The Development of Australian Army Jungle Warfare Doctrine and Training, 1941-1945 Adrian Threlfall This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Social Sciences Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development Victoria University June 2008 Abstract This thesis examines the development of Australian Army jungle warfare doctrine and training during the Second World War. The Australian Army transformed itself from a military force ill-prepared for conflict of any type in 1939 into one of the most professional, experienced and highly trained forces in jungle warfare in the world by 1945. The thesis analyses how this transformation occurred and, in doing so, provides a case study in institutional learning. Attempting to discover how an organisation learns is vital: unless these processes of adaptation are identified, it is extremely difficult for an organisation to apply successfully the lessons in the future. For no institution is this more pertinent than for the military. Armed forces unable to adapt to unforeseen challenges were frequently defeated with often profound consequences. The thesis identifies this process of development and adaptation by the Australian Army from 1941 to 1945. Chapter one explores the interwar period in order to determine the state of military preparedness of the Australian Army and its knowledge of the South West Pacific Area prior to 1939. This will enable an evaluation of the scale of transformation that was required for the army to operate effectively in a tropical environment. The deployment of the 8th Division to Malaya in 1941 will be examined in Chapter Two. It also examines the loss of this formation and the subsequent impact upon the ongoing development of an Australian jungle warfare doctrine. Chapter Three will investigate the training undertaken by 6th Division on Ceylon in 1942, which provided valuable lessons for the future. Chapter Four discusses the preparations of 7th Division in Queensland prior to embarkation for Papua in order to halt the Japanese advance. Chapter Five is the fulcrum around which the thesis revolves and is therefore the longest and most detailed chapter. The lessons learnt at great human cost between August 1942 and February 1943 were critical and they would form the basis of future jungle warfare learning. Chapter Six examines the training period on the Atherton Tablelands that followed those first campaigns, which culminated in the 7th and 9th Division campaigns of 1943-44 at Ramu-Markham and Lae-Finschhafen. Chapter Seven concludes the study by detailing the final campaigns of 1944-45. i I, Adrian Threlfall, declare that the PhD thesis entitled The Development of Australian Army Jungle Warfare Doctrine and Training 1941-1945, is no more than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures, appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work. Signature Date ii Contents Abstract i Declaration ii Acknowledgements iv Abbreviations v Introduction 1 Literature Review 5 Chapter 1 ‘No military knowledge of the region’: 1914-1941 21 Chapter 2 ‘Everything was so different’: The 8th Division in Malaya 44 Chapter 3 ‘Completely devoid of ideas’: The 6th Division in Ceylon 103 Chapter 4 ‘Physical fitness is vital’: Training in Australia 1942 128 Chapter 5 ‘We had to change our ideas’: The Papuan Campaign 1942-43 155 Chapter 6 ‘The ideal training ground’: Atherton Tablelands 1943 247 Chapter 7 ‘No new lessons of importance’: The Final Campaigns 309 Conclusion 334 Bibliography 339 iii Acknowledgements Over the four years in which this thesis has occupied my life, I have been indebted to many people. Most importantly, the person without whom the thesis would not have been completed, my supervisor Professor Phillip Deery. His enthusiasm, suggestions and critiques kept the work enjoyable, on target and prevented it becoming unmanageable. Dr Marc Askew, an original co-supervisor, continued to provide advice and comments. Several other scholars provided advice, suggestions and assistance. Most important were Richard Chauvel, David Horner, Mark Johnston, Robert Pascoe and Mark Stevenson. The members of the 2nd AIF who helped me to better understand their experience of service in the SWPA are some of the most wonderful men it has been my good fortune to meet. My thanks especially to Alan Macfarlane of the 2/24th Battalion, Don Hancock and Lew Manning of the 2/43rd Bn and Gordon King of the 2/6th Independent Company. I am also indebted to the diligent staff at the Research Centre at the Australian War Memorial, the archive most critical to my research. The opportunity to examine the many boxes of training material at the Centre for Army Lessons at Puckapunyal Army base would not have been possible without the assistance of Roger Lee at the Army History Unit. At the CAL itself I need to thank Geoffrey Cooper. On a personal level I must thank my family and most importantly my wife, Leanne for her patience and support throughout the past four years. The thesis would not have been completed without her. iv Abbreviations AA Anti-aircraft AA & QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (Australian Staff) ABDA American British Dutch Australian ADMS Assistant Director Medical Services ADS Advanced Dressing Station AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle AHQ Army Headquarters AIF Australian Imperial Force AMF Australian Military Forces ANGAU Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit Armd Armoured Arty Artillery Arty/R Artillery/Reconnaissance aircraft A TK Anti-tank AWA Amalgamated Wireless Australia (Ltd) AWM Australian War Memorial Bde Brigade BM Brigade Major BMRA Brigade Major Royal Artillery Bn Battalion Brig Brigadier Bty Battery CGS Chief of the General Staff C in C Command in Chief CAC Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Capt Captain CMF Citizen Military Force CO Commanding Officer Col Colonel Comd Command, commander Coy Company C of S Chief of Staff Cpl Corporal CRA Commander Royal Artillery CRE Commander Royal Engineers CSM Company Sergeant Major DCM Distinguished Conduct Medal Div Division DSC Distinguished Service Cross DSO Distinguished Service Order Engr Engineer Fd Field FOO Forward Observation Officer FUP forming up place GHQ General Headquarters, SWPA Gnr Gunner GOC General Officer Commanding GS General Staff; Operations/Intelligence/Training v GSO1 General Staff Officer 1st Class HE High Explosive HF harassing fire HQ Headquarters Hrs Hours I/c In command INF Infantry Int Intelligence IO Intelligence Officer JW jungle warfare JWTC Jungle Warfare Training Centre; Canungra LAA light anti-aircraft LAD Light Aid Detachment L of C Line (s) of Communication LCI Landing craft infantry LCM Landing craft mechanised LCT Landing Craft, Tracked LCV Landing craft vehicle LCVT Landing craft vehicle, tracked LHQ Land Headquarters LMG Light machine gun (Generally referred to the Bren gun) LP Listening post LO Liaison Officer LOB Left Out of Battle LST Landing ship tank Lt (Lieut) Lieutenant Maj Major MC Military Cross MID Mentioned in Dispatches MLR Main Line of Resistance MM Military Medal MMG Medium Machine Gun MP Military Police NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NGF New Guinea Force OC Officer Commanding OP Observation Post OPO Observation Post Officer Ops Operations OR Other rank PIB Papuan Infantry Battalion Pl Platoon Pnr Pioneer POW Prisoner of War PT Physical Training Pte Private QM Quarter Master RAA Royal Australian Artillery RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAE Royal Australian Engineers vi RAN Royal Australian Navy RAP Regimental Aid Post Regt Regiment RMO Regimental Medical Officer RSM Regimental Sergeant Major SAA Small Arms Ammunition Sgt Sergeant Spr Sapper SWPA South West Pacific Area TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops Tng Training Tp Troop [of guns] Tpr Trooper Tps Troops 2 I/C Second in Command USAAF United States Army Air Force VC Victoria Cross W/E War Establishment WO I/II Warrant officer; first or second class; also War Office vii Introduction On 7 December 1941 warfare, as it was known and understood by Australian military forces, changed forever. Within weeks of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour, Malaya and the Philippines, a new term had entered the lexicon of our military leaders: ‘jungle warfare’. Suddenly an army that had been trained and equipped for conventional large-scale multi-unit warfare, of the kind in which it was involved in the Middle East, North Africa and the Mediterranean, was faced with a markedly different conflict.1 Combat in the jungles, mountains and tropical rainforests of Papua, New Guinea, Bougainville and Borneo was to pose numerous, hitherto unforeseen, challenges to the Australian Army. The central aim of this study will be to identify and analyse the processes of adaptation that were required to meet and surmount these challenges. It will also address the following questions: How did an Australian jungle warfare doctrine evolve? How did an army with no previous experience in jungle warfare learn to operate in the jungle? How successfully did that army then apply the lessons it had learned? The first two and a half years of the Second World War saw Australian forces fighting in the deserts of North Africa as well as in Greece, Crete and Syria. Although at times participating in retreats and defeats, the type of combat they were involved in would have been understandable to the Australian forces. The training, doctrine, weapons and tactics employed in these theatres were all familiar to the Australians. Exercises alongside British troops on the plains of Southern England or in Palestine and the Egyptian desert would not have differed markedly from those they undertook in New South Wales or Victoria before they sailed.2 Although there were many differences between the battles of the First World War and the campaign in the Western Desert of the Second World War, an infantryman who had fought in both wars would have found many similarities, most notably in the weapons, training, tactics and doctrine.