IN THE ARENA INQUIRY

A PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS OF 22 PEOPLE THAT LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE ATTACK AT THE MANCHESTER ARENA ON 22ND MAY 2017

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OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF ROBERT BOYLE, PAUL HETT AND PAUL PRICE

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COUNSEL: Guy Gozem Q.C. Austin Welch Leila Ghahhary Lincoln House Chambers Tower 12, Spinningfields, Manchester M3 3BZ Tel: 0161 832 5701

SOLICITORS: Ms Erin Shoesmith Ms Priscilla Addo-Quaye Addleshaw Goddard LLP One St Peter’s Square Manchester M2 3DE Tel: 0161 934 6000

INQ035477/1 IN THE MANCHESTER ARENA INQUIRY

A PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS OF 22 PEOPLE THAT LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE ATTACK AT THE MANCHESTER ARENA ON 22ND MAY 2017

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WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF ROBERT BOYLE, PAUL HETT AND PAUL PRICE

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Introduction

1. This opening statement is made on behalf of Robert Boyle, the father of Courtney Boyle, Paul Hett, the father of Martyn Hett, and Paul Price, the partner of Elaine McIver.

2. At shortly before 10.30pm on Monday 22nd May 2017, Courtney Boyle, Martyn Hett and Elaine McIver all found themselves in the City Room foyer of the Manchester Arena. The City Room was a meeting place. Martyn Hett had attended the concert and was waiting for friends before going on to another venue; he was celebrating as he was due to be travelling to America the following Wednesday for a 2 month holiday. Courtney Boyle was waiting to pick up her younger sister Nicole, aged 15, who had been to the concert. Elaine McIver, who was in company with her partner Paul Price, was waiting to pick up Paul’s daughter Gabrielle, aged 13, and her friend Macie, aged 14, who had also been to the concert.

INQ035477/2 3. Courtney, Martyn and Elaine did not know one another, they had never met and had never spoken with one another. However, they did share one thing in common that they also shared with other members of the public who were waiting for their loved ones in the City Rooms on 22nd May 2017 or who were leaving the concert; they believed that the area was safe and they believed that they were safe. Tragically, they were all mistaken.

4. The Chairman has indicated that he would be assisted by statements from the family teams that identify topics within the terms of reference that are of specific interest to us and to explain why those topics will be our focus during the course of the oral hearings. We present this statement as the fourth of the four family teams. Our aims are complementary to the other teams, our goals are shared. We have cooperated fully with the other teams and with the Inquiry Legal Team and will continue to do so. In this opening statement we do not intend to simply repeat those matters that have been raised by the other family teams. However there are two primary questions that Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price have and which they hope that your Inquiry will be able to answer:

(i) How was it that Salman Abedi was allowed to be in a position whereby he could detonate a bomb in the City Room at 10.32 pm on 22 May 2017?

(ii) Could the tragic events of 22 May 2017 and the deaths of their loved ones have been avoided?

Background

5. We have chosen our words in relation to the first question carefully and deliberately. The disclosure of material by the Inquiry Legal Team to the families and other core participants over the past 18 months, that will be presented to and considered by the Chairman during the course of this Inquiry, has revealed a series of mistakes, errors and missed opportunities by state agencies, corporate bodies and individuals charged with ensuring the safety of members of the public generally, attendees at events in the Arena and people attending the City Room itself.

INQ035477/3 6. The attack at the Manchester Arena was, tragically, not exceptional nor should it have been unforeseeable. The actions of all Core Participants in this Inquiry, but particularly those involved in security, both at a national level and in relation to the Arena and Victoria Station complex specifically, must be viewed in the proper context of the threat posed by on and before 22nd May 2017.

7. In 2016, there had been 16 Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe. The multi-sited attacks in Paris, which included the attack at a concert at the Bataclan theatre had occurred only 18 months before the Manchester attack. Prior to 22nd May there had already been 5 Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe in 2017, and only 2 months before, on 22nd March 2017, 5 people were killed and 50 injured when an Islamist terrorist drove into pedestrians on Bridge and stabbed an unarmed police officer.

8. In response to the March 2017 Westminster attack, Prime Minister Teresa May gave a statement to Parliament. She said as follows:

“We know the threat from Islamist terrorism is very real. But while the public should remain utterly vigilant they should not – and will not – be cowed by this threat.

As Acting Deputy Commissioner Rowley has made clear, we are stepping up policing to protect communities across the country and to reassure the public.

And as a precautionary measure, this will mean increasing the number of patrols in cities across the country with more police and more armed police on the streets.

But the greatest response lies not in the words of politicians, but in the everyday actions of ordinary people.

For beyond these walls today – in scenes repeated in towns and cities across the country – millions of people are going about their days and getting on with their lives.

The streets are as busy as ever.

The offices full. The coffee shops and cafes bustling.

INQ035477/4 It is in these actions – millions of acts of normality – that we find the best response to terrorism.

A response that denies our enemies their victory. That refuses to let them win. That shows we will never give in.”

9. On the same day NaCTSO provided a security update in the following terms:

Following the tragic incident on and at the on 22 March 2017 it is important that the police, security stance and the private sector are joined up. To ensure this NaCTSO recommend businesses consider some protective security tactics to aid their security, whilst remembering that the threat level remains at ‘SEVERE’.

The attack incorporated multiple methodologies - as such no one security element will wholly mitigate such attacks. We understand that people responsible for building security have differing priorities, some being responsible for large iconic sites and others for small businesses, but the message remains the same - effective security and effective communities defeat terrorism

We know that terrorists will undertake hostile reconnaissance ahead of conducting an attack and increased vigilance by staff and the creation of a hostile environment combats such hostile reconnaissance. You should refresh the knowledge of staff that have received Project Griffin and Project Argus training and deploy staff who have received training in behavioural detection (where you have them).

Staff should be encouraged to proactively challenge visitors, vehicles, and anything out of place.

It is important that you review your security plans; consider the following options from the National Stakeholder Menu of Options, particularly around crowded places, night- time economy, and iconic sites. It is recommended that businesses look at the full menu and consider any other options that suit your premises or organisation.

INQ035477/5 10. The threat level remained at severe, meaning that an attack was highly likely. Yet Courtney Boyle, Martyn Hett and Elaine McIver fulfilled their part of the bargain in responding to that threat. They went about their daily lives as before. They engaged in acts of normality, and there can be nothing more normal than a young man celebrating with his friends by going to a pop concert or parents and older siblings waiting in an area with hundreds of others to meet and take home their family members, teenage girls, who had attended the pop concert.

Term of Reference 4 – The Security Arrangements Within and Outside the Arena

11. Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price now believe that whilst their family members fulfilled their part of the bargain, others did not. The first topics within the terms of reference that our clients are most concerned with, are those concerning the security arrangements within and outside the Arena – term of reference 4. This matter has become the cause of anguish and distress for our clients because of what they now know in relation to the security measures that were employed at the Arena and the events of the evening of 22nd May 2017. These concerns have given rise to a number of questions that our clients hope will be answered by this Inquiry. There are 5 matters that have caused our clients particular concern and that have meant that the matters listed in terms of reference 4 are, for them, a priority.

12. Firstly, it is now known that Salman Abedi alighted the Metrolink at Victoria Station at just after 8.30pm. He was carrying a large rucksack containing the explosive device he would later detonate. He spent the next 2 hours within the Victoria Station complex, entering the City Room for the first time at shortly after ten minutes to 9pm. He remained there for 19 minutes. He then wandered through the station and spent time waiting at the Metrolink platform before, again, returning to the City Room at 9:33pm where he remained until the bomb was detonated, just under 1 hour later. He did not fit the audience profile for the Ariana Grande concert. When walking he was struggling with the weight of the bag. There were a number of security guards employed by Showsec in the City Room and patrolling the walkway throughout this period, he was clearly observed by some. There were CCTV cameras in operation.

INQ035477/6 13. Our clients want to know how Salman Abedi, carrying a large rucksack filled with explosives, in no way fitting the audience demographic for the Ariana Grande concert and standing out like a sore thumb was allowed to go unchallenged in Victoria Station, the overhead bridge to the City Room and within the City Room itself for such a significant period of time. Given the threat level as it existed at the time and what had happened in the preceding 18 months, why did nobody who was charged with ensuring security in the City Room and the surrounding locations approach or challenge Salman Abedi, or alert others to his presence, particularly in the 1 hour period preceding the detonation of the IED? What went wrong in respect of the individuals employed on the night and the systems under which they operated that allowed him to go unchallenged by the security staff for such a considerable period of time?

14. Secondly, it is now known that a member of the public not only noticed Salman Abedi acting suspiciously in the City Room but was so concerned that he approached Abedi to ask what he was doing and, at 10:14 pm, also approached a Showsec security staff member in the City Room to report his concerns. While the Showsec security staff member reported this to another staff member 9 minutes later, and whilst Abedi was clearly seen by the Showsec staff, he was allowed to remain in the City Room, unchallenged until he detonated the device. Our clients, and we expect the whole world, wants to know how and why Salman Abedi, after having been identified to security staff by a member of the public, was allowed to remain in the City Room unchallenged and unapproached, for nearly 18 minutes whilst members of the public, including their loved ones continued to congregate there in greater numbers as the concert inside drew to a close. The families of those who died deserve explanations from the individuals involved and the organisations who employ them as to how this was allowed to happen; what the individual failures were as well as the systemic failures at corporate level that led to this tragic set of events. The facts in relation to this missed opportunity are both shocking and stark and this Inquiry is the time for those responsible for this error both at individual and corporate level to accept that responsibility and we call on them to do so.

15. Thirdly, four police officers from the British Transport Police attended at Victoria Station to provide policing for the evening and to provide a visual deterrent. Despite the fact that Salman Abedi moved throughout the station and certain officers actually

INQ035477/7 went to patrol the City Room, no challenge was made to him by the officers. Our clients want to know:

 What were the officers doing over the course of the evening? What was their focus and why did they not see Salman Abedi?

 What was their briefing, what were they there to do?

 Why, given the terror threat and the promise of an increased level of more officers, including armed officers to patrol the streets was it left to three PCSOs and one police constable with only 8 months experience in that role to provide the police presence at Victoria Station for the evening?

 Why was PC Corke, an officer of 30 years’ experience who had experience of policing at concerts at the Arena and who was meant to be at Victoria Station on 22 May 2017 throughout the evening, absent and why more was not done because of his absence?

16. Fourthly, it is now known that Salman Abedi had gone to the Arena on more than one occasion in the days before 22nd May 2017 to conduct hostile reconnaissance. Having returned from Libya on May 18th, 4 days before the attack, he carried out the first. It is also known that Abedi conducted further reconnaissance of the Arena the night before the attack on the evening of 21st May 2017 and on that same evening a Showsec steward reported to his superiors that he had seen a male in dark clothing stood on the staircase which leads to Victoria Station from the Arena taking photographs of the CCTV cameras. Nothing appears to have been done in relation to that report. Abedi visited yet again on the night of the attack, at about 6:30pm. Our clients want to know why Salman Abedi was not spotted on these occasions? Why was more not done in relation to the report that was made on 21st May, particularly given the threat level as it existed at the time?

17. Fifthly our clients invite you to explore the systems and procedures that were employed by the operators of Arena and the security company they employed to ensure the safety

INQ035477/8 of the City Room, particularly in relation to the threat posed by a terrorist attack. This encompasses both the system for assessing the risk and also the systems to properly mitigate that risk. The risk of a further terrorist attack in the UK in 2017 was well known. The particular risk to crowded places, of which the Arena had been identified as such, was known about and emphasised time and time again. The words of the Prime Minister and the advice of NaCTSO, provided less than 2 months before, should have been at the forefront of the minds of those who operated the Arena and who provided security there. Those messages, those warnings should have fed through into everything that those organisations were doing. And yet:

 the Ariana Grande concert was assessed as being low risk;

 the risk posed by a terrorist attack largely overlooked;

 the consideration given to the safety of those exiting the Arena or waiting for loved ones in the City Rooms virtually none existent; and

 the actual security deterrent provided at the Arena was scant, with searches focused far more on ensuring that children did not bring food and drink into the Arena than ensuring that those same children were safe.

18. Our clients are concerned that the systems and procedures employed by the operators of the Arena and the company contracted to provide security were insufficient and rendered the City Room as unsafe and vulnerable to the attack that followed. When considering evidence on these matters we ask you to consider what was the primary focus of those organisations: profit or safety?

19. These five matters are just some of the examples of failings at individual and corporate level that cause deep concern to our clients that the security arrangements within and outside the Arena were inadequate. The focus of our clients is summed up in term of reference 4(vi) “The impact, if any, of any inadequacies in the security arrangements, including whether any inadequacies contributed to the extent of the loss of life that occurred.” Why is this of particular interest? Because of the deep and real concern that

INQ035477/9 this terrible attack, and the loss of the lives of their loved ones, could and indeed should, have been avoided.

Term of Reference 1 – Whether the Attack by Salman Abedi Could have been Prevented by the Authorities

20. The concern that this attack could and should have been avoided, brings us to the second area of particular interest to our clients, term of reference 1 “whether the attack by Salman Abedi could have been prevented by the Authorities.”

21. The attack of 22nd May 2017 did not happen spontaneously. It had been planned and developed over weeks, months and perhaps even years. Salman Abedi was not unknown to the security services. Salman Abedi had displayed signs of radicalisation and extremist views. The concern that our clients have is that there were numerous missed opportunities, chances for intervention and markers not picked up. The overriding concern is that had things been done differently by the security services and others this attack could have been prevented.

22. The background and radicalisation of Salman Abedi are significant matters in this Inquiry. It became clear in the days that followed the attack that Salman Abedi was not an unknown ‘’ but an individual who had started on the path towards the events of 22nd May 2017 many years before and had come to the attention of the authorities on a number of previous occasions. Again there are a number of shocking and disturbing facts in relation to Salman Abedi which we now know:

 His father appears to have been a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group an armed Islamist Group that had been designated as a terrorist organisation by both the UK and United States governments. In September 2015 Ismail Abedi (Salman Abedi’s brother) was subject to ports examination as social media showed "content of concern", a matter referred to CPS for consideration of a Terrorism Act charge. The Grieve report went so far as to say that “post attack it appears highly likely that Salman and Hashem’s extremist views were influenced by their father and fostered by other members of their immediate family.”

INQ035477/10  Since 2011, Salman Abedi had travelled with his father to Libya on the pretence of delivering aid and medical supplies to rebels fighting the Gaddafi regime. He frequently travelled between the UK and Libya without any attempt being made by the authorities to monitor or restrict his travel; quite the contrary in fact, with the Royal Navy rescuing him and his brother from Libya in 2014. Salman Abedi was permitted to return to this country from Libya via Germany on 18 May 2017, again unchecked and unchallenged, days before the attack and with the clear intention of causing misery and grief to as many innocent lives as possible.

 Both Salman and Hashem Abedi associated with certain members of the Libyan community in Manchester who had expressed extreme Islamist views and Salman Abedi had expressed similar views himself.

 Salman Abedi had even gone as far as to visit a convicted terrorist, variously described as an ISIS recruiter, whilst he was a serving prisoner in January 2017.

23. Crucially important is the knowledge that the UK Security Services had of Salman Abedi. From publicly available sources it is now known:

 He had first come to the attention of the security services in 2010.

 He became a subject of interest in 2014 and appears to have been the subject of reporting on numerous occasions from mid-2015 onwards.

 Despite his frequent travel between the UK and Libya no travel restrictions were placed on him. When one considers the Abedi family’s links with Libyan extremists and the knowledge that MI5 had in relation to Salman Abedi his frequent and unchecked travel between the countries is a cause of alarm. This is not a concern that only we have:

Consider what Andrew Parker, Head of MI5 said in Open Session to Intelligence and Security Committee, Thursday, 7th November 2013

INQ035477/11 2.00pm, during the period that Salman Abedi was making his trips between the countries:

“A very important strand of the threat we face is the way in which there is interaction between people who live in this country, who sympathise with or support the Al-Qaeda ideology and they travel to areas where they meet these Al-Qaeda groupings, either Al-Qaeda itself in South Asia or some of these other groupings I have talked about across other regions, because the attractiveness to these groupings is then they meet British citizens who are willing to engage in terrorism and they task them to do so, back at home where they have a higher impact in this country. We have seen that played out in previous plots here, including, as I mentioned, 7/7."

Andrew Parker could not have been clearer that in 2013, MI5 were fully aware of the threat that can arise in precisely the circumstances of Salman Abedi’s visits to Libya.

 We now know that Abedi had been flagged for a review as being a person of concern and subject for further investigation in the weeks before the attack.

24. In spite of all the issues relating to Salman Abedi’s background, despite all the warning signs, despite him being known to the authorities as a subject of interest, neither Salman Abedi nor any member of his family was ever referred to the PREVENT programme and no consideration appears to have been given to it. Again one need only look to the words of Mr Parker on 7 November 2013:

"As you rightly say, PREVENT is also an important pillar of the Government's counter terrorist strategy, and it is the one that gets at dealing with the problem of vulnerable individuals who are exposed to this toxic and twisted message of violence. It is certainly part of what we do with the police to refer people into that programme, wherever we can, wherever it offers a sensible way for dealing with the problem."

INQ035477/12 25. It is also clear from publicly available reports (the Grieve Report), that some of the issues and concerns arising in relation to the way in which the Authorities dealt with, or rather, did not deal with Salman Abedi, were issues that had been previously highlighted following the tragic in the Woolwich Report of 2014 and following the 2006 London Bombings in the 7/7 Report of 2009. Our clients hope to understand through this Inquiry, why deficiencies in the Authorities’ terrorism prevention systems, which were known about 8 years earlier, were still not remedied in 2017. Consequently, Salman Abedi was free to travel to and from Libya, associate with convicted terrorists and, remain totally outside the very PREVENT programme which was designed to stop him from going on to commit the abhorrent attack on the evening of the 22nd May 2017.

26. It is difficult, when presented with these facts, for the three family members we represent not to have the gravest concerns that there was far more that the authorities could have done in the years preceding the attack and even in the days prior to the attack to monitor Salman Abedi and potentially deter him from committing the atrocity on 22 May 2017.

27. The two issues of the security arrangements at and outside the Arena and whether the authorities could have prevented the attack by Salman Abedi are of the most significance and concern for our clients because of the real and justified concern that this attack was preventable, that Salman Abedi could have been stopped, that there were numerous missed opportunities and that whilst politicians were telling members of the public that the best way to deal terrorism was to go about living their day to day lives, those responsible for ensuring the security of the public in general and in particular the public who attended the City Room on 22nd May 2017 failed in their duties to protect those that died.

Term of Reference 5 – The Emergency Response

28. A great deal of time and publicity outside of this Inquiry has been focused on the emergency response to the attack. This is of lesser concern to our three clients than the matters alluded to above. However, it remains a concern for two reasons.

INQ035477/13 29. Firstly, as the loved ones of people who lost theirs at the Manchester Arena, all three of our clients hope that mistakes made in the emergency response will be identified, recognised and accepted in the hope that lessons will be learnt from those mistakes so that, if there is another tragedy such as the Arena attack, lives may be saved in the future.

30. Secondly, Paul Price as well as losing Elaine McIver on 22nd May 2017 is, himself a survivor of the attack. He suffered life changing injuries and so has a particular concern in relation to the adequacy of the emergency response.

31. We wish to make clear that all three of our clients wish to acknowledge and express their gratitude to all of those involved in the emergency response. During the course of this Inquiry the Chairman will hear accounts of a number of police officers, paramedics and members of the public who put concerns about their own safety to one side and went to try and assist the casualties in the City Room, not knowing what danger awaited them. No words of thanks will be sufficient, no public acknowledgment of their bravery will do their actions justice, but we offer them, nevertheless.

32. But it appears that mistakes were made, particularly mistakes at senior and command and control levels. All 5 of the matters listed under term of reference 5 are of concern to our clients, but what they do not want in consideration of these matters is to necessarily blame individuals and find individual fault. Of greater importance is to address why certain mistakes were made on 22nd May 2017 so that they will not be made again. This is particularly relevant because, quite properly, the emergency services and others spend time and resources planning for events such as the attack that occurred at the Manchester Arena and a number of exercises were conducted in the years preceding the attack. It is a striking and concerning fact that a number of mistakes that were identified in these exercises were repeated on the night of the attack.

33. This concern goes further. Mistakes that were made in the emergency response to other terror attacks prior to that at the Manchester Arena, that were subsequently identified and recognised, were again repeated on 22nd May 2017. It is perhaps worth considering a passage from the JESIP Interoperability Framework second edition, published in July

INQ035477/14 2016, that has particular relevance to the emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack:

“The need for a joint response is not new. The findings and lessons identified by public inquiries and inquests have highlighted cases where the emergency services could have worked better together and shown much greater levels of communication, co-operation and co-ordination.”

34. Above all else in relation to the emergency response, Robert Boyle, Paul Hett and Paul Price hope that there will be recognition of what went wrong, actual and effective change made and constructive solutions found to ensure that such mistakes are not made again.

Conclusion

35. In conclusion the three family members we represent use this opening statement to make an appeal to all of the core participants in this inquiry. The Manchester Arena attack occurred over three years ago. Perhaps not everyone will remember where they were when they heard of the attack. But every right minded person will remember the horror they felt when they first heard the details of what had happened that night. The deliberate targeting of our young people, our children, their parents and loved ones, at a pop concert was a sickening act of barbarism. The revulsion and horror that we felt as members of the public is but a modicum of the suffering and pain that the families of those who died have gone through.

36. Those family members have waited patiently and with great dignity for this day to arrive. They have waited over 3 years for answers to the many questions they have, including how this terrible attack was allowed to happen. The response to such an act of barbarism ought not to be for individuals and corporate core participants to adopt defensive, litigious positions. The only response that might convey any dignity would be for core participants to approach this Inquiry in the spirit of honesty, openness and co-operation.

INQ035477/15 37. We invite all core participants to approach the Inquiry in this way, as a mark of respect for those that died, out of sympathy for their families and in recognition that such an approach will provide the Chairman with the ability to make meaningful findings and recommendations that have the best chance of ensuring that such a tragedy might not happen again.

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