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The Political Landscape in Kosovo Since the Declaration of Independence

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The Political Landscape in Kosovo Since the Declaration of Independence Südosteuropa 58 (2010), H. 1, S. 41-66 DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND ETHNIC POLARIZATION HILDE KATRINE HAUG The Political Landscape in Kosovo since the Declaration of Independence Abstract. This article assesses the evolution of the political landscape in Kosovo since its declaration of independence in 2008. It focuses on the first steps of institutional state- and democracy-building under the supervision of the international community. Secondly, it dis- cusses Serb-Albanian Relations, both in the context of Serbia’s contestation of Kosovo’s status and on the local level within Kosovo. With international assistance, considerable progress has been made in establishing a new governance framework, even though huge challenges still remain. Power struggles have led to a fragmentation of the Kosovar political landscape. Political conflicts, personal animosities and the socio-economic challenges facing the govern- ment constitute potential threats to Kosovo’s stability. At the same time, the security situation has somewhat improved. Hilde Katrine Haug is a Post-doctoral Fellow in the Department of Literature, Area Studies, and European Languages at the University of Oslo. From NATO’s intervention in 1999 until 17 February 2008, when Kosovo de- clared its independence, Kosovar Albanians and the political leadership in Prishtina were focused on making Kosovo an independent state. Kosovar Serbs, on the other hand, particularly those living north of the river Ibar, were equally focused on preventing Kosovo from becoming independent. These opposing goals continue to shape the political interests, expectations and fears of these two groups in Kosovo, often to the detriment of other issues affecting their everyday lives. Kosovar Albanians had long anticipated the declaration of independence and they had high expectations for this event. In particular, they expected independence to bring greater stability and a better quality of life. The Kosovar Serbs held lower expectations for life after independence. They expressed fear over developments towards independence and, with the encouragement of Belgrade, they have continued to fight against the survival of an independent Kosovar state.1 1 In addition to the Kosovar Serbs, there are of course also a number of other minority groups in Kosovo. These include the so-called RAE (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian) communities; and 42 Hilde Katrine Haug The case of Kosovo differs in some important aspects from the other cases treated in this issue. The new state entity was formed only two years ago, after its supervised declaration of independence. Although the move to indepen- dence was carefully coordinated with the Quint,2 it was vehemently opposed by Serbia. In fact, Serbia continues to challenge Kosovo’s independence on the international level and refuses to engage with Prishtina on the ground. More- over, Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not unanimously supported by the international community. Thus, the formation of the new state of Kosovo after February 2008 received an incoherent and noncommital response from the rest of the world. The post-independence political landscape in Kosovo is intricate. It remains in flux, and it is not yet conducive to “normal politics”. As- sessing values and voting patterns in Kosovo is made difficult by the fact that not all citizens residing within the state recognize the legitimacy of the pres- ent government. The Kosovar Serb population sees Belgrade as its legitimate government, and thus Kosovar Serbs participated in the Serbian national and municipal elections on 11 May 2008. Due to the special issues surrounding Kosovo’s status, this article focuses on delineating the political developments following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, and especially on the factors that currently affect the state’s stability.3 Although the present political regime in Prishtina has moved beyond the status question, state building and the consolidation of Kosovo’s institutions continue to be the first priority in politics. The local elec- tions held in November and December 2009 were an important step on the road towards the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, these elections gave some indication of the level of future political participation in various communities. Nevertheless, it seems premature to assess the extent of value transformation in the voting patters of Kosovo’s citizens since the events of 17 February 2008. Such a transformation, if it has occurred, will only become apparent with the first post-independence government elections. The new state entity is presently governed by the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), in coalition with the Demo- cratic League of Kosovo (LDK), voted into power at the last election prior to the declaration of independence, on 10 November 2007. The ruling coalition and the opposition are still trying to find their feet in the new political environment. They face new challenges and also new expectations from their citizens. The government does not hold full control over its territory, thus exercising only partial sovereignty. Serbia’s challenge to Kosovo’s declaration of independence at an international level continues to constitute a threat to the state’s stability. The also Bosniaks, Gorani, and Turks. This article will focus primarily on relations between the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. 2 The group of foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, Italy, Britain, and France. 3 Much of what I observe here stems from my experience working in Kosovo between March 2008 and January 2009. The Political Landscape in Kosovo 43 lack of coherence and determination in the international community’s approach to Kosovo since February 2008 has not helped, either. The Serbian government and the Kosovar Serbs still oppose the implementation of the provisions in the Ahtisaari Plan, including decentralization, even though the latter would benefit the Kosovar Serb community. This is because decentralization remains linked to the Ahtisaari plan, the implementation of which would be perceived by the Serbs as indirect recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the standards have once again come to the attention of the international community.4 Retaining the backing of the Quint and its other major international supporters requires the Prishtina government to demonstrate both its will to implement these standards and also its ability to do so. Post-independence politics’ focus on the creation of functional democratic political institutions and the establishment of a certain level of rule of law can be attributed partly to such international demands. Domestic power struggles, as well as the funding that comes with control over political structures and institutions, also contribute to the policy focus on state building and the consolidation of the institutional structure. The most serious challenge facing the present Kosovar government, however, relates to its ability to deal with the huge socio-economic problems. While past failures in this regard could be pushed aside as UNMIK’s responsibility, Kosovo’s government can now be judged on its own performance. The government thus needs to show some determination to meet the expectations created by the declaration of inde- pendence among the Kosovar Albanian majority population, to disperse the fears of the minorities and to provide for their security within the Kosovar society. Reconfiguration and International Challenges Questions relating to Kosovo’s stabilization as a state entity and the consolida- tion of its newly gained independence continue to have a great impact on Kosovar politics. The Serbian contestation of the legality of Kosovo’s independence, slow progress in international recognition, and the lack of a resolution concerning the status of North Kosovo have been particularly important issues. “The Compre- hensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” – commonly known as the Ahtisaari Plan – was intended to form the roadmap for the implementation of a supervised Kosovar independence. However, Ahtisaari’s proposal never received 4 Until 2004, the international presence in Kosovo focused its efforts on setting “standards before status”. The UNMIK administration wanted Kosovo to meet certain standards of good governance before the question of future status would be addressed. Most important among these standards were the creation of functional democratic political institutions, rule of law, the creation of a stable economy, the holding of elections and transparent political processes. UNMIK also demanded that Kosovo provide security of movement to all minorities, and allow for the return of displaced persons. The UN had limited success with this strategy, and after the 2004 riots in Kosovo, its focus slowly shifted to the status question. 44 Hilde Katrine Haug the UN Security Council’s backing, and thus independence was declared without the hoped for support of a UNSC Resolution. The Kosovar government never- theless pledged to implement and follow the recommendations set down in the Ahtisaari Plan – a process which was set as a condition for international recogni- tion of Kosovo’s independence. Thus, the plan has become a blueprint on the road toward state consolidation in Kosovo. Serbia and Russia immediately expressed their opposition to this process, and have disputed the validity of Prishtina’s move. Both Serbian politicians and the Kosovar Serbs have refused to recognize Prishtina’s authority. They continue to argue
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