EEP Essay #27 February The Imperfection of Lying Abstaining from false speech (musāvāda) is the fourth of the five lay precepts. However, the suttas do not specify what false speech might mean in the context of this precept. While false speech may seem to be an obvious concept, there is plenty of ambiguity about what to include as part of the precept. For example, should all statements that are not factual in nature be considered “false speech?” If one unknowingly says something false, is it a violation of the precept? If the precept specifically refers to lying and speech which is intentionally deceitful, are all forms of lying and all deceitful speech violations of the fourth precept, or are there exceptions, e.g., to prevent greater harm from being done? This essay attempts to uncover what might have been the meaning of “false speech” for the Buddha and those who composed the suttas. To do this, I pull together the few and scattered statements related to false speech found in the suttas and in the Vinaya. With this as a foundation, I will consider how these statements might be relevant for our contemporary engagement with the fourth precept. In the suttas, the wrongness of false speech is emphasized in it being called “non- dhamma”, i.e. not the truth or not the Dharma of the Buddha.1 To lie is to stay on the “near shore” and to tell the truth is the “far shore” where the goal of Buddhist practice is attained. 2 More dramatically, lying is referred to as speech that is like “dung” and speaking truthfully is speech that is like “flowers.”3 The Buddha emphasized the importance of not lying in telling his son Rahula that “when one is not ashamed to knowingly lie, there is no evil, that one would not do.”4 The Buddha then added that one should therefore train oneself not to lie—even as a joke. Lying can have drastic karmic consequences both in this life and lives to come.5 This is especially the case for people who lie regularly: “False speech, repeatedly pursued, developed, and cultivated, is conducive to hell, to the animal realm, and to the sphere of afflicted spirits; for one reborn as a human being false speech at a minimum conduces to false accusations.6 1 AN 10.174 2 AN 10.169 3 AN 3.28 4 MN 61 5 AN 10.168 6 AN 10.99 1 EEP Essay #27 February The last point mentioned represents the idea that karmic consequences are somehow reciprocal to the act done: a harmful act done to others results in a related harmful consequence for oneself. In this case, the person who lies to others will be lied about by others in a future life. One early Buddhist fable, presented as a past-life memory of the Buddha, places the origin of societally widespread lying at the time when thieves started to deny they had stolen.7 Another story, more a myth than a fable, describes how lying begins when those who steal make false promises to stop stealing.8 The more immediate psychological reason for false speech is said to be the agitation caused by greed, hatred and delusion.9 In one forceful account, the Buddha provides the following description of how the desire for “gain, honor, and praise” can transform someone disinclined to lie into a liar: Bhikkhus, dreadful are gain, honor, and praise, bitter, vile, obstructive to achieving the unsurpassed security from bondage. Bhikkhus, I have known of a certain person here, whose mind I have encompassed with my own mind: ‘This venerable one would not knowingly lie even for the sake of his mother ... even for the sake of his father ... even for the sake of his brother ... his sister ... his son ... his daughter ... his wife.’ Yet some time later I see him, his mind overcome and obsessed by gain, honor, and praise, telling a deliberate lie. So dreadful, bhikkhus, are gain, honor, and praise, so bitter, vile, obstructive to achieving the unsurpassed security from bondage. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will abandon the arisen gain, honor, and praise, and we will not let the arisen gain, honor, and praise persist obsessing our minds.’10 Other passages mention that the motivation for lying is not limited to benefiting oneself. The Buddha explained that one can knowingly speak falsehoods for one’s own purposes, for the purposes of others, and for the purposes of both self and others.11 7 DN 26.14 8 DN 27.19 9 AN 10.174; lobha hetu kampi, dosa hetu kampi, moha hetu kampi. 10 SN 17.37-43 11 MN 65.13 2 EEP Essay #27 February While in the suttas there are no teachings that specifically elucidate the meaning of the fourth precept, the concept of false speech is discussed in other contexts, most prominently in several of the monastic rules of discipline found in the Vinaya. The Monastic Rule Against False Speech The most significant Vinaya rule concerning false speech is the rule that “knowingly speaking falsely requires confession” (sampajāna musāvāde pācittiya).12 The Vinaya discussion of this rule is done in somewhat legalistic terms, so monastics will know how to administer monastic discipline. Noteworthy in this rule is the requirement that to be a false statement it needs to be spoken “knowingly” (sampajāna). This suggests that the concern is not with unintentional or unknowing forms of false speech. Saying something which is false without knowing it is false would not be considered a violation of this rule. The “fine print” at the end of the Vinaya discussion of this rule explicitly states there is no offense if one has spoken in play or hurriedly. The inline commentary to this passage explains that “in play” (davā) refers to speaking [too] quickly, and that speaking hurriedly (ravā) refers saying something other than what one meant say. At least from the commentarial explanation it seems that speaking in play is a non-offense only if one has spoken fast enough so as to not to know what one is saying. The Vinaya also exempts from the rule those who speak while insane. The disciplinary consequence for lying is to make a statement of “confession” that provides some corrective for one’s false statement. “Confession” is the common English translation for pācittiya. In practice, performing a pācittiya is a clear verbal acknowledgement of having done something requiring such an admission in front of another monastic. In contrast to some religions where a confession is associated with subsequently being forgiven for a transgression, in the early monastic community there was no idea of such forgiveness. In the case of lying, confession is what reestablishes a monastic in the monastic life; the personal karmic repercussions of the lie and confession are not addressed in the Vinaya. In the suttas, when a monk acknowledges a fault to the Buddha, his standard response is to state But since you see your transgression as such and make right (paṭikaroti) in accordance with the Dhamma, we accept you 12 Pācittiya rule 1 3 EEP Essay #27 February [back in good standing]; for it is growth in the Noble One’s Discipline when one sees one’s transgression as such and make right in accordance with the Dhamma by undertaking restraint for the future.13 Here, the Buddha emphasizes the personal benefits, in terms of personal growth, of an admission of fault and subsequently committing to being restrained in the future. While within the extensive list of monastic rules, ‘making right’ in accordance with the Dhamma varies depending on the transgression, acknowledgement of one’s faults is a central practice. An example of the high value the early Buddhist community put on confession is the story of the Buddha admonishing his son Rāhula to avoid lying. After doing so, the Buddha then broadens his instruction. He states that if a monastic has harmed self, others, or both self and others with misconduct—of body, speech, or mind—this should be told to wise companions in the holy life.14 Then having “pointed out, revealed and declared”15 what one had done, one should be restrained in the future. It is noteworthy that the requirement to confess one’s wrongdoing says nothing about confessing to the person one has harmed or, in the case of making a false statement, to the person to whom one has lied. The instruction is simply to confess to some fellow monastic(s). It seems the emphasis is on reestablishing oneself in the rules of restraint that are at the center of the monastic training in sīla. Healing or reconciling the relationship with the person one has lied to is not emphasized. For a monastic, the “legal” consequence, i.e., confession, associated with the rule against lying is not as severe as the consequences for acts requiring expulsion (e.g., sexual intercourse), suspension (e.g., touching a woman in the case of a monk), or a penalty (e.g., keeping extra robe- cloth for more than ten days). For lying, a monastic must only confess having done so, and through the confession one returns to good standing within the community. This is also the case with a subsequent rule against evasive speech used by a monastic who is being questioned about possibly having committed an offense.16 Such evasion, perhaps a lie of omission, is also rectified through confession. 13 MN 65.13 14 MN 61.11 (i 416-417). An example of a monk confessing to another is found at MN 104.18.