THE DOCTRINE OF THE PASSIONS: PLUTARCH, POSIDONIUS AND GALEN

Francesco Becchi

Plutarch is an authoritative point of reference in ethics for the rea rma- tion of the constitutive unity of man called into question by Epicurean materialism and by Chrysippean-Stoic panlogism. He exhibits a profound understanding of human nature and the human psyche: he is well aware that man, inclined toward virtue though he may be, because of the weakness and fragility of his nature,1 is capable neither of achieving the good with only his good natural disposition nor of securing for himself amidst the shifting fortunes of life the self-su ciency, immunity to pain, or inner tranquility that represent the source of happiness.2 From the analysis of human behav- ior he conducts in his Moralia and Lives the conviction clearly emerges that nature, precise and ingenious though it be,3 produces no character that is entirely good or unquestionably devoted to virtue,4 which is the reason why it is di cult to  nd an individual whose life is entirely blameless and pure. Plutarch acknowledges the existence of a naturally wicked perversion (ἔµφυτος κακία) that sometimes tends to cloak itself in goodness and to remain concealed even for long periods. It may manifest itself either grad- ually, as in the case of Philip, or suddenly and completely, as in the case of Sertorius. He makes clear, nonetheless, his conviction, in accordance with Platonic tradition, that certain anomalies and inconsistencies of char- acter, such as certain forms of erroneous and defective behavior—above all in persons endowed with good natural qualities—should not be inter- preted as the manifestations of a genuinely wicked nature; that these are, rather, the efects of a lack of virtue and of philosophical training. It is pre- cisely this de ciency that allows empty opinions and false judgments, which lead to vile passions that are unworthy of a man, to seep in from with- out.

1 Plu., Cleom. 16.8. 2 Plu., De virt. et vit. 101B–D. 3 Plu., De am. prol. 495C. 4 Plu., Cim. 2.4–5. 44 francesco becchi

It follows that even a noble and good temperament, when uneducated, produces virtue without “science”, and thus indulges in many unworthy actions amongst other, loftier ones, as occurs in agriculture when fruit grows spontaneously or when fertile soil is left uncultivated.5 For Plutarch, then, natures that have not achieved a pure and perfect virtue (ἀρετὴ εἰλικρινής) grounded in a rational decision (κατὰ λόγον συνεστῶσα) are apt, alongside great virtues, to manifest great vices as well.6 That said, natural passion7 is for Plutarch an essential prerequisite not only for ethical action8 but also for civic and political activity. This is what prompts him to distance himself from ancient Stoicism, and in particu- lar from Chrysippus, who reduces passions to processes of reason, as if all desires and furious outbursts, like virtues, were judgments. Passions, as if they were the chords and nerves of the soul, need to be tightened and relaxed in a very harmonious way9 in order that they be guided by reason to a right and irreprehensible mean.10 Without them it would be impossi- ble to practice virtue, which is prized less as a possession than as action,11 because it would be impossible to transfer judgments to works.12 Moral- ity is indeed a quality of the irrational part of soul shaped by habit, and virtue is an activity that presupposes right opinion and judgment.13 For Plutarch, consequently, passions are not in themselves an evil, and their eradication is neither morally nor socially desirable.14 Hence his criticism

5 Plu., Arat. 10.5; Cor. 1.3. 6 Plu., Demetr. 1.7–8; De sera num. 552C–D. This is the origin for Plutarch, as for the Academic-Aristotelian school of the need to re ne the natural temperament with λόγος, by incorporating moderation (τὸ µέτριον) into passion eliminating excess (τὸ ἄγαν). On the notion of virtue-mesotes see Plu., De virt. mor. 443C–D: τοῦ λόγου … οὐ βουλοµένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν … ἀ ’ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀ ὰ συµµετρίας παθῶν καὶ µεσότητας, ἐµποιοῦντος. On moderation, wherein lies above all the virtue of the political man, see Plu., Cor. 1.5, 15.4. 7 For the natural passions, see Plu., De tranq. an. 465A. 8 See Asp., EN, CAG XIX 1, Heylbut, 44.16–19: καὶ ἅµα τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν µόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελεῖν µὲν παντελῶς ἀµήχανον, κοσµῆσαι δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον δυνατόν· εἴη δ’ ἂν κεκοσµηµένον ἐν τῇ τῶν παθῶν συµµετρίᾳ. 9 Plu., Per. 15.2. 10 Plu., De virt. mor. 444F–445A; De vitios. pud. 529D–E. 11 Plu., Per. 2.3. 12 For the impulse of passion that permits one to transfer judgments to operations, which can thus become actions, instilling at the irrational level the ethical virtues, which are an intermediacy (mesotes) between de ciency and excess, see Plu., Quomod. quis suos. 84B. 13 On passions as the beginning of actions, see Plu., An corp. afect. 501 C–D. 14 M. Vegetti, L’etica degli antichi (Rome–Bari 1989) 187.