The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-20-2

Editor in Chief Features LISA ALLEY 4 Back to the Future: Unit Training Management GEN Paul E. Funk II Commandant 8 Army Modernization in Next-Generation Vehicles Will Change BG KEVIN D. ADMIRAL the Battlefield MAJ Cory W. Wallace, MAJ George M. Morris, MAJ Scott Stephens and ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army MAJ Shawn D. Pardee Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Kark- 14 Robots and Reconnaissance: We May Never Be Stealthy and er Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Deliberate Again Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR represents the COL J. Frederick Dente and CPT Timothy Lee professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily re- 18 Fire and Maneuver in the Cyberspace Domain flect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command COL Michael D. Schoenfeldt, CPT Matthew L. Tyree and or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or super- CPT William “Bill” Malcolm sede any information presented in other official Army publications. 26 Reconnaissance in the Multi-National Environment: Successful Integration of Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government Allies and Partners into the Reconnaissance Fight property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR editorial of- CPT Jordan L. Woodburn and CPT Scott A. Drake fices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the author’s intel- lectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work it- 31 Defense of Harmony Church: 1-81 Armor Training in Coronavirus-19 Conditions self — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public do- LTC Bradley Nelson and CSM Brandon Petersen main upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec- essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet 35 Enablers at Echelon: Scouts and Mortars Task-Organized to a Maneuver publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for Company clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate CPT Stephen J. Cumby changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content re- 39 On the Headquarters mains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copy- MAJ Amos C. Fox righted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should 44 Security-Force Assistance Brigades Looking for a Few Good Soldiers be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, MAJ Karl M. Harness ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in- stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special 47 Gas! Gas! Gas! I’ve Buttoned Up; Now What? arrangement. COL Esli Pitts and CPT Meaghan Kelly 55 Improving Supply-Support-Activity Operations As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional de- velopment of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR focuses on materials LTC Charles L. Montgomery for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers; Departments weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series en- 1 Contacts listed Soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored 2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 3 Gunner’s Seat 19-series officers and CMF 19-series enlisted Soldiers; and informa- 58 Battle Analysis tion concerning the training, logistics, history and leadership of ar- 64 From the Boresight Line mor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and be- 66 Book Reviews low, to include threat units at those levels. 74 Featured Unit: 73rd Cavalry Regiment Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. Official distribution is made as one copy for each armored brigade headquarters; armored cavalry regiment headquarters; armor bat- talion headquarters; armored cavalry squadron headquarters; re- connaissance squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop, armor company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S. Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di- rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the personnel for such organizations may request two copies by send- ing a request to the editor in chief. Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indi- cated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

2015410 Spring 2020, Vol. CXXXIII, No. 2 Armor School Points of Contact ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Articles can be submitted as email at- tachments to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@mail. ARMOR Editorial Office mil. For all submissions, please include a complete mailing ad­dress and daytime phone number. Editor in Chief SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: We ordinarily do not print articles Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503 that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, Email: [email protected] DSN 835 other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Deputy Editor Gary A. Jones (706) 545-8701 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We will accept conventional photo Email: [email protected] DSN 835 prints or electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi PNG or JPG format. (Please do not send photos embedded Covers, Art Support, Tanks of the World Feature Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754 in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use PowerPoint­ for illustra- Email: [email protected] DSN 835 tions, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shad- ing. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, contact the Editor in Chief. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery U.S. Army Armor School problems or changes of unit address, email usarmy.benning.tra- [email protected]; phone DSN 835-2698 or com­ Commandant (ATZK-DF) mercial (706) 545-2698. Requests to be added to the official BG Kevin D. Admiral (706) 545-2029 dis ­tribution list should be in the form of a letter or email to Email: [email protected] DSN 835 the Editor in Chief. Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor School, COL Sean W. Barnes (706) 545-2029 ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W142, 1 Email: [email protected] DSN 835 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of CSM Kevin J. Muhlenbeck (706) 545-3815 Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit Email: [email protected] DSN 835 is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright th is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the 194 Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/re- COL Dawson A. Plummer (706) 626-5969 printing permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in Email: [email protected] DSN 620 (Bldg. 4) Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall , Suite 316th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ) W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905. COL J. Frederick Dente (706) 626-8670 ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine Web­ Email: [email protected] DSN 620 www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. site at Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626-TANK (8265)/DSN 620: The Ar- George DeSario (706) 545-1352 mor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with Email: [email protected] DSN 835 questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and Army Capability Manager-Armored (CDID TCM-BCT-MC) equipment of the armor force. Brigade Combat Team and Reconnaissance 706.626.2444 Marco Barrera DSN 835 Email [email protected] Army Capability Manager-Security Force (ATZB-CIG) Assistance Brigade 706.545.5054 COL Anthony Judge DSN 835 Email [email protected] CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG Kevin D. Admiral Chief of Armor/Commandant U.S. Army Armor School Ongoing Modernization It has been an honor to see the world- control vehicles quickly. The next step class cadre and faculty of the U.S. of experimenting in a live environment country and succeed on the COVID-19 Army Armor School professionally nav- during the first MUM-T Soldier Opera- battlefield. igate the uncertain times over the past tional Experiment at Fort Carson, CO, Lastly, in May we farewelled CSM Kev- few months, given the COVID-19 situ- is on hold due to the COVID-19 pan- in J. Muhlenbeck with a combined ation. Our instructors and their staffs demic. Initial system training and ori- change of responsibility/retirement implemented safe ways to continue entation was effective and well-re- ceremony. CSM Muhlenbeck has been training future Armor and Cavalry ceived by Soldiers of 4th Infantry Divi- a tremendous asset to the U.S. Army leaders and Soldiers. The cadre en- sion, and I look forward to a successful Armor School and our Army, and will abled the Armor School to continue its experiment. The Armor School team is be missed. He’s worked closely with mission of training, developing, edu- already building plans for integrating the senior noncommissioned officers cating and inspiring the world’s most this new technology into our courses (NCOs) across the Maneuver Center of agile and adaptive Armor and Cavalry and formations to make our Soldiers, Excellence to ensure that the Armor leaders, Soldiers and formations to leaders and formations more lethal School delivers trained, disciplined win in complex environments. and ready. and ready NCOs and Soldiers. I’m look- The Armor School also supports mul- In the near-term, the Army is on-track ing forward to seeing the great things to replace the M113 family of vehicles that CSM Tony Towns – who is joining tiple ongoing modernization efforts st with the Armored Multi-Purpose Ve- us from 1 Armored Brigade Combat with the Next-Generation Combat Ve- st hicle Cross-Functional Team as well as hicle (AMPV), with the first full brigade Team, 1 Armored Division, Fort Bliss, the other eight centers of excellence, combat team (BCT) fielding expected TX – will bring to the table as the new Combined Arms Center, Training and to be complete in 2022. This will allow Thunderbolt 7. Doctrine Command and Army Futures enablers in the armor BCT to have im- Forge the Thunderbolt! Command. In January, the Army re- proved mobility and be capable of aligned its focus on the Optionally keeping pace with the tracked combat Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) pro- platforms they are supporting. The gram by canceling its solicitation for AMPV program made many improve- OMFV prototypes and entered a new ments after last year’s AMPV limited Acronym Quick-Scan phase in the program. The Army’s user test (LUT) and continues on its choice allows us to find a system ca- glide path. The Soldiers who took part AMPV – Armored Multi-Purpose pable of growth on future battlefields. in the LUT provided positive feedback Vehicle on all five variants of the vehicle, and BCT – brigade combat team The Army is also determining the best I anticipate seeing these vehicles ma- LUT – Limited User Test way forward on effective manned-un- MUM-T – Manned-Unmanned neuvering alongside our Abrams and Teaming manned teaming (MUM-T) through Bradleys soon. NCO – noncommissioned officer the continued efforts in the Robotic OMPV – Optionally Manned Fighting Combat Vehicle (RCV) program. The On a separate note, thank you to our Vehicle RCV team designed, built and tested outstanding Armor/Cavalry Soldiers RCV – Robotic Combat Vehicle the first set of RCV surrogates and and leaders who continue to serve our

2 Spring 2020 GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Kevin J. Muhlenbeck Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor School Training the Armored Force in

simulators came into play as a training the COVID World resource; it reminds me of the saying, A lot has changed across the country wearing of masks, officers and non- “What was old is new again!” Remem- and globe since the last Gunner’s Seat commissioned officers must continue ber: individual, crew/squad and pla- article was published in the Winter to be creative when planning and con- toon training doesn’t always have to 2020 edition of ARMOR magazine, but ducting training. An example is that, if be mind-blowing and complex to be one thing that hasn’t changed is that simulators are closed due to virus effective at getting after the funda- our adversaries continue to operate to spread, then find an open piece of mentals – we just need to be creative. undermine the sovereignty and ground outside on which to conduct Finally, it is with a heavy heart that I strength of our country and our allies, section and platoon maneuver walk- write that this will be my last Gunner’s both covertly and overtly. Our ability throughs. Another example may be Seat article, as I pass off the duties to deter threats is truly based on any that, if Soldiers are sheltering in place, and responsibilities of the Armor country or non-state players under- leaders can print out sections of the School to CSM Tony Towns. I will be re- standing that Armor Soldiers are still tank- and scout-platoon manual and tiring this fall and starting the next prepared and stand ready to defend use digital conferencing to have a dis- chapter for Team Muhlenbeck. It has our country, our allies and security cussion about what they read or to been an honor to serve as a Soldier partners at any time and place. This correct how they would react to a tac- and NCO in the world’s best Army for ability is built on the foundation that tical problem. the last 28 years, and I am blessed to our Armor Soldiers and leaders at all It may not be ideal, and some will call have served as the command sergeant levels are proficient in their warrior it a waste of time, but it is training, major of the Armor School. CSM tasks and battle drills and in their ap- and most Soldiers will appreciate the Towns comes to the school headquar- propriate skill-level tasks. This founda- effort leaders put into it as long as it is ters with an array of experiences, is a tion is then built upon with stable and based on doctrine and is tactically stellar leader of character and a pas- proficient combat-platform crews and sound. Not only will I guarantee units sionate Armor NCO, and I know he will scout squads, which builds lethal pla- will be better at collective training and continue to push the school forward toons, companies and battalions. maneuver, but NCOs will be better into the future. Even in the Coronavirus-19 world, this postured to succeed and excel at the Change brings new energy, new ener- truth has not changed. In fact, it Advanced Leader’s Course and Ma- gy continues to enhance organization- should be clearer than ever that the neuver Senior Leader’s Course if the al excellence, excellence builds pride world is a dangerous place, and excus- fundamentals are taught, even if by and PRIDE IS CONTAGIOUS! es for a lack of readiness are not for- rudimentary means. Which was how given. Even with social distancing and all our predecessors did it before

See Page 31 for a look at how one armor training battalion dealt with COVID and maintained training standards

3 Spring 2020 Back to the Future: Unit Training Management by GEN Paul E. Funk II Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) ultimate responsibility to the Army and the nation is to build readiness – for the force of today and the multi-domain operations (MDO) capable force of tomorrow. Central to this responsibility is not only providing trained Soldiers and leaders, but Sol- diers and leaders who can continue to train our operational forces.

It is vital that these Soldiers and lead- ers understand and practice unit train- ing management (UTM). While UTM is clearly defined in our doctrine (Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 7-0 and Field Manual 7-0), it has atrophied in our current generation of field-grade officers, company-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), primarily due to lack of prac- nd th tical experience during their formative Figure 1. PFC Baker of 572 Brigade Engineer Battalion, 86 Infantry Bri- years. It is incumbent on us to place a gade Combat Team (Mountain), Vermont National Guard, participates in a brigade warfighter exercise at Fort Drum, NY, in June 2017. The unit partici- renewed emphasis on the education pated in the brigade tactical exercise as part of its ARFORGEN-cycle training. of this critical army population – both (Photo by SPC Avery Cunningham, 172nd Public Affairs Detachment) formally and informally – to drive the tenets of UTM back into the force. the required gates for certification and center rotations, so brigades can go deployment within the allotted time. multiple years without a Forces Com- ARFORGEN effect Junior commanders were not required mand-directed culminating training The year 2001 marked the beginning to analyze training shortfalls, nor were event. Simultaneously, the fielded of the longest period of continuous they required to have commanders’ force is transforming into the Army of warfare in our country’s history. Oper- dialogue to determine priorities. They the future – one with MDO capabili- ations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi were handed a task list and resources, ties that requires training on all the Freedom stretched the force at un- and told when and where they need- tasks previously understood as mis- precedented levels, requiring multiple ed to be to knock down the next tar- sion critical as well as tasks to support deployments and a strict, centrally get on their particular path to deploy- new capabilities being developed dai- managed force-generation process ment. ly. that ensured units were trained and ready to deploy. Enacted in 2006, Let us now fast-forward to the pres- Management of these myriad tasks Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN, ent. The leaders who experienced this and requirements necessitates an or- was a phased readiness model de- readiness assembly line are now oper- ganized, deliberate approach – an op- signed to provide ready forces on a ations officers, operations NCOs and erational approach. In this case, to specific schedule to meet the required battalion commanders. During nearly move into the future, we must look demand. two decades of deployments, these back to the past – to UTM. leaders routinely dealt with the ut- ARFORGEN met the requirements of most complexity under arduous con- UTM within ALDM the time, but a byproduct of this cen- ditions. They are now faced with The fundamentals of UTM have gener- tralized process was the atrophying of equally complicated problems – only ally remained unchanged over time. UTM skills in a generation of commis- the fight is much different. While some of the verbiage is differ- sioned and NCOs. ARFORGEN and the ent – “Army Training and Evaluation supporting manning timeline was so The Army has readjusted its manning Program” is no longer used, for exam- stringent that training schedules were cycles to one that is more equitable ple – other terms survived – such as effectively dictated top-down so that across units. There is much greater “Training and Evaluation Outlines” – brigade combat teams could meet all competition for combat-training and yet others are new (“Combined

4 Spring 2020 Arms Training Strategies”). The exist- The Army Leader-Development Model feedback and constant change, this ing problem, however, is that we as an (ALDM) is predicated on three pillars can be very difficult, but it is doable. Army are not well-versed in our own of learning – education, training and doctrine. The first step in going “back experience – across three domains – An essential component is the com- to the future” is to instill in the current institutional, operational and self-de- manders’ dialogue. I have often heard generation of leaders the fundamen- velopment. The formal instruction young leaders state that they would tals of UTM. mentioned above is almost exclusively be much more effective if they only education and exists in the institution- knew the priorities of their boss. TRADOC has identified this shortcom- al domain – TRADOC’s purview. To re- While deployed, we routinely interact- ing and is attacking it head on in our institute UTM as a core competency ed with leaders at echelon at a higher professional military education (PME) requires full-immersion in the other frequency so that every member of programs. From the Basic Officer two pillars of learning across the re- the team understood priorities, tar- Leader Course to the Pre-Command maining two domains. gets, messages, intelligence, logistics Course for our commanders, our com- – virtually everything. In the training missioned officers receive a total of 59 First, leaders can gain the doctrinal environment, the commanders’ dia- hours of formal instruction on UTM. knowledge of what is supposed to logue is the doctrinal construct for Similarly, our warrant officers receive happen through institutional educa- leaders at every level to prioritize and 25 hours of instruction across three tion and self-development, but true nest the many tasks they are required PME courses, and our NCOs receive understanding will only be achieved to accomplish – both individual and about 30 hours of instruction across through training, leader development collective – with their higher echelon their six PME courses. This is enough and execution in the operational do- leadership. to teach the fundamentals of doctrine main. To educate our leaders on UTM, to the leaders and future leaders of we cannot just pay lip service to it, we ADP 7-0 describes the commanders’ our Army, but it is not enough to be- have to live it. It must be enforced, dialogue as a “continuous dialogue come experts in the science, much less practiced and part of how we do busi- with their higher and subordinate the art, of training management. ness every day. In an era of immediate commanders about training priorities,

Figure 2. Eight-Step Training Model. (Graphic from Office Chief of Armor Website, https://www.benning.army.mil/Ar- mor/OCOA/content/References%20and%20Guides/8%20Step%20Training%20Model.pdf)

5 Spring 2020 techniques, resources and results.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, priorities are understood up and down The key is actually conducting the dia- exercise temporal discipline. One of the chain of command, it will be easi- logue; being disciplined enough to the most violated principles of UTM er to adapt and overcome the exter- place it on the training calendar as a that I have observed over the years – nalities that interrupt our planned scheduled event and sticking to it. We and have violated myself on occasion training. Take advantage of the time all need guidance to row in the same – is that of the time horizon. Every you have to accomplish your priorities. direction. echelon has a time horizon to which it Think in terms of multi-echelon train- is supposed to adhere. Higher eche- ing – nest your unit’s training inside of Second, leaders can continue to build lons have longer horizons than short- higher-echelon training events that a UTM environment by enforcing the er, but discipline is the key to success. “invade” your whitespace. This is the Eight-Step Training Model. This is the art to training management, and framework over which all training is At the brigade and battalion level, something we all must master because built and is a requirement for consis- timely training guidance is absolutely time is our greatest limiting factor. tent training success. The Eight-Step essential. Equally as important, how- Therefore it is incumbent that we as Training Model is a blueprint – a fill-in- ever, is respecting the subordinate leaders maintain our respective time the-blanks model for leaders at every unit’s time. From a true UTM perspec- horizons, publish our training guid- level to ensure completeness in plan- tive, the company is the level at which ance to communicate our priorities, ning, preparation, execution and as- we most often focus, where the train- hold training briefs to ensure under- sessment. It is based on the troop- ing lock-in time is six weeks out (for standing of our priorities and approve, leading procedures (TLPs), which we Regular Army units). Quite often, how- lock in and, when necessary, adjust all learned as young officers or Sol- ever, we become paralyzed when an training events at company training diers and use for everything we do op- event out of our control – at a higher meetings to achieve our priorities. erationally. Perhaps for this reason, echelon – interrupts our training we assume that our subordinates schedule. For that reason, company know and understand the benefits of training meetings are the center of Great units master basics using this tool. Make it explicit; trust gravity for UTM. We cannot allow in- Effective training is decisive to main- but verify; and teach your subordi- terruptions to have a negative effect, taining readiness in our Army. Like nates the importance and the benefits and we resolve these at company combat operations, planning, prepar- of this structured approach to train- training meetings. ing, executing and assessing training is ing, just as you teach them utilization complex and should follow the opera- of the TLPs for operational missions. Remember that training schedules are tions process – in this case the process priorities of work tied to a timeline – of UTM. Unfortunately, the demands Third, do Army things in an Army way. key to this is the word priorities. If of the Global War on Terrorism The Combined-Arms Center maintains a network of tools under the umbrella of the Army Training Management Sys- tem (ATMS) to assist us in carrying out our training obligations. The Army has standardized mission-essential task lists that simplify the process of iden- tifying the tasks on which we will train. The key is disciplined use. While we love PowerPoint and Outlook, these programs are not integrated training solutions – ATMS and its supporting suite of applications are, and they can be easily accessed through the Army Training Network.

If we enforce the use of Army systems, we will reap the results of the synergy that comes from their built-in integra- tion. Imagine how great it would be for the long-range calendar to be inte-

grated with the daily training sched- st th ule; for identified training tasks to be Figure 3. An M1A2 Abrams tank from Company B, 1 Battalion, 8 Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, automatically linked to the training Fort Hood, TX, conducts a situational-training exercise Nov. 13, 2017. Refin- schedule, where proficiency can be ing the fundamentals of Army doctrine through training – like Company B is updated upon completion of training; doing here in preparation for its upcoming gunnery qualification tables – and this is the reality of the ATMS – but we building experience in the operational force will enable the Army to regain must enforce its use. proficiency. (Photo by SGT Patrick Eakin, 2nd ABCT Public Affairs)

6 Spring 2020 dictated a readiness model that effec- 32nd Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 3rd commanding general (maneuver), tively stripped us of our proficiency in Armored Division, Kirchgoens, Germa- Combined Joint Task Force-1, Afghani- UTM. We are charged with providing ny; Headquarters and Headquarters stan; commander, Combined Joint the Army and the nation a trained and Company, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor Forces Land Component Command- ready force and with maintaining the Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Di- Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq; and commander, capability of that force through train- vision, Kirchgoens; 1st Squadron, 7th Combined Joint Task Force - Operation ing. We must understand training – Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 1st Cav- Inherent Resolve, Baghdad. GEN Funk the art of analyzing and thinking about alry Division, Fort Hood, TX; 1st Brigade holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in it as well as the science of managing it Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, speech communications from Mon- – to achieve this imperative. Fort Hood; 1st Infantry Division, Fort Ri- tana State University and a master’s ley, KS; and III Armored Corps, Fort of science degree in administration I often say that great units master the Hood. GEN Funk’s combat and opera- from Central Michigan University. He basics, and training management is no is a graduate of the Armor Basic Offi- different. Remember that training is a tional experience includes six deploy- ments in support of Operations Desert cer Leader’s and Advanced Courses, journey, not a destination. By embrac- the Command and General Staff Col- ing the fundamentals of our doctrine Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring lege and completed his Senior Service through education in our institutions College as a fellow at the Institute of and refining them through training Freedom and Operation Inherent Re- solve. Operational assignments in- Advanced Technology, University of and building experience in the opera- Texas at Austin. tional force, we will regain this impor- clude observer-controller with the tant proficiency. Through the disci- Live-Fire Team (Dragons), National plined execution of UTM, we will gain Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; squad- Acronym Quick-Scan st rd and maintain readiness in the fielded ron operations officer, 1 Squadron, 3 force and set the conditions for our Armored-Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort ABCT – armored brigade combat team transformation to the MDO capable Carson, CO; regimental operations of- ACR – armored cavalry regiment force of the future. ficer, 3rd ACR, Fort Carson; division op- ADP – Army doctrinal publication erations officer, 1st Cavalry Division, ALDM – Army Leadership- Development Model Leave the jersey in a better place than Fort Hood; chief of staff, III Corps, Fort you found it! ARFORGEN – Army Forces Hood; deputy commanding general, Generation GEN Paul E. Funk II commands TRA- Combined-Arms Center for Training, ATMS – Army Training Management DOC, based at Fort Eustis, VA. As TRA- Fort Leavenworth, KS; deputy com- System DOC commander, GEN Funk is respon- manding general (maneuver), 1st In- MDO – multi-domain operations – noncommissioned officer sible for 32 Army schools organized fantry Division, Fort Riley; and assis- NCO PME – professional military under eight centers of excellence that tant deputy chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, education recruit, train and educate more than U.S. Army, Washington, DC. Joint as- TLP – troop-leading procedure 500,000 Soldiers and service members signments include chief, Joint Exercise TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training annually. Commissioned as an Armor Section J-37, North American Aero- and Doctrine Command officer, GEN Funk has commanded at space Defense Command, U.S. Space UTM – unit training management every level, company through corps, Command, Peterson AFB, CO; deputy including Company A, 2nd Battalion,

7 Spring 2020 by MAJ Cory W. Wallace, MAJ penetrators, underbelly-mines rocket- generation of combat vehicles for our George M. Morris, MAJ Scott propelled grenades, loitering muni- Soldiers. Stephens and MAJ Shawn D. Pardee tions, unmanned aerial systems and As BG Ross Coffman, director of the cyber-electromagnetic activities. The Army must maintain combat-vehi- NGCV CFT, consistently reminds our cle overmatch in close combat against To meet these threats, the NGCV CFT modernization partners within the De- current threats while taking necessary prioritizes the Army Science and Tech- fense Department and industry that actions to ensure overmatch through nology efforts for ground-combat ve- “we cannot modernize to parity. We 2050 and beyond. Therefore the Next- hicles and works with its acquisition must modernize to overmatch our en- Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) partner to field the Armored Multipur- emy.” cross-functional team (CFT) is the Ar- pose Vehicle (AMPV), mobile protect- my’s No. 2 modernization priority. Es- ed firepower (MPF), Optionally NGCV portfolio tablished in 2017 by then-Secretary of Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and AMPV: Is a one-for-one replacement the Army Mark Esper and Chief of Staff Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCV). The for the M113 at the unit level of ar- of the Army GEN Mark Milley, the CFT is also assessing the need for a mored brigade combat team (ABCT) NGCV CFT drives combat-vehicle mod- main-battle-tank replacement and is and below. AMPV will be able to match ernization priorities to rapidly provide working on cutting-edge technologies the pace of an ABCT, have improved Soldiers with the most advanced com- in automation, artificial intelligence survivability and force protection over bat platforms. and machine learning. Overall, the CFT the M113, and be able to incorporate Our peer threats have studied our synchronizes, coordinates and re- future technologies and the Army’s fu- equipment and tactics. They have de- sources government science and tech- ture network. These capabilities will veloped increasingly capable systems nology projects, analytics, academic allow units to operate more securely and armaments that include, but are and industry developments; Soldier and efficiently with the tanks, infantry not limited to, advanced kinetic-ener- assessments and experiments with fighting vehicles and self-propelled ar- gy ammunition, improved anti-tank prototypes; and acquisition efforts to tillery pieces of the ABCT. guided missiles, explosively formed speed the development of the next When fielded, AMPV variants will

8 Spring 2020 replace more than 30 percent of the These Soldier-focused events will in- ABCT’s aging tracked-vehicle fleet. The “We cannot modernize to clude new-equipment training, gun- mission-command vehicle facilitates nery and field exercises to provide fur- enhanced command-and-control for parity. We must modernize ther refinements to DOTMLPF-P in- commanders and staff. The mortar to overmatch our enemy.” sights and the Army’s decision on carrier provides immediate, respon- -BG Ross Coffman which vendor-prototype vehicle the sive fire support to the BCT to conduct Army will select for production in fast-paced offensive operations. The FY22. medical-evacuation vehicle provides boast a 105mm main-weapon system, OMFV: As part of an ABCT, OMFV will the maneuver units and the brigade- 7.62mm coax, commander weapon replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle support battalion the ability to trans- station and a roll-on/roll-off, C- (BFV) to provide the capabilities re- port casualties with en-route care for 17-transportable capability. The MPF quired to defeat a future peer compet- four litter or six ambulatory casualties. will neutralize enemy prepared posi- itor’s force. The Army is seeking a The medical-treatment vehicle pro- tions, heavy machineguns and lightly transformational increase in warfight- vides a workspace for the surgeon or armored vehicles. ing capability, not simply another in- physician’s assistant to care for Sol- cremental improvement over the cur- diers. The general-purpose vehicle The first IBCT to be equipped will be in rent BFV. Like the Bradley, the OMFV supports logistics and non-standard FY 2026. will fight as part of a combined-arms medical evacuation at the company Integrating an armored vehicle into team but will support cross-domain level. the IBCT will require adjustment to the maneuver and readily defeat pacing current doctrine, organization, train- The first units within an ABCT will re- threats while maneuvering Soldiers to ing, materiel, leader development, ceive AMPVs beginning in Fiscal Year their tactical objectives. The OMFV personnel, facilities and policy (DOT- (FY) 2022. will be loaded with advanced sensors MLPF-P) domains. To understand the and mission-command capabilities for MPF: In 2013, 82nd Airborne Division DOTMLPF-P implications, XVIII Air- the vehicle crew and dismounted Sol- submitted an operational-needs state- borne Corps completed two exercises diers. ment identifying an urgent, operation- using U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored al, warfighting need for an MPF capa- Vehicles as MPF surrogates. In FY21, To generate a more transformational bility for conducting Joint forcible en- XVIII Airborne Corps will execute a Sol- approach, the Army is asking tradition- try. To meet this requirement and sup- dier vehicle assessment and limited al and non-traditional industry part- port infantry BCTs (IBCTs), the Army user test of MPF prototype vehicles. ners to participate in a series of digital will field the MPF, a light tank that pro- Both events will have two MPF pla- design reviews and selections before vides precise, large-caliber, long-range toons, each composed of a vendor- the Army settles on up to three ven- direct fires for IBCTs. The MPF will specific prototype set of vehicles. dors to develop prototype vehicles for Soldier evaluation and testing. This revolutionary approach will allow greater innovation and competition in developing a fighting vehicle. The Army plans to equip its first units with OMFV in FY28. RCV: Has two fundamental purposes: deliver decisive lethality on future bat- tlefields and offload the risk associat- ed with extremely dangerous missions from Soldiers to unmanned platforms. RCVs will expand the geometry of the battlefield, rapidly develop a common operating picture and enable com- manders to employ external assets be- fore first contact with Soldiers. Instead of a Soldier, RCVs will also enable com- manders to place robots in the most dangerous locations of the future bat- tlefield to take on complex breaches, long-duration operations and subter- ranean space in dense urban environ- ments. Figure 1. Soldiers from 4th “Dark Horse” Squadron, 9th U.S. Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, complete field testing The RCV suite includes three variants: of the AMPV at Fort Hood, TX. (U.S. Army photo) light, medium and heavy. The RCV (L)

9 Spring 2020 Figure 2. General-purpose and medical-evacuation-vehicle variants of the AMPV.

Figure 3. OMFV, right, illustrated in use on the battlefield.

supports a robust sensor array to en- guided missiles to augment a unit’s or- warfare, counter-unmanned aerial sys- able reconnaissance-focused missions, ganic direct-firepower capability. tems and smoke obscuration. The RCV while the RCV (M) provides a medium- These variants can support modular (H) vehicle fights as a decisive-lethali- caliber weapon system and anti-tank mission payloads such as electronic ty wingman that maneuvers in tandem

10 Spring 2020 Figure 4. RCV (L), left, and RCV (H), right.

with its manned-vehicle counterparts creating a platform “designed by the MAJ Cory Wallace is an RCV require- or as part of a robotic platoon to de- Soldier for the Soldier.” ments developer with NGCV CFT, Army stroy all threat targets with its on- Futures Command, Detroit Arsenal, The NGCV CFT’s three-phased RCV ex- board weapon systems. MI. Previous assignments include periment will lead to an Army-level squadron executive officer, 3rd Squad- All RCVs variants must keep pace with decisions in FY22 and FY23 to field ron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, their organic units during both move- RCVs to the operational force, starting TX; squadron S-3, 3/3 Cav, Fort Hood; ment and maneuver, thus requiring ro- around FY28. G-35 Planner, Headquarters and Head- bust semi-autonomous capability and quarters Battalion (HHBN), 1st Cavalry aggressive mobility characteristics. All Conclusion Division, Fort Hood; and doctrine re- three variants have the potential of in- The NGCV CFT is developing both viewer, Combined-Arms Doctrine Di- tegrating into multiple, if not all, types modern, replacement combat vehicles rectorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His of BCTs within the Army’s force struc- and transformation capabilities for the military schooling includes Cavalry ture. close fight to support multidomain op- Leader’s Course (CLC) and Airborne erations against our peer threats. The School. He has a bachelor’s of arts de- To develop RCVs, the NGCV CFT and CFT is committed to Soldier-centered gree in literature from the U.S. Mili- Combat Capabilities Development design for developing system and tary Academy, a master’s of arts de- Center’s Ground-Vehicle Systems Cen- component technologies. The officers gree in literature from the University ter (GVSC) have conducted multiple and noncommissioned officers of the of Washington and a master’s of sci- live and virtual experiments with Sol- CFT were selected from – and at the ence degree in supply-chain manage- diers. GVSC is leading a virtual experi- completion of their tour will return to ment from the University of Kansas. mentation effort focused on deriving – the operational force, so they under- MAJ Wallace’s awards and honors in- feedback on proposed capabilities and stand the challenges platoons and bri- clude the Bronze Star Medal, two oak- operating concepts at the company gades face every day. and platoon levels. The CFT is working leaf clusters (OLCs), and the Meritori- with the Maneuver Battle Lab at Fort The CFT is making a difference and ous Service Medal (MSM), one OLC. Benning, GA, to conduct more experi- speeding delivery of these ground ments with Soldiers to understand the combat vehicles to the operational MAJ George Morris is the deputy chief RCV’s DOTMLPF-P impact at the bat- force. If you would like to contribute of staff for NGCV CFT, Detroit Arsenal. talion level and above. These experi- your ideas, contact us at the following Previous assignments include brigade ments collect Soldier feedback and in- address: usarmy.detroit.ccdc-gvsc. executive officer, 3rd ABCT, 1st Armored fluence vehicle requirements, thus [email protected]. Division, Fort Bliss, TX; brigade S-3,

11 Spring 2020 fellow, U.S. State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington DC; executive officer, 1-8 Infantry, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car- son, CO; operations officer, 1-8 Infan- try, 3/4 ABCT, Fort Carson; and observ- er/coach/trainer, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. MAJ Stephens’ military schooling includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), CLC, Joint Firepower Control- ler Course and the Naval Command and General Staff College. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in English from Eastern Kentucky University and a master’s of science degree in nation- al security and strategic studies from the Naval War College. His awards and honors include three awards of the Bronze Star Medal, four awards of the MSM, Combat Action Badge, Valorous Unit Award and Iraqi Campaign Medal with four campaign stars. Figure 5. Experiments are collecting Soldier feedback and influencing vehicle MAJ Shawn Pardee is also a require- requirements. ments officer with NGCV CFT. Previous assignments include squadron execu- 3/1 Armored Division, Fort Bliss; Air-Assault Schools. He has a bache- tive officer, 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry squadron S-3, 2nd Squadron, 13th Cav- lor’s of arts degree in history from Har- Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX; squadron op- alry Regiment, 3/1 Armored Division, vard University and a master’s of arts erations officer, 6-1 Cav, Fort Bliss; ca- Fort Bliss; and G-35 chief, HHBN, 1st degree in international relations from pability integrator, Joint Moderniza- Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. MAJ Mor- Webster University. tion Command, Fort Bliss; and deputy ris’ military schooling includes Com- MAJ Scott Stephens is a requirements branch chief, Operational Architec- mand and General Staff College, Infan- officer for NGCV CFT, Army Futures ture, Combined-Arms Support Com- try Mortar Leader’s Course and Rang- Command, Detroit Arsenal. Previous mand, Fort Lee, VA. MAJ Pardee’s mil- er, Jumpmaster, Pathfinder and assignments include interagency itary schooling includes Command and

Figure 6. 1st Cavalry Division Soldiers participate in an NGCV experiment.

12 Spring 2020 Acronym Quick-Scan

ABCT – armored brigade combat team AMPV – Armored Multipurpose Vehicle BCT – brigade combat team BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle CFT – cross-functional team CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course DOTMLPF-P – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities and policy FY – fiscal year GVSC – Ground-Vehicle Systems Center HHBN – Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion IBCT – infantry brigade combat team MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MPF – mobile protected firepower MSM – Meritorious Service Medal NGCV – Next-Generation Combat Vehicle OLC – oak-leaf cluster OMFV – Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle RCV – Robotic Combat Vehicle

Figure 7. A Soldier puts an RCV through its paces during an experiment.

General Staff College, Army Intermedi- concentration on energy systems, from ate Program Manager’s Course, CLC, James Madison University and a mas- MCCC and Armor Officer Basic Course. ter’s of science degree in public admin- He has a bachelor’s of science degree istration from Central Michigan Uni- in integrated science and technology, versity.

13 Spring 2020 Robots and Reconnaissance: We May Never Be Stealthy and Deliberate Again

by COL J. Frederick Dente and the battlefield. However, the prolifer- of the RCV to effectively move forward CPT Timothy Lee ation of advanced technology such as into the 21st Century. the Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) on From iron blades and crossbows to ar- the battlefield at the lowest level will mored vehicles and precision-guided Tactical mobility fundamentally change the way Sol- Cavalry formations have long served munitions, the character of war is con- diers fight tomorrow’s battles, and it as a catalyst to transform the concepts stantly evolving. Nations expend mas- will call into question the very doc- of maneuver warfare into a battlefield sive amounts of energy and capital to trine and methodology the Army uses capability. As maneuver is the essence present new dilemmas for adversaries to train its warfighters. While there of U.S. fighting doctrine, it requires across multiple domains. Often these are varying opinions on whether the the means to seize or retain the initia- technical advances occur in a vacuum, use of RCVs will ultimately enable or tive and to create or exploit offensive and we fail to develop the tactics and hinder reconnaissance and security opportunities. doctrine to fully leverage the new ca- (R&S) operations, the Army must con- pability. At an even more fundamental tinue to address the inadequacies of Commanders require a high degree of level, we often fail to examine how its ability to execute ground R&S op- situational awareness and the time to these new technical capabilities erations to fight and win the next ma- mass and concentrate superior com- change the underlying assumptions jor ground war. bat power against the enemy at the about the character of war in the first right time and place for maneuver to place. This article will highlight the foresee- be successful. For centuries, the pow- able changes in doctrine that must be er of mobility has enabled cavalry for- Semi-autonomous ground-based ro- considered by first examining the ad- mations to accomplish this task. By re- bots, once a dream of the past, are the vantages and disadvantages of three maining mobile and retaining freedom next change in warfare the U.S. mili- long-standing ideas in cavalry doctrine of maneuver, cavalry formations can tary and its adversaries are developing and then describe how these ideas will provide a continuous flow of combat to gain and maintain dominance on inevitably change with the integration information and intelligence to

14 Spring 2020 commanders, helping them cope with not organic to the squadrons, many operations. As a result, cavalry forma- uncertainty, make contact under favor- commanders were forced to task-or- tions often find themselves limited in able conditions, prevent surprise and ganize tank companies from the ma- what they can do for the BCT, reacting facilitate timely decision-making. Serv- neuver brigades to provide the divi- to the enemy instead of creating the ing as the brigade commander’s “eyes sion’s primary reconnaissance asset conditions to create and exploit the and ears,” cavalry formations can de- with the resources needed to fight for initiative. ploy quickly, fight for information and information and survive on the battle- secure key terrain far in front of the field. Integration of RCV main body to provide it with reaction The experience in Desert Storm rein- The proliferation of the RCV on the time and maneuver space. forced the lesson of the North Africa battlefield at the lowest level will fun- However, commanders are frequently campaign during World War II – effec- damentally change these long-stand- forced to sacrifice the amount of de- tive reconnaissance must often in- ing core beliefs in cavalry doctrine. tail collected about the operational clude fighting. Commanders in the They will potentially enable command- environment to maintain their speed, deserts of North Africa in 1943 suf- ers to push past these previous restric- as formations never seem to maneu- fered heavy casualties while employ- tions that have plagued BCTs for cen- ver fast enough. Moving quickly in- ing light-reconnaissance formations to turies while also imposing restrictions creases the risk by forcing Soldiers to fight for information. With that histor- of their own. potentially expose themselves to en- ical lesson in mind, some commanders First, commanders have been fre- emy contact while trying to develop in the deserts of Iraq in 1991 simply quently forced to sacrifice the amount the situation. Yet moving more slowly chose not to use them. of detail collected about the opera- may increase the risk to the mission, tional environment to maneuver as the cavalry may not secure key ter- Economy-of-force quickly; RCVs can effectively mitigate rain before opposing forces begin their Cavalry formations have long protect- this gap entirely. Commanders, once initial attack. This problem has ed and preserved the BCT’s combat limited not only by the enemy and ter- plagued commanders for centuries. power during security operations, al- lowing the commander time to decide rain but also by the human dimension, Stealth where to concentrate forces. This time both physically and mentally, now find While reconnaissance doctrine in- provided by cavalry formations pro- themselves able to consistently main- cludes the capacity for cavalry forma- vides the BCT with a critical capability tain their overall operational tempo. tions to fight for information, the best based on a principle of war: economy- Unlike their manned fighting vehicle way to perform reconnaissance has of-force. Economy-of-force is the prin- (MFV) counterparts, RCVs are not lim- long been argued to be by stealth. By ciple of employing all available combat ited by Soldiers’ lack of sleep or endur- remaining hidden and maximizing the power in the most effective way pos- ance to maintain speed. The RCV can use of cover and concealment to con- sible. The flexible capabilities of the move ahead of the MFVs and quickly duct R&S tasks, cavalry formations can cavalry allow commanders to conserve secure key terrain, while scouts can detect and observe enemy develop- the combat power of their BCTs to use move more deliberately behind the ments well forward of the brigade at a time and place of their choosing. forward-line-of-robots (FLOR) and for- combat team’s (BCT) main body while By expending minimum essential com- ward-line-of-unmanned-aerial-vehi- also retaining their mobility. Stealthy bat power on secondary efforts, com- cles (FLUA) to collect on terrain, civil- reconnaissance prevents the cavalry manders can maximize the most com- ian and even infrastructure informa- formation from becoming decisively bat power on primary efforts. In other tion requirements. (See Figure 1.) engaged and greatly enhances its sur- words, by serving in an economy-of- By allowing RCVs to make first contact vivability. By only engaging the enemy force role, cavalry prevents premature with the enemy and secure key terrain when absolutely necessary, cavalry deployment and attrition of combat in front of the BCT, commanders ulti- formations can gain and maintain con- power before the BCT reaches its ob- mately can mitigate both the risk to tact with the enemy from a position of jective. force and to mission that was previ- relative advantage before executing a However, because an economy-of- ously identified. Yet, while the RCV reconnaissance or battle handover as force, by definition, is to expend the does enable commanders to maintain the relative priority between BCT ele- minimum amount of combat power on tactical mobility, it comes with its own ments shifts. secondary efforts, the ability of a cav- mobility limitations that will funda- Yet despite these advantages, even alry formation to shape the battle- mentally change how reconnaissance stealthy reconnaissance requires an field, influence key actors and consol- doctrine, specifically intelligence prep- ability to survive a chance contact or idate gains and efforts is severely lim- aration of the battlefield (IPB), is an ambush that may occur with little ited. Although properly task-organized taught. Traditional instruction on IPB warning. Historical examples such as cavalry formations can produce effects at the reconnaissance schoolhouse fo- Operation Desert Storm provide an ex- that far outweigh the diversion of cuses on how to best use terrain and cellent study for this. Divisional caval- combat power from the main body, how to use intervisibility (IV) lines to ry organizations at the time lacked the dedicating these additional capabili- conceal movement – whether mount- combat power to conduct their tradi- ties comes at the risk of fewer capa- ed, dismounted or even aerial to re- tional R&S roles. Because tanks were bilities for potential follow-on tain a position of relative advantage.

15 Spring 2020 Figure 1. RCV zone reconnaissance.

However, as stated, RCVs are being with the enemy, the RCV enables the were designed to mitigate. Further- used in front of formations to reduce commander to make first contact with more, organic task-organization to cav- risk and increase situational aware- robots. By operating in a more “force- alry formations may also need to be ness. As a result, IPB on the type of ful” capacity, these RCVs develop the reconsidered, as they may need more terrain that best suits robots may need situation through action and can po- firepower to serve only in a forceful to be more emphasized than IPB for tentially suppress or fix the enemy tempo. traditional mounted and dismounted while the commander maneuvers his maneuver. Furthermore, as these RCVs scouts to a position of relative advan- Conclusion must operate within line-of-sight to tage to engage and destroy the enemy. When rifled muskets were first intro- the control vehicle, a greater empha- Also, the RCV provides the cavalry duced, no army recognized how the sis must be placed on the three-di- commander with more firepower dramatic increase in range and lethal- mensional aspect of the terrain and while still maintaining economy-of- ity would impact massed formations how it affects not just frequency-mod- force to prevent decisive engagement. of infantry. Few armies recognized the ulation communications but also con- impacts of the telegraph and railroad However, despite these advantages, nectivity from the RCV to the control on modern war until it was too late. RCVs operating in a “forceful” manner vehicle. This essential change in the Too often, our tactics and doctrine lag are not without their own inherent way scouts are taught IPB may not far behind the dramatic advances in limitations. While future RCV capabil- only be relevant, but it’s absolutely lethality and mobility. Like these pre- ities must adhere to stringent require- necessary. vious advances, the integration of ments and at least mirror their RCVs into our scout platoons and cav- Finally, because the basic capabilities manned counterpart in terms of mo- alry troops must fundamentally for the RCVs used by the Army’s Next bility and thermal signature, using change the way leaders conduct R&S Generation Combat Vehicle-Robotic RCVs ahead of Soldiers and MFVs in a Combat Vehicle (NGCV-RCV) team in- “stealthy” manner may not even be operations in the near future. clude artificial intelligence-assisted possible. While the RCV may possess To win the next major ground war, our target detection/recognition and anti- the same or even less thermal and R&S doctrine must adapt. Not only tank guided-missile capability, the noise signature of their manned coun- should we incorporate these new sys- ability for a cavalry formation to fight terparts, it becomes extremely diffi- tems into our current organizations for information is greatly increased. cult to mimic the same physical and and our existing training models, but Commanders may never need to oper- electromagnetic signature as a dis- we must also be prepared to challenge ate “stealthy” again, as the RCV essen- mounted scout moving in front of his the underlying assumptions that drive tially mitigates the risk for a com- vehicle to observe an IV line. Conse- our current tactics. It is only through mander to expose his Soldiers to ene- quently, the cavalry commander may this rigorous and professional dialogue my direct fire. The RCV ultimately pro- never actually be able to specify that we can fully leverage the new ca- vides the squadron commander with “stealthy” as a reconnaissance tempo pabilities and opportunities the RCV his own reaction time and maneuver because he must account for the RCVs. offers. space and negates the need to be The impacts of this change would be “stealthy.” Whereas current doctrine astronomical; forcing cavalry forma- COL Frederick Dente commands 316th uses dismounts in front of vehicles in tions to operate solely in a forceful Cavalry Brigade. His previous assign- a covert manner to make first contact tempo increases the risk that RCVs ments include senior cavalry trainer,

16 Spring 2020 Fort Irwin, CA; commander, 1st Squad- ron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Riley, KS; executive officer, 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 10th Mountain Divi- sion, Fort Drum, NY; operations officer, 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment; and commander, Company A, 1st Bat- talion, 63rd Armor Regiment, Fort Riley. COL Dente’s military schools include the U.S. Army War College, Command and General Staff College and Armor Captain’s Career Course. He holds a master’s degree in adult education from Kansas State University and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. COL Dente’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal (four oak-leaf clusters), Defense Figure 2. The Army’s Ground Vehicle Systems Center and NGCV cross-func- Meritorious Service Medal and the tional team demonstrate the mission-enabling technologies demonstrator Meritorious Service Medal (four oak- and RCV surrogate at Camp Grayling, MI, Aug. 22, 2019. (From a video by leaf clusters). Douglas Halleaux, Combat Capabilities Development Center’s Ground-Vehicle Systems Center) CPT Timothy Lee is the Cavalry Lead- er’s Course (CLC) director, assigned to Fort Bliss, TX; commander, Troop E, 6-1 Course and Airborne School. He holds 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Cav, Fort Bliss; assistant S-3 (Plans), a bachelor’s of science degree in sys- 316th Cav Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. 6-1 Cav, Fort Bliss; and platoon leader, tems engineering from the U.S. Air His previous assignments include CLC Troop C, 1st Squadron (Airborne), 40th Force Academy. CPT Lee’s awards in- instructor, 3-16 Cav; commander, Cav, Fort Richardson, AK. CPT Lee’s clude the Bronze Star Medal (with oak- Headquarters and Headquarters military schools include CLC, Ranger leaf cluster) and Meritorious Service Troop, 6th Squadron, 1st Cav Division, School, Maneuver Captain’s Career Medal.

Acronym Quick-Scan

BCT – brigade combat team IV – intervisibility OP – observation post CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course IVO – in vicinity of PL – phase line – forward-line-of-robots FLOR LD – line of departure FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops R&S – reconnaissance and security LoA – line of advance FLUA – forward-line-of-unmanned- RCV – Robotic Combat Vehicle aerial-vehicles MFV – manned fighting vehicle FWD – forward NGCV-RCV – Next Generation UAS – unmanned aerial system IPB – intelligence preparation of the Combat Vehicle-Robotic Combat battlefield Vehicle

Figure 3. RCVs on display at Camp Grayling, MI.

17 Spring 2020 Fire and Maneuver in the Cyberspace Domain by COL Michael D. Schoenfeldt, CPT this threat. In the past, troop and com- must be ready to meet the rapidly Matthew L. Tyree and CPT William pany commanders had been assigned changing world and be confident in Malcolm Prophet (a 24-hour, all-weather, near- their ability to “fire and maneuver” in real-time, ground-based, tactical SI- the EMS. The armored brigade combat team GINT/EW capability organic to the (ABCT) is the most lethal formation BCT) and EW teams that, due to lack the world has ever seen; no other ‘A way’ to compete in EMS of necessity, planning or understand- force can match the firepower and During the past year, the Ironhorse ing, had been a shackle rather than an st maneuverability an ABCT can bring to ABCT of 1 Cavalry Division has re- enabler to their operations. The Army bear on the decisive-action battlefield. called forgotten skills of the pre-Gulf had all but abandoned EW in 1993 af- However, where our adversaries lack War years, including a platoon called ter the end of the Cold War. During the in attributes inherent to an ABCT, they combat EW and intelligence (CEWI). height of counterinsurgency (COIN) are gaining the edge in areas that in- CEWI was once one answer to compet- operations in 2009, the EW branch clude cyber, signals intelligence (SI- ing in and gaining an advantage in the was finally reinstated for counter-im- GINT) and electronic warfare (EW). EMS of the Cold War. Some in the SI- provised-explosive-device jamming. GINT and EW circles will tell you the With that in mind, a dynamic strike by The only contact many maneuver lead- two capabilities are like oil and water. our adversaries to our communica- ers had with EW during that time was Ironhorse views the two as sides of the tions and intelligence systems, digital with the bulky “dukes” that sat in the same coin called information. and frequency modulation (FM), can back of our vehicles. be a catastrophic blow to ABCT opera- Information is the medium that links tions. Protecting our communications, Current global events have shown an the purpose and direction of leaders exploiting those of our adversaries emergence of both state and non- to maximize the warfighting functions’ and supplying maneuver commanders state actors who are not only capable capabilities. Information is a living en- with real-time and actionable intelli- of waging war on land but also of com- vironment, and it needs to be ana- gence will determine the difference peting in the electromagnetic spec- lyzed much the same way as the phys- between victory and defeat. trum (EMS). To meet these new and ical one we are used to maneuvering complex threats, the Army is rapidly in. There is key terrain in this environ- Army EW and tactical SIGINT are pro- replicating the same environments to ment such as radios and computer sys- gressing through significant updates test leaders at the combat-training tems, as well as obstacles and avenues and restructuring in an effort to meet centers. Every echelon of our Army of approach that allow or prohibit ac- cess into the network. By fully access- ing the information landscape, maneu- ver units can find new ways to exploit our adversaries to mass and concen- trate “informational fires.” To gain the edge in the information battlefield and show that EW and SI- GINT are better together than apart, Ironhorse founded the “Wild Bill” CEWI platoon to be a true organic fire- and-maneuver unit in the cyberspace domain. Since its inception, Wild Bill has sensed, collected, found, jammed, destroyed and disrupted enemy infor- mation networks in tough and realistic environments. The line of effort that Wild Bill has created is now tied to cy- ber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA), which is in turn tied to the intelligence section (S-2) collection assets. This chain of information will leave our ad- Figure 1. Current manning. versaries exposed and helpless in the

18 Spring 2020 EMS. Wild Bill is not a one-size-fits all enemy communications, answering organically able of gathering targeting solution to mastering the cyberspace priority intelligence requirements information from its sensors, rapidly domain, but it does provide Ironhorse (PIR) and, when able, destroying or clearing ground and digitally process- the ability to shape it. degrading enemy emitters with either ing fire missions. The fires section lethal or non-lethal fires. makes Wild Bill a true fire-and-maneu- Creating Wild Bill An experienced infantry lieutenant ver element rather than a simple col- Wild Bill was not created overnight, was chosen and instructed to lead, lection asset. nor is it complete. The platoon has equip and train the organization. Wild To cover the electronics side of the grown through trial and error during Bill was provided a Bradley Fires-Sup- formation, Ironhorse funneled all complex training events. It was decid- port Team (BFIST) Fighting Vehicle to available military-occupation specialty ed early that Wild Bill would primarily allow the platoon to rapidly prosecute (MOS) 17Es (EW specialists) and MOS serve as the electronic reconnaissance unobserved fire missions. This distinct 35P/Ns (cryptologic linguists/SIGINT platoon and the commander’s eyes inclusion is what makes the Ironhorse analysts) to fill the ranks. These troop- and ears in the EMS. It was tasked with CEWI platoon different from other EW ers operate host EW and SIGINT sys- sensing and direction-finding (DF) or CEWI platoons of the past. It is tems ranging from legacy and

Table 1. Wild Bill METL.

Figure 2. Training glidepath.

19 Spring 2020 developing Army technologies to com- (CALFEX) operations and the brigade- kill zone. In general, a concave shape mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems. level home-station decisive-action val- yields the greatest chance to fix a tar- The current arsenal includes Prophet, idation, Pegasus Forge V. During these get, while a linear or convex shape Sabre Fury (a modified version of the complex operations, Wild Bill troopers yields a greater area to detect but lim- Duke V4/V5 EW system), EW Tactical revealed their unique capabilities and its the chance to establish a fix. Vehicle (EWTV), Versatile Radio Obser- limitations as they were tasked to find, With a proper collection site set, the vation and Direction (VROD) system fix and destroy multiple emitters in sensors of Wild Bill received specific and the Herrick Pack. With the combi- the form of live and static opposing EMS bands to observe known as “spec- nation of systems and personnel from forces (OPFORs). trum sectors of fire.” These sectors of EW and SIGINT, the platoon also needs The Wild Bill leadership assisted ma- fire were prepared in advance and co- to delineate the legal and specialty dif- neuver commanders in planning dur- incided with the enemy electronic or- ferences between its troopers and ing the orders process and during ex- der of battle the S-2 prepares that lays equipment. ecution. The platoon semi-indepen- out both the enemy equipment and Wild Bill was initially assigned to the dently operated no more than one frequency sets that may appear to Ironhorse Military Intelligence Compa- phase line behind the FLOT. The mis- Wild Bill operators. ny, where a dedicated and informed sion during these exercises was to pro- Once an enemy emitter is detected, SIGINT technician provided oversight vide the maneuver units with over- the operator develops the echelon, and ensured the platoon remained in watch as they executed combat tasks; potential location and activity of the compliance with National Security relay important combat information; source. Throughout six weeks of CAL- Agency directives and procedures. and ultimately enable targeting and FEX iterations, Wild Bill sensed more intelligence for leaders at echelon. With an organizational structure and than 50 emitters. These emitters are a equipment assigned, Wild Bill’s next During the training events, the pla- combination of OPFOR push-to-talk ra- task was to establish a modified table toon proved its ability to integrate dios and Stratomists. The Stratomist is of organization and equipment (MTOE) with maneuver units while also reveal- a signal emitter that is capable of rep- and mission-essential task list (METL) ing its unique capabilities and limita- licating a myriad of single-channel to carry its troopers through individu- tions. plain text (SC/PT) and frequency-agile al, section and platoon training to Wild Bill’s main combat multiplier is its (such as frequency hop) communica- meet their unique task and purpose. ability to conduct electronic-support tions. Also sensed and reported were While training with a common under- (ES) operations, namely DF. Though helicopter navigation systems and doz- standing and nested purpose, the EW this ability is limited on the move, ens of other “out of play” frequencies. and SIGINT troopers began to inte- when established in tactically and Active emitters present a general azi- grate. Before long they were able to technically sound collection sites muth to their location, known as a line sense, find and report as a single unit. (hasty or deliberate) the platoon is of bearing (LoB). Just like a resection The platoon applied these skills during able to sense, fix and destroy the en- in land navigation, multiple LoBs from the Wild Bill Gunnery Table XII platoon emy with speed and accuracy. Con- multiple sensors will achieve a cut or live-fire exercise and added the ability ducting CEWI requires understanding a triangulated fix on an emitter. These to shoot, move, communicate and ac- of how sensors receive signals from cuts and fixes are then reported and curately call for indirect fire. Following the EMS and how each sensor can mu- actioned by the platoon or other ech- successful completion of their pla- tually support the others through elons. Wild Bill developed a reporting toon-level gates, Ironhorse felt confi- proper geometry. Much like an am- scheme that allowed free passage of dent that Wild Bill could operate on bush, there are different formations both time-sensitive combat intelli- the forward-line-of-own-troops (FLOT) that can be used to achieve the great- gence and detailed intelligence that and enable maneuver, intelligence and est geometry for an electromagnetic directly supported targeting. Many targeting. Integrating Wild Bill with ABCT operations With the concept proofed, Wild Bill was ready to operate with maneuver units, but it was not yet fully under- stood how much the platoon could provide to commanders and the bri- gade. Due to its nature as electronic reconnaissance, Wild Bill was natural- ly attached to support the Ironhorse Reconnaissance Squadron, 1-7 Cav. Therefore, Wild Bill was tested during both the Ironhorse company-level combined-arms live-fire exercise Figure 3. Collection-site formations.

20 Spring 2020 Table 2. SALT report.

Also available to Wild Bill is its non-le- thal fires asset, electronic attack (EA). EA, “jamming,” against an adversary’s communications comes with an inher- ent risk to the jammer because of its EMS signature; essentially, it becomes like a flashlight in the dark to enemy sensors. Wild Bill had limited practice jamming, but when it did go “buzzer on,” it achieved effects on Stratomist and live targets during the CALFEX. Due to the risk to the force, Ironhorse uses this capability deliberately and in conjunction with other CEMA effects at a decisive point. Stacking effects like these on top of one another cre- ates an electromagnetic dilemma. During one portion of Exercise Pega- sus Forge, after the enemy tactical-op- erations center was destroyed, Wild Bill conducted EA against enemy FM Figure 4. An M-ATV Prophet established in a collection site. communications, furthering the OP- FOR’s confusion and achieving domi- found emitters answered PIRs such as Fires: lethal and non-lethal nance in the EMS. the location of high-value targets; Wild Bill is free to prosecute the emit- chemical, biological, radioactive, nu- ters with the lethal and non-lethal Capabilities and clear and high-yield explosives target- means available to it. Out of more limitations ing (commonly known as CBRNE); and than 15 digitally processed fire mis- obstacles. Wild Bill has carved a niche for itself sions (both live and simulated), only by being able to search, find and de- Once the maneuver commander had one landed more than 100 meters stroy emitters in parts of the EMS. this intel in hand, Wild Bill’s troopers from the target. Wild Bill even sensed Overall, the platoon can see almost ev- would action their modified size, ac- and destroyed a live emitter with ery signal in the very-high-frequency tivity, location, time (SALT) report, 120mm mortars from more than two and ultra-high-frequency ranges. which detailed the information gath- kilometers away. While not as accu- Within these frequency ranges, Wild ered and the way-ahead to leaders at rate as observed fires, Wild Bill was Bill is very capable of searching, find- echelon. still able to achieve effects on the en- ing and destroying SC/PT emitters at emy and disrupt their operations. ranges up to 10 kilometers. With more

21 Spring 2020 open terrain than the Fort Hood Train- ing Area, it is expected that the pla- toon can see and affect results much further. For signals that Wild Bill is unable to prosecute directly, it has been able to “tip” to more Ironhorse assets such as the Shadow unmanned-aerial-systems (UAS) platoon or the brigade intelli- gence-support element. Wild Bill’s greatest strength is its ability to use these skills while operating on the FLOT. Unlike other EW and CEWI pla- toons, Wild Bill can conduct CEWI that directly enables maneuver, intelli- gence and targeting. However, Wild Bill still remains limited in its ability to find and fix frequency agile communications, Joint Capabili- ties Release’s (JCR) signatures and emitters in the super-high-frequency range. While Wild Bill and its assets are not wholly at fault, it should be noted that their Darkhorse and for- eign-adversary counterparts can do this with lethal accuracy. Jamming communications is as much a capability as it is a limitation because Figure 5. A BFIST provides security for the EWTV. it is largely untested at the BCT level. As stated, it comes with a risk to the kilometers with both organic and at- and a meshed network, operators can force that would need to be mitigated. tached fires assets, and it has a line- put the protractors aside and more ac- Wild Bill will strive to find innovative of-sight of 20 kilometers with a BFIST’s curately fix a hostile emitter. Wild Bill ways around these complicated prob- Fire-Support Sensor System A3. With and CEMA have access to the EW Plan- lems because its troopers understand more sensitive antennas and systems, ning-Management Tool (EWPMT), that the lives of all Ironhorse troopers Wild Bill will be able to sense enemy which is capable of linking the Defense could depend on their ability to see reconnaissance and main-body ele- Digital Service and sharing information and shoot first in EMS. ments up to 30 kilometers and to pro- with other battle-command common- vide early warning before the enemy services systems. However, many of Improving Wild Bill moves into line-of-sight. the Wild Bill sensors use COTS systems As stated, Wild Bill is not a complete The second issue is the limited jam- that are not compatible with EWPMT. product yet, and Ironhorse will contin- ming capability of the jammers Wild To be successful with future equip- ue to seek upgrades to its equipment, Bill has at its disposal. The EWTV and ment fielding, the Army must adopt a manning and vehicles to give it the Saber Fury jammers are the very same common planning tool and GUI for all edge in the electromagnetic and on bulky dukes used during COIN that equipment before becoming a pro- the real-world battlefield. The current were not meant to defeat near-peer gram of record. arsenal of sensing and jamming equip- communications. Fielding new equip- As maneuver begins to adapt EW and ment is plagued with three major is- ment with more sensitive receivers SIGINT, EW and SIGINT must adapt to sues that need to be addressed if oth- and stronger power outputs will be maneuver. The current platforms that er CEWI or EW platoons are to be suc- crucial in providing BCTs with a reli- Wild Bill is assigned – mine-resistant cessful. able system. ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain The first issue is the antennas at- The third issue is the lack of a common vehicles and MaxxPro MRAPs – are not tached to the Wild Bill sensors. The graphical user interface (GUI). The capable of maintaining the rapid and sensors housed in Wild Bill are some multiple Wild Bill sensors do not have forceful nature of an ABCT. CEWI pla- of the best available to any BCT. How- the ability to digitally share found fre- toons of the future need to reflect the ever, the antennas lack the sensitivity quencies, LoBs or enemy intelligence. mobility of the unit they support, and to detect emitters at ranges necessary To do this, operators must use anoth- in the case of Ironhorse, they will need to support large-scale combat opera- er method, FM or JCR, to share infor- tracks. tions (LSCO). An ABCT like Ironhorse is mation and fix the emitter with a map As it stands now, Wild Bill is 18 troop- capable of affecting up to 30 and protractor. With a common GUI ers strong, with only 14 of them EW or

22 Spring 2020 SIGINT MOSs. Combine that with the dozen sensors and five vehicles they operate, and one can picture the phys- ical problems that can arise while op- erating in a contested and continuous- operations environment. Updating the modified table of organization and equipment to task-organize cavalry- scout Bradley Fighting Vehicles and crews will allow the platoon to be self- sufficient at both security and maneu- ver while also operating continuously. These vehicles, both Bradley and Ar- mored Multi-Purpose Vehicle variants, will need to be outfitted with EW and SIGINT equipment and systems to en- sure that CEWI remains fully mission- capable. Answer to dilemma Platoons like Wild Bill are combat mul- tipliers, shaping efforts within the cy- berspace domain. As with any other shaping operation, their task and pur- pose must be nested to support the main effort. This begins with planning, in depth and in advance. Figure 6. VROD mounted on the Wild Bill BFIST in a collection site. Wild Bill cannot be the only EW and SIGINT asset out there. By stacking the knowledge and effects that CEMA and the S-2 can bring to bear, we can un- doubtedly create an inescapable elec- tromagnetic dilemma for our adver- saries. For example, an ABCT can bet- ter ensure the success of a combined- arms breach or the seizure of a city if it is able to simultaneously deny ene- my air-defense artillery with an EA- 18G Growler (jamming-capable air- craft), deny FM signals with an EC- 130H Compass call, deny JCR with a cyberattack, and deny recon or third- party communications with Wild Bill. If a BCT like Ironhorse is the primary battlespace owner in an LSCO environ- ment, it must also extend its influence throughout the cyberspace domain on a scale greater than Wild Bill. Iron- horse foresees the creation of an en- tire EW company to better shape cy- berspace at the BCT level. Under the command of a cyber and EW officer (Functional Area 17B), this company Figure 7. “A way” to update Wild Bill. will be tasked to conduct information enemy tactical-information systems. Accomplishing these tasks would re- dominance within its brigade’s area of The company would be fully nested quire expansion of the current CEWI operations (AO). Its primary tasks with CEMA and the S-2 to accomplish structure into three platoons as well would include mapping the electro- cyberspace echelons of fire that are as more capabilities task-organized to magnetic environment, locating key desperately needed in the decisive-ac- the company. The primary ES platoon command-and-control (C2) nodes and tion environments of the future. would operate in tandem with a SI- denying, degrading or deceiving GINT section much like the current

23 Spring 2020 Figure 8. Projected information-dominance company.

Wild Bill structure. It would be tasked energy into one of those things. The education from Kansas State Universi- to conduct ES to find, fix and destroy progress accomplished in the Iron- ty and a master’s of arts degree in na- enemy emitters and C2 nodes through horse ABCT is a step in the right direc- tional security strategy and resourc- DF. The second platoon would focus tion toward competing in an increas- ing, with a concentration in supply- on conducting EA to degrade and de- ingly disconnected, intermittent and chain management, from the Eisen- ceive enemy information systems. Fi- limited environment. With initiatives hower School. COL Schoenfeldt’s nally, the third platoon would conduct like the Wild Bill CEWI platoon, Iron- awards include the Bronze Star Medal ES with organic unmanned aerial ve- horse will continue to fire and maneu- and Meritorious Service Medal. He hicles (UAV) armed with EMS sensors. ver in the cyberspace domain. also earned a Combat Action Badge. The two ground platoons can be field- COL Michael Schoenfeldt commands CPT Matthew Tyree is the brigade EW st st st st ed by acquiring more program-of-re- 1 ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1 Cavalry Divi- officer, 1 ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1 Caval- sion, Fort Hood, TX. His previous as- ry Division. His previous assignments cord systems to the BCTs, with the ad- nd dition of more EW personnel who are signments include commander, 2 include small-group leader at the Sig- Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st nal Captain’s Career Course; weapons- projected in the current force-design st update. The third aviation platoon will ABCT, 1 Cav Division; commanding company executive officer, Company st st th require fielding an ES-capable UAV general’s executive officer, 1 Cav Di- D, Task Force 1 Battalion, 28 Infan- vision; squadron executive officer, 1st try, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning; platform and more operators. Fielding th this third platoon would be decisive in BCT, 4 Infantry Division, Fort Carson, assistant plans officer, Task Force 1-28 th rd shaping the cyberspace domain within CO; and secretary general staff, 4 In- Infantry, 3 Infantry Division; weap- a BCT’s AO. This platoon will allow the fantry Division. COL Schoenfeldt’s mil- ons-platoon leader, Company D, Task sensors to get above terrain and see itary schools include the Eisenhower Force 1-28 Infantry; and rifle-platoon nd th the EMS past the close fight and into School (Fort Lesley J. McNair), interme- leader, Company B, 2 Battalion, 69 rd rd the deep zone. diate-level education, Armor Maneu- Armor Regiment, 3 Brigade, 3 Infan- ver Captain’s Career Course and the try Division. CPT Tyree’s military The late LTG Hal Moore said, “There is Armor Basic Officer Leader Course. He schools include the Infantry Officer Ba- always one more thing you can do to holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in sic Course and the Signal Captain’s Ca- increase your odds of success”; the history from the University of Kansas, reer Course. He has a bachelor’s of sci- Ironhorse ABCT is investing time and a master’s of arts degree in adult ence degree in physics from the

24 Spring 2020 University of North Georgia. CPT Tyree platoon leader, Company A, 2-5 Cav, Course, Ranger School, Airborne also earned the Basic Army Instructor 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1st Cav Division; School and the Bradley Leader Course. Badge. and plans officer, 2-5 Cav, 1st ABCT He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in “Ironhorse.” CPT Malcolm’s military history with a concentration in Ameri- CPT Bill Malcolm is the Wild Bill CEWI schools include University of Connect- can studies from Eastern Connecticut platoon leader, 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” icut Army Reserve Officer Training State University. CPT Malcolm also 1st Cavalry Division. His previous as- Corps (distinguished military gradu- earned an Expert Infantryman Badge, signments include scout-platoon lead- ate), Infantry Basic Officer Leader Ranger Tab and Parachutist Badge. er, 2-5 Cav, 1st ABCT, 1st Cav Division;

Electronic Warfare Techniques, Washington, ATCAE Pub 3-3, SIGINT/EW Synchronization, For more information DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and 2019. Battalion, 2019. Electronic Warfare Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Technical Control and Analysis Element U.S. Army Electronic Warfare Strategy for 2017. (ATCAE) Publication 1-1, United States Army SI- Unified Land Operations 2025, Washington, GINT Organization and Structure, Fort George DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-13, Information Operations, Washing- G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Battalion, 2019. 2018. ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2016. ATCAE Pub 2-0, Leader’s Handbook (Signals In- Officer Foundation Standards Manual Sig- telligence), Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd nals Intelligence Analysis Technician (MOS FM 34-20, Military Intelligence Group Military Battalion, 2018. 353N), Washington, DC: Headquarters De- (CEWI) (Corps), Washington, DC: Headquar- ATCAE Pub 2-1, Mission Handbook (Signals In- partment of the Army, 2017. ters Department of the Army, 1983. telligence), Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd Army Techniques Publication 3-12.3, Military Battalion, 2018.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ABCT – armored brigade combat team AO – area of operations ATCAE – Army Technical Control and Analysis Element BCT – brigade combat team BFIST – Bradley Fires Support Team Fighting Vehicle C2 – command and control CALFEX – combined-arms live-fire exercise CEMA – cyber-electromagnetic activities CEWI – combat electronic warfare and intelligence COIN – counterinsurgency COTS – commercial-off-the-shelf DF – direction-finding EA – electronic attack EMS – electromagnetic spectrum ES – electronic support EW – electronic warfare EWPMT – Electronic Warfare Planning Management Tool EWTV – Electronic Warfare Tactical Vehicle FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops FM – frequency modulation FM – field manual GUI – graphical user interface JCR – Joint Capabilities Release LoB – line of bearing LSCO – large-scale combat operations METL – mission-essential task list MOS – military-occupation specialty MRAP – mine-resistant ambush- protected MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NAI – named area of interest OPFOR – opposing force PIR – priority intelligence requirement SALT – size, activity, location, time SC/PT – single-channel plain text SIGINT – signals intelligence UAS – unmanned aerial system UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle VROD – Versatile Radio Observation and Direction (system) Figure 9. The EWTV takes the high ground.

25 Spring 2020 Reconnaissance in the Multinational Environment: Successful Integration of Allies and Partners into the Reconnaissance Fight

by CPT Jordan L. Woodburn and areas when explaining their capabili- ations are identified during planning CPT Scott A. Drake ties: intelligence-collection proce- and practiced at sustainment rehears- dures, resource constraints and addi- als. Timely and effective communication is tional support requirements. This will paramount to mission success in re- “encourage active collaboration Effective coordination in reconnais- connaissance operations. Command- among all organizations affected by sance between multinational forces ers require accurate reports to make the pending operations to build shared requires integrated planning. This be- decisions and adjust their plan to best understanding”1 and inevitably lead to gins during mission receipt and the fit the problem sets the battlefield a more synchronized operation. military decision-making process presents. (MDMP). All multinational forces At the Joint Multinational Readiness Special considerations are made to should be included throughout the Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, command-support relationships be- MDMP or comparable planning pro- many North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tween multinational allies and part- cess. Though a liaison officer (LNO) tion (NATO) allies and partners come ners and their U.S. counterparts. With can serve adequately as a representa- to train alongside American units. Of- differing definitions among U.S. doc- tive for the unit throughout the plan- ten multinational elements find them- trine and NATO terminology, the actu- ning process, the commander of the selves under a common headquarters. al mission-command authority can be- attached force should regularly attend With limited means of communication come convoluted. Commanders en- key discussions/briefings of the due to differing platforms, the trans- sure that appropriate headquarters MDMP, including wargaming and the fer of data and valuable priority intel- are assigned to multinational units to course of action (CoA) approval brief- ligence requirements (PIRs) becomes enable effective decision-making and ing. a unique challenge that must be incorporation into all levels of plan- There is no replacement for com- solved to achieve key tasks and suc- ning. “The unit leaders should come mander-to-commander dialogue at all ceed in multinational operations. to a consensus on which command re- lationships the brigade will use (U.S. levels of operations. This will enable During the past seven rotations, effec- or NATO)”2 to ensure all subordinate the commander to “assist in develop- tive methods of multinational integra- elements are effectively employed. ing shared understanding and pur- tion at the company and battalion lev- pose“3 and to ensure his or her unit is els into reconnaissance operations Command-support relationships be- effectively being employed to aid in have emerged. come extremely important when con- mission accomplishment and properly sidering sustainment planning. This is resourced to do so. Without being Plan because of the The first step in integrating a unit com- unique problem prised of multinational allies and part- set that differing ners is to understand the capabilities vehicle variants of their formations. The most effective create among for- way to do this is to demonstrate and mations. For ex- explain the capabilities of forces (es- ample, a light-in- pecially special-purpose forces) using fantry battalion briefings and static displays. This en- may not be ables leaders and Soldiers to see what equipped to han- an ally or partner can bring to the fight dle the logistical and how they get it there. This is es- requirements a pecially useful in reconnaissance op- tank-company erations, where the ability to observe presents. For this named areas of interest is directly cor- reason, leaders at related to answering intelligence gaps echelon consider and information requirements for the what effects a higher command. task-organization To be effectively implemented may have on the throughout the planning process, parent unit. units should focus on the following These consider- Figure 1. Commanders discuss scheme of maneuver.

26 Spring 2020 Figure 2. Comparison of U.S. and NATO command relationships (Adapted from Field Manual 3-16).

properly included in the CoA’s initial from a scaled topographical map and Prepare development, multinational partners distribute overlays to subordinate Joint rehearsals are extremely impor- 4 and allies cannot be fully implement- units.” Graphic control measures such tant in ensuring the planning process ed into the operation’s unity of pur- as restrictive fire lines, boundaries, has accomplished mission synchroni- pose. no-fire areas and reconnaissance zation and shared understanding. All hand-over/battle hand-over lines are Units conducting reconnaissance op- unit commanders should attend bri- crucial to successful integration of erations with multinational allies and gade- and battalion-level combined- multi-national allies and partners. This partners pay special attention to de- arms rehearsals. During these rehears- is because of the risk reduction that veloping and maintaining the task als, staffs and commanders determine they provide to the using force. force’s common operating picture how the scheme of maneuver fits into (COP). This is imperative due to the in- Also, operations such as forward-pas- time, space and terrain. creased risk of friendly-fire incidents sage-of-lines and rearward-passage- Also, commanders discuss how infor- from improper positive identification of-lines are constructed using delin- mation will be transferred between of enemy targets. eated lanes and coordination points to units because of the importance PIRs promote adjacent unit coordination To maintain an effective COP, units en- play in an operation. “Commanders re- and synchronized shifting of area of sure the appropriate maintenance and quire timely and accurate information operations responsibility. dissemination of analog graphics. “For during the execution of operations to clarity and risk reduction, units must maneuver and direct future combat use overlays with control measures operations against the enemy.“5

27 Spring 2020 of command posts (CPs) or the use of LNOs at both U.S. and multinational command nodes. In reconnaissance operations, timely reporting can di- rectly lead to mission success or fail- ure due to the ramifications of ill-ad- vised decision-making by command- ers. By co-locating CPs, commanders at multiple levels can maximize the use of available communication plat- forms to rapidly share information gathered by adjacent units. This is vi- tally important in missions such as the screen, where PIR dedicated to the identification of the main body may have a latest-time-information-is-of- value that expires quickly due the nec- essary repositioning of defensive forc- es to meet the advancing threat. In a recent rotation, a Netherlands re- connaissance troop was overwhelm- Figure 3. A French Leclerc tank maneuvers. (Photo by Daniel Steger) ingly successful in providing informa- tion rapidly to their adjacent units be- Information flow is an especially deli- U.S. forces unless using a single-chan- cause of the areas in which they em- cate part of the operation due to the nel, plain-text frequency, which is placed their key leaders. The com- number of varying communications much more vulnerable to interference mander of the troop split from his CP platforms that may be present and outside intelligence-gathering ef- to move to the TOC of his “reconnais- throughout different formations. forts. sance customer.” As information Many multinational forces do not have flowed from his surveillance sites, he the capabilities to communicate with This inevitably calls for the co-location was able to rapidly pass this

Figure 4. Example of effective information flow among multinational and U.S. reconnaissance forces.

28 Spring 2020 information. This information went di- preparation, operations including mul- levels due to the language barrier that rectly to the commander and staff of tinational and U.S. forces require con- can divide a U.S. and multinational the unit that was prepared in a de- stant communication and synchroniza- force. Co-locating digital communica- fense position behind the troop’s tion through the use of strategically tion means such as Joint Battlefield screen. placed liaison teams. These liaison Command-Platform (JBCP) and multi- teams must be involved in both cur- national systems may require changes This directly enabled timely decision- rent operations and future operations- to existing TOC layouts but enables making and allowed the commander planning processes. This enables cal- timely and effective transfer of infor- of the defending force to make deci- culated decision-making by command- mation. sions to reallocate forces to subse- ers and staffs and ensures that multi- quent, alternate or supplementary national formations are employed Operators can ensure that as units battle positions based off the enemy’s where and when they can be most move or changes are made to graphic scheme of maneuver. This also gave beneficial to the fight. This liaison control measures, they are perfected the reconnaissance-troop commander team includes the multinational unit’s on both systems. Units preparing for the ability to compare COPs, coordi- communication platforms to enable operations with multinational part- nate emergency sustainment resupply ners also “establish a command post timely and accurate reporting of appli- 7 (if needed) and maximize options for cable PIR and unit locations. SOP for each configuration.” casualty care in the event of chance Lastly, units “prepare draft communi- contact. The upkeep and accurate depiction of the COP is important to ensuring that cations exercises and digital-exercises Units develop methods of marking to all subordinate elements have a plans with the intent of executing the assist understanding of multinational shared understanding of adjacent unit systems validations” of the unit prima- vehicle identification at echelon. locations. This may require more ana- ry, alternate, contingency and emer- These methods of marking are created log emphasis due to the lack of com- gency communications plan. and refined during the unit’s planning patible digital communication systems process and then employed to ensure in multinational formations. This re- Conclusion that Soldiers at all levels and across quires more effort on the part of the To be effective in a multinational envi- formations can accurately identify commanding unit’s staff to ensure that ronment, reconnaissance formations friendly vehicles on the battlefield. updates to multinational locations and first maximize their understanding of Markings include both day and night movements are disseminated to all el- attached multinational ally and part- identification means. In the European ements of the formation, and vice ver- ner capabilities. Effective operations theater of operations, where many al- sa. “Development of the COP is ongo- among U.S. forces, allies and partners lies and partners share the same vehi- ing throughout operations.”6 require implementation of adjacent cle variants as some potential adver- units in the planning process as early saries, this is a critical endeavor. To solve the issue of timely and accu- as possible. In addition to using LNOs Friendly-fire incidents are an inherent rate transmission of intelligence, units among formations, commander-to- risk in multinational operations and have historically employed the tactical commander dialogues and joint re- require deliberate mitigation. voice bridge (TVB) within their com- hearsals can ensure shared under- mand nodes. While this is a realistic standing and operational synchroniza- Execute solution, it does not replace the need tion. Following mission planning and for effective liaison operations at all Lastly, by employing systems such as the TVB, U.S. forces and multinational units can multiply the number of com- munication platforms they have at their disposal. Success in multination- al operations begins before units ar- rive in theater and hinges heavily on critically thinking through where LNOs, TVBs and CPs should be placed to be most effective. By planning for and employing these considerations, reconnaissance formations enable more effective information flow and overall mission success.

CPT Jordan Woodburn is the recon- naissance/cavalry troop observer/ coach/trainer (O/C/T), JMRC, Hohen- fels, Germany. His previous assign- ments include commander, Company Figure 5. TVB. (Graphic by MAJ Daniel Kempen) B, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment,

29 Spring 2020 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team KY; and executive officer, Security (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stew- Force Advisory and Assistance Team, Acronym Quick-Scan art, GA; commander, Company D, 1st Headquarters and Headquarters Bat- Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 1st tery, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery ABCT – armored brigade combat ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stew- Regiment,101st Airborne Division. CPT team art; Long-Range Surveillance Detach- Drake’s military schools include the ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer rd Leader’s Course ment leader, Company C, 3 Squadron, Signal Captain’s Career Course, ABOLC, ADP – Army doctrinal publication th st 38 Cavalry Regiment, 201 Battlefield Army Reconnaissance Course, Air As- BCT – brigade combat team Surveillance Brigade (BfSB); and cav- sault School and Airborne School. He BfSB – battlefield surveillance alry-platoon leader, Troop B, 3-38 Cav, has a bachelor’s of science degree in brigade 201st BfSB. CPT Woodburn’s military history from North Georgia College CALL – Center for Army Lessons- schools include the Cavalry Leader’s and State University and a bachelor’s Learned – course of action Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career of science degree in telecommunica- CoA COP – common operating picture Course, Ranger School, Armor Basic tions management from DeVry Univer- CP – command post Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC), Air sity. JMRC – Joint Multinational Assault School, Airborne School and Readiness Center Pathfinder School. He has a bachelor’s Notes LNO – liaison officer of science degree in political science 1 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, MDMP – military decision-making from The Citadel, The Military College The Operations Process. process NATO – North Atlantic Treaty of South Carolina. 2 Center for Army Lessons-Learned (CALL) Organization Multinational Interop- CPT Scott Drake is the cavalry squad- Handbook 16-18, O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer erability. ron/signal O/C/T at JMRC. His previous PIR – priority intelligence 3 requirement assignments include commander, Sig- ADP 5-0, The Operations Process. 4 SOP – standard operating nal Intel and Sustainment Company, CALL Handbook 16-18, Multinational In- procedure Headquarters and Headquarters Bat- teroperability. TOC – tactical-operations center talion, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, 5 Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and TVB – tactical voice bridge TX; S-6, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Reg- Security Operations. iment, 3rd Stryker BCT, 1st Armored Di- 6 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication vision, Fort Bliss; scout-platoon leader, 6-0, Mission Command. Troop A, 1-32 Cav, 1st Infantry BCT, 7 CALL Handbook 16-18, Multinational 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Interoperability.

30 Spring 2020 Defense of Harmony Church: 1-81 Armor Training in Coronavirus-19 Conditions

by LTC Bradley S. Nelson and CSM Brandon Petersen The 1st Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, as part of the 194th Armored Brigade strategy informed by the Armor School and Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), shaped its response to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pan- demic using the characteristics of the defense where applicable. The battalion planned and prepared an area defense of its key terrain to create the conditions to conduct its operational mission. The 1-81 Armor conducts 19K Armor Crewman one-station unit training (OSUT), 91A Abrams Tank System Maintainer advanced individual train- ing (AIT), 91M Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer AIT and the addi- tional-skill identifier (ASI) H8 Heavy Vehicle Recovery Course. Figure 1. Trainees thrived in the “bubble” and kept practicing crucial 19K10 The battalion continues to execute tasks in the field. (U.S. Army photo) and assess the COVID-19 area defense while generating trained tankers and “enemy’s” most-dangerous course of our rehearsal March 14, again shoul- mechanics for the Army. action (MDCoA). der-to-shoulder. Company command- ers had several questions we could not Although comparing our COVID-19 re- Plan answer, so we planned Fragmentary sponse to combat operations can Once we recognized those dangers, Order (FRAGO) 1 to follow shortly. Our break down if attempted too literally, 1-81 Armor immediately planned U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- once we started thinking about the vi- against MDCoA. We developed a sim- mand (TRADOC) leadership dissemi- rus as an “enemy,” the battalion’s ple area defense. We knew we had to nated all lessons-learned from U.S. leaders responded quickly to the fa- create specific conditions before our Army leaders in Korea and Europe. We miliar language and concepts of the tank and wrench companies could read and watched GEN Robert Abrams’ defense. conduct their OSUT and AIT training. press conference from March 13. We made a simple plan and published We found this framework gave us a our operations order (OPORD) March We watched BG Christopher Norrie’s commonly understood structure on 13. The plan essentially outlined social video address from Grafenwoehr, Ger- which we could arrange and analyze distancing, hand-washing and bar- many, about why we must continue multiple streams of information about racks-sanitization instructions. training. We learned from our sister the pandemic. training brigades like 316th Cavalry Bri- Looking back on our efforts, we real- By early March 2020, our chain of gade’s published guidance. ized we still had a lot to learn. To high- command on Fort Benning, GA, fo- light this point, recently we looked at We integrated those lessons and tech- cused on working through the best in- the pictures from the OPORD brief niques into FRAGO 1, which was much formation available and designing the where the battalion leaders were more executable. FRAGO 1 contained best courses of action. proudly standing together beside a the mission and commander’s intent One thing we knew: If COVID-19 wide- National Training Center-grade terrain we used through May 2020. ly infected the training base and pre- model, and all recipients stood shoul- Mission: 1-81 Armor defends Area of vented training, readiness for opera- der-to-shoulder getting the order. We Operations (AO) Red Knight (all bat- tional armor brigade combat teams did pass around hand sanitizer, at talion buildings, training areas, rang- (ABCTs) would decrease. least. es, facilities, vehicles, simulators, The battalion assessed mass infections The battalion received confirmation classrooms, break rooms, etc.) (company-sized outbreaks) as the and backbriefs and then conducted against the spread of COVID-19 from

31 Spring 2020 March 17 to May 31 to allow compa- healthy trainers to carry on the Prepare nies to transition civilians into Sol- operational mission. Screening, Logistics. The battalion S-4’s expert diers in OSUT and AIT. cleaning everything, hand-washing running estimates were key to our lo- and seclusion – if required – protects Purpose. The No. 1 priority is to pre- gistics fight, especially for hand sani- our trainers, families, communities vent the spread of the virus that tizer, hand soap, bleach wipes, bulk and trainees. causes COVID-19 and prepare for CO- bleach and other cleaning supplies. VID-19-infected Soldiers and Depart- • Nothing is “business as usual.” Use Our plan required emergency quaran- ment of the Army civilians if preven- all your experience, discipline, tine tents for each company, so the S-4 tion fails. These counter-COVID opera- intelligence and initiative to fight quickly added general-purpose medi- tions give us the cover we require as COVID-19 while conducting our um tents, cots, light sets and compa- we conduct our operational mission: operational mission. Our ABCTs will ny-level power-generation capabilities Generate combat power for brigade not get a second chance at being to the estimate. Finally, masks combat teams (BCTs) by transforming ready when and if our nation calls. emerged as a technique to fight trans- volunteers into ARMOR READY Sol- We cannot stop training; we cannot mission of the virus, so we meticulous- diers. afford to. ly tracked masks as they moved from • Don’t ignore yourself. We are vendors across the world to the bat- Key tasks fighting a state-of-mind hard-earned talion. Critical to maintaining our • Security is the first priority of work. in combat – it is hard to change. screening was early ordering of “no- Before COVID-19, the gate guards However, if you are experiencing the touch” infrared thermometers, which established security at the gates of symptoms, seclude yourself until we helped us monitor body temperatures Fort Benning. Now, COVID-19 is our get a medical opinion. All of you are quickly. relentless and dangerous enemy. The tough or you would not be here. new enemy must be engaged at Risk assessment by task and event. Each OSUT company, the three divi- every building and training area, at Endstate: AO Red Knight remains clear every workstation and vehicle, in of COVID-19 or is deliberately cleared sions of the Ordnance Training Depart- every classroom and during every of COVID-19. BCTs and Army National ment (Abrams Training Division, Brad- chow period. “Protect the bubble” Guard units continue to receive trained ley Training Division and Ground Mo- with entry-control points (ECPs), 19Ks, 91As, 91Ms and ASI H8-awarded bility Division), the Common Driver screening and hand-washing before Soldiers. COVID-19 is unable to influ- Trainer (tank-driver simulator in Wood entry anywhere. ence Red Knight Soldiers, Department Simulations Center) and the battalion • Protect the force. If you are not of the Army civilians, families and headquarters conducted very deliber- ordered to work, then stay home and trainees or our critical operational ate, task-by-task assessments of the stay healthy. The battalion limited mission. risks of infection transmission in our training to graduation requirements programs of instruction. Each unit’s with few exceptions. We must have leader detailed when and where we had to train with Soldiers inside six feet, for instance, for every task or event. The leadership examined all those risks, and we made some great adjust- ments. From the thousands of discreet training tasks or events, we cancelled combatives and pugil training. That’s it. Leaders created conditions and the “bubble” for us to conduct ev- erything else. It took time and bridg- ing techniques to implement all the control measures (we used gaiter necks until we got better masks, for in- stance), but we did not miss any grad- uation requirements. Rehearsals. Fort Benning activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC), among many steps, to prepare to re- spond to coronavirus. All units re- ceived COVID-19 screening questions and detailed flow charts that de- Figure 2. Tank instructors mitigated risk with screening, masks and sanitation scribed how to react to various screen- of all surfaces to continue training in the tank turrets. (U.S. Army photo) ing-question responses. Company

32 Spring 2020 leadership practiced permutations of Soldier, Department of the Army lunch, and all on-duty Soldiers ate screening results and rehearsed com- civilian and trainee in 1-81 Armor for meals outside and dispersed. pany actions according to the medical COVID-19 daily. Battalion teams • Masks. The battalion initially wore directions. screened every human at the neck gaiters as our face covering but entrance of every building, regardless Messaging. The 1-81 Armor and other migrated to manufactured facemasks of how many previous screenings. training battalions emphasized com- as they became available. Cadre and Fort Benning continued to update municating with family and friends of trainees wore masks almost all the the questions and flow charts with our trainees. By the second week of time. Whenever physically possible, the latest symptoms and techniques. March 2020, our MCoE leadership we prevented droplets from The battalion equipped each learned enough to cancel graduations spreading by wearing good masks. screening table with infrared and family days on Fort Benning. Un- thermometers to measure Every day our leaders had to assess derstandably this caused inconve- temperatures. We screened privates whether these conditions existed in nience and some angst among our to three-star generals during our their AOs. If yes, we could begin train- trainees’ loved ones. Along with all the defense. ing. If no, we had to rectify the defi- training units, we disseminated infor- ciencies before proceeding. Nothing • Cleaning and sanitizing. First mation as quickly and clearly as pos- was more important than protecting Battalion, 81st Armor, increased its sible. We used battalion and company the force. The defense allowed us to workspace cleaning to no less than Facebook pages and leveraged Twitter train safely. at the battalion level. “Ask the battal- twice daily. Before and after work, ion commander and command ser- we cleaned our areas. Barracks geant major” was a question-and-an- cleaning became maniacal. Drill Assess swer series on Twitter that allowed sergeants managed bleach drills and Constant assessment of our opera- family and friends to directly access wipe-down drills constantly. We paid tions process and leader engagements the battalion leadership. Constant heavy attention to common areas, at every level held the line against CO- communication disrupted some ru- doors, desks, chairs, bunks, wall VID-19. When the enemy did pene- mors and brought some tranquility to lockers, latrines, showers, floors and trate, our leaders were ready. the information environment. sinks. If the virus penetrated the On April 17, a full month after our defense, we destroyed the conditions counter-COVID-19 operations order, a required to live outside the human Execution cadre member became sick at home body. We cleaned combat-vehicle overnight. By this time all personnel Create conditions and positions of ad- controls and switches in the tanks. vantage. “Setting conditions” is often were well-trained in recognizing the We cleaned tools and toolboxes in symptoms of COVID-19; the cadre glossed over, briefed without sub- the maintenance bays. We cleaned stance or is ill-defined. Therefore we member called an ambulance, and the our tank-driver simulators medical staff at the hospital tested defined conditions that create and incessantly. sustain the safe “bubble” to facilitate him for COVID-19. The instructor con- training. The battalion leadership had • Hand-washing. We required hand- tacted the chain of command, who to either create or recognize safety washing with warm water and soap took immediate, rehearsed action. for 20 seconds every three hours or conditions every day before we start- Battalion leaders identified all of that ed training: at least hand sanitizer if in the field. We trained and constantly reminded instructor’s recent students, and the • Control of the AO. Companies and ourselves not to touch our faces. leadership secluded them in a pre- ordnance divisions changed behavior pared company seclusion area. The • No massing. We quickly adopting EOC activated Fort Benning’s preven- quickly. Entrances/exits used for social distancing, then renamed it years were placed off-limits. They tive-medicine team, who conducted tactical dispersion following TRADOC contact tracing with the cadre mem- established ECPs to control exactly leadership. We stopped conducting who entered each building in ber and inspected the workspace. The company formations. We deemed company commander closed the work- battalion. This screening force cost platoon formations “suspect.” the companies combat power, but space while awaiting test results to let Squad-size, double-arm interval the situation develop. the protection from vectors was “formations” were the rule. Physical worth it. Early on, especially in our training (PT) became squad PT, and We received notification that the in- large maintenance buildings and it was better. Army Combat Fitness structor’s COVID-19 test results were motorpools, first sergeants went on Tests (ACFTs) (we did not stop ACFTs positive three days after the test. As patrol, challenged anyone they did for the trainees) took longer, but we planned and out of an abundance of not know and asked if they had been achieved the standards. Leaders caution, the leadership moved the in- screened for COVID-19 before entry. cleaned equipment after each use structor’s four students into quaran- It took time to build the defense, and and spread out physically. We closed tine elsewhere on Fort Benning. The we fought complacency throughout. the dining facility’s dining rooms and students spent several days there, and • COVID-19 screening. Battalion conducted field feeding from battalion leadership released those teams screened each officer, mermites for breakfast and dinner. without symptoms back to the unit in noncommissioned officer (NCO), We ate Meals-Ready-to-Eat for a few days. The precautionary steps

33 Spring 2020 the company took likely prevented a larger outbreak. All those trainees and the instructor wore masks. They ob- served correct distancing, never mak- ing close contact with each other. They washed their hands often and cleaned all the training aids before and after use. The instructor recovered, and battalion leadership cleared him to re- turn to work. In conclusion, during early March 2020, 1-81 Armor struggled to under- stand what the ramifications of the emerging pandemic would have on the battalion and its mission. We stumbled through the early days, final- ly settling on familiar and common language of defensive operations to organize our response. We knew we had to defend our key terrain to estab- lish conditions for us to create world- class tankers and mechanics. Figure 3. 1-81 Armor M1 tank instructors never paused motorpool or field Eventually, we made contact with the training. (U.S. Army photo) COVID-19 enemy and successfully stopped its penetration due to de- Basic Course. LTC Nelson has a bache- tailed planning, preparation, execu- lor’s of science degree in general stud- Acronym Quick-Scan tion and assessment by engaged lead- ies from East Tennessee State Univer- ers. sity. ABCT – armor brigade combat team st ACFT – Army Combat Fitness Test LTC Brad Nelson commands 1 Battal- AIT – advanced individual training ion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Ben- CSM Brandon Petersen is the com- mand sergeant major of 1st Battalion, AO – area of operations ning, GA. Previous assignments in- st ASI – additional-skill identifier clude observer/coach/trainer, Opera- 81 Armor Regiment, Fort Benning. BCT – brigade combat team tions Group, National Training Center, Previous assignments include opera- COVID – coronavirus Fort Irwin, CA; brigade executive offi- tions NCO, U.S. Army Armor School; ECP – entry-control point – Emergency Operations cer, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team Fort Benning; first sergeant, Troop N, EOC rd th Center (IBCT), 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, 3 Squadron, 16 Cavalry Regiment, Fort Benning; and first sergeant, Troop FRAGO – fragmentary order KS; operations officer, 1st Squadron, 4th – infantry brigade combat C, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, IBCT U.S. Cavalry, 4th IBCT, 1st Infantry Divi- team sion, Fort Riley, KS; and commander, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. CSM MCoE – Maneuver Center of Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th U.S. Cavalry Petersen’s military schooling includes Excellence Regiment, 4th Heavy Brigade Combat Basic Leader’s Course, Advanced Lead- MDCoA – most-dangerous course st er’s Course, Senior Leader’s Course, of action Team, 1 Cavalry Division, Fort Bliss, NCO – noncommissioned officer TX. LTC Nelson’s military schooling in- Sergeant Majors Academy, Bradley Master Gunner Course, Joint Firepow- OPORD – operations order cludes Command and General Staff OSUT – one-station unit training er Controller Course, Combatives Lev- College, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Ar- PT – physical training mor Captain’s Career Course, Scout els I, II and III and Drill Sergeant TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training Leader’s Course and Armor Officer School. and Doctrine Command

34 Spring 2020 Enablers at Echelon: Scouts and Mortars Task-Organized to Maneuver Company by CPT Stephen J. Cumby What doctrine says fires with the advance guard and ad- jacent units. This can slow the CAB’s The following recommendations are Our doctrine currently defines move- reaction to and development of the based on personal experiences from ments-to-contact, their successful at- situation. The following missions ex- National Training Center (NTC) Rota- tributes and general tactical formation plore our refinement of the move- tion 19-06, during which I commanded but overlooks potential task-organiza- ment-to-contact task-organization to Company C (Tank), 1st Battalion, 5th tion (with the exception of combat en- address those problems and best em- Cavalry Regiment. The “Black Knights” gineers) to conduct the mission effec- ploy doctrine. are part of the infantry combined- tively. nd arms battalion (CAB) for 2 Armored The definitive purpose of establishing Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) “Black First mission contact and developing the situation The first operation was an attack from Jack,” 1st Cavalry Division. while maintaining freedom of action is Sadajan through Killer Escarpment and This was our first “no order” rotation. highlighted by the executing unit’s Echo Valley to establish a support-by- We (at echelon) received two base op- ability to quickly react to the enemy fire (SBF) oriented on Alpha and Bravo erations orders: one prior to our start situation. While tempo is not men- Passes, and then to pass an infantry point from the rotational-unit bivouac tioned in the movement-to-contact company forward to seize key terrain. area and one prior to the live-fire. section of Army Techniques Publica- Ahead of the battalion was one troop tion (ATP) 3-90.5, Combined-Arms from the cavalry squadron oriented on The rest of the orders came as frag- Battalion, some form of speed is ref- the objective and on Granite Pass; the mentary orders (FRAGOs) at varying erenced several times in the discus- battalion scouts were in the vicinity of degrees of “flash to bang” within the sion. For example, ATP 3-90.5 says that Observation Post (OP) Hill to screen execution timeline. doctrine requires executing units to Refrigerator Gap. The company was Throughout the rotation, 1-5 Cav exe- “quickly determine the size and activ- “pure,” with the battalion mortar pla- cuted most of its operations in NTC’s ity of the enemy force” and place toon following to preset mortar firing Northern Corridor. The battalion con- “fires on lead enemy forces. Speed of points (MFPs) to provide coverage. We ducted several movements-to-contact decision and execution is critical.” had two priority 155mm howitzer tar- due to the consistent reapplication of Also, the advance-guard “commander gets on anticipated enemy defensive combat power by the opposing force maintains pressure on the enemy by positions in and around both Alpha (OPFOR), allocation of collection as- fire and maneuver. He (or she) probes and Bravo Passes. and conducts a vigorous reconnais- sets to other brigade priorities and un- During this mission, the forward cav- certainty of the enemy situation. sance … to determine the enemy’s ex- act location, composition and disposi- alry troop suffered heavy losses from actions with emplaced anti-tank (AT) Initially my company found itself exe- tion. The advance guard immediately teams and boyevaya mashina pekho- cuting Black Jack 6’s (call sign for the transmits this information to the CAB tys – Russian-made infantry fighting battalion commander) intent as a bri- commander.” vehicles – in defensive postures. The gade reserve in the defense, commit- cavalry troop identified more AT loca- ting in and around the Matterhorn. The security force’s mission, similarly, tions but could not influence them Following, we resumed our role with focuses its reconnaissance on the en- with direct fire. The troop did not re- 1-5 Cav, leading four offensive opera- emy, the named areas of interest tain the combat power to reconnoiter tions through the Northern Corridor (NAIs), routes and terrain, while re- enemy on our objective. with varied degrees of success. taining priority of fires, to gain and maintain contact without becoming Upon crossing Killer Escarpment, I re- However, by task-organizing the bat- decisively engaged. However, while quested that the mortars establish an talion scouts and mortars to my com- not specified, it’s generally assumed unplanned MFP to cover our move- pany, the battalion found success with the security force’s analysis and re- ment to Echo Valley due to the troop’s our rapid ability to identify the ene- ports (as well as requests for fires, sus- limited capability to influence forward my’s location, composition and dispo- tainment, evacuation and commit- enemy positions. We took contact sition; to develop the situation; and to ment of more combat power) are from AT teams, losing one tank, but defeat the formation with maneuver strictly reported to the battalion (in a eliminated the teams with the estab- and fire. CAB movement-to-contact). lished mortars. Following that success, For brevity, I’ll address the first and This task-organization faces the prob- and with communication problems second operations only (the third and lems of communication equipment with battalion fires, the mortar pla- fourth operations’ task-organization failure or degradation, time for a staff toon dropped to our net. In effect, the was highly similar to their predeces- to process and disseminate informa- mortar platoon fell under us until we’d sors). tion, and time to deconflict organic passed the infantry forward.

35 Spring 2020 We confirmed the locations of the re- commitment of tanks and attack avia- Extending security maining cavalry troop and adjacent tion to reinforce the pass. Immediately following reconstitution units. Then, we requested notification Unable to identify the OPFOR tanks’ of my company, we received a FRAGO of assets entering our area of opera- positions, we awaited resupply of to extend the battalion’s security pos- tions to deconflict fires. We then be- mortar ammunition while we kept ture by 10 kilometers to OP Hill to hold gan a movement-to-contact toward busy shooting down helicopters. We gains made in previous operations our objective to re-establish contact also awaited our priority 155m howit- while the battalion executed a hasty- with the enemy. zer targets to shape our maneuver planning cycle. Again we were tasked The company got very comfortable against the tanks. The lull cost us tem- to lead the operation, which I briefed bounding platoons into overwatch po- po as the OPFOR’s tanks established to my leaders as a movement-to-con- sitions and leading with a single pla- an SBF and the 155 missions were re- tact given the uncertain enemy situa- toon, covered within mortar range, allocated to another battalion. tion. then pulling forward the mortars into Given the operational tempo and bat- a new MFP and continuing the maneu- Despite destroying a few tanks and he- talion planning cycle, the scouts ver toward key terrain. As we ap- licopters, we took significant losses weren’t currently employed following proached Bravo Pass, we made con- and were unable to successfully pass displacement from OP Hill due to en- tact with a mechanized-infantry com- the infantry onto the objective. The emy counteractions. Knight 6 and pany in the defense and suffered two takeaways during this operation were Knight 3 agreed to let me “borrow” casualties. Having previously decon- 1) our limitations with no element for- the scout platoon for our mission, and flicted fires, our mortars fired smoke ward to establish contact with the en- we were also task-organized with the and high-explosive rounds within min- emy and 2) shaping maneuver with mortars after our success employing utes, shaping my lead platoon’s and 3rd fires at the company without having to them in the previous operation. Platoon’s establishment of an SBF, and deconflict through battalion and bri- the subsequent maneuver by myself gade (timely and personal). Following aggressive troop-leading and my 2nd Platoon. We eliminated the procedures, we departed as a robust OPFOR company, triggering enemy company team of a scout platoon (still

Figure 1. An M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle provides security for 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav’s tactical-operations center during the brigade’s 19-06 decisive-action rotation at NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. (U.S. Army photo by MAJ Carson Petry, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav- alry Division Public Affairs)

36 Spring 2020 5x3 with Long-Range Acquisition Sys- tem trucks and M2s), three degraded armor platoons (Slant 11 during this fight due to maintenance and our ex- ecutive officer’s absence to meet oth- er requirements) and a mortar pla- toon. The scouts’ reconnaissance guid- ance for this mission was enemy-fo- cused, rapid and forceful, and oriented on NAIs in which I presumed the ene- my had hastily emplaced weapon sys- tems and platforms during our recon- stitution. Our scheme of maneuver was simple. The mortars immediately established an MFP to cover the scouts in their ini- tial five kilometers of reconnaissance. (The scouts would set in OPs oriented on my NAIs.) We then bounded our platoons by fightable terrain features and pulled forward the mortars to the next MFP to deploy the scouts and re- peat the process. Figure 2. U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav Division, patrol an area beside a mountain during Decisive-Action Rotation 19-06 at NTC April 6, This task-organization allowed us to 2019. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Carlos Cameron, Operations Group, NTC) organically identify enemy positions and maintain contact with them, and Further, the task-organization let the battalion quickly into the mission. In to deploy my tanks under the cover of scouts gain, maintain and hand over response, the scout-platoon leader mortar fires and obscuration to elimi- contact at an accelerated rate directly monitored our company command nate the enemy formation. It was sim- to the advance guard it impacted. We and his platoon nets, but provided his ple, quick-reacting, synchronized and in turn provided the scouts with re- analysis to battalion through Joint Ca- extremely effective. Further, it gave us sponsive mortar fires, sustainment, pabilities Release or relayed through the capability to seize and exploit the communication relay and security. me if the message required articula- initiative. After eliminating the enemy tion. security element and owning OP Hill, Similarly, by cutting out the multiple- we continued the same maneuvers echelon coordination for and decon- Our mortars also monitored the com- through Refrigerator Gap down to the fliction of the battalion mortars, our pany command and platoon nets, and, east side of Alpha and Bravo Passes. fire missions impacted the fight within when necessary, the mortar crews minutes or shifted within seconds. The processed missions digitally or We destroyed another mechanized significant reduction in processing through relay with our Bradley Fire- company that was holding the terrain, times for fires missions facilitated an Support Team (BFIST) given the dis- and we passed our infantry forward to aggressive tempo well suited to the tance from battalion fires. clear the passes, ultimately meeting movement-to-contact. Also, it syn- our commander’s intent of owning the chronized sustainment efforts with Despite the additional mission-com- passes to prevent envelopment as we mission timeframes since we owned mand requirements, owning the as- extended our lines of communication their operational reach, as we did our sets allowed us to own the tempo of through Refrigerator Gap. tanks. the fight and apply combat power at the right place and at the right time. The net architecture admittedly was Second mission The result was evident in the second cluttered at times. The company com- The task-organization of the second mission, when we faced nearly the mand net became home to scouts mission allowed our company team to same enemy situation but only suf- passing targets directly to platoon meet all requirements of both the se- fered a single casualty (the BFIST got leaders, platoons calling for mortar curity force and the advance guard in too excited observing fires). a movement-to-contact while rapidly fires and myself issuing orders to two leveraging fires, deploying the forma- more elements. However, simple radio Future CABs conducting a movement- tion and developing the situation. etiquette and discipline prevented to-contact and leading with a single clutter on all but a couple of occa- company should consider a similar Our scout platoon in later missions sions. task-organization. proved capable of still answering bat- talion’s priority information require- Generally, scouts would lose frequen- Providing the lead company the organ- ments while task-organized under us. cy-modulation communications with ic ability to aggressively gain contact,

37 Spring 2020 deploy its formation, develop the situ- TX. His other assignments include ation and rapidly cover maneuver with commander, Company C (Tank), 1-5 Acronym Quick-Scan swift and accurate fires offers the CAB Cav, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav Division; execu- potential to quickly win the initial con- tive officer, Headquarters and Head- ABCT – armored brigade combat team tact, maintain combat power and ex- quarters Troop, 2nd Squadron, 13th Cav- rd st AT – anti-tank ploit the initiative. alry, 3 ABCT, 1 Armored Division, ATP – Army techniques publication Fort Bliss, TX; scout-platoon leader, The follow-on phases of the operation BFIST – Bradley Fire-Support Team Troop B, 2-13 Cav, 4th ABCT, 1st Ar- CAB – combined-arms battalion after the meeting engagement will mored Division, Fort Bliss; and assis- FRAGO – fragmentary order likely require adjustment of the task- tant S-3, 2-13 Cav, 4th ABCT, 1st Ar- MFP – mortar firing point organization to support follow-on op- mored Division. CPT Cumby’s military NAI – named area of interest erations. As Knight 6, LTC Timothy P. schools include Officer Candidate NTC – National Training Center OP – observation post Meadors, stated, “Getting the task-org School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s right is a simple solution to a complex OPFOR – opposing force Course, Airborne School, Army Recon- SBF – support-by-fire problem.” naissance Course, Maneuver Captain’s CPT Stephen Cumby commands Head- Career Course and Cavalry Leader’s quarters and Headquarters Company, Course. He holds a bachelor’s of sci- 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ence degree in history from Hardin- ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Simmons University, Abilene, TX.

38 Spring 2020 On the Headquarters by MAJ Amos C. Fox forest at a time when the U.S. Army However, days prior to the German as- thought German forces were on their On the morning of Dec. 16, 1944, di- sault, Third Army’s intelligence officer, heels. They did so to overwhelm and saster struck the U.S. Army. The Ger- COL Oscar Koch, had picked up signs isolate American and other Allied forc- mans, in a last-ditch effort to pull vic- the Germans were repositioning forc- es, grab the critical road network at tory from the jaws of defeat, launched es around the Ardennes, potentially Bastogne and secure the port city of the opening salvo of what became preparing for a large offensive through Antwerp, all in hopes of bringing the 2 known as the Battle of the Bulge. the region. Koch sounded the alarm Allies to the bargaining table.1 The ini- to then-LTG George Patton and Third The German operation was predicated tial phase caught the Americans off Army headquarters Dec. 7, 9 and 11. on surprise — attacking in deplorable guard and left the Allies reeling for After visiting several of his divisions weather through a nearly impregnable several days. Dec. 12 and coming to a similar con- clusion as a result of those visits, Pat- ton directed his headquarters to de- velop options in the event that Third Army was instructed to reorient oper- ations from its current location around Metz to the north in the vicinity of the Ardennes forest.3 On Dec. 16, Patton received a phone call from his superior, then-GEN Omar Bradley, the Twelfth Army Group commander. Bradley, alarmed, in- formed Patton that the Germans had indeed attacked and that several American divisions were in dire straits.4 As historian Antony Beevor notes, “All major American headquar- ters lacked information on the true state of affairs.”5 Patton, having taken heed of his staff’s analysis, took Brad- ley’s phone call in stride. As one analyst noted: “As a conse- quence of the Third Army’s aggressive staff work, Patton was not overly sur- prised by Bradley’s phone call during the evening of the 16th. He was disap- pointed that he could not continue his offensive toward the Rhine but not surprised by the German offensive. The continuing analysis and planning by his staff and Patton’s recognized tactical intuition had allowed him to anticipate the offensive and even draw up contingency plans.”6 As a result of Bradley’s call, Patton di- rected Third Army’s headquarters to develop three possible lines of attack: Figure 1. Third U.S. Army commander LTG George S. Patton (left) speaks with • Neufchateau to St. Hubert; BG Anthony McAuliffe, acting commander of U.S. 101st Airborne Division • Arlon to Bastogne; and troops defending Bastogne, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge in World • Luxembourg to Diekirch to St. Vith.7 War II. Patton’s and his headquarters’ preparation enabled Third Army to conduct a sweep across France and play an instrumental role in defeating the Patton’s faith in his headquarters and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes. Patton commanded Third Army his own tactical foresight proved prov- from 1944 to 1945. (U.S. Army photo by SFC Luke Graziani) idential when he was summoned to

39 Spring 2020 the Supreme Allied Commander’s • It was soundly able to control its subordinate commands by reduc- (then-GEN Dwight Eisenhower) head- operations, coordinate plans and ing organizational chaos, disorder and quarters in Verdun the morning of future operations, and sustain Third impediments to mission accomplish- Dec. 19.8 Army throughout; ment. To put it another way, a head- quarters that keeps its subordinate el- When Eisenhower queried Patton on • While wrestling with current ements tangled in the minutia of staff what Third Army could do to help, Pat- operations, the headquarters was bureaucracy and irrelevant battle- ton replied that he could attack north able to think, plan and resource into rhythm events reduces those forma- with 4th Armored Division, 26th Infan- the future, enabling the headquarters tions’ flexibility, thus making them try Division and 80th Infantry Division to bring time to heel. more prone to mission failure. Dec. 21. Patton’s response generated Although Army doctrine provides six incredulity within the room. Few lead- functions common to all command However, purposeful alignment allows ers or staff officers in the room be- posts, these functions do not capture a headquarters increased flexibility, lieved that, given the current environ- a headquarters’ raison d’être. There- which helps not only itself but its high- mental conditions and Third Army’s fore, it logically follows that Third Ar- er headquarters and those that work contact with the enemy, Patton could my’s performance throughout World beneath it. To attain purposeful align- turn his force 90 degrees to the north War II, but more specifically during the ment, a headquarters must ruthlessly 9 and drive straight into another attack. Battle of the Bulge, provides a good remove impediments to its raison point of departure in thinking about d’être. That, in turn, will free it to ef- However, Beevor rightly notes what fectively manage the interplay among enabled Patton’s aggressiveness dur- the how, why and what of headquar- ters operations. coordination, control and sustainment ing the meeting. Beevor contends, in a time-sensitive manner to achieve “Third Army staff had not wasted a 10 Understanding role purposeful activity. A trained and moment.” To be sure, as Patton was trusted staff, like that of Patton’s Third meeting with Eisenhower and the as- To be successful, a headquarters must understand its role. To put it another Army, is the centerpiece of an effec- sembled Allied commanders and staff way, a headquarters must understand tive headquarters. representatives, Third Army’s head- its purpose and why it exists in the quarters had already started a corps first place. However, given contempo- Commander’s role headquarters and combat command rary headquarters doctrine and opera- As Third Army’s work leading up to the from 4th Armored Division moving tions, it is important to begin the dis- Battle of the Bulge illustrates, an north, with the rest of Third Army pre- cussion by highlighting what a head- adroit headquarters is a force multi- pared to move by the end of that quarters is not. First, a headquarters plier that allows it to punch above its morning. does not exist to legitimize the officers weight. Historian Allen Millet notes Once the meeting drew to a close, Pat- and staff sections within it. Next, a that Patton’s staff was brilliant and perhaps one of the best in Europe dur- ton telephoned his headquarters, gave headquarters does not exist to mind- ing the war.13 This wasn’t by chance. the pre-arranged code word indicating lessly churn out slides. Further, it does Patton’s Third Army staff was largely which of the three options Third Army not exist to facilitate or generate irrel- the one he enjoyed throughout the was to execute.11 Through the course evant meetings. Nor does it exist to war, especially when he was at the of the battle, Third Army’s headquar- field-test Harvard Business Review helm of Seventh Army during the Sicil- ters, in conjunction with Patton’s lead- concepts and ideas. ian Campaign.14 Those many months ership and decision-making, resulted A successful headquarters’ purpose is Patton and his staff worked together in his force rescuing the beleaguered to enable and maintain the fighting served as the crucible for their opera- 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne faculty of its subordinate units. The tional relationship – during the period and subsequently defeating the Ger- headquarters accomplishes this by leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, mans in Belgium. In doing so, Third Ar- balancing the interplay of three func- Patton had been indirectly training his my’s exploits during the Battle of the tions: control, coordination and sus- staff. This is where the essence of Bulge have gone down in history as tainment. Third Army’s success at the Bulge can one of the U.S. Army’s high-water be found. marks. These functions are balanced in defer- ence to time because, as theorist J.F.C. A staff is the heart and soul of any Third Army’s success was a blend of Fuller reminds the student of war, headquarters, and for a staff to be Patton’s skill as an officer, coupled “Time is an all-embracing condition, good — efficient, forward-thinking with splendid staff work and a bit of and in war, even more so. ... One of and coordinating — it must be trained, luck. Dissecting Third Army’s head- the greatest problems of generalship disciplined and possess good esprit de quarters success during the Battle of is how to use time to the best advan- corps. While the chief of staff or exec- the Bulge results in three findings: tage, and this demands a perfectly or- utive officer is nominally responsible • The headquarters understood its ganized instrument in which friction, for developing the staff, the onus tru- purpose, enabling its subordinate which is the enemy of military time, is ly resides with the commander. The units’ fighting capacity while reduced to its lowest possible level.”12 commander develops the staff by maintaining the flexibility to adapt Furthermore, a headquarters enables holding it accountable, running it to changing battlefield conditions; and maintains the fighting capacity of through incisive and rigorous process-

40 Spring 2020 es, and respecting it. that be: that support the command, create op- portunities and improve fighting ca- Respect is what’s hidden within Patton • Battle-rhythm inertia; pacity. and Third Army’s working relationship. • Mission creep; Patton’s relationship with his head- • Higher-level staff officers’ attempts Enabling fight quarters suggests he not only respect- to justify their jobs; Napoleon Bonaparte is noted to have ed good officers, noncommissioned • Staff not being able to think beyond said, “The secret of war is to march 12 officers and Soldiers, but he also re- legacy processes; or leagues, fight a battle and march 12 spected staff work. Despite lessons more leagues in pursuit.”16 Third Army like this, all too often today staff work • Staff assuming every meeting or reporting requirement from a higher at the Battle of the Bulge and after- is denigrated, cast in a miserable light ward lends credence to Bonaparte’s or offered as something that must be headquarters must be foisted on one’s subordinate commands. theory. Third Army’s agility and ability “survived.” to punch above its weight illustrates A cottage industry has sprung up of- Chiefs of staff, executive officers and what a headquarters can do when it fering tips, tricks and pithy bromides whoever else plays a part in assigning understands its purpose and is not to assuage the poor soul that must work to a headquarters must ensure bogged down with superfluous, sub- serve on staff. To be sure, a recent of- the headquarters is oriented on what optimizing work. Its ability to rapidly fering at The Military Leader Website matters: work that contributes to the react based on forward-looking staff is instructive. The post states, “Staff headquarters’ purpose. The first step work and a receptive and equally for- time is usually viewed as the trough in in this process is to understand what ward-looking commander is the epit- the career … a holding pattern … the the headquarters is for. ome of how a good headquarters en- ables the fighting potency of its sub- purgatory before one’s time in the The second step is understanding that ordinate units to create useful options spotlight. But as with anything, it is to properly support a headquarters’ 15 for its higher headquarters. what you make of it.” This mindset purpose, it must generate good staff regarding an assignment on staff is work. Good staff work requires space One must assume that the situation in counterproductive and undercuts and time. Leaders of a headquarters headquarters across the force. and around the Bulge would have are responsible for ensuring good staff been far more dire for the men Further, commanders who speak dis- work. Therefore, they are responsible trapped there had Patton and Third paragingly of their staffs, do not spend to fight for time and space for their Army headquarters allowed Bradley, time with their staffs or tout how little staff. LTG Courtney Hodges and others to time they themselves spent on staff The third, and perhaps the most chal- dissuade them from their initial situa- inflict a deleterious effect on their lenging step, is stepping beyond the tion assessment in early December own staff and thus work against the 17 “find a way to get to yes” mindset and 1944. However, Third Army’s dogged effectiveness of their own headquar- embrace the word “no.” While head- persistence and ability to convey the ters. Routine, respectful interaction quarters often find it easy to tell their potential importance and ramifica- between the staff and the commander subordinate units no, telling lateral tions of its assessment sparked a plan- allows the staff to identify how best to units and higher headquarters no is of- ning dynamic that helped Eisenhower present information to the command- ten challenging, especially in the Ar- quickly staunch the bleeding around er, understand how his or her mind my’s “go along to get along” environ- Bastogne, bring up additional rein- works and develop a good working re- ment. However, telling others no is not forcements and rectify the situation lationship. Patton understood this, a bad thing, especially when it is sup- for the Allies. Further, Patton and and it worked not only to his advan- ported by data. Continually saying yes Third Army’s clear and concise orders tage during the Battle of the Bulge, decreases a headquarters’ ability to to their subordinate corps and divi- but also to the advantage of the thou- look beyond the current situation be- sions, and previous coordination, were sands of men and women trapped in cause it bogs down the headquarters the impetus for the success of units and around Bastogne in December th and staff with superfluous work. Say- such as III Corps, 4 Armored Division 1944. 18 ing no, on the other hand, buys back and others. Eliminating low-value time and space, creating room for a headquarters to think deep about a It is fair to suggest that this model work from staff problem and deep into time. This should be the goal of any headquar- To tackle purposeful work that in- makes it operate in a way more aligned ters – to move beyond the foggy realm creases the combat capability of its with Third Army at the Bulge. of reaction and to get firmly en- subordinate units and allows itself to sconced within the world of forward- positively manipulate time toward its Therefore, leaders within a headquar- looking, proactive plans and opera- advantage, a headquarters must re- ters must ruthlessly find and eliminate tions. Doing so, as illustrated by Third move the weeds and underbrush that low-value work that drives sub-optimi- Army during December 1944 through inhibit productivity. To put it another zation. They should do so with the ex- January 1945, better enables the fight- way, a headquarters must eliminate pressed intent to generate more time ing potency of subordinate formations low-value work. This type of work and space for the staff to think, ana- while providing agile, tailorable op- shows itself in many forms, whether lyze, coordinate and develop products tions to the higher headquarters.

41 Spring 2020 9. Time is one of the most valued 199th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, Conclusion st In summation, Patton’s Third Army is commodities in war and in a training GA; commander, Company D, 1 th an instructive model for how a head- environment; do everything possible Squadron, 11 Armored Cavalry Regi- quarters should operate. A headquar- to protect time from those who ment (ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; assistant st th ters is an organization’s most vital el- attempt to consume it. operations officer, 1 Squadron, 11 ement. It is that formation’s central ACR, Fort Irwin; commander, Head- Commanders, chiefs of staff and exec- st nervous system. It is the thinking and quarters and Headquarters Troop, 1 utive officers must develop their head- th nd coordinating element that allows the Squadron, 10 Cavalry Regiment, 2 quarters. They do so by putting their Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car- “doers” to do. Yet this doesn’t come to staffs through rigorous training on fruition on its own. son, CO; and assistant operations offi- purposeful staff processes, holding it cer, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regi- A handful of principles on the head- accountable and creating a culture of ment, 2/4 Infantry Division, Fort Car- quarters are offered as principles to high standards. Also, leaders must son. MAJ Fox’s military education in- help guide commanders, chiefs of staff knock down barriers to high-value cludes Command and General Staff and executive officers as they tireless- work while removing the weeds and College, Airborne School, Maneuver ly work to improve their respective underbrush of low-value work that Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Lead- headquarters and supporting staff: slows a headquarters and pulls it into er’s Course, Bradley Fire-Support Ve- the quagmire of routine battle-rhythm hicle Course and Field Artillery Officer 1. A headquarters’ purpose is to enable requirements. Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of its subordinate commands by science degree in secondary education reducing chaos, disorder and other Commanders, chiefs of staff and exec- utive officers must also cultivate ap- from Indiana University-Purdue Uni- impediments to mission versity at Indianapolis, a master’s of accomplishment. preciation and mutual respect in their headquarters. Far too often today, arts degree in secondary education 2. Purposeful headquarters activity Army culture and narrow-minded from Ball State University and a mas- increases flexibility for its higher leaders denigrate the role of a head- ter’s of military arts and science de- headquarters. quarters and that of its staff. But even gree from the School of Advanced Mil- 3. Ruthlessly remove the weeds and Patton, for all his vainglory, never de- itary Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS. underbrush of bureaucracy and staff murred from extolling the primacy of MAJ Fox’s awards include the Tom inertia to create a productive and his staff and advocating the central Felts Leadership Award, 2017; Draper efficient environment. position it played in all he accom- Armor Leadership Award, Fiscal Year th plished as a commander. Following the 2013; member of 11 ACR’s honorary 4. Generate realistic and useful options rolls; and the Order of St. George that enable the commander, the war, Patton remarked, “The remark- able movement of Third Army from (Bronze). He is also a recipient of Silver subordinate commands and one’s Spurs. higher headquarters. the Saar to the Bulge was wholly due to the superior efficiency of the Third 5. A headquarters manages the Army staff. ... Those who desire to in- Notes interplay among coordination, 1 Antony Beevor, Ardennes 1944: The form themselves on how an army control and sustainment in a time- Battle of the Bulge, New York: Viking should be moved should study this op- sensitive manner. Press, 2015. eration as set forth in meticulous de- 2 Ibid. 6. The immediate is the enemy of tail in the ‘After-Action Operations Re- 3 George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It, prepared; forward-reaching, 19 port’ of Third Army.” New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1995. disciplined plans and operations 4 processes are critical to moving Culturally, commanders, and the Army Ibid. beyond operating in the right now as a whole, would be wise to practice 5 Beevor. space. more appreciation because doing so 6 Paul Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Bat- will likely increase productivity within 7. Moving beyond operating in the tle of the Bulge,” Military Review, May their respective headquarters. right now is critical to generating 1990. 7 agility, synchronization, informed MAJ Amos Fox is the squadron execu- George S. Patton, Notes on Bastogne Operation, Jan. 16, 1945. plans and operations, and realistic tive officer, 1st Battalion, 35th Armored 8 options. Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Com- Beevor. 9 8. A headquarters must always bat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Ibid. vigorously coordinate (for example, Bliss, TX. Previous assignments include 10 Ibid. make the appropriate connections operations officer, 1-35 Armored Reg- 11 Ibid. with people and resources) and then iment, 2/1 Armored Division, Fort 12 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Sci- st diligently synchronize (for instance, Bliss; chief of plans, 1 Armored Divi- ence of War, Leavenworth, KS: Combat streamline their employment in time sion; strategic-plans officer, Combined Studies Institute reprint, 1993. and space) capabilities; a Joint Forces Land Component Com- 13 Allan Millett, https://www.pritzkermili- headquarters should never pass on mand – Operation Inherent Resolve, tary.org/whats_on/pritzker-military-pres- an opportunity to showcase its Baghdad, Iraq; commander, Troop L, ents/allan-millett-siege-bastogne-they- ability to do hard staff work. 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, key-allied-victory/.

42 Spring 2020 14 Ibid. Pen and Sword Publishing, 2007. 15 “Surviving Staff Life,” The Military 17 Munch. Acronym Quick-Scan Leader, https://www.themilitaryleader. 18 Patton, Notes. com/surviving-staff-life/. ACR – armored cavalry regiment 19 Patton, War as I Knew It. 16 David Chandler, Napoleon, London: LEGENDS OF ARMOR

43 Spring 2020 Security-Force Assistance Brigades Looking for a Few Good Soldiers by MAJ Karl M. Harness six battalions: three maneuver battal- The company adviser teams (CATs) are ions (two infantry and one cavalry organized the same way but are led by What is a security-force assistance bri- squadron), an artillery battalion, an a key-developmental-complete major gade (SFAB), and what is its mission? engineer battalion and a logistics bat- (who is also the company command- Many Soldiers interested in volunteer- talion. Further aligning with BCTs, er). A pre-command captain serves as ing for one ask these questions. each battalion has subordinate com- the operations adviser/executive offi- Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, panies, troops and batteries, all of cer, and a master sergeant serves as Security Force Assistance Brigades, which have three subordinate adviser the team sergeant/first sergeant. The defines an SFAB as “the Army’s dedi- teams (ATs). other members of the team are the cated conventional organization for ATs are the core of the SFAB, and they same MOS as the ATs but are staff ser- conducting security-force assistance are led by a post-command captain. geants and sergeants first class. CATs around the world. The 12-Soldier team consists of four advise battalions and brigades. While each SFAB has a regional focus, maneuver advisers who have an 11- or Battalion adviser teams (BATs) are a its unique capabilities enable it to per- 19-series military-occupation specialty little more complicated. The battalion form wherever it is needed with mini- (MOS) and eight “enabler advisers,” headquarters contains all the same mal cultural and regional orientation.” consisting of intelligence, communica- staff sections/warfighting functions as tions, explosive ordnance disposal/en- a standard BCT and provides two ad- The SFAB organization is a hybrid of gineer, logistics, fires, medical, opera- viser teams, led by the battalion com- conventional brigade combat teams tions and maintenance Soldiers in the mander and the executive officer, re- (BCT) and Special Forces teams. Orga- ranks of sergeant and staff sergeant. spectively. In addition to the staff nized as BCTs, the brigade headquar- These teams primarily advise battal- functions required of standard battal- ters provides mission command over ions. ions, BATs advise at the brigade and corps level. The three support battalions (fires, en- gineer and logistics) are organized similarly to the maneuver battalions, but their adviser teams only have four Soldiers. These teams focus more on partnership within their areas of ex- pertise at echelon rather than with the larger maneuver formations. The SFAB organization maximizes flex- ibility for the unit. They are capable of deploying as companies through the entire brigade, or, much like 2 SFAB, as separate task forces especially task-or- ganized to meet mission requirements for the combatant command. This inherent flexibility allows the SFAB to achieve its core mission as outlined in ATP 3-96.1, “which is to as- sess, train, advise and assist foreign security forces (FSF) in coordination with joint, interagency and multina- tional forces to improve partner capa- bility and capacity, and to facilitate achievement of U.S. strategic objec- tives,” thus making it a unique organi- zation in the Army. Advisers in the SFABs are not Special Figure 1. SFAB adviser teams from brigade to team level. (Adapted from Fig- Forces and are not part of Special Op- ure 1-5, ATP 3-96.1, May 2018) erations Command. They are

44 Spring 2020 conventional Soldiers selected to ad- vise partner-nation conventional secu- rity forces. They are not intended to advise a partner nation’s Special Op- erations Forces (SOF), even though they may coordinate with them (through allied SOF) on the battlefield. Adviser attributes The SFABs desire particular attributes for the advisers. For example, selfless service is paramount to the adviser’s success. An adviser’s success is not based on personal actions but on the actions and success of the partner force. Service in the SFAB requires a certain type of personality and pro- vides an excellent backdrop for the unique purpose and mission of the As- sessment and Selection (A&S) Branch. A&S is not just looking for the most qualified candidates, they are looking for the right qualified candidates. Figure 2. SFC Lockett observes SFAB candidates conducting the Leader Reac- The Security Force Assistance Com- tion Course as part of the SFAC A&S Course in July 2019. U.S. Army photo. mand (SFAC) chose 11 adviser attri- butes outlined in Field Manual (FM) Army leaders. Many candidates attend candidate (the discipline attribute). 3-22, Army Support to Security Coop- the course with strong files but are not Candidates must arrive physically pre- eration, which are “disciplined, ma- selected based on their demonstration pared for the course. Failure to com- ture, displays sound judgment, initia- of the adviser attributes. plete the Army Physical Fitness Test tive, cool under pressure, tolerance with a minimum score of 240 (with at Soldiers desiring to serve in the SFAB for ambiguity, open-minded, empa- least 70 points in each event) is an au- must consider a very important ques- thetic, situationally aware, patient, tomatic drop from the course. Candi- tion: Why should I volunteer for this morally straight.” These are the attri- dates must also prepare for various organization? Many Soldiers volunteer butes the A&S Branch seeks to identi- other physical activities, which include for the duty station or the bonus, or fy and assess in each potential adviser. varying-length foot marches and other they think assignment to the organiza- A&S conducts this assessment through physically demanding tasks, all of tion will lead to more success in their the execution of the SFAB A&S Course which are calculated as part of the as- careers. These reasons, though valid, held at Fort Bragg, NC. sessment. are selfish in nature and do not serve The SFAB A&S Course places Soldiers the organization, the Army at large or Physical fitness is only one aspect of in an environment that challenges in- the SFAB mission. As stated, selfless service in the SFAB. Advisers must dividuals and assesses their ability to service is the adviser’s benchmark. know their MOS, so study, study, work within a small team, and it pro- study. There is no time given the cur- vides an opportunity to observe the Volunteers should not base service rent deployment schedules for the bri- adviser attributes. The SFAC A&S solely on personal desires but on a de- gades to hire noncommissioned offi- Branch continually reviews and up- sire to serve the nation and to enable cers (NCOs) and officers who do not dates each event to ensure the course FSF to defeat the enemies of the Unit- know their jobs. Not only should NCOs provides an accurate assessment of a ed States before the country must in- and officers clearly understand their candidate for the selection board. tercede with military might. In the MOSs inside and out, Soldiers should While A&S looks at and reviews in de- SFAB, Soldiers will do more with less study the regulations and FMs so they tail a candidate’s official military-per- (troop-to-task ratio) and be expected are confident in their craft and can sonnel file, the file alone is not a true to know their jobs to teach it to oth- find answers when they do not know indicator of a candidate’s ability to op- ers while providing expert analysis and them. erate as an adviser. advice so their partners can accom- plish the mission. Soldiers must understand the differ- The current selection rate for the A&S ences between teaching and advising, Course is 73 percent, which indicates along with the ability to balance one that Soldiers who are successful in the Prep for assessment, over the other. Teaching focuses on conventional force are not necessarily selection, success the “how to do” something, but an ad- the right fit as an adviser. Advising FSF Preparing for SFAB A&S requires disci- viser explains why doing a certain task is a complex task that does not suit all pline and self-study on the part of the is more advantageous than another.

45 Spring 2020 Advisers must look at the broader pic- a holistic view of what the units are, Harness’ military education includes ture and consider the second- and what the mission set is and what to ex- the Command and General Staff Col- third-order effects of an action, yet ac- pect in the assignment. lege, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneu- cept that their partner may decide to ver Captain’s Career Course, Armor Of- After preparing themselves and their do something differently. ficer Basic Course, Basic Airborne families for potential service in the Course and Air Assault School. He SFAB, Soldiers should seek out the SFAB officers must be technically and holds an associate’s of arts degree in SFAB recruiting team for more infor- tactically proficient with the ability to liberal arts from New Mexico Military mation and details about joining. Sol- think critically while seeing the larger, Institute, a bachelor’s of arts degree in diers may connect with the SFAB Re- more complex picture. Officers in par- communications (radio/TV/film) from cruiting and Retention Team via the ticular advise partner forces on plan- California State University-Fullerton team’s Website at www.goarmy.com/ ning and synchronizing effects. If offi- and a master’s degree in adult and sfab or by calling the team: officers at cers do not clearly understand the mil- continuing education from Kansas (910) 570-5159 and enlisted at (910) itary decision-making process or the State University. MAJ Harness’ awards 570-9975/5131. Soldiers who are in- Army Design Methodology, they need and honors include the Bronze Star terested in the SFAB may also contact to start studying. Advisers are expect- Medal and Meritorious Service Medal. ed to know how to solve problems – the team via email at usarmy.bragg. not just by the SFAB leadership, but by [email protected]. their FSF counterparts as well. They MAJ Karl Harness is the deputy chief look to the U.S. adviser as a subject- Acronym Quick-Scan of the SFAC A&S Branch at Fort Bragg. matter expert, so advisers must be His previous assignments include one! rd ATP – Army training publication squadron operations officer, 3 Squad- A&S – assessment and selection nd Soldiers who desire to serve in a SFAB ron, 2 SFAB, Fort Bragg; squadron ex- AT – adviser team must also prepare mentally. Serving on ecutive officer, 6th Squadron, 9th Cav- BAT – battalion adviser team a small team requires significant men- alry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry BCT – brigade combat team tal flexibility. The long hours required, Division, Fort Hood, TX; squadron op- CAT – company adviser team along with the guarantee of deploy- erations officer, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cav- FM – field manual – foreign security forces alry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry FSF ments, will place significant stress on MOS – military occupational the adviser and his or her family. Sol- Division, Fort Hood; senior liaison of- specialty diers must prepare themselves and ficer to the U.S. Embassy, Combined NCO – noncommissioned officer their families for the assignment by ef- Joint Interagency Task Force 435, Ka- SFAB – security-force assistance fectively communicating with each bul, Afghanistan; and commander, brigade other and clearly understanding ex- Headquarters and Headquarters SFAC – Security Force Assistance pectations. Prospective SFAB Soldiers Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored-Cav- Command SOF – Special Operations Forces should seek out SFAB veterans to gain alry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA. MAJ

46 Spring 2020 Gas! Gas! Gas! I’ve Buttoned Up; Now What? by COL Esli T. Pitts and none had their protective mask read- CBRN filters, forcing them to shut CPT Meaghan E. Kelly ily available, so the chemical agent down. Blue 4 was combat ineffective. rapidly attacked their nervous sys- Airburst artillery was exploding in the Things were no better at the company tems. White 4’s loader was typical. He distance as White 4 keyed the net. command post. The first sergeant tried to hold his breath while digging “Black 6, this is White 4. Observing red grabbed the battalion command net his mask out of the sponson box, but rain at MR 465 776. No change to and announced “Flash, Flash, Flash, his mask was just too deep, having slant. 0615. Continuing mission. Over.” Gas!” but failed to identify the calling slipped beneath a can of oil, a spare unit before succumbing to the deadly Axeman 6, the tank-company com- barrel and the muzzle-boresight de- air. He keyed the net again but was un- mander, acknowledged the report. vice. Fully exposed to the agent, he able to speak clearly and began vom- Looking at his map, he noted that died while stretched across the top of iting. Axeman 6 sprinted from his truck White’s platoon was closest to the the turret and then slipped to the floor. to get his mask from his tank’s spon- point of impact. He called the compa- His Antidote Treatment Nerve Agent son box but never made it. The execu- ny: “Guidons, this is Black 6. Assume Auto-injectors (ATNAAs) remained in tive officer was more fortunate since we are observing enemy prep fires. No his protective-mask carrier. he had his mask with him while talking change to defend time at 0700.” White 2, on the farthest flank, lived with the mechanics. However, upon re- White 4 dropped down in his hatch. the longest. White 2 Golf managed to turning to his tank, the crew refused Artillery was nothing new, but the vol- key the platoon net and announce to unbutton, and he was forced to re- ume of fire in this particular mission “Gas!” but nobody else had enough re- main outside on the ground. The me- was intense. The rounds were bursting maining motor functions to relay it on chanics were effective at donning their about 500 meters to the north, but the company net. Unlike most, White masks and, in one case, administering since they were beyond an intervisibil- 2 Delta had his mask with him in the their ATNAAs. ity line, he thought there was limited driver’s station. Medics eventually Red Platoon, on the left flank, was likelihood of damage unless a round found him dead in the seat with the largely unaffected by the strike due to hit significantly outside the apparent mask in his hands. The new filter, still the wind direction. However, it was un- sheaf. (Lucky they had been doing sur- wrapped in plastic, sat in the mud and aware of this and tried to react. It vivability moves!) White 1 chose to re- leaves at his feet. fought through the same problems the main in position but directed all four other platoons had with similar, The chemical strike drifted into Blue’s tanks to close their hatches to the though less lethal, results. Red’s crews battle position with only slightly bet- open-protected position. He shud- dug out their masks, buttoned up, ter results. Blue 4 called a warning on dered, picturing a hot fragment slicing turned on the overpressure systems the company net, allowing both Red into one of the crew. and then sat alone in their tanks, un- and the command post to take action. aware that they were not actually Turns out it wasn’t shrapnel they had Blue’s crews buttoned up and turned downwind or that their CBRN systems to worry about. on their chemical, biological, radioac- were also inoperative. The extent of tive and nuclear (CBRN) overpressure Having massed their guns long enough actions-on-contact in Red Platoon was systems. Unfortunately, systems of 31 to deliver a chemical strike, the enemy that Red 1 dropped a chemical strike and 32 hadn’t been serviced in years artillery displaced. With the wind icon on his Joint Capabilities Release and were inoperative. Those crews blowing at about three mph, it took (JCR), which was enough for Lancer died believing they were sealed in their about six minutes for the first traces of Main to identify that they had been tanks. Blue 3’s system actually func- nerve agents to hit White 3 on the struck. tioned, but without a round in the company’s right flank. tube, the seal was not intact – they The enemy regimental commander A chemical alarm 100 meters out were the last to die. Blue 4, a former had successfully disrupted friendly would have given them 72 seconds’ drill sergeant, got his crew into masks, forces with a non-persistent chemical warning, but there was none. As it administered ATNAAs to two of the strike at his planned point of penetra- was, White 3 was the first to detect Soldiers and followed up with Convul- tion. The company’s lack of readiness the strike, feeling the effects within a sive Antidote, Nerve Agent for the had done the rest. Now the regiment’s minute of breathing it in. Lacking re- loader. He saved their lives, but the lead elements were 45 minutes from spiratory protection, they died quickly, lack of microphone cables for their assaulting that position, taking advan- and the rest of White soon followed. masks kept them off the net for almost tage of the ensuing chaos while know- Some crewmembers were already 20 minutes. While searching for ca- ing the area would be clear of contam- wearing protective overgarments, but bles, they experienced a fire in the old ination by the time they arrived.

47 Spring 2020 Battle, a tank company tasked as the area. The first volleys were on target exposed on top of turrets, was in the brigade reserve, was set in a tactical- and Battle’s multiple chemical alarms worst shape. assembly area several kilometers to immediately began to blare as the oily With the gentle reminders of their the rear. Unknown to them, they had chemicals fell toward Battle. noncommissioned officers (NCOs), ex- previously been located by enemy re- Battle’s reactions were evidence of posed Soldiers automatically decon- connaissance efforts and targeted their good training. Unlike Axeman, taminated their skin. They were famil- with a persistent chemical strike to fix Battle 6 had identified (and reiterated) iar with the drill: don protective mask them in their assembly area. Proving the line “auto masking is in effect” and get undercover. Then pull out the that everybody struggles with syn- from the operations order, and they Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion chronization, the enemy’s second recognized the incoming artillery as a (RSDL) and decon their faces or other strike began two minutes after the trigger to automatically don their pro- contaminated skin. Hold breath, break non-persistent strike. Those two min- tective masks. Battle 6 had also direct- the seal on the mask and pull it out utes, plus Battle’s training proficiency, ed that chemical defensive gear be and away from the face. The decon proved invaluable. checked during pre-combat inspec- technique left slippery lotion on their The brigade would defend in mission- tions. Not all the Soldiers were fully hands and faces. Wipe away from the orientated protective posture (MOPP) proficient in donning their masks, and eyes. Scrub down. Don’t forget to get Level 2, but not everybody was there a lot can happen in nine seconds, but the recesses in the skin such as the yet. Battle Company’s White and Blue the Battles had a good head start. It nose, corners of mouth and between Platoons were still in the middle of up- helped that they were carrying their the fingers. Don’t forget to turn your grading from MOPP 0 to MOPP 2 for masks rather than storing them. hand away and decon the inside of the the defense when Axeman’s Red 1 mask as well. posted the strike. Seeing the icon, Bat- Unlike the vapor hazard to Axeman, tle’s crew began to hurry. Blue 4’s in- Battle’s primary threat was liquid con- Unfortunately, several Soldiers in sistence that MOPP 0 really did mean tamination. Battle’s first action was to White and the company trains did not having your gear inside the tanks at seek overhead cover to avoid exposure initially realize they were already con- individual crew stations (and not in the to it. Red Platoon, already in MOPP 2, taminated. Continuing to MOPP 4 pro- bustle rack) likely saved lives that buttoned up. As part of the battle drill, tected them from more exposure, but morning. It isn’t easy to don MOPP they assumed there was also a vapor it did nothing for the persistent agent gear inside the tank, but it’s better hazard and so they battle-carried a already on their skin. Underneath their than getting caught outside during a main gun round, turned on their over- protective garments, the agent did its chemical strike, which is what hap- pressure systems and continued to work and those Soldiers were soon in pened to White. White’s crews were MOPP 4 under the assumption that agony. scrambling to get their gear from bus- the overpressure systems were inop- Battle’s commander and executive of- tle racks and sponson boxes as the erative. Blue continued to don MOPP ficer quickly reacted to the strike. Once strike arrived in a high concentration gear while taking similar precautions his own crew had responded, he came of airbursts upwind of the assembly as Red. White, still with Soldiers up on the net. “Guidons, this is Black 6, radio check in sequence, over.” After a few moments, all three platoons had responded, and he continued. “Come to REDCON [readiness condition] 1 and give me a slant report.” Meanwhile, the executive officer focused on re- porting to higher. He had already called up a report of “red rain” (ob- serving artillery) and, on recognizing it as a chemical strike, dropped an icon on the JCR. The CBRN 1 report was one of several he kept laminated to the in- side of his hatch, and he quickly filled it out. “Hammer Main, this is Battle 5; CBRN 1 report follows, over.” “Battle 5, this is Hammer Main, send it, over.” “CBRN 1 follows: Line Bravo/ MR465735/-//. Break. Line Delta/ 270630LOCT2019. Break. Line Foxtrot/ MR465735/AA//. Break. Figure 1. Soldiers dismount to recon in MOPP 4. Line India/ Air/Substance Name: HD

48 Spring 2020 Blister/Persistent /Manned Point De- Awkwardly, working with his gloves had emplaced fresh M9 paper on dif- tection System// on, he pulled one out and began to ferent parts of the tank, even though Line Mike Romeo/Liquid/Puff. Over.” work it. As he read the instructions, he it was difficult to see through the vi- quickly realized that his wristwatch sion blocks. was underneath his thick rubber Step 2, develop situation The platoons’ designated CBRN survey At this point, Axeman has largely failed gloves. He yelled for the gunner to give teams slowly came out of their hatch- to execute Step 1 to actions-on-con- him times from the JCR, and for the es, checking the visible M9 paper tact: deploy and report. Meanwhile, loader to check the other platoons’ hanging from their vehicles for signs. Battle has reacted appropriately. His frequencies to see if anybody else was Then they transitioned to the M8 pa- Soldiers deployed by seeking covered still up. Minutes later, he was in com- per, blotting it on suspicious areas. The positions, upgrading their protective- munications with Red 1. The next thing M8 paper matched the results of the posture level and initiating immediate he heard on the radio was “Contact, M9 paper: Liquid, H, blister agent. decon efforts. While there were some tanks, West. Out,” followed by the re- Having done an initial check with the casualties, they were minimal. They port of a main gun firing. The crew paper, each CBRN tank’s crew also also reported effectively, using both looked at each other and, as one, slid started an M256A1 kit. That was near- the JCR and the radio to submit a toward their hatches. Axeman (-) was ly a 20-minute process, but in the end, CBRN 1 report. Let’s look at how they in contact. it would give a definitive reading as conducted Step 2, develop the situa- well as indicate whether the strike was tion. Battle 6 had re-established communi- cations within the company. By his persistent or non-persistent. While this Red Platoon, Axeman’s only remaining count, they still had 13 operational was going on, the platoons continued combat power, sat in their tanks. Red tanks, but the platoons had identified their immediate decon. Most had al- 4 had dropped off the net, and Red 1 four Soldiers showing serious chemi- ready decontaminated their skin, and was not sure what to do next. Finally, cal-agent symptoms. These would re- tank commanders continued to assess he called Red 2 and asked if he’d em- quire evacuation to the dirty aid sta- their crews for signs and symptoms of placed his Joint Chemical Agent Detec- tion, using the designated dirty route. contamination. Several crewmembers tor. The answer was no. Not only had decontaminated their skin again, just he not emplaced it, he hadn’t even He sent his guidance. “Guidons, Gui- in case. Despite their identification of brought it on the operation. Nor had dons, Guidons, this is Black 6. Main- the strike as H, blister agent, the Sol- he brought an M256 kit. Nor had Red tain REDCON 1. Have your CBRN tanks diers were more familiar with the 3. Not that it would have done any initiate chemical survey; let’s confirm symptoms of nerve agent, leading to good in this particular instance, but his what we were attacked with. Report some false assumptions. One nervous check also revealed a lack of M8 or M9 your results to Black 5. Break. All oth- loader injected himself with his AT- paper. (He laughed bitterly at the ers, maintain security but continue im- NAA. strips of 100 mile-per-hour tape he mediate decon of remaining skin and After the three platoons each reported had wrapped around the wrist and an- essential individual equipment. Report their contamination findings as blister kle of his wet-weather gear to simu- completion to Black 5. Break. Be pre- agent to the company command post, late M9 paper.) Red was unable to de- pared to move in the event that we are the executive officer finished the initial termine the type or nature of the chem targeted for a follow-on strike. Consid- CBRN 4 report and submitted it to bri- strike. Why hadn’t he heard from Black ering we’ll be tracking contamination gade. As before, he did so both by ra- 5, 6 or 7 since the attack? He tapped across the brigade’s rear area, we’ll dio and over the JCR. out a message to the battalion tacti- get their approval before we move. cal-operations center on the JCR. As Five, once you’ve got platoon reports, “Hammer Main, this is Battle 5. CBRN Red 1 realized he was now the compa- call an initial CBRN 4 report to bri- 4 Report follows, over.” gade. Acknowledge, over.” All stations ny commander, the red horde was “This is Hammer Main, send it.” closing on their battle position. Out- acknowledged, and he settled back in side, the wind and the rising tempera- the turret for a minute. If there was “Line India / SH1/TS: Blister/Persistent tures were already doing their best to enough time, he could also mark the (P)//. Break.” disperse the vapor. extent of the contamination on the “Line Quebec / MR465735/Liq/ ground. Manned Survey (MSVY) /SCD//. Blue 4’s filter fire had gone out, fortu- Break.” From what he’d seen, it appeared that nately with no injury to the crew. They “Line Sierra / 270700LOCT2019//. had all evacuated the tank, trading the they had been attacked with a liquid Over.” fear of death by fire for one by nerve agent of some kind. That would imply agent. Sitting helplessly on the blow- an existing but limited vapor hazard. Decontaminating their skin was just a out panels, Blue 4 recalled the box of However, the liquid would spread if battle drill, but surprisingly, training M256 kits the CBRN NCO had issued touched. Battle would need to identify had prepared them well for the next him prior to the deployment. He had the agent, then decontaminate key step: the reality of decontaminating stuffed it into the bustle rack instead equipment to prevent the spread of skin and individual equipment. About of giving it to the CBRN tank. He had the agent from equipment to person- two-thirds of the company had vary- never trained with them but had seen nel. With everybody buttoned up, this ing amounts of chemical agents on the they had printed instructions on them. could be problematic. Fortunately they tanks or exposed gear outside the

49 Spring 2020 Table1. Levels of decontamination. vehicles. The crews would continue im- determined as clean. As they decon- Battle soon got the call: “Guidons, Gui- mediate decon (see Table 1), the most taminated the equipment, they were dons, Guidons, this is Hammer 3. basic level, which would only address careful to also redo their gloves. [Fragmentary order] follows. ….” a portion of the contaminants. First, they would dump contaminated exter- Halfway through decontamination, Lancer was tasked to assume attach- nal stowage. (Fortunately, properly the CBRN teams began to complete ment of Battle and establish an attack- covering it before the mission prevent- their M256 kits and call the results up by-fire (ABF) position to prevent pen- ed too much loss.) Even so, there was to the executive officer. They all indi- etration of Lancer’s positions. It didn’t one joker: “Black 6, this is White 4. cated H, mustard (a form of blister take Battle long to enter Lancer’s net Who’s going to sign the statement of agent). The executive officer reported and establish the ABF. In the distance, charges for all this gear we’re throw- the update to brigade: “Hammer they could see the hulks of Axeman’s ing out?” Main, this is Battle 5. We’ve complet- White and Blue Platoons – victims of ed our M256 kits with no change to surprise and their own lack of training. Immediate decontamination focused our CBRN 4.” Red also died, though they had de- on those things the crew needed to layed the enemy regimental attack fight their tanks, such as the external Shortly after, Battle 6 sent a situation- long enough for Battle to establish the machineguns or the insides of those al report (sitrep) to the brigade. “Ham- ABF. Ultimately, Battle’s training en- hatches that had still been open when mer Main, this is Battle 6, SITREP fol- abled them to survive a chemical the strike happened. Crewmen used lows.” He paused for an acknowledge- strike, maintain themselves as viable M334 wipes to decon all contaminated ment before continuing. “Our slant is combat power despite contamination individual equipment by wiping the 13 and zero with nine vehicles having and destroy the enemy’s lead battal- surface, using sweeping motions away enough to stop the onslaught. Lancer ion. from the body. The crew took care not 6 contacted brigade and recommend- to spread any contamination to any ed release of the brigade reserve to his Only after the fight did Battle 6 move area that had been visually battalion.” Hammer 6 approved, and his company to a decon point, where

50 Spring 2020 It also means that boxes of contingen- cy chemical equipment must be stored throughout the company area. How- ever, at a minimum, all Soldiers in a company should be issued appropriate equipment for training. This includes a complete training Joint Service Light- weight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) with a protective mask that has been properly fitted using the M41 Protective Assessment Test Sys- tem (PATS) and the correct alcohol. Units should stock enough M8 paper, M9 paper, RSDL and M100 decon kits to get them through the next several collective-training events.

CBRN equipment Figure 2. A Soldier decontaminates his vehicle. All of a company’s CBRN detection equipment should be assigned to the they linked up with the division’s in a chemical environment, which can platoons’ CBRN survey teams and chemical company, conducted thor- be communicated to the unit through properly maintained through com- ough decontamination and finally training guidance, training schedules mand maintenance, scheduled servic- come out of MOPP 4. or just by walking up behind a squad es and calibrations under the supervi- and announcing “Gas, gas, gas!” sion of the CBRN NCO and CBRN offi- Prior to 2003, Soldiers generally cer. Even if they lack proficiency, crews trained in MOPP 2, and there was a Training and operating in MOPP gear should bring their CBRN detection high probability they would be in is hard. It’s different. It is debilitating. equipment to the field for all training MOPP 4 before it was over. Sometimes And, yes, it can be risky. Putting a bat- events so they can learn to employ they performed like Axeman during talion into MOPP 2 (and MOPP 4 as and stow it per the load plan. training and sometimes more like Bat- necessary) is not popular in the hot All these items should be inspected tle. Then came the wars in Iraq and Af- months, but it is nothing that previous routinely during pre-combat checks ghanistan, and chemical proficiency generations didn’t do routinely. was replaced, rightly so, by different (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections training requirements. The first step is to require Soldiers to (PCIs), in priorities of work and during carry their protective masks as part of recovery operations. The CBRN NCO Operating in a chemically contaminat- the field uniform during the next train- should maintain all equipment not as- ed environment now is less likely than ing event. Critical to the mindset is a signed to the platoons’ teams. The it was, but it is still a possibility that commitment to do CBRN tasks correct- CBRN NCO should maintain an appro- should drive training as the Army’s fo- ly, such as wearing full MOPP gear priate bench stock of repair parts for cus returns to near-peer competitors. properly, or that Soldiers don’t “take masks and other unit equipment. Some leaders bring the habit of train- a knee” or set down equipment in con- ing for CBRN proficiency into battalion taminated areas. Leader training command – with mixed results at best, At minimum, platoon leadership and mainly due to a lack of time. Subse- Individual protective above should know how to react to a quently, battalion/task-force maneu- equipment chemical attack – it is a battle drill that ver trainers see units challenged to Gone are the days when the company requires training to gain and maintain operate in a chemical environment executive officer maintained sizes for proficiency. If Soldiers know how to due to constraints in training and CBRN gear and a basic load of chemi- get into MOPP gear, leaders can lead equipment. CBRN proficiency is fairly cal defensive equipment. For deploy- them through most of the other tasks easy to achieve provided leaders and able units, this facilitated building In- and preserve combat power. Leader their Soldiers have enough time. Lack- dividual Chemical Equipment (ICE) training should address all required ing time, there are other consider- packs, with one built for issue upon leader actions during actions on con- ations that can still build CBRN readi- alert and a second one carried in the tact. ness over time. company trains. (Question: Where do nd Step 1 – deploy and report – focuses you store 60-70 2 ICE packs in the on immediate actions to protect indi- Mindset company trains? Answer: Build racks viduals from attack and includes sub- First is a mindset for CBRN proficiency. in the supply sergeant’s truck. And mitting a CBRN 1 report. Leaders at any echelon can create an don’t forget to move them when pla- expectation they will train to operate toons task-organize.) Step 2 – develop the situation

51 Spring 2020 motorpool to do so properly? Do the crews know how to operate the sys- tem? CBRN survey-team training At least one, but ideally two, tanks per platoon should be designated as CBRN tanks. These crews should be trained to detect, identify, report and monitor chemical contamination and how to mark it. They should also be able to lead the platoon through MOPP-gear exchange, unmasking procedures and operational decontamination. They should maintain and employ the pla- toon’s CBRN equipment. They should also be the platoon’s experts in indi- vidual task training, including immedi- ate decontamination. Build this CBRN training at company- or battalion-level to maximize resourc- es. Operational decontamination teams The operational decontamination team represents the battalion’s ability to conduct minor decontamination of vehicles and equipment to provide temporary relief from the contaminat- ed environment, conduct MOPP-gear exchange and get the affected Soldiers and equipment back into the fight. It is not “thorough decontamination.” It requires organization, practice and a lot of water. Once both the decon apparatus and the operational decon team (generally mechanics and the support platoon) resided in Headquarters and Head- quarters Company (HHC) and lived in Figure 3. Soldiers in MOPP 4 gear. the field trains unless postured for- – focuses on confirming the nature centers. Confusing purple smoke (in- ward. The company’s executive officer and extent of attack, marking, contin- dicates the Family of Scatterable often trained and employed the team. ued immediate decontamination and Mines) with yellow smoke (usually in- Now, with the decon apparatus as- updating CBRN reporting with CBRN 4. dicates CBRN) is awkward at best. signed to HHC, it is not co-located with an available manpower source during Steps 3 and 4 will largely be externally Vehicle maintenance, operations; it requires guidance and directed. However, leader training coordination across two companies to should also include operating in a con- operator training establish and train the team’s Soldiers. taminated environment, how to con- Take a look at unit vehicles’ service duct MOPP-gear exchange and un- packets. Were the CBRN systems fully First, leaders should challenge the masking procedures, and participation serviced? Do the overpressure sys- chemical officer and NCO to demon- in operational decontamination as the tems work? Are they being checked strate the decon apparatus in opera- supported unit. Also, leaders must un- during monthly preventive-mainte- tion, with water blivets filled, opera- derstand the rules of engagement for nance checks? Are crews actually tak- tional pumps and the equipment actu- chemical play at combat-training ing a coax and a dummy round to the ally spraying water. Then leaders

52 Spring 2020 should identify a leader for the team, tions into collective training. centers, command posts or unit trains build a battle roster and then train an when building unit proficiency with Situational-training exercise (STX): CBRN tasks. Ideally, these nodes can operational decon team. Whether a unit is just beginning to not only react to a chemical strike on The battalion should also train the build proficiency or already incorpo- their position, but they guide their same team to support the detailed- rates CBRN conditions into training, a units through those reactions. They troop decon lane as part of thorough focused lane allows its leaders to em- can also manage the fallout from decontamination. Once the team is phasize all aspects of the battle drill in those strikes; for instance, they can trained, leaders should exercise the a way that often gets cut when train- move decon assets, designate dirty team’s Soldiers frequently during or ing other collective tasks (for example, routes, and prepare and submit CBRN after other collective training. if the M256 kit was completed in less reports and chemical-downwind mes- than 20 minutes, somebody faked it). Individual training sages. The graduate level is when they See Figure 5 for an example of a com- can do so while continuing ongoing Depending on a unit’s circumstances, pany CBRN STX executed at the pla- operations without impact. individual-training proficiency will be toon level. A platoon establishes an either the easiest or most difficult to assembly area near the gas chamber. Tactical standard-operating proce- achieve. There was a time when ma- After occupation, they experience a dures (TACSOPs): TACSOPs are a great neuver units did a day of CBRN task chemical attack and respond accord- mechanism to establish accountability training every quarter. There is a long ingly. After initial-response actions for the way leaders want to conduct list of individual tasks to train on. were complete, Soldiers would take an CBRN operations in their units. Round-robin training is an effective admin pause to pass through the gas CBRN proficiency used to be the stan- methodology (see Figure 4), but don’t chamber for mask-confidence training. dard. Now it is more of a graduate-lev- forget the gas chamber and mask-con- Following that, they remount and con- el skillset. Given the current increased fidence tasks. Select some tasks and duct a basic mission while buttoned focus on readiness across the Army, in- build a quality training event. Individ- up, then continue monitoring and tegrating CBRN into routine training ual training should also include firing eventually unmasking procedures. events is a natural progression and a CBRN tables during individual and This is a perfect opportunity to exer- logical next step to making units that crew-served weapons qualifications. cise the operational decon team as much better. With that in mind, lead- well. ers at any echelon always have the lat- Collective training itude to say those three magic words: Having gained individual and leader Mission command: While this training “Gas! Gas! Gas!” proficiency, it is time to put it all to- describes maneuver-unit training, do gether and incorporate CBRN condi- not neglect the tactical-operations COL Esli Pitts is U.S. Army Europe’s command inspector general, Wies- baden, Germany. His previous assign- ments include director of training and leader development, Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Israel; task-force maneuver trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany; com- mander, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Reg- iment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and instructor, Department of Tac- tics, Command and General Staff Col- lege, Fort Leavenworth, KS. COL Pitts’ military education includes U.S. Army War College, Pre-Command Course and Command and General Staff Col- lege. He holds a bachelor’s of arts de- gree in history from Washington State University, a master’s of science de- gree in international relations from Troy University and a master’s of arts degree in security studies from U.S. Army War College. COL Pitts’ awards include the Bronze Star with oak-leaf cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal and Meritorious Service Medal with one silver oak-leaf cluster (repre- Figure 4. Round-robin training. sents five additional awards).

53 Spring 2020 CPT Meaghan Kelly commands Acronym Quick-Scan Company A, 84th Chemical Battal- AAR – after-action report rd ABF – attack-by-fire ion, 3 Chem Bri- ATNAA – Antidote Treatment Nerve gade, Fort Leon- Agent Auto-Injector ard Wood, MO. CBRN – chemical, biological, Her previous as- radiological, nuclear signments in- DED – detailed equipment clude small-group decontamination instructor, 84th DTD – detailed troop decontamination Chem Battalion, HHC – headquarters and U.S. Army CBRN headquarters company School, Fort Leon- ICE – Individual Chemical ard Wood; pla- Equipment toon leader, 44th JCR – Joint Capabilities Release Chem Company JSLIST – Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (Hazard Re- nd NCO – noncommissioned officer sponse), 2 Chem PATS – Protective Assessment Test Battalion, Fort System Hood, TX; assis- PCC – pre-combat check tant S-3 officer, PCI – pre-combat inspection 2nd Chem Battal- REDCON – readiness condition ion; and CBRN of- RSDL – Reactive Skin rd Decontamination Lotion ficer, 3 Battal- – mission-oriented protective th MOPP ion, 8 Cavalry posture Regiment, Fort SITREP – situational report Hood. CPT Kelly’s STX – situational-training exercise military schools TACSOP – tactical standard include the CBRN operating procedures Basic Officer Leader’s Course and the CBRN Ca- reer Course. She holds a bache- lor’s of arts de- gree in communi- cation from the University of Dubuque. Figure 5. CBRN STX by platoon.

Figure 6. A Soldier makes notes on a masking-criteria chart.

54 Spring 2020 Vital BCT Logistics Readiness Link: Improving Supply-Support-Activity Operations by LTC Charles L. Montgomery home-station operations. Organiza- focuses on the arrival of supplies at tions must wholeheartedly invest in the SSA. The supply-support activity (SSA) rep- data-entry clerks to ensure the right resents the epicenter of logistics with- supplies are ordered and arrive at the Military-occupation specialty (MOS) in a brigade combat team (BCT) re- right time to sustain operations. 92A, Automated Logistical Specialist, gardless of tactical-formation compo- Soldiers process supplies and place sition. The SSA must operate at the highest them in supported-battalion lanes. The SSA serves as the critical link be- level of efficiency from origin (supply MOS 92A Soldiers once touched the tween tactical- and national-level sup- clerks at the battalion), to brigade/di- supplies a second and third time dur- ply echelons; this link is vital to the vision (“ZPARK” managers) and, finally, ing the outload process after placing overall level of unit readiness. This fact the supply entry/exit point (SSA). The them into specified unit lanes, and this mandates comprehensive system ef- SSA accountable officer (AO) is the meant the entire process required 2.5 fectiveness, combined with an in- linchpin during the execution of this manhours per document number. To depth knowledge of Global Combat entire operation. alleviate strain on material-handling rd Support System-Army (GCSS-A), to equipment (MHE) and SSA Soldiers, 3 Leaders within a BCT must search for ABCT implemented a container roll- navigate the supply architecture effec- ways to maximize logistics platforms tively. on/-off platform (CROP) exchange pro- and Soldiers with the explicit intent of gram that reduced manhours by an ag- improving operations holistically. This gregated 1.3 hours. ‘Strategic private’ article explores lessons-learned as 3rd The reference to “strategic private” Armored Brigade Combat Team FSCs and the brigade-support battal- does not solely apply to tactical oper- (ABCT), 1st Armored Division, Fort ion (BSB) base companies were as- ations. Strategic privates and special- Bliss, TX, developed multiple solutions signed specific geographical areas ists at the battalion-clerk level repre- to increase operational productivity. within the SSA. Each company was sent the origin of the supply/demand tasked to place three CROPs at the signal for the entire Army. If these Sol- These solutions include implementing SSA, which were controlled by the SSA diers are not trained properly, the en- a “Touch It Once Campaign,” express- AO for property accountability and tire supply-chain management system lane creation, daily forward-support- management purposes. This system al- will be adversely affected over time. company (FSC) logistics packages lows SSA personnel to load unit CROPs (LOGPACs) and overaged, repairable- once with required MHE, increasing This creates enormous ramifications item listing (ORIL) management. the SSA’s efficiency and overall unit within BCTs, so these Soldiers’ level of throughput. proficiency truly makes them strategic ‘Touch It Once Campaign’ during the execution of tactical and The “Touch It Once Campaign” Also, once FSCs transport CROPs back

Figure 1. 123rd Brigade Support Battalion’s SSA model.

55 Spring 2020 to their area of operations to facilitate pick up supplies supply downloading, ORIL items are multiple times backhauled to the SSA for processing daily. on the same CROPs. The BSB distribu- The immediate tion company is responsible for trans- impact of creat- porting ORILs to the logistics-readi- ing this lane was ness center (LRC) and for bringing a decrease in empty CROPs back to the SSA to start customer wait the cycle over again. time of 17 per- The “Touch It Once Campaign” has in- cent, which creased efficiency tremendously with- placed supplies in 3rd ABCT, and it represents a meth- in the warfight- od that can be replicated in field envi- ers’ possession ronments to enable Soldiers to train as faster, contribut- they will fight. ing to sustained high operational- Express-lane creation readiness (OR) Categorically the SSA has two types of levels. Continu- customers: those picking up bulk items ous improve- from an external area, and those se- ments targeted curing smaller Class II and Class IX to increase OR, items from internally controlled areas. directly contrib- Securing those smaller items is based uting to greater on the premise of potential pilferage. lethality, remains the overarching Third ABCT increased efficiency goal of all 3rd through the implementation of dedi- cated battalion pickup timeframes to ABCT leaders. focus on detailed requirements for all customers, not just combined-arms Daily FSC battalions. Although this increased LOGPAC proficiency by 19 percent overall, es- The ultimate test pecially in the area of time-on-station, of any tactical- there remained an opportunity to im- level organiza- prove operations. tion is to have es- tablished sys- Figure 2. CPT Michael Hills (right), commander of FSC J, 4th To make improvements, “express tems that trans- Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd ABCT, uses the express lanes” were created. Express lanes op- fer with ease be- lane to pick up Class II and IX supplies at the 3rd ABCT SSA. erate daily with no specific battalion tween HS and (U.S. Army photo) assigned to daily pickup windows. The field environ- only management mechanism at- ments. the company delivers supplies in field tached is that units can only use this However, the comfort and conve- environments. lane if they have 10 documents or few- nience of HS operations directly con- The implementation of daily unit LOG- er at the SSA. tribute to atrophied field-craft skills PACs produced the following effects: that are required to defeat the enemy To use the express lane, units employ • Significantly decreased CWT; four distinct methods of coordination: in severely degraded technological en- vironments. The key mitigation mea- • Increased FSC ability to execute • Telephonic; sure is to train at home station as we convoy operations; • Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT); fight; this type of training will transfer • Allowed more LOGPAC repetitions • Home station (HS); and with tremendously less friction. (which increased Soldier’s confidence • Non-classified Internet protocol in execution); Third ABCT implemented daily LOGPAC network (VSAT/HS). • Enhanced logistic-release-point operations from unit motorpool areas Each coordination measure has an as- operations through daily to the SSA to replicate tactical opera- sociated tactical version to replicate coordination between the BSB and tions. This also applied to all four com- the same sight picture during the ex- FSCs (which directly supports panies within the BSB. ecution of tactical operations in field brigade-support-area execution); environments. Once the unit makes However, the BSB’s distribution com- and contact with the SSA, the 92As pull pany (Company A) assumed a dual • Established a firm foundation for the that specific unit’s 10 documents (or role. Company A has the responsibility execution of field-trains combat post fewer) to expedite the process. The on a rotating schedule to deliver sup- and combat-trains command post creation of this lane allows units to plies to supported battalions just like operations.

56 Spring 2020 ORIL management The final improvement measure con- assignments officer, Human Resources Sustainers and warfighters have an un- cerned sending our MOS 92A Soldiers Command, Fort Knox, KY; support-op- nd rd deniable obligation to increase ORIL directly to maneuver battalions to pro- erations officer, 2 Infantry BCT, 3 In- management effectiveness, which di- cess and approve recoverable items fantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; bri- nd rectly impacts the Army enterprise on-site. From that point, FSCs deliv- gade S-4, 2 Infantry BCT; and G-5 and sustainable OR from a limited ered the items to the SSA, and the School of Advanced Military Studies rd parts-production perspective. To this transportation platoon delivered the Planner, 3 Infantry Division, Fort end, 3rd ABCT implemented a deliber- items to the LRC. Stewart. LTC Montgomery’s military schools include Pathfinder and Air- ate process targeted at reaching the This entire process, with support from borne Schools, Joint Planner’s Course Army’s ORIL turn-in standard of 10 all leaders within the BCT, has im- and Joint Firepower Course. He has a days (per Army Regulation 750-1, proved ORIL management immensely. Army Materiel Maintenance Policy) bachelor’s of arts degree in history The SSA within any organization rep- while holistically improving the effi- from the University of Southern Mis- resents the nucleus of sustaining and ciency of SSA operations. It’s our re- sissippi, a master’s of science degree increasing OR to engage and destroy sponsibility to get recoverable items in human-resource management from the enemy during a prolonged period back into the Army system to ensure Tarleton State University and a mas- of time. This endeavor demands en- the organization as a whole continues ter’s of military arts degree in military gaged leaders at all echelons to ensure to operate at a high level of readiness. operational art and science from Com- our formations remain committed to mand and General Staff College. LTC One improvement measure in the pro- the execution and overall effective- Montgomery’s awards include the cess is aggressive attention to the De- ness of sustainment operations. Bronze Star Medal (one oak-leaf clus- fense Working Capital Fund (DWCF). The key is to design and implement ter) and the Meritorious Service Med- The DWCF – established under Title 10 systems that transfer without friction al (four oak-leaf clusters). of the U.S. Code, Section 2208 – allows to field or austere environments and the Army to repair and purchase re- to replicate the environment where quirements for all supplies, mainte- Acronym Quick-Scan we will engage our enemies. nance, transportation and the other ABCT – armored brigade combat financial needs required to operate a Low-density training for all MOS 92A team professional organization. The gener- Soldiers within the BCT is essential; AO – accountable officer ated ORIL credit helps the DWCF and this investment will mitigate skill atro- BCT – brigade combat team our organization remain fiscally re- phy over time. Leader professional de- BSB – brigade-support battalion sponsible to American taxpayers. velopment – combined with rotating CROP – container roll-on/-off the brigade maintenance meeting to platform In addition to the financial revenue the SSA footprint to increase the over- CWT – customer wait time generated, critically required parts DWCF – Defense Working Capital all importance of the SSA among BCT that may not be on the assembly pro- Fund leadership – represents another good duction line are repositioned into the FSC – forward-support company technique to improve operations. GCSS-A – Global Combat Support Army system for refurbishment and re- System-Army turned to the warfighter. A myopic ap- The success or failure of an organiza- HS – home station proach to returning repairable parts tion lies within the will of its leaders. LOGPAC – logistics package into the system produces detrimental Engaged leaders must develop viable LRC – logistics-readiness center effects to readiness over time. solutions within the system of record MHE – material-handling equipment (GCSS-A) to keep our organization op- MOS – military-occupational Secondly, for a BCT, the return credit erating at a high level of readiness specialty is essential to operate an armored for- postured to engage any enemy force OR – operational readiness ORIL – overaged, repairable-Item mation. To illustrate, an M1 Abrams within the world. engine costs $903,498 and the return listing credit is $361,781, representing a LTC Charles Montgomery commands SSA – supply-support activity 123rd BSB, 3rd ABCT, Fort Bliss, TX. His VSAT – Very Small Aperture 40-percent return on investment of Terminal the entire cost. previous assignments include

57 Spring 2020 BATTLE ANALYSIS Operation Crusader: Auchinleck’s and Rommel’s Great Gamble

Part 2 of 2 imbalance in armor strength was read- As Rommel was taking in this informa- dressed, giving GEN Erwin Rommel tion, he was balancing it against a plan by retired U.S. Marine Corps LTC one of his most important decisions of of his own. Rommel had cast his eyes Robert W. Lamont the campaign. east with the intent to strike a decisive In November 1941, Britain and her blow against Eighth Army. He felt that Commonwealth launched Operation On the morning of Nov. 24, GENs Rom- by attacking across XXX Corps’ line of Crusader with the intent of lifting the mel and Ludwig Crüwell met to discuss communication, he could inflict siege of the key North African port of the outcome of the action in and enough fear in the British of being sur- Tobruk. In the first part of this article around Sidi Rezegh. Crüwell stressed rounded and could strike at their com- (published in the Winter 2020 edition that the enemy had been smashed but mand structure’s cohesion. In short, of ARMOR), the interaction between that enough force remained for Afrika by exploiting maneuver as a defeat disjointed British offensive execution Corps to stay in the area and destroy mechanism, he could unbalance and swift, massed response by Afrika the survivors. Intelligence was report- Eighth Army and throw them from the Corps allowed Axis forces to partition ing that the New Zealand Division was field.2 We can read his intent in his re- the superior numerical strength of moving west from Bardia, posing a po- marks to GEN Johann von Ravenstein, their opponent into a series of free- tential threat to the Tobruk area if left commander of 21st Panzer Division, form and intense actions, defeating uncovered. The remnants of XXX Corps when he told him: “You have the them each in turn. Historically, tank were regrouping southeast of Afrika chance of ending this campaign to- losses were reported as 530 for the Corps, and their intentions were un- night.”3 British and 100 for the Germans. The clear at this point.1

Figure 1. Disposition of units during Operation Crusader Nov. 24-26, 1941. (Map by author)

58 Spring 2020 Status of forces At this point in the battle, the balance of tank strength within Afrika Corps – coupled with vehicles from the Italian Ariete Division – would have placed enough combat power on the field to challenge any likely combination the British could muster along the Libyan- Egyptian frontier. With the British 70th Division bottled up in Tobruk and the New Zealand Division advancing piece- meal toward the Germans from Bar- dia, Rommel had to develop a decisive scheme of maneuver to turn the tide. His approach would be to personally lead the combined strength of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions southeast to the Trigh El Abd track and then head for Bir Sheferzen to develop the situation. The Ariete Division would parallel this move on the north flank to prevent in- terference from British threats from that direction. For their part, the British forces were licking their wounds and attempting to continue the attack toward Tobruk. XXX Corps was centered south of the Trigh El Abd track, working to recon- stitute its tank strength. It was sup- ported from two large supply dumps 15 miles south of Bir El Gubi, and an- other southeast of Gabr Saleh.4 The New Zealand Division was moving down the Trigh Capuzzo roadway to- ward the former German assembly area of Gambut. The 7th Indian Brigade was holding along the frontier and keeping Halfaya Pass open for rein- forcements and supplies.

Despite initial setbacks on contact Figure 2. GEN Sir Claude Auchinleck, commander-in-chief, Middle East, and with the enemy, Operation Crusader MG John “Jock” Campbell, commander of 7th Support Group, confer in the was grinding forward.5 With both sides Western Desert. (United Kingdom government photograph by CPT G. Keating, now executing offensive operations, No. 1 Army Film and Photographic Unit; public domain) the stage was set for a direct contest of opposing wills to see who would were evading this maneuver by fleeing determination in the face of uncer- “blink” first and transition from the at- in multiple directions. tainty tempered the impact of the tack to the defense. confused battlefield state and negated The confused nature of the situation much of the influence of maneuver as Rommel’s rush had infused doubt in GEN Sir Alan Cun- a defeat mechanism.6 By mid-morning Nov. 24, Rommel ningham, commander of the British would begin his “dash to the wire,” Eighth Army. As he looked to recover Rommel’s rush down the Trigh El Abd leading 21st Panzer Division from the the battle, he contacted Field Marshal track missed the British supply dumps front in a bid to turn the tide. The ef- Sir Claude Auchinleck, commander-in- to the south. By ordering commanders fect within the XXX Corps’ command chief Middle East, and recommended to advance without troubling about structure was almost immediate. Field that Eighth Army retire to Egypt imme- what was on their flanks, it should reports, with a tone of panic, placed diately. This request was to receive a come as no surprise that these static Afrika Corps squarely across their lines blunt and forceful rebuff from the the- installations were bypassed.7 As the of communication. The 7th Armoured ater commander, who directed that lead armor elements were reaching Division and 1st South Africa Division the offense continue. Auchinleck’s the wire, Afrika Corps was spread over

59 Spring 2020 60 miles of desert. What Rommel had Cunningham from command of Eighth vision and the garrison at Tobruk.12 envisioned as a final pursuit had land- Army and the appointment of GEN Sir The action that was to follow in and ed as a blow against open air.8 Neil Ritchie. Ritchie’s more aggressive around Tobruk would see each side spirit was in line with Auchinleck’s ex- By that evening, Rommel had reached gain and lose tactical advantage as pectations and would carry forward the frontier and issued orders for the their material strength was ground with the rest of the battle. The second following day. The 15th Panzer, sup- down to bare bones. The New Zealand event was the renewed efforts of 70th ported by the Ariete Division, would Division would establish a link-up with Division to break out of the Tobruk en- turn north and attack through Sidi the embattled garrison, only to have circlement. This effort was to link up Azeiz in the general direction of Bar- the siege of Tobruk re-established by with the New Zealand Division at El dia. The 21st Panzer Division would a determined 15th Panzer Division Duda.11 swing across the frontier and attack counterattack from the south of El through Halfaya Pass toward Sollum.9 Duda.13 By Nov. 28, despite some success the Rommel was able to finally drive the New Zealand Division from Execution of these orders were ham- previous day against 5th New Zealand the field, but the cost in doing so pered by fuel shortages and strong re- Brigade, it was becoming clear to would preclude him from holding his sistance. Allied air forces were begin- Rommel that his attempt to force the position in Cyenaica. ning to influence the action and com- British to give up the attack had failed. plicate movement plans, especially for It was at this point that he decided to On Dec. 7 the siege of Tobruk was lift- those units on the Egyptian side of the break contact on the Sollum front and ed, and Rommel decided to withdraw frontier. More disquieting was that the turn both panzer divisions west along to the positions prepared at Gazala.14 British supply services were recover- the Trigh Capuzzo to readdress the Of course, events half a world away ing “knocked-out” tanks, repairing balance in and around Tobruk. In one somewhat overshadowed Eighth Ar- them and returning them to the bat- of those odd twists in military history, my’s accomplishment as they pursued tle. By the end of the day, 70 such ve- this move would bring the battle back Afrika Corps east along a familiar hicles had been re-crewed and were full circle as the stage was set for a re- track. ready for action.10 The impact of leav- match around the airfield at Sidi Reze- ing the field of battle to the British gh. Rommel was to override the rec- Attrition vs. maneuver was beginning to come home. ommendation of his staff as he looked In analyzing the outcome of this sec- to engineer a counterattack that ond phase of Crusader, the focus turns Tobruk garrison would disrupt and prevent the com- to what was intended against what Nov. 26 was to witness two key events plete link-up and reinforcement be- was accomplished. In departing for in the battle. The first was the relief of tween the advancing New Zealand Di- the “wire,” Rommel had hoped to cut

Figure 3. Disposition of units during Operation Crusader Nov. 27-28, 1941. (Map by author)

60 Spring 2020 side-by-side two styles of warfare. Crüwell, in reacting to the wide-rang- ing British advance, looked to mass his armor, partition the enemy through movement and engage each part of his opponent in turn. Rommel, on the other hand, looked to exploit maneu- ver and disrupt Eighth Army’s entire command structure. This would allow him to force his opponent away from offensive operations directed toward Tobruk and place him back along the frontier wire. Given Rommel’s past op- erational success, he had solid reason to believe this was completely achiev- able with the means at hand. The wild card became Auchinleck’s resolution to stay the course in the face of a con- fusing and chaotic situation. Military literature is full of discussions regarding the merits of attrition vs. maneuver as appropriate battlefield defeat mechanisms. This article does not suggest that one is dominant over the other, but rather each are opera- tional realities that must be addressed by the prudent commander. Your op- ponent’s will to fight potentially drives the selection of a defeat mechanism Figure 4. A British Crusader tank passes a burning German Panzer IV tank during the planning process. As Rom- during Operation Crusader in North Africa Nov. 27, 1941. (United Kingdom mel was to discover, you don’t always government photograph by LT L.B. Davies, No. 1 Army Film and Photographic get to fight the French of 1940 fame. Unit; public domain) Historical examples of not compre- across XXX Corps’ supply line and in so Rommel spent his final fuel reserves hending your opponent’s resolve in- doing force its commander to give up to execute this movement, which re- clude the Japanese in the Pacific Island his effort to relieve the siege at To- duced his tactical options as the con- campaign and the more recent Battle bruk. This was intended as a direct en- tinuing campaign unfolded. On Dec. 5, of Fallujah. In the Pacific, the Marines gagement of the British chain of com- the Italian Comando Supremo made it found it necessary to systematically mand to break their will to continue clear the supply situation would not reduce the enemy in a series of small- the struggle. improve until the end of the month, unit duels. While combined-arms tac- when airlift efforts could be initiated tics, such as the “corkscrew” to de- Using maneuver as a defeat mecha- from bases in Sicily. In the week that stroy fortifications on Iwo Jima,16 were nism was a close-run thing. Clearly followed Rommel’s decision to pull used in these battles; the result re- Cunningham had been influenced to back from the Tobruk front, Afrika mained a difficult battle of attrition. abandon the struggle, and his recom- Corps was down to eight operational The Battle of Fallujah would show that mendation to fall back in Egypt pro- tanks and the Italian Ariete Division this level of resistance is not relegated vides clear evidence as to the state of could muster 30.15 This stands in sharp solely to the realm of distant history. his mind at the end of the battle’s first contrast to XXX Corps, who retained In discussing this battle with a Marine phase. However, Auchinleck was not a their presence on the battlefield and Corps armor veteran, he was struck at beaten opponent, and his orders to through aggressive recovery efforts the fanaticism of the Arab fighters. In continue the offensive demonstrate were able to return more than 70 this urban setting, he saw no quit in the resolution of a leader uninflu- tanks to the battle. The balance in ar- the opposition, as they were com- enced by the confusion and chaos gen- mor strength that had been skillfully pletely willing to “fight to the death.”17 erated by the rapid movement and won in the first phase of Crusader by Understanding your enemy, their op- shifting fronts of Afrika Corps’ armor Axis forces was spent with interest erational tendencies and their resolu- strength. during this follow-on effort. tion remains a solid guidepost for The materiel ramifications of the Operation Crusader, and the German campaign planning today as it did “dash to the wire” provide a clear in- response to it, is unique in that it al- when it was advanced by Sun Tzu. The dication of the cost of engagement. lows the military analyst to compare armored task force is uniquely suited

61 Spring 2020 Suppression or lack of air defense will allow aircraft to influence action by both limiting the response of enemy assets and the systematic reduction of their combat potential. A gap in their indirect-fire capability will support suppression of their frontline forces by our artillery, enhancing the freedom of maneuver for our formations. The true strength of the combined-arms team is its inherent ability to tailor combat power to exploit any one of these opposing capability gaps across a number of warfare domains.

In closing, this review of Operation Crusader has allowed the reader to ex- plore a number of related battlefield dynamics. The use of partitioning as a defeat mechanism was reviewed, and the role of mounted combined-arms teams to implement such an approach was developed based on both combat modeling and this historical example. Rommel’s “dash to the wire” provided keen insights into the strength and weaknesses of maneuver as a defeat mechanism. It developed the linkage between the level of fanaticism within your opponent and their susceptibility to being unhinged by such an opera- tional approach. Understanding the strength and relevance of these styles Figure 5. The crew of a Mk VIB light tank look for any movement of the ene- of warfare will enhance the ability of my near Tobruk, Nov. 28, 1941. (United Kingdom photograph by CPT G. Keat- any future commander or staff to de- ing, No. 1 Army Film and Photographic Unit; public domain) velop and analyze courses of action and chart a clearer path ahead. to adapt to a wide range of enemy partitioning as a defeat mechanism. threats, operational terrain and vary- Also, they have the inherent combat Retired U.S. Marine Corps LTC Robert ing missions. power to create gaps and negate the Lamont is technical director of the Am- continuity of the enemy’s defense. Mounted combined-arms forces, built phibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp around a solid armor core, remain ca- Partitioning the enemy in terms of Pendleton, CA. Previous assignments pable of executing a wide array of op- physical space has its roots in his include scientist, Naval Surface War- erational schemes to ensure the suc- weapons-employment ranges, the in- fare Center, Fallbrook, CA; exercise ac- cessful implementing a number of de- fluence of terrain and his current dis- tion officer, III Marine Expeditionary feat mechanisms. Given their all- positions. The dimension of time pro- Force, Okinawa, Japan, planning Tan- weather mobility, these combat for- vides the next method for partitioning dem Thrust in Australia and Cobra mations are able to disperse, mass and an enemy. The ability of your oppo- Gold in Thailand; instructor, U.S. Army recombine to present their opponent nent to reinforce each other from dis- Armor School, Fort Knox, KY; and com- an ever-changing array of tactical persed locations is dependent on its pany commander and assistant opera- threats. These are the very operation- rd ability to recognize and react to our tions officer, 3 Tank Battalion, Twen- al characteristics that ensure mounted maneuver. This is influenced by its tynine Palms, CA. Other assignments combined-arms teams remain a dom- command-and-control system, the included operations analyst in the inant formation in open combat. mobility and speed of its units, and Studies and Analysis Division, Marine When gaps are identified on the bat- the movement potential of interven- Corps Combat Development Com- tlefield, as with the advance of the ing terrain. mand, completing analyses for anti- British 7th Armoured Division during armor force structure, combat identi- Operation Crusader, mounted forces Finally, the inability of the opposing fication and the Advanced Amphibious are able to maneuver while retaining force to field combined-arms teams Assault Vehicle. LTC Lamont’s service the advantage offered by this unfold- may present the opportunity to parti- afloat includes executive officer, Ma- ing alignment and implement tion the enemy based on capability. rine Detachment, USS Constellation,

62 Spring 2020 and combat car- Ltd., Marshall Cavendish, USA, 1973. go officer, USS 2 Ibid. Cleveland. His 3 military school- David Irving, The Trail of the Fox, New ing includes the York, NY: Thomas Congdon Books, 1977. Armor Officer 4 David Fraser, Knight’s Cross, New York, Basic Course and NY: Harper Collins, 1994. Armor Officer 5 Ibid. Advanced 6 Course. LTC MG F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, Lamont holds a New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1956. bachelor’s of sci- 7 Fraser. ence degree in 8 Irving. management and technology 9 Evans. from the U.S. Na- 10 Ibid. val Academy and 11 Ibid. a master’s of sci- 12 Ibid. ence in opera- 13 Mellenthin. tions research 14 from the Naval Evans. Postgraduate 15 Referenced at http://en.wikipedia.org/ School. His wiki/operation_crusader. Figure 6. A Matilda tank crew overhauls their vehicle in awards and hon- preparation for the next phase of battle near Tobruk Dec. 16 The corkscrew tactic used smoke and 1, 1941. (United Kingdom government photograph by CPT G. ors include Meri- suppressive fire to blind the pillbox, fol- Keating, No. 1 Army Film and Photographic Unit; public do- torious Service lowed by tank or man-packed flame- main) Medal with three throwers to burn the defenders and con- gold stars, Na- cluded with a demolition team to col- tional Defense Medal with one bronze star and the Sea Service Deployment Rib- lapse the structure. The mantra of “blind bon with four bronze stars. He is a silver-level member of the Order of St. George. ‘em, burn ‘em and blast ‘em” was well LTC Lamont is also the author of Panzer Trilogy, which he says is “fiction, but the known throughout the close of the Pacif- Armor lessons-learned are real.” ic Campaign. 17 MSG Michael Chouinard interview Jan. Notes 19, 2014, at the Amphibious Vehicle Test 1 LTG Sir Geoffrey Evans, History of the Second World War (Part 24), BPC Publishing Branch, Camp Pendleton, CA.

Donovan Research Library Maneuver Center of Excellence hosts Armor student papers on various subjects, https://www.benning.army.mil/Library/Virtual.html, and back issues (1988-1982)of ARMOR magazine, https://www.benning.army.mil/Library/ CavalryArmorJournal/index.html Back-issue archiving shared with eARMOR (1983 through current edition), http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/

63 Spring 2020 Onward to Company Command

by SFC Gary W. McKenzie Jr. (one to three months) priority and a underused and crucial instrument in near-term (could be due at the end of maintaining crew lethality. However, You are about to take command of the day or two weeks out) priority. at more than $750 per 4.724-caliber your first unit: the armor or scout Managing time and organizing the us- round, we cannot possibly live on a company, maybe even the anti-tank able calendar space you have are cru- tank range for four months of the company at Fort Irwin, CA. This time is cial, yet tricky, tasks. I urge you, how- year. exciting; family and friends alike will ever, to not look beyond the basics as be anxious to celebrate this achieve- • AGTS should have nested goals … often; skills that will enhance the for- ment. As you take the reins, you have where are you in your gunnery mation’s lethality are not all sexy to commit to some priorities – a prior- density? Are sustainment crews training events. The basics are gun- ity is the most effective way for a com- shooting four to six hours per month? nery-skills training tasks, Excellence in mander to steer an organization. You Are new crews meeting the 12-15 Armor program, land navigation, must also understand that the ability hours of intensive training in the first troop-leading procedures/military de- to throttle pursuit of your priorities in week? cision-making process, weapons qual- a manner that enables focused orga- • AGTS should be a platoon-led event. ification, certifications, gunnery … the nizational energy on highers’ mission list is long. The simple things matter, • Vehicle-crew evaluators, AGTS will permit much better results for the repetitions matter; armor warriors instructors/operators, simulations that highly regarded “key develop- rely on skills that are easily overlooked training managers and master mental eval.” from the bird’s nest. gunners: are we training these? Are we training changing doctrine and Priorities meeting standards? Understand this simple concept: If you Reacting Reacting have more than two priorities at any is almost a swear word. The From your new seat, you impact the given time, they’re not priorities. enduring question is: “Should the future of armor lethality. What do we Ways to ensure that priorities are pri- company react to the battalion or the want armor formations to bring to the orities: other way around?” table in five years? Are you training • Set monthly goals or “to do” lists. • Understand that you can influence them that way? the boss at times; just make sure it’s • Focus a month on property, including the right time. SFC Gary McKenzie Jr. is NCO in charge ancillary equipment and services. and master-gunner adviser/liaison, Ex- • Fragmentary orders exist for a • The Command Supply Discipline peditionary Training Support Division, reason; they are necessary. Program is important – this is a great 7th Army Training Command, Grafen- way for a new commander to learn • Limit how much emotional energy woehr, Germany. He “has held every the unit’s discipline and get face-to- you spend in the presence of your position in a tank company from the 2 face time with Soldiers. Soldiers; in combat they would look tank driver to platoon sergeant.” Pre- to you as the anchor. • Have a training-meeting format vious assignments include platoon ser- st going into the job; protect this • It may be necessary at times to geant, armor opposing forces, 1 Bat- th meeting at all costs. If having pursue a discussion with the boss talion, 4 Infantry, Hohenfels, Germa- th biweekly training meetings works for about the “sacredness” of your ny; squadron master gunner, 11 Ar- you, then commit to this – this frees training calendar and the effort you mored-Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort up two hours every other week for are putting into it to resource Irwin, CA; troop master gunner, Troop th admin tasks and getting sync’d with excellent training – try to establish C, 11 ACR, Fort Irwin; tank command- th your first sergeant. the purpose of the calendar as er, Company D, 11 ACR, Fort Irwin; contractual between you both. tank commander, Company D, 2nd Bat- • Make it a training meeting – this isn’t talion, 9th Infantry Regiment, Camp where you talk about maintenance Gunnery Casey, Republic of Korea; master in- or taskings that are coming down! It Gunnery never ends; there is no defin- structor, one-station unit training could be as simple as the vests for itive start point or finish point. Short (OSUT), Headquarters and Headquar- Army Physical Fitness Training next and sweet: you have master gunners ters Company, 1st Battalion, 81st Armor week or as in-depth as reviewing the in your formations who can help you Regiment, Fort Knox, KY, then Fort concept of operations (four to six identify your training deficiencies and Benning, GA; OSUT instructor, Fort weeks out) for a company-level field- challenges. Knox; and leader/gunner/tank com- training exercise. • The Advanced Gunnery Training mander, Company H, 3rd ACR (three You should try to have a long-term Simulator (AGTS) is the most combat tours in Iraq during Operation

64 Spring 2020 Iraqi Freedom I, III and 07-09), Fort Advanced Leader’s Course. He holds a Carson, CO, and Fort Hood, TX. SFC bachelor’s of science degree in organi- Acronym Quick-Scan McKenzie’s military schooling includes zational leadership from Denver Uni- Abrams Master Gunner, Joint Firepow- versity, with a secondary major in hu- ACR – armored-cavalry regiment er Course, Interservice Range Safety man resources. SFC McKenzie’s awards AGTS – Advanced Gunnery Training Simulator Course, Senior Instructor/Operator and honors include the Meritorious NCO – noncommissioned officer Course, Maneuver Senior Leader’s Service Medal. OSUT – one-station unit training Course, Battle Staff Course and

Table 1. Chart of company experience. Most of a company’s experience is in senior noncommissioned officers.

65 Spring 2020 BOOK REVIEWS accuracy followed. Given the limited these improvisations are detailed, Panzerfaust Vs. Sherman: European resources available to German indus- along with photos of their use. The ef- Theater 1944-45 by Steven J. Zaloga; try, production of the panzerfaust ini- fectiveness of each system is fully dis- New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing tially failed to meet demand. Eventu- cussed throughout the book. ally, the Germans were able to pro- Plc; 2019; 80 pages with photographs, The book includes fascinating details duce eight versions of the panzerfaust. maps, illustrations and bibliography; on the technical specifications for the These improvements to the panzer- $22. panzerfaust, including the weapon’s faust gradually increased the effective firing and sighting procedures, along range of the system from 30 meters to with a detailed diagram of the impact Steven Zaloga’s latest work examines almost 100 meters, with a penetrating sequence. Zaloga then examines in de- “the revolutionary new antitank weap- capability of between 140 and 200 tail the battle for the Normandy vil- ons introduced on the battlefield in millimeters. late 1943.” His examination concen- lage of Villiers-Fossard to demonstrate trates on the development and em- While range was an employment limi- the effectiveness of German antitank ployment of the German panzerfaust tation in open areas, the close French systems against the employment of ar- bocage fields encountered by the mor and infantry units from the Amer- (armor fist) and similar weapons rd against the U.S. Army’s M4 Sherman Americans coming out of the Norman- ican 3 Armored Division. This con- tanks. A detailed chronology is provid- dy beachhead offered ideal terrain for cluding portion of the book provides ed that enhances an appreciation for employment of the panzerfaust. How- an appreciation for the difficulties of the time and energy that went into the ever, for every German action there achieving battlefield success against development and employment of an- was an equal Allied counter-action. As an entrenched enemy force armed titank systems against American, Brit- the author relates, “There are no with effective antitank weapons. known accounts of who came up with ish and Soviet tank forces. This is a superbly written account of the idea of using sandbags” as a field- the devastating effectiveness of man- expedient method for defeating the The German experiences on the East- portable antitank weapons. Zaloga has panzerfaust. ern Front created a situation where written a fine work worthy of review massive Russian tank forces confront- by those seeking a better appreciation ed German ground forces. Limited Interestingly, while the American Sev- enth Army employed a wide variety of of asymmetrical warfare. Maneuver numbers of towed antitank weapons leaders well acquainted with the close were available, forcing the Germans to sandbag and cement defensive mea- sures, Third Army forbid any such combat operations of recent years will improvise. Several examples of these find this book insightful. improvised weapons systems are ex- modifications to their tanks. However, RETIRED COL D.J. JUDGE plained and supplemented by applica- action during the December Battle of ble photographs. It became apparent the Bulge led to “widespread com- that while these improvised systems plaints about the poor armor protec- required “heroic bravery on the part tion of the M4.” Instead of sandbags American Armor in the Pacific by Mike of the infantryman,” they had a limit- for protection, Third Army cannibal- Guardia; Philadelphia: Casemate Pub- ed operational effectiveness. A better ized armor plating off derelict German lishers; 2020; 124 pages with photo- way was sought. and American vehicles as a means of graphs, maps, index; $24.95. offsetting the panzerfaust. Several di- Given their early use of shaped charg- agrams and photos of these improve- es, German industry developed a ments are provided. The author also When one is asked what the notable shaped charge which was a “type of includes a section that discusses how armor engagements of World War II hollow charge that added an impor- the Soviets and British protected their were, more likely than not, the re- tant ingredient: a metal liner between armored forces against German anti- sponse would be one or more fought the warhead’s explosive and the cavi- tank systems. in Europe or North Africa: Hannut, ty. When the warhead was detonated, Allied industry also proposed several Kursk, El Alamein, Hurtgen Forest and the explosive blast was focused on the solutions, including development of a in the Alsace during the Battle of the metal liner, compressing it into a hy- plastic armor system. Unfortunately, Bulge. Largely forgotten is the history personic stream of metal particles that this added some three tons of weight of the battles fought in the Pacific The- could penetrate a great deal of steel to the turret and four tons to the hull ater by U.S. Army and Marine Corps armor.” This lethal shaped charge be- area. This and other fabrications tankers against the fanatical and bat- came the warhead for the panzerfaust. proved to “be too great a challenge.” tle-tested Imperial Japanese Army The German infantryman now pos- Tactical units, therefore, continued to (IJA). sessed a hand-held antitank system rely on developing and improving a that could permit him to engage a host of field-expedient methods to Mike Guardia’s American Armor in the tank. Improvements in range and counter the shaped charge. Several of Pacific is a fine snapshot of this

66 Spring 2020 important time in mounted combat Although the Army and Marine Corps tions doctrine. history. With full-color maps, photo- shared the same platforms, the two RETIRED LTC LEE F. KICHEN graphs, graphs and his keen writing services tended to employ them dif- style, he vividly describes 20 opera- ferently. Many will find controversial tions beginning with defense of the Guardia’s assessment of the Army’s Tank Battles in East Prussia and Po- Philippines in 1941-42 and culminat- and Marine Corps’ employment of ar- land 1944-1945: Vilkavishkis, ing with the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. mor. According to Guardia, the Marine Gumbinnen/Nemmersdorf, Elbing, The organization of the book enhanc- Corps was more aggressive with its Wormditt/Frauenburg, Kielce/Lisow es it readability. The timeline at the tank battalions, preferring to use tanks by Igor Nebolsin; Warwick, United beginning of the book is a useful tool as the vanguard during synchronized Kingdom: Helion and Company; 2019; that lends context to armor operations tank-infantry operations, whereas the 544 pages; $61.22. in each campaign. Army lacked the synchronicity typical of Marine Corps operations, using its The introduction describes the devel- armor as “back-up assets only when opment of the opposing forces’ tanks certain high-value targets had been Igor Nebolsin’s extraordinary efforts during the interwar years. Noting the identified. … Ironically, the Army’s am- with his work Tank Battles in East success of Allied armor during World phibious tank battalions were more Prussia and Poland 1944-1945 need War I, Japan experimented with a few adept at conducting shoreline opera- to be put into context. For many read- tanks imported from Europe, and in tions.” ers and military-simulation gamers, 1931 began producing tanks of its own the Eastern Front of World War II is design. The Type 97 Chi-Ha Medium American Armor in the Pacific is a fine less interesting post-Operation Bar- Tank was Japan’s most widely pro- book; however, it is not without short- barossa – and certainly after the Bat- duced tank. The first variant mounted comings. The lack of battalion-level or- tle of Kursk. A key reason for this is a low-velocity 57mm main gun. A later ganizational charts is disappointing. that the postwar “history” – as pre- variant had a 47mm high-velocity Scattering vehicle specifications and sented in popular and academic writ- main gun. Although considered the operational data throughout the text ing about the period post-Kursk to the best Japanese tank, the Type 97 was was burdensome; a chart with tank- operations leading up to the capture still inferior to the American M3 Stu- by-tank comparison would better cap- of Berlin – are not about spectacular art and M4 Sherman tanks. ture this data. There was no discussion wins against Soviet mass; they’re sole- Unable to sustain tank production and on sustainment operations. There are ly about grinding attritional war. Also, losing excessive numbers to combat, some factual errors – for instance, the main German protagonists who the IJA abandoned shoreline defense Guardia incorrectly wrote that the fought on the Eastern Front – Guderi- in favor of fighting inland battles of at- Army had a total of 50 separate tank an, von Manstein, Manteuffel, Raus trition, relegating tanks to static de- battalions, a third of which served in and others – wrote less on this period fense missions. The IJA, cognizant of the Pacific; however, at the end of the of the war as well as colored their the inevitability of an American inva- war, the Army had 150 separate tank writings for their intended U.S. Army sion of the home islands, kept a rela- battalions, with only 15 in the Pacific audience. A third key reason is that tively large number of tanks in reserve Theater. In at least two photographs, the Soviets’ failure to open their ar- on the islands. there were unit-designation errors. chives due to Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s (and onward) security restrictions The broken volcanic terrain and dense Guardia’s work has relevance to to- meant that accessibility to Soviet war- tropical vegetation of the Pacific Is- day’s Armored Force. It clearly and un- time operational records was lacking. lands was not conducive to long- ambiguously reminds us that armor These reasons meant that only post- range, tank-on-tank engagements such can fight on extremely difficult terrain glasnost did we start to get a more as those in the European and Mediter- and participate in amphibious opera- balanced interpretation of the gigantic ranean theaters. Lacking open terrain, tions. The lessons of the Pacific cam- struggle that consumed both the Third most armor operations in the Pacific paigns were soon forgotten, only to be Reich and Stalin’s Union of the Soviet were limited to supporting slow and painfully relearned in Vietnam. As the Socialist Republics. unrelenting dismounted-infantry com- Indo-Pacific and sub-Sahara Africa re- bat. gions increase in strategic importance, Nebolisin’s feel for the material and The Marine Corps, in addition to em- the tactics, techniques and procedures this timeframe of the war is quite ploying M3 and M4 tanks, required a adopted by Army and Marine Corps good. The only thing he could have platform for amphibious operations. tankers in World War II remain rele- done in terms of context is segue from The Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) “Al- vant today. The Army’s jungle-opera- what is commonly referred to as the ligator” and its follow-on variants – ca- tions doctrine is woefully outdated; destruction of Army Group Centre to pable of carrying 18 troops or 4,500 Field Manual 90-5, Jungle Operations, the 1944-1945 phase of the Eastern pounds of cargo and mounting the M3 was last published in 1982, with only Front, as the armor battles around tank turret – satisfied this require- nine pages devoted to armor and Wilkowszki are in early August 1944. ment. The Army also employed the mechanized-infantry operations. The Doing so would have added greater LTV, ultimately fielding 15 battalions in Army is doing its Soldiers a disservice depth to this work and more insight the Pacific. by not modernizing its jungle-opera- into the period.

67 Spring 2020 Nebolsin humanizes the war from the into set-piece German ambushes. comes to mind. The book is hard to Soviet perspective; for instance, in Nebolsin also provides many inserts of put down – I read more than 60 per- each of the book’s four sections, he both German and Soviet equipment- cent (300 pages) of it in one day! Its gives us thumbnail citations of various readiness reports and their current overall richness in terms of detail, les- Soviet heroes. It is a shame, however, maintenance status. sons to be learned and absorbed, and that Nebolsin didn’t tell us exactly as a counter to decades of military There are several things I wish Nebol- what these citations mean in terms of German ubermensch memoirs makes sin had done within Tank Battles. The precedence for Western readers. Be- it a book not to be missed. One can first is perhaps more of an editorial fore this work, most of us had never only look forward to future works nature: that either Nebolsin or the heard of “Cavalier of the Order of Glo- from Nebolsin. publisher’s editorial staff had clearly ry”; we must guess at the award’s rel- DR. (LTC) ROBERT G. SMITH set off his contributions and analysis ative value in terms of prestige – a to make that material more readily ap- small oversight. But the number of ci- parent to the reader. Sometimes his tations or examples where soldiers writing is evident, but in other places covered German panzers in straw and Blood, Guts and Grease: George S. I guessed. That is a shame, as Nebol- set them alight in combat seems prob- Patton in World War I by Jon B. Miko- sin’s comments add to the overall nar- lematic. lashek; Lexington, KY: University Press rative as set forth by the operational of Kentucky; 2019; $26.99 Kindle; Where the book truly excels is in terms histories used here. $35.32 hardcover. of the interplay among the daily oper- The maps? How about a non-academ- ational reports from Soviet fronts, ic ewww! First the reader is forced to armies, tank corps and tank brigades, find the maps in the book. Unless he Countless biographies have been writ- as juxtaposed against reports from or she is well-versed on the areas of ten about George S. Patton Jr. Unfor- their German foe – in this case, main- Poland or East Prussia covered in the tunately most pay only little attention ly the German Fourth Army, as well as book, he/she might not know where to Patton’s World War I experiences, principal German panzer leaders and those places are, so it would have which were the bedrock of his success- commanders during these battles. been helpful to include the campaign ful command of a corps and two field Again, the wealth of combat detail for maps with their relevant areas. In- armies in World War II. Jon B. Mikolas- Blood, Guts and Grease: George the battles of Wilkowyskzi, Gumbin- stead, Helion Press lumps them all in hek’s S. Patton in World War I nen/Nemmersdorf and Kielce/Lisow, one area at the book’s midpoint. fills that void among others, is astounding. Perhaps Worse, the maps have no key to them with his detailed and insightful exam- even more astounding is the frankness in terms of scale or what the symbols ination of this seminal period of Pat- that comes through in some reports as mean. Even with my armor back- ton’s career. Patton wasn’t an excep- well as in notations like “the officers ground and knowledge of military tion to the maxim: “Great command- of the unit should not be arrested as symbology, I was frankly perplexed. ers aren’t overnight successes.” World criminals.” There are a number of pho- War I was the proving ground for his tographs, almost none of which this The translation is near spotless, with command philosophy and his ability to Eastern Front aficionado had seen be- only several instances where things train Soldiers and lead them in com- fore. are a bit garbled. bat. The only time Nebolsin doesn’t con- Patton’s egotism, aggressiveness and What makes this book shine for this nect the dots well is in the geopolitical his unbridled ambition first became old armor officer are the materials and economic sense when he calls the apparent during the Mexican Punitive about preparing for combat opera- German movement of four panzer di- Expedition in 1916, when he led the tions, as the lack of meaningful atten- visions from northern Poland to Hun- Army’s first motorized attack and tion paid to the prebattle side occurs gary a mistake. At this point, the Hun- killed Jose Cardenas, one of Pancho too often in the history of military garian oil fields were the sole remain- Villa’s lieutenants. The Patton family’s writing. Here we get a glimpse into ing major source of petroleum, oil and political influence and his wife’s how new replacement soldiers were lubricant products for the Wehrmacht, wealth undoubtedly contributed to his brought into units, as well as into so the choice was no choice, really – early career advancement. His sister boresighting, weapons practice and the Wehrmacht was strategically Nita’s romance with GEN John J. Per- tank gunnery (often using recovered obliged to control the Hungarian oil shing played no small part in Patton’s German Tiger and Panther tanks to fields. Also, one might raise an eye- becoming Pershing’s aide in Mexico. build vehicle recognition and a sense brow at the tragedy of Nemmersdorf, of self-confidence that their tank A year later, Patton sailed to Europe where the generally accepted version main-gun rounds would defeat these on Pershing’s American Expeditionary is that the Red Army avenged German tanks). We also read how, by this point Force (AEF) staff. Mikolashek de- actions upon Soviet civilians who had in the war, reconnaissance had almost scribed Pershing as a father figure and first crossed into German territory. become a fetish for the Soviet High Patton as the obedient son. On the Command, remembering the days of It is easy to recommend Tank Battles other hand, Patton disliked most of his the border battles in Operation Bar- in East Prussia and Poland 1944-1945. seniors, who only tolerated him for his barossa, where units often blundered For one, no comparable work readily ability to win. BG (later LTG) Hugh A.

68 Spring 2020 Drum and BG (later MG) Fox Conner trainers” developed the first cadre of widely known unit to take part in the were the only other senior officers be- officers and enlisted leaders for the Bush War. Selous Scouts: Rhodesian sides Pershing whom Patton trusted Tank Corps. Although respected by his Counter-Insurgency Specialists is a and respected in World War I. Soldiers, they feared him because of short, if informative, examination of his fixation on discipline. the scouts’ formation, selection pro- Bored and disgusted with staff work cess, training, equipment, operational While dealing with the complexities of and fearing that promotions and glory employment and ultimate demobiliza- training soldiers and building units for would elude him, he became Ameri- tion. ca’s first tanker. Although not initially combat, Patton continued his profes- enamored with tanks, they were the sional development by attending the Selous Scouts briefly traces Rhodesia’s means to his end of furthering his ca- Army General Staff College in Langres. history through colonization under reer. Applying to the embryonic Tank Patton learned his first lessons in the namesake Cecil Rhodes to the post- Corps, Patton stressed his combat ex- art of command and the science of World War II movement for decoloni- perience in the Cardenas affair, service control of a large unit in the St. Mihiel zation and eventual Communist-sup- as a cavalry officer, knowledge of au- and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Patton ported insurgency, then to eventual tomobiles and motors, and fluency in demonstrated uncommon courage world recognition as the Republic of French as his qualifications. Patton’s and his ever-present quest for glory by Zimbabwe. Author Peter Baxter effec- first experience with tanks came with leading his tanks on foot despite Rock- tively uses the Rhodesian Bush War as his attendance at the French tank- enbach’s orders directing him to re- a backdrop for telling the scouts’ brief training center at Champlieu for two main in a command post, where he history and lasting legacy. Baxter weeks and another week at the French would be accessible to his higher com- writes from a position of both profes- tank factory outside Paris. The paper mand. While leading a trench-breach- sional and personal expertise, having he wrote describing his time with the ing operation, he struck some Soldiers grown up in both Kenya and Zimba- French would become early doctrine with a shovel, exhibiting the same bwe, as well as extensively studying for the Tank Corps. roughness and brutality revealed by history. For those familiar with African the World War II slapping incidents. history, the topic of Rhodesia-Zimba- While Patton emulated Pershing, his bwe may easily evoke strong feelings, After the war, Patton reverted from his relationship with his immediate boss, particularly on the civil war and wartime rank of colonel to his perma- BG Samuel D. Rockenbach, chief of the Mugabe’s decades of disastrous lead- nent rank of captain. Patton, seeing lit- AEF Tank Corps, was rocky at best. ership. To his credit, Baxter presents a tle future in tanks after Congress abol- They were diametric opposites: Rock- generally even-handed account of the ished the Tank Corps, returned to the enbach, 22 years older than Patton, Bush War and the scouts’ role in that cavalry in 1920. Although Patton re- was quiet and even-tempered. Al- conflict. turned to the horse cavalry, he contin- though not a great thinker, due to his ued to reflect on his World War I ex- Despite its relatively short length of work ethic and political astuteness, perience and to write about tanks and just 72 pages, Selous Scouts will pro- Rockenbach had a successful pre-war their employment in a future war. vide the reader a number of critical career. With his career dependent on RETIRED LTC LEE F. KICHEN lessons to be remembered when intro- Rockenbach, Patton had only a half- ducing a new unit to an established hearted relationship with him. His military force. Selous Scouts repeat- dealings with Rockenbach were har- edly stresses the absolute need for an bingers of his interactions with GEN Selous Scouts: Rhodesian Counter-In- intelligence staff knowledgeable of the Dwight D. Eisenhower and GEN Omar surgency Specialists by Peter Baxter; local culture and area of operations. N. Bradley in World War II. Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers; Part and parcel of this lesson is that If Rockenbach was the father of the 2019; 72 pages; $29.95 (soft cover). military-intelligence personnel gener- Tank Corps, Patton was the midwife ally lack the depth and breadth of lo- with his establishment of the Light cal knowledge necessary to be effec- Tank School at Bourge, France, where From July 1964 to December 1979, the tive, thus requiring specialized training he trained tankers and developed the white-minority-ruled nation of Rhode- or assistance of experts. organizational structure for the Tank sia fought a long battle against two Baxter also devotes significant atten- Corps. This training and organizational black independence movements in tion to the inevitable friction between structure bore fruit in what became one of the last events marking decolo- th conventional and Special Operations 304 Tank Brigade, which Patton com- nization on the African continent. forces for scarce resources, personnel, manded in the St. Mihiel and Muese- Dubbed the Rhodesian Bush War, the intelligence and operating areas. Bax- Argonne offensives near the end of civil conflict – which was yet another ter avoids the hero worship all too the war. facet of the larger, global Cold War – common in recent books and movies The school wasn’t a command posi- ended with a transition to majority examining Special Operations forces, tion, but it was what today’s Army rule under Robert Mugabe. Viewed instead highlighting both the scouts’ considers a “key development” posi- through a military lens, a Special Op- successes and failures. The book’s lat- tion, which either makes or breaks a erations unit dubbed the Rhodesian ter passages describe the unit’s unde- career. His system of “training the Selous Scouts remains the most niable tactical achievements in the

69 Spring 2020 field and challenges at working with army was supplemented by militias. As World War II loomed on the hori- the larger Rhodesia Army or the na- Conscription reluctantly occurred as a zon, the conceptual phase of our mili- tional-security services. Baxter also result of a national emergency. tary came to the forefront as war addresses allegations of the darker plans, known as Rainbow 5, addressed chapters in Selous history, including Regardless of the model used, a nation various worldwide contingency opera- rogue operations and illegal ivory trad- forms its distinctive force based on tions the United States might face in ing via elephant poaching. three components: the physical, con- the future. A force structure to sup- taining such items as manpower and port these possible operations result- Selous Scouts is Book 38 in a long-run- equipment; the moral, consisting of in- ed in a reorganization of the standard ning series titled “Africa at War,” which tangibles like courage and unit pride; Army division from the World War I covers the post-colonial period to the and the conceptual, covering doctrine square division containing 25,000 men present day. Prospective readers may and tactics. This last component is the to a triangular one containing 15,000 wish to add this book to their person- most important but also the most dif- men. Once a divisional structure was al library as a stand-alone work or as ficult to establish and sustain. created, it served not only to create part of a larger collection. In either more infantry divisions but also was a case, Scouts is guaranteed to provide The chapter on the mobilization of flexible base that allowed the creation an evening of enjoyable reading. both industry and manpower to deal of airborne and armored units. LTC CHRIS HEATHERLY with any threat, especially that posed by the 1933 rise of Germany coun- How Armies Grow is a well-written tered by France and Great Britain, pro- book that addresses a host of econom- vides a balanced look at how other na- ic, mobilization and manpower issues The Expansion of Military Forces: tions grow their respective militaries. in a series of short chapters. While it How Armies Grow In The Age Of Total The sections covering the various addresses how armies grow, it does War 1789-1945, edited by Matthias methods for establishing a reserve not cover the creation and under- Strohn; Havertown, PA: Casemate Pub- force are instructive. Interesting also standing of a given nation’s vital, ma- lishers; 2019; 196 pages with foot- is the chapter dealing with use of co- jor and peripheral interests that bring notes and bibliography; $41.89. lonial forces by Britain and France dur- a society to economically and emo- ing both world wars. tionally support a given-sized force. Those desiring to expand their knowl- While France, Germany and Great Brit- edge of the role these factors play in In the broadest sense, an army is a ain possessed a long-established mili- the creation of an effective fighting fighting force created by a nation to tary schooling system, the United force must look elsewhere. However, provide for the “common defense.” States was a relative latecomer to this for those in search of an understand- Given the requirement for defense aspect of army growth. We did not es- ing of the various methods used to and demands of the society, along tablish a formal war college until the bring a military into being, this is a with economic factors, nations have 1900s when the secretary of war in highly recommended source. followed several paths in creating and the Theodore Roosevelt Administra- RETIRED COL D.J. JUDGE nurturing a military force. One Ameri- tion, Elihu Root, argued before Con- can and eight British contributors of- gress for a military school that would fer insight into how Germany, France, meets the demands for “a synergy of Great Britain and the United States managerial and tactical skills.” His formed effective fighting forces. Each German Flak Defences vs Allied Heavy foresight reaped rewards as the Unit- Bombers: 1942-45 by Donald Nijboer; contributor to this anthology provides ed States entered World War I with a a unique approach that provides in- New York, New York: Osprey Publish- core of Army officers who appreciated ing; 2019; 80 pages; $15.59. sight on how a given nation used its how to create a large force from what manpower, economic resources and was the frontier-based U.S. Army. ingenuity to create a military force. Creating an army from this essentially Donald Nijboer’s German Flak Defenc- As pointed out by the authors, there border-protection force tested the es vs. Heavy Bombers is an easy book are two general historical models Woodrow Wilson administration. How to overlook due to its thin size, resem- upon which a nation creates a credible it met the challenge and the aftermath bling Osprey Publishing’s typical vol- fighting force. The Continental Model of the war are covered in crisp detail. employed by Germany and France The same is true for the discussion on ume. But no matter what your interest consisted of a small regular army aid- how the American military used the is, Nijboer’s work truly hits the histo- ed by mandatory short-term conscrip- interwar period to enhance the mili- rian’s sweetspot that punches way tion that flows into a substantial-sized tary-education system while reverting above its weight in terms of pages. reserve force. Given the traditional to a small constabulary force. Along Overlooking this book would simply be dislike by their respective societies of the way, the Congress acceded to the an error on the reader’s part, as the large standing armies, Great Britain Army’s request and established the book is not merely entertaining, but and the United States followed a Army Industrial College to address mo- the overall narrative flow is tremen- slightly different model. In this ver- bilization of industry to support a fu- dous. Professors and instructors often sion, a small volunteer-based regular ture military force. talk about “less is more,” and here is a

70 Spring 2020 perfect case where less is more for author makes a good case that the European continent from German op- perhaps the average student of histo- Germans’ investment in flak was a pression. Many books, articles and ry or World War II, or for the strategic- good exchange for the damage and films covering almost every aspect of air-campaign enthusiast. destruction it wrought upon the Allies’ the invasion are available for those in- air fleets. terested; it would be difficult to find The very first thing I did upon receiv- an area not already addressed. Yet Dr. There are perhaps some areas Nijboer ing this book was turn to the bibliog- Niklas Zetterling, a Swedish historian could have explored but chose not to raphy. There it was, the bible of flak and researcher, found a unique sub- in German Flak Defences. As noted, he works: Edward B. Westermann’s Flak- ject-matter area seldom detailed in didn’t explore the more commonly German Anti-Aircraft Defenses 1914- other works. 1945. Knowing that Nijboer consulted known Wasserfall missile or the less and used Westermann gave me great commonly known Taifun. However, By focusing his attention on German confidence in the book without having neither would have been game-chang- forces in Normandy from June to late turned a page. On the other hand, ers due to the Germans’ failure to de- August 1944, Zetterling reviews a va- there were minor weaknesses. For ex- velop a proximity fuze. Also, Nijboer riety of topics with clarity. His research ample, one could have wished Nijboer could have examined more than he did is based on Allied and German ar- had used the Oct. 12, 1944, memoran- the tradeoff regarding the need for chives, war diaries and the Anlangen. dum for MAJ James L. Luke on “Ger- flak vs. the inability to use the same The Anlangen is a series of distinct man Flak Defense as Related to Trans- weapon type to deal with the mass of German documents that contain “re- portation Targets.” Even more so, one Soviet armor. At the end of the war, ports, compilations and documents might have wished for a separate cite many flak units were sent to the front, produced at the time of the battle.” for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey specifically the Eastern Front, for just Relying on these documents, the au- study, “The German Flak Effort that purpose, which he does lightly thor provides insights on German through The War.” But these are very note. combat readiness, mobility and train- ing. minor quibbles. (The most interesting Nijboer’s German Flak Defences vs. part of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Sur- Heavy Bombers is easily the best im- It should be noted that Zetterling does vey study was the flak-rocket develop- mersion book on this subject this not analyze several German-type units ment, which Nijboer didn’t pay much ground pounder – who has quite the found in Normandy. These include attention to.) love for and library of World War II air fixed vs. mobile anti-aircraft units and The book is liberally illustrated, as is combat – can find to date. What is coastal-artillery formations. most interesting is how little American the standard for many Osprey books. Zetterling divides his work into two fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-wing el- The graphics of flak shells, color cut- parts. Part I reviews the source mate- ements have faced any sustained air- away drawings and many well-chosen rial consulted to support his work. He defense-artillery effort since Vietnam black-and-white pictures make this a then expands with a detailed chapter – other than 11th Air Regiment’s attack treat for the reader who might be new on German military terminology. This during Operation Iraqi Freedom near to the subject. For the reader who is is most helpful in appreciating the ini- Bald, Iraq. Nijboer’s book is highly rec- perhaps better versed, it is likely you tial part of the book. The chapters on ommended and, in terms of pure cost, will snuggle down into your favorite German combat-unit organization and is a great value. For those wanting to reading spot with tea or coffee and the number of German troops in Nor- drill down in greater detail, the bibli- simply enjoy the selection and struc- mandy seek to clarify the type and ography is meaty enough to enable turing of the book’s illustrations. I was number of armored and infantry units the reader to further slake his/her impressed that Osprey included a in Normandy and whether army units thirst on the subject of flak defenses. graphic of the U.S. Army Air Forces’ were equipped differently than those DR. (LTC) ROBERT G. SMITH combat-wing formation, which I per- of the elite Wafffen SS. sonally use to make a point to the mil- itary-science classes I teach. Thought-provoking comments are pro- vided in the discussion on the effects There are some choice facts that will Normandy 1944: German Military Or- of Allied airpower on German person- catch your attention. For example, do ganization, Combat Power and Orga- nel, formations and logistics. Compar- you know how many women were em- nizational Effectiveness by Niklas ing official Allied documents on the ployed in the flak realm? More than Zetterling; Havertown, PA: Casemate subject and his findings, Zetterling lays 116,000 young women were used, not Publishers; 2019; 142 pages, including out charts and figures detailing Allied in ancillary roles, but to replace flak appendices, footnotes and bibliogra- claims, as contrasted with information gunners released for duties at the phy; $34.95. found in German-source documents. front. (There is no mention of casual- This impressive amount of data com- ties among these female flak gunners.) parison is controversial and will spark Another choice fact: The dual-barreled The largest amphibious action ever debate. 128mm Flakzwilling 40/2 weighed in undertaken occurred June 6, 1944. Part I of the book concludes with more at 28 tons. Over the past 75 years, writers have reviewed and dissected the long-her- facts and figures on German tank With his command of the facts, the alded invasion that freed the strength, personnel losses and

71 Spring 2020 movement by German units in and prominent place in the writings on the political obstacle, so Mrs. Luce asked around the battle area. Zetterling’s battle for Normandy. Eisenhower about it when she met comments on German combat effi- RETIRED COL D.J. JUDGE with him in Spring 1952. The meeting ciency are well founded as he applies sheds some light on Eisenhower’s per- a quantitative analysis to source per- sonal view of faith. sonnel figures. This analysis also re- views the effects of other elements in- The Soul of an American President: Luce had been warned by one of herent in this subject area – such as The Untold Story of Dwight D. Eisen- Eisenhower’s aides that “he goes through the roof when people ask him tactics, air superiority, weather, logis- hower’s Faith by Alan Sears, Craig Os- what his denomination is (or) what tics and weapons – have on German ten and Ryan Cole; Ada, MI: Baker church he belongs to. We’ve tried to units. Books; 2019, 230 pages; hardcover discuss it with him, and he bawls us $13.26. Part II of the book lists and evaluates out and says it’s not any of our damn German combat formations, artillery business (because) religion is an abso- headquarters formations and miscel- Many accounts of the storied life, mil- lutely private matter.” Despite the laneous headquarters, along with the itary and political career of Dwight Da- warning, Luce raised the issue with command-and-control elements of vid “Ike” Eisenhower grace the Inter- Eisenhower during the meeting. The German infantry and panzer units. net, libraries and bookstores nation- authors recount how Eisenhower re- Eight appendices supplement and en- wide. They often focus on aspects of portedly exploded in anger as predict- hance material already presented. this General of the Army/U.S. presi- ed. Luce said, “(Ike) jumped to his feet These provide more details on the ar- dent’s legacy from his time as a cadet and got red to the roots of his hair.” rival schedule of units into the Nor- at the U.S. Military Academy at West She said Eisenhower then openly talk- mandy area, a list of unit histories, Point, NY, to his tenure as the two- ed about his faith, saying, “Claire, do commentary on the reliability of Ger- term 34th president. Until now, though, you think I could have fought my way man casualty figures, logistics and few, if any, of the historical accounts through [World WW II], ordered thou- comments on other works. of Eisenhower’s life focused on the sands of fellows to their deaths, if I couldn’t have gone down on my knees This is an order-of-battle book that role faith played in shaping one of the th and talked with God and begged him should be approached with a certain 20 Century’s most influential leaders. to support me and make me feel what amount of awareness. As such, there I was doing was right for myself and are no maps or photos presented. For In their book, The Soul of an American the world? Why, I couldn’t live a day example, to follow the author’s discus- President: The Untold Story of Dwight of my life without God.” sion of weapons, types of artillery and D. Eisenhower’s Faith, Alan Sears, tanks, one would need to consult a Craig Osten and Ryan Cole tell the sto- Luce said she learned that Eisenhower separate book covering these items or ry of a man who began life in abject wasn’t opposed to being part of a possess a familiarity with the subject poverty in rural Texas to a childhood church; he was reluctant to speak matter. Zetterling’s comments on the spent in western Kansas. His parents openly about his personal faith or as- effects of Allied airpower on German were deeply religious people who sociate himself with a particular de- tanks and infantry units, along with his grounded young Ike in daily Bible nomination because he thought it views on German combat effective- reading and study at home. Ike’s faith would be perceived as a political ness, are certain to cause discussion. sustained him through his days at move. West Point to the loss of a young son, These remarks, however, should by no marital difficulties, depression, career Many people throughout Eisenhow- means deter one from reading this disappointments and the horrors and er’s life impacted his faith, but the au- book. The detail and organization of aftermath of World War II. thors highlight the connection to one material is impressive. Maneuver-unit person whose link to Ike went back to commanders will derive a better sense Eisenhower, however, was reticent when Eisenhower was serving as Su- of the effects of unit organization, fire- about his faith. For instance, when he preme Commander of the North At- power and maneuver as exhibited by was still undecided about seeking the lantic Treaty Organization. At that time both sides during the vicious fighting Republican nomination for president Eisenhower began corresponding with in Normandy. The result of Allied air in the early months of 1952, he was young Southern Baptist evangelist Bil- attacks on the French rail and road urged by friends and influential people ly Graham from North Carolina in systems, along with attaining and of the day to run. Two of the people 1951. The two had become acquaint- maintaining air superiority during and who were strongly in favor of Eisen- ed via oil baron Sid Richardson, a mu- after the invasion, will re-emphasize hower’s candidacy were Henry R. tual friend from Texas who met Gra- to ground commanders the vital role Luce, the founder of Time magazine, ham during the evangelist’s Fort of airpower in any current and future and his wife, Claire Booth Luce, the Worth, TX, crusade in 1951. Graham operation. This is a well-researched formidable former congresswoman had given Richardson a letter and and well-written book which will ei- from Connecticut. The influential Re- asked him to share it with Eisenhower. ther enhance, refute or confirm the publican couple were concerned In the letter, Graham expressed his writings of others on the critical battle about Eisenhower’s lack of public clar- deep concern for the state of the na- for Normandy. It should occupy a ity about his faith as a possible tion’s moral fiber while urging

72 Spring 2020 Eisenhower to offer himself for service principles shaped public policy during as president. the Cold War era and defined the soul Acronym Quick-Scan of a nation. Eisenhower remains the only U.S. GARY A. JONES AEF – American Expeditionary president to be baptized while in of- Force Deputy Editor, ARMOR fice. This book captures how personal IJA – Imperial Japanese Army faith impacted the man whose LVT – Landing Vehicle Tracked

For Company- and Platoon-Level Leaders’ Professional Development: Musicians of Mars, Vol. 3: the Cobra Strikes One of the Center for for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)’s recent products (published in Febru- ary 2019), it is a series of tactical vignettes in the same vein asDuffer’s Drift and should aid mounted-maneuver leaders in conducting professional development with their junior officers / noncommissioned officers. From the CALL Website: “Musicians of Mars III The Cobra Strikes picks up the tale of ... Task Force Mustang in the af- termath of their successful defense (in CALL Handbook 16-12, Musicians of Mars II) of Engage- ment Area Blackjack. ... As with Musicians of Mars II, this handbook takes the reader through a fictional scenario where the tactical leaders make decisions, some good and some not so good, that impact subsequent actions. Musicians of Mars III will have its leaders learning and improving as they progress through tactical engagements. This was intentional in the develop- ment of this publication and is designed to facilitate tactical discussions at the company and platoon levels.” All three Musicians of Mars publications are available by going to the CALL Website, https:// call.army.mil, and clicking on “Publications.” Direct links are Musicians of Mars III: The Cobra Strikes, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-08.pdf;Musicians of Mars II, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/16-1;Musicians of Mars I: A Story of Synchronization for the Company/Team Commander, https://usacac.army. mil/node/2358. The publications are also available to order in hard copy. (Books and ship- ping are free to unit address. To order publications, visit https://call2.army.mil/rfp (CAC login required). General questions can be directed to CALL’s Request for Information line at (913) 684-2255 (CALL).) From foreword: “There is still a tendency in each separate unit … to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire. … That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music, each instrument must support the others. To get har- mony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars … must come into the concert at the proper place at the proper time.” -MG George S. Patton Jr., address to 2nd Armored Division, July 8, 1941

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The shield is divided into red, blue and gold because these are the colors of the shoulder-sleeve insignia of the armored tank forces. The lightning bolt is symbolic of the striking power of the organiza- tion. The unit was activated June 1, 1941, at Fort Lewis, WA; inacti- vated Feb. 8, 1946, at Camp Kilmer, NJ; and reactivated Aug. 1, 1948, at Fort Benning, GA. The distinctive unit insignia was originally ap- proved for 756th Tank Battalion (Light) May 15, 1942. It was redes- ignated for 756th Tank Battalion Nov. 22, 1943. The insignia was re- designated for 73rd Tank Battalion Oct. 12, 1953. It was redesignated for 73rd Armor March 19, 1963. It was redesignated effective Feb. 25, 2004, for 73rd Cavalry Regiment. Headquarters, Department of the Army PB 17-20-2 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited PIN 206747-000