DOCSLIB.ORG

By Salafi Manhaj

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
By Salafi Manhaj Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ SSAALLAAFFIIMMAANNHHAAJJ..CCOOMM RREESSEEAARRCCHH DDIIVVIISSIIOONN ˶ΏΎ˴Β˸γ˴΃˴Ϧ˶ϣϲϔϠ˴δϟ΍Ξ˴ϬϨ˴Ϥϟ΍Ϟ˴ϫ˶ΏΎ˴Β˸γ˴΃˴Ϧ˶ϣϲϔϠ˴δϟ΍Ξ˴ϬϨ˴Ϥϟ΍Ϟ˴ϫ ˮ˶ϑ͊ήτ˴Θϟ΍˴ϭ͋Ϯ˵Ϡϐϟ΍˴ϭ˶ΏΎϫ˸έϹ΍ˮ˶ϑ͊ήτ˴Θϟ΍˴ϭ͋Ϯ˵Ϡϐϟ΍˴ϭ˶ΏΎϫ˸έϹ΍ IISS TTHHEE SSAALLAAFFII MMAANNHHAAJJ AANN IINNDDIICCAATTOORR OOFF TTEERRRROORRIISSMM,, PPOOLLIITTIICCAALL VVIIOOLLEENNCCEE AANNDD RRAADDIICCAALLIISSAATTIIOONN?? AA CCRRIITTIICCAALL SSTTUUDDYY OOFF TTHHEE NNYYPPDD DDOOCCUUMMEENNTT:: ‘RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST – THE HOMEGROWN THREAT’, BY MITCHELL D.SILBER AND ARVIN BHATT (SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS – NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)1 1 This is available Online at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/pdf/dcpi/NYPD_Report- Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf __________________________________________________________________ 1 © SalafiManhaj 2007 Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ CONTENTS 3 Summary 7 Introduction 10 Well-Known Salafi Scholars and their Views on Terrorism, Radical Politicization and Violent Extremism 37 Key Observations about Silber and Bhatt’s Report 49 Salafi Mosques in the West that have Consistently Opposed Terrorism, Radical Politicization of Views and Violent Extremism: A Case Study of Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre (aka Masjid Ibn Taymiyyah) in London 58 Conclusion __________________________________________________________________ 2 © SalafiManhaj 2007 Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ SUMMARY Indeed, all praise is due to Allaah, we praise Him, we seek His aid, and we ask for His forgiveness. We seek refuge in Allaah from the evil of our actions and from the evil consequences of our actions. Whomever Allaah guides, there is none to misguide and whoever Allaah misguides there is none to guide. I bear witness that there is no god worthy of worship except Allaah and I bear witness that Muhammad is the servant and messenger of Allaah. ƂƊǹ Ȃ ĄǸ ÊǴ ąLj ČǷ Ƕ ĄƬ ǻ ƊƗ ăȁ ōȏ Êƛ ċǺ Ąƫ Ȃ ĄǸ ăƫ Ɗȏ ăȁ ÊǾ Êƫ Ƣ ƊǬ Ąƫ ċǪ ăƷ ăǾ ƐǴ dz ơ ƒơ Ȃ ƌǬ ċƫ ơ ƒơȂĄǼăǷƕăǺȇÊǀōdzơƢăȀČȇƊƗƢăȇƃ “O you who have believed, fear Allaah as He should be feared and do not die except as Muslims (in submission to Him).” {Aali-Imraan (3): 102} ơ ĆŚ Êư Ɗǯ Ɔȏ Ƣ ăƳ Êǁ Ƣ ăǸ ĄȀ ąǼ ÊǷ ōƮ ăƥ ăȁ Ƣ ăȀ ăƳ ąȁ ăǃ Ƣ ăȀ ąǼ ÊǷ ăǪ ƊǴ ăƻ ăȁ ÇƧ ăƾ ÊƷ ơ ăȁ Çdž ƒǨ ċǻ Ǻ ďǷ Ƕ ƌǰ ƊǬ ƊǴ ăƻ ȅ Êǀ ōdz ơ ĄǶ ƌǰ ċƥ ăǁ ƒơ Ȃ ƌǬ ċƫ ơ ĄDž Ƣ ċǼ dz ơ Ƣ ăȀ Čȇ ƊƗ Ƣ ăȇ ƃ ƂƢĆƦȈÊǫăǁąǶƌǰąȈƊǴăǟƊǹƢƊǯăǾƐǴ dz ơ ōǹ Êƛ ăǵ Ƣ ăƷ ąǁ Èȋ ơ ăȁ ÊǾ Êƥ Ɗǹ Ȃ ƌdz Ɣ Ƣ ăLj ăƫ ȅ Êǀ ōdz ơ ăǾ ƐǴ dz ơ ƒơ Ȃ ƌǬ ċƫ ơ ăȁ Ɣ Ƣ ăLj Êǻ ăȁ “O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allaah through whom you ask things from each other, and (respect) the wombs. Indeed Allaah is ever, over you, an Observer.” {an-Nisaa (4): 1} ơ Ćƾ ȇ Êƾ ăLJ Ƣ Ɔdz ąȂ Ɗǫ ơ Ȃ ƌdz Ȃ ƌǫ ăȁ ăǾ ōǴ dz ơ ơ Ȃ ƌǬ ċƫ ơ ơ Ȃ ĄǼ ăǷ ƕ ăǺ ȇ Êǀ ōdz ơ Ƣ ăȀ Čȇ ƊƗ Ƣ ăȇ ƃ ƂƢĆǸȈÊǜăǟ ơ Ćǃ ąȂ Ɗǧ ăǃ Ƣ Ɗǧ ąƾ ƊǬ Ɗǧ ĄǾ Ɗdz Ȃ ĄLJ ăǁ ăȁ ăǾ ōǴ dz ơ ąǞ Êǘ Ąȇ Ǻ ăǷ ăȁ ąǶ ƌǰ ăƥ Ȃ Ąǻ ƌƿ ąǶ ƌǰ Ɗdz ąǂ ÊǨ ąǤ ăȇ ăȁ ąǶ ƌǰ Ɗdz Ƣ ăǸ ąǟ ƊƗ ąǶ ƌǰ Ɗdz ąƶ ÊǴ ąǐ Ąȇ “O you who have believed, fear Allaah and speak words of appropriate justice. He will amend for you your deeds and forgive your sins. And whoever obeys Allaah and His Messenger has certainly attained a great attainment.” __________________________________________________________________ 3 © SalafiManhaj 2007 Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ {al-Ahzaab (33): 70-71} To proceed: Within the “war on terror” scenario the Salafi da’wah and tradition has been seen as a methodology which is the main cause, thrust and impetus for terrorism and political violence and as even promoting such radical views. A large body of research has been authored which seeks to claim that the Salafi way is indeed an extremist radical belief system which eventually manifests itself with political violence and terrorism.2 One such report which follows this rather simplistic and incorrect assertion is the latest report by the New York Police Department entitled Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat by two senior intelligence analysts for the NYPD, Mitchell D. Sibler and Arvin Bhatt. Even though they aimed to understand the process by which Muslim youth become attracted to more extreme understandings and interpretations of Islam, it fell far short of doing the subject any justice and greatly misunderstood much in this regard. One of the more glaring problems with the report is that it rather boldly holds the Salafi methodology as being the main catalyst for terrorism and then seeks to present examples of what they consider to be ‘Salafi’. Here is where the problem lies, as the two analysts Silber and Bhatt, make reference to samples which are not ‘Salafi’ in the slightest and are rather takfeeri, jihadi, ikhwaani (i.e. followers of the Muslim Brotherhood) and even at times Tablighi!? Yet all of it is placed under the poorly defined, by them, rubric of ‘Salafism’. This study hopes to critically assess some of the claims of the Sibler and Bhatt and explore the reality of the Salafi way in regards to issues related terrorism, political violence and extremism. We will actually quote from the leading and well-known Salafi scholars themselves who the Salafis hold to be their reference points – in order to assess 2 For example Marc Sageman in his book Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004) states on page 1: “The global Salafi jihad is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of re-establishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state...it preaches salafiyyah (from salaf, the Arabic word for “ancient one” [sic] and referring to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad),...” Sageman goes on to say about al-Qaeda that “Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets it goals, and guides it tactics.”!!? Then Sageman says: “What sets the global Salafi jihad apart from other terrorist campaigns is its violence against foreign non-Muslim governments and their population in furtherance of Salafi objectives.” __________________________________________________________________ 4 © SalafiManhaj 2007 Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ the assertion that adopting Salafi Islam leads to political violence and terrorism. As a result, it will be evident that the Salafi da’wah and methodology is one of the main barriers to the spread of terrorism in the world today.3 Indeed, the more stricter and serious the Salafi, the less likely the person will fall into radicalisation or terrorism: Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings, and the more “moderate”, those more open to other streams of thought, may provide slightly more fertile recruiting grounds for the jihadis.4 These are for the following reasons: 9Strict Salafis are religious and not entrenched in political activity, political involvement and rhetoric; let alone terrorism. Politics is not their first port of call, rather to educate and cultivate Muslims upon tawheed and adhering to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (sallallaahu ’alayhi wassallam) along with purifying the beliefs of the Muslims is their focal emphasis. 9Salafis frown upon forming political parties and groups which are based on partisan loyalties. 9Salafis do not hold secret clandestine meetings in order to put into place a strategic political plan. 9Salafis do not pledge allegiance to heads of organisations, groups and political parties. 9Salafis hold it to be un-Islamic to stage a revolt or rebellion against the leader of a Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader it, and especially if the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power. 9Salafis take into account the benefits and harms of any action which is done in the name of advancing the religion. 9Salafis do not agree with the targeting of innocent people in warfare based on the evidences from the Qur’aan and Sunnah. 9Those who claimed to be Salafi and then began adopting the methodology of Ikhwaan ul-Muslimeen (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood) were those who eventually 3 See for example the excellent study: Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix (International Crisis Group: September 2004). Online: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Islam/83_indonesia_backgrounder_why_salafism_and_terro rism_don_t_mix_web.pdf 4 Ibid., p.ii __________________________________________________________________ 5 © SalafiManhaj 2007 Is Salafiyyah a Cause of Terrorism? ______________________________________________________________ avoided referring to themselves as being ‘Salafi’ and rejected its well known principles. Unfortunately then, these individuals did end up leaving the Salafi way and some began to support erroneous ideas of jihad which the Salafi scholars did not endorse whatsoever. For more on the above topics refer to the lecture series entitled ‘Politics in Light of Islam’ by Shaykh Khalid al-’Anbaree which is available on www.salafimanhaj.com As a result, this in itself indicates the Salafi way and tradition is quite clear in its emphasis and position but unfortunately all of this seemed to have escaped the NYPD analysts, Sibler and Bhatt. We will also critically assess the claim made by Sibler and Bhatt in their NYPD study that regular attendance at a Salafi Mosque is a factor that leads to terrorism. We support our refutation of this claim with reference to a case study of a Salafi Mosque in the heart of London and how it has been probably the most pivotal mosque in London in opposing extremist and terrorist beliefs and methodologies.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Volunteer Initiatives
    COVID-19 RESPONSE: VOLUNTEER INITIATIVES The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said, “Seek out the vulnerable among you. Verily, you are only given provision and support due to your support of the weak.” (Tirmidhi). With many more people self-isolating, including elderly, single parents, disabled or others who are social/economically vulnerable, there are more and more volunteer initiatives being started by Muslim activists and institutions all across the UK. Check them out below. This document is constantly being updated. Your initiative not here? Email us on [email protected] to get it added! COVID-19 volunteer response initiatives by region: 1. Scotland 2. North East England 3. North West England 4. Yorkshire and the Humber 5. East Midlands 6. West Midlands 7. East England 8. Wales 9. London 10. Greater London 11. South East England 12. Wider Volunteer Initiatives SCOTLAND GLASGOW CENTRAL MOSQUE Assistance for the elderly and those living alone Contact: 01414 293132 | [email protected] VIRAL KINDNESS SCOTLAND Assistance for those in need, fostering connection across Scotland and building an army of volunteers. If you need help, if you know someone who needs help or if you as an individual, group or business wants to offer help, contact: 0800 054 2284 |www.viralkindness.scot Twitter: @ViralKindScot | Facebook: /ViralKindnessScot NORTH EAST ENGLAND NEWCASTLE CENTRAL MOSQUE Assistance in delivering essential food supplies and medicine for the elderly and vulnerable in isolation. Contact: 07426 313662 NORTH WEST ENGLAND BLACKBURN – LAMMACK PRAYER ROOM (MUSALLA) Assistance in shopping/medication collection & delivery, practical support around home and health visits Contact Sabir: 07930 242425 BLACKBURN – MASJID-E-RAZA Assistance with shopping collection and delivery, medication collection and health care visit, friendly phone call to overcome loneliness, friendly children support and practical support at home.
    [Show full text]
  • Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent
    MEDINA IN BIRMINGHAM, NAJAF IN BRENT INNES BOWEN Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent Inside British Islam HURST & COMPANY, LONDON First published in the United Kingdom in 2014 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL © Innes Bowen, 2014 All rights reserved. Printed in the USA Distributed in the United States, Canada and Latin America by Oxford University Press, 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. The right of Innes Bowen to be identified as the author of this publication is asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. A Cataloguing-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 978-1849043014 www.hurstpublishers.com This book is printed using paper from registered sustainable and managed sources. CONTENTS Acknowledgements vii Glossary ix Introduction 1 1. The Deobandis: The Market Leaders 11 2. The Tablighi Jamaat: Missionaries and a Mega Mosque 35 3. The Salafis: ‘Don’t call us Wahhabis!’ 57 4. The Jamaat-e-Islami: British Islam’s Political Class 83 5. The Muslim Brotherhood: The Arab Islamist Exiles 101 6. The Barelwis: Sufis and Traditionalists 115 7. The Shia ‘Twelvers’: Najaf in Brent 135 8. The Ismailis: The Dawoodi Bohras and the Followers of the Aga Khan 165 Notes 187 Index 211 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book could not have been completed were it not for the help of those whom it is about: the followers of Britain’s most important Islamic networks. I am grateful to the many individuals who made time to be interviewed and trusted me to tell their stories.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing Terrorism
    Policing Terrorism A Review of the Evidence Darren Thiel Policing Terrorism A Review of the Evidence Darren Thiel Policing Terrorism A Review of the Evidence Darren Thiel © 2009: The Police Foundation All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of The Police Foundation. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Police Foundation. Enquires concerning reproduction should be sent to The Police Foundation at the address below. ISBN: 0 947692 49 5 The Police Foundation First Floor Park Place 12 Lawn Lane London SW8 1UD Tel: 020 7582 3744 www.police-foundation.org.uk Acknowledgements This Review is indebted to the Barrow Cadbury Trust which provided the grant enabling the work to be conducted. The author also wishes to thank the academics, researchers, critics, police officers, security service officials, and civil servants who helped formulate the initial direction and content of this Review, and the staff at the Police Foundation for their help and support throughout. Thanks also to Tahir Abbas, David Bayley, Robert Beckley, Craig Denholm, Martin Innes and Bob Lambert for their insightful, constructive and supportive comments on various drafts of the Review. Any mistakes or inaccuracies are, of course, the author’s own. Darren Thiel, February 2009 Contents PAGE Executive Summary 1 Introduction 5 Chapter
    [Show full text]
  • Stephen Delahunty [email protected] FOI: 55307 29 October 2019
    Home Office 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF [email protected] www.homeoffice.gov.uk Stephen Delahunty [email protected] FOI: 55307 29 October 2019 Dear Mr Delahunty Thank you for your e-mail of 2 September 2019 , in which you specifically request: - all digital and physical correspondence between anyone employed in, or subcontracted to, the department's Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) and employees or representatives of Horizon PR in June 2017. Your request has been handled as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In relation to these questions, I am able to disclose some of the information that you have requested, which can be viewed in Annex B. Other information relating to your request is being withheld at this time as it is exempt from disclosure by virtue of Section 24(1) (National Security). Please find further details of this exemption in Annex A. Furthermore, the Home Office has obligations under data protection legislation and in law generally to protect personal data. We have concluded that some of the information that you have requested is also exempt from disclosure under section 40(2) (personal information) of the FOI Act, because of the condition at section 40(3A)(a). This exempts personal data if disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles in Article 5(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation and section 34(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018. If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to [email protected], quoting reference 55307.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Radicalization in the Uk: Index of Radicalization
    ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE UK: INDEX OF RADICALIZATION Anna Wojtowicz, (Research Assistant, ICT) Sumer 2012 ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of radicalization amongst British Muslims in the United Kingdom. It begins with a review of the Muslim population, demographics and community structure. Further presenting several internal and external indicators that influenced and led to radicalization of Muslim youth in Britain. The paper concludes that there is no one certainty for what causes radicalization amongst Muslims in United Kingdom. However, it is certain that Islamic radicalization and the emergence of a homegrown threat is a growing trend that jeopardizes the countries security, peace and stability. Radicalization in the United Kingdom is an existing concern that needs to be addressed and acted upon immediately. Misunderstanding or underestimating the threat may lead to further and long term consequences. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 I. Introduction 4 II. Background 5 History of the Muslim Community in the United Kingdom 5 Population 7 Geographical Concentration of Muslims 8 Ethnic Background 10 Age Estimate 11 Occupation and Socio-Economic Conditions 11 Religious and Cultural Aspects 13 Multiculturalism 17 Islamophobia 20 Converts 21 Case Studies –London, Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Leicester 22 III. Organizations 28 Organizations within the United Kingdom 28 Mosques, Koranic Schools and Islamic Centers 34 Student Groups 40 Islamic Websites and TV 43 IV. Radicalization in Britain 43 Theoretical Background and Causes of Radicalization 43 Recruitment and Radicalization: Overlook 47 Radicalization Process 49 Forms of Financing 51 Radical Groups and Movements in the UK 53 Influential Leaders in the UK 60 Inspiration and Influence from Abroad 67 Sunni 67 Shia 70 3 V.
    [Show full text]
  • Online Islamic Da'wah Narratives in the UK: the Case of Iera
    Online Islamic Da'wah Narratives in the UK: The Case of iERA by MIRA A. BAZ A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Religion and Theology College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham September 2016 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis is an in-depth study into two of the UK charity iERA's da'wah narratives: the Qura'nic embryology 'miracle' and the Kalam Cosmological Argument. While the embryo verses have received scholarly attention, there is little to no research in the da'wah context for both narratives. Berger and Luckmann's social constructionism was applied to both, which were problematic. It was found that iERA constructed its exegesis of the embryo verses by expanding on classical meanings to show harmony with modern science. Additionally, it developed the Cosmological Argument by adapting it to Salafi Islamic beliefs. The construction processes were found to be influenced by an online dialectic between iERA and its Muslim and atheist detractors, causing it to abandon the scientific miracles and modify the Cosmological Argument.
    [Show full text]
  • Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism: Failing to Prevent
    Thomas, Paul. "Index." Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism: Failing to Prevent. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. 171–177. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 28 Sep. 2021. <>. Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 28 September 2021, 16:00 UTC. Copyright © Paul Thomas 2012. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence. Index 7/7 attack 1–2, 27, 59, 109, 135 Atran, Scott 20, 31, 137 and group dynamics 31–2 al-Awlaki, Anwar 2, 33 home-grown suicide bombers 15–17 Azghar, Maz 51 Manningham-Buller comment before 120 Bakhri, Omar 109, 110 9/11 attack 1, 51, 135 Bali Islamist attacks 31 21/7 plot 30, 31 Bangladeshis 3, 11, 46, 47, 89, 136 ‘30-year rule’ 36 al-Banna, Hasan 18 Barot, Dhiren 22, 23, 58 Abdulla, Bilal 16 BBC 71, 110, 120, 125, 129 Abdullah, Daud 59 beards 90 Abdulmutallab, Farouk 16–17, 33, 109 Beeston (Leeds) 24–5, 91 ACPO (Association of Chief Police bi-cultural affi liations 48 Offi cers) 24, 63, 67, 82, 112, Bin-Laden, Osama 2, 23, 56, 137 130–1 Birmingham City Council 125 Act Now 121–2 Birt, Y. 83, 88 Advisory and Reformation Committee 56 Blair, Tony 21, 23, 46, 59, 94 Afghanistan 1, 90 Blears, Hazel 91 Al-Qaeda training camps 28, 30 Bleich, E. 119 foreign policy 21–2, 47 BNP (British National Party) 29, 94, 140 African-Caribbeans 15, 32, 36, 48, 86 and Bradford 36 agency 38, 39 and Copeland 92 Ahmed, Kafeel 16 and white, working class Al-Muhajiroun 29, 109 communities 68, 79 Al-Qaeda 2, 18, 23, 31, 74, 137 Bolton (Lancashire) 45, 100 and British Muslims 2, 45 bonding experiences 31–2 far/near enemies 19 ‘born-again’ Muslims 51, 136 manuals 113 Bradford (West Yorkshire) 36, 44, 46, and prisons 114 100, 105 and universities 109 Breivik, Anders Behring 5, 75, 93 Alam, Y.
    [Show full text]
  • Faith-Centres-Report
    SE Faith Brochure-8aug_Layout 1 07/08/2012 16:35 Page 1 Promoting ethnic diversity across sport & physical activity The role of faith centres in the provision of sport and physical activity June 2012 Summary Report by Sporting Equals SE Faith Brochure-8aug_Layout 1 07/08/2012 16:35 Page 2 Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Methodology 3 3 The National Picture 4 4 The Regional Picture 6 5 Faith Centre Research 8 5.1 Churches in the UK 8 5.2 Mosques in the UK 9 5.3 Synagogues in the UK 12 5.4 Temples in the UK 14 5.5 Gurdwaras in the UK 15 6 Insight Research 17 6.1 The Role of Faith Centres 17 6.2 On-line Participant Research 19 7 Sporting Equals Faith Centre Model 20 8 Selection of Case Studies 21 9 Conclusion 23 10 Recommendations 24 11 Appendices 25 Appendix 1 – Faith Centre Model 25 Appendix 2 – Faith Centres in London 26 Appendix 3 – Faith Centres in Birmingham 30 Appendix 4 – Faith Centres in Leicester 33 02 www.sportingequals.org.uk SE Faith Brochure-8aug_Layout 1 07/08/2012 16:35 Page 3 Promoting ethnic diversity across sport & physical activity 1 2 Introduction Methodology Religion plays an extremely important role for many The research methods used in this report include a communities in the UK and earlier research carried out mixture of desktop and on-line research, questionnaires by Sporting Equals into the role of faith centres to help and telephone surveys. These surveys were carried out drive growth in sports participation 1 revealed that faith between April and June 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ‘The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It’ July 10, 2008 Statement of Peter P. Mandaville Associate Professor of Government & Politics Co-Director, Center for Global Studies George Mason University Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Distinguished Members of the Committee: In violent Islamist extremism, the United States faces a complex, little understood, and rapidly evolving threat. I am therefore particularly grateful for the opportunity to address this important hearing, and to provide some background information that will help us contextualize and locate violent Islamism within the much broader and diverse universe of contemporary Islamic political thought and activism. I would also like to address the phenomenon of Islamism in the West (more specifically in the United Kingdom) and the question of what the United States might be able to learn from the UK’s experience of dealing with various manifestations of Islamism—violent and otherwise—in recent years. Just as Islam cannot be said to be a monolith, the same goes for Islamism as an ideological project. While it is possible to identify certain key figures and groups as being central to the genealogy of modern Islamism, those who have subsequently drawn on their ideas or organized themselves in their mold have often done so in widely varying ways—interpreting and adapting their views to disparate and sometimes even mutually exclusive agendas. If our goal today is to make some definitive determination as to whether Islamism as a political ideology fosters or hinders violent extremism, then we are likely to be disappointed.
    [Show full text]
  • British Muslims: Mosques 10 Minute Read
    CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS BRITISH MUSLIMS: MOSQUES 10 MINUTE READ Mosques provide space for daily prayer and other community gatherings. This guide provides an overview of mosques in Britain including what GENERAL they are for, and how they are governed. Mosques provide space for daily prayer, the weekly Jum’a and other community gatherings. They offer Qur’an classes for children, and the larger ones host Shari‘ah Councils. KEY POINTS • Approximately 85 per cent of British Muslims • Internal mosque disputes concern are Sunni; 15 per cent are Shi‘a. management and election issues. At times, conflicts also take place between • In 2017, there were 1,825 mosques in the neighbouring mosques, or mosques of UK. The majority were associated with South different sects. Asian reform movements (72 per cent). Drawing on Middle Eastern traditions, nine • Mosques have become a target for hate per cent were Salafi, with three per cent crimes. representing mainstream Arab or African • Although many mosques are religiously Sunni Islam. Around six per cent were run conservative, few have been linked to jihadi by and for Shi‘as (including Ismailis). The extremism, a key exception being Finsbury remainder were non-sectarian prayer rooms. Park Mosque in north London. • In 2017, 72 per cent of mosques had facilities • The suitability, training and standards of for women, though the nature and extent of mosque leadership have been discussed these varied. within Muslim communities and by • Mosques provide space for daily prayer, the Government with a review published in 2010 weekly Jum’a and other community gatherings.
    [Show full text]
  • “MARKAZ JAMIAT AHL-E-HADITH UK” (Markaz Jam’Iyyah Ahlul-Hadeeth UK)
    The Deviations Of The “MARKAZ JAMIAT AHL-E-HADITH UK” (Markaz Jam’iyyah Ahlul-Hadeeth UK) The Clear Errors of its Heads & its Lecturers A Deviated Methodology An Organization concerned with politics False Accusations against those who advise it False Attacks invented against Salafi Publications Falsely Narrating to the Shaikhs Those who defend the Organization blindly The global effect of the Organization in harming the Salafi da’wah 1 CONTENTS Page 3 | Chapter 1 | JAM’IYYAH AHL-E-HADITH HEADQUARTERS, GREEN LANE MOSQUE, HOST THE 'RESPECT' SOCIALIST PARTY CANDIDATE, SALMA YA’QOOB Page 5 |Chapter 2 | HEADS OF THE JAM’IYYAH AHLUL-HADITH UK DECLARE OPEN SUPPORT FOR THE SOCIALIST PARTY. THE PHOTO IN THE ATTACHED IMAGE IS THAT OF ABDUL-HADI AL-OMARI Page 3 | Chapter 3 | SUHAYB HASAN IS UPON “EUROPEAN COUNCIL FOR FATWA AND RESEARCH” ALONGSIDE PEOPLE OF INNOVATION AND HEADS OF DEVIATION Page 8 | Chapter 4 | SUHAIB HASAN OF JAM’IYYAH AHLUL-HADITH ON STAGE CO-OPERATING WITH EXTREME SOOFEES & OTHERS FROM AHLUL-BID'AH! IN JUNE 2006 Page 10 | Chapter 5 | JAM’IYYAH HEAD CLAIMS THAT DEMOCRACY IS SUPPORTED BY THE SHAREE’AH Page 13 | Chapter 6 | THE HEADS OF THE JAM’IYYAH CALL TO UNITY WITH THE DEVIATED GROUPS WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS Page 15 | Chapter 7 | A JAM’IYYAH AHLUL-HADEETH PUBLICATION PRAISING SOME OF THE AHLUL-BID’AH AND PUTTING THEM ALONGSIDE THE IMAAMS OF SUNNAH Page 17 | Chapter 9 | SUHAIB HASAN OF JAMIAT AHLE-HADITH UK JOINS CELEBRATION OF PROPHET’S BIRTHDAY!! Page 20 | Chapter 10 | ABU USAMAH KHALIFAH ADH-DHAHABI & HIS SPEECH CONCERNING THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTS.
    [Show full text]
  • The Danish Cartoons and Modern Iconoclasm in the Cosmopolitan Muslim Diaspora Jytte Klausen
    Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009), 86–118 The Danish Cartoons and Modern Iconoclasm in the Cosmopolitan Muslim Diaspora Jytte Klausen Twelve caricatures or cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad were pub- lished in Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper, on September 30, 2005. Two weeks later, the Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was presented with two letters. One was a letter of complaint from a group of ambassadors representing eleven Islamic countries in Den- mark. A nearly identical letter arrived from the Organization of the Is- lamic Conference (OIC), an intergovernmental organization of ªfty- seven Muslim countries, which coordinated the diplomatic protests against the cartoons. Coinciding with the arrival of the letters, three thousand Danish Muslims demonstrated in Copenhagen, demanding an apology from the newspaper for insulting Muslims by printing images of the Prophet. Four months later, violent demonstrations were held from Nepal to Nigeria. The cartoons commanded global attention. Nearly 80 percent of the individuals included in a thirteen-country public-opinion survey con- ducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 had heard about the cartoons, a number that rose to 90 percent in Jordan and Egypt and in the four European countries surveyed. The survey also showed an over- whelming inclination to attribute fault to the other side. Muslims thought that Western arrogance was at fault; non-Muslim Westerners thought that Muslims were at fault.1 The cartoons are still available on many Internet sites.2 During the conºict, writers in the Western press often argued that Muslims are pious iconoclasts who have their own religious and politi- cal reasons for wanting to restrict non-Muslims’ use of images.
    [Show full text]