Downloaded 4.0From License

chapter 3 Expertise and National Planning Abstract This chapter looks into the development of Indonesia’s postcolonial higher education system and the international technical assistance protocol in developing Indonesia’s new managerial class. It looks into the rapid expansion of higher education and the effort of the Indonesian society to decolonize its education system away from the Dutch model. Because of the swiftness of this process, Indonesianization looked a lot like Americanization. International aid through technical assistance was the primary means through which Western ideas on development planning and expert production through international higher education became cemented. Aid money helped create personal and institutional relationships between Indonesian and American government institutions and universities. In particular, the relationship between experts like the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Indonesia’s state planning institution, the faculty of economics of the University of Indonesia and UN and usaid technical experts and Western social scientists from American within mit’s Indonesia Project and others. These forms of transnational relationships legitimized the position of In- donesian planning experts within planning institutions that had strong institutional relationship with the West. This pattern would continue throughout much of the twentieth century. Keywords Indonesianization of higher education – Americanization – international technical aid – modernization theory – Indonesia project This chapter discusses two developments concerning the postcolonial creation of expertise during the 1950s. The first was the development of higher education in both quantitative and qualitative terms: this included the expansion of domestic tertiary education and the Americanization of the curriculum and study methods, as well as the introduction of the Guided Study method. The second was the development of the various institutes for national planning and economic development, which was the result of a new institutional relationship forged by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo with the untaa (United Nations © Farabi Fakih, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004437722_005 Farabi Fakih - 9789004437722 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-NDDownloaded 4.0from license. Brill.com10/02/2021 06:07:10PM via free access 88 Chapter 3 Technical Assistance Administration) and American aid in the form of an in- tellectual association with the Charles River (Harvard- mit) community of scholars. The developments above represented the defining characteristics of the chang- ing elite culture of the 1950s. First, the decade was a period in which efforts to erase the colonial legacy were made in various aspects of national life. One of the most famous of these efforts was the nationalization of Dutch- owned enterprises. Yet, Indonesianization occurred in more areas than just the economy. It was prev- alent in the education, legal, and administrative systems, among others. Indone- sia sought foreign expertise and consultants through the only channel available in that period: the international aid structure dominated by the United States of America. In many respects, Indonesianization was Americanization. Second, the establishment of institutions for national planning and economic development resulted in a new protocol for elite creation that was cemented during the decade. The shift towards being educated as a marker of elite status was significant, with education surpassing nobility as a class marker. A new elite emerged from the social and cultural shift brought about by the introduction of the fetish of efficiency and the lexicographic assault of English terminology to denote modernity: efficiency, planning, manager and manage- ment, and so forth. Terms such as ‘expert’ and ‘manager’ became markers of status. 1 Expert Creation When the Dutch transferred sovereignty, the problem of the lack of expertise was already apparent. The number of Dutch experts in Indonesia fell throughout the 1950s. In 1950, there were more than sixteen thousand Dutch employees in leading positions; by 1951, the number had already dropped to seven thousand; and by 1956, it had atrophied to around six hundred.1 Difficulties at the office owing to the unclear division of tasks and responsibilities, which were exacerbated by the rising cost of living, lack of security, poor housing, and the disappearance of good schools for their children, determined the decision of many Dutch to repatriate.2 This occurred despite efforts by the Dutch and 1 Meier, Den Haag- Djakarta, 176. 2 Nota omtrent de ontwikkeling van zaken in Indonesië in zoverre de verhoudingen binnen de Nederlands- Indonesische Unie en de belangen van Nederland daarbij betrokken zijn, na, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hoge Commissariaat Bandung, 1950– 1957, inv. nos. 556– 566. Farabi Fakih - 9789004437722 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 06:07:10PM via free access Expertise and National Planning 89 Indonesian governments to retain their presence. For instance, the Dutch employees of the Republic were reassured by a regulation issued on 1 January 1950 by the Dutch government regarding the continued payment of pensions and other support for those who worked for the Indonesian government.3 The government’s efforts to improve expertise in the civil service entailed two approaches: retaining or conscripting foreign employees and, at the same time, expanding education opportunities for Indonesian employees, either in Indonesia or abroad. Dutch employees were preferred by Indonesia’s administrative elites. They knew Indonesia far better than experts from other coun- tries. The higher- echelon Indonesian civil servants spoke Dutch and thus com- munication between Indonesian and Dutch experts was less of a problem. The abilities of the Dutch employees were not in doubt and, to some extent, were considered to be superior to those of other Western nations.4 There were quite a number of new Dutch employees who were generally progressive.5 Indonesia also began sending students abroad to foreign universities and expanding its own higher- education offering. In 1960, the Depernas tried to get an overall picture of the number of experts in the country from government departments and institutions. The outcome was not accurate, because some departments failed to provide or provided incomplete information, but the ag- gregate number offers an indication of the expansion of expert manpower by the end of the decade. In all, there were 4,453 Masters/Doctorandus degrees held, comprised of 1,659 medical doctors, 803 legal specialists, 650 engineers, 219 social/ political scientists, and 200 economists, among others. In addition, there were 2,519 employees with bachelor’s degrees (469 majoring in social/ political sciences, 221 in economics, 282 in law, and 198 in engineering).6 Related to this was a serious lack of executive managers. A look at the sta- tistics for 1941 reveals a ratio of three executives to five non- executives. The top- level executives were university graduates, while the upper mid-level executives were graduates of college-level academies7. In comparison, the 1961 data show that the executive and top- executive level had shrunk to just 3.5 per 3 Antara, 30 December 1952. 4 With the exception of the Netherlands Military Mission, which was disparaged by Simatu- pang in a newspaper article. anri, Delegasi Indonesia, inv. no. 1267. 5 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan (Djakarta: Abadi, 1951), 37– 8. 6 Rantjangan Dasar Undang- undang Pembangunan Nasional Semesta, Buku Ke iii, 1388– 9. 7 Such as the hbs (Hogere Burger School), the Dutch High School; gymnasia are Dutch pre- paratory schools for higher or university education; the Mosvia (Middelbare Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, High School for Indigenous Civil Servants), the college for native civil service candidates (Pamong Pradja); and the Bestuursacademie, an administrative school. Farabi Fakih - 9789004437722 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 06:07:10PM via free access 90 Chapter 3 table 1 Data and levels of employment of civil servants, Dutch East Indies, October 1940 Workers Supervisors Executives Top ex./ (low- level (lower (upper policymakers employees) mid- level mid- level (high- level employees) employees) employees) Dutch 355 5,045 7,909 2,808 Indonesian 49,662 8,830 5,023 221 Chinese 157 337 240 – Total 50,178 14,212 13,172 3,029 Percentage 61.78% 17.49% 16.21% 3.75% Ratio 20 6 5 1 source: prajudi atmosudirdjo, ‘masalah pendidikan ilmu administrasi pada perguruan- perguruan tinggi’, in lapuran musjawarah ilmu administrasi nega- ra dan niaga, 33 cent of the total civil service (E and F group). In order to return to 1941 levels, the creation of eight to ten thousand public administration experts would be required, something which the four universities teaching public administration were not equipped to handle with their annual graduations of just two hundred people.8 In Table 2 below, the A and B columns represent workers, C and D represent supervisors, E represents executives, and F represents top executives. The third row shows the ratio; thus there were five executives for every ninety- five non- executive civil servants. 2 putaba (Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing) The Centre for Foreign Employees (Pusat Tenaga Bangsa Asing, putaba) was established in 1951 at the Indonesian High Commission in The Hague. It was created after a team headed by Prof Gunarso

Load more