3 1 CONTEST was first created in 2003, and made publicly available in 2006. For more, see ‘Preventing Violent Extremism – Communities and Local Government Committee Contents’, Communities and Local Government Committee, 30 March 2010, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6504.htm, last visited: 20 June 2017. 2 Prevent Strategy, HM Government, July 2011. 3 Counter-Extremism Strategy, HM Government, October 2015. 2 In February 2015, Prevent was further refined as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act. From 1 July 2015, delivery of the Prevent duty became a legal requirement upon public bodies in the UK, making them subject to a statutory duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. This applied, and currently applies, to local authorities, prisons, schools, universities and NHS Trusts. Compliance by the relevant institutions requires training staff in understanding radicalisation and being able to identify vulnerability to radicalisation and extremism, as well as providing staff with a process for raising concerns about individuals potentially vulnerable to being drawn into radicalisation. Once referred to Prevent, the case of an individual of sufficient concern would be assessed by a Channel4 panel consisting of police, social services and local community resources. Individuals could then be offered mentorship as well as other forms of support and guidance, which – as it currently stands – the individual may accept on a voluntary basis.5 The 2009 CONTEST review noted that Prevent received far less in the way of resources than other strands of CONTEST6. Following the May 2017 attack in Manchester, the former independent reviewer of terror legislation David Anderson QC confirmed that Prevent still receives only 1% of the total counter- terrorism budget of £3 billion.7 It is therefore apparent that in the 8 year period between the 2009 review and the May 2017 attack in Manchester, Prevent was still receiving less in budgetary resources than other strands within the counter-terrorism strategy. Over the period 2015–2016, approximately 7,500 individuals were referred to Prevent. However, of those individuals, further action at the Channel level was only taken in 10% of cases.8 According to the most recently available figures, in 2015 around 70% of those referred to Channel were linked to Islamist extremism, while 15% of Channel referrals concerned far-right extremism.9 Although extensive and comprehensive information about Prevent’s success rate is not publicly available, one concrete example of Prevent’s impact is that in 2015 alone, the scheme stopped more than 150 individuals in the UK from travelling to Syria.10 From the outset, Prevent met with hostility, and the campaign to discredit and undermine the strategy intensified as moves to make Prevent a statutory duty as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act solidified. Prevent has faced opposition from a number of quarters, including extremist groups, Muslim community organisations and civil liberties campaigns, as well as some in the public sector tasked with its delivery. Moreover, a concerted campaign of misinformation and mistrust about Prevent has been advanced by a number of organisations. At varying times this alliance against Prevent has included the Muslim Council of Britain, Cage, Mend, Prevent Watch, the Islamic Human Rights Commission, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK, and Stand Up to Racism. The campaign against Prevent has also 4 Channel is a multi-agency safeguarding programme which operates throughout England and Wales. In Scotland, the equivalent programme is known as Prevent Professional Concerns. It provides tailored support to people who have been identified as at risk of being drawn into terrorism. For more, see ‘Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill’ Factsheet, HM Government, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/540532/CTS_Bill_- _Factsheet_8_-_Channel.pdf, last visited: 20 June 2017. 5 ‘Channel Duty Guidance, protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism’, HM Government, 23 April 2015. 6 It is important to stress that although the review was published in 2009, the reference in question was discussing historical limitations stemming from the original construction of CONTEST in 2003. In particular, it states “In 2003, this part of CONTEST was the least developed. The intelligence and analytic picture was incomplete: resources in most countries, including the UK, were devoted to investigative work, in order to protect the immediate threat to life, rather than to understanding the factors driving radicalisation.” The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’, HM Government (March 2009), pp. 83- 84. See:http://www.northants.police.uk/sites/default/files/The%2520Goverments%2520Counter%2520Terrorism%2520Strategy%5B1%5D.pdf 7 ‘Government’s anti-terror Prevent programme must be strengthened after Manchester attack, says former terror watchdog’, Telegraph, 24 May 2017, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/governments-anti-terror-prevent-programme-must-strengthened/ 8 ‘Prevent scheme “fundamental” to fighting terrorism’, BBC News, 27 December 2016, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38440939, last visited: 20 June 2017. 9 ‘CONTEST the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report 2015’, HM Government, 21 July 2016, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539683/55469_Cm_9310_Web_Accessible_v0.11.pdf, last visited: 20 June 2017. 10 ibid. 3 received support from elements within a number of prominent unions, including the National Union of Teachers, the National Union of Students and the University and College Union.11 Allegations against Prevent have ranged from accusations of McCarthyism, spying and the stifling of free speech, through to racism, Islamophobia and the criminalisation of devout Islamic practices. In reality, the emphasis in Prevent is not on spying, but rather on trained public sector professionals being able to identify individuals who are vulnerable to being drawn into extremist activity.
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