Madeleine Albright Time for Review
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Party Attitudes Towards the Society : Values, Religion, State and Individuality
FES Policy Analysis Series 3 Party Attitudes Towards the Society: Values, Religion, State and Individuality EBERT May 2009, Prishtina FES Policy Analysis Series Policy Analysis Report #3: Party Attitudes Towards the Society: Values, Religion, State and Individuality Report Prepared by: Kushtrim Shaipi Agon Maliqi May, 2009, Prishtina TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND........................................................................................................................4 1.1. Rationale ................................................................................................................................................4 2. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................6 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....................................................................................................................7 3.1. Theoretical Overview: Values and the Sources of Their Development .............................................7 3.2. Values and Politics .............................................................................................................................9 3.3. Contemporary Debates on Values and Politics in the West ............................................................12 3.4. Values in the Context of Kosovo Politics..........................................................................................14 4. KOSOVO PARTIES AND VALUES...............................................................................................................17 -
Kosovo After Haradinaj
KOSOVO AFTER HARADINAJ Europe Report N°163 – 26 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE RISK AND DEFLECTION OF REBELLION................................................... 2 A. MANAGEMENT OF THE HARADINAJ INDICTMENT ..................................................................2 B. SHADOW WARRIORS TEST THE WATER.................................................................................4 C. THE "WILD WEST" ON THE BRINK ........................................................................................6 D. DUKAGJINI TURNS IN ON ITSELF ...........................................................................................9 III. KOSOVO'S NEW POLITICAL CONFIGURATION.............................................. 12 A. THE SHAPE OF KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICS .....................................................................12 B. THE OCTOBER 2004 ELECTIONS .........................................................................................13 C. THE NETWORK CONSOLIDATES CONTROL ..........................................................................14 D. THE ECLIPSE OF THE PARTY OF WAR? ................................................................................16 E. TRANSCENDING OR DEEPENING WARTIME DIVISIONS?.......................................................20 IV. KOSOVO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FINAL STATUS.................................. -
List of Prime Ministers of Kosovo
SNo Phase Name Took office Left office Political party 1 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Fadil Hoxha 1945 01-02 1953 Communist Party of Kosovo 2 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Fadil Hoxha 01-02 1953 01-06 1963 League of Communists of Kosovo 3 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Ali Shukriu 01-06 1963 01-05 1967 League of Communists of Kosovo 4 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Ilija Vakić 01-05 1967 01-05 1974 League of Communists of Kosovo 5 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Bogoljub Nedeljković 01-05 1974 01-05 1978 League of Communists of Kosovo 6 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Bahri Oruçi 01-05 1978 01-05 1980 League of Communists of Kosovo 7 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Riza Sapunxhiu 01-05 1980 01-05 1982 League of Communists of Kosovo 8 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Imer Pula 01-05 1982 05-05 1984 League of Communists of Kosovo 9 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Ljubomir Neđo Borković 05-05 1984 01-05 1986 League of Communists of Kosovo 10 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Namzi Mustafa 01-05 1986 1987 League of Communists of Kosovo 11 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Kaqusha Jashari 10-03 1987 09-05 1989 League of Communists of Kosovo 12 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Nikolla Shkreli 09-05 1989 1989 League of Communists of Kosovo 13 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Daut Jashanica 1989 04-12 1989 League of Communists of Kosovo 14 Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo Jusuf Zejnullahu 04-12 1989 05-07 1990 League of Communists of -
Kosovo's New Political Leadership
ASSEMBLY SUPPORT INITIATIVE asiNEWSLETTER Kosovo’s new political leadership ASSEMBLYasi SUPPORT INITIATIVE NEWSLETTER юѦȱŘŖŖŜǰȱќȱŘŘ Strengthening the oversight role of the Kosovo Assembly oces Mission in Kosovo ASSEMBLY SUPPORT INITIATIVE 2 NEWSLETTERasi Editorial Editorial 2 Kosovo has a new political leadership. Within one Mr. Kolë Berisha’s speech on the occasion ǰȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ of assuming the Assembly Presidency 3 ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĜǯȱȱ Fatmir Sejdiu succeeded the late President Ibrahim President Fatmir Sejdiu talks to BBC 6 Rugova. Former TMK Commander Agim Ceku succeeded Bajram Kosumi as prime minister. Mr. “There is no full freedom in Kosovo Kole Berisha succeeded Nexhat Daci as president unless all of Kosovo’s citizens can enjoy it” 7 ȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱȱŘŚȱȱŘŖŖŜǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ Kosovo Serb Leaders Meet Premier Çeku, ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱ Consider Joining Government 9 rounds of talks on decentralization. Recent Developments in the Assembly 10 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ sessions in the Assembly on various policy issues. The new president Let’s learn to hear the voice of the citizen 12 ȱȱ¢ǰȱǯȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ a new democratic atmosphere and to strengthen co-operation with Presidency of the Assembly 14 international institutions. Transparency and full adherence to Rules Why we asked for a new dynamic in of Procedure are high on his agenda. Assembly’s Work 16 In light of the current changes at the Assembly one can hope that this ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴǰȱ Our Vision of an Independent Kosovo 17 to further enhance their role in overseeing the work of the government ȱ ¡ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Pay off Time 18 Consolidated Budget (KCB). -
European Union Election Expert Mission Kosovo 2021 Final Report
European Union Election Expert Mission Kosovo 2021 Final Report Early Legislative Elections 14 February 2021 The Election Expert Missions are independent from the institutions of the European Union. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy and position of the European Union. European Union Election Expert Mission Kosovo* Early Legislative Elections – 14th February 2021 Final report I. SUMMARY Elections were held for the 120-member unicameral Kosovo Assembly on 14th February 2021. As with the four previous legislative elections since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, these were early elections provoked by a political crisis. The elections were competitive, and campaign freedoms were generally respected. There was a vibrant campaign, except in the Kosovo Serb areas. Despite a very short timeframe and challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the elections well and in a transparent manner, although problems with Out of Kosovo voting reduced confidence in that part of the process. Election day was assessed by local observers as orderly, with voters participating in high numbers. However, as with previous elections, the process deteriorated during the vote count and a large number of recounts were ordered due to discrepancies in the results protocols. Such long-standing systemic problems, which have been identified in previous EU EOMs, should be addressed to enable Kosovo to fully meet international standards for democratic elections. These elections were held in an increasingly polarised atmosphere, influenced by the turbulent political developments since the last legislative elections. -
Southern Balkan Challenges After the Hague Indictment
Conflict Studies Research Centre Balkans Series 0 5/12 Southern Balkan Challenges After The Hague Indictment James Pettifer Key Points * The Hague indictment of Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj offers both opportunities and dangers for the international community. * The US, while supporting the general principle of Kosovo independence, is currently letting the Europeans take the lead on the issue. * There is a short window of opportunity for political progress if a major conference can be arranged to progress the political status issue. * In the medium term, if political progress is not forthcoming, the risk of conflict in the region, in Kosovo, Macedonia, Preshevo and Cameria increases substantially. 05/12 Southern Balkan Challenges After The Hague Indictment James Pettifer The indictment sending Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj to the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) had been long expected after a period of preparation of Kosovo and international public opinion. The fact that he has accepted the indictment and has gone to the Hague voluntarily has provided a good public relations coup for the Kosovo Albanian leadership by contrast to the intransigence and lack of cooperation with ICTY in most other Balkan countries, and is likely to increase the pressures for rapid progress towards independence within Kosovo. But it is not seen that way in Serbia, and the Serbian position is increasingly closely linked to the residual influence of Greece and its associated orbit within the EU. The party of Hardinaj is in general seen in Kosovo and the world in general as very much aligned to the Anglo-American axis within Kosovo and had only about 8% of the votes. -
Kosovo Pollution Costing the Earth
Opinion: Scrapping Article 38 Won’t Help Kosovo Media’s Cause June 22 - July 5, 2012 Issue No. 91 www.prishtinainsight.com Price € 1 Best-Selling NEWS Kosovo History Two-thirds of Upsets Albanians Kosovo Water Lost and Serbs A Kosovo Albanian Professor has succeeded in annoying both historians in Serbia and also those from > page 2 his home country. NEWS Jusuf Buxhovi’s trilogy on Serbia Still Bent on Kosovo’s history, published in February, claims among ‘Abusing’ Kosovo other things that Issue Albanians, not Greeks, > page 3 founded the city of Troy. NEWS See Page 5 Kosovo Task Force Probes Mystery of Kosovo Pollution Costing the Earth Asanaj's Death Pollution of Kosovo’s air, land and water is costing the country’s economy up to 330 million euro a year, sending > page 4 thousands to an early grave and could even spark conflict with its neighbour Serbia, two new reports by the FEATURE World Bank have warned. Round-up: Justice Danube, could lead to conflict which receives untreated waste- Poisoned Wells By Lawrence Marzouk, Bujar Aruqaj between the troubled neighbours. water from the divided town of in Kosovo “This is a significant trans- Mitrovica, before the river enters The World Bank believes that > page 12 and 13 rishtina’s air is four times boundary concern,” the report Serbia, and later the Danube. groundwater, used by up to a third more polluted with the most warns. “There is no treatment of the of the population for drinking INSIDE PRISHTINA Pdangerous, PM2.5 particles wastewater collected, which water in Kosovo, is also polluted Prishtina’s than international safe levels, Water Conflict includes both domestic and indus- and a health risk, particularly to according to new data released by trial wastewaters,” the report children. -
02 Klasnja.Indd
THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION The EU and Kosovo Time to Rethink the Enlargement and Integration Policy? Marko Klasnja The EU’s approach to the HE European Union has been hailed for its contri- Tbution to the largely successful post-communist Western Balkans has been transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Exerting its well-known “soft power” advantages by of- plagued with inconsistencies fering the possibility of membership, the EU encouraged and half-baked measures. The the partners in the ongoing process of integration and “Europeanization,”1 here meant to connote the processes situation in Kosovo demonstrates and mechanisms by which European efforts to build political, economic, legal, and social institutions cause that the EU needs to rethink its changes at the domestic level.2 This success story has so policy arsenal if it is to achieve far not been replicated in the Western Balkans, another region undergoing transition where the EU’s ambitions its goals. and pledges seem to mirror those of the earlier “Eastern Enlargement.” The results in the Western Balkans have so far been much more limited and by no means assure an equally successful outcome. This may be a consequence of the much wider range of challenges faced by the region than was the case with Central and Eastern Europe, given the recurring conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the late start of transition in many countries, and the unsolved territorial and ethnic issues, not to mention other prob- lems. The intricacies of the status-settlement process for Kosovo—that is, whether the province will become an independent country or remain part of Serbia—exemplify the multi-faceted nature of the transition process in the region. -
A Study of the Development of Post-War Political Parties in Kosovo
From Guerillas to Cabinets - A Study of the Development of Post-War Political Parties in Kosovo Master Thesis Mariana Qamile Rød University of Bergen Department of Comparative Politics i Abstract The fourth Yugoslav war, the war in Kosovo, was fought between 1998 and 1999. The Kosovo Liberation Army and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo, fought the Serb police, military and paramilitary forces, but also at some points each other. The war was a battle between a Kosovan guerilla uprising, against a far superior Serb military power. The game changed as the international community, and most importantly NATO, intervened to put an end to the war. The KLA was a rapidly growing, sporadically organized guerilla movement. It was established as a result of increasing oppression from the Milosevic regime against the Kosovo Albanians, as a more radical faction than the pacifist Albanian resistance movement, LDK. Despite of their problems, the KLA became national heroes, and their political successors are still in 2017 dominating the political arena. This thesis main research question is; "How has the war legacy affected the development of political parties in post-conflict Kosovo?" To answer my research question, I conducted 22 qualitative interviews with Kosovan ex-combatants and politicians, in addition to an extensive document analysis. Through five different theoretical frameworks, each highlighting different important aspects affecting the development of political parties in a post-conflict state, I tried to uncover which processes and actors have been decisive in this regard. The five theories yield important results on their own, but when combined, it becomes obvious how these processes are not linear and multidimensional. -
Decentralization Should Not Imply Enclavization
Decentralization should not imply enclavization Bajram Kosumi1 Kosovo is in the process of an assessment standards as required by both the UN Security Council of and the Contact Group. We expect that the assessment will show that Kosovo has made major progress. In other words, we expect this assessment to be realistic and to open the door to starting a discussion on the final status of Kosovo. As is known, there have been several political and technical assessments so far, and all of them have been positive. There were some difficulties at the beginning. However, the Kosovo government and its agencies have relied on all their potential and have managed to make an initial breakthrough. These are the arguments that guarantee ongoing assessment. We do not see standards as something which the international community imposes on Kosovo. I have said many times that those were the standards of freedom and human rights, and that is how we perceive them. We will build a better democracy and show more respect for human rights and freedoms not because the international community required this, but because of our future. We want to create a democratic society, a free society that guarantees equality among all its citizens. Kosovo has established democratic institutions invested with new powers. With their four years experience, these institutions have proved that they are up to the Kosovo challenge, even in difficult times such as in the past several months. Both the Kosovo institutions and politicians have demonstrated wisdom and resoluteness in making decisions and taking over responsibility. A positive evaluation by international political factors testifies to this. -
Kosovo After Haradinaj
KOSOVO AFTER HARADINAJ Europe Report N°163 – 26 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE RISK AND DEFLECTION OF REBELLION................................................... 2 A. MANAGEMENT OF THE HARADINAJ INDICTMENT ..................................................................2 B. SHADOW WARRIORS TEST THE WATER.................................................................................4 C. THE "WILD WEST" ON THE BRINK ........................................................................................6 D. DUKAGJINI TURNS IN ON ITSELF ...........................................................................................9 III. KOSOVO'S NEW POLITICAL CONFIGURATION.............................................. 12 A. THE SHAPE OF KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICS .....................................................................12 B. THE OCTOBER 2004 ELECTIONS .........................................................................................13 C. THE NETWORK CONSOLIDATES CONTROL ..........................................................................14 D. THE ECLIPSE OF THE PARTY OF WAR? ................................................................................16 E. TRANSCENDING OR DEEPENING WARTIME DIVISIONS?.......................................................20 IV. KOSOVO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FINAL STATUS.................................. -
F a S T Update Kosovo Semi-Annual Risk Assessment May 2006 To
F A S T Update Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment May 2006 to October 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (relative) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (relative) 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 9 The FAST International Early Warning Program 10 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 02 Dr. Florian Bieber Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 70 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • The stability of Kosovo and key events in the region remain a function of the ongoing status discussions. Both developments over the past six months, as well as the stability of Kosovo in the foreseeable future are primarily dictated by the nature and possible outcome of the status negotiations. While the talks themselves have failed to yield any tangible results to date and remain largely deadlocked, the Country Stability, as well as Conflictive Events, have been greatly fluctuating recently, as they have over the past years. Most worrying is the sharp, if temporary, decline of Country Stability in late 2006, as well as the increase in relative Conflictive Events, indicating increased tensions in the face of an expected conclusion of the status talks in early 2007. • In Serbia, the authorities have continuously emphasized their rejection of independence for Kosovo and in extension any imposed solution which would not be based on a compromise incorporating Serbian demands.