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A Review of Thee Kian Wie's Major
Economics and Finance in Indonesia Vol. 61 No. 1, 2015 : 41-52 p-ISSN 0126-155X; e-ISSN 2442-9260 41 The Indonesian Economy from the Colonial Extraction Period until the Post-New Order Period: A Review of Thee Kian Wie’s Major Works Maria Monica Wihardjaa,∗, Siwage Dharma Negarab,∗∗ aWorld Bank Office Jakarta bIndonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) Abstract This paper reviews some major works of Thee Kian Wie, one of Indonesia’s most distinguished economic historians, that spans from the Colonial period until the post-New Order period. His works emphasize that economic history can guide future economic policy. Current problems in Indonesia were resulted from past policy failures. Indonesia needs to consistently embark on open economic policies, free itself from "colonial period mentality". Investment should be made in rebuilding crumbling infrastructure, improving the quality of health and education services, and addressing poor law enforcement. If current corruption persists, Indone- sia could not hope to become a dynamic and prosperous country. Keywords: Economic History; Colonial Period; Industrialization; Thee Kian Wie Abstrak Tulisan ini menelaah beberapakarya besar Thee Kian Wie, salah satu sejarawan ekonomi paling terhormat di Indonesia, mulai dari periode penjajahan hingga periode pasca-Orde Baru. Karya Beliau menekankan bahwa sejarah ekonomi dapat memberikan arahan dalam perumusan kebijakan ekonomi mendatang. Permasalahan yang dihadapi Indonesia dewasa ini merupakan akibat kegagalan kebijakan masa lalu. In- donesia perlu secara konsisten menerapkan kebijakan ekonomi terbuka, membebaskan diri dari "mentalitas periode penjajahan". Investasi perlu ditingkatkan untuk pembangunan kembali infrastruktur, peningkatan kualitas layanan kesehatan dan pendidikan, serta pembenahan penegakan hukum. Jika korupsi saat ini berlanjut, Indonesia tidak dapat berharap untuk menjadi negara yang dinamis dan sejahtera. -
Widjojonomics Sampai Habibienomics Widjojonomics Sampai Habibienomics
Fajar Nur Alam WIDJOJONOMICS SAMPAI HABIBIENOMICS WIDJOJONOMICS SAMPAI HABIBIENOMICS Oleh : Fajar Nur Alam dan Farida Sarimaya1 ABSTRACT This article entitled “Widjojonomics to Habibienomics: Different views of Economic thoughts of Widjojo Nitisastro and B.J Habibie towards Indonesian Economy in the New Order.” The main issues raised in this study is how differing ideas of B.J Habibie and Nitisastro Widjojo about Indonesian economy in the New Order era in 1971-1999. The method used in this bachelor thesis research is historical method, which is conducted in following steps: heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography, while the technique used is literature study. Based on the study, several conclusions can be drawn. The government of New Order started its governance with economic crisis. To solve it, therefore stabilization and rehabilitation of national economy is needed. Widjojo Nitisastro and B. J. have different background both in terms of their youth life and education. That is what influences the characters and ways of their thinking. Economic principal of Widjojo Nitisastro, which often called as Widjojonomics, exemplifies that modernization of economic system that covers market, fiscal and foreign debt is expected to give birth to a trickle-down effect, which assumes that if the policy is intended to provide benefits for the rich, the poor would also be impacted through the employment expansion, income distribution and market expansion. Economic principal of B.J Habibie, which often called as Habibienomics, is a system of economy that should be developed though the seizure of advanced technology to catch up with developed countries. Indonesia should not only be a state that can only produce goods that have comparative advantages. -
Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: a Preliminary Analysis*
Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: A Preliminary Analysis* Shiraishi Takashi** Indonesia underwent enormous political and institutional changes in the wake of the 1997–98 economic crisis and the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. Yet something curious happened under President Yudhoyono: a politics of economic growth has returned in post-crisis decentralized, democratic Indonesia. The politics of economic growth is politics that transforms political issues of redistribution into problems of output and attempts to neutralize social conflict in favor of a consensus on growth. Under Soeharto, this politics provided ideological legitimation to his authoritarian regime. The new politics of economic growth in post-Soeharto Indo- nesia works differently. Decentralized democracy created a new set of conditions for doing politics: social divisions along ethnic and religious lines are no longer suppressed but are contained locally. A new institutional framework was also cre- ated for the economic policy-making. The 1999 Central Bank Law guarantees the independence of the Bank Indonesia (BI) from the government. The Law on State Finance requires the government to keep the annual budget deficit below 3% of the GDP while also expanding the powers of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) at the expense of National Development Planning Agency. No longer insulated in a state of political demobilization as under Soeharto, Indonesian technocracy depends for its performance on who runs these institutions and the complex political processes that inform their decisions and operations. Keywords: Indonesia, technocrats, technocracy, decentralization, democratization, central bank, Ministry of Finance, National Development Planning Agency At a time when Indonesia is seen as a success story, with its economy growing at 5.9% on average in the post-global financial crisis years of 2009 to 2012 and performing better * I would like to thank Caroline Sy Hau for her insightful comments and suggestions for this article. -
Ali Wardhana
VOLUME XIII / NO. 145 / OKTOBER 2019 ALI WARDHANA Usianya terbilang muda kala beban negara dipercayakan padanya. Warisan persoalan ekonomi menunggu dibereskan. Di tangan Ali dan timnya, hiperinflasi dicundangi, institusi keuangan dibenahi, penerimaan negara dikukuhkan, pun kualitas hidup masyarakat dieskalasi. Kecakapan dan kejujuran nurani jadi modal lima belas tahun mengampu Menteri Keuangan. EDISI KHUSUS VOL. XIII / NO. 133 / OKTOBER 2018 1 ISSN 1907-6320 Daftar Isi Diterbitkan oleh: Sekretariat Jenderal Kementerian Keuangan. Pelindung: Menteri Keuangan LAPORAN UTAMA Sri Mulyani Indrawati. Pengarah: Wakil Menteri Keuangan Mardiasmo. Penanggung Jawab: 17 Ali Wardhana, 1928 - 2015 Sekretaris Jenderal Kementerian Keuangan Hadiyanto. Pemimpin Umum: Kepala Biro Komunikasi dan Layanan Informasi Nufransa Wira Sakti. Pemimpin Redaksi: 20 Infografis Kabag Manajemen Publikasi, Rahmat Widiana. Redaktur Pelaksana: Yani Kurnia A. Dewan 22 Tuan Pelopor Pembaruan Birokrasi Redaksi: Ferry Gunawan, Dianita Suliastuti, Titi Susanti, Budi Sulistyo, Pilar Wiratoma, 25 Sang Penegak Reformasi Pajak Purwo Widiarto, Muchamad Maltazam, Sri Moeji S, Alit Ayu Meinarsari, Teguh Warsito, Hadi 27 Tegas Tuntas Membenahi Surono, Ali Ridho, Budi Prayitno, Budi Sulistiyo. Tim Redaksi: Farida Rosadi, Reni Saptati D.I, Danik Setyowati, Abdul Aziz, Rostamaji, Adik Tejo Waskito, Arif Nur Rokhman, Ferdian 29 Agar Berkah Minyak Tak Jadi Musibah Jati Permana, Andi Abdurrochim, Muhammad Fabhi Riendi, Leila Rizki Niwanda, Kurnia Fitri 30 Berimbang dahulu, Bertumbuh Anidya, Buana Budianto Putri, Muhammad Irfan, Arimbi Putri, Nur Iman, Berliana, Hega Susilo, Kemudian Ika Luthfi Alzuhri, Agus Tri Hananto, Irfan Bayu Redaktur Foto: Anas Nur Huda, Resha Aditya 34 Penakluk Hiperinflasi Pratama, Fransiscus Edy Santoso, Andi Al Hakim, Muhammad Fath Kathin, Arief Kuswanadji, Intan Nur 37 Vokal di Forum Global Shabrina, Ichsan Atmaja, Megan Nandia, Sugeng Wistriono, Rezky Ramadhani, Arif Taufiq Nugroho. -
H. Bachtiar Bureaucracy and Nation Formation in Indonesia In
H. Bachtiar Bureaucracy and nation formation in Indonesia In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 128 (1972), no: 4, Leiden, 430-446 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 09:13:37AM via free access BUREAUCRACY AND NATION FORMATION IN INDONESIA* ^^^tudents of society engaged in the study of the 'new states' in V J Asia and Africa have often observed, not infrequently with a note of dismay, tihe seeming omnipresence of the government bureau- cracy in these newly independent states. In Indonesia, for example, the range of activities of government functionaries, the pegawai negeri in local parlance, seems to be un- limited. There are, first of all and certainly most obvious, the large number of people occupying official positions in the various ministries located in the captital city of Djakarta, ranging in each ministry from the authoritative Secretary General to the nearly powerless floor sweepers. There are the territorial administrative authorities, all under the Minister of Interna! Affairs, from provincial Governors down to the village chiefs who are electecl by their fellow villagers but who after their election receive their official appointments from the Govern- ment through their superiors in the administrative hierarchy. These territorial administrative authorities constitute the civil service who are frequently idenitified as memibers of the government bureaucracy par excellence. There are, furthermore, as in many another country, the members of the judiciary, personnel of the medical service, diplomats and consular officials of the foreign service, taxation officials, technicians engaged in the construction and maintenance of public works, employees of state enterprises, research •scientists, and a great number of instruc- tors, ranging from teachers of Kindergarten schools to university professors at the innumerable institutions of education operated by the Government in the service of the youthful sectors of the population. -
Indo 54 0 1106967521 149
F o r t h e S a k e o f D e b t M a n a g e m e n t : How w a s P residential D e c r e e No. 39/1991 D r a f t e d ? The Editors On September 4,1991, President Soeharto issued Presidential Decree No. 39/1991, announcing the formation of the Team for the Coordination of Management of Offshore Commercial Loans (Tim Koordinasi Pengelolaan Pinjaman Komersial Luar Negeri, or Tim PKLN). It consisted of ten ministers and the governor of the Bank of Indonesia and was headed by Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance, Industry, and Development Super vision, Radius Prawiro. The Team was to coordinate the management of all offshore com mercial loans outside the framework of the IGGI and other official loans, to determine the total amount of offshore commercial loans to be procured from the international capital market in each fiscal year, and to decide the priority order of offshore commercial loans for financing development projects and other purposes.1 In short, the team was created for debt management to bring expanding offshore commercial loans under control. About a month later, on October 12,1991, after the Team met with Soeharto, Coordi nating Minister Radius Prawiro announced that it had set ceilings for offshore commercial borrowing by the Bank of Indonesia, state banks, private banks, state corporations, and private corporations, and that it had decided to approve three out of the seven large projects already in the pipeline for implementation in the 1991/92 fiscal year. -
The Indonesian Economy During the Soeharto Era: a Review
THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY DURING THE SOEHARTO ERA: A REVIEW Peter McCawley Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, College of Asia and the Pacific. Australian National University ABSTRACT At the beginning of the 1970s it was easy to believe that the road ahead for Indonesia was difficult. But as the decade unfolded, the changes across the Indonesian economy, and the sustained growth, surpassed all expectations. Numerous dramatic events seized Indonesian and international attention during the 1970s including corruption issues, the 1972 rice crisis, the Malari riots of early 1974, and the impact of the first oil boom including the Pertamina crisis. Anne Booth and I reviewed these developments in our edited collection of articles on The Indonesian economy during the Soeharto era. Looking back, our edited volume captured the excitement of the 1970s and, perhaps, was rather too cautious in looking towards the further gains that changes in the next few decades would bring to Indonesia. Keywords: Indonesian economy, Soeharto era, Crisis INTRODUCTION Over three decades ago Anne Booth and I cooperated to edit The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era. The collection (Booth and McCawley 1981) was one of the first major surveys of economic developments in Indonesia during the early part of the Orde Baru period. We prepared our edited collection at the end of the 1970s, a decade during which Indonesia experienced both turbulent economic times and much economic progress. As a contribution to recognizing the remarkable contribution that colleague Anne Booth has made towards the study of both the Indonesian economy and global Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. -
Islam and Economic Development in New Order's Indonesia (1967- 1998)
The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera- tion among the governments and peoples of the Asia Pacific region including the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern- ment with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and Pacific governments. East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for comment and to inform interested colleagues about work in progress at the Center. For more information about the Center or to order publications, contact: Publication Sales Office East-West Center 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601 Telephone: 808-944-7145 Facsimile: 808-944-7376 Email: [email protected] Website: www.EastWestCenter.org EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS International Graduate Student Conference Series No. 12, 2004 Islam and Economic Development in New Order's Indonesia (1967- 1998) Muhamad Ali Muhamad Ali is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, University of Hawaii at Manoa. He is also an East- West Center Degree Fellow. He can be reached at [email protected]. This paper was presented at the 3rd East-West Center International Graduate Student Conference, February 19-21, 2004 in Honolulu, Hawaii. East-West Center Working Papers: International Graduate Student Conference Series publishes graduate students' research in progress. This paper has been peer-reviewed. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Center. Please direct orders and requests to the East-West Center's Publication Sales Office. The price for Working Papers is $3.00 each plus shipping and handling. -
Indonesia's Economy Since Independence
INDEX A ASEAN (Association of Southeast Abdurrachman Wahid, 35, 122, 187 Asian Nations), 72–73, 103, 175, ADB (Asian Development Bank), 271, 286–87, 291–92 162–63 ASEAN-4, 159, 286 “administrators”, 44–45 ASEAN-5, 273 affirmative policy, see Benteng ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, programme 134 Agency for Technology Assessment ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Application, see BPPT (AFTA), 263, 291 Agency for the Revitalization of the Asian Development Bank, see ADB Forest Industry, see BRIK Asian economic crisis, 3, 24, 69, Agreement on Textile and Clothing, 103–04, 122, 126–27, 129, see MFA 132, 156, 163, 169, 175, 179, “Ali-Baba” enterprise, 16, 32 187–88, 192, 194–98, 208, 212, Ali Sastroamidjojo, 33, 43 214–15, 248, 257, 273, 282–84, Ali Wardhana, 78 287, 289, 291 “anti-export bias”, 72–73, 102, 151, aftermath, and, 74–77, 260–63 155–56, 168–69, 177, 187, 252, auto-parts industry, impact on, 255 280–81 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic developments after, 84–87 Cooperation), 103 industrial development overview, Arab-Israeli War, 91 176–83 Army Staff and Command School, see manufacturing sector after, 163–67 SESKOAD “Asian Tigers”, 159, 176 Army Strategic Reserve Command, see Assaat Movement (Gerakan Assaat), Kostrad 19, 21 A.R. Soehoed, 100, 149, 152–54, 276 Australia and Argentina: on Parallel Asahan aluminium smelter, 100 Paths, book, 134 15 Indonesia_Economy.indd 297 4/12/12 3:41:23 PM 298 Index authoritarianism, 83 BIN (Bank Industri Negara), 12, 42 automotive industry, 282–83 B.J. Habibie, 35, 81–82, 100, 122, auto-parts firms, number -
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chapter 3 Expertise and National Planning Abstract This chapter looks into the development of Indonesia’s postcolonial higher education system and the international technical assistance protocol in developing Indonesia’s new managerial class. It looks into the rapid expansion of higher education and the effort of the Indonesian society to decolonize its education system away from the Dutch model. Because of the swiftness of this process, Indonesianization looked a lot like Americanization. International aid through technical assistance was the primary means through which Western ideas on development planning and expert production through international higher education became cemented. Aid money helped create personal and institutional relationships between Indonesian and American govern- ment institutions and universities. In particular, the relationship between experts like the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Indonesia’s state planning institution, the faculty of economics of the University of Indonesia and UN and usaid technical experts and Western social scientists from American within mit’s Indonesia Project and others. These forms of transnational relationships legitimized the position of In- donesian planning experts within planning institutions that had strong institution- al relationship with the West. This pattern would continue throughout much of the twentieth century. Keywords Indonesianization of higher education – Americanization – international technical aid – modernization theory – Indonesia project This chapter discusses two developments concerning the post- colonial crea- tion of expertise during the 1950s. The first was the development of higher edu- cation in both quantitative and qualitative terms: this included the expansion of domestic tertiary education and the Americanization of the curriculum and study methods, as well as the introduction of the Guided Study method. -
Backlash Against Foreign Investment Regime: Indonesia’S Experience
Backlash against Foreign Investment Regime: Indonesia’s Experience Herliana A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2017 Reading Committee: Dongsheng Zang, Chair John O. Haley Melissa Durkee Program Authorized to Offer Degree: School of Law ©Copyright 2017 Herliana ii University of Washington Abstract Backlash against Foreign Investment Regime: Indonesia’s Experience Herliana Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Dongsheng Zang School of Law This study investigates Indonesia’s changing attitude from embracing to repudiating foreign direct investments. Opened its door for foreign investment in the late of 1960s and enjoyed significant economic growth as the result, the country suddenly changed its foreign investment policy in 2012 to be more protectionist towards domestic investors and skeptical towards foreign investors. The essential issues to be discussed in this research are: what motivates Indonesia to move away from global investment regime; what actions the country has taken as manifestation of resentment against the regime; and who are the actors behind such a backlash. This is a qualitative study which aims at gaining a deep understanding of a legal development of Indonesia’s foreign investment. It aims to provide explanation of the current phenomenon taking place in the country. Data were collected through interviews and documents. This research reveals that liberalization of foreign investment law has become the major cause of resentment towards the foreign investment. Liberalization which requires privatization and openness toward foreign capital has failed to deliver welfare to the Indonesian people. Instead, foreign investors have pushed local business players, especially small and medium enterprises, out of the market. -
The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre* ↓ by David Ransom
Space for Notes The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre* ↓ By David Ransom “Indonesia is the best thing that's happened to Uncle Sam since World War ." --a World Bank official Indonesia, which in the past fired the imagination of fortune-hunters and adventurers as the fabled East Indies, was long regarded as "the richest colonial prize in the world." Harking back to such times, Richard Nixon described Indonesia in 1967 as "the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area." Not too many years earlier, however, the prize had been thought all but lost to the fiery nationalist, Peking-oriented Sukarno and the three million-strong Indonesia Communist Party waiting in the wings. Then in October 1965 an unsuccessful coup and a swift move by Indonesia's generals immobilized the leader and precipitated the largest massacre in modern history, in which from 500,000 to a million unarmed communists and their peasant sympathizers were killed. When the bloodletting was over, the immense nationalist spirit of a decade had vanished, and the Indies' vast natural treasures were opened by the new regime to U.S. oil companies and corporations. To cut the ribbon on the Indonesian side was an extraordinary team of economic ministers known to insiders as "the Berkeley Mafia." Sporting PhDs from the University of California and acting as a closely-knit clique in the councils of power, these men shaped the post-nationalist policies of the new regime. Behind their rise to eminence and power lay a saga of international intellectual intrigue, of philanthropoids and university projects, of student Generals and political Deans, and a sophisticated imperial design beyond Cecil Rhodes's wildest dreams.