2 Paradiplomacy – Scotland in the World 22 Linda Fabiani 22 Abstract 23 2.1

Home , Ambassador, Consulate, Exchange officer, Inatsisartut, Linda Fabiani, Paradiplomacy

Adam Grydehøj Linda Fabiani Jordi Solé i Ferrando Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi Maria Ackrén

Centre Maurits Coppieters 2014

2 3 Contents

Introduction 6 1 GOALS, CAPABILITIES, AND INSTRUMENTS 10 oF PARADIPLOMACY BY SUBNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS Adam Grydehøj 10 Abstract 11 1.1. introduction 11 1.2. Defining paradiplomacy 12 1.3. Jurisdiction as a zero-sum system 13 1.4. Competing national and subnational interests 14 1.5. Paradiplomacy in practice 17 1.6. Toward a stronger system of European paradiplomacy 20 2 Paradiplomacy – Scotland in the World 22 Linda Fabiani 22 abstract 23 2.1. Introduction 23 2.2. Scontland’s story 24 2.3. Scotland re-emerges 28 2.4. Scotland’s Experience with Paradiplomacy 28 2.5. Dealing with the Hard Stuff 34 2.6. Resources 35 2.7. Conclusion 37 3 From paradiplomacy to Protodipomacy: 38 the emergence of New Western European States and the case of Catalonia Jordi Solé i Ferrando 38 abstract 39 4 Basque Paradiplomacy 50 and European Union Internal Enlargement Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi 50 Aknowlegment 51 abstract 51 This publication is financed with the support 4.1. Introduction 52 of the European Parliament (EP). The EP is not 4.2. Foreign affairs of the Basque Government 54 responsible for any use made of the content of 4.3. Limitations of the activities carried out by the Basque Government 60 this publication. The editor of the publication is the sole person liable. 5 5 Paradiplomacy in Greenland 64 Maria Ackrén 64 abstract 65 5.1. Introduction 66 5.2. A Short History of Greenland’s International Role 66 5.3. General Development Regarding Paradiplomacy 68 5.4. The Greenlandic Case 68 5.5. Paradiplomacy within the Economic Sphere 69 5.6. Paradiplomacy within Other Policy Areas 70 5.7. Political Considerations Regarding Greenland 72 5.8. A New Greenlandic Strategy? 74 5.9. Conclusion or Way Ahead 75 Bibliography 79 Centre Maurits Coppieters 88 Members of the CMC 91 Colophon 93

6 7 introduction We live in historic times. Across Europe ancient nations, regions, and peoples, currently under the jurisdiction of various states, are increasingly calling for either enhanced autonomy or outright independence, and all the benefits that go with bringing decision-making power back home.

Scotland and Catalonia now have the opportunity to decide on their future and whether they want to become free, independent states. This is thanks to their pro-independence parties’ electoral success and, most importantly, the overwhelming support of their constituents.

Their European umbrella, the European Free Alliance (EFA) is best described as a broad alliance Gathering a diverse range of parties from all across Europe. Each with their own unique approach on how to improve the prospects for their people. EFA has always advocated for (1) minorities in their struggle for recognition, (2) parties with an autonomy / devolution You are reading the main policy papers presented during the conference agenda and (3) and also independence parties. These 3 different approaches Local Actions in a Global Context: ”Paradiplomacy by Subnational Juris to self-determination have always been equally important for us. dictions” organised last 15-17 January 2013, in Longyearbyen, Svalbard. Now is also the time to show we are an EU party that represents emerging It considered how subnational jurisdictions (towns, cities, counties, and new states and that we hence facilitate emerging new states in their regions) and other non-state actors use paradiplomacy to seek influence preparatory process towards full statehood. One important element beyond their borders. As globalisation reduces the ability of national towards statehood is recognition as a state and in this sense para-diplomacy governments to independently implement effective policies, subnational and pluto- diplomacy are important. It’s time EFA focuses more on jurisdictions are finding that sovereignty is no longer essential for entrance emerging new states as a new phase, important for some of our parties. to the global stage. Local governments are using paradiplomacy and informal diplomacy to promote their interests internationally in areas like Günther Dauwen trade, culture, tourism, politics, and environment. Secretary-General CMC

8 Paradiplomacy 9 Abstract

This paper defines paradiplomacy as “a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional activating targeting foreign political entities”. Because paradiplomacy is specifically an example of political interaction between unequal partners, taking place outside of the internationally accepted political sphere, it is by nature a contested practice. This paper argues that subnational jurisdictions and sovereign states have inherently differing policy objectives and that paradiplomacy is best capable of achieving policy objectives when it manages to either slip beneath the political radar of sovereign states or acquire the de facto concession of sovereign states. For this reason, the more sophisticated paradiplomatic tools (such as pseudo-embassies) are not necessarily more effective in achieving policy objectives than are 1 GOALS, less sophisticated tools (such as participation in international networks). Successful paradiplomatic practice requires a balance of developing capabilitieS, AND political structures and of pursuing concrete policy objectives. The aims of subnational jurisdictions seeking greater autonomy or independence could inSTRUMENTS OF be furthered through the construction of stronger networks of like-minded PARADIPLOMACY subnational jurisdictions in Europe and internationally. by SUBNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 1.1. Introduction

Paradiplomacy can be a difficult subject to discuss, not least because there is sometimes an understandable reluctance to admit that one is engaging in it. This chapter will address what paradiplomacy is, how it is undertaken, and why it might be important. It will also consider why national governments might be opposed to the practice of paradiplomacy by their subnational jurisdictions. It is only by facing up to what paradiplomacy actually entails that we can understand what it can and cannot offer to localities and regions that are pursuing greater self-determination. Adam Grydehøj As the structure of governance in Europe and the world as a whole grows Adam Grydehøj (PhD in Ethnology, University of Aberdeen) is Director of more complex, new opportunities are arising for enterprising subnational Island Dynamics and Research Associate at the Institute of Island Studies, jurisdictions to increase their powers of self-determination (Bartmann, 2000; University of Prince Edward Island. He works to encourage knowledge Keating, 1999). For some, full independence might be the ultimate ideal, exchange between academic, government, and the business world, with a while for others, increased power might be an end in itself. Either way, paradi- focus on culture, economy, and policy in small island communities. plomacy represents a path toward gaining greater standing and influence

10 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 11 in the international community. It is not a path, however, that is guaranteed this cannot be regarded as paradiplomacy inasmuch as the target of the to lead to success, and in some cases, paradiplomacy can actually hinder a activity is within the entity’s jurisdiction (even if the methods being used jurisdiction’s quest for greater international recognition. In addition, as is are beyond the entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity). always the case, a policy instrument is only as good as the policies it advances, It can furthermore be useful to distinguish between ‘paradiplomacy’ and effective paradiplomacy holds out the ability to effectively produce bad and ‘public diplomacy’. The former targets foreign political entities per results, which is a particular risk in the case of subnational jurisdictions that se whereas the latter target foreign publics in a more general sense. An lack substantial prior experience on the world stage. important reason for this distinction is that, unlike paradiplomacy, public diplomacy is not usually extra-jurisdictional, i.e. does not exceed a political entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity: Sovereign states tend not to place 1.2. Defining paradiplomacy legal limits on the ability of their subnational entities to address foreign publics through tourism campaigns, overarching place branding initiatives, We will begin with a brief definition of the concept of paradiplomacy and etc. Of course, the distinction between paradiplomacy and public argue for an understanding of paradiplomacy as a set of instruments for diplomacy can be more theoretical than actual, for not only are members of achieving certain symbolic and policy-oriented objectives. In this chapter’s formal governments also themselves members of foreign publics, but the broad definition, paradiplomacy is a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional opinions of members of the general public can influence the stances of their activity targeting foreign political entities. own governments. Depending on how public diplomacy is undertaken, it could even implicitly seek to influence the policy of foreign entities (rather In this context, an ‘entity’ is a unit of government: Thus, Catalonia is a than just the ideas of their publics). subnational entity, Spain is a national entity, and the European Union (EU) is a supranational entity. Spain is also a higher-level entity relative to We should note that although the present paper focuses on paradiplomacy Catalonia, yet Spain is simultaneously a lower-level entity relative to the EU. undertaken by subnational entities that are either moving toward full independence or are seeking to expand their jurisdictional capacity, many The above definition rests on an understanding that different levels of of these same activities are also undertaken by national entities (sovereign government possess different levels of ‘jurisdictional capacity’, i.e. different states). There are cases in which national entities strive for goals that are degrees of competence “to pass laws, build effective administrative difficult to achieve through formal diplomacy, causing engagement in processes, facilitate inward capital flows, encourage education and support informal diplomacy, which can often take the same forms as the types of the development of a climate conducive to economic growth” (Baldacchino, paradiplomacy discussed here (Grydehøj, 2014). 2002, 349). ‘Extra-jurisdictional’ activity is thus activity exceeding a political entity’s de jure jurisdictional capacity, representing a de facto expansion of the entity’s powers. 1.3. Jurisdiction as a zero-sum system

This definition furthermore specifies that paradiplomacy must target foreign There is a certain unwillingness within the scholarship to use the term political entities, i.e. must aim to influence subnational entities in other ‘paradiplomacy’ itself. It is thus that Criekmans (2010a, 1-2) seeks to avoid countries, foreign sovereign states, etc. When, for instance, a subnational contention by referring to “the academic study of what was once called entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by ‘paradiplomacy’,” pointing out that “Some scholars are not fond of the participating in an international policy network or entering into a twinning term paradiplomacy because it suggests an element of conflict between agreement, this can generally be regarded as paradiplomatic activity the national and sub-national policy levels, and implicitly assumes in as much as it targets foreign entities. When, in contrast, a subnational ‘incompatible interests’.” It is understandable that one would wish to avoid entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by the suggestion of conflict in paradiplomacy, especially because such a providing financial support to key business actors within its own territory, suggestion could prompt attempts by higher-level entities to reign in the

12 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 13 activities of lower-level entities. Nevertheless, subnational entities that are since they involve the exercise of powers that are legally the reserve of moving toward independence or seeking to enhance their existing powers these higher-level entities. Thus, while the results of paradiplomacy by a should be wary of arguments to the effect that paradiplomacy does not subnational entity may not necessarily be contrary to the interests of the necessarily involve the pursuit of objectives that are incompatible with the sovereign state, the exercise of the paradiplomacy is itself a transgression interests of higher-level entities. of the sovereign state’s authority. From the perspective of the sovereign state, there is good reason for the sovereign state – and not its constituent Although jurisdictional capacity has always been negotiated and contested entities – to wield diplomatic authority because it is only the sovereign within and between sovereign states, the rise of supranational and interna- state that is responsible for advancing the objectives of the state as whole. tional entities and authorities has further complicated the delineation of powers. Both paradiplomacy and internally oriented expansions of jurisdic- Let us consider an example from the archipelago of Shetland, a subnational tional capacity could prove worthwhile for a subnational entity seeking entity of Scotland, which is itself a subnational entity of the United Kingdom outright independence or greater self-determination, and both types of (UK). In the 1990s and early 2000s, Shetland’s local government used both activities necessarily challenge higher-level entities’ notions of the powers internally oriented and paradiplomatic de facto expansions of jurisdictional that the subnational entity possesses. The very existence of a relevant capacity to strengthen its commercial fishing industry in the face of rising higher-level entity results in at least a qualitative weakening and at most a supranational legal restrictions on fishing, increased competition, and quantitative decrease in the jurisdictional capacity of its constituent entities. declining fish stocks.T he UK quite concretely benefited from the relative Jurisdiction is a zero-sum system in the sense that one political entity’s success of these local fishing-promotion activities because a portion of the accrual of de facto or de jure jurisdictional capacity can only result from economic advantage that Shetland gained presumably came vis-á-vis foreign another entity’s absolute or relative loss of this same capacity. For instance, actors as Shetland’s share of the fish catch increased relative to what it might just as the increasing power of the sovereign state historically weakened the have otherwise been. In other words, there was a direct relationship between capacity of local communities to manage their own fisheries, the creation Shetland fishermen in particular making more money and UK fishermen in of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy weakened the capacity of the EU’s general making more money (since Shetland fishermen are also UK fishermen). constituent sovereign states to manage their own fisheries. The existence of EU policies on fishing, agriculture, manufacturing, labour, etc. does not The situation was, however, problematic, for not all of the value added due mean that sovereign states no longer have any power over these areas, but to these industrial promotion activities in Shetland was subtracted from it does mean that sovereign states no longer have exclusive or superior de foreign actors. With regards to a particular local government programme, jure power over these areas. Such losses or gains of jurisdictional capacity in fact, fishermen from elsewhere in Scotland complained that Shetland are neither inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ nor are even necessarily resisted by fishermen possessed an unfair advantage (Grydehøj, 2013a) – in other the entities that lose out: For instance, the EU’s constituent national entities words, that the increased competitiveness of the Shetland fishing industry might ideally wish that they could independently determine all aspects of undermined the competitiveness of the Scottish fishing industry as a fisheries policy for themselves, but given that this would involve exerting whole. It is unlikely that either the devolved Scottish government or the UK extra-jurisdictional control over other sovereign states that make use government would ever have been inclined to undertake the same kinds of European waters (which would be either impossible or unpleasant in of activities in Shetland alone as did the local authorities in Shetland. This practice), an EU Common Fisheries Policy represents a palatable alternative. is because the accrual of value by one subnational entity vis-á-vis other subnational entities that are constituents of the same national entity is not in itself a relevant goal for a sovereign state. 1.4. Competing national and subnational interests It is not in itself a relevant goal, but it could be a relevant goal from the All types of de facto expansions of jurisdictional capacity by subnational sovereign state’s perspective in certain circumstances. For instance, the entities represent a challenge to the authority of higher-level entities sovereign state might seek to redistribute wealth within its territory in order

14 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 15 to increase national economic equality: It might be deemed better to have entity in question is acting like a sovereign state because it feels it ought to numerous small fishing industries scattered around the country than one be regarded as a nation. The argument that the paradiplomatic activities of very strong industrial centre. Or in contrast, a sovereign state might seek an emerging nation are harmful to the sovereign state in which this nation to reinforce a locality’s national dominance in a particular industry in order is currently encompassed is thus missing the point: Paradiplomacy is being to enhance its – and thus the country’s – international competitiveness, used to de facto enact nationality and secure national interest in the de jure even if this meant weakening actors in the industry in other localities within absence of a relevant nation-state. the country: It might be deemed that numerous small industrial centres were unsustainable and that more value would be produced by nurturing specialisation and economies of scale in one very strong industrial centre 1.5. Paradiplomacy in practice (Grydehøj, 2013b). There has been a tendency to view paradiplomacy progressively, as taking There is thus a tension between the interests of the sovereign state as a place in waves of increasingly sophisticated political activity. Criekmans whole and the interests of its constituent entities. It could be argued that (2010b, 45-46), indeed, breaks down “the full spectrum of diplomatic the more responsible and responsive a sovereign state is, the greater the instruments” into the following: likelihood that it will act against the interests of some of its subnational entities relative to others. Thus, whereas any local government activity a) Ius legationis or political representation abroad; could either intentionally or unintentionally strengthen the national b) Ius tractandi or treaty-making power; welfare, determinations as to what is in the best interests of the sovereign c) other agreements of a certain formalized nature: (political) state as a whole can only really be made at the national level. declarations of intent and/or cooperation agreements, transnational contracts and cultural agreements or partnerships; In most cases, paradiplomacy by subnational jurisdictions is not remarked d) The development of own programmes of assistance and sharing of upon at the national level. For instance, when the local government of the know-how: bilateral programmes, programmes on cross-boundary city of Copenhagen undertakes paradiplomatic activity regarding climate cooperation, programmes that want to bring the civil societies of change even though climate diplomacy is a national responsibility, there the region and other regions/countries together, OR multilateral is no complaint, for Denmark’s national government deems Copenhagen’s programmes; activities to be in the national interest despite the Copenhagen govern- e) Other forms of participation in multilateral frameworks and ment’s focus on its own interests. By the same token, when the local organizations: observing and participating in (technical) committees, government in Shetland engages with a foreign head of state in order to the creation of OR participation in funds within multilateral flatter local cultural nationalist sentiments, neither the Scottish nor the UK organizations, becoming an associate member of multilateral governments deem this to be a threat–in part, we may assume, because organizations; they are aware that the foreign state in question does not regard the f) participation in other formal or informal networks; engagement in the same light as does Shetland. g) Developing a public diplomacy, both domestic and international.

Conflict only arises when higher-level entities feel that their own authority Criekmans’ list suggests descent (with the items at the top being more is threatened by the actions of lower-level entities. In the case of paradi- politically sophisticated than those at the bottom) and feeds into the idea plomacy, the situation can be particularly acute if a strong nationalist that the more complex or sophisticated the form of paradiplomacy, the sentiment exists in the subnational entity and if this entity is regarded as more advanced the paradiplomatic project in question. using paradiplomacy as a tool for gaining support for independence or for eventually rendering independence a fait accomplis. From the perspective This assumption might be an instance of confusing cause with effect. of this volume, such paradiplomacy is morally justified since the subnational We will consider this by discussing the most formally sophisticated

16 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 17 paradiplomatic instrument, namely political representations (hereafter, engaging with them. It is instead through its public diplomacy efforts that pseudo-embassies), both within the sovereign state (such as the the TRNC makes much of its paradiplomatic impact: Although activities Greenlandic and Faroese representations in Copenhagen) and outside aimed at convincing people that North Cyprus is an ideal place to go on it (such as Scotland House in Brussels and the Québec representations holiday or attend university are targeted primarily at foreign publics (rather around the world). In many cases, such pseudo-embassies are reflections than foreign political actors), they can indirectly affect the opinions – and of the prior success of a nationalist movement, not of its ability to achieve ultimately, policies – of foreign political actors as well (Grydehøj, 2012, 190). paradiplomatic success on its actual policy objectives. These pseudo- embassies are striking precisely because they are often accepted as at least How then can subnational entities seeking outright independence or semi-legitimate by the sovereign states to which they are subordinate and, greater self-determination accomplish the most in practical terms? What as a result, by other sovereign states. is most important: building the structures of independence or achieving policy goals? There is no clear-cut correct answer because different kinds of This, however, is not always the case: An interesting counter-example paradiplomatic activity can achieve different kinds of results. For instance, is offered by a de facto but unrecognised state, the Turkish Republic of even the most successful of pseudo-embassies by subnational entities are Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which operates pseudo-embassies in a range of at some level symbolic acts: They can be bases from which highly effective countries. With the exception of the TRNC embassy in Ankara, however, paradiplomatic activity (for instance, trade promotion or meetings with these pseudo-embassies are completely unrecognised by their host states foreign politicians) can take place, but such activity could theoretically have since the Greek Cypriot-dominated government that controls the south of been undertaken elsewhere, for such pseudo-embassies lack the privileges Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus) is regarded by all countries except for Turkey that the international community grants to fully fledged, recognised as the only legitimate authority on the island. It is precisely because the embassies. This does not, however, mean that pseudo-embassies of this TRNC’s pseudo-embassies have no formal legitimacy that they are capable sort fail to add value to the paradiplomatic activities that they host, for their of undertaking extremely sophisticated paradiplomatic activity. TRNC very use as sites of paradiplomatic activity demonstrates a subnational pseudo-embassies can offer passport services, birth certificates, and other entity’s de facto capacity to undertake diplomacy. In other words, by services that have the trappings of true ambassadorial work-services that imitating embassies, such pseudo-embassies could not only potentially are closed to many pseudo-embassies that are set up with the concession directly enhance the efficacy of the paradiplomatic activities they host but of the sovereign state. This is not to say that having the concession of one’s also indirectly enhance the willingness of foreign actors to regard these sovereign state is a bad thing, but having this concession does mean that activities as legitimate. one is obliged to play by the sovereign state’s rules. Such a situation may be more palatable for subnational entities like Scotland, Greenland, and This, however, is just a potential, not a given, for if a pseudo-embassy is Faroe that have won from their sovereign states legitimate pathways to viewed not simply as less than fully fledged (such as with the pseudo- future independence (should they choose to follow them) than it is for a embassies of subnational Québec and unrecognised Taiwan) but as subnational entity like Catalonia, which possesses a delegation to the EU instead wholly illegitimate (such as with unrecognised TRNC), then the but no legal trajectory toward independence. paradiplomatic activities it carries out could be further delegitimised as a result. The pseudo-embassy’s host country (and typically the sovereign Of course, in discussing pseudo-embassies, one must consider that instru- state of which the subnational or unrecognised entity is arguably a mental sophistication is in itself no guarantee of political effectiveness. The constituent) must first concede to at least a degree a legitimacy before TRNC’s unrecognised pseudo-embassies undertake high-level activities the pseudo-embassy can have any kind of positive effect. In the absence yet are of little value to the TRNC in terms of achieving policy objectives of such a concession, these ‘guerrilla embassies’ are possibly counter- that involve engagement with foreign states since the very fact that the productive: Their symbolic force draws attention to the paradiplomatic pseudo-embassies are pretending to be embassies without the concession nature of paradiplomatic activities, which is a good thing if other entities of the international community means that national entities must avoid wish to engage in paradiplomacy with you but is a bad thing if they wish

18 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 19 to avoid giving the impression of engaging in diplomatic activity with a preference for remaining outside of the EU presents a challenge for non-existent or illegitimate state. subnational entities within the EU that are seeking substantially increased self-determination rather than outright independence. The problem is more Fortune can thus be said to favour the fortunate: The highly respected than a relative inability to appeal to precedent; it also limits a subnational pseudo-embassies of Greenland and Faroe in Copenhagen share a building entity’s ability to seek support from and engage diplomatically with peers. with the altogether official Icelandic embassy and are recognised as undertaking (limited) ambassadorial functions via Denmark’s and Iceland’s Those who aim to strengthen the ability of European ethnic and cultural concession of their legitimacy. This in turn enhances the power of the groups to pursue self-determination should consider ways of strengthening activities that Greenland and Faroe undertake from these premises. the platform for facilitating subnational paradiplomacy on a European level. The emergence of a stronger network of highly autonomous subnational entities within Europe (not necessarily limited to the EU) could help 1.6. Toward a stronger system of European legitimise such paradiplomacy as well as grant it additional effectiveness paradiplomacy through economies of scale. Greater international cooperation between subnational entities at all levels could be of wide benefit: It could serve Subnational entities and unrecognised states are not necessarily barred as a halfway house for subnational entities seeking full independence, from effectively engaging in paradiplomacy if they lack prior international as a useful sphere of activity for those highly autonomous subnational support. As noted above, the fact that certain paradiplomatic instruments entities that are content with their present de jure jurisdiction, and as a are less sophisticated than others does not necessarily make them any launching pad for aspirational subnational entities that presently lack less effective. Despite the international community not regarding it as a but are striving for enhanced jurisdictional capacity. In all cases, it could legitimate candidate for future independence, Shetland has had consid- give subnational entities the opportunity to simultaneously develop erable paradiplomatic success in practical terms, perhaps precisely governmental structures that are conducive to independence and greater because its paradiplomatic activities on foreign soil have been largely self-determination as well as pursue the practical policy objectives that shorn of symbolic force. Because Shetland lacks a significant independence presumably play a significant role in the desire for independence or greater movement and because its government largely leaves its cultural self-determination itself. nationalism at home when it undertakes activity abroad, this subnational entity’s involvement in international fishing disputes, trade shows, tourism and culture networks, etc. have not raised complaint. None of the UK’s three crown dependencies (the Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey) are part of the EU, and none have trajectories toward full independence, yet all have shown themselves capable of engaging with the international community at a high paradiplomatic level in terms of financial negotiations as well as competently engaging in public diplomacy to advance positive place brand images of themselves. The lack of outright nationalism in these paradiplomatic efforts – that is, the lack of a challenge to the de jure jurisdictional status quo – make them palatable to the higher-level entities involved.

It is interesting to consider in this context that many of the most autonomous European subnational entities (crown dependencies, special or overseas territories, outermost regions, etc.) remain outside of the EU. Exceptions include Åland, Gibraltar, and (from a certain perspective) Scotland. This

20 Adam Grydehøj | Paradiplomacy 21 Affairs, Culture and the Gaelic Language, and was Convener of the Parlia- ment’s Scotland Bill Committee. She is currently a member of the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body and sits on the Referendum Bill and Welfare Reform Committees.

Longyearbyen. Norway, 17 January 2013

Abstract

Since the union of the Scottish and English crowns in 1603, Scotland’s state diplomacy has been conducted largely through London-based institutions. In 1707, Scotland and England established the United Kingdom, within 2 Paradiplomacy– which aspects of Scottish identity were protected – law, church and education. From the late 19th century, developments in government saw Scotland in the the emergence of a Scottish component of the British Civil Service, covering Scottish domestic affairs. World Because of this history, despite four centuries of union with England, in one form or another, Scotland’s identity as a nation is not in dispute. Its unique identity is recognised in many fields, not least in culture and sport. Since the formation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, non-state diplomacy has been a unifying priority, even when the governing parties favoured the constitutional status quo. With the coming to power of the SNP, as a minority administration in 2007, and as a majority government in 2011, the process intensified. The independence referendum in 2014 represents our biggest challenge. Have we laid the groundwork for Scotland to make the transition from Linda Fabiani stateless nation back to nation state? What diplomatic challenges do we face in making that transition? Can non-state diplomacy really help? Linda Fabiani MSP for East Kilbride was educated at Hyndland Secondary School in Glasgow and graduated with a Diploma in Housing from Glasgow University. Before she was an elected representative, Linda had a successful career within the housing associations sector. Linda was first elected to the Scottish Parliament in May 1999 where she was an MSP for Central Scotland 2.1. Introduction until 2011 when elected as MSP for the East Kilbride constituency. She is a Fellow the Chartered Institute of Housing and an Honorary Fellow the Royal As a member of the Scottish Parliament since 1999, and a minister in Incorporation of Architects in Scotland. In 2007 the Italian Government Scotland’s first pro-independence government, from 2007 to 2009, I had awarded Linda the Cavaliere dell’Ordine della Stella della Solidarieta’ the opportunity to see at first hand growing links between Scotland and Italia (Knight of the Order of the Star of Italian Solidarity) for working to government institutions across the globe operating above, at, and below promote Scots/Italian links. Linda is a former Minister for Europe, External the level of the nation-state.

22 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 23 Such links are not entirely new. Scotland’s local authorities have developed In 2014, fifteen years after that first meeting of the modern Scottish international links over many years, whether through town, city and region Parliament, the people of Scotland - for the first time ever - will have the twinning arrangements, or as Scotland’s cities have used international opportunity to decide democratically the country’s constitutional future2. representation to boost economic development. These forms of interna- Westminster’s legislation for the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament tional operation do not represent a challenge to the integrity - territorial or sought to prevent Holyrood from challenging the continuation of the symbolic - of the United Kingdom (Cornago 2010). United Kingdom. Indeed, this year, in a publication on its view of the nature of the 1707 union between Scotland and England, the UK Government Those of us on either side of the debate over Scottish independence may published legal advice (Great Britain and Parliament 2013), which stated: not see Scotland’s recent participation in para-diplomacy in the same “Whether or not England was also extinguished by the union, Scotland certainly way. Indeed, the impact of independence on Scotland’s international was extinguished as a matter of international law, by merger either into an engagement, especially with the EU, is an important factor in the current enlarged and renamed England or into an entirely new state” (Great Britain debate over Scotland’s relationship with the UK. and Scottish Parliament 2013, 74).

Scotland’s future relationship with the UK will come to a head over the Appearing in a legal opinion published by the UK Government, this next 18 months. On 18 September 2014, the Scottish Government will hold sentence demonstrates the significance of the issues raised by the debate a referendum that will allow the Scottish people to determine whether over Scotland’s constitutional future. Not since the 18th century has a UK Scotland remains in the United Kingdom, or takes back the responsibilities Government so publicly endorsed the view that Scotland has no continuing of an independent nation-state. right to exist as a separate entity, and continues to do so only by the tolerance of the Westminster Parliament. Whatever the outcome of that referendum, which I hope will be to re-establish Scottish independence; it is unlikely that Scotland will accept The suggestion that Scotland was extinguished 300 years ago would a downgrading of its international profile. Therefore, one way or another, come as a shock to the many peoples and nations who have witnessed its Scotland’s enhanced engagement with the international community will re-emergence on the international stage over recent years. These groups continue, and, most likely, grow. are as diverse as

• many parliaments and governments, national and regional, with 2.2. Scotland’s story whom Scottish representatives have worked over issues ranging from climate change to education, from development to culture; On 1 July 1999, my former Holyrood1 colleague, Dr Winnie Ewing, had the • audiences at the many internationally toured cultural events based privilege of opening the first session of the modern Scottish Parliament. on Scotland’s unique languages, cultures, and experience; and After a break in the life of Scotland’s Parliament of almost 300 years, she • judges of the European Court of Justice, whose President from picked a resounding phrase to mark the occasion: “The Scottish Parliament, 1984-88 was Lord MacKenzie-Stuart, whose background was in adjourned on the 25th day of March, 1707, is hereby reconvened.” (The Scottish Scotland’s separate legal system, which is founded on significantly Parliament 1999). different principles from that in effect in the rest of the United Kingdom.

1 The modern Scottish Parliament is situated beside Holyrood Park and Holyrood Palace in 2 The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 followed a referendum in which the Edinburgh, and takes its name from this location. UK Parliament determined the terms of the settlement.

24 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 25 So, why is there such a gap between the rhetoric of the UK Government and Education Department was formed in 1872; in 1885, the UK Government the reality of Scottish nationhood, as experienced by Scots and our many appointed a dedicated minister with responsibility for Scotland. In 1926, international contacts, and what role might para-diplomacy be playing in the minister in charge of the Scottish Office joined the UK Cabinet. This Scotland’s fight for international recognition. arrangement continued until 1999, when the parliament took over most of the responsibilities of what was, by then, a Scottish Office ministerial team. Scotland is one of Europe’s oldest nations. It emerged as a single political entity over the 9th and 10th centuries. Its sole land border - with England - Over the 300 years of union, a wide range of Scottish non-governmental was largely resolved by the early 13th century (Education Scotland 2013a). organisations has grown, especially in areas protected by the union, with However, relations between the two countries remained strained and Scots their own links to European and international networks. Scotland has direct courted England’s European competitors; most notably France, in what membership of international sporting bodies, including FIFA, a position Scots refer to as the ‘Auld Alliance’3 (Education Scotland, 2013). that even anti-independence commentators strongly defend6 (Scottish Cup 2011). In 2014, Scotland will host the Commonwealth Games7 (The CDF The Scottish and English crowns were unified in 1603, with the accession 2013) and Golf’s Ryder Cup8 (R&A 2013), both with the active support of the of King James VI of Scotland to the position of James I of England. Since Scottish Government. then, despite the existence of a Scottish Parliament until 1707, and again from 1999, London-based institutions have conducted Scotland’s state Scotland retains a distinct cultural identity and a diaspora of up to 45 million diplomacy. people worldwide consider themselves of Scots ancestry. Scots travelled afar, some by choice some not9 (Education Scotland 2013c), and as a result, In 1707, the parliaments of Scotland and England agreed by separate Acts we have strong links with many parts of the world (The Scottish Government of Union, to form the united kingdom of Great Britain. Despite negotiations 2013a). In 2009, at the instigation of a pro-union First Minister, Scotland proceeding in haste, the agreed Treaty of Union protected many Scottish staged a Homecoming for the diaspora, to mark the 250th anniversary of institutions and traditions, including our education system, which was the birth of our national poet, Robert Burns (Queen Margaret University already providing universal free primary education, and major elements of 2009). This will be repeated in 2014, to coincide with the Commonwealth Scots Law and the legal system. The Treaty also protected Scotland’s distinct Games and the Ryder Cup (Visit Scotland 2013). In a useful coincidence, religious tradition, a significant factor, even in today’s more secular society, 2014 is also the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, the decisive given that the monarch is also head of the Church of England4 (BBC 2011). battle in Scotland’s war of independence.

As government activity grew in Scotland over the 19th century, much Incredibly, unlike Ireland, which has been actively engaging with its of it driven forward by Scotland’s local authorities, a distinct Scottish diaspora since the earliest days independence (Diaspora Matters 2011), public administration developed5 (Education Scotland 2013b). A national these are among the most significant steps taken to tap intoS cotland’s global network.

3 The alliance dates from the treaty signed by John Balliol, King of Scots, and Philip IV of France in 1295 against Edward I of England. The terms of the treaty stipulated that if either 6 The Scottish Football Association rejected a “Team GB” for the football at the 2012 London country were attacked by England, the other would invade English territory. Olympics, concerned this might jeopardise Scottish participation in the Worls Cup. 4 The Church of England was established in the 16th century, when the English monarch 7 Scotland has participated as separate team in every Commonwealth Games since 1930, Henry VII was refused a divorce by the Pope and assumed the role of the head of the church as have Wales and England. in England. 8 Scotland is widely recognized as the home of Golf, with the Royal and Ancient Club of The Church of England has a limited presence in Scotland and no links to the dominant St Andrews responsible for creating the rules of the modern game. Church of Scotland, of which the monarch is not the head. 9 The Clearances – in which a large part of Scotland’s Gaelic speaking population were 5 This would be in fields such as por Relief, Education, Roads, Housing, Urban Development, forced from their homes, with many travelling overseas, is one of the defining elements in Public Health etc. Scottish history.

26 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 27 2.3. Scotland re-emerges In 1999, Scotland House was opened in Brussels, with Catalan representation to Europe cited as a model for what the pro-union Scottish Executive12 was In a move directly aimed at preventing the SNP from gaining control of hoping to achieve. Through the first two terms of parliament, governed by Holyrood, the Parliament’s voting system10 was structured to prevent the a coalition of unionist parties, Labour and Liberal Democrats, the primary election of a single-party government (Wintrobe 2001). Scots quickly came focus of our work on External Affairs was our relationship with the EU to see Holyrood as their Parliament, with survey results regularly indicating and the impact of European Law on devolved issues. Scotland became over 70% of Scots believe Holyrood11 (Economic & Social Research Council an active participant in REGLEG, the network for Regions with Legislative 2011; The Scottish Government 2010) should matter to Scotland more than Competency of the EU. Westminster. Since 1999, para-diplomacy has been a priority, even for governing Following two four-year terms of pro-union government, in 2007, the parties that favour the constitutional status quo. At EU level, the Scottish SNP became the largest party in the Parliament and formed a minority Government opted for engagement through the Regions with Legislative government. In 2011, a high level of support for the SNP right across Scotland Powers (RegLeg) Group in preference to the Committee of the Regions; overwhelmed the carefully designed voting system and elected a majority indeed, Jack McConnell, a pro-union First Minister, served as President SNP government. Westminster had a choice; it could stand on its view that of RegLeg. The approach adopted to European engagement during this Scotland had been ‘extinguished’ and attempt to block an independence period has been described as ‘co-operative’, exercising influence ‘behind referendum, or it could recognise Holyrood’s democratic mandate and pass the scenes’ and ‘insider’(Keating 2010, 158). legislation permitting an independence referendum. Westminster adopted the path of letting the referendum proceed and the two governments In March 2002, the pro-union coalition published its first statement of signed an agreement to that effect (The Scottish Government 2012). priorities for work on external engagement. Although European issues were dominant, the statement signalled the government’s intention to Scotland’s growing confidence in recent years, assisted by our experience work further afield to support its functional responsibilities, and to promote of para-diplomacy, has undoubtedly played its part in gaining this Scotland. Then Deputy First Minister, Jim Wallace summarised the priorities referendum. as13 (The Scottish Parliament 2002):

• promotion of Scottish devolved policy interests in the European 2.4. Scotland’s Experience with Paradiplomacy Union and internationally; • building of mutually beneficial links with regions and countries The Parliament reconvening in 1999 prompted a high level of international of the European Union and beyond; interest in events in Scotland. The Parliament and the Scottish Government • the promotion of a positive image of Scotland overseas. work with a network of 57 consuls and honorary consuls based in Edinburgh, and have developed close links with many Ambassadors to the UK. In the Following approval of this document, the Government entered into a last full calendar year representatives of 13 National Parliaments and 12 range of bilateral agreements with other Sub-state Governments: Catalonia Regional Parliaments officially visited the parliament. (May 2002), covering agriculture and rural affairs; architecture; education;

12 The Scotland Act 1998, which established the parliament used the term ‘Scottish 10 The voting system provides for the election of 72 ‘First past the post’ or Constituency Executive’ for the ministerial team. When the SNP took office in 2007, usage changed to members, and 56 ‘Additional’ or regional members elected by proportional representation. ‘Scottish Government’. The 1998 Act has now been amended to reflect this. 11 Findings are drawn from the British and Scottish election survey of 1997, the Referendum 13 Presentation of the statement to the Scottish Parliament. Ironically, Jim Wallace is now survey of 1999, the Scottish parliamentary election survey of 1999, and the Scottish Social the senior Scottish Law Officer for the UK Government, and supervised production of the Attitudes surveys of 2000 to 2001. ‘Scotland extinguished’ legal advice.

28 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 29 research to support innovation; health; housing; urban regeneration and To underpin the International Development Policy, the Government transport; Tuscany (November 2002), covering economic development; established an International Development Fund of £3m per annum. The arts & culture; cultural education & creativity; and EU and international Policy prioritised the use of this fund to support development in Malawi, policy; North Rhine-Westphalia (February 2003), covering EU policy; science one of the countries with which Scotland has long-standing ties; although and technology; and the stimulation of entrepreneurship; Bavaria (June we now support work in many other countries a high priority for Malawi 2003), covering land use planning and design; justice; education; tourism; continues to underpin our work to this day. environment and administration (Scotland and Scottish Executive 2004). One of the early drivers in the Government looking beyond Scotland’s Led by their increasing contact with the diaspora, Scotland’s politicians borders was a drop in the country’s population. Even after the discovery of embraced the growing Tartan Day movement in Canada and America, oil off Scotland’s shores in the 1960s, Scotland’s population was in decline. aimed at celebrating these countries’ strong Scottish heritage. With the As can be seen from Diagram 1, this was quite dramatic when compared to US as our largest international trading partner, both the Government and the population growth taking place in other nearby countries. Parliament welcomed this initiative. Between 1970 and 2000, the population of Scotland dropped by 2%, by By the end of its first session, in 2003, the whole Parliament had moved contrast, Northern Ireland’s population increased by over 50%. in the direction initially supported only by the SNP, with the European Committee assuming a wider External Relations remit. The returned, pro-union, coalition Government published its first International Strategy in Population change 1970/71 to 2010/11 Scotland and adjacent countries 2004 (Scotland and Scottish Executive 2004). Although this was a significant 60% advance, the administration seemed reluctant to stake Scotland’s interna- 50% tional claim too strongly. This hesitancy can be detected in the 2004 40% document’s strategic goals, one of which was: “to position Scotland internationally as a leading small nation” (Scotland and Scottish Executive 2004, 6). 30%

20% This is not a bold ambition for a nation that has contributed significantly 10% to so many fields of human endeavour. The Parliament’s European and 0% External Relations Committee welcomed the strategy, but stated “To 1970/1 1980/1 1990/1 2000/1 2010/1

develop the strategy further, we believe that the devolved government will pop’n 1970/71 increase on % Cumulative -10% need to show greater vision and confidence” S( cottish Parliament 2005). Census years Ireland Northem Ireland England & Wales Denmark Scotland In the International Development Policy, published the following year, the Government recognised that the strategy had been inward facing (The Scottish Government 2005), emphasising the benefits that would accrue to In a development that was unimaginable pre-devolution, the Scottish Scotland from international relations14. However, it did lay the groundwork Government persuaded the Home Office to approveT he Fresh Talent for later developments. Initiative, a uniquely Scottish component to UK immigration policy. Initiated in 2004, Fresh Talent offered overseas students who studied in Scotland the right to remain and work, in Scotland, for two years beyond graduation. 14 The Scottish Executive International Development Policy states that “The International This was put in place against significant opposition from elsewhere in the Strategy is primarily concerned with the benefits that can accrue to Scotland - politically, culturally or economically - from establishing strong international relationships” (The UK and despite control over immigration being “closely associated with Scottish Government 2005, 2). ideas of national sovereignty and national identity” (Skilling 2007, 102).

30 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 31 When the SNP took office in 2007, we began to expand Scotland’s role affecting countries around the North Sea and North Atlantic that are of internationally. For example, we expanded the work around Tartan Day to more concern to Scotland than to the UK. build an annual ‘Scotland Week’. This focusses on economic development and engages with contacts across the USA and Canada. For many years, alcohol has been a powerful feature of Scottish life, socially, and through the iconic Scotch Whisky industry, which exports over £4 For example, in Scotland Week 2008, the First Minister launched the billion worth of product per annum. The SNP Government identifies Scottish Government’s £10 million Saltire Prize for marine renewables. The Scotland’s growing consumption of alcohol as a problem, and accepts launch took place in the Washington headquarters of National Geographic, that price can be used as a factor in regulating consumption. It brought which gave the announcement an otherwise unattainable international forward legislation to set a minimum price per unit of alcohol, which has profile (The Scottish Government 2008). implications for EU competition policy and is in dialogue with the EU over implementation of this proposal as a public health measure. Although the Parliament had begun to embrace External Relations from its early days, this did not feature in a ministerial title before my appointment, The Scottish Government recognises the need to protect and grow exports in 2007, as Minister for Europe, External Affairs, and Culture in the first of Scotch Whisky. The opening of the Parliament in 1999 has increased SNP Government. With the benefit of a ministerial post within the First focus on the importance of the industry to Scotland. With the support of Minister’s team, we were able to bring this area of activity together under a the Scottish Government, Scotch Whisky is securing Geographic Indication government-wide International Engagement Framework. of Origin Status15 across the world, including in the crucial Chinese market (The Scottish Government 2009). The principal difference between the SNP Government and its predecessors was that we very deliberately presented Scotland as a nation in its own In recent years, Scotland has performed strongly in attracting foreign direct right, rejecting the notion that Scotland is simply a region of the United investment and research and development. In 2011, we attracted over Kingdom. The idea that Scotland had been ‘extinguished’ in 1707 hadn’t 5,900 jobs; that was 2,000 more than any other part of the UK, including even made an appearance at that time. London. We have attracted investment from companies based in China, Japan, Norway, the Middle East, the USA, and elsewhere16 (The Scottish Since 2007, the Scottish Government has produced a range of country Parliament 2012). It seems the possibility of an independent Scotland plans, for the USA, Canada, India, Pakistan, and China, to direct and focus doesn’t hold many fears for companies that already operate in a multitude Scotland’s external engagement. The framework is clear about the need to of different countries; this appears to come as a surprise, possibly even a link external engagement to the Government’s overriding goal of creating disappointment, to our political opponents. sustainable economic growth. It is also clear about the need to build Scotland’s global identity – and not in a small way. The re-emergence of Scotland on the world stage offers a platform and a support for Scotland’s creative industries, whether these are based on our We also of course have very clear plans for our engagement with Europe. For example, Scotland has Europe’s largest fisheries zone and still accounts for over 60% of UK fishery landings; yet, Scotland has been routinely excluded from top table discussions on the Common Fisheries Policy. The SNP has 15 EU policy was introduced by Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14th 1992 - protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and consistently challenged the UK Government on this exclusion. foodstuffs. Geographic Indication of Origin Status means that Scotch Whisky must be made in Scotland. In 2010, for the first time, a Minister in the Scottish Government spoke 16 Taqa (Abu Dhabi), Avaloq (Switzerland), FMC Technologies (USA), Aker (Norway), Ineos (England), PetroChina (China), Dell (USA) , Gamesa (Spain), BNY Mellon (USA), State Street on behalf of the UK; this took place in negotiations over mackerel quotas (USA), Amazon (USA), Doosan Power Systems (England), Hewlett-Packard (USA) and between the EU and Faroes and Iceland. This is just one of many issues Mitsubishi Powers Systems (Japan/USA)

32 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 33 traditional cultures, or on Scotland’s significant contribution to the digital suspects took place under Scots Criminal Law, one of the parts of Scotland’s age. The Parliament’s first National Cultural Strategy, agreed the year after separate legal system protected by the Treaty of Union. In 2001, the sole the re-establishment of the parliament and by all political parties, called for convicted bomber, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was sentenced to life impris- the promotion of International Cultural Exchange and Dialogue, and for the onment in a Scottish jail. establishment of a long-awaited National Theatre of Scotland. In 2009, with the SNP in power in Holyrood, Megrahi applied for release in The National Theatre unveiled its first major production in 2006 – the play, compassionate grounds following a diagnosis of terminal cancer. Arguably, Black Watch. Apart from being an excellent piece of theatre, the play’s vivid because of the international aspect of his case, the UK Government portrayal of soldiers at war gave a strong Scottish perspective on the Iraq could have directed Scottish Ministers not to release Megrahi17. The UK war and provoked huge interest. It played to packed houses at home, and Government chose not to invoke its powers, yet stayed silent as US Senators with the support of the Scottish Government had highly successful tours in threatened reprisals against Scotland after the Justice Secretary granted America, China, India, and elsewhere, visiting over 40 cities. As I write this, it Megrahi’s request. In the face of such duplicity, is it any wonder that only a is playing to packed houses in Glasgow, before taking to the road again to small minority of Scots trust the UK to act in Scotland’s interests18? Seattle and San Francisco. Scotland’s diplomacy is not all far afield, however. The SNP recognises the The NTS has continued to reflect Scottish identity and values (The Scotsman need to maintain a social union within the British Isles post-independence, 2012), including in the most recent production, Glasgow Girls, which tells and we can see the beginning of this in the British Irish Council (BIC). The BIC the story of asylum seekers in Scotland and a community campaign to was initiated as part of the Northern Irish peace process, through the ‘Good challenge UK Government asylum policy. The Scottish Government values Friday’ Agreement between the UK and Irish governments, and the political the part played by NTS, and helps to promote their work overseas, as it does parties in Northern Ireland. It brings together the Irish and UK governments, for Scotland’s other creative groups – our traditional musicians, classical the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, together national companies, visual-arts collections, and a broad spectrum of with representatives of the Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey. creative talents who are interpreting, and in many cases leading, Scotland’s re-engagement with the world. We see the BIC developing into a Council of the Isles, perhaps learning from the Nordic Council, as one of the forces that can help maintain positive However, we should bear in mind the warning from one reviewer of Black relationships between the nations and regions on the British Isles in the Watch: “cultural diplomacy is best kept fire-walled from regular diplomacy... years ahead. its effectiveness declines the nearer it comes to the official foreign policy apparatus” (Cull 2007, 12). 2.6. Resources This is every bit as true at the sub-state level as it is at state level; cultural endeavour can of course be political, but it must never become mere Diplomacy, even paradiplomacy, costs money! Prior to devolution, propaganda. Scotland’s external links strongly focussed on the USA. In 2001, of 60

2.5. Dealing with the Hard Stuff 17 Clause 58(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 states “Power to prevent or require action. If the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that any action proposed to be taken In terms of major diplomatic issues, few come bigger than that of the 1988 by a member of the Scottish Executive would be incompatible with any international obligations, he may by order direct that the proposed action shall not be taken.” Lockerbie bombing, in which 270 people died, most of them USA citizens. 18 In the same study that found 70% support for Holyrood as more important to Scotland By agreement between Libya, the UK, and the USA, the trial of two Libyan than Westminster, only 13% of Scots trusted Westminster to always or mostly act in Scotland’s interest, whereas a majority thought Holyrood would do so.

34 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 35 representatives of the Scottish Government or its agencies posted abroad, the world. Our Environment Minister attended the Copenhagen climate 31 were in the USA, 15 in Brussels, and another 15 covered Asia and the Rest conference in 2009 as a representative of one of the first governments to of the World. agree carbon targets to 2050 (The Scottish Government 2013b).

In 2009-10, spending outside Scotland’s borders by the Government and Our Ministers have headed numerous business delegations, including to the its agencies (Hudson and Nicol 2010), was just under £30m, approximately Middle East, China, and India. Our presence at cultural and sporting events 0.1% of the Government’s budget. Just four organisations incurred over 90% is important in the promotion of both business and tourism. Recently, the of international spending. The Government itself incurs expenditure across First Minister attended The Ryder Cup in the US to take handover as the its diverse responsibilities; Scottish Development International promotes next host nation, and previously had attended the premiere of the Disney- international trade and inward investment; VisitScotland promotes tourism Pixar animated film, Brave, set in Scotland. in Scotland, and; the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) markets Scottish educational qualifications and consultancy internationally (ibid). 2.7. Conclusion The budget in 2009/10 represents an increase of over £10m, 54% in real terms, from financial year 2004-05.There are two main factors in this As we move towards the 2014 referendum, the groundwork we have laid increase. Scottish Development International now has over 80 staff working since 1999, and indeed in the years before that, must come to fruition. in 15 countries, and, over its first term, the SNP doubled the International While our opponents talk of a Scotland ‘extinguished’ in 1707, those of us Development Fund to £9 million. promoting Scottish independence look to Scotland’s future.

The pattern of spend has shifted: the proportion spent in both Europe and Diplomatic issues already dominate the referendum debate, with disputes the USA is down; spend in Asia has increased significantly and spend in the over Scotland’s place in the EU, and our relationship with NATO in the rest of the world increased from 1% of our international spend in 2004/05, context of our ambition to free Scotland of nuclear weapons. At a recent to almost 25% in 2009/10, due largely, but not solely, to the International seminar in Brussels, Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, spelled out the Development Fund’s focus on Malawi. Scottish Government’s views on an independent Scotland’s place in the EU (European Policy Centre 2013). One of the critical resources in Scottish diplomacy is international trips by Government Ministers. The number of trips made outwith the UK has been Winnie Ewing, who opened the modern Scottish Parliament with such relatively stable since the parliament was established in 1999, at approxi- aplomb also served as a Member of the European Parliament, from 1979 mately 50 visits a year, many of them relatively routine visits to Brussels to 1999. During that time, she earned the title Madame Ecosse, and earned (many more are made to London, but these don’t count as foreign trips). Scotland many friends across the union.

As a sign of how quickly matters change in world affairs, when the parliament However, Winnie’s first parliamentary election was to the UK Parliament in opened in 1999, Climate Change was not seen as sufficiently important to 1967. Following her victory, which marks the start of the SNP as a political be ‘reserved’ as a responsibility of the UK Parliament19. Consequently, this force, she welcomed her election with the words: “Stop the world, Scotland issue of global significance automatically devolved to Scotland, which put wants to get on.” in place one of the most ambitious pieces of climate change legislation in I hope the overview I have given you provides some sense that Scotland is now moving towards ‘getting on’, and that our heightened engagement

19 The Scotland Act 1998 adopted the principle of devolving all matters to the Scottish with the world in recent years has played some part in moving our Parliament, unless specified, in Schedule 5 of the Act, as a Reserved Matter. campaign forward.

36 Linda Fabiani | Paradiplomacy 37

Member of the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) since 2003, in June 2007 he was elected as mayor of his home city Caldes, and re-elected in June 2011. Since October 2011, he is ERC’s deputy secretary-general for institutional and international relations. From March 2012 he is the Secretary General of the European Free Alliance (EFA). In December 2012 he was elected as Member of the Catalan Parliament.

Abstract

Since the 80’s, sub-state governments with legislative powers have developed a range of Para-diplomacy strategies that over time have 3 From become more open and complex. These strategies have been more effective the more they have been conducted in cooperation and with the paradiplomacy to agreement of the respective central governments.

Protodipomacy: Some sub-state governments have included in their Para-diplomacy the emergence strategies the promotion of an own cultural identity. For governments such as Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland or the Basque Country, external of New Western policies have become not only an opportunity to directly promote their economic and cultural interests, but also to publicize and promote their european States national specificity and aspirations.

and the case Recently, some of these governments, especially in the case of Scotland of Catalonia and Catalonia, have been committed with the achievement in the short term and in a strictly democratic way of an independent state for their own countries. This means that Para-diplomacy activities are complemented by proto-diplomacy, ie strategies to seek international alliances and support for the achievement of independence. Proto-diplomacy, to these stateless nations, is a discrete activity that often conflicts with state diplomacy. Nevertheless, it constitutes a key field of action in order to optimize the chances for these self-determination processes to become a success. Jordi Solé i Ferrando EFA as European political party, drawing together civic nationalists, Born in Caldes de Montbui, Catalonia, in 1976, in 1998 he graduated in supports the self-determination processes and sees this as a democrati- Political Science and Public Administration at the Autonomous University zation and normalization towards a different and better Europe. of Barcelona and continued his studies in Germany with a Master program in European Studies. From 2002 to 2007 he worked as political advisor in the European Parliament in the EFA group.

38 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 39 The European Free Alliance (EFA) is a European political party with three such as Scotland’s future EU membership; and in Catalonia, the very same decades of experience and presence in 17 European countries, which possibility that the Catalans could be free at last to vote on its own future, includes parties that from progressive values and a clear democratic stance, critically depends on the role of other countries and international organi- advocate the collective rights of national minorities, self-government and zations: the less sensible they will be to Spanish pressures, the more likely self-determination. EFA wants a better and stronger Europe, a people’s the Catalans will be able to exercise their right to decide. Europe that really implements the subsidiarity principle, a Europe opened to emerging new states. Although the official slogan of the European In this chapter, I want to make a brief discussion of the diplomatic activity Union is ‘Unity in Diversity’, the EU needs to act upon the blatant linguistic of Western stateless nations seeking independence by peaceful and and cultural inequality in Europe. EFA claims for linguistic equality giving democratic means, using the case of Catalonia as an example. In order to official status to all European languages and protecting endangered reach a better understanding of how this diplomatic activity looks like, I will and minority languages. Many of our parties are active in self-governing first review the two key concepts of sub-state entities’ diplomacy: paradi- regions with legislative competences across Europe. Some advocate full plomacy and protodiplomacy; then I will make a brief review of the reasons statehood for their countries, while others advocate (more) devolution or that have led a majority of Catalans to support independence, also leading self-government. Seven MEPs from EFA parties are present in the European an even larger majority of them to support the demand of a democratic Parliament, within the Greens/EFA parliamentary group. referendum on the issue; and then thirdly, and finally, I will make an even briefer description of how Catalan institutions are bringing those reasons to We in EFA are glad to see that some stateless nations in Europe are involved international organizations, foreign governments, civil societies and public in self-determination processes that for several reasons have sped up in opinions in order to pave the way for international support and recognition. the last years and that could end up with the emergence of new Western European States. These nations are mainly Scotland and Catalonia, with How could we describe paradiplomacy? To begin with, we must mention Flemish and Basque pro-independence forces making clear progresses that, in Europe, there are several federal or decentralized states that have towards this goal as well. More specifically, both the Scottish and the sub-state entities with legislative powers (in the EU there are in total 74, Catalan government have taken compromises to call for a referendum on most notably in the federal Austria, Germany and Belgium or in the region- the independence of their countries. Scotland will hold its referendum in alised Italy, Spain or the United Kingdom). Some of these political entities autumn of this same year, after the signature of the Edinburgh Agreement have developed, especially from the 80’s, foreign policy strategies to with the British government in 2012. Meanwhile, in Catalonia, a clear defend and promote, parallel to central state diplomacy, their interests in majority of the autonomous Parliament has reached an agreement to call the international arena. This is what we understand by paradiplomacy. for a referendum in November, but in this case the Spanish government has clearly stated its rejection of any dialogue or negotiation directed to reach Some sub-state entities have created a constitutionally based, complex and an agreement similar to the Edinburgh one. structured set of instruments and policies for their own external activities with functional and geopolitical priorities. According to (Keating 2010), the EFA supports these self-determination processes and regards them as main fields of this external action are: economic development, technology, democratization and normalization paths towards a different, diverse education, environment, culture, institution-building, migration, human and better Europe. All these processes stem from democratic values and rights, environment and security. As a matter of fact, then, in Europe a rights, such as the right to decide, that for us is a key collective right. Thus, considerable number of states do not enjoy a monopoly of competences in from a purely democratic point of view, we believe that no democratic the area of foreign affairs. political force should never reject the exercise of democracy. However, it is clear that the actual success of these democratic processes is not only a Globalization, internal democratization and federalization, and the matter of democratic principles, but also a matter of politics; and, indeed, European decision-making process have facilitated the rise of paradip- of international politics. Scotland’s referendum is being fought over issues lomatic activities for sub-states entities. A globalized world with multiple

40 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 41 levels of governance and the concurrence of many public and private actors representation offices, have or desire to have some type of formal treaty- opens the scope for action for sub-state entities in the international field. making power linked to their domestic competences, and seek presence in And in the specific framework of the European Union, where many of the international organizations, be it formal or through informal links. They also competences of sub-state governments are indeed shared with European tend to be very active in terms of public diplomacy, that is, in their efforts to bodies, regions have practical incentives to try to influence the complex promote through publicity, cultural events and marketing communication decision-making process and benefit from EU resources. At regional level, a positive image and reputation for their countries, in order to to present as well as at state level, European affairs are increasingly seen as a matter of them as good locations for investment, living and tourism and also to domestic as much as foreign policy given the deep implication of the EU for promote the idea that they are a self-governing entities that want to play all tiers of government. a role in world affairs.

A thriving activity in paradiplomacy is a by-product of constitutional However, paradiplomacy is at the end of the day the diplomatic activity of provisions that allow them as much as a result of political initiatives (consti- a sub-state government, with very limited aspirations and means, almost tutional arrangements vary considerably between different states, the always focused on gaining cultural and economic advantages for the most generous being Belgium). In some specific cases, like the Catalan one, population that this government represents, whether a stateless nation the process has been the other way round. The Catalan government started or not. Thus, when the government of a stateless nation engages in a in the 80’s an active pro-European policy, which included a represen- democratic process of self-determination, a new approach is required. For tation office in Brussels and other ad-hoc initiatives, a policy that was seen those governments actively seeking independence, paradiplomacy activities with suspicion and was even politically and legally fought by the Spanish are therefore complemented by protodiplomacy, i.e. strategies to seek government, until in 1994 a Constitutional Court rule recognized the international alliances and support for the achievement of independence. right for autonomous communities to pursue their internal competences beyond the borders of the state (‘in foro interno, in foro externo’ doctrine). Protodiplomacy, to these stateless nations, is a discrete activity that often Although the Spanish constitution stipulates that foreign policy is an conflicts with state diplomacy, since two different/divergent national exclusive prerogative of the state, 2006 Catalan autonomous constitution projects compete in the international arena. Nevertheless, it constitutes a (the Estatut) stipulates that the international competences of Catalonia key field of action in order to optimize the chances for these self-determi- derive from the internal competences, mainly in the fields of culture, nation processes to become a success. The official recognition by the education, trade, tourism and sports. international community of these new states is a crucial step for them in order to be fully active in this community, but all this demands a prior, It should be taken into account that sub-state entities with legislative careful action on the international stage. powers have a national identity distinguished from the rest. This identity is usually based on a specific culture, a particular history with government Established states may be reluctant to protodiplomacy activities from institutions in the past, a distinct party system and a collective project for stateless nations because they would not like to antagonize the home the future (a willingness to exist as a particular group) largely shared by nation state by openly supporting their national aspirations. The world of citizens. These entities tend to be especially active in the field of paradi- diplomacy is a conservative world, and all nation-states have a self-interest plomacy, since they find in it not only an opportunity to promote their in maintaining their sovereignty and territorial integrity and, thus, in economic and cultural interests, but also to publicize and promote their resisting diplomatic developments that appear to promote centrifugal national specificity and aspirations among the peoples of the world. In this tendencies within nation-states (Kincaid 2010). That’s why protodiplomacy sense, paradiplomacy can be seen as a nation building policy. is by no means an easy business.

Thus, stateless nations such as Flanders, Catalonia or the Basque Country Protodiplomacy activities usually target governments that are seen to play (and Québec outside Europe) have a particularly dense network of a key role in the hypothetical recognition of the new state. In that sense,

42 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 43 alliances and influences among other devolved and federated territories of the seventeen Spanish autonomous communities, and it is one of the play a secondary role, because the ultimate goal is the recognition by the most dynamic, populated and opened to the world. The country’s official international community, that is, by the community of states. Influential language is Catalan, alongside Spanish, which is the official language for transnational lobbies can also be a target by stateless nations wishing to the whole state. The Catalan linguistic and national community extends to become new states. The relationship with their diaspora is also important: the rest of the Catalan Countries: Valencia, the Balearic Islands and some communities of nationals who emigrated abroad can be valuable partners counties in southern France. All these territories have been historically in promoting the independence project in the countries where they live. linked to the Principality of Catalonia, which for many centuries and until the beginning of the 18th century had its own laws and institutions of In the case of potential new western European states, the EU is also a government. target, since these states might well secure EU membership right after the independence. Flemish, Basque, Scottish or Catalan citizens are indeed Over the centuries, Catalonia was gradually integrated into a personal European citizens as well, since their states long belong to the EU. Internal monarchic union first with Aragon and then, in the dawn of the Modern enlargement is here a key concept. All new Member States of the Union Age, with Castile, the cultural and political core of modern Spanish had to undergo a long process of institutional and political integration into nationalism. Within this common crown, Catalonia retained a great degree the EU. In order to become members of the Union they had to accept legal of self-government through a mixed government between the crown and standards of the Member States of the Union, and their accession requires the parliament, not very far away from the English and Scottish systems. the consent of all member states. But “internal enlargement” refers to the However, Catalan freedoms and constitutions were eventually abolished accession of states not from outside but within EU boundaries, states that in 1714 after a military defeat against the troops of Philip V, at the end of would arise from democratic secession or succession processes within the War of the Spanish Succession. There began the attempts of building a states already members of the European Union. Therefore they would strongly unified, culturally and linguistically homogeneous, and politically automatically fulfill the criterion for being admitted into the EU. sometimes authoritarian, sometimes dictatorial, Spanish nation state.

However, the acceptance of “internal enlargement” as the result of a In a short republican period in the 1930’s, right before the civil war, Catalonia secession from a member state is far from being the official doctrine of the regained its own institutions of government, but they were again brutally EU; nor it is, by the way, to reject it. The main reasons for this ambiguity abolished, this time by Franco. With the coming of democracy in the end of are two. In the first place, the EU treaties determine how a state can enter the 70´s, Catalan self-government was re-established. During these three the Union and how should it leave it, but they don’t say a word on what decades of self-government, Catalan institutions have been consolidated, happens after the secession of a territory from one already-member state. and they could even broaden their powers after a new Estatut came into In the second place, the EU has never been faced with the need to handle force after much dispute in 2006. such a scenario, so there are no precedents. Thus, neither its written law nor any precedent would tell the EU what to do in case that Scotland or But these three decades have also shown that Spain is unwilling to Catalonia happen to eventually secede. There’s a legal void. And where recognize its true multinational reality and the political implications that there’s a legal void, politics, and therefore diplomacy, play the lion’s share this recognition should bring. The central government formally treats the in determining the final outcome. Here the key role of protodiplomacy autonomous communities in equal terms, whereas in fact some of the in paving the way for an automatic, or at least quick and easy, admission communities (most notably Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) of nations like Scotland or (even more) Catalonia if they finally decide to have a distinguished national feeling that deserves, for the sake of their became independent states. smooth accommodation into the Spanish project, a differential treatment. Far from this, the parties that have ruled Spain (both center-right and Now let me briefly focus on the Catalan case. Catalonia is a European country center-left), backed by a public opinion reluctant to the recognition of the located in the north-east corner of the Iberian Peninsula. Formally it is one national diversity within Spain, have chosen the strategy known as “café

44 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 45 para todos” – coffee for all; the same for all, even though some regions do support was particularly visible during the last two September 11ths (2012 not want –and probably do not need- as much. and 2013), the National Day of Catalonia. In 2012, a civic and even festive demonstration on the streets of Barcelona became one of the largest in Another important fact should be added to this lack of national recognition all European history, with a clear motto: “Catalonia, New State in Europe”. for Catalonia: the huge fiscal deficit that our country suffers year by year Just one year after, a 480 km massive human chain, called the Catalan Way vis a vis the central government. This fiscal imbalance amounts to 16 towards Independence, was formed following the ancient Via Augusta, billion euros every year. This tax drain has tremendously harmed Catalan from Le Perthus (French Republic, Vallespir) up to Alcanar (Kingdom of economy. Despite its traditional strength our economy has in recent years Spain, Montsià). lost dynamism to the advantage of other Spanish regions, most notably Madrid. Despite generating the resources that are necessary to maintain 2012 demonstration, an unprecedented historical event, led the Catalan and even improve our welfare state and our economic infrastructure, the president, Artur Mas from the center-right party Convergència i Unió, to deficit imposed by our financial relationship with Spain, in addition to our end the parliamentary term and call for early elections, which took place on current economic crisis, have brought our government and our country to November 25. These elections formed a fragmented parliament, but with a point close to collapse. a clear majority of members advocating the need for a referendum to be called for next year. The minority government of Convergencia i Unió is now A recent episode, the last reformation of our autonomous constitution (the backed by my party, the Catalan Republican Left (ERC in Catalan), under the Estatut), is also important to understand the Catalan fatigue. In 2005 the condition, amongst others, to move decisively towards the referendum, Catalan Parliament approved by a large majority (with the support of 120 which both Spanish conservatives and socialists assure they will never let MCP’s to 15) a proposal for a new Estatut that, according to Spanish consti- to happen. tutional provisions, was to be sent to the Spanish parliament for review, discussion and approval. There the proposal was severely cut. Nevertheless, Therefore, within Spain, Catalonia lacks from recognition as a stateless this revised proposal was voted by a majority of Catalans in a referendum. nation, a just economic treatment and reasonable fiscal self-government as an autonomous government. A majority of Catalans have been backing But despite of this, the Estatut was taken to the Spanish Constitutional Catalan nationalist parties with the aim not to break with Spain, but to Court by some other Spanish autonomous communities as well as by accommodate Catalonia within a new, federal and multinational Spain; the People’s Party (at the time the main opposition party at the Spanish however, the absolute failure of this project during the reformation of Parliament). They all alleged that many parts of the new Estatut were the Estatut in the past decade has led this majority to now back the idea unconstitutional, specially those concerning fiscal autonomy, justice, the of secession, with an even more massive majority supporting the call equalization between Catalan and Spanish as official and compulsory for a referendum on the issue. Unlike the British government, Madrid is languages, and Catalonia’s recognition as a nation. After 4 years of deliber- determined to not allow this democratic referendum; thus, Catalonia’s ations, the court stated that the Estatut had indeed gone too far in several independence will be more than likely the result of unilateral action due aspects and cut it once again, re-writing or re-interpreting many of the most to the unilateral decision of Madrid to not negotiate nor dialogue with the important articles concerning language, national recognition, economic Catalan government, despite the repeated offers in this sense. autonomy, self-government and justice. All this process was experienced as a humiliation by a large majority of the Catalan society. These are our reasons, and we are convinced that they show very few flaws. We’re not in front of a reasonable central government, but in front of one The toughness of the economic crisis, the injustice of the fiscal system, and that is determined to ignore the democratic demands of a huge and stable the general feeling of mistreatment to our own culture, national personality majority of the Catalan society. But, in order to overcome Madrid’s frontal and self-government have ended up forming a civic and political majority opposition to the exercise of democracy in Catalonia, we the Catalans have supporting a call for a referendum on independence. This huge popular an obvious need to explain our case to the whole world. On the one hand,

46 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 47 there are different international campaigns and initiatives driven by Catalan listen. Our people have started to speak out loud, and very soon will speak civil society and the pro-referendum parties in Catalonia. And on the other out louder; and our institutions are working hard to assure that the world hand, there are Catalan protodiplomatic efforts. is going to listen.

Thus, the Catalan government has recently created the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, popularly known as Diplocat. In its website, this agency is self-described as “a public-private partnership designed to foster dialogue and build relationships between the citizens of Catalonia and the rest of the world”. However this broad statement, from its very beginning the Diplocat has been deeply committed to explain the reasons why a majority of Catalans want independence, and (especially) why an even larger majority want a referendum on the issue. Diplocat is particularly oriented to public diplomacy, therefore being more focused on the relationship with foreign public opinions and civil societies, rather than with governments.

But Catalonia also sees a target, of course, in foreign governments; in the end, they will be the ones from which Catalonia will need recognition. In this sense, the Catalan institutions have been also actively, while quietly, making its own efforts to promote the Catalan referendum’s cause to many different governments and international organizations. This protodiplomatic effort has generally been built upon the blocks of Catalan paradiplomacy, presenting the Catalans as reasonable people enraged by the old-fashioned nationalism of the Spanish governments whether center-left or center-right, as well as for their rejection of the idea of a democratic referendum on independence like the one that, with absolute normality, will take place in Scotland after an agreement between the British and the Scottish governments.

Thus, Catalonia is presenting its case to the world not only with convincing reasons, but with means to bring these reasons to that world. The economic situation of the Catalan government, harmed for the crisis but specially by the deliberate fiscal asphyxia imposed by a hostile Spanish government, forces Catalan institutions to use austere means in its protodiplomatic efforts. My impression, however, is that these means are slowly having an effect. In the quiet efforts that my own party is doing on its own to interna- tionalize our cause, we have noticed an evident change of attitude in many actors of the international scene: from largely ignore Catalan independ- entism, during the last year they have started to ask and, most importantly, to listen. And what we, those who stand up for Catalan freedom, need to win this battle, are just two things: our people to speak, and the world to

48 Jordi Solé i Ferrando | Paradiplomacy 49 Aknowlegment

My warmest thanks to Adam Grydehoj from “Island Dynamics” as organiser of the Seminar in Svalbard on “Local Actions in a Global Context, Paradiplomacy by Subnational Jurisdictions”. My deep appreciation to the Deputy Governor Mr. Lars Erik Alfheim and the Mayor Christin Kristogffersen for their most enlightening explanations on the political, social and cultural situation of the island of Svalbard in the North Pole. It was and will ever be one of the most extraordinary trips I have ever done, an unforgettable experience. Thank you also to EFA for making it possible to meet with other colleagues from all around the world. It was an intense Seminar where we all learnt a lot from each other, both from the academic point of view and from the human point of view. And finally thank you toS valbard itself for its unrivaled natural beauty 4 Basque even in extreme conditions of coldness and darkness. Paradiplomacy and European Abstract union Internal We live in a globalized world in which paradiplomacy is necessary if we, as subnational entities, are to establish direct relations to deal with the issues Enlargement that are crucial to us, depending on the will and level of self-government enjoyed.

For those stateless nations wishing to initiate a process of self-determination, paradiplomacy is an effective instrument to help further our cause. It is an essential step in the right direction. Yet it is also true that there comes a time when the diplomacy of States on which we depend – in our case the French and Spanish States – closes the door on us. Therefore, it is our view that the future of our people lies in the establishment of a free, sovereign State within the European Union so that we can forge diplomatic ties like any other State. Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi Paradiplomacy and diplomacy should co-exist peacefully, in mutual respect EFA Vice-president, International Relations Secretary at the National for the different levels of self-government because they thus facilitate, Executive of Eusko Alkartasuna, Member of the Araba Provincial Parliament speed up and take better advantage of the relations among the various (Basque Country), Secretary General of the think tank Alkartasuna levels of representation. They should not, however, work against each other Foundation and Secretary General of Eurobask (Basque Council of the because diplomatic relations should be understood as those that are built European Movement). from the bottom up, not the other way around.

Longyearbyen. Norway, 17 January 2013

50 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 51 4.1. Introduction [Navarre], and 3 in French territory or Iparralde: Lapurdi [Labord], Behe Nafarroa [Basse Navarre] and Zuberoa [Soule]) has about 8.218 km2 and Paradiplomacy and diplomacy should co-exist peacefully, in mutual respect around 3.150.000 inhabitants, To this amount it should be added the for the different levels of self-government because they thus facilitate, diaspora, which Basques consider eighth province. Indeed, it is estimated speed up and take better advantage of the relations among the various that there are more than 10 million people of Basque descent in the world, levels of representation. They should not, however, work against each other being Argentina a clear example of that, as the 10% of the population is of because diplomatic relations should be understood as those that are built Basque origin. from the bottom up, not the other way around. In our case, however, we find ourselves with twoS tates characterized by the strongest Jacobin and It must be pointed out that administratively Iparralde is not legally centralist tendencies: France and Spain. recognized, in fact, the Basque territory in France is separated into two French departments that spill over into the geographical area of the French To facilitate our understanding of the issue, let’s bring a brief explanation of Basque Country. Good thing that Basques like daunting challenges. the current situation in Euskal Herria. Since 2009 Basques have witnessed the reunification of left-leaning After 25 years of nationalist governments, in 2009 the Basque Country nationalist forces in the Basque Autonomous Community as well as in experienced the interregnum of a constitutional government, or what it is Nafarroa and Iparralde. Although they are three different administrations, the same: a non-nationalist government. This allowed to clearly identifying these forces are committed to respecting the pace of each administration, the type of diplomatic relations to be established depending on the will to while they share a common goal – that of holding a referendum for implement a nation-building policy. Today, the new government, led by the self-determination. Basque National Party (EAJ-PNV), is a nationalist government, which was set up on 19 December 2012. Therefore as to date it’s not easy to know what The Basques have always been a people open to the outside world – its kind of foreign affairs policy they will be implementing. However, there is seafaring history and its expertise in transforming minerals to metal made no doubt that the previous transition to a constitutional government did it a people that were naturally inclined to establish relations on an equal away with the political facet of the Basque paradiplomacy in order to, on the footing with peoples of other lands. During the twentieth century and the one hand, focus nearly exclusively on economic and trade relations, and on Republican era under Lehandakari20 Agirre, the first President of the Basque the other, to become open to cooperation with other Spanish autonomous Government, Basques had their own currency and foreign representation communities in issues dealing with foreign affairs, all this with the aim of abroad. But let’s focus on the Spanish transition so that you can learn how reducing the importance of Euskal Herria and to diminish its own identity. Basques went about acquiring the competences we now enjoy and why we now consider them to be insufficient, even if at the moment the Basque Nonetheless, Euskal Herria is experiencing an unprecedented period in its Country does have the highest level of self-governance in comparison with history as a result of the decision of E.T.A to cease all acts of armed violence any other sub-national entity in Europe (Cronin 2008). in October 2011; therefore, this is the time to reactivate diplomatic channels to initiate a genuine peace process that will pave the way for a true and After 40 years of dictatorship under Franco, the Spanish transition – which peaceful co-existence in Euskal Herria. by some politicians such as the author, is been called the “incomplete Spanish transition”– gave Spain another geographical distribution to make The Basque Country or Euskal Herria is the land of the people that speak the Basque language (Pérez-Agote 2006; Trask 1997), and refers to the area located in the borderland between northern Spain and south-west 20 Lehendakari is the Word used to call the President of the Basque Government in any language; however, following the dictionary of the Basque Academy: Euskaltzaindia; France. The total area of its seven provinces at both sides of the Pyrenees “the Basque noun lehendakari means "president" and can refer to the president of any (4 in Spanish territory or Hegoaldea: Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Nafarroa country, club, association, etc” (Mitxelena 2013)

52 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 53 it appear to be a decentralized State (Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga that is, of three of the four southern provinces that compose the Basque 2009, 183–184). However it did so, by giving all the autonomous regions Country. practically the same competences, thereby dashing the hopes of Catalans, Basques and Galicians and giving autonomous powers to those that sought The Basque regional government has acquired international relations none, such as Murcia, Extremadura or Madrid, for whom decentralization competences, what shapes the foreign policy and international relations. only meant higher costs and heavier administrative burdens desired But it must be insisted, foreign policy action encompasses much, much by none. Madrid is the most eloquent case of this: in addition to having more because it also includes the activities carried out by the Basque all the institutions inherent in the Spanish Government, it has a regional Government through its Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. It government and a regional parliament in Madrid, it is not surprising thus also includes the activities of the three provincial governments, with their that the Partido Popular – the Spanish Popular Party – speaks of overlapping respective Directorates for European Affairs, the important contributions and recentralization with regard to the Spanish State. Therefore, sooner or to international solidarity and cooperation for development made by the later the Spanish State will have to seek a different system. Basque municipalities, the political organizations and labour syndicates, chambers of commerce, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), cultural Some, have no doubt that the Catalans and Basques will embark upon associations and many others (Ugalde Zubiri 2005). the road to self-determination (Pérez-Agote 2006). Independentists shall do this in full respect for Spain, while demanding that the Spanish The first Basque Government set the stage for what in 1991 would become Government respect peoples in return. As sovereign Nations they shall the General Secretariat for Foreign Affairs for a fundamentally political not ask permission, nor shall they wait any longer because they’ve already reason (Castro Ruano and Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública 2004). been down that road and the only response gotten from the Spanish It endeavoured to project some semblance of country, with its own socio- Government is a systematic “no”. political reality, cultural identity and history (Ibid).Actually, it was a matter of acquiring an essential tool to build a nation; it was also, of course, done In spite of it all, the Transition enabled Basques to lay the groundwork for economic reasons, such as seeking investments abroad and markets for what is now the Basque foreign policy. The first Basque government for its own industries and technology so as to modernize it, as well as of the post-Franco era (1980 to 1985) – under the leadership of Carlos promoting tourism in the country (Ibid). And lastly – also very important for Garaikoetxea, who founded Eusko Alkartasuna, the political party to which cultural reasons – was to spread the Basque language and culture, targeting the author belongs – set up the institutions that successively developed the in particular the diaspora. four Basque governments that followed (Garaikoetxea 2002). And this was important because he was convinced that institutions matter, that is, that With regard to this point, I would like to thank Professors José Luis de Castro institutions shape political outcomes. As Peter Burens and Jana Deforche Ruano and Alexander Ugalde Zubiri, whose reports have been used in the appoint, “major decisions taken at one point in time shape the scope and creation of this article. I would also like to say that they prefer to speak of direction of future decisions”(Bursens and Deforche 2010, 168). That was the “foreign relations of non-central governments” rather than “paradi- the case in 1985 and also today, we are again at this same critical juncture. plomacy” to avoid any reference to hierarchy or subordination (Castro Spain is at this critical juncture: Catalonia and the Basque Country want to Ruano and Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública 2004, 21) become new States of the European Union. The General Secretariat for Foreign Affairs is the body that assists the Lehendakari, the President of our Government, in defining and setting the 4.2. Foreign affairs of the Basque Government political and institutional strategy of the Autonomous Community’s foreign policy (Ugalde Zubiri 2005, 8). The General Secretariat has two directors, Since the Basque administrative setup is quite complex. In the following the Director of International Relations and the Director for Basque Citizens lines, the situation of the Basque Autonomous Community will be described, and Basque Communities Abroad. Its main policy areas are relations with

54 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 55 the European Union, cross-border cooperation, International Relations and represents all the Autonomous Communities on issues that affect their relations with Basque groups abroad. competences. As you can understand, that is not at all sufficient.

To date the Basque Government has opened 8 delegations: Brussels, New The Basque Government’s “European policy” covers both participation in York, Mexico, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Bogotá, the Delegation for defining the position of the Spanish State in Brussels by means of the very Cross-border Cooperation, headquartered in Gasteiz, the capital of the deficient and unsatisfactory internal channels existing today, such as direct Basque Country, and the Delegation of the Basque Country in Madrid, participation in the European Union’s institutions via those bodies and which was opened on 7 February 2003 and closed in 2009, when the structures that allow it; and interregional cooperation in numerous organi- constitutional government was formed and re-instated with diminished zations and bodies with different objectives. competences by that same government two years later. The Basque Government has engaged in a strategy that takes full advantage The Delegation of the Basque Country to the European Union in Brussels of the meagre possibilities of participation existing today, such as attending defends Basque socioeconomic, sectoral and business interests in the multilateral meetings and serving on committees of the European European Union. It guarantees the participation of Basque Government Commission open to representatives of the Autonomous Communities. representatives in the decision-making bodies of the European Union, for It also advocates in all possible forums, and with other autonomous example in the working groups of the Councils of Ministers that are open governments, the need for greater participation and the improvement of to the Autonomous Communities (Eusko Jaurlaritza 2013). However, partici- existing channels, as their limitations and ineffectiveness have been largely pation in those bodies continues to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. proven (Castro Ruano 2004). Further, the Delegation of the Basque Country in Brussels is the gathering point for the Basque community in Belgium and of public and private Direct participation in institutions of the European Union has also been Basque entities wishing to act at the EU level. It organizes activities aimed at a priority of the Basque Autonomous Executive, like its participation spreading information and promoting the economic, business and cultural in the Committee of the Regions and the activity developed in various interests of the Basque Country to European institutions and partners. The organizations engaged in interregional cooperation, both of a sectoral Basque Country is also a member of the Committee of the Regions. and political nature. While maintaining its presence in bodies such as the Assembly of European Regions, the Basque Government works closely It goes without saying that a top priority–and rightfully so–is that of the with other like-minded governments, for example, in the Conference of Basque Country’s place in the European Union. The process of integration European Regions with Legislative Power. in the European Union covers areas of competence proper to the Basque Autonomous Community. Participation in this process is inevitable and the But the different external and European vocations of many other non-central enhancement of mechanisms of participation both within the Spanish State governments, both with regard to the European Union and to internal and directly with the institutions of the European Union, such as partici- affairs, have proven a hindrance that restricts or impedes possibilities for pation in the Council of Ministers, is a major aspiration of the executive Basque action abroad and in the European Union. Some organizations are branch of the Basque Government. involved in interregional cooperation structures of extremely broad-based multilateral participation, thus composed of highly heterogeneous entities, True, on 9 December 2004, the Spanish Conference for European within and outside the Spanish State and such organizations hamper the Community Affairs did adopt the agreement that opened a few Council Basque Autonomous Community’s foreign affair aspirations. groups to the participation of the Autonomous Communities (Secretaría de Estado de Administraciones Públicas 2004). But it is also true that still today, The Basque Autonomous Community engages also in sectorial cooperation autonomous community representation is carried out by the inclusion in with other non-central governments under various frameworks: the Network the Spanish Delegation of a member of an Autonomous Government who of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development, IT4ALL – Network

56 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 57 of Local Authorities for the Information Society, the Office of the High Basque communities on both sides of the border, since it gives priority to Commissioner for Human Rights, or the Forum of Global Associations relations with Bordeaux. of Regions, established in 2007 as a joint initiative of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe, and the United Nations Nonetheless, one of the most interesting features of interregional Development Programme (Ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9). The potential of these cooperation is the systematic practice of concluding agreements relating networks is huge since it would produce a de facto recognition of the to international relations with foreign entities – the Basque Administration non-central governments within the United Nations (paradoxically, the has been doing that since the 1980s. Such instruments come in many forms United Nations recognizes local governments and NGOs as actors with a – conventions, memorandums of understanding, cooperation protocols or consultative role, but not regions, because some States are opposed to joints declarations, to list a few. The Basque Government has undertaken it) (Castro Ruano 2004). Another distinguishing feature of those networks various means of cooperation with non-central governments; territorial is that they are not limited geographically to the European continent, as bodies such as federated States, regions and cantons; central governments was commonplace until recently: today non-central governments of other of States and State bodies (ministries and public institutions); and interna- continents have also joined assertively. These networks reflect the sectorial tional organizations and other entities such as private foundations, univer- multidimensionality of foreign policy action, in this case, of the Basque sities, financial institutions, NGOs and cultural organizations, in particular Country. those in Europe and the Americas (Ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9).

Concerning cross-border cooperation, the Basque Country belongs to the With regard to development and cooperation, the Basque development Working Community of the Pyrenees and the Atlantic Arc Commission and cooperation Agency was set up in 2010 and it reflects the increasingly (Ugalde Zubiri 2005, 9). Cross-border cooperation is nothing more broadening model of decentralized cooperation implemented by non-central than keeping up to date relations we have traditionally had with our governments and local administrations. It falls under the President’s Office but neighbours. It is one of the dimensions of interregional cooperation with I will not elaborate much on this due to lack of time except to say that Basque very specific features derived from being a neighbouring country and from official development cooperation began in 1988 with 0.7% of the Basque the existence of a State border. The Working Community of the Pyrenees Autonomous Community’s operating budget. In reality, it is an expression was established in 1983 and deals with four main areas: Communication not only of institutional cooperation, but it also reflects–at least in part–the infrastructures, Research and training, Culture, youth and sport and Basque people’s solidarity and outreach with other peoples of the world. Sustainable development (ibid). Its members are three French regions: Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrenées and Languedoc-Rousillon and four Spanish Another action area is that of the Basque groups abroad, in other words, autonomous communities: Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, the Basque Country relations with the Basque diaspora. Since the 1990s, the Basque Government and the Principality of Andorra. The Atlantic Arc Commission is one of the has maintained a specific policy line for relations with Basque citizens who six geographical commissions in the Conference of Peripheral Maritime live temporarily in other countries, basically for study or work reasons, and Regions of Europe. It was established in 1989 and covers five States: Ireland, those Basque groups or communities living in other countries (among others, United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal. emigrants of Basque descent) and associations, mainly the euskal etxeak or Basque social centres. Activities and programmes in this area derive from Speaking of bilateral cross-border cooperation, allow me to mention the Law No. 8/1994 on Relations with Basque Groups and Centres Abroad of the establishment of the Aquitaine-Euskadi Euroregion on 12 December 2011 Basque Autonomous Community, adopted by the Basque Parliament in 1994, under the innovative approach of community law of the European Grouping and other laws stemming therefrom (Eusko Jaurlaritza 1994). of Territorial Cooperation (Eusko Jaurlaritza and Region Aquitaine 2011). However, from a political point of view and seen from a nation-building The number of officially recognized Basque social centres and their perspective, this agreement is not fully satisfactory because Aquitaine is federations throughout the world is currently 175. They are located in 24 larger than the Basque Country and often hinders cooperation with the countries, mainly in Argentina and the United States. You may find it curious

58 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 59 that there are 10 of these Basque social centres and federations in Spain, in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The question regarding not including the Basque Autonomous Community, and 3 in France. Law the possibilities for action relating to international relations offered by this No. 8/1994 aims to strengthen these entities on behalf of its members, framework has led to a lively political and academic debate. The lack of its internal cohesion and effectiveness of its associative actions (Eusko precision of the constitutional text concerning the meaning of international Jaurlaritza 1994). Therefore, it seeks to protect and enhance the links that relations in article 149.1.3 resulted in some initial restrictive interpretations these groups maintain with the Basque Country, to heighten awareness of of the possibilities open to the autonomous communities for developing the Basque reality by promoting its culture and economy and to nurture their activities abroad (Constitución Española, 1978). relations with different host countries I( bid). It sets out also a series of rights and services to which the centres and its members alike are entitled. Over time, the Constitutional Court recognized to a certain extent the Thus, those who return to the Basque Country will be able to claim health international dealings of the Autonomous Communities, albeit with care and other types of assistance, submit calls for the allocation of social certain limitations and restrictions. According to most of the doctrines, housing or benefit from means of support aimed at facilitating their return the inflection point between the closed–and often ridiculous–obstruc- trip, provided that certain conditions are met. tionist positions lies in judgment 165/1994 of 26 May concerning the establishment of the Basque Delegation in Brussels, which opened officially Furthermore, the diaspora exercises its voting rights in Basque elections. in 1996, in which the Constitutional Court rules in favour of the position According to the Electoral Census of Residents Abroad concerning the Basque of the Basque authorities (Tribunal Constitucional 1994). Since then, the parliamentary elections on 21 October 2012–out of a total of 1,718,696 voters– international relations of the autonomous community will be considered 56,740 voters residing abroad registered with a municipality in the Basque legitimate, within certain boundaries. Autonomous Community cast their ballots (INE, 2012. Therefore, the vote of the diaspora represents 3.29% of the Basque Autonomous Community These boundaries continue to be as narrow as the political will of the Spanish electorate. The majority of countries with Basque voters are in the Americas, central Government so deems. From the start, this political will tends to representing 51.3% of the Basque electorate overseas, compared with those short-circuit the foreign activities of the Autonomous Community in such a in Europe, which accounts for 30.3% (ibid). way that recourse to the Constitutional Court ends up being the customary way of elucidating the legitimacy or illegitimacy of many initiatives relating Last but not least, the Basque Government strives to promote the spread of to international relations. As soon as resolute steps are taken towards the Basque language and culture throughout the world through the Basque nation-building, Basques find ourselves blocked by the Spanish Consti- Institute, which was founded on 13 May 2008 as a public entity governed tution, which was in fact rejected by an overwhelming majority of Basque by private law with its own legal status. It is part of the Basque Department citizens when consulted in a referendum about it (Blas Guerrero 1978, 205; of Culture (Eusko Jaurlaritza 2008, vol. 3629, sec. 88). Let us recall that Muro 2011, 167–168). Beñat Etxepare was the author of the first book printed in Basque, Linguae Vaconum Primitiae. Dating back to the first half of the 16th century, the Currently, recourse to the Constitutional Court focuses on economic issues publication was aimed at introducing the Basque language and culture to such as the drug co-payment, pension cuts or measures restricting the the world (Lasagabaster 2001, 403). access of undocumented persons to health care services. Of course, there are other issues of recourse to the Court: political matters like the legality or not of Basque political parties, the Parot doctrine (which deals with 4.3. Limitations of the activities carried out the non-remission of sentences), democratic participation in institutional by the Basque Government structures and so forth. The absolute majority of the Spanish Popular Party does its utmost to ensure that what should be dealt with by the Government The legal framework for Basque international relations is provided in the ends up in the Constitutional Court. Spanish Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country and

60 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 61 Therefore, as it was said at the beginning of the article, in the Basque case, This new year–2013–will see the admission of a new State to the European Basques have decided to seek a place in the European Union as a member Union: Croatia. It has been a long and tortuous road, but it will be recognized State. For that reason, we are proponents of EU internal enlargement. as a new member of the Union. 2013 is also the year declared to be the It is our view that Europe should march resolutely towards becoming a European Year of Citizens by the European Union. And in the words of the Europe of Peoples, where each community if so desired can become a European Commission itself, it was so declared because “the better the member State. Whatever the case, we must build a Europe that respects men and women of Europe understand their rights as EU citizens, the more the pace and wishes of each community and the levels of participation informed the decisions they can take in their personal lives, and the more and representation they seek in the European institutions. A Europe of vibrant democratic life in Europe can be at all levels” (European Commission Peoples will be more decentralized and more European in virtue of its 2013). That is our wish as Basques and European citizens. increased respect for European cultural identity. Indeed, various stateless nations throughout Europe continue to demand their full emancipation Indeed, as Professor Mario Zubiaga, put it recently: “it’s time for the and the chance to associate with other peoples of the continent, and the institutions to become sub-versive, to put at the fore front what laid behind, world on an equal footing (Keating 2010). And they wish to do so without the will of the majority of its citizens. Institutions apart from granting security giving up the common project of European construction. and predictability they ought to pave the way for the changes their societies demand” (Zubiaga 2012). Professors Matas, Gonzalez, Jaria and Román argue that the European Union law cannot be an obstacle hindering the legitimate democratic will of European citizens who, in a particular region of Europe, decide to found a new State for themselves through a democratic and peaceful process (Matas I Dalmases et al. 2011).

In accordance with the precedents of Greenland and above all those of German unification, theU nion should be capable of responding to the democratic aspirations of part of its citizens by constituting a new State, which would rule out ex novo admission. The treaties cannot be used to frustrate the will of a legitimate majority as it would be the same as sanctioning someone for exercising a legitimate right. The treaties must be interpreted in such a way as to allow for the integration of a declaration of will supported by Union’s fundamental legal and political principles, as a democratic community of law.

Certainly it would not be understood that a European Union based on States which, in many cases had originated through processes hardly or not at all democratic should fail to respond satisfactorily to new States appearing within the Union. If democracy requires an agreement on the territorial legitimacy of political power, the possibility of an internal Union enlargement made through transparent, open and participative means has to be well accepted both by the other Union member States, guided by democratic principles, and by the Union itself.

62 Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi | Paradiplomacy 63 Abstract

Paradiplomacy has become a concept for regional governments acting within international relations, i.e. sub-national jurisdictions developing their own international agenda. Regions open offices and conduct “trade missions” abroad; become involved in regional/international organizations and participate in regional/international conferences and networks. The most common evidences of paradiplomacy are found in Western Europe.

This paper will focus on the case of Greenland as an Arctic player in the new era of geopolitics in the North. How does Greenland operate in international relations in the different policy fields? What is the current political strategy for Greenland, while the focus is on the hydrocarbon and mineral assets that 5 Paradiplomacy are supposed to be located both off-shore and on-shore in Greenland? What role does the Greenlandic government play in these affairs? in Greenland

5.1. Introduction

This article will elucidate how the paradiplomacy is functioning in a more peripheral sub-national jurisdiction focusing on Greenland. Greenland can be seen as a Scandinavian welfare model but at the same time it also qualifies as Maria Ackrén a developing region, since the economy is dependent on the block grant from Denmark fixed at the 2009 level. Maria Ackrén is Associate Professor in Political Science since 2011 at Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland. She is also Head of Department of The home-rule system derives from 1979, but since Greenland has been a Social Sciences since 2012 at the same institution. Her field of research is former colony and recently become more involved in international relations within comparative politics focusing on autonomous regions in the world, it is interesting to see how Greenland has managed the new role of becoming island studies, methodology and recently Arctic relations with a special focus more and more self-regulating in areas such as international relations. However, on Greenland. Denmark as the metropolitan state has the exclusive rights of foreign affairs. With the new Self-Government Act from 2009, Greenland has some room for Associate Professor in Political Science manoeuvre in international relations, which will be further elucidated. Department of Social Sciences Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland The Danish strategy in the Arctic is very much focused around the relationship PB: 1061 between Copenhagen and Nuuk. This has both been stressed in the Danish- 3900 NUUK Greenlandic joint strategy from 2008 and in the Kingdom of Denmark’s Phone: +299-36 23 47 Arctic strategy from 2011 (Bailes et al. 2012). The aim of the latest strategy E-mail: [email protected] can be seen as a reaction and respond to the major ongoing environmental

64 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 65 and geopolitical challenges in a growing global interest towards the Arctic crucial meteorological information; and fourthly, Greenland’s mineral wealth and at the same time Denmark tries to redefine its role and strengthen was of value for the aircraft industry in the USA and Canada (Archer 2003). its position as a key player in the Arctic in terms of referring to the whole In 1951, a new defence agreement was struck between Denmark and the Kingdom including Greenland and the Faroe Islands. USA concerning Greenland. The Americans established the Thule Air Base in the northern part of Greenland and the base was considered of high This essay will following the introduction be divided into four main parts. military value (Boel and Thuesen 1993). The motives for the 1951 agreement The first part will give a short historical overview of Greenland’s international were to stress the shared framework of NATO, which Denmark by this time role from the Second World War until today. This is to give the reader a notion had entered as a member; to underline the mutuality of interest between of Greenland’s strategic geopolitical role throughout different periods in Denmark and the United States regarding the defence of Greenland; to allow time. The second part will elucidate the aspect of paradiplomacy within the the United States a wide range of defence-related activities in Greenland; economic sphere and the third part will continue to look at other policy areas and at the same time to protect the local people (Archer 2003). where Greenland is playing an international role. The conclusion or last part will take the current political considerations into account. From 1958 to 1990 the US operated four radar stations over the inland ice as part of the Distant Early Warning System (DEW). Another development was two Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) stations, which were established on 5.2. A Short History of Greenland’s International Role Greenland’s east coast and these were connected to NATO’s wider navigation system in the Arctic. During the Cold War the Ballistic Missiles Early Warning As other regions in the Arctic, Greenland has come under pressure from System (BMEWS) at Thule provided the US with a notice of a Soviet surprise outside powers using the area to pursue their larger interests. The Arctic as attack. Other connections were placed in Alaska and England (Archer 2003). such is a sparsely populated, resource-rich region whose location makes it During the Cold War the Arctic was divided into two armed camps with the increasingly important in geopolitical terms (Young 2011). Looking at history, Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States on the other, together we can say that military planners have always seen the Arctic as a theatre of with four of its NATO allies – Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway (Young operations for weapons systems and as a potential arena for actual combat, 2011). With the end of the Cold War, strategic interest in Greenland declined while others have perceived the region as giving opportunities for collabo- and most of the military bases closed, but Thule Air Base is still running and it ration in scientific research and presenting a growing need for co-operation has even been upgraded to an advanced missile-defence standard. Permission to protect the shared ecosystems of the region (Young and Cherkasov 1992). for this development was laid down in 2004 with the Igaliku Agreement. This agreement was a supplement to the 1951 Defence Agreement and was signed During the Second World War when Denmark lost contact with Greenland also by the home-rule authorities of Greenland (Petersen 2011). due to German occupation, the US showed interest in placing military bases around the island. The US opened a consulate in Godthaab (now Nuuk) Since the late 1980s, the so-called Arctic eight (Canada, Russia, the United and US coastguard vessels patrolled Greenlandic waters (Boel and Thuesen States, and the five Nordic states) have taken a lead in co-operative 1993). In 1941 the US signed a defence agreement with Greenland. This was measures and international diplomacy regarding the Arctic region. The most made possible by the Danish ambassador in Washington D.C. at the time, prominent results of the international co-operation in the Arctic can be seen Henrik Kauffmann.T he treaty gave the US the right “to construct, maintain in the form of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, adopted in 1991 and operate such landing fields, seaplane facilities and radio and meteoro- and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Young 2011). Greenland logical installations as necessary” (Archer 2003). By the end of the war the US plays an active role in the Arctic Council and paradiplomatic matters have had established 13 army bases and 4 navy bases in Greenland. Greenland been in the forefront since the advent of Home Rule back in 1979. Greenland was considered important for four main reasons: first, it was important to is now in a hot spot regarding the new Arctic geopolitical game that is now prevent access to North America by any potential hostile power; second, taking place between major powers in the Arctic. This is somewhat discussed Greenland was a key transit point to Europe; thirdly, Greenland provided in the end of the paper.

66 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 67 5.3. General Development Regarding Paradiplomacy fisheries, because of changing sea temperatures.T he EU continued to buy the right to catch cod, but there were some concerns that this was not very Criekemans (2008) has traced three waves of paradiplomacy made by sustainable (Gad 2013). sub-states. The first wave derives from the 1980s and onwards. During this period a growing number of non-central governments are attracting foreign In 2006, a joint declaration concerning EU/Greenland partnership was direct investments through own initiatives (e.g. Catalonia’s early efforts in issued as an umbrella covering the fisheries agreement and a new special Japan) or using their culture and identity as a trade mark for placing oneself partnership agreement foreseeing increased cooperation in a number of on the international map. These initiatives were of a more ad hoc nature with areas presumably of interest to the EU, such as minerals, transportation, and a minor form of integration. The second wave illustrates the 1990s, where climate research (Gad 2013). the sub-state entities of certain European countries are taken a more formal step into diplomatic relationships, because of legal reforms (e.g. the Belgian With the new Self-Government Act from 2009, the Government of Greenland state reform in 1993, which awarded formal ius tractacti and ius legationis can negotiate at an international level in agreement with the Danish state to the Regions and Communities). The current third wave is characterized especially in areas of Greenlandic interests. The Greenlandic Government by steps in the direction of a ‘verticalization’ of the organizational structure can also sign international agreements and become a member within such of the administration or department of external/foreign affairs.T his process international organisations that are of Greenlandic interests without any is an ongoing process, where the sub-states are forming their own foreign intervention from the Danish state (Udigivet af Bureau for Inatsisartut 2009). policy within their metropolitan states. One recent example of this is the Greenland is following quite the same system as the Azores in this case. Portuguese autonomous region of the Azores in the Atlantic. The amendment of the 2004 Constitution in Portugal changed the framework of the regional system of self-government, and as a consequence a new amendment of the 5.5. Paradiplomacy within the Economic Sphere Political and Administrative Statute of the Autonomous Region of the Azores from 2009, now states that the islands can pursue their own international Greenland is economically dependent on Denmark through the annual policy with its own agenda and objectives. This will be done in co-operation block grant, which is now lying at DKK 3.4 billion according to 2009 level. with foreign regional bodies. The Azores can also take part in organisations The main industries in Greenland consist of the fishing industry, mining created by international conventions (Lanceiro 2009). and some small private businesses. Other characteristics of the Greenlandic economy are a very low level of production of goods and services for the domestic market and therefore the import exceeds the export (Jónsson 5.4. The Greenlandic Case 1999). However, there is a lot of optimism regarding future endeavours since oil, gas and mineral exploration is taking place both off-shore and on-shore in Following Criekemans’ three waves of paradiplomacy we can say that Greenland. The possible new extractive industries will attract a lot of interna- Greenland before the advent of Home Rule in 1979 was under the power tional investors. According to the new Self-Government Act from 2009, there of Denmark, since Greenland was considered as a county amongst other is a statement that the block grant will be reduced to half the amount if the counties in Denmark from 1953. Before that Greenland was a Danish incomes from natural resources exceed DKK 75 million (Udigivet af Bureau colony through the years of 1721-1953. With the introduction of Home for Inatsisartut 2009). Rule, Greenland had no real say within international relations, since this was considered as a Danish overall matter. The call for more autonomy The Government of Greenland has taken a clear step towards exploration came during the 1980s with the withdrawal from the European Economic and exploitation of natural resources in two strategy plans from 2009. In Community (EEC) and the option of a status as an OCT (Overseas Countries the first strategy, there is a discussion around the issue of exploration and and Territories). This was the first international decision Greenland made by exploitation of oil and gas with the policy of licenses. In the second strategy, its own. There were, however, some problems in the 1990s regarding the cod there is an outline of the policy regarding minerals (Råstofdirektoratet:

68 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 69 Grønlands Selvstyre 2011). There is a political ambition that all activities and supporting Inuit initiatives within national jurisdictions. Its governing within the area of extractive industries are made in such a way that it takes all body is the ICC General Assembly comprised of delegations from Greenland, aspects of security, safety, health and environmental issues into account. The Canada, Alaska and Russia. Between General Assemblies, held every third Government has a goal to develop the mineral industry as a central economy year, the ICC is led by a president and an executive council (Innuksuk 1994). sector in Greenland. The estimation is that Greenland will during the next five to ten years have at least five active mines with over 1000 citizens working The ICC is recognizing that Inuit rights extend across the circumpolar within this business (Råstofdirektoratet: Grønlands Selvstyre 2011). regions, including marine areas and transcend the national boundaries of Arctic states (Innuksuk 1994). With respect of other regions, such as, Québec, Within the economic sphere Greenland has been active to negotiate Wallonia and Catalonia their paradiplomatic activities are very much centred favourable agreements with the EU. Greenland was a member in the on the issue of exporting identity and culture similar to Greenland in this European Economic Community (EEC) until 1985 together with Denmark. In matter (Criekemans 2008). It only differs what kind of identity and culture we 1985, Greenland seceded from the EEC as the first territory to ever leave the are referring to. In the Greenlandic case it is about the Inuit traditional life, in EEC, but established agreements through the so called OCT-order (Overseas Québec and Wallonia it is the French identity and culture and in Catalonia it Countries and Territories) (Gad 2013) .A fishery agreement was struck and has is the Catalonian identity and culture that the regions are exporting to other been renewed in several occasions. The agreements with the EU is not just areas. focused on the fishery sector, they also include co-operation within areas such as research (especially climate research), education, energy, tourism Another important organization is the Arctic Council, where Greenland and food security (Gønlandsk-dansk selvstyrekommissions 2008). has been one of the “founding fathers”, signing the document on behalf of Denmark, when the Arctic Council was established in 1996. The organi- Since 1992, a Greenlandic representative has worked in the Danish diplomatic zation functions as a forum for the Arctic states and nations in the Arctic mission in Brussels and held diplomatic status. Today, four persons work rim (Motzfeldt 2006). The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental full-time in Brussels for Greenland. First, Greenland was part of the Danish forum promoting co-operation, co-ordination and interaction between the delegation, but now both Greenland and the Faroe Islands have their own Arctic states. The member states are: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland offices with own entrances (Gad 2013). and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA. Added to this there are six international organizations representing Greenland can be compared to other European regions in this sense, since Arctic indigenous peoples, which have permanent participant status (Arctic Bavaria and Scotland for instance, have also been co-operated in similar areas Council). The most important issues within the Arctic Council have been as Greenland. In the case of Bavaria, international trade, international cultural related to climate change, environment and biodiversity (Motzfeldt 2006). or educational policies, and even tourism are seen as separate areas, which are even managed by separate institutions. In Scotland, public diplomacy The Kingdom of Denmark’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2009-2011 has been in focus in the cultural and economical areas (Criekemans 2008). has highlighted peoples of the Arctic, the International Polar Year (IPY) legacy, climate change, biodiversity, megatrends (in the Arctic), integrated resource management, operational cooperation and the Arctic Council in a 5.6. Paradiplomacy within Other Policy Areas “new geopolitical framework” (Bailes et al. 2012).

Greenland takes part in various international organizations as an own Greenland takes also part in the Nordic co-operation through the membership nation. One of the most important ones is Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers since 1984. The The ICC founded in 1977 has become a trademark of Inuit co-operation most important issues in a Greenlandic context have been the issues between Greenland, Alaska, Canada and Russia. The ICC is an international around environment, indigenous peoples’ status and some security matters non-governmental organization, which works for Inuit rights internationally (especially regarding the Thule Air Base) (Sændergaard 2006). Greenland

70 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 71 has established a Nordic Institute (N.A.P.A.) since 1987 (Sændergaard 2006). would though like to have embassies in those cities, which are important In 1985 another Nordic co-operation was established through the for Greenland. They suggest to open embassies in the USA and Canada West-Nordic initiative with Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland as and to keep Greenland within NATO, even if Greenland would become an partners. This co-operation has further been developed into what is called independent state (Demokraatit). NORA (North Atlantic Cooperation) with North- and West-Norway as members as well (Lytthans 2006). Siumut (S) is also in favour of independence and the party would like to take over the foreign labour legislation from Denmark. The party is also The Greenlandic Government has a foreign office, which handles the working for preparation of what the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea co-ordination, contact and functions as an advisory board in international (UNCLOS) will bring regarding the claims of the extended continental shelf relations between Nuuk and the Greenlandic Representation in Copenhagen that Denmark/Greenland has put forward to the Commission on the Limits and the Greenlandic Representation in Brussels. The foreign office has different of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The application is still in process and will be matters on its agenda, such as, the Arctic co-operation, the EU, the UN, Nordic delivered in 2014. Siumut is also in favour of better marketing management co-operation, Indigenous Peoples, the Joint Committee between the USA of Greenlandic products to the world markets and would like to see more and Greenland, foreign- and security policy and foreign commercial matters trade agreements with other countries. The party would also work for more (Udenrigsdirektoratet). In the Parliament (Inatsisartut) there is a foreign- and international representation in other countries than exist today. Another security committee, which has been established since 1988. The committee point in the party’s programme is to establish some form of military in is discussing important international affairs, which relates to Greenland.T he Greenland, e.g. having an own navy or military service (“Siumut” 2013). matters are the same as for the foreign office at the governmental level. Atassut (A) is more conservative than the other parties. The party respects Denmark to have the overall control over foreign- and security matters. 5.7. Political Considerations Regarding Greenland Atassut wants that Greenland is heard in matters related to Greenland within EU, ICC and the Nordic co-operation. The most important areas that The election of 12th March 2013 has been decisive also for which way Greenland should have a voice within are the fishing sector and culture Greenland is going to go regarding international affairs.T he results showed according to the party’s programme (Atassut). a majority for Siumut, the Social Democratic Party at 42.8% of the total votes with Aleqa Hammond as the leader, who was the total winner of the election The other two parties: Kattusseqatigiit Partiiat (KP) and the new party Partii with as much as 6818 personal votes. Inuit (PI) do not have a special international agenda, since these parties are more in favour of domestic Greenlandic issues. Partii Inuit is a new nation- Before the election each party profiled itself regarding international affairs. alistic party with independence on its agenda, but it is not clear what kind of Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) has been in the forefront regarding the international foreign policy this party wants. field. IA’s policy is to develop Greenland into a fully sovereign state both politically and economically. Foreign affairs are important matters for the According to the coalition agreement of the new Government 2013-2017 party in question. Greenland should become an equal player on the interna- between Siumut, Atassut and Partii Inuit the international agenda is to tional arena. IA is engaging in international agreements between other enhance the Greenlandic competence regarding international relations. The nations and also establishing agreements with international companies, possibilities within the OCT-order within the EU should be better utilized and especially in the area of extractive industries. The goal is to develop the the trade with neighbouring countries should be developed. New markets foreign office into a Department of Foreign Affairs (Inuit Ataqatigiit 2013). for Greenlandic products are also mentioned, but there are no details about Demokraatit (D) has another policy regarding international relations. Their what kind of markets the Government are thinking of. Within the security policy is more limited to keep status quo in the sense, that Denmark will dimension it is mentioned that there will be more control over the shipping continue to take care of the overall foreign- and security policy. Demokraatit traffic within Greenlandic waters, since this will probably increase due to

72 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 73 climate change. Cooperation regarding SAR-operations will take place with minerals in southern Greenland. Another private company from the same neighbouring countries (Government of Greenland 2012). province invested in a joint prospecting project in Greenland with the United Kingdom’s Nordic Mining Corporation. In 2011, a company owned by the Sichuan provincial government, Xinye Mining, was reported to have plans 5.8. A New Greenlandic Strategy? to purchase an iron ore mine in Greenland’s Isua region from the British company London Mining (Jakobson and Peng 2012). This process is still an Lately, there has been some turbulence within the Arctic policy strategy ongoing process, but there has been some contradictory development since regarding Greenland. Prime Minister, Aleqa Hammond, Siumut decided the Chinese director working with the project now has been withdrawn from to boycott the Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna, Sweden. This was made Greenland. The whole project has been a little bit put on hold for the moment. in protest against the Swedish chairmanship and as a notification to the member states within the Council to consider if Greenland and the Faroe Islands might be sitting as equal partners at the negotiating table on separate 5.9. Conclusion or Way Ahead chairs with Denmark with voting rights in the future. Another way of tactic was to give attention towards the Canadians to be aware of the situation, After the election the whole world has been focusing on Greenland and since Canada is now taking over the chairmanship. There have been a lot of what will happen, especially within the extractive industries. Greenland has discussions whether this was a good strategy or not (Sermitsiaq). been in focus in the world news and newspapers. The direction towards trying to build up a totally new industry has been in focus, but with Siumut Demokraatit (D) has also recently been having requests of changing the now in the role as leading the negotiations, some international investors Ottawa Declaration from 1996 between the Arctic states. The Declaration is have already reacted more negative and we have seen shares on the stock the agreement between the eight Arctic states sitting in the Arctic Council, market declining within the possible new sector of income in Greenland. which gives every state a vote in the Council. As a result of the boycott However, the projects in place will still go on and a possible iron ore mine Demokraatit has no showed support of revising the Ottawa Declaration so will be placed in the Godthåbsfjord 120 km’s northeast of Nuuk with London that also the self-government areas, such as, Greenland and the Faroe Islands Mining as the company in charge of this particular project. would be able to have a vote themselves at the table (KNR 2013). Siumut has a more restrictive policy within this sector. The party would like An interesting feature regarding the Arctic Council is that the Kiruna meeting to enforce royalties from day one for all multinational companies working on 15 May 2013 brought new permanent observers into the Council. Amongst within extractive industries, while the former leading party IA had enforced these China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore became new a taxation policy which has already been giving Greenland some income. IA observer states (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013). The Chinese observer status has been attracting a lot of international investors from countries, such as, has been a little bit controversial, since foreign ministers in Denmark (incl. the US, Canada, Australia, China, South Korea, the EU and of course Denmark. Greenland), Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland have been supporting Now, there seems to be an uncertain situation of what will happen within this China’s application. The other Arctic states (Canada, Russia and the USA) have area. Siumut has also been in favour of extracting uranium as a bi-product, been more silent on this issue. Denmark has huge interests in China, since while extracting rare earth elements (REE) from the grounds at a certain level the country has been investing a lot of money into the Asian market in recent with environmental, health and nature in mind. For the time being, there is years and there is some geopolitical tactics behind the Danish support for an expert group investigating this issue. the observer status in the Arctic Council. The Chinese interest in the Arctic has been a little bit exaggerated by Danish media. The main interest for We can say that Greenland in its current form is focusing on the paradi- the Chinese is the new possible shipping route due to climate change. The plomacy within the economical sphere rather than in other areas. There is, investment in Greenland is minor so far. In 2009, a private mining company of course, still a focus on environmental and cultural concerns, but the main from Jiangxi province acquired prospecting rights to explore metals and focus is clearly within the economical sphere.

74 Maria Ackrén | Paradiplomacy 75 Greenland has also becoming aware of the geopolitical game, which is now going on in the Arctic, so we might experience a process towards a “Greenlandic Arctic Strategy” in the future. The Faroe Islands are already on their way to have an own Arctic strategy, so Greenland will possibly follow suit. There are a lot of diplomatic interests directed towards Greenland at the moment. During the recent weeks (during time of writing), Greenland has had some high-level visits from the German ambassador, the Norwegian ambassador and the French ambassador. Iceland has decided to establish a more permanent form of diplomatic office in Nuuk in the near future and there might be more to come.

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86 87 On behalf of the Centre Maurits Coppieters and our partners I sincerely wish to thank the authors of the report for their groundbreaking approach to the subject and their passionate, conceptually robust and well structured factual presentations.

Finally I also wish to thank you (the reader) for your interest in our organization and for reviewing our modest contribution to a much wider European political debate in this area.

Günther Dauwen Secretary of Centre Maurits Coppieters www.ideasforeurope.eu Centre Maurits Coppieters Goals of the European Political Foundation CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS (CMC)

According to its general regulations, the Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw persues the following objectives and references:

 observing, analysing and contributing to the debate on European public policy issues with a special focus on the role of nationalist and regionalist movements and the process of European integration; The European Parliament recognized the Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC)  serving as framework for national or regional think tanks, political founda- as a Political Foundation at a European Level in 2007. Since then the CMC has tions and academics to work together at European level; developed political research focusing on European issues, also in the fields  Gather and manage information for scientific purposes on all nationalist of multilevel governance, management of cultural and linguistic diversity and regionalist movements, organisations, structures,… in all its appea- in complex (multi-national) societies, decentralization, state and consti- rances situated in a European context; tutional reform, succession of states, conflict resolution and protection of  Making available information to the public on the implementation of the human rights. principle of subsidiarity in a context of a Europe of the Regions;  Promoting scientific research on the functioning and the history of all So far, every little step has been important to the steady consolidation and national and regional movements in the EU and making the results public growth of the Centre, that’s why I’m especially proud of this publication. to as many people as possible; Indeed, it undoubtedly represents a crucial contribution to the current state  Developing actions to open information sources and historical informa- of affairs and will certainly have a notorious impact both in the Academia tion sources in a structured and controlled way with the aim to build a and among European decision makers in a broad sense, including European common data network on issues of Nationalism and Regionalism in Institutions (like the European commission, European Parliament, Council Europe; and Committee of the Regions), other political actors, think tanks, research  Maintaining contacts with all organisations who are active in national centers and contributors to the European integration process. movements and with the Institutions of the EU;

88 89 The Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw takes all the necessary actions Among other things, Coppieters was the author of: ‘Het jaar van de Klaproos’; to promote and achieve the higher stated goals always observing the ‘Ik was een Europees Parlementslid’; ‘De Schone en het Beest’. He is Honorary principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles member of the EFA. of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Members of the Centre Maurits Coppieters

Maurits Coppieters arritti, Corsica (Sint-Niklaas, 1920 – Deinze, 2005) alkartasuna Fundazioa, Baque Country, www.alkartasunafundazioa.org

The Fleming Maurits Coppieters studied history and later became a Doctor Fundació Emili Darder, Balearic Islands, www.fundacioemilidarder.cat of Laws and obtained a master’s degree in East European studies. During Fundació Josep Irla, Catalonia, www.irla.cat the Second World War, he refused to work for the German occupier. After many years as a teacher, he worked as a lawyer for a while. He was one of the Fundacion Aragonesista 29dejunio, Aragon, www.chunta.org/29j.php people who re-established the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (Flemish People’s Fundación Galiza Sempre, Galicia, www.galizasempre.org Movement), of which he was the President from 1957-1963. Home of the Macedonian Culture, Macedonia, Greece Coppieters’ political career began when he became a member of the Flemish-nationalist party Volksunie (VU) which was formed in 1954. With Welsh Nationalism Foundation, Wales, the exception of two years, Coppieters was a town councillor between www.welshnationalismfoundation.eu 1964 and 1983. He was also elected as a member of the Belgian Chamber Le Peuple Breton, Brittany, www.peuplebreton.net (1965-1971) and Senate (1971-1979). At the same time, Coppieters became President of the newly formed ‘Cultuurraad voor de Nederlandstalige Cultuur- gemeenschap’ (Cultural Council for the Dutch-speaking Community, from associated members which later the Flemish Parliament emanated), when the VU formed part of the government. In 1979, Coppieters was moreover elected during the first Kurdish Institute of Brussels, Belgium, www.kurdishinstitute.be direct elections for the European Parliament. transylvanian Monitor, Transilvania, www.emnt.org

As a regionalist, he became a member of the Group for Technical Coordi- Centre International Escarré per les Minories Ètniques i Nacions, nation and Defence of Independent Groupings and Members in the Catalonia, www.ciemen.org European Parliament (TCDI). Among other things, he made a name for istituto Camillo Bellieni, Sardinia, www.istituto-bellieni.it himself when he championed the cause of the Corsicans. In the meantime, Coppieters also played a pioneering role in the formation of the European Free State of Rijeka Association, Rijeka Free Alliance, of which he became the Honorary President and in whose expansion he continued to play a role, even after he said farewell to active politics in 1981. In 1996, Coppieters joined forces with the president of the Flemish Parliament, Norbert De Batselier, to promote ‘Het Sienjaal’, a project with a view to achieve political revival beyond the party boundaries. Coppieters died on November 11, 2005.

90 91 Colophon CMC publications, 9

Editorial CMC asbl, Centre Maurits Coppieters, Boomkwekerijstraat 1, 1000 Brussels www.ideasforeurope.eu

Publication date 2014

Publication series and number CMC STUDIES | 2014 | 1

Authors Adam Grydehøj, Linda Fabiani, Jordi Solé i Ferrando, Lorena Lopez de Lacalle Aristi, Maria Ackrén

Editorial Board Xabier Macias, Alan Sandry, Josep Vall, Antonia Luciani, Miguel Martinez Tomey, Günther Dauwen

Translation Dobra forma

Coordination Günther Dauwen, Aitziber Salazar and Ignasi Centelles

Scientific board Alan Sandry. Advisor on the field of Political Science Luc Boeva. Advisor on the field of History of Nationalism Ruben Lois. Advisor on the field of Geography Carmen Gallego. Advisor in the field of Anthropology Josep Huguet. Advisor in the fields of Contemporary history and Public governance Jaume Garau. Advisor in the fields of economic development and promotion Daniel Turp, Advisor in the field of international Law

Graphics and Layout Wils&Peeters - Lier

Printing Drukkerij De Bie - Duffel

No items of this publication can in any way be copied or used without the explicit permission of the author or editor.

92 93 Previous Centre Maurits Coppieters studies Previous Centre Maurits Coppieters policy papers

CMC 2013 — An Alternative Economic Governance for the European Union CMC 2014 | 1 — The Fiscal Balance of Stateless Nations with the EU by Xavier Vence, Alberto Turnes, Alba Nogueira by Jaume Garau and Félix Pablo With the collaboration by ICEDE members Oscar Rodil, Brais Yáñez and Jorge Fernández CMC 2013 | 2 — Internationalism vs Globalism by Isidor Marí, Santiago Castellà Surribas and Josep Bargalló CMC 2012 — The Future of Europe An integrated youth approach In a joint effort with Fundació Josep Irla

CMC 2012 — The Ascent of Autonomous Nations 2nd edition The institutional CMC 2013 | 1 — Law and Legitimacy: The denial of the Catalan voice advantages of being an EU member state, by Matthew Bumford by Huw Evans In a joint effort with the Welsh Nationalism Foundation In a joint effort with the Welsh Nationalism Foundation

CMC 2012 — Variations autour du concept d’empreinte culturelle CMC 2012 | 3 — Making ideas spread New Media, Social Networks, Political Définition du concept et metodes de Mesure, by Elna Roig Madorran Communication, advocacy and campaigns, by Jorge Luis Salzedo Maldonado et Jordi Baltà Potolés CMC 2012 | 2 — The size of states and Economic Performance in the CMC 2011 — Approaches to a cultural footprint Proposal for the concept European Union, by Albert Castellanos i Maduell, Elisenda Paluzie I Hernàndez and ways to measure it, by Elna Roig Madorran and Jordi Baltà Potolés and Daniel Tirado i Fabregat. In a joint effort with Fundació Josep Irla CMC 2010 — The Internal Enlargement of the European Union 3rd edition CMC 2012 | 1 — 2014-2020 Un autre cadre financier pluriannuel pour une Analysis of the legal and political consequences in the event of secession or nouvelle Europe Pour une Europe des peuples, by Roccu Garoby dissolution of a Member State, by Jordi Matas, Alfonso Gonzalez, Jordi Jaria In a joint effort with Arritti and Laura Roman. In a joint effort with Fundació Josep Irla CMC 2011 | 3 — From Nations to Member States CMC 2009 — Electoral contestability and the representation of regionalist by Lieven Tack, Alan Sandry and Alfonso González and nationalist parties in Europe, by Simon Toubeau CMC 2011 | 2 — Diversité linguistique Un défi pour l’Europe CMC 2008 — A different kind of kinetics Establishing a network of heritage and research institutions for the (historical) study of national and regional CMC 2011 | 1 — Tourism and identity, by Marien André movements in Europe, by Luc Boeva In a joint effort with Fundació Josep Irla

CMC 2010 | 1 — Language Diversity A challenge for Europe

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