The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over Serbia, 1999 6 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2015 Daniel L. Haulman AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2015 7 (Overleaf) The A–10 he last major United States military The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, acknowl- Thunderbolt II was a major aircraft in the air war over operation of the twentieth century was edged “excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbia. (All photos USAF.) noteworthy in a number of ways. It Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army marked the first time NATO took part in combat which has resulted in numerous civilian casualties operations against a sovereign nation. It was the last and…the displacement of more than 230,000 per- Ttime manned aircraft shot down manned enemy air- sons from their homes.” These words were incorpo- craft. The operation resulted in no American casual- rated into United Nations Security Council Resolu - ties. It ended one of the worst instances of genocide tion 1199 passed on September 23, that demanded a in a century of genocide. Most importantly, it was the ceasefire in Kosovo, dialogue between the warring first air campaign that produced victory without the parties, the end of action by security forces against use of ground forces. Operation Allied Force, or the civilians, and the safe return of refugees.2 Air War Over Serbia, resulted in victory without any Concurrently, the North Atlantic Treaty American or NATO “boots on the ground.” Organization prepared to exercise air strikes, if nec- In early 1998, violence erupted within Kosovo essary, to enforce UNSCR 1160. Dr. Javier Solana, between Yugoslavian (Serb) forces and the Kosovo Secretary-General of NATO, stated on September IN EARLY Liberation Army (KLA). As a result, a Contact 24, the day following the passage of UNSCR 1160, 1998, Group consisting of the foreign ministers of six that the alliance was preparing to act. Solana VIOLENCE nations, the United States, the Russian Federation, announced that the North Atlantic Council had just the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy approved issuing an activation warning that ERUPTED met in London during March in an attempt to dis- increased its level of military preparedness and WITHIN cuss the growing war within Kosovo. Partly in allowed NATO commanders to begin identifying KOSOVO response to two statements from the Contact forces required for possible air operations.3 BETWEEN Group, dated March 9 and 25, the United Nations On October 12, 1998, Richard Holbrooke, YUGO - Security Council passed Resolution 1160 on March President Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans, 31. It urged a political settlement of issues in flew to Belgrade and warned the Yugoslavian pres- SLAVIAN Kosovo, supported greater autonomy for Kosovo ident that if he failed to comply with UN resolu- (SERB) within Yugoslavia, and banned arms sales and tions, he risked NATO air strikes. Lt. Gen. Michael FORCES AND deliveries to Yugoslavia. The resolution also con- E. Short, USAF, who commanded NATO air forces THE KOSOVO demned the use of excess force by Serbian paramil- in the theater, accompanied Holbrooke. He spoke LIBERATION itary police forces against the civilian population, personally with Milosevic, telling him essentially ARMY (KLA) and denounced any terrorist activity such as that that the question was not whether NATO planes which the Serbs claimed the KLA performed.1 would be flying over Kosovo, but whether they In May and June, NATO leaders met in Brus - would be taking photographs or dropping bombs. sels to consider military options. In June, an agree- On October 13, NATO’s North Atlantic Council ment between Yugoslav President Slobodan authorized activation orders for air strikes. United Milosevic and Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia, States aircraft and aircrews deployed to Europe in allowed the formation of a Kosovo Diplomatic preparations for air strikes against Serbia.4 Observer Mission, consisting of representatives from The threat produced diplomatic results in several nations, to report on freedom of movement Belgrade. On October 15 and 16, Yugoslavian repre- and security conditions in the troubled province. The sentatives signed agreements to allow a Kosovo ver- six-nation Contact Group continued to meet, and ification mission on the ground and an air verifica- issued statements on June 12 and July 8 on the tion mission. On October 24, the United Nations increasing deterioration of conditions in Kosovo. Security Council passed Resolution 1203, which Serbian police security forces in Kosovo, in an effort endorsed the verification missions. However, to deprive the KLA of their civilian supporters, Milosevic, as president of Yugoslavia, had signed began to drive ethnic Albanians from their homes. neither agreement, suggesting that he could later Daniel L. Haulman is Chief, Organizational Histories, at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. After earning a BA from the University of Southwestern Louisiana and an ME (Master of Education) from the University of New Orleans, he earned a Ph.D. in history from Auburn University. Dr. Haulman has authored three books, including Air Force Aerial Victory Credits, The USAF and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, and One Hundred Years of Flight: USAF Chronology of Significant Air and Space Events, 1903-2002. He has written several pamphlets, composed sections of several other USAF publications, and compiled the list of official USAF aerial victories appearing on the AFHRA’s web page. He wrote the Air Force chapter in supplement IV of A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History and completed six studies on aspects of recent USAF operations that have been used by the Air Staff and Air University. He has also written a chapter in Locating Air Force Base Sites: History’s Legacy, a book about the location of Air Force bases. The author of fifteen published articles in various journals, Dr. Haulman has presented more than twenty historical papers at histori- cal conferences and taught history courses at Huntingdon College, Auburn University at Montgomery, and Faulkner University. He co-authored, with Joseph Caver and Jerome Ennels, the book The Tuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, published by New South Books in 2011. This work is extracted from another book chapter. An abridged version appeared in Air Force Magazine. 8 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2015 (Near right) Slobodan Milošević was the President of Serbia from 1989-97 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. (Far right) Lt. Gen. Michael E. Short, USAF, who com- manded NATO air forces in the theater. claim he had never made such a commitment him- tion, of all atrocities committed against civilians self. After intense negotiations between Milosevic and full cooperation with the International and Dr. Javier Solana, the Secretary General of Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including com- NATO, with NATO military leaders present to rein- pliance with its orders, requests for information and force the threat of NATO air strikes, Milosevic investigations…”8. As a result of the resolution, an reluctantly agreed on October 25, to sign an agree- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former ment to remove “excess” Serb police and paramili- Yugoslavia convened, with Louise Arbour appointed tary forces from Kosovo and allow the verification as chief prosecutor.9 missions to proceed. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA, The crisis intensified in November and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) December, 1998. Milosevic forbade the entrance of was present at the signing.5 United Nations war crimes investigators to deter- MILOSEVIC The aerial verification agreement allowed mine whether ethnic cleansing and genocide had RELUC- NATO reconnaissance aircraft such as USAF U–2s occurred in Kosovo. On November 17, the UN TANTLY and MQ–1 Predators, to verify the removal of Serb passed Security Resolution 1207, condemning AGREED ON forces from civilian areas of Kosovo. A week later, Yugoslavia for failing to arrest and transfer three OCTOBER 25, NATO formally approved aerial surveillance mis- individuals indicted by the International Criminal sions over Kosovo, Operation Eagle Eye, which Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.10 TO SIGN AN began on October 29, 1998. 6 The final crisis began in January 1999. On AGREEMENT Operation Eagle Eye aerial verification flights January 8 and 10, the KLA ambushed and killed TO REMOVE over Kosovo took place in conjunction with the four Serbian policemen near Stimlje, Kosovo. On “EXCESS” ground verification mission or KVM (Kosovo January 15, fighting erupted around the village of SERB POLICE Verification Mission). The Organization for Security Racak, as Yugoslavian police forces advanced into AND PARA- and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provided the area. The KLA retreated from the town. Several approximately 1,400 personnel for that part of the people were shot and wounded during the advance. MILITARY verification process. The ground mission arrived in The Yugoslavian forces cornered about thirty men FORCES Kosovo in November under the leadership of and boys in the cellar of a house. Letting the boys FROM William Walker, a former U.S. ambassador to El go, they took the twenty-three men elsewhere. The KOSOVO Salvador.7 next day, villagers found their bodies. They had been Resolution 1203, in addition to endorsing the shot at close range. The Yugoslavs had apparently verification missions in Kosovo, also called for the targeted the men of the village, probably in retalia- enforcement of previous UN Security Council tion for the killing of their own police earlier in the Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The United Nations and month. International investigators soon determined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization spoke with that forty-five persons had died in Racak, including one voice on the need for Yugoslavia to reduce its two women and a twelve-year-old boy. Nine KLA military presence in Kosovo, to allow the return of soldiers were also found dead.