The Origins and Contested Legacy of Indonesia’S Berkeley Mafia
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The Origins and Contested Legacy of Indonesia’s Berkeley Mafia, 1955 – 1969 By Barry Thrasher Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts In the Department of History at Brown University Thesis Advisor: Professor Kerry Smith April 6th, 2018 Thrasher ii Acknowledgements I would like to take the time to single out several people whose help made this project possiBle. The order of these acknowledgements does not reflect the degree of importance each person had on the final product - in fact, each one was equally vital to the completion of this thesis. To my advisor, Professor Smith; thank you for the invaluaBle wisdom and insight you Brought to Bear on my writing. I don’t douBt that there were moments you were pulling your hair out, But the care and patience you demonstrated for the Best part of 12 months reflects on your dedication to the craft of history. To my writing group; Grace, Greer, and Katy, thank you for pushing me every week to write, read, and reflect. The quality of your work and the sincerity of your comments motivated me to continually improve my own writing, and I hope I was aBle to help you do the same. Special thanks go to the Brown University History Department and the Southeast Asian Studies Initiative - two organizations on campus that encouraged me to pursue a topic in Indonesian history. Within these organizations I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Pollock, Professor ShiBusawa, Professor Evelyn Hu-DeHart, and Charles Carroll for their constant support and excitement over my topic. I would also like to thank the University of Indonesia Faculty of Economics (FEUI) and in particular IBu Tati for generously giving her time to assist in my research. I rely heavily on the primary sources found at the FEUI liBrary as well as those given to me By Professor Emil Salim, who graciously accepted me into his home for an interview. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends whose support for this project manifested in the late nights, long drives to remote archives, and hours of time spent listening to me talk aBout Indonesian economic development. To Tom, Ita, Shanze, and Coda; your love, friendship and kindness has not only shaped this project But also my experience as an undergraduate at Brown. Thrasher iii Preface The first time I heard the name “Berkeley Mafia” was in a passing-reference made By a fellow intern at the Jakarta Globe, one of the few daily English-language newspapers in Indonesia. It was the summer of 2013 and copies of the film The Act of Killing were making their way on flash drives furtively from one major newspaper to another for review. There had Been no puBlic release of the film in Indonesia But for a Brief moment, the film was availaBle to download on YoutuBe – until the Indonesian government stepped in and Banned all puBlic showing of the documentary. It was easy to see why it had done so. The film’s director, Joshua Oppenheimer, shows known perpetrators of the 1965 killings re-enacting the violence which claimed the lives of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Indonesians; perpetrators who, at the time were acting in tandem with the army, were commended for saving the country from a communist takeover.1 Almost 50 years on, and the trauma from that period is still excruciatingly fresh, yet Besides Oppenheimer’s piece, little is known aBout the institutions and actors who perpetrated violence en masse. After watching the film at the office, my Indonesian colleague turned to me and said, “You know, Suharto, the New Order – none of that would have Been possible without the Berkeley Mafia”. It was not the first time that I heard the name Berkeley Mafia Before. Growing up, I heard stories aBout the role these economists-cum-technocrats played in Suharto’s government as well as their legendary status as lecturers at the University of Indonesia. The little I knew painted the Berkeley economists as disciplined academics, not the sort to Be caught up in the hijinks of politics, let alone the communist massacre of 1965. In OctoBer of 2016, Joshua Oppenheimer came to Brown University to screen The Act of 1 Oppenheimer, Joshua. The Act of Killing. Documentary. Det Danske Filminstitut, 2012. Thrasher iv Killing and The Look of Silence. I struck up a conversation with him aBout the New Order, the Berkeley Mafia, and the countless other individuals who quietly worked to perpetrate violence in the name of staBility and estaBlish legitimacy for Suharto. Joshua told me that there is still so much work to Be done to retrieve the Basic facts of what Suharto and his government did in the late 1960s - this coming from a filmmaker who had spent eight years in Indonesia trying to investigate the matter himself. As I delved deeper into the Berkeley Mafia’s place in Indonesian history, I was stunned By the variety and imprecision with which everyday Indonesians recalled the role these economists had played at the outset of the New Order. Name-dropping the “Berkeley Mafia” was enough to provoke reactions from the young, college-aged Indonesians that I knew, though often their perceptions were closely linked to the history of the violence of that period. Older Indonesians were more cautious and reverent of the Berkeley Mafia due to their ties with the Suharto regime. The lack of historical clarity regarding the 1965 coup and the precise cast of actors implicated in the events leading up to the New Order is largely the fault of the Indonesian government and its efforts to prevent any serious study of the dramatic coup. This policy has fueled the investigative energy of historians for decades, But it has also stirred the imagination of several generations of Indonesians with agendas of their own. They retell the story of Gerakan 30 September Partai Kommunis Indonesia (G30S/PKI), the “30th September Movement”, and the early days of the New Order with varying degrees of accuracy. While historians tend to focus on the political and economic maneuvering of Suharto and the technocrats, most Indonesians have tended to latch onto violence as central to their understanding of what happened, violence Thrasher v which was so poignantly captured By Oppenheimer’s Act of Killing and its sequel, The Look of Silence (2014). For decades, students in Indonesian elementary and junior high schools were required to watch a film produced and Backed By the New Order Government titled G30S/PKI (1984), which portrayed the communist party as an atheist, militant cult. Only recently, in September of 2017, did Indonesia’s Culture and Education Minister declare that the content of the film was unsuitaBle for children. While this shift in attitude certainly marks some progress away from the anti-communist phoBia that struck the nation in 1965, Indonesia has yet to process the violence in a cathartic way. Oppenheimer cautions Indonesia for its failure to face it’s Bloody past head on, and urges the government to recognize the victims of the violence that still live with the trauma of G30S/PKI to this day. This failure to address the past and the use of censorship as a coping tool is a suBtle But powerful reality that has impacted my research and writing. There are several arguments that I make in this thesis that rely heavily on my interviews with Dr. Emil Salim - one of two surviving members of the Berkeley Mafia (due to his age, SuBroto was indisposed to an in-person interview). While my conversation with Emil was fruitful, I found myself suspicious of his narration of events, specifically his rosy depiction of Suharto. It was hard to figure out what was fact, and what was what Emil wanted me to Believe - or what Emil wanted himself to Believe. Besides the explicit arguments that I’ve laid out Below, I hope you also come to appreciate the sensitivity and reluctance with which this period in history is treated By Thrasher vi Indonesian people. So as you read, please keep this question in the Back of your mind: what does it mean to write a history that is painful to remember? Thrasher vii Table of Contents Introduction: The 1965 Crisis and Pretext for Development 1 Section One: The Young Technocrats At Home and Abroad, 1955-1965 16 Section Two: Rationalism, Pragmatism, and Ekonomi Pancasila, 1966-1969 37 Conclusion: Suharto’s Development Dictatorship Post 1971 56 Appendix 62 BiBliography 71 Thrasher 1 Introduction: The 1965 Crisis and Pretext for Development In March of 1967, Sukarno, founding father of the ill-fated United States of Indonesia, the President of the RepuBlic of Indonesia, and Prime Minister for life, walked into the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) to face “political death By a thousand cuts”.1 The country was on the Brink of collapse. The national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, “Unity in Diversity” was losing purchase in a country mired in ethnic tension and political Battles. In less than 18 months, Sukarno’s once strong authority as leader of Indonesia under a “Guided Democracy” had Been undermined By the fallout over the September 30th, 1965 Communist coup.2 Sukarno, who was intimately linked with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party), Became a scapegoat for the deaths of six army generals. His hearing Before the MPRS was a show trial of outrage and disappointment with the entirety of his 22 years as head of state. On March 27, 1968 the seat of power was presented to his rival, Lt. General Muhammad Suharto.