Joint Force Quarterly

Home , III Corps (Australia), Merrill McPeak, USS Leary (DD-879)

02Cov2 9/25/96 11:39 AM Page C2

Cov 2 JFQ / Summer 1996 03Prel 9/25/96 11:44 AM Page 1 JFQ

AWord from the Chairman

In 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, pondered the bitter lessons of joint operations from World War II and the price paid in blood of parochialism in the services and a lack of joint doctrine. He argued that “separate ground, air, and sea warfare is gone forever.” Such ideas, although deemed “revolutionary, dangerous, and unnecessary” during the organizational battles that raged after the war, resulted in the formation of the Department of Defense in 1947.

From the National Security Act of 1947 to help failing states. The Armed Forces have per- the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act formed superbly in every operation despite ardu- of 1986, we have traveled a long, hard road. ous demands on them and their families. In addi- Nonetheless, we have made considerable progress tion, a quantum leap in joint doctrine—with 63 in acquiring, sustaining, and refining the capabil- publications completed and another 35 on the ity to conduct joint and combined operations. way—has improved joint operations and training Even in the Persian Gulf significant interservice exercises. As in the past, many of our best joint ef- problems emerged: fratricide, difficulties in intel- forts have been a product of cooperation among ligence diffusion, incompatible communication artful commanders after an operation has begun. links, limited airlift and sealift capabilities, the de- That cooperation must continue, but we must be velopment and dissemination of air tasking or- more proactive in providing the fabric of jointness ders, and logistical problems. As in the past, how- before an operation begins. ever, we were able to resolve most of these and A second paradox involves strategic and bud- other issues during a lengthy period of prepara- get realities. Today’s force will compete with to- tion prior to the campaign. In the future, we can- morrow’s. We must continue to refine critical op- not count on the factor of time to resolve joint erational aspects of joint operations and sustain a concerns. We must be ready to execute a CINC’s high level of readiness. Training, exercises, educa- war plan with little or no notice. tion, and even quality of life are fundamental to Today we face some interesting paradoxes. day-to-day readiness. At the same time, for the fu- On one hand the end of the Cold War enabled us ture, we must also devote greater resources to to reduce forces and budgets by about 35 percent. force modernization to take advantage of new On the other we have conducted some forty joint technologies and replace aging equipment. We operations in recent years—to preserve the dignity need readiness and modernization to successfully of peoples in the face of savage tragedies, evacuate accomplish missions at minimal cost of lives. innocent citizens, crush illegal drug activities, and (continued on page 4)

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■ CONTENTS

22 Building a Joint Training Readiness Reporting System by John C.F. Tillson 1 A Word from the Chairman by John M. Shalikashvili 29 JLASS: Educating Future Leaders in Strategic and Operational Art ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET by James C. Hyde and 6 Letters to the Editor Michael W. Everett

■ COMMENTARY ■ DOCUMENTATION 8 Warriors of the 13th Generation 34 Joint Vision 2010: by Lewis Ware America’s Military— JFQ Preparing for Tomorrow ■ ■ 11 Unified Endeavor ’95 and 51 Innovation: Past and Future Modeling Effective Training by Williamson Murray by Ralph W. Passarelli and Frank E. Schwamb 61 “Top Down” Planning and Joint Doctrine: The Australian 16 Training the Pacific Warriors Experience by Jay B. Yakeley III and by Thomas-Durell Young Harold E. Bullock 67 The C–17 Transport— Joint Before Its Time by George M. Dryden PHOTO CREDITS

The cover features USS Kentucky (U.S. Navy/F.E. Zip Zimmerman); the inset photos (from top) show Marine opposing force during CJTFEX ’96 (U.S. Marine Corps/C.D. Clark), aviators examining Vickers machine gun in France, 1918 (U.S. Army Military History Institute), Bradley fighting vehicle (U.S. Army), military police posted in front of Haitian parliament building (2d Marine Division/M.T. Huff), and F–16s aloft (Combat Camera/Brett Snow). The front inside cover incorporates (clockwise, from top right) self-propelled gun and tactical vehicles being loaded on C–17 transport (McDonnell Douglas), Coast Guard cutter Northland repatriating Haitians (U.S. Air Force/Val Gempis), preparing for air drop (U.S. Air Force/Ken Bergmann), Marine M–1 tank rolling off landing craft (Military Photography/Greg Stewart), and Blackhawk helicopter lifting off USS George Washington (U.S. Navy/Gregg Snaza). The table of contents photos show (from top) Indonesian peacekeeper 74 Strategic Leadership and the providing security at political rally in Cambodia (United Nations/J. Issac), C–17 transport (U.S. Air Force/David McLeod), SEALs and Thai special forces during “Fourth” Army War College Cobra Gold ’95 (Joint Combat Camera/Tony Lambert), Special Forces aboard USS George Washington for fleet exercise 2–94 (U.S. Navy/Gregg Snaza), and by Richard A. Chilcoat and Fill ’er Up by James F. Berge (U.S. Air Force Art Collection). Roderick R. Magee II The back inside cover captures IFOR 155mm self-propelled howitzer at McGill Base, Grid 171726, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (55th Signal Company/Jon E. Long). The back cover encompasses landing craft underway off Rota, Spain 81 Developing a Strategy for (U.S. Navy/Stephen H. Kless), M–1 tank (U.S. Marine Corps), naval battle group Troubled States (U.S. Navy), and F–16s at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona (U.S. Air Force/Val Gempis). by Robert B. Oakley

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SUMMER 96 / NUMBER 12

89 Garuda XII: Indonesian ■ THE JOINT WORLD Peacekeeping in Cambodia 108 Exercises, Education, by John B. Haseman and History 95 Supplying War: Interservice and Interallied Cooperation in China-Burma-India by Leo J. Daugherty III

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 106 Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg

■ OFF THE SHELF 112 Are We Really Ready for an RMA? A Book Review by Brian R. Sullivan

114 Campaigning under the U.N. Banner: A Book Review by Jeff S. Kojac

115 The Pacific Century and Future Causes of War: A Book Review by Patrick M. Cronin

117 Cumulative Index JFQ(1995–96): Issues 9–12

Joint Force Quarterly

Hans Binnendijk JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and top- Editor-in-Chief fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 136 for Patrick M. Cronin employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations details). Please direct all editorial communications to: forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, Acting Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy Analysis, Editor contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies Joint Force Quarterly unified commands, and joint force development. Consulting Editor ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Robert A. Silano Fort Lesley J. McNair not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense Editor Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 Martin J. Peters, Jr. or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 Production Coordinator without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 Calvin B. Kelley ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- E-Mail: [email protected] Copy Editor rial is quoted from or based on its contents. This publication has been approved by the Secretary of JFQ is available on the Internet via the Joint Doctrine Web The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Defense. site at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction. ISSN 1070–0692 August 1996

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Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher Historically, great leaders such as Eisenhower ADVISORY COMMITTEE and Marshall have seen improved jointness as a means of dealing with similar paradoxes. The in- Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University Chairman formation age has magnified this reality. For example, many improved C4I systems have no sin- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman gle-service parent. Moreover, information age Col John W. Brooks, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College technologies offer the possibility for weapons and

MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College we have come a long way since Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces we have some distance to go BG Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff

Col Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College other systems that will meet the requirements of BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College all or many of the services and warfighting CINCs.

Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College Clearly efforts to achieve a common direction and high levels of jointness must continue. Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College Today we are institutionalizing the spirit of that RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College endeavor. And that is the process we have begun over the past several years by developing joint Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College doctrine, strengthening joint training and exer- RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College cises, embedding jointness into force planning and materiel development processes, adding new EDITORIAL BOARD facilities such as the Joint Warfighting Center, and continuing to refine interaction with war- Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University fighting CINCs. We have come a long way since Chairman the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but we have some dis- Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University tance to go.

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Scripture tells us that “Where there is no vision, the people perish,” and that is just as true ■ Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University today. A joint, long-term vision—shared by all COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy services and unified CINCs—is essential if we are to retain a viable national security into the uncer- Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University tain environment of the next century. We had Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College long-range assessments in the past, but out of ne-

Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces cessity we designed and sized forces primarily for one worst case, threat-based scenario: global war ■ Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF Naval War College with the Soviet Union. Yet with the massive Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College changes that followed the end of the Cold War we found it necessary to focus almost exclusively Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation on short- and mid-range modifications to Cold William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College War force structure. This process resulted in the CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review. The latter provided a “sizing scenario” for designing force John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago structure absent a clear threat. LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute Today, for example, we are sized to meet two

Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College major regional contingencies (MRC). These scenarios are only mid-term markers that helped James H. Toner ■ Air War College build, manage, and sustain our forces. Today, it is LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University clear that we need a long-term vision to focus our efforts. The Commission on Roles and Missions of COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College the Armed Forces agreed and recommended that COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College JCS “propose a unified vision for joint operations...toguide force and materiel development, integrate support to CINCs, improve joint doc- A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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Shalikashvili

trine development, develop and monitor joint bridge between such critical efforts as the Joint readiness standards, and increase emphasis on Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the joint training.” Thus, to remain dominant in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments future we will need a mark on the wall to help us (JWCA), and the upcoming Quadrennial Defense develop the requisite warfighting capabilities to Review by offering a common benchmark against deter or defeat any threat that emerges. which to measure all options under considera- JV 2010 is that mark on the wall. It is the con- tion. While these individual processes currently ceptual template for how the Armed Forces will bring service perspectives into joint focus, JV channel the vitality and innovation of our people 2010 will integrate the efforts of all processes. The and leverage technological opportunities to result will be more efficient use of resources and a achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint better return on our investment. warfighting into the 21st century. It will help us The second benefit is that JV 2010 will en- leverage our strengths, especially quality people able us to leverage every opportunity that pre- and technology, to create a force with capabilities sents itself during this period of rapid change. to dominate any battlefield across a full spectrum Knowing the types of capabilities we desire, it will of threats. JV 2010 will also provide a measure of permit us to transform emerging technologies merit for evaluating innovations which have the into advantages that support our vision. Today, potential to support our vision. for example, we are in the midst of a revolution JV 2010 is the result of two years of thought in military affairs. Rapid technological changes and hard work by the CINCs, services, and Joint must and will force changes in organization, Staff. We have a training, and operations. If there is one certainty, long history of it is that the revolution will cause us to either multiservice initia- maintain our edge or lose it. JV 2010 is designed JV 2010 will enable us to further tives, interservice to help us retain it. refine procedures for assessing rivalries, and con- The final benefit of JV 2010 is that it will tention over roles allow us to achieve higher levels of jointness. We and developing joint capabilities and missions. This will always fight jointly, and despite tremendous is not all bad. progress over the last several years we must con- Healthy competi- tinuously refine our warfighting capabilities. tion over ideas is fundamental to the course of in- Various joint efforts are underway, such as novation. But the collegiate, joint effort repre- enhancing the joint lessons learned process and sented in JV 2010 bodes well for service developing joint doctrine and training. These ef- cooperation within a framework of joint warfight- forts will continue and I expect that JV 2010 and ing concepts. the plans that result from it will accelerate them. JV 2010 is not so much about technology as JV 2010 will also bring a greater level of jointness it is focused on developing new operational capa- to every facet of warfighting by ensuring that cur- bilities. The new capabilities embrace every aspect rent and future development efforts contribute to of warfighting including quality people, leading desired joint capabilities. We will capitalize on edge technology, integrated training and doc- the experience of the Joint Warfighting Center as trine, superior equipment and weapons systems, it plays a central role in implementing JV 2010. and more. We now enjoy the advantage of having the Three important benefits will emerge from world’s finest military. That fact is not chiseled in JV 2010 and the process that flows from it. stone. Maintaining our status as a preeminent First, it will foster continued cooperation power will demand work, particularly at a time of among all DOD components in working toward a unprecedented change. We will have to be united common set of joint warfighting capabilities in and flexible as we move into the next century. two critical ways. It will serve as a litmus test for JV 2010 will help us negotiate the changes evaluating future service and CINC initiatives. ahead, leverage new opportunities, and maintain The services will be the prime movers in over-the- our standing as the finest fighting force in the horizon thinking and restructuring, and CINCs world, capable of deterring war or winning a con- will be the prime movers in testing and validating flict if called upon to fight. We will maintain a concepts and technologies. JV 2010 will also pro- force with the capability to deploy to a theater on vide a benchmark for evaluating changes into the short notice, ready to fight and win as a joint team. 21st century. It will help us harness the best efforts and keep us focused on joint capabilities, JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI not business as usual or divergent priorities. Chairman Once implemented, JV 2010 will also enable of the Joint Chiefs of Staff us to further refine procedures for assessing and developing joint capabilities. It will provide a

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■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

theater forces may be unnecessary—and less ef- THE LAST WORD Letters... fective. The current policy whereby regional CINCs To the Editor—The two letters from John Ray source components to form JTFs/JECs when Skates and Barton J. Bernstein in your last issue, ROTATING ASHORE needed works. which appeared in response to my article, “Opera- To the Editor—In “A Word from the Chair- —LTC Chris North, USA tion Downfall: The Devil Was in the Details” (see man” (JFQ, Winter 95–96), GEN Shalikashvili dealt EUSA Battlefield Coordination JFQ, Autumn 95), prompt me to make one final mainly with what should and should not be done Detachment, Korea effort to make my case. with defense spending. While I agree with most of The assertion by Professor Skates that he his points on base realignment, acquisition reform, OR A JOINT CPO? was only attempting “to determine the casualties and base closures, I disagree with the notion of pri- To the Editor—While serving as command that were projected by the military planners” contra- vatizing and outsourcing at shore-based com- master chief for Naval Special Warfare Group Two, I dicts statements in the preface, summation, and mands. Shore duty is typically viewed by those of recommended JFQ to my chiefs’ mess for aware- subtitle of his book. Moreover, the remarkably low us who serve in the Navy as a break between sea ness of a joint perspective in executing our tasks. number of casualties which he projected from larger duty assignments. But when civilians replace sailors For that reason I read the letter from SGM Traeger estimates in contemporarious military sources is in these commands you cut the number of billets (“A Joint NCO?” JFQ, Autumn 95) with great inter- central to his thesis that a ground invasion would available for shore duty. Most sailors look forward est. It hit home since much if not all of the focus on not have been so bad after all: a contention that he to rotating ashore, regarding such assignments as jointness involves matters of operational planning now seems to hope readers will not notice. incentives for the time that they spend at sea. Tak- and execution. Personnel items—morale, welfare, While Skates had access to much of the ing that away is demoralizing. I also find it wasteful personal recognition, education, and training—are available evidence, he seems to understand little of to hire civilians for jobs that sailors can do just as largely ignored. it. As a result, his book reveals innumerable mis- well and at less cost. Sailors already collect a pay- Simple nuisances in the context of one ser- conceptions which directly or indirectly support his check. Why not capitalize on that? vice culture can become significant obstacles for claim that casualties would have been compara- —STG2 (SW) Michael V. Chiazza, USN the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who tively low and that using the atomic bomb was un- Master at Arms Division serve in joint billets or participate in joint exercises. necessary. These include an overly literal interpre- Naval Education and Training Center This might involve disparities along service lines tation of what the Japanese meant by beach among members of a “joint team” when it comes to defenses, misreading the increasing effectiveness ENGAGEMENT FORCES per diem rates or awards recommendations. of enemy anti-tank doctrine, and failing to realize To the Editor—In “New Forces for Engage- Dealing with such challenges is not uncom- that weak centralized control of Japanese artillery ment Policy” (JFQ, Winter 95–96), William Mendel mon for senior enlisted personnel who daily face was irrelevant when firing from dug-in, camou- made an excellent case for organizing a joint en- education, PERSTEMPO, and retention problems. flaged positions on pre-ranged, congested landing gagement command (JEC) to tackle operations Such issues do not go away in the joint world; they sites and avenues of approach. Also, he serious other than war (OOTW). He recommended a func- become more complex. Though Traeger touched on mishandles the question of the Kamikazes. tional, CONUS-based standing joint task force (JTF) “the friction at the seams of joint training and oper- I am delighted, however, that Professor for worldwide use. Another way to meet this chal- ations,” he might have asked: How well are we Bernstein found my criticism of the Skates book lenge is with regional policy and forces. OOTW mis- managing the intricate relationships among the “spirited,” but unfortunately he and I differ on the sions are often regional versus functional, with so- members of different services with their unique cul- historical record. Regarding President Truman’s let- lutions peculiar to a CINC’s AOR. tures and how well are they working, living, learn- ter to Air Force historian James Cate, though Tru- Standing JTFs in peacetime are few and nor- ing, and executing together? The answer today is man bypassed his staff more frequently than any mally reserved for special missions. However, some “okay, but.” That is unacceptable. We can do better. other chief executive in this century, it was not un- theater exercise programs train regionally appor- I support the sergeant major’s recommendation. usual for him to allow his staff read and comment tioned forces for missions, including OOTW, pre- The Chairman should have a senior NCO or CPO on on hastily penned communications. In the original dicted for their AOR. Predesignated headquarters his joint leadership team. draft of the Cate letter, Truman recounted only the within the PACOM AOR (namely, I Corps, III MEF, —GMCM Brian L. Berrey, USN (Ret.) “minimum” number of expected casualties that Seventh Fleet) are trained as JTF commanders Waldorf, Maryland George Marshall gave him—which happened to be under CINCPAC. Joint forces are trained and rou- 250,000 men—and made no reference to a maxi- tinely employed in PACOM, gaining valuable experi- SORRY MEIN HERR mum. Secretary Stimson, however, had publicly cited a maximum, stating that he was advised that ence at all levels. To the Editor—Carl von Clausewitz’s middle the figures “might” exceed one million. CINCPAC developed a decision process for name is Philipp Gottlieb, not Maria as shown in the Presidential aids Ken Heckler and David Lloyd selecting the best suited JTF commander for a par- caption under his likeness which accompanied my thought that providing both maximum and mini- ticular mission based on various factors, some of article (JFQ, Winter 95–96). For the record, Maria mums figure was crucial, and among other things, which are hard to forecast prior to the event. A de- was his wife’s name. This confusion has been very raised the Stimson account. That Truman was re- ployable augmentation cell from the CINCPAC staff pervasive. Even Sir Michael Howard admits having minded by these two young staffers—who had not and components, routinely exercised, is sent to a gotten it wrong as did reference works like the attended any meeting with Marshall—is not, as JTF commander and assures that it has the joint Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. expertise to accomplish the mission. —MAJ Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA A new CONUS-based organization which nei- Chief, Battalion/Brigade Doctrine ther routinely works in the theater nor trains with 3/16 Cavalry

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

Bernstein proposes, something that proves or dis- be easily distorted and turned into a shield for dis- bipolar Cold War it is becoming more so. Linear, re- proves what the President discussed with Marshall gracefully selfish conduct. What seems odd is that ductionist argumentation can neither adequately in private. Neither does it alter the fact that Truman Toner clearly points to the superiority of integrity describe nor prescribe such a world. Those who personally approved the addition to his letter, which over all other virtues. To me, integrity is the fullest disagree over the continued existence of the Air credited Marshall as the source, and used these expression of those essential qualities that make up Force in such an environment should consider the figures and attribution in his memoirs as well. a person of character. nature of both the defense establishment and the As for Bernstein’s contention that “Stimson’s Integrity is the virtue of honor selflessly ap- external world in which it exists and must interact. own published postwar claim is unsupported by plied and devotion to professional competence. It Let me to cite two illustrations, one negative and reliable pre-Hiroshima sources that any scholar has goes beyond wisdom and good judgment because one positive. unearthed,” perhaps he should consult Truman and it brings forth right action which, in turn, is the very On the negative side, there is the field of the Hiroshima Cult by Robert P. Newman. It seems heart of duty. Whatever one thinks of Robert E. “cutback management” that addresses reducing or that during this period of intense scrutiny of the Lee’s personal behavior, his statement that “Duty is eliminating organizational structure. Unfortunately, casualty issue and the wider implications of drop- the sublimest word in the English language,” re- administrators and policymakers who initiate this ping the bomb, the Secretary of War’s own staff flects a soldier’s traditional grasp of that concept as process often fail to take into account the complex- reported a figure of 1,000,000 which meets it existed prior to World War II. ity and nonlinearity found in the real world. The re- Bernstein’s search for a pre-Hiroshima source. One facet of duty is perhaps rather stiffly, al- sult is that in attempting to “unbuild” a major orga- It is also important that Marshall never re- beit well captured in Worth’s battalion orders issued nization such as the Air Force one finds that things futed Truman’s statement, even obliquely. What he at West Point in 1820: “. . . an officer on duty do not tend to come apart in the same way they said was that an invasion would have been “terribly knows no one. To be partial is to dishonor both him- were put together. bitter and frightfully expensive in lives and trea- self and the object of his ill-advised favor.” Here in- On the positive side, the simple existence of sure.” He also stated that claims the war would tegrity of person and the fulfillment of lawful orders a separate Air Force can yield real benefits in the have ended soon, even without using atomic are united to transcends mere honor. Honorable complex world of international security. Thus in weapons “were rather silly,” maintaining that “it conduct is fundamental to integrity, but honor has a coping with complex environments (such as foreign was quite necessary to drop the bomb to shorten distinctly personal quality, so much so that, without affairs), the regulating system (or security structure) the war,” going on to add that “I think it was very an admixture of selflessness, it is easily distorted. must be similarly complex. Structural complexity of wise to use it.” Integrity, as Toner ably, if indirectly notes, is a better human systems can be enhanced by a variety of —D.M. Giangreco basis for conduct. people, viewpoints, and experiences (educational Military Review —Douglas V. Johnson II and operational). One can’t assume that complexity U.S. Army Command and Strategic Studies Institute is enhanced just by the existence of many entities General Staff College U.S. Army War College within a larger structure. That is, the existence of a navy and marine corps in one compartment, an A MATTER OF HONOR NONLINEAR WORLD army in another, and an air force in yet another doesn’t in itself add to complexity in a defense es- As the Army reengineers its Having read arguments on the To the Editor— To the Editor— tablishment. Linear addition does not enhance doctrine on leadership, one underlying objective is disestablishment of a separate Air Force in the complexity. Elements must be linked both horizon- to adopt a set of values. In his article on “Leader- pages of JFQ and elsewhere, I find many of them, tally and vertically. Individual services must be ship, Community, and Virtue” (JFQ, Spring 96), though valid, are linear and reductionist. Protago- made to interact and perform jointly. James Toner provides a timely impetus for consid- nists assume that adding enough details—on roles, There are several bottom lines. First, a sepa- ering candidate values. And yet I was troubled by missions, capabilities, et al.—will carry the day. rate Department of the Air Force has existed for half the structure of his argument with its mantra that The Air Force will then survive or be eliminated. a century. Much of the defense establishment today “the highest virtue of a soldier. . . is honor.” The The modern world is enormously complex is predicated on that fact. Any effort to disestablish problem, as he rightly indicates, is that honor can and it is also nonlinear. International security is at the Air Force may not be as clearly delineated as least that complex, and since the demise of the some might believe. Second, any attempt to do so may have major unforeseen consequences. Sadly, in the nonlinear world events are generally not re- versible. Thus we may create an “oops” that cannot put your pen to paper . . . be undone. Third, though messy and perhaps du- plicative, the existing defense establishment may by its complexity be more survivable and adaptive to JFQ real world events. —Maj Francis X. Neumann, Jr., welcomes your letters and comments USAF (Ret.) Troy, Illinois FAX your correspondence to (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 or send it on the Internet to [email protected]

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■ WARRIORS of the 13th Generation

commentary By LEWIS WARE

he article by Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelley, USAF, the commander of Air Uni- T versity, on “Brilliant War- riors” which appeared in the last issue of JFQ offered various thought-provok- ing ideas on professional military education (PME). Since the author sought to stimulate debate, let me accept the challenge. Kelley assumes that PME should teach students to recognize strategic environments of the next century as “alternate futures.” They “are descriptive,” he says, “not predictive or nor- mative.” Thus from the outset he begs the question of the reality that such futures claim to represent and in which officers will be expected to operate. Even if one succeeds in grasping the general shape of “alternate futures” for objective scrutiny, nowhere does he spell out how to validate their concrete nature. One is asked, in fact, to view alternate futures in terms of “planning stories or scenarios.” Thus it may be hard to resist predicating the future on subjective predilections.

Lewis Ware is on the faculty of the Air Command and Staff College. (Ken Wright) U.S. Air Force

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Ware

If alternate futures are nothing concern that any action is preferable to strongly that appropriate behavior more than plausible constructs of real- misdirected action or no action at all. ought to be measured against a moral ity, Kelley nevertheless encourages ap- This perspective leads to other pit- as well as an intellectual standard. plying a rigorously objective method falls. The need to pick the right future Thus his interest in experience-based in creating them. The system chosen from the profusion available encour- education has the added attraction of to build the future uses the same infer- ages Kelley to suggest that technology reestablishing the “confident assurance ential reasoning that he asserts is suffi- will provide the instrument of analysis of virtue, right conduct, and fidelity to cient in order to know the past. As to validate the correct choice. From core values.” In this way PME is sensi- proof he claims that a proportional re- here, it is but a single step to define tive to problems of a larger society by lationship exists between creating al- the sole purpose of education as help- recreating an environment in which ternate futures and commercial prof- ing the military select the proper tech- institutional civics with its associated itability. Thus, for a business to neglect nologies to evaluate alternate futures. standard of morality may be inculcated shaping the future environment in But more than a simple instrument of and a professional ethos restored. As which it expects to sell its products analysis, technology will itself ulti- he says, a military that loses public

might entail a loss of its market share mately become, to his mind, the facili- support may be, like a faltering bureau- commentary to another business that does. By the tator by which the next generation of cracy, in more trouble than a military same token, one is counseled, a mili- officers will be creatively nurtured and which loses a battle. tary that does not generate alternate educated. Hence it follows that “if we This concern over core values is futures may lose the nation it serves. can envision alternate futures, we can laudatory. One must ask, nonetheless, Equating the loss of a market to use technology to create them as vir- whether such remediation is really the loss of national security is inappro- tual realities.” Similarly, because offi- possible given the vast range of experi- priate. The military does not make a cers have been exposed to the high po- ences that PME curricula intend to tai- product whose profitability determines tential of technology during training, lor technologically in addressing the the degree to which national survival they will expect the same quality of ex- needs of individual students. The prob- may be assured. On the contrary, it is posure in education. Therefore tradi- lem is that the requirement to meet one of many instruments whose power tional approaches to education will no student expectations will almost cer- ensures the execution of policy on longer do. tainly guarantee that students remain which national security is based, secu- If alternate futures are manifested the subject, not the object, of a process rity itself being the result of many as virtual realities and technology is designed for their improvement. Thus complex social, political, economic, key to gaining access to those realities, they may ultimately exercise a decid- and military interactions. PME is doing its job correctly when it ing influence on the structure of their The marketplace comparison is furnishes the reasons for students to education according to a principle of perhaps more apt when one service is make informed choices from the vir- personal utility rather than intellectual bested by another for a share of the de- tual realities they may confront. To or moral rigor. It can be argued that fense budget. But even here the survival quote Kelley, “PME must come at the since education has no output except of one service vis-à-vis another, to say right time, offer the right experience, students, undue deference to the will nothing of a nation as a whole, is never point to the right information, provide of students may, in the final analysis, in doubt. Still it is not surprising that a nearly risk-free laboratory to inno- exact a price in entitlements that PME Kelley frames our national survival in vate, apply technology to unusual con- can little afford. Once granted, entitle- such terms since services are expected ditions, and reach conclusions that ments may embolden students to to make the ultimate sacrifice to defend can [be] tested.” The rationale for ex- make further demands on the educa- the Nation and undercapitalized mili- posing students to such a technologi- tional system in the name of individ- taries are presumed to be weak. cally-driven system is to produce offi- ual progress. As Carl Builder pointed Though conclusions about the fu- cers with appropriate behavioral out in his recent book entitled Icarus ture can be drawn from present evi- responses at the lowest possible cost. Syndrome, the military has lost a sense dence, to make similar inferences from From his perspective, only an experi- of its collective mission, leaving a vac- the past may ignore the objectivity of ence-based program can provide the uum that the careerism of individual established facts. Alternate futures dis- optimal environment for this process. officers has promptly filled. It would miss the past by absolving us from te- Be this as it may, to insist that ex- be tragic indeed if suggestions made by diously analyzing empirical data, en- perience-based education contains lit- Kelley to make PME more meaningful abling us to make theoretical quick tle risk is to place unwarranted faith in to students ultimately encourages this fixes on reality. The need to infer the the value-free nature of technology vexing trend. nature of both the past and future is and in the capacity of machines to That could conceivably be the case an occupational hazard of the military solve all intellectual problems with if the PME system which he envisions is that flows invariably from pressure to minimum effort and maximum effi- decentralized, organized around short act decisively. For this reason, the ciency. Furthermore, Kelley feels courses of a practical nature, and con- process proposed can rapidly become ducted throughout an officer’s career in an exercise in expediency if driven by the form of continuing education. The chance for students to attend a resident

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■ THE 13TH GENERATION

college dedicated to a synoptic vision of virtual reality and the wargames mod- cialty for academic personnel, a PME the educational process rather than spe- elled on it can sharpen. But will experi- institution is devalued. When continu- cific and discrete student needs would ence-based education produce the de- ity and collective wisdom—essential to decrease proportionately and, also, any sired brilliant warriors? So long as the the health of such an institution—are possibility that students would be per- purpose of PME is to encourage stu- violated by frequently assigning instruc- sonally counselled by mentors in the in- dents to behave in a consistent moral tors to improve their promotion pro- tellectual values that Kelley wants PME and intellectual manner according to files, the standing of the PME system is to inculcate. Thus the essence of learn- functions determined by alternate fu- diminished. When the inability of the ing by observation, example, and per- ture technology alone and student de- personnel system to identify and assign sonal interaction with leaders will no mands on the educational system, the competent officers to faculty positions longer be available. From there it is but chances of producing “brilliant” offi- in a prompt way is sometimes excused a short step to the compensatory belief cers are slim. as administratively unfeasible, a college that informational technology will re- The lack of critical thinking decried suffers. All too often such problems replace the mentor in the same way one is in Kelley’s article cannot be remedied by sult in temporary technological fixes to

commentary told to expect that it will create the vir- more interest in the future at the ex- long-term issues with the vain certainty tual reality of alternate futures. That the pense of less interest in the past. Nor will that, by so doing, a virtue has been system is envisaged, under these condi- critical thinking be encouraged by bet- made out of the inconsistencies in mili- tions, to furnish an environment of ter and more sophisticated gaming. The tary culture. Sadly that conviction high innovative potential capable of of- result will be officers who are not bril- lingers beneath the approach to the fering intellectual and moral guidance liant but facile, who are more quick- problem of PME found in “Brilliant in which the educator is more, not less minded but whose intelligence lacks Warriors.” JFQ important, seems highly improbable. any depth because their ideas are devoid The ideas in “Brilliant Warriors” of real content. In losing their point of attempt to respond to the certainty reference to the past, they will never that the Armed Forces will decrease in grasp the notion that critical thinking is size while conducting a wider range of both a process by which the evolving so- both traditional and nontraditional cial and historical contexts of ideas are roles. Equally certain is that the mili- comprehended and a matrix in which tary will carry out these missions in the quality of new ideas is judged. How coalitions and must find the most ad- to make conceptual interconnections is vantageous way to more fully under- exactly what studying Clausewitz, stand their partners. Kelley feels that a Mahan, and the great campaigns of mili- recourse to the study of human moti- tary history can teach brilliant warriors. vation alone is needed to perfect inter- To eliminate a learning environment in personal skills. While it is important to which critical attitudes are formed by know that certain signals have broad great books in favor of technology of du- social meanings which can impede bious educational value will yield results communication, the suggestion that which are ambiguous at best. If one ac- the antidote may be found in studying cepts the PME recommendations pro- the psychology of cross-cultural rela- posed by Kelley, both the individual tions is misplaced. One may tend to forms and the signatures of concepts forget that studying culture as social may be lost in the mass of undifferenti- behavior is, after all, only a small part ated data that information technology of a constellation of meaning when demands that one absorb and manipu- compared to the greater value obtained late. And this may occur simply because from studying the historical evolution the services have not prepared teachers of national values and leadership. as competent mentors and in those aca- JFQ welcomes your I do not disagree that Kelley’s demic skills which are necessary to help letters and comments. preference for the behavioral, experi- students make this very fundamental ential, and technological in education distinction. Write or FAX your may produce “smart, adept, agile, and I propose that PME be designed correspondence to savvy” professionals. These warriors with fewer technological schemes and certainly will be better equipped to ex- more emphasis on human capital. At (202) 685–4219/DSN ercise the quick reflexes of decision- the senior and intermediate levels of Air 325–4219, making that greater familiarity with Force education, academic preparation and experience to act as mentors are or E-Mail to not yet given the full attention which [email protected] they deserve as criteria for faculty selection. Without a military career spe-

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Marines unrolling mobility matting during Agile Provider ’94.

Unified Endeavor ’95 and Modeling Effective Training U.S. Navy (John Luckenbaugh)

By RALPH W. PASSARELLI and FRANK E. SCHWAMB

nder the unified command plan, U.S. Program Summary Atlantic Command (ACOM) is respon- JTF training is conducted in three phases (see sible for the joint training of assigned figure 1). The first consists of five days of seminars Uforces in the continental United States. held in three parts. Phase IA consists of three days Accordingly, it conducts training to prepare joint dealing with the roles and organization of JTF head- task force (JTF) commanders and staffs for joint quarters, staff procedures, joint doctrine, and joint operations. Unified Endeavor ’95 (UE ’95) was the tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). Phases first in a series of training exercises held in this IB and IC focus on joint planning and operational program. ACOM viewed it as an opportunity to procedures, respectively. They are designed to help learn what works for JTF staff training and what the staff prepare for phases II and III. Phase II is six needs improvement. This article describes the days of joint planning that lead to development of training program and the results of an evaluation an operations order (OPORD). During phase III of UE ’95 by the authors. both commander and staff execute the OPORD in a six-day simulation-driven exercise. Phase IA is led by joint subject matter ex- Figure 1: ACOM JTF Commander and Staff Training perts drawn from ACOM directorates. Phases II and III require more support. For these, ACOM stands up a joint task force training team (JTT) Phase IA: Academic Training and joint exercise control group (JECG). When ACOM plays the role of the supported command, Phase IB Phase II: OPORD Development Exercise a CINC crisis action team (CAT), an operations planning group (OPG), and an ACOM deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) also Phase IC Phase III: OPORD Execution Exercise are activated. JTT (with some 40 subject matter experts) and a senior mentor (retired flag/general Days 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 officer) offer interactive instruction and feedback to exercise participants throughout both phases. A joint exercise control group (150 people) guides the entire process and ensures that the training remains focused on its objectives. CAT and OPG Ralph W. Passarelli and Frank E. Schwamb are both field representatives support CINC play. DJTFAC (14 individuals) aug- of the Center for Naval Analysis affiliated with U.S. Atlantic Command ments a JTF commander’s staff. and U.S. Pacific Command, respectively.

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■ MODELING TRAINING

JTASC, MTP, and SOP play impor- Figure 2: Command Structure and Locations, UE ‘95 tant roles since there are no standing JTF headquarters organizations. Headquar- ters must be formed each time. The com- Higher Authorities Suffolk, Virginia JECG plex process of quickly standing up a JTF headquarters with as many as 1,000 men and women, of whom more than Supported U.S. ATLANTIC Supporting Norfolk, Virginia CINC COMMAND CINC 60 percent could be augmentees, requires that we jointly train sufficient personnel and have written guidance. CJTF North Fort Hood, Texas (III CORPS) Unified Endeavor ’95 UE ’95 was conducted in three ARFOR NAVFOR ARFOR AFFOR JFACC JSOTF JPOTF (III CORPS(–)) (CCDG–12) (II MEF(FWD)) (8th AF) (8th AF) (SOCACOM) (1stPO BN) phases spread over four months: IA, Fort Hood, Portsmouth, Camp Lejeune, Barksdale, North Fort Hood, North Fort Hood, North Fort Hood, academic training seminars (January Texas Virginia North Carolina Louisiana Texas Texas Texas 9–11); IB/II, operations order development exercise (February 5–11); and IC/III, operations order execution exercise (April 18–24). To reduce costs, distributed interactive simu- The scenario was cast in Southwest Asia and re- lation (DIS) technology is utilized to produce a required the JTF commander to plan defense of an al- alistic environment for tactical activity in phase lied nation against an aggressive neighbor and, if III. Realism is enhanced by actual command, con- necessary, to repel an invasion. U.S. Central Com- trol, communications, computer, and mand (CENTCOM) was the supported command realism is enhanced by intelligence (C4I) systems, a thinking played by ACOM and a CENTCOM liaison cell. 4 opposition force, and role playing to Commander III Corps commanded the exercise JTF. C I systems, a thinking simulate the Joint Staff, Department During phase I, the JTF headquarters and opposition force, and of State, and governmental agencies. component staff principals assembled at Fort role playing The costs of moving actual units are Hood, Texas, for three days of academic training avoided by computers which simu- seminars led by ACOM subject matter experts. late movement and interaction. Phase II was preceded by a day of academic Moreover, separating staff training and unit/plat- training (phase IB) focused on joint planning and form joint field training makes both more effi- organization. This instruction helped the JTF plan- cient. Joint staff training is freed of field exercise ners prepare for six days of joint planning (phase restrictions (such as safety and range require- II), which led to the UE ’95 operations order. ments). Units/platforms can schedule joint field Phase III was preceded by a day of academic training without staff training being driven by training (phase IC) intended to help the 800 JTF the scenario. Simulation-supported joint staff staff members prepare for the execution phase. training has replaced joint field exercise staff The JTF command structure and locations for training (the Ocean Venture and Agile Provider phase III are shown in figure 2. During phase III, series) at ACOM because it provides better JTF a JTF commander and his headquarters operated headquarters training at less cost. from North Fort Hood. The commander felt that To structure and further enhance JTF staff conditions there more nearly replicated those a training, ACOM is developing a Joint Training JTF might expect if deployed in a mounting crisis. Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) with fa- The joint force air component commander cilities, systems infrastructure, communications, (JFACC), joint special operations task force simulations, technical support, analytical sup- (JSOTF), and joint psychological operations task port, and control mechanisms for joint training force (JPOTF) also operated from North Fort as well as operational rehearsals. Hood, while the service component commanders ACOM is also developing a JTF headquarters operated from home stations. mission training publication (MTP) that will serve At the end of UE ’95 participants anony- as a descriptive, performance-oriented guide for mously filled out questionnaires. ACOM used the commanders, staff sections, and personnel. A responses to identify areas where the training con- headquarters standing operating procedures cept or its implementation needs improvement. (SOP) document is also being developed. It offers Of two hundred forms submitted, 84 percent felt general guidance on responsibilities, organiza- that UE ’95 provided both useful and effective JTF tion, and practices for JTF headquarters sections headquarters training for their position. The in- and personnel. struction was generally perceived as effective throughout the entire staff. However, this was the

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Passarelli and Schwamb

also be part of this process. He normally Figure 3: UE ’95 Compared with a Model for Effective Training focuses on training requirements that ensure JTF and component headquar- A Proposed Model ters staffs can respond to various mis- for Effective JTF Applying the Model to Unifed Endeavor '95 sions. Therefore, his requirements can Training usually be stated in terms of the ability CINC Requirements G of a JTF staff to perform the required Requirements CJTF Requirements G Simulation Support G joint planning and operational Driven Communications G JMETs G processes independent of a scenario. It Above M Realistic Simulation Environment Below G is frequently possible to express the training requirements of both a CINC MTP/SOP M Instruction Components M JTT Facilitated G Participants and JTF commander in terms of joint CJTF G mission essential tasks (JMETs), and Feedback Designers G that was precisely the process used in Controllers G Man hours G UE ’95. Figure 4 displays the connection Cost-Effective Travel G G – GOOD between the requirements of a CINC Support G M – MODIFY and JTF commander and the UE ’95 staff training tasks. Linking training in this manner ensures that it is focused on requirements articulated by a CINC Figure 4: Translating Training Requirements into Tasks and JTF commander and helps avoid re- peating unnecessary training. Joint Mission Second, training should be conducted Essential Tasks (JMETs) in a realistic, supportive environment. The questions that follow are of interest in CINC Training evaluating a simulations-driven training Requirements JTF JTF Commander environment. How close are we to re- Mission and Training producing stimuli that a JTF can expect Plan Staff Training Tasks CJTF in actual operations? Is the headquar- Training ters dealing with issues one would ex- Requirements pect in actual operations? Are participants getting appropriate stimulation from above and below? Do they receive realistic inputs in the expected amounts from organic C4I systems? Are these in- first time many participants were exposed to joint puts believable in terms of timeliness, responsive- training so they had little to compare it with. ness, accuracy, relevance, and sufficiency? Finally, Participants were asked to contrast UE ’95 are trainees being led logically through the train- training with joint field exercise training if they ing tasks? had previously been in a field exercise at JTF For UE ’95, we gathered data on the realism headquarters level. Of the 40 who responded, 82 of the simulation support, communications, and percent felt that UE ’95 provided more effective stimulation from above and below JTF command JTF headquarters training than field exercises. level. In UE ’95, simulations-driven tactical movement and engagement support was provided by a A Model confederation of service simulations using distrib- Effective training must be focused on specific uted interactive simulation (DIS) technology. The requirements, occur in a realistic atmosphere, be simulations remained on-line throughout phase supported with instruction and feedback, and be III—an outstanding performance for a develop- cost-effective. Using the model shown in figure 3, mental exercise. a comparison of the elements of In a perfect exercise participants are unaware UE ’95 suggests five points. of simulation support and remain focused on the in a perfect exercise First, the training process training. However, 55 percent of UE ’95 partici- participants are unaware should be requirements driven. The pants found that simulation was particularly no- theater training concerns of a ticeable or intrusive at their position. We will of simulation support CINC and the need to assess the never get to the point where everyone agrees on soundness of war plans and crisis response capabilities normally drive training requirements. The needs of a JTF commander must

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■ MODELING TRAINING

British Gurkhas laying cover fire during CJTFX ’96. U.S. Marine Corps (C.D.U.S. Marine Corps Clark) U.S. Air Force (RandyU.S. Air Force S. Mallard) Main compound for UE ’95 at North Fort Hood. the model results. However, when over half of the (such as the ambassador) were quite effective. participants find the simulation intrusive, the vis- When surveyed, the JTF was very satisfied with ibility of the models needs to be reduced. It the amount of interaction between the JTF and should decrease as ACOM gains experience with CINC staff. But JTF headquarters spent more time exercise design and control and JTASC stands up. dealing with tactical issues from below than For the most part participants used their com- strategic and operational issues from above. This mand and control systems. Employing them dur- would not be expected in real operations. ACOM ing the execution phase adds to realism and im- exercise designers are working to provide more proves training. This practice should be considered stimulation from over the JTF level. essential to good simulations-supported training. One should not lose sight of the proper role Appropriate levels of stimulation for a JTF for simulations and scenarios. Joint staffs train to staff from both above and below is another con- processes (or tasks), not to particular scenarios. sideration. Stimulation from below is easier to What matters is that the staff can coordinate air achieve because simulations interact primarily at assets in support of the assigned mission, not component level (from under). This plus strong simulation results used to drive training. Realistic component play provided significant stimulation scenarios and simulation results allow JTF staffs from below JTF headquarters command level dur- to execute such processes (tasks) while reacting to ing UE ’95. appropriate stimuli. Thus, improving simulation Stimulation from above JTF level is more dif- fidelity by 10 percent will have little effect on ficult. Current models do not do it. It only can be joint training. done by a CINC and his staff or credible role players. During UE ’95, the on-scene role players

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Passarelli and Schwamb

Third, training should include formal and facilitated instruction. ACOM JTT provided the formal and facilitated instruction. It was the strength of UE ’95 training and achieved the highest recognition of any training element. Phase IA seminars were so effective that JTF staff principals recommended that future phase IAs include more members of the JTF staff and additional topics. At the end of phase III, 80 percent of participants felt that JTT feedback had improved their training and performance. USS Nassau. During UE ’95, we discovered U.S. Navy (Johnny R. Wilson) that phases IB and IC (academic training) were particularly effective yet hard to ac- Fifth, the training must be cost-effective. If complish. On arriving at the exercise site for training is too costly in dollars or man-hours, it phases II and III, participants were anxious to may not be performed often enough by ACOM to begin planning and organizing for operations. maintain proficiency. In this regard UE ’95 is There was pressure to compress IB and IC. How- commendable. Its estimated cost was less than a ever, by the end of phases II and III participants tenth that of Agile Provider ’94. Large joint field expressed a growing appreciation for IB and IC. At exercises are clearly not the venue for training JTF the end of phase II, 76 percent of the participants staffs; they are too expensive and infrequent. indicated more time should have been devoted to However, if the UE ’95 series of exercises is to phase IB, which lasted only six hours. remain the most cost-effective joint staff training it Fourth, the training must compete with other simulation-based train- support costs can be controlled should include substantive ing approaches. While this comparison was not feedback to both partici- made, UE ’95 would likely contrast quite favorably. by matching simulation fidelity pants and designers. JTT Total training expense is comprised of ele- to JTF training processes provided the participant ments that can be examined individually for cost- feedback in UE ’95. It in- effectiveness. In particular, simulation-support cluded four formal after costs may vary widely but can be controlled by action reviews for the staff principals, interactive matching simulation fidelity to JTF training proc- individual feedback by JTT members during the esses. For example, if an electronic terrain map exercise, and a mini-after action review between with 1-meter accuracy would not normally be the JTT members and their respective staff sec- available there is no reason to provide it as part of tions at the end of each phase. Headquarters was the training. Exercise designers can pursue a cost- surveyed and found to be quite satisfied with the effective staff training program by protecting low feedback process. cost/more effective elements at the expense of Reaction for designers was also substantial. It some high cost/less effective elements. included an after action review with the JTF principals and CINC, a survey of the entire JTF staff ACOM is incorporating the lessons of UE ’95 for ways to improve training, written self-evalua- into training for JTF commanders and staffs. tions by each ACOM directorate, and assessments Methods for improving JTF stimulation from by both JECG and JTT. This feedback concen- above are under development, and MTP and SOP trated on design and control. are being revised. JTASC will soon achieve full op- However, JTF components were not included erational capability to improve the ability of in the reaction process to a degree that made them ACOM in creating increasingly realistic training full participants in the training. During UE ’95, environments. JFQ JTT focused on the JTF headquarters staff. The components viewed the JTF after action reviews via video teleconference. At the end of UE ’95, the components recommended that JTT members be stationed at their locations to provide self-directed training and feedback focused at the component level. This suggestion will be pursued.

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■

The message from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) flashed on the screen of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) command duty officer at 0200. The American Embassy had informed the CINC of its original assessment some hours earlier. Yet the message was jolting: immediately after a devastating earthquake had struck a small yet vital Pacific nation, guerrillas had attacked its capital. Urgent calls for help ensued. The prime minister warned that his country could no longer safeguard American lives and property. The duty officer rushed the latest information to the CINC and his battle staff who were already assembling. Together they reviewed an assessment from the operational planning team (OPT) and activated the crisis action team (CAT). With details from the NMCC message, OPT recommended activation of joint task force (JTF) Deci- sive Response based on I Corps, a PACOM designated and trained JTF headquarters. A 35-member deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) was told to “purple-up” the corps staff. The DJTFAC team chief, part of OPT from the outset, made certain DJTFAC received the latest information to begin parallel crisis action planning while waiting to join the JTF staff. By 0800, DJTFAC was on its way to join JTF Decisive Response with a copy of the OPT-drafted warning order. It stayed in radio contact with CINCPAC and the JTF headquarters during the trip, developing courses of action. Within hours, a single- service headquarters became a fully-functional JTF headquarters. American citizens at risk as well as an ally on the ropes had brought a rapid, decisive response by the United States TRAINING through its unified headquarters in the Pacific. the Pacific Warriors By JAY B. YAKELEY III and HAROLD E. BULLOCK Photo Lab)

USS Independence leaving Victoria Harbor, Hong Kong. Independence U.S. Navy (

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Yakeley and Bullock

any scenarios involving the PACOM seven largest land armies demonstrates the histor- area of responsibility (AOR) de- ical tensions in the region.2 Dealing with such an mand an immediate though calcu- AOR requires innovation, regional focus, and spe- Mlated response. How does the com- cialized training for both headquarters and forces. mand maintain the ability to react? The answer is CINCPAC, as tier one in the command and a combination of vision, planning, and rigorous control structure, concentrates on three major training based on a two-tiered warfighting strat- tasks: enabling a JTF, providing strategic guid- egy. Under this strategy, a major regional conflict ance, and synchronizing JTF actions with theater (MRC) which occurred in Korea would be han- operations. The CINCPAC battle staff and opera- dled by the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific tional planning team, in coordination with the Command (CINCPAC), and by the commander in national command authorities (NCA), both for- chief, U.N. Command. Lesser regional contingen- mulate a strategic course of action and evaluate cies (LRC) would be conducted using pre-desig- JTF operational courses of action. The PACOM nated, highly trained JTF headquarters in com- nerve center, the crisis action team, provides in- mand of tailored component forces (tier two) terface to NCA and coordinates information and with strategic guidance from tier one, namely, sustainment flow to JTF. CINCPAC. The second tier consists of six headquarters The two-tier strategy drives much of PACOM pre-designated and trained as either primary or joint training. CINCPAC conducts frequent, rigor- alternate JTFs. The primary headquarters are I ous training for each JTF. It includes classes, real- Corps, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and istic command post exercises, Seventh Fleet, while the alternates are Alaskan CINCPAC concentrates on and large-scale field drills. Exer- Command, I MEF, and Third Fleet. Each receives cises are designed around the regular, focused training in JTF operations, and enabling, guidance, and training objectives of the JTF upon activation as a JTF are reinforced with the synchronizing JTF actions commander and include a com- CINCPAC deployable joint task force augmenta- prehensive after action review tion cell. with theater operations (AAR). By comparing joint mis- DJTFAC is not a standing organization with sion essential task list (JMETL) specified manning, but a tailored organization standards against training performance, JTF com- (25–35 personnel) drawn from a trained pool of manders arrive at a realistic readiness assessment CINCPAC headquarters and Hawaii-based service and determine follow-on training needs. This cre- component personnel with various specialties. ates a feedback loop, from training objectives to These hand-picked augmentees provide joint and exercise design to post-exercise capability assess- area expertise in key positions on the JTF staff and ments and follow-on training goals. This process are specially trained in crisis action procedures at enables PACOM to focus joint training on re- the operational level. All members perform nor- gional demands and JTF commanders to tailor mal staff duties at their parent commands while training to their needs. Independent inspector on call, thus saving the expense of a separate orga- general assessment is a refinement that concen- nization. Besides adding joint perspective and op- trates on the structure of training events. From erational expertise, members provide theater-level initial JMETL-based readiness assessment through expertise on Pacific region issues. In short, DJTFAC post-training reassessment, the PACOM program is a tool in the commander’s box for transforming links tailored joint training to missions, culminat- his staff from a single service or area headquarters ing in effective warfighting.1 to that of a fully-capable JTF. Having described what DJTFAC is, it is Foundation for Readiness equally important to indicate what it is not. The PACOM two-tiered command and con- While staffed largely by CINCPAC headquarters trol strategy—employing trained, pre-designated personnel, it is not “CINCPAC-forward.” In fact, JTF headquarters to handle LRCs—is born of a as an entity it vanishes on arrival. The CINC uniquely challenging theater, an AOR that covers transfers operational control of all DJTFAC mem- more than half of the earth’s surface, stretching bers to a JTF commander, and they are com- across 16 time zones. It contains 63 percent of pletely integrated into his staff. DJTFAC, though the world population in emerging to highly-in- thoroughly versed in crisis action planning, is not dustrialized societies. The presence of the world’s limited to future operations planning. Members serve at the commander’s discretion wherever their expertise is required, from personnel matters to operations to logistics to communications. A Rear Admiral Jay B. Yakeley III, USN, and Major Harold E. Bullock, USAF, JTF commander can also request special staff such 3 are director for operations and JTF training officer, respectively, at as medical, legal, and civil affairs experts. U.S. Pacific Command.

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■ PACIFIC WARRIORS

Underlying the use of JTFs for contingencies A Pacific-Oriented Program short of an MRC is the assumption, backed by ex- As mentioned above, the PACOM two-tiered perience, that Pacific contingencies will likely be strategy is designed around JTFs capable of re- sudden, short, and relatively small. Examples are sponding to no-notice crises anywhere in the Operation Fiery Vigil (after the eruption of Mount AOR. Pacific JTF training includes three distinct Pinatubo) and Operation Sea Angel (following the phases. The first, purely academic, is conducted 4 massive 1991 floods in Bangladesh). by a small mobile team from the Readiness and JTF operations (training and contingency re- Training Division of CINCPAC headquarters. sponse) also are a principal way of furthering the Over two or three days instructors cover a variety CINCPAC cooperative engagement strategy. In of JTF responsibilities including crisis action plan- part, this strategy seeks to further national objec- ning, JTF structure, information management, tives and foster regional peace through bilateral and operational-level joint warfighting. Special- 5 and multilateral contact. ized tutelage also is offered to JTF headquarters Unlike the European theater, with a strong sections such as J-1 or J-2. Moreover, electives are NATO alliance structure, the Pacific depends on available which allow a recipient headquarters to diverse bilateral and multilateral agreements to customize instruction to organizational strengths protect and enhance U.S. and weaknesses. This is linked directly to the sec- planning and organizational interests. Of the seven mu- ond phase of joint training, a staff exercise abilities gained during joint tual defense treaties world- known as Tempest Express. wide to which the United Tempest Express is a scenario-based, five to training provide a foundation States is a signator, five are seven day event conducted by Readiness and with nations in the PACOM Training Division and assisted by other DJTFAC for full JTF capability 6 AOR. Sustained and fre- members. Aimed at a JTF commander’s primary quent military to military staff, it includes specialized classes in staff inte- contact is critical to international relationships in gration and more detailed instruction on crisis ac- the Pacific. Combined JTF operations are an ex- tion planning (CAP), but its main focus is to walk cellent vehicle for such contact and enable our a staff through the CAP steps from mission analy- forces to strengthen interoperability with armed sis through campaign plan or OPORDER develop- forces throughout the region. ment. The emphasis is on process rather than Since specific missions cannot be predicted product, with frequent breaks to discuss ways to and JTFs do not exist until a mission requires one, approach various aspects of planning. Daily after- innovation is needed to define JTF training. The action reviews reinforce the learning process and six designated PACOM JTF headquarters face a resolve problems. full range of possible missions from humanitarian Tempest Express provides a single-service or assistance to conventional warfighting. Forces as- geographically-focused organization with the signed could vary widely in composition and size. skills to transition to a full JTF headquarters. Because it is impossible to anticipate exactly Planning and organizational abilities gained dur- what operations a given JTF might conduct, ing joint training phases one and two, combined PACOM training rests on two joint mission essen- with the joint staff augmentation of DJTFAC, pro- tial task lists (JMETLs)—a theater-strategic list ad- vide a foundation for full JTF capability. This is 7 dressing tier one and an operational-level list tested in phase three—serving as a JTF headquar- 8 shared by JTF headquarters. Both strategic and ters in a major JCS exercise. operational-level JMETLs contain tasks essential This phase-three JTF training exercise serves a to mission success. JMETLs include measurable number of purposes. First, it allows the comman- standards for each task, helping a commander to der and staff to put the lessons of phases one and determine the readiness of his headquarters with two into practice. Second, it enables further bond- respect to these tasks. By assessing performance at ing between DJTFAC members and an augmented METL tasks, the CINC or a JTF commander deter- headquarters. Trainers and mentors of phases one mines key items that need further training and and two are an integral part of a JTF staff during tailors exercises accordingly. This discourages de- phase three. On another level, the exercise pro- signing an exercise around that of the previous gram itself is key to developing regional affinities year. It also allows the commander being trained among allies and potential coalition partners. This to choose the objectives rather than leaving it to streamlines command and control since JTFs exercise designers. often include members from other nations. A major joint exercise orients participants geographically, politically, and organizationally. It is conducted in varied environments to maximize

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training value and international interoperability In recent exercises, designers have employed cells while building mutual trust and confidence. Pro- at the National Defense University and the U.S. fessional associations and exchanges also provide Army War College to accurately represent NCA real value. An allied colonel on the combined actions. The lifelike play of “command-external” task force (CTF) staff today may be his nation’s influences is critical to training tier-one (CINC- commanding general tomorrow. PAC headquarters) as well as tier-two (JTF) forces. A diversity of exercise venues offers frames of High-fidelity simulation also requires JTF reference that could not be duplicated outside the commanders (as well as U.S. Forces Korea and theater. U.S. and foreign forces that may fight to- CINCPAC) to control large forces without the ex- gether can train together, often in the same areas pense—in terms of dollars and operations tempo they would deploy to in an actual contingency. (OPTEMPO)—of fielding huge tactical forma- Even when the training is done in the continen- tions. Ulchi Focus Lens, a vast simulation-aided tal United States, it often includes allied person- war game held each year in Korea, is the largest nel from throughout the Pacific and retains a spe- such exercise in the world and has far fewer polit- cific theater focus. ical ramifications than the better-known Team Realistic exercises such as Tandem Thrust, Spirit. Likewise, the simulation-based Tempo where the commander is sea-based and the JTF com- Brave exercise enables a JTF commander to wield ponents often include Australian forces, and Cobra large tactical forces without raising PERSTEMPO Gold, which includes Thai forces, further enhance or OPTEMPO of actual units. JTF readiness and coalition experience. Countries Another facet of the PACOM exercise pro- such as Australia are now studying the CINCPAC JTF gram is the creative and realistic participation of model for their own regional training. With shrinking budgets and downsizing, PACOM works to achieve realistic training while minimizing the number of days individuals are deployed away from home station (PERSTEMPO). For example, CINCPAC has combined disparate service exercises under an umbrella JTF. This synergy allows JTF headquarters to experience joint operations without levying an added exercise load on subordinate forces. U.S. and Thai Seals Also, efforts are made to realistically repre- rappelling during sent senior authorities up to and including NCA. Cobra Gold ’95. Joint Combat Camera Center (Steve Thurow) U.S. and Korean amphibious forces on Tok Sok Ri Beach. U.S. Navy (Melvin C. Farrington)

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training. It is not a means of reporting failure or success to senior commands. The Payoff The most obvious advantage of the PACOM approach to joint training is characterized in the phrase “train as you fight.” During the dedicated instruction phases (one and two), DJTFAC builds a reputation with designated JTF commanders and staffs as knowledgeable professionals. They are a known commodity by the time they integrate with JTF as DJTFAC during an exercise or contingency. This allows not only continuity in methodology, though that is critical. More importantly, as the same team deploys repeatedly to join with a JTF headquarters, they develop strong one-on-one relationships with their JTF counterparts. When DJTFAC deploys for a major exercise U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)U.S. Air Force or contingency response operation, they have the Rangers boarding full trust of a JTF commander and staff. Though aircraft in Thailand. hard to quantify, personal relationships and mu- coalition and allied forces. Both overseas and tual understanding pay huge dividends in crises, CONUS-based PACOM forces regularly join with where every second counts and staffs must start their counterparts in theater. In a recent Tempo out at a dead run. Brave exercise, an Australian army major general The PACOM approach to joint training and served as deputy CTF commander, and Australian operations maximizes the capabilities of theater officers and NCOs filled key billets throughout forces, CONUS and overseas-based. Even those the headquarters. This same integration is found based at home maintain a focus on the Pacific in other combined exercises in theater. Whether honed by the PACOM joint training program. it is I Corps forming a CTF with Royal Thai armed The two-tiered strategy and phased training meet forces or a III MEF-Australian Defence Forces part- the needs of each command and refine joint nership, regular training with potential partners skills. To ensure such a customized approach, is invaluable in preparing for future crises. training activities are based on a participating Yet any exercise, regardless of how well it is commander’s JMETL assessment, maximizing the executed, has little value without a way of learn- benefit of each academic and practical exercise. ing from its strengths and weaknesses. Too often CINCPAC tailors personnel support to its JTFs as this effort has taken the form of a “hot wash” fo- well. The DJTFAC team that helps transform a cused on what happened rather than why it hap- single-service headquarters into a joint opera- pened. PACOM recently integrated systematic tional-level JTF is chosen to fit the needs of the after action reports (AARs) into each exercise. augmented command as well as the crisis faced With the aid of experts from the Joint Warfight- by that JTF. ing Center and in-house trained observers, the Another aspect of the PACOM approach is AAR team objectively assesses command perfor- efficient use of personnel. Those who conduct mance after each exercise.9 joint training are the same individuals who inte- It should be remembered that during exer- grate into a contingency headquarters. Drawn cise design participant commands picked JMETL from CINCPAC and service headquarters (PACAF, tasks for the training. Using JMETL, which sets USARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and MARFORPAC), they standards for tasks, trained observers assess JTF are selected for expertise in service component performance on each task being exercised. At the and joint employment. However, except for end, an AAR facilitator guides commanders and CINCPAC J-38 which coordinates DJTFAC, they their senior staffs through a review of exercise are not full-time trainers. When not deployed, events, encouraging positive aspects and dis- they serve as action officers on their respective cussing weaknesses. This dialogue focuses on why staffs, maintaining specialty and regional exper- a specific area fell short, not on who or what tise. The skill of this training team, combined failed. A full AAR report is provided only to the with the knowledge that the same officers and commander of the organization under review. It NCOs will be there when the proverbial balloon is an objective tool to define goals for subsequent goes up, strengthens trust and confidence between CINCPAC and the second tier, the JTF commander.

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In all areas, CINCPAC strives for a seamless With increasing OPTEMPO and shrinking forces, transition between training and operations. a tailored regional orientation optimizes training. Forces that expect to operate in the Pacific theater In sum, the CINCPAC approach creates a train there whether they are garrisoned in Japan seamless, broad-based link between actual joint or California. Furthermore, they train using the operations and training to execute them. The two- same command and control structure they would tiered warfighting strategy used in joint training operate under during an actual contingency. Ex- today is the one used in contingencies of tomor- ercises are tailored to known or likely hot-spots in row. The next crisis location may be the occasion theater. CINCPAC also hosts frequent multilateral for joint training. And importantly, those who ex- training. It may be overseas, afloat, or on the U.S. ecute the contingency operations of tomorrow— mainland. Combined training enhances forward from the tactical warfighter to CINCPAC—are the presence in a region where most diplomatic inter- participants in today’s joint training. action is accomplished through military-to-mili- The bottom line? The PACOM focused, high- tary contacts. quality joint training provides mission ready Multilateral training reflects the reality that forces equal to the challenges of an unpredictable U.S. forces are unlikely to operate unilaterally in new world. JFQ any effort, be it disaster relief multilateral training reflects or combat. CINCPAC con- NOTES ducted a JTF commanders the reality that U.S. forces 1 CINCPAC (J-382), “JTF Training Concept,” Infor- conference in April 1996 with mation Paper, January 9, 1996. are unlikely to operate emphasis on the balance be- 2 The seven largest armies are, in order, China, Rus- tween force readiness and sia, United States, India, North Korea, Vietnam, and unilaterally in any effort multilateral engagement. De- South Korea. CINCPAC, Pacific Area Update Brief, Feb- cisions reached at the confer- ruary 1995. ence will be incorporated in future training and 3 CINCPAC Instruction 3020.11A, “Organization and operations. Administration of the USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Recent exercises with the Japanese Self De- Task Force Augmentation Cell (DTJFAC),” January 3, 1994. fense Force in Yakima, Washington, provided the 4 JTF Fiery Vigil (June 10–24, 1991), under Maj Gen forces of both nations with important combined William Studer, USAF, was tasked with the evacuation in operations experience. Professional as well as per- the wake of the eruption. This JTF included the USS Lin- sonal relationships established among U.S. and coln carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group foreign militaries, country teams, and regional (ARG), and nearly the entire military community on agencies are force multipliers in crises where time Guam. JTF Sea Angel (May 11–June 15, 1991), com- is short and smooth integration is essential. manded by MajGen Henry Stackpole III, USMC, accom- Personal trust and confidence is just as criti- plished humanitarian relief tasks following the flooding cal within the U.S. military team. PACOM JTF in Bangladesh. In addition to the Tarawa ARG, JTF–SA commanders know that the trainers working with included Marine and Army troops as well as airlift provided by the Army, Air Force, and the Marine Corps, them in a Tempest Express command post walk- plus Air Force communications units. through will be back for major JCS exercises or 5 Cooperative engagement aggressively employs the real world contingencies to serve on their staffs. means available to PACOM—forces, assets, funds, pro- The continuity between training and operations grams—through forward presence, strong alliances/bi- in terms of personnel and procedures smooths lateral relationships, and crisis response. Using them, the transition to crisis operations, even when this strategy seeks engagement and reassurance in their nature cannot be predicted. peace, deterrence and cooperation in crisis, and unilateral or multilateral victory in conflict. See “A Comman- The benefits of the PACOM mission-driven, der in Chief Looks at East Asia,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. JMETL-based training are clear. The training is dri- 7 (Spring 1995), pp. 12–13. 6 The nations include the Republic of Korea, Japan, ven by commanders, not exercise designers. Thailand, Philippines, and Australia. Guided by an assessment of his command’s ability 7 CINCPAC Joint Mission Essential Task List, version to execute its mission essential tasks, a comman- 1.0, March 1, 1996. der specifies training objectives which drive train- 8 CINCPAC JTF Joint Mission Essential Task List, ver- ing events. This applies whether he is the CINC or sion 1.0, 1995. a designated JTF commander and results in train- 9 Joe Barto et al., “Joint Model After-Action Review ing events tightly focused on force readiness. System,” Common Perspective, vol. 3, no. 2, (September Theater-specific training brings further pre- 1995), p. 21. paredness. Commanders and their forces remain current in both Pacific politico-military affairs and theater command and control processes.

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■ BUILDING a Joint Training Readiness Reporting System By JOHN C. F. TILLSON

he warfighting commanders in chief Currently, CINCs as customers can identify (CINCs) and services are working to be- only a few general needs at best and have no con- come “fully capable of operating effec- sistent way of informing suppliers of specifics. T tively as a joint team.” 1 Toward that The services as suppliers thus cannot be sure they end, the commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Com- are providing forces capable of performing joint mand (ACOM), has designed a joint training pro- tasks. Nor can CINCs as customers predict gram to enhance the capability of the Armed whether the suppliers can provide forces that Forces to deploy and operate immediately upon meet their needs. CINCs have access to reports on arriving overseas.2 Unfortunately neither the training readiness of units assigned or appor- CINCs nor services are likely to know if and when tioned to them—for example, the joint reporting they achieve that goal since there is no way of structure status of resources and training system measuring or reporting key elements of joint (SORTS) 5—but the reports present problems for training readiness.3 This article outlines a system both suppliers and customers: that could provide both CINCs and services with ■ Customers get a generic view of training readi- the information to assure force readiness. ness from SORTS, but they do not know a unit’s capabil- Readiness can be viewed like a business situa- ity to perform joint missions or even specific service tion in which the customer is always right. If com- tasks or missions. They do not know the training readi- batant CINCs are seen as customers to whom the ness of large formations such as Army corps or Navy services supply forces, CINCs must create de- fleets, logistics organizations, or critical enablers such as mands (or define requirements) and communicate supporting CINCs and service/joint battle staffs. them to suppliers. Otherwise the services may ■ Although suppliers use a common rating system supply forces untrained for customers’ needs. Sup- (C-ratings) to report the status of their units, its meaning differs among and even within services. In addition, it al- porting CINCs 4 are like wholesalers who help cus- lows suppliers to use any one of three uncoordinated tomers determine their requirements, then decide measures of training readiness 6 that make it even harder what will meet them, then communicate those for a CINC to determine if his needs are being met. needs to the services who supply forces. ■ The ratings have little predictive value. External events like personnel turbulence can destroy training readiness overnight. ■ Some services have no generally accepted way John C.F. Tillson is a member of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources to predict the time needed to increase training readiness levels to qualify for deployment ready status. This has Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses and formerly served in led to troublesome controversies over the ability of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Air Force security police personnel disembarking in Jordan. U.S. Air Force (PaulU.S. Air Force R. Caron)

Army National Guard divisions or brigades and Naval air forces under the Air Combat Command, naval Reserve air wings to meet customer needs. forces under Second Fleet, and Marine forces ■ Neither CINCs nor services have a way to link under Marine Forces Atlantic. Regional CINCs, mission readiness to estimates of the resources needed such as the commander in chief, U.S. European to maintain it. Command, have charge over all forward de- ■ Neither CINCs nor services have a way to esti- ployed forces within their areas of responsibility. mate future training readiness. Service secretaries and chiefs have similar CINCs thus have a poor basis on which to re- but broader responsibilities. Though not under port to the Secretary of Defense on their readiness CINCs, they are subject to the provisions of chap- or on needed resources. They can ter 6. Each secretary has a legal responsibility to clearly insist on better information. respond to requests from CINCs on prepared- CINCs have a poor basis According to chapter 6, title 10, of ness—either through responsibilities of the secre- on which to report on the U.S. Code, a CINC has responsi- tary to component commanders or directly to bility for the preparedness of his CINCs. These conflicting duties have not been re- their readiness or on forces and also has the authority to solved in law or practice. needed resources give directions to subordinate component commands and forces “nec- The Right Tasks essary to carry out missions assigned A potential solution to these problems has to the command.” three parts. First, CINC joint mission essential Subordinate component commands include task list (JMETL) and service METL systems all operational forces within the Department of should be connected to provide two-way, mis- Defense. Thus the commander in chief, U.S. At- sion-related information flow between CINCs and lantic Command, for example, has charge over operational forces. That would allow CINCs and the U.S. Army Forces Command, which includes services to communicate more exactly tasks for all Army forces within CONUS (except for special which CINCs need forces and enablers to per- operations forces, which are subordinate to U.S. form. It would also allow for essential feedback. Special Operations Command). He also controls

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Each service has a process for determining the tasks that their forces must perform as well as for building a service-oriented METL. Each process allows service commanders to tell units about these tasks. These processes have little or no connection to CINCs or other services. ■ Army and Marine Corps ground force commanders use a METL process to tell subordinate commanders which tasks to train on, but neither process is linked to CINCs. Ground unit commanders generally develop their own METL without explicit review from the Army or Marine component commander. ■ Navy type commanders (COMSURFLANT, COM- SUBLANT, COMAIRLANT) on each coast identify specific tasks that ships, squadrons, and submarines are to train on. Many are Navy-specific, such as convoy escort, and may not be relevant to CINC missions. ■ Air Force commanders of the Air Combat and Air Mobility Commands specify the tasks units are to U.S. Air Force (LemU.S. Air Force Robson) train and manage the training readiness system. F–16s and KC–135 ■ The Marine Corps air combat element uses a tanker during Cope centralized process for determining mission essential North 94–1. Second, services should adopt a common measure of training readiness that is mission and tasks, training syllabus, and training readiness measures for each type of aviation unit. task oriented. Given the varied missions and associated tasks assigned to CINCs, such a cross-ser- These processes are not based on CINC vice reporting measure will provide CINCs and JMETLs nor coordinated with them, but they also services the necessary mission-oriented training could be. readiness data. The measure should be based on The lack of communication on training sta- the percentage of METL tasks trained to standard. tus between CINCs and forces might be solved That percent is one of three ways SORTS provides through a system that uses the existing chain of for reporting training readiness. command and links the CINC JMETL and service Third, CINCs and services should employ METL processes. CINCs would receive their mis- modern data base management systems and the sions and force allocations, conduct their own global command and control system to integrate analyses to identify JMETLs for each mission, and joint and service data. The appropriate CINC or determine what missions should be given to sub- service should maintain the data bases while pro- ordinate component commanders. They would viding access to noncustodial CINCs and services. then assign missions to component commanders There are numerous reasons for the poor ex- and communicate their JMETLs to them. The ser- change of mission, task, and training readiness vices could also use this process to identify “core information among CINCs, component comman- competencies” (for instance, convoy escort) that ders and services, and assigned forces: remain important even if no CINC has an immediate need for them. It can also ensure that ser- ■ CINCs have not had a tool for analyzing their missions in terms of tasks to be performed by forces and vice forces are trained in the wide range of tasks enablers under them. necessary for overseas deployment with no cer- ■ CINCs have recently developed a process for tain destination or mission. identifying their JMETL, but do not transmit it to their The component commanders would conduct components. their own mission analyses, identify their own ■ Components have their own METL process and METLs for each mission, and assign missions to train on service-defined tasks but do not coordinate their subordinate organizations, which in turn their METL with CINCs. would conduct their own mission analyses and The universal joint task list (UJTL) can pro- identify their METLs. Part of each commander’s vide a framework for enhancing CINC-service analysis would be to compare his METL with that communications. It lists the full range of tasks a of his higher commander and reconcile any dif- CINC might have to perform.7 CINCs use UJTL to ferences. Every commander would ensure consis- create a JMETL for each mission assigned. CINCs tency. In this way missions up and down the are still developing this capability and do not use chain of command would fit those assigned to it to communicate their needs to the services. But they could.

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combatant CINCs, and every commander would the Marine Corps training readiness support sys- have a METL that aligned with every other. Each tem (MCTRSS). It may be that these systems can be commander would train his unit in its METL modified to fit the joint community. tasks to the standards specified. Knowing his Because each service uses from one to three tasks, each commander could identify the re- measures of training readiness, none of which are sources needed to train his unit to standard in specifically oriented to a CINC’s mission, the in- each task. This proposal expands on practices de- formation CINCs receive does not offer a consis- scribed in Army training manual FM 25–100. tent, mission-oriented view of unit preparedness. This process would require that each service A cross-service training readiness measure or component commander tentatively identify tied to each CINC’s JMETL would provide a com- the active and Reserve organizations and units to mon basis on which to evaluate the training readi- be assigned to a CINC for a given mission. This ness of the forces and enablers for a particular mis- step alone should focus the efforts of subordinate sion. It would allow CINCs and services to work units on specific mis- together to identify key training tasks, training mission analysis could identify sions and tasks. It could priorities, and training shortfalls both generally be particularly impor- and for specific CINC missions. It would provide a the standards to which a task tant to Reserve units consistent, cross-service measure of training readi- must be performed that often have no clear ness that reflects the importance of different tasks idea what missions to for different missions for different CINCs. train for. It would also The Marine Corps CRP system is a potential force CINCs and services to resolve conflicts in model for such a cross-service measure. It is an cases where, for example, units may be assigned to explicit survey of the percentage of mission essen- more than one CINC or to so many mission essential tasks trained to standard. The Marines have tial tasks they cannot meet training standards. long used it for aviation units and are now ex- The mission analysis process could also be panding it to ground units. It could be applied to used to identify the conditions under which, and staffs, individuals, crews, and units of all sizes. the standards to which, a task must be performed. CRP has various characteristics that are im- The feedback process would help commanders at portant in the proposed joint training readiness re- every level to train their units to the conditions porting system (JTRRS): and standards set by the CINC or service compo- ■ based on mission analysis nent commander. It would also allow CINCs and ■ task oriented and used to indicate performance services to assure both cross- and intra-service to standard for each task consistency. ■ applicable for both individual and collective training Measuring Readiness ■ reflects the impact of personnel turbulence be- It is not enough to connect JMETLs to cause it is tied to individuals METLs. The second element of the proposed re- ■ provides a way to link resources to training readiness because each task has an associated cost, de- porting system is a common, mission-oriented scribed in terms of both time and money joint training readiness measure that could be ■ details the training events, cost, and time used by CINCs, services, and joint enablers such needed to move a pilot or squadron to a “fully trained” as JTF battle staffs. status. Each service either has or is working on a train- CRP as currently employed has three major ing management system that tracks training by shortcomings for joint training readiness: tasks and associates resources to tasks. One is the standard Army training system (SATS). The Navy ■ based on generic and fixed missions and tasks uses the type commander readiness management and may not reflect the missions and tasks of concern system (TRMS) for surface ships, and it is develop- to a CINC ■ applied to individual pilots and crew members ing a similar system for aviation units. The Air Force only. There is no CRP rating for battle staffs or complex keeps track of its pilots through the graduated com- organizations with many capabilities or systems bat capability (GCC) system, a measure of the tasks ■ gives equal weight to all pilots in a unit and for which a pilot or aircrew is trained. The Marines does not explicitly recognize the need to have some monitor the combat readiness percentage (CRP) of who are better trained, such as flight leaders and mis- their pilots in an automated scheme called the avia- sion commanders. tion training and readiness information manage- The Navy training system for ships and air- ment system (ATRIMS). They are also working on craft and the Air Force system for aviation units an overall training management procedure called are similar to the Marine Corps system. What

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they lack is a way to convey the training informa- directly from firing range scores. In others, com- tion to joint commanders. That is the purpose of manders and subject matter experts might deter- a training readiness measure usable by all ser- mine the scores. vices. Given multiple The accompanying table shows how a com- units require multiple training CINCs with multiple mis- mander with three missions and the same three 8 readiness scores—one for each sions, most units will be tasks for each mission might assign weights to responsible to multiple each task for each mission, resulting in a different mission assigned CINCs and for multiple TRP score for each task and mission. A unit or missions. Units therefore subunit would receive an absolute score for each require multiple training readiness scores—one task reflecting its training status. If the task is for each mission assigned. For example, a unit fully trained to standard, the score is 100 percent. might be ready for peace operations but not for a If it is partially trained, the score is less. If a unit major war. Current systems do not reflect this dif- receives an absolute score of 75 percent for task A ference. But they could. and the task weight for mission 1 is 33 percent, Building on the Marine CRP and similar the TRP score is the product of 75 percent and 33 Navy and Air Force systems, we have designed a percent, or 25 percent. For mission 2, regardless DOD-wide joint training readiness measure of the absolute score, if task B is not relevant to the mission, then the weight is zero and the TRP score for that task for that mission is zero. The unit is fully trained in task C and gets full credit for that task for each mission. Since task C is relatively unim- portant to missions 1 and 3, this high absolute score does not translate into a high TRP score for these missions. The overall unit TRP score for each mission would be the sum of the TRP scores for each task. More complicated tech-

II MEF Combat Camera (R.A. Phifer) niques for assigning weights Marines during CJTFEX could be built into the METL- ’96, Camp Lejeune. known as the training readiness percentage (TRP). building software and could quickly become a It is intended to retain the commander’s responsi- routine task for commanders as they build their bility for assessing the training readiness of his METLs for each assigned mission. unit while simultaneously allowing all services to describe training readiness on a common basis Multiple Reports that would be directly related to a CINC’s as- A mission-oriented JTRRS is very complex. A signed missions. unit may have to be proficient in multiple tasks Here is how a TRP scoring system might associated with multiple missions assigned to work. As part of the mission analysis process, multiple CINCs. For JTRRS to work, a unit needs a commanders could assign weights or values to way to keep track of its multiple tasks and to re- each JMETL or METL task based on its impor- port its mission-oriented training readiness to its tance to assigned missions. That weight would be multiple masters. Each service needs to manage the TRP METL percentage score for that task. By forces and resources to optimize the training definition, the sum of task weights in a METL readiness of its multiple units and organizations would be 100 percent. A unit that is fully trained to meet multiple needs of multiple CINCs. And for a mission would receive the maximum TRP CINCs need a way to keep track of the readiness of score for that mission—100 percent. The weights forces allocated to each of their multiple missions. assigned to tasks at each level would be subject to These requirements would have made such a sys- review as part of the JMETL/METL consistency as- tem impossible prior to the computer age, data surance process described above. base management, and communications systems. The score for each task would be measured Accordingly, we propose that JTRRS exploit much like training readiness scores are deter- both new communications and data base man- mined today. In tasks where objective measures agement systems to integrate service and joint are possible, as in gunnery, the tally could come data bases and to provide communications up and down the chain of command. These systems

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Table: Assigning Task Training Scores

Mission 1 Mission 2 Mission 3 ■ ■ Absolute score Task TRP Task TRP Task TRP Tasks for each mission for each task weight score weight score weight score

A 75332550381007 B 40502000007530 C 100 17 17 50 50 15 15 ——— 62 83 52

Sample TRP calculation for unit or subunit with three missions (in percent).

would track multiple JMETLs and METLs, moni- the level of battalions, ships, and squadrons, as is tor training status by task, and allow CINCs and possible today. services to maintain a real-time record of mission Services will have access to CINC data bases training readiness by CINC, mission, and unit. to identify mission-oriented JMETL of each CINC Such a system might work as follows: and the conditions and standards associated with CINCs and services would keep track of pertinent tasks. As they build force packages in real time for data. CINCs would monitor missions, the associ- contingencies, CINCs and services will have ac- ated JMETLs for each mission, and the training by cess to one another’s data bases to identify the task of those forces and enablers for which they units best trained in an emerging mission. are responsible. For example, each CINC would The impact of this system at unit level keep track of the training readiness of his battle should be small. Virtually all units use computers staff and supporting communications units. to monitor training on a task basis. All units keep Each service would oversee the missions, as- track of their SORTS status and send the data to a sociated METLs, and training, by task, of the higher headquarters. Under this system, units forces and enablers for which it is responsible. For would continue that practice. New software could example, the Air Force would keep track of all simplify unit reporting. task training by unit and also by air operations JTRRS could assist military departments and centers that support component commanders. CINCs in exercising training and personnel man- Once JMETLs/METLs and task training status agement responsibilities. A key issue facing DOD are in appropriate data bases, any participant with is the need to estimate training readiness. Today approved access can compare JMETLs and METLs to there is no way to reliably project it. With JTRRS, ensure compatibility and to compute a mission-ori- it may be possible to project peacetime training ented training readiness status. Each participant will readiness a year or so in advance and to project be authorized access to some data in all other par- how long it should take either an active or Re- ticipants’ data bases. For ex- serve component unit to train to standard in its ample, a CINC may be given METL tasks. it may be possible to project access to service METLs and Given a systematic, task-based understand- peacetime training readiness training readiness data at ing of unit training readiness, cognizance of the a year or so in advance every level from large orga- tasks that need to be trained for a projected oper- nizations down to battalion, ation, and estimates of time and resources needed ship, or squadron level for training each task, each service may be able to though not lower. CINCs will be able to look at predict pre-deployment training time and future service METLs to ensure that organizations as- peacetime training readiness. In other words, signed or allocated to them are trained appropri- given certain assumptions about the availability ately. They will also have access to data needed to of personnel and training resources, JTRRS could compute the mission-oriented training readiness include two additional indicators: of assigned and allocated forces. ■ an estimate of how long it will take a unit to go In most cases a CINC will most want to from its current training readiness status to 100 percent know the mission readiness of large organizations TRP, a threshold TRP, or an appropriate TRP for some such as Army divisions or Navy battle groups—a other mission capability that does not exist now. He might also ■ the future training readiness of a unit given as- want to know the mission readiness of units at sumptions about the availability of personnel and training resources.

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■ TRAINING READINESS

Both projections could be maintained in the ■ develop a compatible cross-service training same data system as the standard JTRRS. readiness reporting measure based upon CINC JMETLs These indicators should help identify the im- and service METLs pact of the personnel management system on ■ design a data base and management system for unit training readiness. JTRRS will allow unit training that is in sync with the global command and control system commanders to determine the specific implica- ■ expand, within each service, the METL or equiv- tions of turbulence on units and may improve alent systems to cover large organizations, battle staffs, personnel policies. This system could demon- and other enablers strate the relative consequences on training readi- ■ develop a METL system for joint battle staffs ness of policies such as the individual replace- and other enablers ment system compared with the Army cohesion, ■ design and conduct tests of any proposed train- operational readiness, and training (COHORT) ing readiness reporting system in order to demonstrate system or the Marine unit deployment program— its feasibility, validity, and reliability. two policies designed to enhance unit readiness and solidarity. These are issues that pose challenges to the JTRRS should also help CINCs and services joint world. JFQ manage other training resources. When component and unit commanders know their missions NOTES and tasks to be trained, they will have an explicit 1 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the Roles, basis for allocating training funds and resources. Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United Unit commanders will have a credible, objective States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February basis for requesting training resources. CINCs will 1993), p. III–4. know which units are trained in which tasks and 2 Clarence T. Morgan, “Atlantic Command’s Joint will have a basis for discussing training and re- Training Program,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 8 (Summer source allocation with the services. Units, both 1995), p. 120. active and Reserve, can be told to maintain differ- 3 Training readiness is the component of overall ent levels of training readiness and can be held readiness that reflects the ability of a unit to perform as- accountable. Finally, wartime planning can in- signed tasks to a given standard. We have defined joint training readiness as that of military units and enablers clude specific plans and resources for pre-deploy- from different services working together to accomplish ment training for both the active and Reserve a mission that requires the coordination of their forces. components. It includes the training readiness of the joint headquar- Much of what needs to be done to build ters and of the assigned and supporting service forces JTRRS is already underway. working together. 4 ■ CINCs, with the Directorate for Operational Supporting CINCs include those who provide ser- Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, are develop- vices to combatant CINCs (for example CINCTRANS, ing a task-based, mission-oriented system for building who provides strategic air and sealift), and other war- JMETLs for assigned missions. fighting CINCs who furnish forces or other support to ■ ACOM and J-7 are identifying JMETLs for JTF the CINC with primary responsibility for a mission. 5 battle staffs. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1–03.3, Joint Reporting ■ ACOM and J-7 are building JTF battle staff train- Structure Status of Resources and Training System (Washing- ing systems. ton: Government Printing Office, August 1993). 6 ■ The services have or are developing task-based The three measures defined in the JCS SORTS direc- training and reporting systems: tive are percentage of mission-essential tasks trained to standard, percentage of crews mission qualified, and —The Army and Marine Corps are developing training time in days required to bring unit perfor- task-based training reporting systems for ground mance in mission-essential tasks to standard. forces. 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JSM 3500.04, Universal Joint —The Navy is converting to a METL system, and Task List (Washington: Government Printing Office, the type commander readiness management sys- May 15, 1995). tem (TRMS) will provide Navy component com- 8 These tasks might be primary mission areas for manders task-based training readiness informa- Navy ships and aviation units. tion for ships, submarines, and aircraft. —The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, have been using task-based training readiness systems for aircraft for years. But this is not enough. Building effective JTRRS requires initiatives to: ■ coordinate and connect CINC JMETL and service METL efforts

28 JFQ / Summer 1996 09Hyde 9/26/96 9:24 AM Page 29 Joint Combat Camera Center (Tony Lambert) Joint Combat Camera Center (Tony Educating Future Leaders in Strategic and Operational Art By JAMES C. HYDE and MICHAEL W. EVERETT

he joint land, aerospace, and sea simu- success to training at Red Flag, Blue Flag, Twenty- lation (JLASS) is the preeminent joint nine Palms, and the National Training Center. But educational exercise structured to sup- such training is costly because it requires deploy- T port wargaming at the senior colleges. ment of a large number of personnel as well as It generally concludes advanced studies electives considerable material over great distances. It also on strategic and operational art. The exercise is consumes sustainment and maintenance stocks. unique in that both red and blue teams win. This Congress is heeding the popular call to focus can only be accomplished through cooperation on domestic issues and balance the budget. Cuts among faculty and staff members. have been made across the board, leaving much JLASS is also the only exercise that explores of the government to provide the same output service capabilities in a learning environment, with reduced resources. This has required the ser- which not only allows but actually encourages vices to make hard decisions on weapon systems risk-taking. Students thus think in a nonthreaten- and readiness that are felt by unified commands: ing situation, learn to ask the right questions, ex- CINCs must train with fewer resources each day. plore military options in support of political ob- It therefore becomes more vital for senior colleges jectives, and experiment by employing innovative to find ways to educate officers in strategic and teaching tools at a pivotal time in their careers. operational art and science. Part of this need can Warriors who fought in the Persian Gulf, re- be met through wargaming. gardless of component, attributed much of their Wargaming In the Summer 1994 issue of JFQ, Peter Perla characterized wargaming as “focused on the dy- Lt Col James C. Hyde, USAF, is assigned to the Wargaming and Simula- namics and on the interplay of human decisions tion Center, National Defense University, and COL Michael W. Everett, and possible outcomes of those decisions....By USA, is on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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■ JLASS

nature wargames seek to explore messy, unquan- Figure 1: JLASS Player Cells tified questions that the physical sciences and operations analysis must ignore.” Al- games train, analyze though there are many kinds of OPPOSING FORCE games—ranging from visual two-di- (National War College) possible outcomes and mensional simulations of a theater military capabilities, battlefield of today to three-dimen- U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (Industrial College of the Armed Forces) and educate sional virtual battlefield simulations of tomorrow—all have three roles: to train, to analyze possible outcomes COMBINED FORCES COMMAND and military capabilities against those varied out- (U.S. Army War College) comes, and to educate. PACIFIC FLEET Educational games have been used tradition- (Naval War College) ally at intermediate and senior level professional military education (PME) institutions: that is, at U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND staff and war colleges. Unlike training wargames, (Marine Corps War College) they expose students to issues that they will likely confront as senior leaders. A game may have ei- PACIFIC AIR FORCES ther a service or a joint flavor depending on its (Air War College) institutional sponsor. The senior colleges provide player cells (see figure 1) for JLASS which is held each spring at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. A 1993 agreement among the colleges outlined the threefold purpose of this exercise: to develop future strate- LRC scenarios occurred in the South China Sea. gic leaders, enhance PME by examining potential They were designed to place continued pressure U.S. military responses to regional crises, and ad- on the blue force once a Southwest Asia MRC had vance development and application of supporting subsided. They also provided the red team with technical tools and methodologies. This rationale options with which to confound the politics of is complemented by four exercise objectives: the Pacific region. ■ educate through an active learning process addressing issues at the strategic and operational levels Structure ■ promote jointness, recognition of coalition is- Within the JLASS structure the heads of the sues, and enhancement of resident instructional pro- senior PME institutions serve as the executive au- grams thority and the exercise sponsors. By agreement, ■ improve strategic and operational level simula- committees both plan and execute the program tions, wargames, and exercises while a JLASS steering group plans the exercise. A ■ expand logistics and sustainment play to illus- new planning cycle begins with the end of an ex- trate strategic and operational impacts. ercise. Each college provides at least one faculty Various scenarios have been gamed thus far. member and one wargamer who select tasks to JLASS has had an Asia/Pacific focus in the last few address from the universal joint task list. Tasks for years and the first scenario with two major re- 1996 include: deployment and redeployment, gional conflicts (MRCs) was used in 1996. It also employment, force sustainment, intelligence, di- included three limited regional conflicts (LRCs). rection and integration, mobilization, theater One MRC was situated in Southwest Asia and was force requirements and readiness, alliances and scripted off-line prior to the arrival of students. regional relationships, maneuver and firepower, Players received intelligence updates on a South- and command and control (C2). A game design west Asian MRC while planning for a possible document is published to determine the nature of second conflict in the Pacific. The purpose of the play. In addition, the steering committee sched- first MRC was to compound the difficulties of ex- ules game dates and planning conferences. ecuting a near–simultaneous second MRC. A council of elders (COE), comprised of rep- Another purpose for a robust scenario was to resentatives of the colleges, directs the game to enable blue team players to grasp the impact of ensure that student learning objectives are met. an ongoing MRC on a second one in terms of Given the number of objectives for each college, mobility and equipment availability—from spe- the council has performed with aplomb. Within cial assets which both CINCs would require to Re- the five days of the exercise it managed a ple- serve forces already fighting in another region— as well as the political problems which a second MRC would cause at home and in theater. The

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Hyde and Everett

■ understood the impact of special operations Figure 2: JLASS Structure ■ planned for and integrated information warfare (IW) ■ Planning Execution assessed impact of maritime exclusionary zone ■ developed noncombatant evacuation operation Steering Council of plan in MRC theater Group Elders ■ planned for war termination and post-conflict activities—force regeneration, rearm, refit.

Exercise Controllers Green Cell COE helps the exercise director in resolving Director problems that arise from student moves and re- Ground Coordination sultant adjudications. The director, who works for Truth COE, is responsible for game control and also keeps adjudication moving smoothly to ensure Adjudication that the daily input from student moves results in Control Subject Matter Request for Off-line Cell realistic outcomes that facilitate ensuing learning Experts Information Cell objectives. Coordination Under the exercise director and COE (JLASS Query Structure, figure 2) are the controllers, green Query/Feedback Student Query Cells (other nations) cell, off-line adjudication cell, subject matter experts, and request for information (RFI) cell. Normally there are one or two controllers (professional wargaming staff members) for each player cell who articulate player moves to the director and COE. The off-line adjudication cell coordinates with subject matter ex- thora of learning objectives and accomplished perts on special operations forces (SOF), logistics, the following: intelligence, WMD, service specific capabilities, ■ employed concepts of strategic and operational and computer-simulation modeling. Combined, art the cells help controllers immeasurably during ■ understood crisis action planning and execution adjudication. process ■ translated political objectives into military ob- The Media jectives ■ understood strategic leadership environment Students learn to deal with the media during ■ developed theater strategies planning phases. Media attention intensifies as ■ developed and executed joint multinational in- students arrive at Maxwell. CINCs and political tercollegiate campaign plans—conducted defensive and advisers immediately undergo a media “murder- offensive operations (counterattack), and developed and board” to ascertain their perspectives on the con- executed logistical plans flict. Red and blue team members also may make ■ understood strategic aspects of mobilization subsequent statements throughout the exercise. ■ understood strategic deployment Each day the exercise begins with a Global News ■ examined Reserve component employment options Network (GNN) telecast providing an overview of ■ examined and executed force projection options the simulated world. Great care is taken to weave ■ engaged in media relations a credible story through a series of fabricated ■ organized C2 joint forces press releases from both sides. Day-to-day deci- ■ understood strategic intelligence sions of a political nature may not directly affect ■ developed options for weapons of mass destruc- the battle area but have a significant impact on tion (WMD)—identified and suggested appropriate the- the overall simulation. In JLASS ’96 interviews, ater response, assessed impact of WMD attack on exe- for example, prominent businessmen complained cuting campaign plan, and developed campaign plan about the effect of fighting on sales to their re- contingencies gional trading partners who were not involved in ■ analyzed theater options in second MRC in two near-simultaneous MRC environment the conflict. A congressional representative re- ■ allocated forces and resources in multi-crisis ported that her constituency wanted a quick theater peace since the reduced flow of raw material and ■ examined and suggested regional strategies— subassemblies from the Pacific rim was costing battlespace dominance, power projection jobs. Several other “short bites” contributed to ■ understood employment of JFACC in theater virtual realism. campaign planning ■ understood ballistic missile defense planning ■ recognized difficulties in coordinating basing rights

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■ JLASS

Game Play Figure 3: JLASS Supporting Models After the morning GNN update, each team receives an intelligence and operations briefing to Joint Integrated Contingency Model set the stage for the day’s learning objectives. (JICM) Then students pursue development of branches and sequels based on the situation. Later in the Extended Air Defense Simulation day, players brief controllers on their next move (EADSIM) and long–term vision of how the conflict will develop. After that students attend seminars which Fallout Assessment System complement the exercise. For the faculty and (FAS) controllers the day has just begun. Controllers discuss the next move for each Automated NBC Informational System II player cell with COE and the director. Then, in a (ANBACIS) closed session, COE and the director determine the length of moves through a combination of Strategic Unconventional Warfare Model player decisions and in conjunction with learning (SUWAM) objectives. COE recalls controllers to provide the “new ground truth regional picture.” This in- Crisis Action Model cludes the new current date, the timeline since (CAM) the last move, and major constraints placed on the game. Shortly thereafter the off-line cell and controllers adjourn for the nitty-gritty assessment (placing data within the framework constructed by COE). council guidance, intelligence and operations up- The assessment process adds realism to keep dates are worked while media personnel turn the players involved. This part of the simulation is highlights into the next day’s GNN report. critical if students are to believe that they are in a real struggle for survival. The process usually be- Issues gins with an overview of the As in any large exercise, issues arise that may video teleconferencing timeline and theater-wide exist in future games and actual operations. player moves such as warships Player coordination is important to developing could permit students to assuming defensive positions, wargames. Blue teams must be able to discuss and participate in JLASS from movement of air assets, or in- resolve planning issues during the academic year. formation/command and con- In the current year as in the past, the primary their home stations trol warfare (C2W). Special oper- means of coordination was via secure telephone ations missions include and video teleconferencing (VTC) facilities. Also, disruption, destruction, or gathering intelligence differences in VTC audio-visual equipment on units and logistics sites. Several computer among colleges and equipment down time con- models support adjudication and are particularly tinued to impact on student coordination. Each helpful in areas such as air defense, deployment, college is on the defense simulation internet WMD, SOF, and IW/C2W (see listing in figure 3). (DSI), but this system is cumbersome for the The off-line cell melds the results from mod- multi-point mode and has reliability problems. els plus information from the controllers with lo- Three colleges have the defense commercial gistics constraints and air base and port capabili- telecommunications network (DCTN) which ap- ties to create events that lead to “ground truth” pears more dependable than DSI. A single reli- on the next day. Not all information is computer- able, secure VTC system is essential to distributed supplied. Much of it comes from controllers who coordination and gaming. may want to stress a point, challenge students, or Also, differences in college travel and con- review an issue from the classroom. In either case, flicts in scheduling VTC persist. Again this year the timeline is massaged and woven into a plausi- students were unable to resolve some issues until ble story to present a dilemma to both sides. In they met face-to-face at Maxwell. To help them the evening after the adjudication teams finish, remain focused, colleges should select standard- the controller group (that is, the exercise director, ized hardware and software to create a joint se- controllers, RFI, media, and off-line cells) reviews nior level VTC network. This system could also the assessment. Controllers express opinions on help faculties coordinate curricula issues, provide whether the results make sense. If stories follow for distance learning (faculty and guest lecturers addressing other institutions), allow for gaming other than JLASS, and eventually permit students to participate in JLASS from their home stations.

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Controllers utilized a computer model to Logistics becomes an enabler and disabler for help adjudicate SOF and IW/C2W missions for operations in a two-MRC scenario. Red and blue the first time in 1996. Previously SOF adjudica- teams experienced constraints because of indus- tion caused concern among controllers and stu- trial base shortcomings. Logistics handbooks de- dents. Resource specialists were well versed on veloped by the Industrial College of the Armed special operations doctrine but unfamiliar with Forces contributed to the exercise by delineating the modus operandi of opposing force unconven- available resources. Logistics issues led to operational warfare capabilities. Consequently, achiev- tional debates on both sides. Students learned to ing adequate SOF results, and then applying them operate in a resource constrained environment to the game, was a problem. Difficulties arose due which, although the constraints may not have to the lack of computer programs that could been as debilitating as necessary, made the trans- quickly show the effects of near-term SOF mis- portation cell an integral partner with unified sions on the long-term conflict. For example, an command cells and a “must” player. attack on a satellite downlink station might have no effect at all on the current battle. However, if JLASS remains the premier joint educational sufficient backup downlink stations are available, exercise. Its structure and format offer ample the normal flow of information may be disrupted leverage for senior colleges to meet their learning while switching takes place. It could affect future objectives. Faculty and staff learn to trust and co- fighting if the air tasking order was in the process operate with one another from the initial steering of being sent when the system was destroyed and group meeting to the final after action review. the backup stations were under assault. In a very Students internalize the spirit of cooperation as short time, the computer model partly resolved an essential aspect of joint and combined war- this problem by assessing successes and failures of fare. This provides future leaders an educational SOF missions. This is a step in the right direction experience in strategic and operational art not because SOF operations will get increased empha- available elsewhere. Preparation for and involve- sis as JLASS matures. ment in the exercise allow players to explore is- If adjudicating SOF is hard, information war- sues beyond the scope of unified command plan- fare and C2W is more so. The exercise held in ning staffs. The exchange of ideas derived from 1996 was the first in which an honest attempt various service perspectives and college curricula was made to introduce IW/C2W into a JLASS enlivens the unique potential of JLASS. JFQ game. Work in this area is still in a nascent stage. There are no educational models available to adjudicate IW/C2W actions. Moreover, it is tough to subjectively assess the effects of a successful IW attack on the game. Providing results to students for planning purposes was a challenge. It was also especially difficult for red controllers since the National War College team included students from the School of Information Warfare Strategy. Given potential capabilities of opposing forces in the year 2004, students developed comprehensive plans to disrupt or delay blue force deployment into theater. In addition, they planned to drive wedges between blue coalition partners, interfere with financial networks in blue home areas, disrupt air traffic control systems from their home- land to northeast Asia, and destroy quality of life systems within their territories (for example, power grids and water supplies). As there is still no consensus on the effects of this type of warfare, there was no agreement among controllers on the success or effect of an IW campaign. Ab- sent an IW/C2W specific model, red controllers used the SOF model which provided adequate material to generate feedback to students.

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Joint Vision documentation 2010: America’s Military— Preparing for Tomorrow

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JOINT VISION 2010 ■

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template Joint Vision 2010 then examines six critical for how the Armed Forces will channel the vital- elements required to transform the operational ity and innovation of our people and leverage concepts into joint capabilities: people, leader- technological opportunities to achieve new levels ship, doctrine, education and training, organiza- of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Focused on tional structure, and materiel. In its conclusion, achieving dominance across the range of military JV 2010 assesses the challenges and opportunities operations through the application of new opera- in moving toward its implementation. tional concepts, this template provides a com- This vision draws on our most fundamental mon direction for the services in developing source of strength—our people. People are the unique capabilities within a joint framework of Armed Forces; at the end of the day, success in doctrine and programs as we prepare to meet an war or in peace will rest ultimately on the men uncertain and challenging future. and women of the Armed Forces.

The nature of modern warfare demands that documentation we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. JV 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for service and unified command visions. —JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JV 2010 begins by addressing the expected continuities and changes in the strategic environment, including technology trends and implications for the Armed Forces. It recognizes the crucial importance of our current high quality, highly trained forces and provides the basis for their further enhancement by prescribing how we will fight in the early 21st century. U.S. Navy (Timothy Osborne) This vision of future warfighting embodies the improved intelligence and command and control available in the information age and goes The skills and vitality of our people will also on to develop four operational concepts: domi- provide the driving force for shaping change. nant maneuver, precision engagement, full di- Channeling our strengths with this vision, we mensional protection, and focused logistics. will move toward a common goal: a joint force— Each of the operational concepts incorpo- persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent rates our core strengths of high quality people in any form of conflict. and information-age technological advances, builds on proven competencies, and focuses de- MTHREADS OF CONTINUITYM velopment of future joint capabilities. Together, As we build forces to this joint vision, there the application of these four concepts by robust will be strong threads of continuity with the con- high quality forces will provide America with the temporary strategic and operational environ- capability to dominate an opponent across the ment. Among these threads are American goals range of military operations. This full spectrum and interests, as well as the missions, tasks, strate- dominance will be the key characteristic we seek gic concepts, and quality of the Armed Forces. for the Armed Forces in the 21st century.

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■ JOINT VISION 2010

Goals and Interests America’s strategic nuclear deterrent, along Enduring goals include protecting the lives with appropriate national level detection and de- and safety of Americans both at home and fensive capabilities, will likely remain at the core abroad; maintaining the political freedom and of national security. However, the bulk of our national independence of the United States with forces will be engaged in or training for world- its values, institutions, and territory intact; and wide military operations. In these operations we providing for the well-being and prosperity of the will largely draw upon conventional warfighting Nation and its people. capabilities—we will fight if we must—but will These goals, in turn, generate interests that also use these same capabilities to deter, contain must be protected and advanced. Fundamental conflict, fight and win, or otherwise promote interests are enhancing U.S. security, promoting American interests and values. prosperity at home, and promoting democracy To ensure we can accomplish these tasks, abroad. power projection, enabled by overseas presence, The United States has undertaken foreign will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of a future force. We will remain largely a documentation and security policies aimed at securing these interests. Ensuring strong relations with our allies, force based in the continental United States protecting rights of transit on the high seas, and (CONUS). However, permanently stationed over- enlarging the community of free market democ- seas forces, infrastructure and equipment, tem- racies are examples of policies we are likely to porarily deployed forces, and interaction between continue to pursue in the years ahead. On the U.S. and foreign militaries demonstrate commit- whole, there is likely to be far more continuity ments, strengthen our military capabilities, and than change in these interests and policies. enhance the organization of coalitions and multinational operations to deter or defeat aggression. Power projection from the United States, achieved through rapid strategic mobility, will enable the timely response critical to deterrence and warfighting capabilities. Overseas presence and highly mobile forces will both remain essential to future operations.

Quality of the Force Currently, our Armed Forces are the best trained, best equipped, and most ready force in the world. The quality of our people is unequaled at all levels of the chain of command. Leaders are developed through well-conceived, intensive, and

DOD long-term programs. Equipment is first-rate and it is sustainable in all operations. Together, person- Missions, Tasks, and Strategic Concepts nel, leadership, and equipment are molded into exceptionally able forces through stressful train- To protect vital national interests we require ing, which closely approximates wartime condi- strong forces, which are organized, trained, and tions and requirements. equipped to fight and win against any adversary Since the mid-1980s, this high quality has at any level of conflict. Concurrently, we must been the essence of the Armed Forces. Military also be able to employ these forces in operations operations are planned knowing that leaders truly other than war to assist in the pursuit of other understand the requirements, that the equipment important interests. is operable and safe, and that the men and The primary task of the Armed Forces will re- women at the cutting edge have the skills and main to deter conflict—but, should deterrence character to execute their tasks successfully. fail, to fight and win the Nation’s wars. In addi- However, this quality force has been tion, we should expect to participate in a broad achieved only at great expense and effort. It has range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and required the creation of institutions and proce- peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, dures, sharpened over more than two decades of and recent experience suggest that we will usually experience, to develop the Armed Forces in the work in concert with friends and allies in almost most effective, efficient manner possible. These all operations. institutions and procedures, and the high quality forces they have produced, remain at the very center of Joint Vision 2010.

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us to face the challenges of combat. Such training, consisting of carefully balanced programs of individual, crew, and larger organizational training and assessments, is central to training the way we will fight. From individual or crew mission simulators, through full-blown field exercises at home or abroad, realistic, evaluated training is and must remain our best combat multiplier. Joint, coalition, and combined training and exercises have improved interoperability and understanding of the strengths of each service as well as allies and coalition partners. From the individual warfighter to large multinational forces, this systematic approach has enabled our men and

II MEF Combat Center (C. D. Clark) women to hone their skills many times before documentation ever having to perform actual combat missions. These training innovations must be sustained. Attracting people with intellectual tools, Today, our highly trained, quality force has physical skills, and motivation to serve effectively the tools to perform its warfighting tasks. Just 15 in the military was foremost among the require- years ago, our forces were less well equipped, ments for building a professional, robust, and spare parts inventories were critically short, and ready force. In the late 1970s, over 15 percent of sustainability was low. Since then, we have mod- all enlistees scored in the lowest category for mili- ernized the force and ensured that we procured tary qualification examinations. Today, less than the parts and provided the training required to 1 percent are in that category and over 90 percent take full advantage of this new equipment. of enlistees have graduated from high school. The Technologically superior equipment has combination of careful targeting of requirements, been critical to the success of our forces in com- recruiting incentives, quality of life initiatives, bat. This first-rate equipment, when combined and challenging opportunities has been very ef- with top quality forces, has been a key element of fective in attracting the personnel needed to sus- our continuing operational successes. We must tain a quality force. continue to ensure our soldiers, sailors, marines, Retention of highly trained servicemembers and airmen are fully capable of fulfilling their re- in sufficient numbers has also been a key require- quired tasks with equipment that is engineered to ment, and we intend to sustain these efforts. Our provide superior mission performance as well as first-term reenlistment rates have risen by 10 per- safety and reliability. We must maintain a careful cent over the last fifteen years. Higher retention balance between equipping and sustaining our is the result of a committed effort by top leader- forces and between tooth and tail in force struc- ship throughout the government toward raising ture. We must also work to assure an efficient, ef- career satisfaction, improving command climates, fective support structure and resources. keeping pay competitive and benefits stable, maintaining time at home and deployed at an ac- MDYNAMIC CHANGESM ceptable balance, and focusing on quality of life Accelerating rates of change will make the initiatives. future environment more unpredictable and less Another element of success has been effec- stable, presenting the Armed Forces with a wide tive leadership development. From deliberate and range of plausible futures. Whatever direction intensive processes involving institutional, on- global change ultimately takes, it will affect how the-job, and self-study methods, the men and we think about and conduct joint and multina- women of the Armed Forces gain the skills, tional operations in the 21st century. How we re- knowledge, and attitudes needed to accomplish spond to dynamic changes concerning potential their required tasks across the range of military adversaries, technological advances and their im- operations. These formal development processes plications, and the emerging importance for in- are designed to balance timing, costs, and opera- formation superiority will dramatically impact tional requirements at each level of leadership. how well the Armed Forces can perform its duties We will retain those innovative processes to en- in 2010. sure that we maintain the best possible leadership for the Armed Forces. Realistic and stressful training has been the primary way to keep readiness high and prepare

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needed to produce the immediate effects and achieve the desired results.

Multinational Operations It is not enough just to be joint when conducting future operations. We must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners. Although the Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality.

Potential Adversaries documentation There will continue to be states or groups that oppose or threaten American interests and values or those of friends and allies. Our recognition of these threats and challenges will continue to drive national security efforts. Greater global interaction will strongly influence the nature of future threats. Wider access to advanced technology along with modern weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction

(Robert McRoy) (WMD), and the requisite skills to maintain and employ it, will increase the number of actors with sufficient military potential to upset existing re- USS America gional balances of power. Modern systems are sufficiently powerful that smaller numbers can dramatically alter the The Imperative of Jointness threats facing us. A number of potential adver- The Armed Forces are smaller than they have saries may acquire the military hardware to make been in over 40 years, and we have decreased the themselves distinctly more dangerous. percentage of forces permanently stationed over- Our most vexing future adversary may be seas. Faced with flat budgets and increasingly one who can use technology to make rapid im- costly readiness and modernization, we should provements in its military capabilities that pro- not expect a return to the larger active forces of vide asymmetrical counters to U.S. military the Cold War period. strengths, including information technologies. The American people will continue to expect Alternatively, the high leverage associated with us to win in any engagement, but they will also modern systems means that significant improve- expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives ments in military capabilities can occur very and resources while accomplishing missions suc- rapidly, outrunning the pace of compensating po- cessfully. Commanders will be expected to reduce litical or military countermeasures. the costs and adverse effects of military opera- Application of these technologies against us tions, from environmental disruption in training may also prove surprising. Adversaries will have to collateral damage in combat. Risks and expen- an independent will, some knowledge of our ca- ditures will be even more closely scrutinized than pabilities, and a desire to avoid our strengths and they are at present. exploit vulnerabilities. We anticipate the proba- Simply to retain our effectiveness with less bility of facing technological or operational sur- redundancy, we will need to wring every ounce of prise will increase in the period ahead. capability from every available source. That out- In sum, the United States must prepare to come can only be accomplished through a more face a wider range of threats, emerging unpre- seamless integration of service capabilities. To dictably, employing varying combinations of achieve this integration while conducting mili- technology, and challenging us at varying levels tary operations we must be fully joint: institu- of intensity. tionally, organizationally, intellectually, and tech- nically. Future commanders must be able to visualize and create the best fit of available forces

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weapons, will further enhance precision capability. Advances in target effects technologies will be integrated into existing weapons and give commanders greater flexibility. These improvements will result in increasingly discrete and precise capabilities, which can achieve optimum results in both combat and other operations. Advances in low observable technologies and the ability to mask friendly forces will also continue over the next 15 years. Signature reduction will enhance the ability to engage adversaries anywhere in the battlespace and improve the documentation survivability of forces who employ it. Stealth will strengthen the ability to ac-

U.S. Air Force (RussU.S. Air Force Pollanen) complish surprise, reduce overall force requirements in many operations, and make forces less visible to an unsophisti- Accelerating rates of change will make the fu- cated or disoriented adversary. Micro-miniaturiza- ture environment more unpredictable and less station will also promote signature reduction and ble, presenting the Armed Forces with a wide range greatly increase the capabilities available for individ- of plausible futures. Whatever direction global uals and small units. Concurrently, multispectral change ultimately takes, it will affect how we think sensing, automated target recognition, and other ad- about and conduct joint and multinational opera- vances will enhance the detectability of targets tions in the 21st century. How we respond to dy- across the battlespace, improving detection ranges, namic changes concerning potential adversaries, turning night into day for some classes of opera- technological advances and their implications, and tions, reducing the risk of fratricide and further ac- the emerging importance for information superior- celerating operational tempo. ity will dramatically impact how well the Armed Improvements in information and systems Forces can perform its duties in 2010. integration technologies will also significantly impact future military operations by providing deci- Advancing Technology Trends sionmakers with accurate information in a timely This era will be one of accelerating techno- manner. Information technology will improve the logical change. Critical advances will have enor- ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess infor- mous impact on all military forces. Successful mation. The fusion of all-source intelligence with adaptation of new and improved technologies the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, com- may provide great increases in specific capabili- mand organizations, and logistic support centers ties. Conversely, failure to understand and adapt will allow a greater number of operational tasks to could lead today’s militaries into premature obso- be accomplished faster. Advances in computer lescence and greatly increase the risks that such processing, precise global positioning, and forces will be incapable of effective operations telecommunications will provide the capability to against forces with high technology. determine accurate locations of friendly and Long-range precision capability, combined enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerg- distribute relevant data to thousands of locations. ing as a key factor in future warfare. Technologi- Forces harnessing the capabilities potentially cal advances will continue the trend toward im- available from this system of systems will gain proved precision. Global positioning systems, dominant battlespace awareness, an interactive pic- high-energy research, electromagnetic technol- ture which will yield much more accurate assess- ogy, and enhanced stand-off capabilities will pro- ments of friendly and enemy operations within vide increased accuracy and a wider range of de- the area of interest. Although this will not elimi- livery options. These capabilities will increase the nate the fog of war, dominant battlespace aware- combat power available for use against selected ness will improve situational awareness, decrease objectives, resulting in enhanced economy of response time, and make the battlespace consid- force and a higher tempo of operations. erably more transparent to those who achieve it. The ability to produce a broader range of potential weapons effects, from less-lethal to hard target kill, from sensor-fused to directed energy

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During all operations, advanced technology in the hands of an adversary will increase the importance of force protection at all echelons. Any efficiencies garnered by offensive systems must be underwritten by appropriate redundancies to safeguard against unanticipated technological, strategic, or operational surprise. Adaptations to this increasingly lethal battlespace will be warranted. These adaptations are likely to take the forms of increased stealth, mobility, dispersion, and pursuit of a higher tempo of operations among elements documentation within the battlespace. To cope with more lethal systems and improved targeting, our forces will require stealth and other means of passive protection, along with mobility superior to enemy ability to retarget or

U.S. Navy (F. E. Zip Zimmerman) U.S. Navy (F. react to our forces. Increased stealth will reduce an enemy’s ability to target our forces. Increased dispersion and Implications of Technological Advances mobility are possible offensively because each The combination of technology trends will platform or individual warfighter carries higher provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality and has greater reach. Defensively, dis- lethality. Commanders will be able to attack tar- persion and higher tempo complicate enemy targets successfully with fewer platforms and less geting and reduce the effectiveness of area attack ordnance while achieving objectives more rapidly and area denial weaponry such as weapons of and with reduced risk. Individual warfighters will mass destruction (WMD). The capability to con- be empowered as never be- trol the tempo of operations and, if necessary, sus- fore, with an array of detec- tain a tempo faster than an enemy will also enable more lethal battlespace tion, targeting, and communi- our forces to seize and maintain the initiative dur- cations equipment that will ing military operations. will increase the impor- greatly magnify the power of Greater mobility and increased dispersion tance of stealth, mobility, small units. Strategically, this will, in turn, require additional communications improvement will enable and coordination capabilities since the synchro- dispersion, and pursuit more rapid power projection nization of these dispersed elements will become of a higher operational and reduced logistics tails. Op- even more important. Fortunately, the technology for this improved systems integration is at hand. tempo erationally, within the theater, these capabilities will mean a The implications of improved systems inte- more rapid transition from de- gration are both profound and complex. New ployment to full operational technologies will allow increased capability at capability. As a result, we will improve the capa- lower echelons to control more lethal forces over bility for rapid, worldwide deployment while be- larger areas, thus leveraging skills and initiative of coming even more tactically mobile and lethal. individuals and small units. These capabilities The implications of this increased lethality could empower a degree of independent maneu- for overall force structure requirements are un- ver, planning, and coordination at lower eche- clear. Given current technology, force structure lons, which were normally exercised by more se- today is adequate to meet a full range of global nior commanders in the past. Concurrently, needs, but barely so. While these prospective im- commanders at higher echelons will use these provements in lethality clearly offer promise of technologies to reduce the friction of war and reducing the number of platforms and amount of apply precise centralized control when and where ordnance required to destroy targets, many mili- appropriate. tary missions will require occupation of the ground and intensive physical presence. For these missions the promises of technology are less certain, especially in environments such as cities or jungles.

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Information superiority will require offensive Figure 1: Emerging Operational Concepts and defensive information warfare (IW). Offen- sive information warfare will degrade or exploit adversary collection or use of information. It will Dominant Maneuver include both traditional methods, such as a preci- Information sion attack to destroy adversary command and Precision Engagement control capability, and nontraditional methods, Superiority and Massed Technological Effects such as electronic intrusion into an information Innovations Full-Dimensional Protection and control network to convince, confuse, or de- ceive enemy military decisionmakers. Focused Logistics There should be no misunderstanding that our effort to achieve and maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful attacks on information systems. Defensive information warfare to protect the ability to conduct information op- documentation erations will be one of the biggest challenges in the period ahead. Traditional defensive IW operations include physical security measures and en- Even for higher level commanders, the accel- cryption. Nontraditional actions will range from erated operational tempo and greater integration antivirus protection to innovative methods of se- requirements will likely create a more stressful, cure data transmission. In addition, increased faster moving decision environment. Real-time strategic level programs will be required in this information will likely drive parallel, not sequen- critical area. tial, planning and real-time, not prearranged, de- cisionmaking. The optimal balance between cen- MCONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONSM tralized and decentralized command and control Our forces have been largely organized, will have to be carefully developed as systems are trained, and equipped to defeat military forces of brought into the inventories. potential adversaries. Direct combat against enemy forces is the most demanding and com- Emerging Importance of Information plex set of requirements we have faced. Other op- Superiority erations, from humanitarian assistance in peace- Throughout history, gathering, exploiting, time to peace operations in a near hostile and protecting information have been critical in environment, have proved to be possible using command, control, and intelligence. The unquali- forces optimized for wartime effectiveness. fied importance of infor- Technological advances will magnify the ad- mation will not change vantages provided by our high quality force. The information superiority—to in 2010. What will differ promise provided by these technologies is best collect, process, and dissemi- is the increased access to viewed from an operational perspective. In the information and im- past, capabilities often required us to physically nate an uninterrupted flow of provements in the speed mass forces to neutralize enemy power. The time information while exploiting and accuracy of prioritiz- needed to build and employ massed combat ing and transferring data forces, including platforms, weapons, and associ- or denying an adversary’s brought about by ad- ated logistics, required to achieve success resulted ability to do the same vances in technology. in military operations that were largely sequential While the friction and in nature and tactics which too often saw land, fog of war can never be maritime, and air forces massed in time and space eliminated, new technology promises to mitigate By 2010, we should be able to change how their impact. we conduct the most intense joint operations. In- Sustaining the responsive, high quality data stead of relying upon massed forces and sequen- processing and information needed for joint mili- tial operations, we will achieve massed effects in tary operations will require more than just an other ways. Information superiority and advances edge over an adversary. We must have informa- in technology will enable us to achieve desired ef- tion superiority: the capability to collect, process, fects through the tailored application of joint and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of infor- combat power. Higher lethality weapons will mation while exploiting or denying an adver- allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that for- sary’s ability to do the same. merly required massed assets, applied in a sequential manner. With precision targeting and

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to success. When tied to a more rapid resupply, reinforcement, and reen- gagement capability, they will be better able to provide the best response at less risk to themselves, based on the mission objectives and circumstances of the battlespace. Whether operating from dispersed locations or in close proximity to each other, the confidence of each warfighter or crew will be bolstered by enhanced connectivity to comrades, supporting elements, and higher commands. In sum, by 2010 we should be able to enhance the capabilities of our documentation forces through technology. This will, in turn, expand our great advantage: the adaptability, initiative, teamwork, and commitment of our people at

U.S. Air Force (ConradU.S. Air Force M. Evans) every level. To exploit the enormous potential of technology, we must develop in longer range systems, commanders can achieve a systematic manner the full range of required en- necessary destruction or suppression of enemy hancements. This process must begin with a new forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing the conceptual framework for operations. need for time-consuming and risky massing of The basis for this framework is found in the people and equipment. Improved command and improved command, control, and intelligence control, based on fused, all-source, real-time intel- which can be assured by information superiority. ligence will reduce the need to assemble maneu- These are the most straightforward applications ver formations days and hours in advance of at- of much of the new technology; however, the full tacks. Providing improved targeting information impact of these technologies is more profound. directly to the most effective weapon system will Enhanced command and control and much im- potentially reduce traditional force requirements proved intelligence, along with other applications at the point of main effort. of new technology, will transform traditional All of this suggests that we will be increas- functions of maneuver, strike, protection, and lo- ingly able to accomplish the effects of mass—the gistics. These transformations will be so powerful necessary concentration of combat power at the that they become, in effect, new operational con- decisive time and place—with less need to mass cepts: dominant maneuver, precision engage- forces physically than in the past. ment, full dimensional protection, and focused This will enhance combat capabilities against logistics. These operational concepts will provide opposing military forces. To be sure, this will not our forces with a new conceptual framework. obviate the ultimate need for “boots on the ground” in many operations, nor will it relieve New Operational Concepts servicemen and women of the need to be physi- Dominant maneuver will be the multidimen- cally present at decisive points in battle or in sional application of information, engagement, other operations, or to be exposed to conditions and mobility capabilities to position and employ of great danger and hardship. widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, and space However, in all operations technological ad- forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks. vances and use of information will give our Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain a warfighters at the individual, crew, and small unit decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, levels major qualitative advantages over potential depth, and height of the battlespace. adversaries. Our forces will be able to sense dan- Through a combination of asymmetric lever- gers sooner. They will have increased awareness age, achieved by positional advantages, as well as of the overall operational environment, including decisive speed and tempo, dominant maneuver the situation of friendly forces, allowing them to allows us to apply decisive force to attack enemy make better decisions more rapidly. They will centers of gravity at all levels and compels an ad- have an enhanced ability to produce a range of versary to either react from a position of disad- desired effects by bringing together the correct vantage or quit. mix of assets at the place and time most favorable

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Dominant maneuver will require forces measures, low observable technologies, signature adept at conducting sustained and synchronized reduction, and enhanced deception capabilities operations from dispersed locations. They must will provide similar advantages for protection and be able to apply overwhelming force in the same improve chances for mission success. medium and create asymmetric advantages by at- Together, the organizational concept of dom- tacking cross-dimensionally, such as air or sea inant maneuver is a prescription for more agile, against ground or ground and sea against air de- faster moving joint operations, which will com- fenses. These forces must have the ability to out- bine land, maritime, and air forces more effec- pace and outmaneuver an enemy. Current sys- tively to deliver decisive combat power. tems, enhanced by information superiority, will Precision engagement will consist of a system provide a clearer picture of enemy and friendly of systems that enables our forces to locate an ob- locations. Information superiority also will allow jective or target, provide responsive command joint commanders to coordinate widely dispersed and control, generate the desired effect, assess the units, receive accurate feedback, and execute level of success, and retain the flexibility to reen- more demanding, higher precision requirements. gage with precision when required. Even from ex- Increasingly lethal direct and indirect fire sys- tended ranges, precision engagement will allow tems, with longer ranges and more accurate tar- us to shape battlespace, enhancing the protection geting, will increase the punch of these forces as of our forces. they maneuver. Information operations will tie high fidelity The tailor-to-task organizational ability will target acquisition, prioritized requirements, and provide the additional advantage of self protec- command and control of joint forces within bat- tion—another key element for successfully tlespace. This combination will provide a greater achieving dominant maneuver. The combination assurance of delivering the desired effect, lessen of seamless operations with reduced buildup time the risk to forces, and minimize collateral damage. and a smaller, more widely dispersed footprint Precision engagement will build on current will make it much more difficult for an adversary U.S. advantages in delivery accuracy and low ob- to find and attack our forces. Other defensive servable technologies. It will use a wide variety of means, including very accurate aerial deliveries or air drops, discriminate weapon strikes, and precise, all-weather stand-off capability. Enhanced

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Upon this information base, we will employ a full array of active and passive measures at multiple echelons. Active measures will include battlespace control operations to guarantee the sea, air, space, and information superiority that is needed to gain the degree of control to accomplish the assigned tasks. Active measures will also include an integrated, in-depth theater air and missile defense that will exploit service-unique capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track, and deny enemy attacks on our joint forces. Passive measures will include the inherent protection provided by information superiority and dispersal to increase warning of attacks. Op- erational dispersion will further reduce risks to documentation our forces. New sensors and information dissemination systems will be deployed to detect chemi- cal or biological attack at great ranges and provide warning to specific units that may be affected. Enhanced deception and camouflage measures, increased individual and collective pro-

U.S. Navy tection, and a joint restoration capability against the effects of WMD are also key elements for achieving full dimensional protection. jointness will ensure greater commonality be- Most importantly, these active and passive tween service precision engagement capabilities measures will be combined to provide a more and provide future joint force commanders with seamless joint architecture for force protection, a wider array of responsive, accurate, and flexible which will leverage the contributions of individ- options. ual services, systems, and echelons. The result will Full Dimensional Protection. We must also probe improved freedom of action for friendly forces, tect forces from the very technologies that we are and better protection at all echelons against preci- exploiting. Unless we provide an adequate mea- sion attack, weapons of mass destruction, and sure of protection for our forces, these new opera- other conventional or nonconventional systems. tional concepts will be highly vulnerable to dis- Focused Logistics. Each of the preceding con- ruption. We will achieve this required level of cepts relies on our ability to project power with protection through the concept called full dimen- the most capable forces, at the decisive time and sional protection. The primary prerequisite for place. To optimize all three concepts, logistics full dimensional protection will be control of the must be responsive, flexible, and precise. Focused battlespace to ensure forces can maintain free- logistics will be the fusion of information, logis- dom of action during deployment, maneuver, tics, and transportation technologies to provide and engagement, while providing multi-layered rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even defenses for forces and facilities at all levels. Full while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics dimensional protection will enable effective em- packages and sustainment directly at the strate- ployment of our forces while degrading opportu- gic, operational, and tactical level of operations. nities for an enemy. It will be essential, in most It will be fully adaptive to the needs of our in- cases, for gaining and maintaining the initiative creasingly dispersed and mobile forces, providing required to execute decisive operations. The con- support in hours or days versus weeks. Focused cept will be proactive, incorporating both offen- logistics will enable joint forces of the future to sive and defensive actions that may extend well be more mobile, versatile, and projectable from into areas of enemy operations. anywhere in the world. Full dimensional protection will be built upon Logistic functions will incorporate informa- information superiority which will provide multi- tion technologies to transition from the rigid ver- dimensional awareness and assessment, as well as tical organizations of the past. Modular and identification of forces in the battlespace. Informa- specifically tailored combat service support pack- tion warfare will support this effort by protecting ages will evolve in response to wide-ranging con- information systems and processes while denying tingency requirements. Service and defense agen- an adversary similar capabilities. cies will work jointly and integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced business practices, commercial

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Figure 2: Full Spectrum Dominance

Dominant Maneuver Peacetime Engagement Information Precision Engagement Superiority and Deterrence and Conflict Prevention Technological Full-Dimensional Protection Innovations

Focused Logistics Fight and Win documentation

economies, and global networks. Active and Re- Likewise, the tactical mobility required for serve combat service support capabilities, pre- dominant maneuver which enables our forces to pared for complete integration into joint opera- move rapidly into position to overwhelm an tions, will provide logistic support and enemy will also allow commanders to place forces sustainment as long as necessary. in positions of control in counterdrug, counterter- Information technologies will enhance air- rorism, or peacekeeping operations. Precision en- lift, sealift, and pre-positioning capabilities to gagement capabilities designed for warfighting lighten deployment loads, assist pinpoint logis- tasks will also enable greater discrimination in the tics delivery systems, and extend the reach and application of force against an emerging threat longevity of systems currently in the inventory. during peace enforcement operations. Full dimen- The combined impact of these improvements will sional protection will allow freedom of action for be a smaller, more capable deployed force. It will forces and limit their vulnerability during combat require less continuous support with a smaller lo- and noncombatant operations. Focused logistics gistics footprint, decreasing the vulnerability of will ensure delivery of the precise amount and U.S. logistics lines of communication. types of supplies required for joint forces to suc- Full Spectrum Dominance. Each of these opera- ceed in combat or noncombat operations. tional concepts will reinforce the others and will Although the positive implications for en- allow us to achieve massed effects in warfare from hancing capabilities across the range of military more dispersed forces. This synergy will greatly operations seem obvious, we cannot assume that enhance our capabilities in high intensity con- all new concepts will be equally valuable in all ventional military operations. operations. In intensive combat, target destruc- However, the synergy of these four concepts tion may be essential in the early engagements of transcends intense conventional warfighting. an operation, but extensive physical presence Without overspecialization, the development of may later be necessary to accomplish the assigned these new operational concepts has great poten- mission. This presence may be required to fully tial to fulfill more effectively the full range of neutralize enemy forces, deal with prisoners and tasks assigned to us. That is, taken together these potentially hostile populations, or otherwise as- four new concepts will enable us to dominate the sure that success in attacking targets is followed full range of military operations from humanitar- through to achieve overall objectives of opera- ian assistance, through peace operations, up to tions. For noncombat operations, physical pres- and into the highest intensity conflict. ence will likely be even more important. Thus, we Information superiority will provide a com- must ensure that capturing new technologies mander with enhanced awareness of his area of does not overspecialize the force; we must retain responsibility, whether his objective is to close balanced and sustainable capabilities. with and engage an adversary or render assistance We recognize that, regardless of how sophis- in a humanitarian operation. Surveillance, recon- ticated technology becomes, the warfighter’s naissance, and knowledge of the precise location judgment, creativity, and adaptability in the face of dispersed friendly forces to effectively direct their efforts are applicable for all military tasks.

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of highly dynamic situations will be essential to We cannot expect risk-free, push-button the success of future joint operations. The human style operations in the future. Military operations element is especially important in situations will continue to demand extraordinary dedica- where we cannot bring technological capabilities tion and sacrifice under the most adverse condi- fully to bear against opponents who seek to nul- tions. Some military operations will require close lify our technological superiority by various combat on land, at sea, or in the air. The courage means. In these cases, success will depend, as it and heart of our soldiers, sailors, marines, and air- has historically, on the physical, intellectual, and men will remain the foundation of all that the moral strengths of the individual soldier, sailor, Armed Forces must do. marine, and airman—especially their adaptability Innovative Leadership. The dynamic nature of in the face of the unexpected. joint operations in the 21st century battlespace Critical Considerations. To sustain the Armed will require a continued emphasis on developing Forces and instill these operational concepts will strong leadership skills. While we must do every- require high quality peo- thing possible to leverage the power of advanced ple—the key ingredient technologies, there are inherent limitations. Con- documentation critical considerations: high for success. The judg- fronting the inevitable friction and fog of war quality people, innovative ment, creativity, and for- against a resourceful and strong minded adver- titude of our people will sary, the human dimension including innovative leadership, joint doctrine, remain the key to success strategic and operational thinking and strong joint education and training, in future joint operations. leadership will be essential to achieve decisive re- Turning concepts into ca- sults. Effective leadership provides our greatest agile organizations, and pabilities requires adapt- hedge against uncertainty. enhanced material ing leadership, doctrine, We will build upon the enduring foundation education and training, of functional expertise, core values, and high eth- organizations, and ma- ical standards. Future leaders at all levels of com- teriel to meet the high tempo, high technology mand must understand the interrelationships demands posed by these new concepts. among military power, diplomacy, and economic Dedicated, High Quality People. Thus, recruit- pressure, as well as the role of government agen- ing and retaining dedicated high quality people cies and nongovernmental actors, in achieving will remain our first priority. Only a force that national security objectives. They will require a has the courage, stamina, and intellectual ability sophisticated understanding of historical context to cope with the complexity and rapid pace of fu- and communication skills to succeed in the future joint operations will have the capability to ture. The evolution of command structures, in- achieve full spectrum dominance. creased pace and scope of operations, and the continuing refinement of force structure and organizations will require leaders with a knowledge of the capabilities of all services. Without sacrific- ing their basic service competencies, these future leaders must be schooled in joint operations from the beginning of their careers. This leadership development must begin rigorous selection processes and extend beyond formal education and training. Hands-on experience in a variety of progressive assignments must stress innovation, dealing with ambiguity, and a sophisticated understanding of the military art. In short, our leaders must demonstrate the very highest levels of skill and versatility in ever more complex joint and multinational operations. Joint Doctrine. As we change the way we fight, joint doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for joint military operations. Joint doctrine is a critical ingredient for success because the way in which leaders think and orga- nize their forces will be as important as the technology we use to conduct future joint operations. Future joint doctrine must articulate the process required for successful joint planning but must be U.S. Army

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and fully prepares forces for joint operations is Figure 3: From Concepts to Capabilities similarly important. We must emphasize integration of joint capabilities and develop skills that increase individual and organizational effectiveness. Our training must reflect emerging threats and include both information saturation and total interruption of information flow. Enhanced modeling and simulation of the battlespace, when coupled with on the ground evaluation with real soldiers, sailors, marines, and Doctrine airmen, improve the realism of training, upgrade Quality Force Education the levels of day-to-day readiness, and increase Operational Training opportunities to test innovative concepts and Concepts Organization 2010 new strategies. Simulations must be intercon- Concepts Materiel Capabilities nected globally—creating a near-real-time interac- documentation

Implementation tive simulation superhighway between forces in every theater. Each CINC must be able to tap into this global network and connect forces worldwide that would be available for theater operations. This network will allow selected units in CONUS to train with forces in an overseas theater without actually deploying there. Similarly, we will pursue improvements in campaign modeling and analysis to exploit the concepts of this vision. This global simulation network must include Reserve and National Guard units, as well as se- flexible enough to serve as a broad framework to lected multinational partners, to increase their guide forces in joint and multinational opera- readiness and interoperability. tions. It is the key to enhanced jointness because Agile Organizations. In order to make opti- it transforms technology, new ideas, and opera- mum use of the technologies and operational tional concepts into joint capabilities. concepts discussed earlier, we must carefully ex- We will discover new ways to change the de- amine the traditional criteria governing span of velopment process for joint doctrine. Thus, we control and organizational layers for services, must integrate top-down doctrine throughout the commands, and defense agencies. We will need development cycle, while continuing to ensure organizations and processes that are agile enough that joint doctrine fully incorporates the to exploit emerging technologies and respond to strengths that each service brings to joint warfare. diverse threats and enemy capabilities. As we Education and training programs must prepare move forward, we may require further reductions joint warriors to meet the challenges of the future in supervision and centralized direction. battlespace. They must emphasize employing new All organizations must become more respon- technologies and achieving operational concepts sive to contingencies, with less startup time be- outlined in this vision. It tween deployment and employment. Because we is essential that joint pro- rely on the total force to provide the full range of joint doctrine serves as a fessional military educa- military capabilities, we also require responsive common perspective and tion (PME) provide Reserve components that can rapidly integrate warfighters with an un- into joint organizations. fundamentally shapes the derstanding of strategic Increased organizational flexibility will en- way we plan, think, and train concepts in the future enhance responsiveness. We will seek organizations vironment where military that can support flexible force packaging and for military operations force will be applied, as work to smooth the process further. well as an in-depth un- Enhanced Materiel. Since most of the plat- derstanding of individual forms expected to be in use in 2010 are already service systems and how their integration en- designed or operational, we will emphasize high hances joint operations. leverage, leading edge technology enhancements The requirement for high quality, realistic, to increase capabilities. We will also place greater and stressful training that amplifies education emphasis on common usage between services and increase interoperability among the services and multinational partners.

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We will need a responsive research, develop- thus expect continuing assessment and adjustment, and acquisition process to incorporate new ments for affordability as well as for other lessons technology. This process must leverage technol- learned during the implementation process. ogy and management innovations originating in Achieving the full promise of this vision will the private sector through responsive access to largely depend on how well we structure our de- commercial developments. fense program. We will have to make hard choices to achieve the tradeoffs that will bring MIMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010M the best balance, most capability, and greatest in- We must proceed with implementing Joint Vi- teroperability for the least cost. Ultimately, we sion 2010 in a way that captures the promise of will have to measure continuously the affordabil- new concepts while sustaining readiness and flexi- ity of achieving full spectrum dominance against bility through every step of this evolution. the overarching need to maintain the quality of The implementation plan will involve CINCs, forces, readiness, and force structure needed to services, and joint organizations. Each element execute our operational tasks between now and the year 2010. must participate in developing and testing these documentation new concepts and their overall integration. Model- As we implement this vision, we must ac- ing, demonstrations, simulations, technology knowledge that strong leadership, warfighting wargames, and joint exercises will help assess and skill, and innovative thinking will be central to validate these concepts, as well as assist in develop- developing the detailed requirements and deci- ing new operational procedures and organizations. sion points. Our organizational climate must re- ward critical thinking, foster a competition of ideas, and reduce structural or cultural barriers to innovation. Both in peacetime and war, the creative talents of our men and women provide us a critical advantage over those who would consider challenging us or our allies.

Our Armed Forces are the world standard for military excellence and joint warfighting. We will further strengthen our military capabilities by taking advantage of improved technology and the vitality and innovation of our people to prepare forces for the 21st century. Joint Vision 2010 creates the template to guide the transformation of these concepts into joint operational capabilities. It serves as the basis for focusing the strengths of each individual service or component to exploit the full array of available capabilities and allow us to achieve full U.S. Air Force (MarvU.S. Air Force Lynchard) spectrum dominance. It will also guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to The implementation process will integrate assure we will be able to achieve more seamless ongoing initiatives, such as the Joint Require- joint operations in the future. ments Oversight Council, Joint Warfighting Ca- As we pursue this vision, we must remain pabilities Assessments, and Advanced Capabilities mindful of our responsibilities: to prevent threats Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), to promote to U.S. interests from emerging, deter those that the integrated development of operational capa- do, and defeat those threats by military force if bilities. Concurrently, joint education and doctri- deterrence fails. In 2010, we will meet these re- nal development must keep pace. sponsibilities with high quality people and lead- As we implement this vision, affordability of ers, who are trained and ready for joint opera- the technologies envisioned to achieve full spec- tions and able to exploit high technology trum dominance will be an important considera- equipment. Even during a time of unparalleled tion. While we anticipate that some significant technological advances we will always rely on the improvements in capability may be gained eco- courage, determination, and strength of Amer- nomically, for example, by dual-use technologies ica’s men and women to ensure we are persuasive for C4I, others will be more difficult to achieve in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any within budget realities that exist today and will form of conflict. JFQ exist into the next century. We anticipate the need to be selective in the technologies we choose, and

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Now on the Internet— http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010

POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES Joint Vision

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 2010: America’s Military— Preparing for Tomorrow A Changing World Decisive WWWin WarWWW INFORMATION Persuasive SUPERIORITY

MULTINATIONAL in Peace OPERATIONS Quality Forces

ENHANCED Preeminent JOINTNESS in Any Form Dominant Maneuver of Conflict WWW

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INNOVATION: Past and Future By WILLIAMSON MURRAY

Mid-air refueling, Rockwell Field, California.

DarkStar UAV. U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force U.S. Air Force

e have entered a period of un- military institutions confronted great interna- certainty where threats are inde- tional uncertainty, relatively low support, and terminate even as changes in substantial technological change, offer views on technology accelerate. Rapid in- how one might view innovation in the next W 1 novation—apparent in the impact of stealth century. and precision weaponry in the Gulf War—ap- Many difficulties confront historians in draw- pears likely to continue. Yet the Armed Forces ing guidance from the past. It is impossible to are not apt to receive anything close to the re- replicate conditions of war in peacetime, while sources enjoyed during the Cold War. With less war itself is so permeated with fog and friction money and greater ambiguity on the nature of that it is difficult for military organizations to de- opponents and wars in the future, we must in- termine what has actually happened on the battle- novate. Recent case studies of innovation in a field.2 Since we prepare for and fight war in the similar period—the 1920s and 1930s—when real world rather than on computers, military innovation and adaptation reflect the complexity of that reality—one in which, as science increasingly Williamson Murray currently holds the Major General Matthew C. Horner reveals, chance and nonlinear factors dominate. chair of military history at Marine Corps University and is professor of For the analyst of innovation, complexities of the history emeritus at The Ohio State University.

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process make it extraordi- An Evolutionary Phenomenon narily difficult to recover With the possible exception of the British air the past in a simple, di- defense system developed by Hugh Dowding dur- gestible form. Relations ing the late 1930s, an innovation that flew in the among technological inno- face of airpower theories, bringing new ideas and vations, fundamentals of concepts of fighting to fruition was a long process military operations, and in the interwar years. This suggests that effective changes in concepts, doc- military innovation is evolutionary rather than trine, and organization that revolutionary. To the British and French in sum- drive innovation are essen- mer 1940, the unfolding of German exploitation tially nonlinear. Changes in tactics, Blitzkrieg warfare, doubtless appeared as inputs such as weapon sys- revolutionary. But to Germans involved in the tems—large or small—may process since the 1920s it seemed evolutionary. not yield proportionate While the degree of alteration on a year-to- changes in outputs or com- year basis can be relatively small, gradual and cu- bat dynamics. And the im- mulative change can be dramatic over time. The pact of changes on doctrine contrast between French and German tactical sys- or the education of an offi- tems could not have been more striking in May cer corps is almost incalcu- 1940, but innovations that led to this breaking lable. point took two decades. However gradual the Reading the past re- Naval Historical Center changes, a chasm existed between how these two Higgins ramped quires understanding how forces thought about, prepared for, and executed landing boat, 1941. interactions actually work. on the battlefield. Since the 1950s, research from fields as diverse as Evolutionary innovation depends on organi- meteorology, ecology, physics, and mathematics zational focus over time rather than guidance by has uncovered numerous dynamic systems so one individual for a short period. Military leader- simple as to represent virtual paragons of deter- ship can affect the process through long-term cul- ministic, clockwork mechanisms; yet they can tural changes rather than short-term decisions. give rise to long-term behavior so complex as to Interwar development of armored warfare offers be literally unpredictable or chaotic. It now ap- some perspectives. The most influential leaders pears that stable systems with simple and pre- were Lord George Francis Milne of Britain and dictable dynamics are in fact the exceptions in General Hans von Seeckt of Germany. Milne was nature rather than the rule. And most crucially, the more willing to see the army of the future in the local randomness of nonlinear systems is terms of armored forces. He not only supported basic: gathering and pro- armored maneuvers with scarce funds but told his cessing more information senior officers in the 1920s: evolutionary innovation with better algorithms and depends on organizational computers cannot, even in It is up to us to find some means of bringing war back to what it was when the art of generalship was focus over time rather than principle, make the unpre- dictability go away. possible. The only means of doing this is to increase guidance by one individual The implications of mobility on the battlefield. Now that is the point of these developments sug- the initiation of the armored brigade—to revive the 3 gest that the world as a whole does not work in a possibility of generalship. mechanistic, deterministic fashion; that complex Seeckt, though interested in motorized war- social interactions such as military innovation or fare, never got to that point. In 1928 he cau- actual combat do not reduce to simple linear tioned the Reichswehr officer corps that he did not processes; and that the study of human affairs— foresee motorized soldiers entirely replacing the interplay of thousands of independent vari- horsemen. ables—is more of an art than a science. The But the significant issue is that Seeckt fos- process of innovation in military institutions and tered a culture of innovation through the kind of cultures, involving myriad actors, complex tech- officer corps he created in the early 1920s and the nologies, and uncertainties of conflict and institutional values he inculcated. His officers de- human relations, forms a part of this world and is veloped doctrinal concepts based on past as well no more subject to reductionist solutions than as current experience.4 In 1920 he established 57 any other aspect of human affairs. committees to study the lessons of World War I.5 This effort produced the basic Reichswehr interwar doctrine manuals that had such influence on the Wehrmacht. This is an important point. There is an old axiom that generals prepare for the last war. In

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Launching USS Lexington, 1925. Naval Historical Center

F4B–1 taking off from USS Lexington.

Naval Historical Center

fact most military organizations show little interest in studying the lessons of even recent conflicts. Rather, they ignore the past or look to another paradigm. But the Germans were different. Based on the Reichswehr study, Werner von Naval Historical Center Fritsch and Ludwig Beck—who became the army F6Cs and T3Ms aboard commander and the chief of the great general USS Lexington off San Diego, 1928. staff, respectively, when Adolf Hitler came to power—wrote Die Truppenführung in 1932, the put little value on professional study of war.6 Con- chief army doctrine manual that the Wehrmacht sequently, Milne’s influence was wholly personal used with such effect during World War II. The and dissipated rapidly in the 1930s after his retire- values Seeckt imparted to the Reichswehr placed a ment and a series of unimaginative leaders took high value on analysis of changes in doctrine, control. These officers, particularly Field Marshal tactics, and technology. In other words he created Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (Milne’s suc- an ideal climate for innovation. cessor), effectively sabotaged his initiatives.7 It Milne, on the other hand, took over the thus appears that long-term decisions which affect British army well after World War I. That force the culture and values of the officer corps are cru- had done little to examine its experience in the cial to innovation, while it is difficult for a single war, and Milne would not begin such an effort individual to institutionalize change. until his last year as the chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS). Moreover, the regimental system

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Launching USS Nautilus, Mare Island Navy Yard, 1930.

Curtiss OC–1 Falcon. Naval Historical Center

in mechanized forces with capabilities well beyond those of other European armies. Essential to this success was the German ability to conceptu- alize the operational as well as tactical levels of war in doctrinal writings.

Naval Historical Center Thus Die Truppenführung provided the army with a coherent framework for thinking about future battlefields. It not only offered a means of integrating the traditional branches—artillery and Success in Innovation infantry—but latitude to incorporate evolving Despite difficulties, some military institu- concepts of armored war and close air support tions did innovate with success during the inter- within a doctrine aimed at fighting mobile, de- war period. Others, however, failed dismally. The centralized battles. Since German officers took factors that led to success thus show what will be doctrine manuals seriously they could compre- conducive to future innova- hend the larger picture of combined arms. Once since German officers took tions. Perhaps the most crucial exposed to the possibilities of armor in the Polish factor is military culture. One campaign, many skeptics were converted. doctrine manuals seriously might define military culture Moreover, there was honest reflection on fu- they could comprehend as the sum of intellectual, pro- ture developments. For example, the German high fessional, and traditional val- command and general staff subjected army perfor- combined arms ues possessed by an officer mance in Poland to a searching analysis in which corps. It is key to how officers operational success was not the major criterion. In assess the external environment and respond to Britain, on the other hand, Montgomery-Massing- threats. It is also crucial in how forces prepare for berd in the early 1930s suppressed the Kirk report combat and innovate. on the performance of the British army in World As suggested above, the German officer corps War I because it was critical. That would have been met many of these criteria. They in effect incor- inconceivable in Germany. porated innovations in armored warfare through a comprehensive and realistic understanding of modern warfare. Steady and incremental improvement in tactics as well as doctrine resulted

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Murray

Navy culture created a realistic relationship between annual exercises and education and wargaming at the Naval War College. Develop- ments in carrier aviation largely rested on academic processes. The college designed summer fleet problems, the fleet executed them realistically, then a careful evaluation funneled the results back to Newport. Finally the college, well connected with the fleet, kept officers informed on developments in naval aviation and concepts for employing it. Moreover, the Navy sent its best officers to the Naval War College. The realism and imagination of the wargames at Newport are particularly striking. As early as 1923, a game involved a blue fleet of five aircraft carriers against an opponent with four. While some games cast carriers in the mundane role of spotting for a battlefleet, the blue forces

Naval Historical Center launched a strike of two hundred aircraft armed P–39N, 1943. with bombs and torpedoes which crippled enemy carriers and a battleship. As Steven Rosen ob- This culture of critical examination tran- served in his study of innovation: scended the learning processes about the last war. Most important, concepts essential in the con- Throughout the late 1930s one sees the same pat- duct of carrier war were worked out. The necessity of tern as the Germans conducted exercises and then massing aircraft for strikes was highlighted. Rather combat operations. In all cases they continued to than assigning aircraft to each battleship to act as its critically assess what had occurred in the field. eyes, they were launched and kept in the air until Thus they learned from mistakes. Key to their ap- large numbers could be assembled for an independent proach was the treatment of errors in using new strike. The need for a coherent air-defense plan to co- equipment or procedures. They saw mistakes as a ordinate the use of defensive aircraft was emphasized, learning experience, not a cause for reproof. and the commander of the red fleet was faulted for During this period German army culture pro- failing to come up with such a plan.8 vided for trust and honesty among command levels. Commanders were not afraid to admit that The Navy approach to wargaming was simi- their units had problems. The Anschluss is a good lar to that of the German army. Neither used ex- illustration of this process, as the occupation of ercises or games to justify current revealed doc- Austria in March 1938 indicated weaknesses trine or exclude possibilities not popular among throughout the participating units. After-action senior officers. In other words, exercises and reports from battalion to army level became ever games aimed at those questions that one might more critical of troop performance, training, and ask, not at solutions. In peacetime they were edu- discipline in higher levels of command. cational. In war they showed possibilities. The But cultural problems robbed Germans of most important German game for crossing the the advantages gained in tactical and operational Meuse, for example, held in March 1940, did not innovations. The most brilliant battlefield success resolve whether Panzer spearheads should make could not make up for logistic and intelligence the breakthrough by themselves or wait for the 9 systems that failed to function in the modern infantry. world. Given the contempt on the part of their Perhaps the greatest interwar contribution officer corps for these crucial areas—the Luftwaffe which military culture made to innovation was in and navy were as bad as the army—the Germans allowing officers to use their imaginations. Where were unable to engage in prolonged struggle. If that did not exist or military colleges inculcated tactical innovations gave the Wehrmacht an ad- an absolutist doctrine—as in the French army or vantage early in World War II, they could not tri- at the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical School—the umph over gross mistakes in strategy, logistics, result was flawed military innovation. and intelligence made largely as a result of mili- Failure to Innovate tary culture. German officers were not alone in benefiting Italians were the least successful innovators from a culture that encouraged innovation. Car- of the interwar period. While Anglo-American rier aviation in the U.S. Navy offers lessons about successful military change in the interwar period.

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and German historians once blamed Italian fail- over the fleet air arm and the loss of most naval ures on ethnic characteristics, recent scholarship airmen to the RAF in 1918 made innovation al- has placed it where it belongs—on an officer most impossible, at least compared to events in corps that failed its nation and soldiers.10 A re- the United States and Japan. mark by General Ubaldo Soddu suggests the per- Distinct barriers to innovation appeared vasive culture of the Italian throughout the 1930s. Perhaps the most obvious military: “When you have a is a willful desire to discard history or twist it to the most glaring message fine plate of pasta guaranteed justify current doctrine and beliefs. In 1924 the of World War I was that the for life, and a little music, you British air staff explicitly rejected the past in a don’t need anything more.” 11 memorandum to the chiefs of staff committee bomber only got through Any staff or war college that which argued that the force attacking an enemy under fighter escort emphasizes golf and “getting nation: in touch with the family” is . . . can either bomb military objectives in populated not about to provide the intel- areas from the beginning of the war, with the objec- lectual climate for innovation. tive of obtaining a decision by moral effect which Evidence throughout the interwar period such attitudes will produce, and by the serious dislo- suggests a wide-scale pattern of failing to inno- cation of the normal life of the country, or, alterna- vate which reflects a larger problem of military ef- tively, they can be used in the first instance to attack fectiveness. As one commentator on the perfor- enemy aerodromes with a view to gaining some mea- mance of military institutions from 1914 to 1945 sure of air superiority and, when this has been gained, noted: can be changed over to the direct attack on the nation. Thus in the spheres of operations and tactics, The latter alternative is the method which the lessons where military competence would seem to be a nation’s of history seem to recommend, but the air staff are rightful due, the twenty-one studies [on separate na- convinced that the former is the correct one. tional military experiences] suggest for the most part This dismissal of history reflected the attitudes of most air forces in those years. Unfortu- nately for crews in World War II, the lessons did matter. The most glaring message of World War I was that the bomber only got through and back under fighter escort. Yet there was a pervasive belief in the RAF and the U.S. Army Air Corps that long-range fighters were not needed, possible, or relevant to strategic bombing. Air combat had repeatedly stressed during World War I that air superiority was essential to all air operations, particularly bombing. Without fighter support, attacking aircraft took prohibitive losses. But it took innumerable Schweinfurts and Nurembergs before air staffs of the next war awoke to that fact. If military organizations sometimes ignore the past, they can also misuse it. The French, see- ing the disasters that resulted from offensives in

U.S. Army Military History Institute 1914, 1915, and 1917, wrote off any approach to France, 1918. offensive warfare other than their stylized, tightly less than general professional military competence and controlled “methodical battle.” Their defeat in sometimes abysmal incompetence. One can doubt 1940 displayed the quality and inevitability of a whether any other profession in these seven nations Greek tragedy; but it is hard to see how they during the same periods would have achieved such poor could have developed another attitude on offen- 12 ratings by similarly competent outside observers. sive operations. Nevertheless, the French interpre- Misuses of History tation was basically flawed and historically inac- curate. During the late 1930s General Maurice Failing to innovate is more than simple in- Gamelin exacerbated a faulty doctrine by shut- competence. Some military institutions may have ting off all debate within the French army. compelling reasons not to innovate or circum- More difficult to explain is the reaction of scribe possibilities. In the case of the develop- most navies to the unrestricted submarine war- ment of British carrier aviation, the arguments fare during World War I. In retrospect, Germany almost broke Britain’s sea lines of communications in 1917. Yet when the war was over, the

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Murray Naval Historical Center Testing radar on board USS Leary, 1937.

attack U.S. sea lines of communications. At the same time they devoted few resources to protecting their own commerce. In the end they lost their merchant shipping to U.S. submarines while inflicting hardly any damage on enemy shipping. Rigidity One fact of life in many organizations that has had a ominous influence on the institutional capacity to innovate is rigidity. It appears in many areas, especially doctrine. There are reasonable explanations for French offensive doctrine

Naval Historical Center remaining rigid throughout the interwar period. XAF radar antenna, Harder to fathom is why it stayed so fixed in re- USS New York, 1938. gard to defensive warfare. Kriegsmarine wrote the U-boat off as a major The French also believed the Germans could weapon and based its hopes entirely on rebuild- not and would not ultimately perform radically ing a high sea fleet of battleships (and virtually differently from their own forces. They refused to no carriers). Ironically, in 1936 Admiral Karl recognize that an enemy had other options and Doenitz and his chief engineer pushed the naval might exercise them. It was mirror imaging of the high command to support development of U- worst sort. Immediately after the defeat of France boats with a higher underwater speed—what in 1940, historian Marc Bloch (a French reserve would eventually become the Walter U-boat. But officer who observed the collapse at highest lev- senior admirals displayed no interest in technol- els), identified one major cause of this disaster: ogy for a form of naval war they had dismissed.13 “our minds [were] too [in]elastic for us ever to The Royal Navy also wrote off the submarine. On admit the possibility that the enemy might move the basis of their victory in World War I and their with the speed which he actually achieved.” 14 development of sonar, the British gave up on an- This inflexibility was aggravated by an institu- tisubmarine warfare and threw themselves en- tional bias against feedback that contradicted exist- tirely into ensuring that Jutland would never ing doctrine or preparations. Exercises aimed at in- happen again. culcating “revealed truth” into units—not at But the Japanese made the most amazing adapting doctrine to real life. There was little learn- misuse of submarines despite their “long lance” ing since the high command had all the answers. torpedo, the finest undersea weapon of the war. In the face of the lessons of World War I and the Battle of the Atlantic in 1940–41, they failed to

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Such rigidity led organizations to shut off alternative paths. The belief that bombers would always get through led airmen to minimize the potential of the Luftwaffe to interfere with bomber operations. For the Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Forces, it meant minimizing technological support to aid the accuracy of attacks at night and in bad weather. The measure of air effectiveness thus became the number of sorties flown or targets attacked, tonnage of bombs dropped, and acres of cities destroyed. Air war had become an end in itself, and real measures of effectiveness simply failed to interest most air commanders. Certainly the most rigid interwar military was the Soviet army. Stalin’s purges ensured the loyalty of Soviet military institutions. Most innovation ceased and the officer corps chased after mindless conceptions of revolutionary war which severely damaged its capacity to fight and made it incapable of grasping how the Wehrmacht would fight. The outcome was the most catastrophic defeat in history in terms of human losses. The So- viets escaped its consequences only because of the appalling strategic and political misjudg- ments of their opponent. Implications There are some parameters for successful in- U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force Parachuting over novation. First, one must not think in terms of Brook Field, Texas, individuals—future Mitchells, Dowdings, Guderi- 1926. ans—in furthering change. The interwar period reveals the need for officers to be educated and The British army showed no greater interest encouraged to innovate—a far larger problem in growing from exercises and had no effective than finding one innovative officer. Education system to disseminate lessons learned through its and values are basic factors in innovation. Profes- units. Even during the war there sional military education (PME) was vital to is little evidence that they incor- the interwar period reveals change in the interwar years and will be more so porated battle experience in in the future if it provides the broad conceptual the need for officers to be training.15 There was ample data context that innovation requires. educated and encouraged from the Middle East, but Home In the larger picture, educational values Forces appeared to pay virtually among officers require an intellectual and physi- to innovate no attention to it. Divisions cal commitment. Only a willingness to think working up for combat had to through the business of war allows leaders to per- innovate and adapt almost on their own. Hence ceive the long-term potential of innovation. tactical innovation came on the battlefield—a Moreover, officers must have connections with, most expensive teacher. An armor officer in and an understanding of, civilian technologies North Africa described the results: dominated by innovation. Military institutions Other officers told me of how they had seen the must judge future war realistically. Here the Hussars charging into the Jerry tanks, sitting on top of muddy boot world of exercises and lifelike their turrets more or less with their whips out. “It looked wargames lies at the heart of effective innovation. like the run-up to the first fence at a point-to-point,” the The development of German armor doctrine and adjutant described it. The first action was very typical close air support and of American and Japanese of those early encounters involving cavalry regiments. carrier aviation shows the relationships among They had incredible enthusiasm and dash, and sheer education, doctrine, wargames, and exercises. exciting courage which was only curbed by the rapidly When military organizations and high com- decreasing stock of dashing officers and tanks.16 mands “knew” the answers and drove the solutions, the results were sometimes disastrous in sti- fling innovations.

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Murray U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force B–9 bomber.

What does the past imply for those who will who can truly challenge blue forces. Such scenarios must innovate during periods of low budgets, major examine the impact of innovative approaches on all three technological changes, and uncertain strategic levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. conditions? First, specific, detailed plans to en- ■ The services must rethink their operational hance innovation are probably a nonstarter. tempo and the number of annual exercises. The value of exercises, particularly when resources are short, lies Courses on it at staff and war colleges will offer not just in their conduct but their planning and little, and creating innovation specialties may lessons-learned analysis. The latter must involve more only attract those interested in a safe career rather than reports no one reads, but rather rethinking doc- than crusaders for change. Efforts to institutional- trine, training, and education at every level. The value ize innovation will inhibit rather than foster the of exercises ultimately depends on the preparedness of process. Change demands officers in the main- participants to think through what went well and what stream of their professions, with a prospect of did not. reaching the top ranks, who have peer respect ■ The services must ensure that lessons learned and will take risks. The bureaucratization of inno- focus on more than validating doctrine and processes. vation—particularly in the current framework of During the interwar period the French sought seriously to examine World War I and learn from exercises. But the U.S. military—guarantees its death. they also created a system that narrowly constrained ex- How then to encourage it? The best route ap- ercises and study and that ensured the sanctioned appears to be to foster change in service cultures. But proach would again prove. They learned what made one can only achieve cultural changes over the generals and staff officers happy, a clear case of self-ful- long haul, not a traditional American approach. filling prophecy, at least until the Germans arrived on Areas where the Armed Forces might push the banks of the Meuse. the process are listed in conclusion. ■ At every level the services must think in discrete measures of effectiveness. They need to consider exactly ■ The services must think in terms of fighting real what they wish to do to an opponent. And as war opponents, with real capabilities and real strategic and changes, they will require new measures and methods. political objectives. Exercises and gaming must take place Above all, the services must foster a climate of military within concrete scenarios against realistic opponents professionalism.

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■ The services also need to rethink PME. Much in- 9 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Washington: Zenger, terwar innovation depended on relations between the 1979), p. 71. staff and war colleges and the world of operations. Un- 10 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941, fortunately, the Armed Forces lost much of their belief in Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War (New York: PME following World War II despite the testimony of Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 16. Eisenhower and Spruance who credited their days at 11 Ibid., p. 57. Leavenworth and Newport for their success. But any at- 12 John H. Cushman, “Challenge and Response at tempt to encourage cultural changes and foster intellec- the Operational and Tactical Levels,” in Military Effec- tual curiosity demands better PME. It also requires that tiveness, volume 3, World War II, edited by Allan R. Mil- education remains central throughout an officer’s career. lett and Williamson Murray (London, Allen and Unwin, One may not create another Seeckt or Dowding and 1988), p. 322. manage his career through the ranks, but one can foster 13 John Terraine, The U-boat Wars, 1916–1945 (New military culture where those so promoted have imagina- York: Putnam, 1989), p. 617. tion and intellectual grounding to support innovation. 14 Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat (New York: Norton, ■ Finally, the services must encourage greater fa- 1968), p. 45. miliarity with nonlinear analyses. A heavy emphasis on 15 Williamson Murray, “British Military Effective- engineering, which is prominent in the officer acquisi- ness,” in Military Effectiveness, vol. 3, pp. 90–135. tion procedure of three services, reflects a mind set that 16 Robert Crisp, Brazen Chariots (New York: Ballan- is not conducive to innovation. While some suggest tine, 1960), p. 32. that the military needs more engineers to encourage nonlinear thinking, they are wrong. In fact what the services lack are biologists, mathematicians, and historians. Presently most senior officers think of innovation the way the Luftwaffe did during World War II, in quan- titative and qualitative terms of techniques and platforms rather than conceptually. JFQ

NOTES

1 See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Mili- tary Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1996). This article was adapted with permission of the publisher from a chapter in the above book. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Barry Watts in preparing the article. 2 Despite claims that technological change will stop friction, there is compelling evidence to the contrary. See Barry Watts, “Friction in the Future,” in Brassey’s Mershon American Defense Annual, 1996–1997 (Washing- ton: Brassey’s, 1996). 3 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, vol. 1 (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 129. 4 Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences,” in Military Innovation. 5 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kans.: Uni- versity Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 37. 6 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 7 Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927– 1938 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1988), pp. 130–31. 8 Steven Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innova- tion and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1991), p. 69.

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“Top Down” Planning and Joint Doctrine:

Australians leading American column, Northern Territory. The Australian Experience U.S. Army (Al Chang)

By THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG

n terms of defense planning, Australia is a and a resilient alliance, it has retained a close se- paradox. Though located in a remote region curity association with the United States. of the world, Australians do not in general Australia is the world’s most urbanized soci- I draw a sense of security from their geo- ety with the overwhelming preponderance of its graphic isolation. There are no land boundaries, populace in the southeast. Yet it is the climatically and regional threats since World War II have been inhospitable, underdeveloped, and resource-rich distant or sporadic. Nonetheless Australia’s anxi- north and northwest that have been receiving at- ety over its exposed position proves that a coun- tention from the Australian Defence Force (ADF). try does not need an identifiable threat to con- Geostrategic realities and recent experience sider itself insecure. For example, while have combined to produce an advanced defense sufficiently removed from the frontline in the planning system. Many post-Cold War difficulties Cold War, Canberra was a staunch “blue force” facing Western militaries—such as developing ca- during the period of superpower confrontation; pabilities-based planning systems and achieving indeed, with shared experiences of many wars greater jointness—have tested defense leaders in Canberra since the early 1970s. What initiated the change in thinking was the official recogni- Thomas-Durell Young is research professor of national security affairs in tion in 1972 that Australia had no threat against the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

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reliance in light of the impending withdrawal of the British from the Far East, the Nixon Guam Doctrine, and evident failure of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The policy was further elucidated and with stronger language in the Liberal-Country Party coalition government’s Australian Defence, Novem- ber 1976. Reliance on allied military assistance in the event of a direct threat to Australia would no longer be assumed, thereby giving impetus to developing a balanced, more self-sufficient force. The apotheosis of self-reliance was reflected in Defence of Australia 1987. For the first time, the concepts of “self-reliance” and the “defense of Australia,” with an endorsed national strategy Combat Camera Imagery (April Alexander) and policy guidance to help implement them, be- F–111 arriving in came more than mere terms. A strategy of “de- Darwin for fence in depth” was adopted to direct ADF devel- Pitch Black ’93. which to plan. To its credit, the defense establish- opment. Specific strategic guidance followed in ment developed a top-down, threat-ambivalent 1991 and set the priorities for improving ADF ca- planning system and force development method- pabilities to operate in the north by increased ology. One outcome of this approach has been to force presence and facilities for deployments. foster jointness by linking joint doctrinal develop- The 1994 paper further acknowledges the ment to strategic guidance. Indeed, it is not un- new regional challenges involved in their pursuit common to hear that commanders not only and “defence in depth” has become “depth in de- know ADF joint doctrine but actually use it. fence,” thereby providing a more holistic ap- While the U.S. Armed Forces have now proach employing all national assets, as opposed adopted jointness as a formal discipline of study to its earlier more limited definition. and have tomes of doc- One discernible change in previous policy is it is not uncommon to hear trine, comparative litera- an acknowledgement that ADF must be more ca- ture on joint matters is lim- pable of carrying out missions outside of the de- that commanders not only ited. Thus the Australian fense of Australia. However, force development know joint doctrine but use it experience warrants exami- will still be guided by the defense of Australia, nation. This article analyzes with capabilities for regional engagement, peace- two key elements of Aus- keeping, and external deployment being consid- tralian jointness: defense planning/force develop- ered tangentially. The 1993 Strategic Review made ment methodology and the development of joint no mention of “Australia’s area of direct military doctrine. A description of the evolution of Aus- interest,” which had been given considerable tralian defense policy will place these two systems prominence in Defence of Australia 1987. This con- in context. Whereas it would be imprudent to cept had utility in the 1980s in shifting the focus claim that the Australian experience is applicable more firmly from filial protection by “great and to other defense establishments, the processes un- powerful friends” to the peculiar needs of Aus- derlying its elements should be of interest to U.S. tralia’s defense. The job done, and with growing planning and doctrine communities. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, limited boundaries were discarded as strategic and force Defense Policy development tools. One result of Canberra’s policy For those unfamiliar with Australian defense, of “regional engagement” was the ground break- Defending Australia 1994, a white paper issued by ing December 1995 security pact with Indonesia. the previous Labor government, is the latest itera- While it may appear that Australian planners tion of a policy which has enjoyed general sup- have long been blessed by policy consistency, this port across the political spectrum since 1972. In is not so at the implementation level. Between the that year the ruling Liberal-Country Party coali- 1972 white paper and its 1987 counterpart, defense tion (the Liberal Party being “conservative” in planners lacked adequate guidance from political Australia) issued the first formal white paper on authorities. It took the publication of the Review of defense. Significantly, the Australian Defence Re- Australia’s Defence Capabilities in 1986 by Paul view argued in favor of a defense policy of self- Dibb, a consultant to the minister of defence, to move the government to articulate and sanction an official strategy. The 1987 defense white paper offered thorough guidance in which Canberra

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Young

HMAS Dubbo and HMAS Fremantle during Kangaroo ’95. Australian Defence Public Relations (K. Piggott) U.S. Marines preparing to jump with Australian paratroops. Second, the defense establishment develops appreciations of regional military capabilities in Australian Defence Public Relations (Gary Ramage) being as well as prospect. These are not official threat assessments but rather surveys of regional defense capabilities.1 As such, there is no consider- stated national security aspirations and announced ation of, or judgment on, the motives or intent of a strategy of “defense in depth.” Importantly, this regional countries. An appreciation of a nation’s paper also had the effect of limiting force structure geographic setting and the military capabilities of planning specifically to the defense of Australia. regional states informs judgments on warning time and defense preparation requirements. Defense Planning Third, these findings suggest what is credible Australian defense policymaking has four and what is not in the form of “contingencies.” major steps. First, planners consider geopolitical For example, an invasion or conquest of Aus- and geostrategic factors such as the proximity of tralian territory would be too demanding on states, population centers, terrain, infrastructure, enemy combat, combat support, and logistics ele- et al. Overall, planners face defending an island ments. Japan might have thundered on the continent distant from other countries, having a northern coast during World War II but never re- vast and climatically inhospitable north with a alistically looked like conquering the country. limited population base and infrastructure. On On the other hand, while no motive or intent the positive side, Australia has a formidable “air- for conflict at any level can be perceived, prudence sea gap” between its coast and the archipelago demands the ability to meet feasible contingen- farther north through which an attacker would cies, now called “short-warning” (rather than the have to pass. earlier low or escalated) conflicts.2 The scale and intensity of short-warning conflict could range

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contingencies are used as a from small raids to larger Force Development protracted operations, baseline against which defense The process used by the Australian Depart- still a demanding pros- ment of Defence and Headquarters ADF to carry capabilities can be weighed pect in the sparse tracts out force development has three stages: strategic and remote waters of the concepts, defence force capability options papers, far north. and specific capability proposals, including key Contingencies are not used for formal threat- capability submissions. The process must be seen based planning but as a baseline against which de- as a continuum since distinctions drawn between fense capabilities can be weighed. Credible contin- the stages are somewhat arbitrary. gencies have a direct influence on developing ADF Stage 1—Developing strategic concepts. Guid- capabilities to meet conflicts that could arise in ance identifies likely ADF roles in the defense of the near term, and the defense expansion base (re- Australia. Currently, strategic concepts are written serve forces and defense industrial capabilities) for for each of eight roles. The concepts are devel- conflicts that would take longer to develop. oped to ensure a joint focus as well as the full and Fourth, planners generate five and ten-year complementary capabilities of ADF: plans based on realistic financial guidance set by ■ intelligence collection and evaluation the government. This provision grew from a fail- ■ surveillance of maritime areas and northern ure to garner the appropriations which the Dibb Australia review and earlier white papers assumed. ■ maritime patrol and response This planning process produces the follow- ■ protection of shipping, offshore territories, and ing conclusions: resources ■ ■ Australia possesses a natural and formidable air- air defense within maritime areas and northern sea barrier. approaches ■ ■ There is no identifiable country with the intent defeat of incursions on Australian territory or ability to threaten fundamental national interests, let ■ protection of civil and military assets (including alone national security (that is, to launch and sustain a infrastructure and population centers) lodgement on Australia). ■ strategic strike. ■ Certain countries do possess some capabilities But because these roles are broad, a strategic which could be employed against Australia, and their concept derives a list of tasks including specifica- acquisition of more threatening weapon systems could tion, in the greatest possible detail, of task para- be countered by increasing ADF capabilities. meters such as rates of effort, location, duration, ■ Nevertheless, in the short term and without expansion, such capabilities could only generate conflict and sustainability and, whenever possible, initial well short of major attack or invasion. judgments of task priorities. ■ As a consequence, Australia will protect itself Tasks derived from strategic concepts must through a strategy of depth in defense. be identified correctly and comprehensively as they evolve since they form the basis for force de- These conclusions equal a net assessment velopment. It must be made clear what is to be and establish requirements for a standing force done, where, when, how many times, and for structure and defense base. The assessment has how long. Note that strategic concepts do not the following implications for defense policy: specify how to accomplish missions. ■ In light of Australia’s threat-ambiguous environ- An update of these concepts over time is en- ment, sophisticated intelligence gathering and assess- visaged as factors change. Moreover, once all ment capabilities are crucial to providing sufficient eight have been endorsed they will be supported warning to allow an appropriate political response. by environmental (land, sea, and air) concepts ■ Inhibiting incursions and monitoring sovereign territory and seas require refined air, maritime, and and one master concept as a baseline repository 3 ground surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for common consideration. suitable for peacetime and wartime. Stage 2—Defence force capability options papers. ■ Priority must be directed to meeting short warn- These documents examine the extent to which ing-time conflict. current and approved ADF capabilities can under- These processes establish a practice by which take tasks identified in endorsed strategic con- defense officials can delineate ADF missions with- cepts. Where tasks cannot be completed to an ad- out accentuating implausible threat scenarios. equate level, the papers identify broad options for This is not always easy since it requires clear policy overcoming deficiencies. This drives the system and consensus on key areas in the defense com- to examine in a joint manner what can be done munity. The system has provided planning with with existing capabilities and, should deficiencies stable direction to develop force structure for the arise, to determine what capabilities are required defense of Australia in a top-down manner. for the future.

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Young

Australian troops landing from HMAS Tobruk. Australian Defence Public Relations (C. Woods)

Capability options papers are developed to ■ How much is enough? (Identify where excess/ accomplish the following: shortfall exists and what to do about it.) ■ What are the costs and risks? ■ Assess the performance likely from using all ex- ■ What are the preferred generic options? isting capabilities.4 This step establishes the baseline against which the cost of adjustment options will be Stage 3—Specific capability proposals, including measured. major capability submissions. Following approval ■ Determine what level of performance is accept- of generic options, the final step before funding able and the consequences of not meeting that standard; approval and acquisition is determining specific that is, does a deficiency need to solutions and matching resources with force just as force development is be overcome? This analysis must structure requirements. Questions involved at also consider the effects of not this stage focus on cost, type, and density of influenced by strategic completing the tasks. Conversely, equipment required and timing of procurement. concepts, so is joint doctrine surplus capability requires a decision as to whether to reduce structure or shift excess capabili- Joint Doctrine ties elsewhere; for example, reserve components. Just as Australian force development is ■ Explain how a defense force could reduce the highly influenced by strategic concepts, so is deficiency inexpensively with cost-effective adjustments joint doctrine. In short, endorsed strategic con- such as changes in doctrine, training, or command and cepts provide the foundation for the develop- control. ment of ADF joint doctrine. So important are ■ If the defense force cannot fulfill a task, this these concepts that it is extremely difficult for a stage will explain ways it can acquire greater proficiency service to obtain new capabilities unless it can by improving such components as manpower, facilities, equipment, training, organization, etc. show that they would directly support existing ■ Estimate level of improvement and likely costs strategic concepts. of an enhancement option as well as consequences of Joint doctrine must demonstrate how ADF is not performing to the level judged acceptable. capable of performing the missions described by ■ Finally, establish force development priorities strategic concepts and has thus become more influ- based on the preceding analyses as well as the best re- ential. For instance, while responding to an inher- turn for expended resources. ently low “force-to-space ratio” through a series of While complicated, this process can be command reorganizations, ADF has had to become summed up as follows: more proficient in joint operations. Consequently, ■ Can the identified tasking be done now? (What are existing capabilities and how well can they perform the task?)

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all exercises are joint. The capstone ADF Publica- there is a routine method of ensuring that doc- tion 1, Doctrine, has become umbrella guidance for trine remains relevant to operators in the field. the three services, to which their own doctrines must conform. The services have come to accept Post-1972 defense gave Canberra a twenty- joint doctrine as a useful means to achieve the year head start in planning to operate jointly in a often elusive goal of jointness, noting, however, threat-ambiguous regional environment. More- the important role of each service’s professional over, geostrategic realities, financial exigencies, doctrinal sources in influencing joint culture. and defense guidance forced ADF to take joint- As concepts mature, joint doctrine increas- ness seriously. This is not to suggest that the Aus- ingly flows from and supports specific concepts. tralian model is either perfect—it is evolving—or ADF joint doctrine thereby provides methods by appropriate for other countries. Australia clearly which the services can support national strategy. enjoys a unique strategic culture. Although the individual services previously found What is relevant are the methodologies and it difficult to demonstrate that they could execute systems outlined above. Developing a planning strategic concepts separately, joint doctrine com- process that translates national policy and strate- bined with emerging operational concepts pro- gic guidance into overarching concepts, capability vides integrating and rationalizing guidance. options, and principles to govern force employ- Lastly, joint doctrine will help the comman- ment should not be discounted. Given shortcom- der, Australian Theater, and his one geographic and ings in current joint strategic planning within the three environmental component commanders to Pentagon, the Australian experiences could hold assess and demonstrate command preparations to answers for improvements in the U.S. planning accomplish missions stipulated in the Headquar- system. Thus, in an era of financial penury in ters ADF Master Task List, as well as respond to the many nations, and recognizing that future opera- Chief of Defence Force’s Preparedness Directive (on tions will require joint capabilities, a study of Aus- readiness levels and resource allocation). tralian defense planning and joint doctrine could Joint doctrine is drafted at the ADF Warfare reveal what will and what will not work. JFQ Centre by teams of field grade officers from all services with recent operational experience. The NOTES centre, organized in 1990 from two joint warfare 1 While defense officials emphasize that these ap- schools, is chartered to develop and teach joint preciations are not threat assessments, references to “in- doctrine, manage the ADF exercise analyses plan, telligent adversaries” and Australia’s “favorable security and maintain a data base for post-exercise analy- environment” presuppose a threat, however ill-defined. ses. It is concerned with developing and validat- Officials respond that their methodology does not allow ing joint doctrine on the operational level. Con- threats to overly influence their force development sequently, the centre does not normally develop methodology. 2 tactical level doctrine, which is done by the indi- Levels of conflict include low-level, escalated low- vidual services in accordance with joint doctrine. level, and more substantial conflict. Escalated low-level conflict is defined as an “attacker supplementing or Valid joint doctrine must address strategic substituting unconventional tactics and forces with mil- concepts when it is drafted. Once completed and itary units prepared to confront our forces direct.” vetted, doctrine is reviewed by the Joint Opera- 3 As further feedback, an operational level concept for tions Doctrine Group which is comprised of ser- the defense of Australia will produce the “warfighters’ vice representatives, joint commands, Headquar- view” and improve interaction of the separate service ters ADF, and other interested parties. Draft planning for all eight roles or combinations of them. doctrine is then staffed through the services. 4 Concept papers make assumptions on actual geo- Agreement to publish is reached by consensus. graphic locations, frequency, intensity, and currency of The tendency to water down joint doctrine which significant conflict periods similar to two MRCs and the can arise in the United States during consensus- win/hold/win judgment. 5 For a critique of the U.S. doctrine development building is largely mitigated in Australia because process, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell the process is focused on strategic concepts dur- Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine, and Antipodean In- ing the early stages of development and through- sights (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, out the coordination phase.5 Strategic Studies Institute, 1995). Once endorsed, joint doctrine is validated for relevance and utility through the observation of joint and combined exercises by the ADF War- fare Centre. The assistant chief of defence force (operations) sponsors such observation visits, thus ensuring the involvement of Headquarters ADF in the review. Any observed inadequacies can result in a doctrinal review. In this manner,

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The C–17 Transport—

U.S. Air Force (David McLeod) C–17 Globemaster III. Joint Before Its Time By GEORGE M. DRYDEN

ointness does not spring full blown from and development, testing, and doctrine formula- the mind and will of operational comman- tion.2 In this program, the Air Force supported ders. It must be cultivated not only the C–17 and accepted participation by the Army. through planning and training but in ac- J The Requirement quisition. For acquisition to be joint, cooperation among the services must exist at each step along “The failure to appreciate the importance of the way.1 Although infrequent, joint acquisition airlift is as old as modern airpower—and even the programs have been successful. The C–17 Globe- Air Force is occasionally guilty of it.” 3 Strategic master III transport was a program in which the lift has always been regarded as a bureaucratic Army and Air Force cooperated in drafting specifi- stepchild and the Air Force commitment to the cations, source selection, promotion, engineering C–17 program was routinely questioned because the Army would be the principal user.4 In addition, the C–17 competed for fighter dollars. Con- ventional wisdom would thus presume inatten- George M. Dryden is a defense analyst with International Technology tion by the Air Force. While support within the and Trade Associates, Inc.

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■ C–17 TRANSPORT

Military Airlift Command (MAC)—now the Air Mission design was divided into two sec- Mobility Command (AMC)—was always absolute, tions. Army representatives developed scenarios the Air Force as a whole was not enthralled by the for the types and numbers of units to be trans- C–17 until 1991 when it was seen as a means of ported. As the Joint Chiefs noted in a memo to commanding scarce budget dollars because of its the Secretary of Defense: cross-service mission. Major Army field commands assisted in developing a But the Air Force steadily supported C–17 pro- series of individual (intratheater) airlift requirements curement—at higher than authorized levels. As that were derived from OPLANS for Europe, Southwest one observer stated: “The Air Force took the rare Asia, and Korea. These “snapshots” provided a sound step of awarding the contract for [the C–17 pro- basis for evaluating the qualitative airlift require- gram] to McDonnell Douglas even though Con- ments of the CINCs.7 gress had not provided any funds.” 5 And others emphasized that the mere existence of the pro- As a result, the process produced both pay- gram demonstrated commitment because C–17s loads and schedules by determining how many were not necessary for any Air Force mission. If the troops and how much equipment had to be service opposed the program it could have easily moved, to what destinations, and how fast. shifted its support to an alternative program. Thus Simultaneously, the Air Force developed a most observers agree that Air Force support has catalogue of global airfields (including runway been consistent if not overwhelming. and ramp specifications) and operational ranges required to utilize them. This revealed how far Cooperative Foundation the aircraft had to fly and how austere a field it In 1979, Major General Emil Block, USAF, could land on. took command of the cargo/transport aircraft-ex- By merging data, the task force created 24 perimental (C–X) task force that was charged mission scenarios which the winning contractor with developing a program management direc- had to solve. Mission 7, for example, was de- tive, preliminary system operational concept, and scribed as follows: draft mission element need statement. His Army Logistics missions with payloads at 100 percent of the and Marine Corps counterparts were tasked with 2.25 G capability (of the aircraft)...final one hour providing service requirements to the Air Force. at 500–1100 feet above ground level...at an average Following the failed advanced medium take- speed of 300 knot equivalent airspeed using low level off and landing (AMST) program—an attempt to (contour flying)...procedures....Land on a 4000 produce a jet-powered, outsized, cargo-capable C– foot paved runway with adequate fuel to fly an addi- 130 replacement—the C–X tional 500 nautical miles after offload....At the teams that developed program intended to meld midpoint of low altitude cruise at 300 KEAS, [the the intercontinental range C–X should be able to perform] an evasive maneu- requirements were comprised and outsized cargo bay of ver of up to 2.25 G.8 the C–5 with the austere of Air Force and Army officers As a result, the C–X aircraft was conceived in field capability of the terms of overall joint warfighting capabilities, not C–130. AMST produced as an organic Air Force requirement. two prototypes, one of which, the McDonnell Because C–X concept development and de- Douglas YC–15, was a direct technological prede- sign included Army involvement in a tradition- cessor of the C–X program product, the C–17. ally Air Force domain, new design factors became General Block oversaw four sections of the important: how to load and tie down cargo, how task force. Army and Marine representatives were much time it takes, and transitioning from one responsible for representing service interests and mission to another. Such factors may not have each oversaw a section.6 Additionally, the opera- been addressed as thoroughly without direct tions panel was jointly chaired by an Air Force of- Army participation. ficer from MAC and another from Logistics Com- With RFP completion, the program moved mand and an Army officer. The program thus on to the process of source selection in which the considered service interests to ensure general if Air Force did not solicit Army input but had an not total satisfaction. Army general on its board. As one Air Force offi- Concept and Design cer told the author, “The Army had primary input at source selection. Some would even say one of Rather than prescribing particular technical the designs lost because of the Army. They didn’t characteristics, the request for proposal (RFP) de- like it as well.” scribed missions to be accomplished by C–X aircraft. Teams that developed those requirements were comprised of both Air Force and Army officers.

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his service’s birthday that year, “the first Transport Aircraft Comparisons C–17 will be delivered to Charleston Air Force C–17 Runway Range Base [which is] a very significant event for 3,000 feet 2,760 miles the United States Army.” 9 McPeak, in turn, Payload 169,000 pounds noted that the two services planned a joint Crew celebration of the first delivery. “The C–17 is important to meet our mobility require- C–5 Runway Range ments. I plan to help celebrate the Army’s 5,000 feet 3,434 miles birthday ...by flying the C–17 personally Payload into Charleston.” 261,000 pounds The following year, the Army and Air Crew + Force chiefs together with the Marine Corps commandant each sent personal letters to Congress on behalf of the transport. Sulli- C–141 Runway Range 5,000 feet 2,800 miles van’s letter stated: Payload We will need the C–17 to provide the strategic 80,000 pounds Crew airlift for troops and equipment to provide our forced entry capability and simultaneous applica- C–130 Runway Range tion of joint combat power across the depth of the 3,000 feet 2,356 miles battlefield in the 21st century. The C–17 is the Payload only aircraft that can get the Army’s outsized 42,673 pounds 10 Crew combat systems to the next war when required. This echoed what the chiefs had said a Aircraft Length 50 feet 100 feet 150 feet 200 feet decade earlier in support of the aircraft: “Be- cause it offers superior military utility at a competitive price, the C–17 has strong support from the Air Force, Army, and Marine The C–X contract was awarded to McDon- Corps.” 11 It is hard to find similar joint backing nell Douglas for a design designated C–17. After for any other recent program. that decision, the Army was no longer involved Those who worked inside the program con- in the contract negotiations but remained in- firm that these public statements of cooperation formed of developments. The Air Force served as were genuine. In the early days, one participant re- the contractor’s sole point of contact. called the Army and the Air Force chiefs of staff Jointness also extended vicariously to the closely coordinated their support for the program. contract design teams. In But such high-level support also had its perils. designing the C–17, Mc- Some Air Force participants groused that though the Army and Air Force chiefs Donnell Douglas employed the Army consistently supported the requirement, of staff closely coordinated a studies and analysis group it was sometimes evasive in backing the aircraft. their support for the program composed of up to 75 per- Further, a charge was made that the Army never cent former Army person- pushed too hard for the C–17 because it feared nel. In response to the mis- being compelled to supply the funding. Yet as one sion-based RFP, this group designed what some Air Force officer commented, “the C–17 wouldn’t called the optimal cargo compartment. The C–17 be there without Army support.” transport was built around a back-end cargo area Jointness on other levels of the program was which could accommodate paratroopers, vehicles, at least as important as those described above. It palletized loads, roll-on/roll-off shipments, air- would have been futile for the Army to provide drop, and medical evacuation. Designers looked at input only at the outset since years of engineer- what the Army had to move and created the small- ing development and testing programs have cre- est transport possible based on that requirement. ated hundreds of design changes. Testimony Personnel Involvement Congressional scrutiny was intense as both In the early 1980s, about 25 Army officers the Air Force and the Army promoted the C–17. were assigned to the C–17 program. As one of At a hearing in May 1993 before the Senate them later recalled, initially the Air Force “didn’t Armed Services Committee, the Army chief of staff, General Gordon Sullivan, and the Air Force chief of staff, General Merrill McPeak, testified in support of the aircraft. Sullivan remarked that on

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■ C–17 TRANSPORT

Humvee in cargo area for air-drop. U.S. Air Force (MikeU.S. Air Force Reinhardt) U.S. Air Force (KenU.S. Air Force Bergmann) Jumping over Sicily drop zone, Fort Bragg. U.S. Air Force (PaulU.S. Air Force Caron)

know what to do with Army [representatives] at ported to the Army chief of staff, to the U.S. the program office.” Yet eventually cooperation Army Training and Doctrine Command which took root without any extraordinary problems. arguably lessened his clout and ability to repre- The Army representative at Wright-Patterson— sent Army interests. first a colonel, later a lieutenant colonel—served Army and Air Force officers working C–17 is- as a requirements officer to provide input to the sues in Pentagon budget offices also coordinated Air Force. efforts. Despite interservice cooperation, there But the Army’s presence in the program of- were problems in locating the appropriate points fice did not in itself guarantee a joint outcome. of contact when questions arose or information Some representatives were ineffective. In addi- was requested. Responsibilities for various aspects tion, a change in the chain of command reas- signed the representative, who originally re-

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of the program were widely diffused within the the Army convinced the Air Force of the need for services and identifying counterparts was diffi- a redesign. The outcome was larger seats which cult. One solution was to set up a special distribu- accommodate more weight and are made from a tion system within the Pentagon to speed docu- Kevlar composite to provide protection and ments between the Army and Air Force. lessen hotspots, again indicating the constructive role of the Army throughout the program. Joint Products The measure of an effort is the product, Joint Testing and Doctrine which begs the question: have Army require- Similar to the role of Army officers at ments been satisfactorily addressed? Three exam- Wright-Patterson was that of the Army officer ples come to mind in answer. Early in develop- posted to the C–17 “test-bed” at Edwards Air ment, one Army officer noted that the RFP Force Base, California. He worked daily with the document had omitted red cargo bay lighting to Air Force testers and was responsible for Army preserve night vision, an operational considera- paratroopers and technicians involved in the pro- tion which is central to Army doctrine and plan- gram. In 1993 the representative was a lieutenant ning. Although the contractor balked at adding colonel from the Army Materiel Command. In- the lights, they were put in once specifications volvement in testing was a logical extension of were provided by Army laboratories at Fort the Army’s participation in previous stages. De- Rucker, Alabama. sign elements that the Army requested—like para- Later, in November 1992, the U.S. Army Lo- trooper seats—had to be verified, and the service’s gistics Command alerted the Air Force that the involvement has been accordingly high. One Mc- Army wanted an update on the program. This oc- Donnell Douglas official explained that the Army curred shortly after a C–17 wing broke during a was integral to testing. One of the first C–17 static loading test. (Sec- flights was to Fort Hood for load analysis. On st jointness required data on C–17 tions of fuselage and reaching Texas the aircraft was packed with 1 wings were tested using Cavalry Division tanks, artillery, et al. and per- capabilities to be disseminated large hydraulic pistons formed as designed. At the end of the test pro- throughout the services prior to flight testing to gram the Army Airborne Board certified that the simulate stress on the air- C–17 can carry equipment, thus ensuring that it frame; the wing was de- satisfied Army needs. signed to withstand 150 percent of expected max- Finally, the acquisition effort will be wasted imum flight stress.) Concern was expressed if the C–17 is not employed jointly. Doctrine is because of an earlier experience with the Lock- consequently essential because it sets the tone for heed C–5 which also had failed loading tests and conduct in the field (especially for the Army). did not fully satisfy Army needs. Both Army and Air Force officers acknowledged Based on this concern, the Air Force briefed the need to develop joint doctrine, although one Army officials. During one of those sessions, the Air Force officer claimed that it is less of a prob- Army III Corps commander noted that the test lem for his service. He argued that Air Force doc- plan had not been updated since the 1980s. This trine would employ the C–17 jointly and effec- was a problem because the equipment listed in tively as soon as it became operational but Army the plan was no longer in the inventory. M–60 doctrine may lag. An Army officer countered that tanks, for example, had been replaced by M–1s. doctrine within his service is to “deliver supplies This discovery allowed the Air Force to update as far forward as possible or practicable,” thereby the test plan, avoiding delays and embarrassment implying that it will fully utilize C–17 capabilities during subsequent cargo loading tests. without adjustment. Another example involved paratrooper seat Regardless of which opinion is more accu- design. In the specifications, the seats were made rate, jointness required data on C–17 capabilities of fiberglass and designed for a soldier weight of to be disseminated throughout the services. The 310 pounds. But in the intervening decade the center for this activity was Scott Air Force Base, Army increased the weight to 400 pounds. While Illinois, where both AMC and Transportation an Air Force official claimed the information had Command (TRANSCOM) are located. There the been miscommunicated, the result was the same. Army, Air Force, and Marines established the joint The seats were too small and the fiberglass caused Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency “hotspots” on the paratroopers’ backsides. (ACRA) whose leadership rotates among them The Army lobbied for redesigned seats which every two years. The agency coordinates doctrine it regarded as an issue of “fit and function.” The Air Force, believing the point was solely comfort, opposed the change because it would result in more weight, time, and money. After three years,

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quires a constant effort to keep current. The situation was exacerbated by a tight defense budget, hostile press, and congressional pressure. Despite disagreements, the process has been open with both sides making concessions. As one congressional expert put it: “Interservice cooperation has kept the program going. I have never heard that the services were dissatisfied.” A final question remains: Why has the program proven to be joint? The C–17 began before the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought jointness to the fore. Nor was an interservice effort the natural thing to expect: the Army and Air Force had feuded for decades, especially over roles and missions such as tactical/close air support. Explanations depend greatly on perspective. The Air Force recognized from the beginning that the Army was the prime user. As indicated, the Air Force appeared fully aware throughout of the value of involving the Army in most aspects of

U.S. Air Force (PaulU.S. Air Force R. Caron) the program. Although broadly accurate, this ex- C–17A taking off from planation avoids further examination. Jordanian air base. There is a more obvious reason why the Air Force realized the need for Army involvement and helps develop joint system operating con- with the C–17 transport. During the 1970s, the cepts. It was tasked to publish a pamphlet to help Air Force did not include the Army in the AMST field commanders employ the C–17 and integrate program. As a result, there was no Army support all its capabilities into operational plans. when problems arose. AMST terminated because In December 1990 ACRA issued a draft pam- of a lack of jointness or the Air Force sought to phlet entitled Multi-Service C–17 Employment Con- make a 180-degree turn. cept. Its recipients ranged from the Joint Chiefs While other factors such as personal initia- and commanders of the 25th Infantry Division and tive played a role, no evidence contradicts or adds 1st Marine Amphibious Force to the Air National to the AMST explanation of jointness in the C–17 Guard.12 The pamphlet’s purpose was clear: program. Therefore it may be concluded that bu- This concept describes how the services will use the reaucratic learning by the Air Force—resulting C–17. The concept provides a basis for actions to im- from self-interest and its AMST experience—was prove the Nation’s ability to deploy, employ, and sus- the primary cause. tain combat forces by airlift. The signatory headquar- As one defense analyst observed: ters will examine the concept, evaluate current There are no perfect weapons. There is no way to employment concepts, and investigate possible eliminate tensions between users and developers, or changes to doctrine, training, materiel, procedures, services and their various branches, in formulating plans, and force structure.13 weapons requirements or managing development. Nor The document also defined terms such as is there any way to ensure a perfect balance between 14 “small austere airfields” and “direct delivery,” pro- these competing demands as development proceeds. vided cargo load plans for various types of equipment, and explained aircraft capabilities. This in- That is correct, but effectiveness, not perfec- formation is similar to that found in promotional tion, should be the criterion, and the C–17 pro- literature distributed by McDonnell Douglas. It curement process meets that standard. No one in- represents a first step in revising doctrine and op- dicated any major problems in the joint effort. erational plans to jointly utilize the C–17. Most of the difficulties mentioned are nearly un- avoidable in a large bureaucracy. The Army and The Lessons Air Force worked together effectively, if cau- Many would agree that efforts to make the tiously, to produce an aircraft which will meet the C–17 program joint have been sincere if imper- requirements of both services well into the next fect. As one Army officer stated, “The Air Force century. As one member of the Joint Staff re- had always been cooperative but [problems are marked, “The C–17 fills all the holes.” The air- inevitable] in a program this big.” He further craft does that because the acquisition program noted that the sheer size of the C–17 program re- was joint. JFQ

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Unloading Abrams tank.

Desert airstrip at National Training (E.H.U.S. Air Force Littlejohn) (E.H. U.S. Air Force Littlejohn) Center.

9 U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, NOTES “Hearing on FY94 Defense Authorization,” 103d Cong., 1 This article is largely based on a series of confiden- 1st sess., May 19, 1993. tial interviews conducted in 1993 and 1994. 10 Gordon R. Sullivan, letter to Ronald V. Dellums, 2 The Marines have also been represented. Their role chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has not been examined, however, since they play an May 17, 1994. identical but smaller role than the Army which, in any 11 R.H. Barrow, E.C. Meyer, and Lew Allen, Jr., letter case, is much more reliant than the Marine Corps on to John G. Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Ser- airlift, and its involvement with the C–17 project is vices Committee, November 25, 1981. thus much more crucial. 12 Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, Multi- 3 U.S. Air Force, Airlift and U.S. National Security: The Service C–17 Employment Concept (Scott AFB, Ill.: U.S. Case for the C–17 (Washington: Government Printing Army Training and Doctrine Command and U.S. Air Office, 1991), p. 1. Force Military Airlift Command, December 12, 1990), 4 Jeffrey Record, Beyond Military Reform: American pp. D1–D6. Defense Dilemmas (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 13 Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, C–17, 1988), p. 50. p. 1. 5 William H. Gregory, The Defense Procurement Mess 14 Thomas L. McNaugher, Defense Management Reform (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 116. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 178. 6 Charles Johnson, Acquisition of the C–17 Aircraft— An Historical Account (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1986), p. 32. 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secre- tary of Defense, February 23, 1984. 8 Johnson, Acquisition, p. 38.

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■ Strategic Leadership and the ‘‘Fourth’’ Army War College By RICHARD A. CHILCOAT and RODERICK R. MAGEE II U.S. Army (Richard Ward) Students discussing “hot spot” during exercise.

Scholars have long maintained that the military is a bona fide profession, standing shoulder to shoulder with other fields such as medicine, law, and education.1 The task of keeping current in the profession of arms, however, is unique. Doctors, attorneys, and teachers practice their skills daily, whereas soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen apply their talent—warfighting—only sporadically, often with years or even decades between conflicts.

This represents no small problem in the The Armed Forces—and indeed the militaries preparation of senior leaders. How competent of all peace-bent Western democracies—thus face would we expect a heart surgeon to be who per- a paradox: to the extent they deter war they deny formed coronary balloon angioplasty only once or themselves the combat experience to continue to twice in his career? What level of jurisprudence deter war. It has thus been the task of U.S. military could we expect from a trial lawyer who tried his education and training to impart to individuals first case 28 years after law school? Both Dwight and units the actual skills demanded by their Eisenhower and Omar Bradley were graduated wartime roles within a realistic combat-simulated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915 yet did environment. More specifically, it has been the not experience combat or wartime command for dream of educators and trainers to replicate the another quarter century. Military leaders who are psychological and physical experience of war, exposed to two or three wars in a career are con- short of actually shedding blood, in arranged en- sidered unusually experienced. While the fre- counters with a hostile sparring partner. We have quency of military operations has increased since fallen far short of this over the years, though at the Vietnam War, their duration has decreased, so times training is realistic, particularly at the indi- that traditional limits on cumulative experience vidual and tactical levels. still apply. The complexity of the interplay among many factors and actors on the operational, Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, USA, is 43rd commandant of the U.S. strategic, and policy levels, however, has made it Army War College and Lieutenant Colonel Roderick R. Magee II, USA, is impracticable until recently to exercise staff and assigned to the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College.

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command functions in a simulated wartime set- The second college emerged following 1918. ting with authenticity. With the microchip, mili- Just as the Spanish-American War prodded reform tary educators and trainers have—or soon will of senior education, so too did the Great War by have—the ability to practice strategic leaders with revealing glaring weaknesses in the ability of the such fidelity to the combat ideal that they can defense establishment to plan and execute a na- step from classroom to tional mobilization. The role of instruction was information technology command post and barely recognized, a course in command was intro- tell the difference. Technol- duced, and by the time the tenure of the second today enables the mind much ogy creates this virtual real- college drew to a close in 1940 political, eco- as industrial technology once ity. Warfare on these levels nomic, and social considerations had begun to is predominantly intellec- appear in the curriculum, as did a greater empha- did the muscle tual rather than physical, sis on history. and information technol- Janus-like, the third college commenced in ogy today enables the mind much as industrial 1950, following a 10-year interregnum imposed technology once did the muscle. Exciting possi- by World War II, one face transfixed on that con- bilities for senior leader development thus come flict and the other turned to the Cold War. Nearly into view. every USAWC instructional and research entity The U.S. Army War College (USAWC)—the matured during that period. Institutionalization preeminent military institution for teaching the of joint and multinational warfare led the college application of landpower within a joint and to go beyond field army tactics to operational art, multinational framework—is capitalizing on re- theater strategy, and alliance protocol. cent technological advances to prepare strategic The main focus of instruction—student sem- leaders. The intent here is not to tout USAWC suc- inars—crystallized into a form that promised to cesses but to promote an understanding among all endure. With 16 students representing a mix of services of emerging potentialities. As the Presi- services, branches, components, foreign services, dent of National Defense University, Lieutenant and government agencies, each seminar was a mi- General Ervin Rokke, USAF, has pointed out in crocosm of the joint, combined, interagency force these pages, “The stakes have clearly changed... sanctioned by doctrine. Immersion in an authen- in the context of professional military education tic heterogeneous environment modeling a typi- (PME)....Adapting [to changes of the post-Cold cal strategic headquarters shaped leaders who, War era] is the basic challenge confronting the while expertly qualified in their own service do- war colleges today.” He cited updating pedagogi- mains, were conditioned to think and act jointly. cal concepts, approaches, and technologies as The fourth college, which dates from about among the ways PME must adapt.2 1990, is the product of two geostrategic events, the demise of the Cold War and the dawn of the A Glance Back information age. The former led to a revolution Since its establishment in 1903 by Secretary in grand strategy, replacing a clear unitary threat of War Elihu Root, the Army War College has with more nebulous and sundered ones just as evolved through three stages and is now well into dangerous in the long term. The latter introduced a fourth.3 In establishing the college Root used a revolution in the conduct of war, information- terms that remain applicable today: “Not to pro- based techniques that extend force effectiveness mote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and exponentially. Advanced computer technology, to adequate preparation to repel aggression.” In his cite one example, can digitize battlespace, deploy- vision, future leaders could “study and confer on ing an array of sensors and surveillance devices the great problems of national defense, military that provide a real-time picture of friendly and science, and responsible command.” These three enemy situations while enabling commanders to immutable elements have lent continuity to the act before an enemy can knowledgeably react. curriculum since 1903. The fourth college is assimilating these revo- The college’s first incarnation, which lasted lutionary developments and learning pedagogy to until World War I, was animated largely by the produce more educated and practiced strategic felt need to improve senior level command and leaders. Serendipitously, the information-based staff performance, which had been notably poor technology which is revolutionizing warfare has during the Spanish-American War. Located in also helped achieve a degree of realism that meets Washington, it was organic to the War Depart- the most demanding vision of educators and ment General Staff, actually serving as a war plan- practitioners alike. ning element. Initially, there was no formal academic instruction. Only gradually did the idea take hold that the program should include not only on-the-job training but theoretical study.

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Managing Change To assure that all institutional efforts were harnessed to a common goal, we initially had to decide what we wanted in a fourth USAWC. The vision—as determined by a deliberate process of institutional self-discovery—is to be “the Nation’s preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower . . . a learning institution...preparing today’s leaders for tomorrow’s challenges...pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach.” The terms strategic art and strategic leadership as institutionalized in the vision also demanded explanation.4 Deceptive in their apparent simplic- ity, both concepts in fact required considerable scrutiny. Strategic art—the counterpart to the much more widely discussed operational art—was accorded a brief, functional definition. It is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (national security goals and objectives), ways (courses of action for achieving them), and means (resources for pursuing courses of action) to promote or defend national interests. Strategic art is thus not a purely military activity but rather is permeated with political implications. U.S. Army A definition of strategic leadership followed. The “first” Army War College (1902–07) located at 22 Jackson It is the act of influencing people and organiza- Place in Washington: the Army War Board and then the college occupied a brownstone (far right) facing Lafayette Square across tions to systematically employ strategic art—and Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. ends, ways, and means at hand—in defense of the Nation or theater interests. It is not the sole province of the military commander. It must be exercised by all staff members we aim to produce jointly of joint, unified, and com- can implement national military strategy. They bined commands, as well as must practice their craft in a politico-military cli- qualified strategic leaders by civilians within DOD, the mate more volatile, uncertain, complex, and am- who can implement national National Security Council, al- biguous than in the past (dubbed VUCA by stu- liance structures, and even on military strategy dents). To develop the requisite mental agility, we the country-team level. The employ an adult active-learning process, with em- mission was then refined, phasis on how to think as opposed to what to placing special emphasis on preparing students for think. In small seminars, augmented by guest lec- strategic leadership positions as part of a joint, tures and question-and-answer periods, students unified, or multinational force. probe tough issues, mastering the art of strategic Finally, it became clear that we must specify thinking, which includes a concurrent appeal to and teach special competencies beyond those we historical mindedness (past), conceptual and criti- have traditionally required (but must continue to cal thinking (present), and creative and visionary demand). Fluency in the strategic art in the infor- thinking (future). Students are then ready for mation age must include capabilities such as or- Collins Hall. chestrating multiple simultaneous battles across a vast three-dimensional space, leading in learning Strategic Training organizations, managing massive flows of data, Key to activities at USAWC is the recently responding to new information and circum- completed Collins Hall which houses the Center stances, maintaining flexibility in the empower- for Strategic Leadership. The center has a dual ment of subordinate commands, psychological mission of supporting the college in its educa- and physical stamina, hands-on computer skill, tional role and defense leaders in their decision- and literacy in joint and service doctrine. making role. The hall is a secure learning, confer- The staff and faculty must assure that future encing, and gaming facility with a conference evolution of the college hews to the established path, thus realizing its vision. In brief, we aim to produce jointly qualified strategic leaders who

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The “second” Army War College (1907–40), Washington Barracks: the building has been the home of the National War College since its founding in 1946 at what today is Fort Lesley J. McNair. Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library.

hall; video teleconference center; classrooms; state-of-the-art automation, computer, communications, and gaming assets; and access to the defense simulation internet and the global command and control system. In academe, laboratory periods, practicums, and internships provide frequent opportunities to apply expertise, theories, and techniques. As discussed earlier, however, the military often falls short of the civilian academic model since opportunities for realistic on-the-job education as well as training in war are rare. What makes Collins Hall unique among simulation and gaming centers, aside from unrivaled communications capa- U.S. Army bilities, is the capacity of its gaming tools and fa- The “third” Army War College, Fort Leavenworth (1950–51): for cilities to incorporate more players, more one year the college was reestablished in Grant Hall (above) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. transactions, and more third- and fourth-order effects. Strategic leaders of the future can verify their expertise under conditions of virtual reality. With students seated before computer terminals just as they would be in wartime joint headquarters, the stimuli of strategic war—down to fatigue and

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■ STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP U.S. Army The “fourth” Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1951-present: Collins Hall (shown here) is a recent USAWC addition which houses the Strategic Leadership Center. Initiated in 1995, SCE is a joint multinational exercise that applies joint and service doctrine in 11 realistic regionally-based crisis scenar- stress—can be replicated so faithfully that partici- ios. It involves all 320 students, 150 faculty pants are able to suspend their disbelief and accept members, and guests who play designated roles. the virtual as real. We call it experiential learning.5 The diversified student body provides an ideal Collins Hall is the Army’s strategic “combat pool from which to constitute staff and com- training center,” a laboratory where students can mand teams for national and unified command put ideas into action. Just as combat training cen- headquarters. ters (such as the National Training Center, Red The exercise embraces political, military, and Flag, Twentynine Palms, and Joint Readiness economic play at the operational and strategic Training Center) train “virtual veterans,” we edu- levels. To increase the intensity and diversity for cate “virtual strategic leaders.” each student cell, the class is divided into three groups, each playing the 11 scenarios indepen- Crisis Exercise dently. Operational fortunes among the groups The strategic crisis exercise (SCE) is an an- vary since the same scenarios unfold according to nual ten-day politico-military exercise/wargame differing student analyses and recommendations conducted at USAWC under the crisis action and contrasting decisions by key actors. guidance found in Joint Pub 5–03.1, Joint Opera- Roles played by students include members of tion Planning and Execution System. The 1996 itera- the National Security Council; Departments of tion of this exercise took place March 13–26, two- State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce; Chair- thirds of the way through the academic year, man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff; which permitted students to draw on the core country teams; service chiefs and staffs; geo- courses in term I and regional appraisals and ad- graphic commanders in chief and liaisons to vanced courses in term II. Term III advanced functional supporting commands; and public af- courses were scheduled after SCE so students fairs. Major officials—the President, Secretaries of could pick electives to strengthen their professional development based on weaknesses revealed by the exercise.

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State and Defense, and others—are played by staff into a simulated 210-day period in order to and faculty or outside experts. stretch force and strategic lift resources. For each scenario students must systemati- The scenarios were developed from a locally cally address the following planning issues: prepared futures document, a study resource de- ■ What are the national interests in the region of picting a plausible international environment for conflict? 2006 and not intended to be predictive. All five ■ What are the interests and likely reactions of re- unified commands were assigned scenarios. gional actors and those outside the region? U.S. Southern Command faces two scenarios. ■ If U.S. forces are committed, what strategic A hurricane in a Central American nation necessi- guidance will be given to CINCs? That is, what are the tates a U.S. humanitarian assistance operation. criteria for success? The desired exit strategy? The crite- Antigovernment guerrillas then exploit the situa- ria for conflict termination? The desired end state? Post- tion, which leads to American involvement in conflict activities and responsibilities? counterinsurgency operations. Later, a border war When answers to these questions are com- among three South American countries results in pleted and staffed, students draft a presidential the United States joining a multinational peace decision directive for each scenario. operation while a permanent political settlement The exercise design follows the standard cri- is negotiated. sis action planning (CAP) process as set forth in U.S. European Command confronts two sce- Joint Pub 5–03.1: narios. One remains the Balkan fragmentation of phase I—situation development 1992. A U.N. force—with a U.S. contingent— phase II—crisis assessment (major or lesser keeps a precarious peace. But the situation is dete- regional contingency) riorating as pressure grows to divert U.S. forces to phase III—course of action development other areas. Meanwhile, a major regional contin- phase IV—course of action selection gency has developed in northwest Africa, where phase V—campaign execution planning one Maghreb state has attacked another. Wash- phase VI—campaign execution and achieve- ington must decide whether to commit forces to ment of desired end state. defend the victim. Another scenario involves a water crisis among three nations in the Middle USAWC has added a phase VII (redeploy- East within the EUCOM area of responsibility. A ment and force reallocation) to address troop- major geostrategic issue is whether to assign this and lift-juggling requirements under a multiple- crisis to U.S. Central Command. crisis environment and a phase VIII (exercise re- U.S. Central Command has its own hands 6 view) to complement the learning process. Stu- full. Although a diplomatic solution to a water dent performance is based on the universal joint crisis is negotiated, the command must deal with task list, together with added reallocation and re- a dispute among three states on the southeastern deployment of forces. The analysis, planning, Arabian peninsula. Internal unrest in one raises staffing, and execution proce- the possibility of a noncombatant evacuation of scenario events exercise dures students use during the U.S. citizens. The most pressing scenario, how- the interagency process, 11 scenarios precisely mirror ever, is an invasion of an oil-producing Gulf state those they may employ as by a powerful neighbor. This forces the national including governmental strategic leaders. This is the command authorities to deal with a second major and international agencies epitome of experiential learning regional contingency while the one in northwest and is made even more mean- Africa continues. ingful when used with after ac- The Asia-Pacific region offers little respite for tion reviews designed for analyses, synthesis, beleaguered decisionmakers. U.S. Pacific Com- evaluation, and diagnosis of the learning itself. mand deals with three scenarios at roughly the Scenario development ensures that all player cells same time. In the first, oil and gas discoveries in are involved and all organic phases of an opera- the South China Sea become the focus of a long- tion are played, from strategic policy decisions to simmering dispute among several neighboring campaign execution. Scenario events and con- states, forcing Washington to abandon a policy of troller interplay exercise the interagency process, benign neglect. In the second, friction develops be- including negotiations with both governmental tween a major Asian power, on one hand, and a and international agencies. Media coverage and smaller neighbor and the United States on the its political effects are also heavily played. The other. Further complicating the situation, an earth- students are even required to testify before mock quake-induced tidal wave strikes a regional port, crisis-centered congressional panels. The scenarios involve the spectrum from general war to operations other than war. They are time-phased

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leading to noncombatant evacuation of foreign na- actually fighting—but we do it more successfully. tionals. The third scenario has intensified piracy in If those sergeants of old could visit the National the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca lead- Training Center or a similar facility they would be ing to growing requests for U.S. assistance by the astonished by how much today’s tactical training Association of Southeast Asian Nations. resembles the real thing. SCE, capitalizing on the Even the continental United States gives rise capabilities inherent in the Collins Hall complex, to an operation. As a geographic command as enables us to practice, educate, and develop well as force provider for other commands, U.S. strategic leaders with comparable realism. Senior Atlantic Command has regional responsibilities. level PME is on the right track. JFQ When an earthquake, with its epicenter near a large metropolitan area, devastates the south cen- NOTES tral part of the Nation, ACOM must provide mas- 1 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: sive aid. The scenario exercises a Federal response The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: when forces designated for such emergencies Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7–18; and Morris have been diverted overseas. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Por- In sum, these scenarios enable students to trait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 3–5. practice strategic leadership in major and lesser 2 Ervin J. Rokke, “Military Education for the New Age,” regional contingencies, natural disaster relief, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 9 (Autumn 1995), pp. 18–23. 3 noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assis- Based on Richard A. Chilcoat, “The ‘Fourth’ Army War tance, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, low-in- College: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995–96), pp. 3–17. tensity conflict, and freedom-of-navigation dis- 4 See Richard A. Chilcoat, Strategic Art: The New Art for putes. Thus the modus operandi resembles what 21st Century Leaders (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War students would do in actual operations. College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 10, 1995). 5 The active learning spiral is a model for experien- The annual SCE, having gone through only tial learning. Students bring a vast “experience” base to two iterations, is still developing. Indeed, as the USAWC where they spend time “reflecting” in both in- technology of war simulation improves, USAWC dividual efforts and the seminar, then “learning” from staff and faculty must exploit such enhanced ca- their reflections, and finally “acting” in varied roles dur- pabilities to produce ever more realistically prac- ing SCE. In this way they gain experience and the cycle ticed leaders. continues. See Executive Development Roundtable, Building Individual and Organizational Capacity Through More particularly, as SCE evolves we can in- Action Learning (Boston: Boston University School of troduce progressively more distributed play. This Management, 1993). refers to participation of distant players through 6 Russell F. Weigley, who observed SCE in 1996, re- military communications links as opposed to sim- marked: “Learning [really] takes place after the exer- ulating involvement locally. Such a capability is cise,” when students can reflect. within the technical capability of Collins Hall and will be extended to the Department of the Army staff in 1997, Joint Staff in 1998, and Office of the Secretary of Defense and unified commands in 1999 or 2000. The challenge lies in organizing participation by busy, far-flung actors who face pressing operational distractions. In any event, the improving capabilities of Collins Hall and incorporation of distant players will open the possibility in the near future of involving the highest level defense officials (serving or retired) in gaming and testing endeavors. Some will remember when company training was no more realistic than playing cops and robbers. Senior NCOs in those days, hearkening back to a time when “real” soldiers bestrode the battlefield, enjoyed shocking us by saying “We need to get this outfit bloodied every month or so to keep it in fighting trim!” Today there is a similar challenge—to exercise troops in war without

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Camp Able Sentry in U.S. Air Force (Michael J. Haggerty) Skopje, Macedonia. Developing a Strategy for Troubled States By ROBERT B.OAKLEY

he number of states undergoing inter- into the millions. Physical and political damage nal unrest has increased notably since to states has included anarchy and massive de- the Cold War. This has created some 45 struction of their meager infrastructures. Internal T million refugees and internally dis- unrest has sometimes led to conflicts with neigh- placed persons, three times the number reported boring states and burdened them with waves of ten years ago. Communal violence exacerbated refugees. These severe problems threaten world by ethnic, religious, or other differences has be- stability, the advancement of human rights and come far and away the preponderant form of democracy, and on occasion more tangible U.S. conflict over the past five years, even though interests, including those of strategic importance. threats of interstate belligerency remain high in The United States and the international com- some regions. Deaths from violence, famine, and munity have channeled substantial energy and disease cannot be accurately estimated but run capital into efforts intended to resolve or mitigate internal upheavals, including grandiose, idealistic approaches described as the New World Order, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is a visiting fellow at the National Agenda for Peace, and “assertive multilateralism.” Defense University; a former foreign service officer, he served as They have discovered no generally applicable for- special envoy to Somalia under Presidents Bush and Clinton. mula for assured success in the short term, remain

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unsure of the best long-term solutions (such as Such operations have varied implications for sustainable development), and in any event will C4I, force selection and deployment, logistics and not dedicate the considerable resources required. transport, availability of equipment, funding, et Yet they have also found it impossible to simply al. While the actual size and composition of U.S. turn their backs and walk away. and other forces will obviously vary depending This article briefly assesses the causes and upon country-specific situations, the activities means available to deal with what for the lack of a and operational environment most frequently as- better term are often called “troubled states.” The sociated with these operations include: focus is on employing the Armed Forces, with em- ■ logistic and other support for—even direct roles phasis on areas to be improved on the strategic or in—benign humanitarian operations, including rapid policy level as well as the operational level. provision of large-scale relief that surpasses readily available civilian resources, civil affairs and human Background rights support, and possible protection of relief opera- Unrest in troubled states is fueled by long- tions in low-risk environments term, systemic crises such as overpopulation, en- ■ logistic and other support for—even direct roles vironmental damage, food shortages, poverty, in- in—small- to med-sized coalition peace operations, largely military in nature (observation, force separation, come disparity, corruption, and bad governance demilitarization, demining, and weapons control), con- as well as societal divisions. There is also a pro- ducted in low-risk environments with participating pensity to appeal to ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or forces not being major combat units other forms of separatism for solace, protection, ■ support for—even direct roles in (to include and identity. Such movements often pressure the command of)—complex, med-sized civil-military peace- regimes of the day, seeking to redress grievances, keeping and peacemaking operations in more danger- promote special interests, or simply take power. ous environments They fracture existing institutions and heighten ■ bilateral and multilateral noncombatant evacua- the chance of emotion and violence prevailing tion operations (NEOs) over rational dialogue. Governments, in turn, ■ bilateral and multilateral enforcement of block- ades, embargoes, and no-fly zones have lost power and become vulnerable to frag- ■ participation in and command of major coali- mentation and particular causes. This is attribut- tions for expanded peacekeeping and peace enforce- able to freer international communication; the ment operations in hostile environments. increased power of global organizations, corpora- tions, and criminal networks; and the spread of Non-Military Strategy democracy, individual liberty, and private-sector Early Action. U.S. strategy should focus ini- economic systems at the expense of state control. tially on the early identification of potentially trou- Absent Cold War restraints and a preoccupa- bled states and the effort to improve conditions be- tion with major conflicts, international law and fore a crisis develops which requires urgent organizations and individual nations have in- international military or humanitarian interven- creasingly intervened in response to internal tion. The best means of achieving that end is problems, particularly when violence erupts. The through conventional bilateral and multilateral in- very substantial capabilities and resources of struments of assistance to address the causes of many defense establishments—freed from East- both short- and long-term tension, enhance stabil- West confrontation—have become engaged in ity, and improve governance. The many different humanitarian and peace operations as well as attempts to prevent or resolve conflict by short- more conventional activities, such as supporting term actions have revealed the extreme difficulty allies, protecting vital interests, and preparing for of the task and the importance of tackling root major regional conflicts. Such operations fre- causes. More long-term bilateral and international quently combine political, economic, diplomatic, attention to intrinsic problems in troubled states and military actions supported by multinational will be needed, including social, economic, envi- coalitions—and occasionally multinational po- ronmental, and other conditions, as well as mid- lice. There is no sign of a diminution in the trou- term issues such as greater political representation bled-state phenomenon and attendant unrest in and more equitable resource distribution, and bet- the next decade. Thus the Armed Forces can an- ter trained and behaved military and security ticipate being immersed in multinational human- forces. itarian and peace operations, though they may This situation is aggravated by reductions in consider them as improper uses of resources or an bilateral and multilateral economic, social, and unwelcome diversion from what they regard as military assistance. The decline in spending has more appropriate, traditional military roles. major implications for available global resources, including programs for preventive action in troubled states. This comes at a time when there is an

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obvious need for more constructive use of in- has been employed in recent years against Iraq, ternational and regional organizations as well as Bosnia, and Haiti. However, the effectiveness of em- ad hoc bilateral and multilateral activities. This bargoes is increasingly questioned since they are trend will be difficult to reverse given the preva- perceived as punishing the poor while not achiev- lent congressional mood of disengagement and ing their objectives within a reasonable time. deep cuts in support for civilian agencies which operate abroad (except the Central Intelligence Political-Military Strategy Agency). However, not to do so will over time in- Doctrine and Planning. While nothing new for crease the burden on the Armed Forces, including the military, the number and frequency of recent defense budgets and force readiness. It can dan- peace operations (or low intensity conflict), and gerously erode U.S. influence built up arduously growth of forces and supporting elements in- over fifty years, thus damaging vital long-term involved, has resulted in a new presidential policy terests. directive (PDD–25) as well as new joint doctrine Second Stage. The next stage would be a and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. prompt response to resolve or contain a crisis to Despite improved doctrine and more experi- avoid greater problems and large-scale interven- enced policymakers, however, one must expect tion. Usually this involves concerted multina- that not every decision will be made in accor- tional action of a primarily civilian nature with le- dance with a preplanned blueprint. PDD–25 pro- gitimization and support vides valuable advice but no doubt will continue there should be an interagency from regional or interna- to be interpreted flexibly. Public opinion, the tional organizations, fo- views of friendly states, and broadly construed effort to begin contingency cused on a rapid delivery national interests (human rights, promoting planning for organizations of crisis assistance (food, democracy, and humanitarian issues) may result likely to participate medicine, and short-term in intervention even when important U.S. secu- job creation). Bilateral re- rity or economic objectives are not directly gional or international threatened. teams could survey and assist urgent socio-eco- Joint and service doctrine and other pubs on nomic, human rights, and defense needs. They humanitarian and peace operations have appeared, could include both U.N. and nongovernment or- including the Joint Task Force Commander’s Hand- ganizations (NGOs) as well as civilian and military book for Peace Operations issued by the Joint representatives of individual nations. Further- Warfighting Center. Both doctrine and training em- more, they could survey future intervention possi- phasize effectively combining political, diplomatic, bilities should situations worsen. humanitarian, economic, and security considera- A preliminary assessment would be con- tions of military operations. However, there re- ducted of the desirable objectives and the types mains a need for overall doctrine, consistently ap- and levels of required resources, other contribu- plied, that provides for integrated planning and tors, and whether the situation demands unilat- incorporates lessons learned from recent peace op- eral, multinational, or international action. There erations. (Some of those lessons that were success- should also be an interagency effort to collect data fully adopted in planning for the multinational on the country in question and to begin contin- force in Haiti were not put into practice when gency planning on a combined basis for civilian preparing for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in and military organizations likely to participate. Bosnia and other recent operations.) The supporting diplomatic actions that would be This means that civilian agencies as well as needed prior to any force commitment include: the Armed Forces should be ready to execute the ■ consultations with U.N., international, and re- necessary contingency plans, crisis management, gional organizations and governments to communicate and resource allocation. Such capabilities for and obtain responses to the U.S. proposition that mili- civilian agencies require major improvements. tary action should be taken Moreover, both civilian and military organiza- ■ efforts to create a multinational core group, pos- tions should strengthen interagency planning, sibly including regional organizations, willing to assist crisis management, and combined surge capabili- through political influence, financial support, and/or ties. At present, there are variations in knowledge, direct civilian or military participation planning, and assets among agencies, often re- ■ diplomatic approaches to U.N. and other in- sulting in improvisation in the field, with the ternational and regional organizations to mobilize support and legitimize intervention. military taking on what were assumed to be civilian missions. One alternative to direct intervention that ought to be weighed is economic sanctions. Some- times implemented by the use of naval and air forces, this sort of action has political appeal and

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The United States is the only military power intelligence support from civilian agencies. Mili- that can meet the eventualities of any peace oper- tary action must be linked to effective, early hu- ation on its own, and it is the most capable na- manitarian and economic support from national tion in the world when it comes to assuming the and international civil resources. PSYOP and pub- lead in orchestrating effective coalitions. Capabil- lic information programs intended to solidify po- ities developed over the years for other missions, litical support at home and abroad should be im- including major regional as well as low intensity plemented rapidly, as an essential part of the conflicts, are directly relevant to peace opera- overall operation. tions. Thus when a decision is made to partic- Our political-military strategy should be ipate in such operations the Nation does not lack premised on plans to exit completely as well as the military capacity. Instead, there is a problem on interim measures to replace active forces with of generating political will (including allocation Reserve units, foreign forces, or civilian assets of resources) and then determining the level of after initial stabilization. It should include long- the commitment and selecting the appropriate term, systematic assistance to the U.N. and re- forces. In addition, it is necessary to effectively gional bodies (such as the North Atlantic Treaty coordinate the appropriate civilian and military Organization, the Organization of American assets, including those of both international orga- States, and the Organization of African Unity) as nizations and other countries. well as selected governments to improve both in- However, the poor use of the Armed Forces dividual and collective capabilities. This will en- negatively impacts on public support, morale, op- able others to operate absent U.S. participation or erating tempo, and readiness for all missions with greatly reduced U.S. transport, logistics, and across the board. Thus basic U.S. capabilities for equipment. (When the forces of other nations conducting actual peace operations must be re- have not been adequately prepared in advance, fined and augmented, not diminished to give pri- however, providing last-minute training and ority to contingency preparations for possible some basic support can also alleviate burdens on larger conflicts. The critical requirement for the U.S. forces by making coalition operations more United States is fielding a wide variety of combat effective.) International and military education support assets (including aviation) from the ac- and training, foreign military sales, and other tive and Reserve components. Over the past five forms of military engagement such as joint/com- years these elements have been placed under se- bined exercises should be targeted for this pur- vere stress in terms of their operating tempo, pose—which clearly falls under the policy of whereas regular combat units have been much “preventive defense” articulated by the Secretary less utilized. Looking ahead, one can see the need of Defense. Experience proves that this approach to augment combat support elements. improves long-term military-to-military relations At the same time, every effort must be made as well as the capabilities of coalition partners to to minimize the demands on forces without re- conduct peace operations. ducing the prospects for success. For instance, experience has revealed that a decision not to de- Coalitions ploy any personnel for participation in a Establishing coalitions can reduce demands coalition peace operation means that such a on U.S. resources as well as add to the political ef- coalition is unlikely to be formed, or if it is, that fectiveness of an operation. There are interna- it will be much less effective than with the inclu- tional and domestic advantages when other na- sion of even a small U.S. contingent such as a tions contribute forces to peace operations, thus headquarters element, logistical units, and SOF. forming a “coalition of the willing.” Placing a Limited involvement by the United States can be coalition under the Security Council or regional justified in terms of obtaining greater overall ben- organization such as NATO provides a forceful le- efits from other participants. gitimizing endorsement, considerably increasing The U.S. strategy for military involvement the prospects that other states will contribute to should be premised on mobilizing a coalition to the coalition. But while such participation eases share political and resource burdens while ensur- fiscal, personnel, logistics, and materiel burdens, it ing capacity and credibility. That means getting complicates command and control. Differences on top of an opponent—either political or mili- will occur in doctrine, training, readiness, and tary—and staying on top, even while minimizing other capabilities, as well as C3I (since many coali- the use of force and preserving an even-handed tion members have not entered the computer approach to minimize casualties and avoid an un- age). The advantage of superior regional political necessary armed clash. Initial forces must have an influence and expertise by some partners, as well overpowering edge in firepower, C3I, logistics, and SOF, including psychological operations (PSYOP). It also means political, diplomatic, and

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as greater international participation, tends to Contingency planning for coalitions should compensate for the lower level of their military provide for integrated and coordinated activities capability. The broad, longer-term implications of with national and international civilian agencies such combined action for U.S. global and regional and NGOs. Absent such coordination—and even policy also militate in favor of accepting some with it—there will be unexpected, unplanned, units with lower capabilities as part of a coalition. and unbudgeted demands on military capabili- The United States should thus minimize but ties, and operations will not be as effective. There not exclude less-qualified countries and work out also will be longer periods of U.S. military en- in advance the least trou- gagement before an operation is transferred to if participation includes sizable blesome, most effective civilian agencies and organizations. This requires distribution of duties continued efforts by the United States to land forces, the United States among coalition partners strengthen the impact of U.N., international, and should lead the military side as well as C3I and liaison regional organizations and improve cooperative arrangements (which re- international planning and operations. of operations quire diplomatic and military talent). It should U.N. Operations also determine coalition needs for additional lo- Substantial improvements have been made gistic support, transport, training, and equipment in the capability of the Peacekeeping Division at and be prepared to provide it to partners if other U.N. headquarters to manage small- and mid- sources are not available. sized operations, even to coordinate diverse ele- The United States has shown its ability to ments such as military and police forces, relief ef- manage coalitions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, forts, human rights, civil administration, and in some instances employing unorthodox elections.1 However the United Nations itself rec- arrangements (such as Russian participation in ognizes that it is unable—even with outside sup- IFOR). Assessing and covering gaps in essential port—to rapidly mobilize a sizable force or con- capabilities of partners will usually involve, at a duct operations in a hostile environment (that is, minimum, providing added personnel and sup- to carry out peace enforcement). port for C3I (such as radios and computers) and Haiti offers an instructive lesson in the effec- aviation (such as helicopters and C–130s). The tive use of the United Nations in conjunction Armed Forces should usually provide units with a U.S.-led coalition legitimized under the trained in the use of less-than-lethal weaponry U.N. banner, and of superior advanced planning and PSYOP assets. This is often critical in dealing by the interagency community in Washington, a with civilian demonstrations or armed aggressors theater command (U.S. Atlantic Command), and hiding behind a screen of unarmed civilians. (The the U.N. Secretariat. The multinational force outcome of such confrontations can either make (MNF) that was deployed to Haiti restored public or break the success of a mission because of its order, reinstalled the legitimate government, orga- impact on public opinion both in the country nized an initial round of elections, started an in- where the operation is being conducted and at digenous police force, and demobilized local home.) forces. After six months, the United States handed The command and control of peace opera- off the lead to the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) tions is also critical. If participation in a mission and was then able to significantly reduce its pres- includes sizable land forces, the United States ence, and even more notably to reduce costs should lead at least the military side of operations (roughly one-third of the U.S. share for MNF). (as in Haiti). Both dual-key and separate-but-re- After one year, UNMIH was extended but without lated operations (similar to the U.N. Protection the U.S. military contingent. UNMIH was able to Force in Bosnia) should be avoided. Command maintain momentum generated by MNF with a and control will not be identical to that exercised much smaller force and Canada assuming the lead when the Armed Forces operate unilaterally. in providing and commanding the multinational However, coordination, cohesion, and unity of force with only indirect U.S. support. purpose can be attained if the United States uses its leverage in the Security Council and other Core Competencies methods to ensure advanced coalition under- The variety of potential humanitarian and standing and support a precise mandate, mission, peace operations is vast. Each will be different and and rules of engagement on the political as well require careful assessment of the situation and the as the operational and tactical levels. This under- strategies and resources required to meet it. This standing should be reviewed and verified periodi- will involve at least initial decisions on the period cally, lest subsequent developments cause an erosion in coalition cohesion as happened in Somalia during UNOSOM II.

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and extent of international intervention. Also, if has been achieved. Many combat support units the objective is to alleviate unrest and violence or rely heavily from the outset on the Reserve com- correct their basic causes, on the magnitude and ponents which have proven their effectiveness.2 mix of available multinational military and civilian Allies such as France, Britain, Canada, and assets, and on the degree to which the U.S. military Holland as well as the Scandinavian countries will participate. In addition to basic preparations have routinely incorporated peace operations in for military commitments, some special aspects of their military doctrine and training. Such empha- U.S. core competencies warrant consideration. The sis also is emerging among Latin American and emphasis is on agility and the adaptability of fun- Asian countries and taking hold within the Part- damental training and resources. nership for Peace (PFP). Their mutual participa- Maintain forces trained for peace operations. Ex- tion in peace operations exercises provides advan- perience has shown that operations have a tages for all those involved. Combined training greater likelihood of success when there is at least by PFP members with both U.S. and other NATO some American participation. In many situations forces in Germany, the United States, and else- ground combat units can come from elsewhere. where prepared them to participate in Bosnia. There should be a nucleus of highly capable Given the experiences of the last few years forces from a very few countries, with other forces and projections for the next decade, it appears assigned duties commensurate with their capabil- that a limited number of combat forces as well as ities and suitability (including their culture sensi- specialty units will be used in peace operations. tivity) for the mission. This Nation should be pre- However, the anticipated need for units well pared to provide personnel with the skills needed trained in such operations as a secondary mission for peace operations. need not exceed two or three regular Army For purely humanitarian emergencies with brigades (together with SOF and Marines)—partic- little threat of violence, the Armed Forces should ularly if our Armed Forces provide special skills to be prepared to furnish initial, urgent transport boost the capabilities of other countries. To mini- (usually air) plus logistics support in cases when mize an erosion of conventional combat skills, that of international relief agencies is too limited intensive training could be merged with combat or slow to mobilize. When the humanitarian op- training as is now done during most Joint Readi- eration envisaged is faced with a serious danger of ness Training Center (JRTC) peace enforcement armed conflict, the United States should be pre- rotations, and be conducted at least every two pared to deploy SOF and even helicopter gun- years, with “just-in-time” training done prior to ships or C–130s as well as protection for airports deployment. and aircraft. Additionally, there should be a designated U.S. forces deployed should have some cadre of officers and senior NCOs with training, unique training in peace operations, or those units experience, and proven performance in conduct- committed (especially headquarters staffs) should ing peace operations. Assignments could include have recent experience in such operations. There observers for U.N. missions, providing “just-in- is no need for personnel to be designated and time” training, staff positions for headquarters of trained for peace operations as a coalition operations, liaison with civilian agen- military commands should primary or exclusive role. Active cies, and advisors or augmentees to normal staff of forces, particularly infantry, can those units about to deploy under JTFs or CJTFs. be reinforced by civilian handle most contingencies pro- Operate in conjunction with civilian agencies agency representatives vided that officers and NCOs and nongovernment organizations. Peace operations have specialized training or retraining for military personnel should include cent experience and that units working with civilian agencies and NGOs on con- have pre-deployment training for the country in tingency planning for civil-military operations question. Some units such as military police, engi- and support for humanitarian operations and neers, PSYOP, and medical and logistical support human rights activities. While such training has have even less need for special training, although been conducted by the Marines, JTRC, and both they also need officers and NCOs with either spe- U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. South- cial training or recent experience in peace opera- ern Command (SOUTHCOM), it requires more tions. Army Special Forces and Marine expedi- emphasis. Units with specific skills such as mili- tionary units are ideal for this purpose because tary police, SOF, engineers, and air support also their training includes most activities required should conduct brief periodic training together for peace operations. Experience has shown in sit- with civilian agency and NGO representatives as uations such as Haiti or Bosnia that Reserve well as larger exercises which include Army and units—as well as individual Reservists—can oper- Marine ground combat units. ate as effectively as active forces once an initial intervention has taken place and a degree of stability

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Oakley U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) (Val U.S. Air Force Refugee camp in Goma, Zaire.

Given the civil-military complexities of most and risks to U.S. and other military forces in- peace operations, need for area and language ex- volved. pertise, and relevance of coordinating humanitar- Establishment of a relatively effective civilian and political activities in multinational peace ian police force may well require military as well operations and vis-à-vis the countries where oper- as civil police assistance, given the likelihood of ations are conducted, military commands should unsettled or potentially violent conditions. There be reinforced by civilian agency representatives is also the possibility that indigenous police will with the requisite skills when an operation enters not initially have the training, discipline, or the active planning phase. In country, a well- structure to command minimal obedience and staffed embassy can assist once proper coordina- follow appropriate standards in dealing with the tion is established, but it will often be required to local people, even with the help of civilian in- augment embassy staffs for this purpose. More- ternational police monitors. The latter do not or- over, reinforcement will usually be needed at dinarily have a mandate to conduct direct police CINC level for the Department of State political functions or carry arms and, if they did, could be adviser and by liaison officers from the Agency for dangerously over-matched by militias, bandits, or International Development and from its auton- the local police force itself. Moreover, recruiting omous Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In ad- international police contingents is slow work; dition, civilian liaison officers may be needed with and the recruits are usually of uneven quality. All military units below CINC level. Military liaison this argues for initial assistance by military police officers serving with civilian organizations such as and SOF (including PSYOP) to international po- U.S. embassies, U.N. field headquarters, the U.N. lice monitors as well as local police. High Commissioner for Refugees, et al., have also Without the early creation of an indigenous proven to be valuable. force capable of public order functions, military Public Security. A peace operation will often personnel will have to carry out those functions require supervising, assisting, retraining, or even alone, putting them at greater risk and requiring establishing an indigenous civil police or constab- additional personnel. In Haiti, the United States ulary force to provide basic law and order or pub- quickly realized that military police and SOF were lic security in troubled states. This will usually needed to provide direct liaison and support for take place in conjunction with demobilization, international police monitors as well as for both reorganization, and/or other restraints on local the interim public security forces (IPSF) and the military forces. Without this measure, it is very Haitian national police which replaced them. difficult to complete the mission successfully enough to execute the exit strategy. Furthermore, its absence contributes to the burden imposed on

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Once this occurred, policing proceeded satisfacto- the above areas to ensure success of an overall op- rily, public security was maintained, the elections eration. This can reduce civil-military confusion, took place peacefully, and indigenous police had enhance coordination, and minimize the opera- time to be trained properly and to gradually as- tional tasks of the military by more effective use sume their duties with the confidence of a back- of civilians. It may be necessary for the military up force. This created conditions conducive to to contribute transport, radios, or computers be- the U.S. exit strategy, replacing MNF with fore civilian assets arrive, but such support should UNMIH. be transferred to civilians as soon as possible. In Bosnia, the IFOR mandate did not include Jointly staffed civilian-military operational coor- direct support for the international police task dination cells and an exchange of liaison officers force (IPTF), except in the event of an emergency. will be needed, from the planning stage to the IPTF arrived slowly and was of uneven compe- completion of the exit strategy. As in the case of tence and had a weak mandate. Its members, peace operations, multinational humanitarian along with the local police that they were to as- operations require planning and exercises consist, were of marginal utility in the face of politi- ducted with other military organizations to pre- cal intimidation and armed gangs. Public security pare for coalition action. Unified commands, no- outside the zones of separation patrolled by IFOR tably PACOM and SOUTHCOM, have already was often inadequate. This made it very difficult begun to do so. to achieve critical civilian mission objectives such as public order, freedom of movement, refugee re- Peace operations are clearly not a panacea turn, and free elections—and thereby created seri- for the problems of troubled states and have been ous problems for the U.S. exit strategy and the subject of increasing criticism for wasting re- timetable. sources on less than vital interests and diverting Army military police together with the much the assets of the Armed Forces from more impor- smaller Marine Corps military police and SOF tant missions. However, it is equally clear that the have demonstrated in Panama, Somalia, and troubled-state phenomenon is far from over, that Haiti that they can provide the initial assistance peace operations will occur in the future, and needed to train indigenous police/constabulary to that U.S. forces will often be involved. It is also take control of public security. Moreover, supple- evident from the score of operations conducted mented by civil affairs personnel, they were able over the last five years—which have included suc- to help initially with judicial and prison adminis- cesses as well as failures—that some approaches tration. Questions regarding the legal status and work better than others. Important lessons have some other aspects of employing military police been learned. and SOF to carry out these activities should be re- The United States must draw upon and apply solved, so that their use can be planned for in ad- these lessons, in practice and theory, so that our vance and they can be employed at the outset of Armed Forces (and civilian agencies) are prepared an operation. to mount peace operations effectively. This Humanitarian/Human Rights. This element of means ensuring that doctrine, training, planning, peace operations requires close coordination and and resources are appropriate for the diverse tasks sometimes direct support from military forces. which such operations demand—as unpleasant or The key support functions include: onerous as they may be—even while submitting ■ delivering relief supplies to and inside a prob- critical decisions on U.S. participation and sup- lem state (logistics, transport, engineers, and possibly port to careful scrutiny and minimizing their im- protection), assisting with refugees, and responding to pact on joint warfighting capabilities. JFQ natural disasters ■ establishing coordinated civil-military commu- NOTES nications and coordinating systems (such as radio fre- 1 Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador, and Haiti are exam- quencies and possibly equipment, joint civil-military ples of successful U.N. peace operations. operations center, exchange of liaison officers, and use 2 Earlier seasoning in Somalia plus brief pre-deploy- of civil affairs personnel) ment training prepared the 10th Mountain Division to ■ providing assistance for human rights observers lead the multinational force in Haiti. The 25th Infantry and elections (logistics and protection) Division and the 2d Cavalry were able to replace the 10th ■ rehabilitating local institutions and infrastruc- Division without a hitch because of prior intensive ture (civil affairs, logistics, and engineers) JTRC training, plus pre-deployment training. The 1st Ar- ■ creating effective police or constabulary forces mored Division profited from training at the Combat ■ clearing mines. Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, be- Experience has indicated that there must be fore going into Bosnia. coordinated pre-operation planning with regional, international, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as U.S. civilian agencies in all

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Garuda XII: Indonesian Peacekeeping in Cambodia By JOHN B. HASEMAN

s the number and magnitude of peace Jakarta has provided forces for U.N. peace- operations around the world have keeping missions for almost forty years. While each grown in recent years, vigorous debates numbered operation—designated Garuda—has Ahave raged in Congress and elsewhere varied, Indonesia has evolved a system which inte- on prerequisites for U.S. military involvement in grates preparation and execution in both standard U.N. and non-U.N. peace operations, even doctrine and training. Its first U.N. operation was whether the United States will support such opera- mounted in the Sinai in 1957 and the twelfth in tions. Recent American experiences have had var- Cambodia. In recent years Indonesians have served ied success, adding fuel to the debate on the future on the Iran-Iraq and the Iraq-Kuwait borders as role of the Armed Forces in peace operations. well as in Namibia, Somalia, and Bosnia. Washington is uneasy with military opera- The preamble to the Indonesian constitution tions in which decisive force is not an option and of 1945 provides for “maintaining world order no solution to complex social, political, and secu- based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice.” rity issues is apparent. Peace operations doctrine, National policy thus assumes a responsibility for which is still evolving, stresses jointness. It is an peace not only in Indonesia but also in other na- realm in which the United States is not adept. tions, including the elimination of colonialism and Thus it is imperative to learn from other coun- restoring harmony around the world. The country tries with experience in peacekeeping. Many of recognizes that peace requires both military action these states are located in the less developed and nonmilitary support for development. world. Their national policies back such U.N. op- The Indonesian armed forces have a unique erations, and they have the military doctrine and dual mission called dwi-fungsi, which includes tra- training to execute them. ditional military roles as well as a nonmilitary Indonesia, one of the most experienced sup- role in national development. It is this nonmili- porters of peace operations, learned vital lessons tary role that has prepared Indonesia exception- while preparing for and executing a difficult mis- ally well for peace operations. The military is con- sion in Cambodia during the largest and most sidered a representative of the entire nation costly U.N. peacekeeping mission to date. through its involvement in such efforts. In responding to any request for peacekeeping forces, the Indonesian military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI) tailors con- Colonel John B. Haseman, USA (Ret.), is a consultant on southeast Asian tingents to the mission, situation, requirements affairs and served as defense attaché in Jakarta. for logistical support, and equipment. Garuda

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Indonesian guarding UNTAC headquarters, Phnom Penh. United Nations (P.S. Sudhakaran) United Nations (P.S.

contingents can be made up of individuals, teams Indonesian doctrine stresses small unit and for limited activity or missions, or organic mili- guerrilla warfare to defend the country against in- tary units reinforced as necessary. vasion. One of its key concepts is “territorial doctrine” and territorial operations that assign units Garuda XII and individuals in a geographically-oriented com- The Indonesian peacekeeping mission in mand system which places military personnel at Cambodia, known as Garuda XII, consisted of four all levels throughout the country. The closest re- army airborne infantry battalions reinforced with cent U.S. comparison is the role which district se- combat support and combat service support units. nior advisors played in Vietnam where Army offi- This was a joint operation that included elements cers functioned tactically at the local level as well from the army, marines, na- as in pacification missions. the Indonesian peacekeeping tional police, and air force as Territorial operations in Indonesia provide required. (The national po- detailed information about every corner of the mission in Cambodia was a lice are a branch of the country in the event of war. The concept is to co- joint operation armed forces with equal sta- hesively meld army and people to resist an inva- tus; the marines are subordi- sion, as occurred during the Indonesian struggle nate to the navy.) Each con- for independence in the late 1940s. Almost every- tingent served nine months in country including one in the military spends part of their career in an overlap period with successive contingents. territorial units through routine personnel assign- Unlike deployments for smaller U.N. opera- ments. It is ideal preparation for overseas peace- tions, Cambodia required battalion sized units keeping because it provides person-to-person ex- and augmentation rather than individual sol- perience at the local level. The U.S. military has diers. Indonesia’s task was to identify well trained no equivalent seasoning: the closest experience is and led infantry battalions that resulted in a deci- disaster relief in which servicemembers provide sion to respect unit integrity when possible in domestic support when emergencies strike local providing reinforcements. In such situations ABRI communities. deploy units drawn from the elite Army Strategic Senior ABRI leaders stress that there is no Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), a two-division standard peacekeeping preparation training. Ordi- primary tactical formation. Military personnel as- nary proficiency for territorial and tactical opera- signed to KOSTRAD are recruited selectively, en- tions is the prime mechanism for training units suring quality leaders and units. designated for overseas peacekeeping. Unit readiness and proficiency in individual military skills are the keys to preparing for deployment.

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Haseman

UNTAC Sectors of Cantonment and Demobilization

LAOS THAILAND

PAKISTAN BANTEAY 3 RATANAKIRI MEANCHEY SIEM REAP Phnom Thbeng Meanchey STUNG TRENG Boung Long PREAH VIHEAR URUGUAY Sisophon BANGLADESH Stung 4 2 Treng Siem Reap

Battambang Tonle BATTAMBANG Sap KAMPONG THOM

NETHERLANDS Kampong MONDOL KIRI Thom INDONESIA 1 MALAYSIA 5W KRATIE Pursat Senmonorom 8 Kratie

Kampong PURSAT Chhnang KAMPONG KAMPONG CHAM Kampong INDIA CHHNANG Cham 5E VIETNAM

Krong KOH KONG TUNISIA PHNOM GHANA and Koh Kong 9W PENH Prey Ta Khmau Veng INDONESIA Kampong GULF FRANCE Speu KANDAL PREY OF KAMPONG VENG SVAY THAILAND 6 International boundary SPEU BULGARIA RIENG TAKEO Svay Provincial boundary Chhak 9E Rieng National capital 0102030 40 mi Kampong Takeo Saom 02040 60 km KAMPOT Provincial capital Sector boundary Sihanoukville Kampot 5W Sector number Map No. 3736 SIHANOUKVILLE

Initial UNTAC deployment was designed for phase II of the ceasefire, in which the forces of the four factions were to gather separately in cantonment areas, relinquish their weapons, and begin their reintegration into civil society. (Names of U.N. member countries indicate which troop contributor was in command of a given sector.) Source: United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995.

Such training is augmented by location-spe- In preparing for Cambodia, key officers and cific specialty training. Area studies familiarize NCOs received instruction in English. There was personnel with conditions in the peacekeeping also a unique opportunity for Cambodian lan- area of operations (AO). This includes lectures on guage instruction. Cambodian asylum-seekers at a the differences between their home base and the refugee center on Galang Island in Indonesia pro- foreign operational area and focus on geography, vided a pool of instructors on language, culture, demography, and socio-economic conditions. and history. Selected Cambodians were brought Area orientation covers familiarization with cli- from Galang Island to teach at unit base camps. mate, weather, and terrain; religion, history, cul- They also helped compile a simple Cambodian- ture, language, and customs; the background of Indonesian dictionary for use by peacekeepers. the U.N. mission; operational objectives and rules of engagement—what soldiers should and should not do; and stern indoctrination with respect to local beliefs and mores.

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In addition to a solid base of military readi- contacts between the ancient kingdoms on Java ness and area studies training, Indonesian units and in Cambodia. Moreover, Indonesians noted a also received more specialized instruction. For the common skin color and shared social-cultural sys- Cambodian operation, deploying contingents tems. Despite key differences in language, na- had extensive training on mine detection, mobile tional history since independence, and religion, patrolling, and the tactics and doctrine employed Indonesian familiarization programs with regard by the Cambodian political factions which they to its own people stressed building on similarities and minimizing deviations. By the time the UNTAC mission was completed in 1993 Indonesia had provided the largest contingent. Its four reinforced battalions plus observers totalled some 3,400 of the 15,000 troops assigned to UNTAC. Two Indonesian brigadier generals served as chief of staff of the UNTAC military component. One battalion served at headquarters in Phnom Penh while another served in the crucial province of Kampong Thom (see map). Indonesians believe that their most important contribution was the operation in Kampong Thom which was a barometer for all aspects of politics and security in Cambodia because all factions maintained a powerful presence there. Most central government infrastructure was nonexistent, which made ABRI territorial operations significant to reestablishing government services and forging communications both

United Nations (P.S. Sudhakaran) United Nations (P.S. among the four factions and between UNTAC Indonesian peace- and the people. The number of weapons held by keepers at Pochentong the warring factions required a sizeable force to Airport. would encounter. Moreover, unit leaders received collect arms and demobilize units. intensive training on negotiating skills, intelli- Kampong Thom was an important province gence collection, interpersonal communications, for historical, political, economic, strategic, and and psychological operations. tactical reasons. Centrally located and bordering eight other provinces, its economic potential was The Cambodia Connection great even by Cambodia’s wretched post-war con- Indonesia had a vested political interest in ditions, with extensive fishing on Tonle Sap and Cambodia based on the key role which it played fertile rice fields. Its strategic advantages included in negotiations among the warring factions that lake ports, a river system for north-south trans- led to agreement on deploying peacekeepers portation, a large airport, and two national high- under the United Na- ways. Each of the factions wanted control of Kam- Kampong Thom was important tions. Jakarta began in- pong Thom, with the Khmer Rouge being in a formal meetings in particularly strong position. Both Pol Pot and for historical, political, economic, 1988 with the four fac- Khieu Sampan were born there, and it was a Khmer strategic, and tactical reasons tions as well as the Rouge stronghold during the Indochina War. other international players. With France, Provincial Operations it co-hosted the 1989 Paris conference of the An airborne battalion reinforced by a marine Cambodian factions and 20 nations which led to infantry company, a national police team, and the signing of a peace agreement. specialists—850 members overall—were assigned ABRI saw several reasons for Indonesia being to Kampong Thom. (Infantry battalions have an asked to assume a leading role in providing man- authorized strength of 699 with five line compa- power for the U.N. Transitional Authority in nies—four organic army and one marine.) Each Cambodia (UNTAC) that resulted from the Paris company in turn deployed its platoons geograph- conference. First, both Cambodia and Indonesia ically. The 14 districts of Kampong Thom made were former colonies and, in an earlier period of unit deployment easy, with one platoon assigned Southeast Asian history, there had been extensive to each district and one at battalion headquarters in Kampong Thom City. Special purpose teams (such as intelligence, medical, and riverine) were deployed as needed throughout the province.

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Haseman

information on the various factions. Communi- Faction Forces (Kampong Thom Province) cations emphasized mutual respect and understanding. Soldiers were keenly aware that even Strength one man could have great impact on the mission. Khmer Independence National Army 2,800 Informal contacts worked the best. Indone- [Leader: Norodom Ranarith] sian commanders sought key communicators such as village leaders, faction chiefs, and unit Khmer People’s Liberation National Armed Forces 400 commanders. “Coffee shops first, formal meetings [Leader: Son San] later,” noted a young officer. The junior officers— platoon and company commanders—mediated National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 5,000 small local disagreements. Indonesian soldiers cel- [Leader: Pol Pot; controlled most rural areas within province] ebrated their holidays, traditions, and customs and invited Cambodians to observe or take part. Cambodian People’s Armed Force (CPAF) 3,600 They also encouraged Cambodian cultural events [Leader: Heng Samrin; controlled towns and main highways] and ceremonies and sometimes took part. Cambodians were attracted to Indonesian activities such as medical and dental care, video broadcasts, sports events, and village construction projects planned and executed with the people. Priorities included village sanitation and Transportation was possible by both land and cleanliness, school repair and construction, and water, and U.N. helicopters were on call when teaching done by rank and file Indonesian sol- other forms of transport were not feasible. diers. Daily ABRI needs were met by local pur- The primary challenge for the Indonesian chases at fair prices and no rear area supply sys- contingent was to establish credibility with each tem was used to obtain food, water, and other armed faction, then to build on that to demobi- necessities. lize them and their weapons. With 12,000 fac- While such cooperative efforts were with the tional fighters in the province (see figure) the task people rather than armed factions, since all the was daunting. All four factions saw the impor- people were members or supporters of one fac- tance of Kampong Thom province to their vary- tion or another these approaches were very effec- ing political and military agendas, and all had tive. Indonesian troops conscientiously con- considerable capabilities. Based on the past record ducted development projects in areas controlled and strength, the Khmer Rouge were particularly by all of the factions including the Khmer Rouge. feared and hated. The Indonesians, as part of a As one battalion commander said, the most diffi- deliberate policy, treated each faction the same, cult problem was constantly emphasizing that including the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian factions were not the enemy but instead people People’s Armed Forces. with other ideas. This emphasis gradually won ac- Employing territorial operations doctrine, ceptance by the Khmer Rouge. the Indonesians concentrated first on winning The results were important. The Indonesians the confidence of the population. “We were al- were always able to enter, visit, and operate in ready very similar in skin color and cultural areas controlled by all four factions, a situation not traits,” one battalion commander observed, a fac- achieved by many other national contingents. tor which he believed was a key to success in the “Everything had to be accomplished by repetitious field. The Indonesians felt that the system of ter- efforts and patience,” one commander stated. ritorial operations used for rural development at Phase one of the operation was to establish home would also work in Cambodia. communications and relations with all factions. Once settled, operations in the province Phase two was to create a climate in which the began at the lowest practical level, usually pla- U.N. mission and its personnel could be accepted. toon. Commanders emphasized local culture and The Indonesians found that even being concilia- social systems. Indonesian military camps were tory to the Khmer Rouge did not bring compli- open to locals, and they mingled freely with sol- ance. Often all factions would comply with U.N. diers. Discussions began with small groups of vil- instructions save for the Khmer Rouge. Indone- lagers and townspeople through which all fac- sian battalion end-of-tour reports all cautioned tions were contacted. Patience was important in that the Khmer Rouge would remain a threat exchanging views and approaches to more recal- throughout and after the UNTAC period. citrant groups. Gradually the Indonesians gained While Indonesians saw their efforts as balanced, some other national contingents felt that they were consistently too close to the Khmer Rouge. Indonesian reports noted such concern

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but their ability to mediate the release of other Overall, the success of Garuda XII can be at- U.N. personnel seized by the Khmer Rouge indi- tributed to deliberate and detailed preparation cated that their policy provided them with access and implementation of both doctrine and tactics. which other UNTAC elements lacked. As the largest force deployed to Cambodia with One incident illustrates the degree of In- peacekeeping expertise, Indonesians were the log- donesian effectiveness. When the Khmer Rouge ical trainers of other national militaries, including seized six UNTAC members in Anlung Ranh and the United States, in the intricacies of interna- another two in Osala, a mixed UNTAC military tional peacekeeping operations. working group in Phnom Penh was unable to re- Senior Indonesian officers credit their suc- solve the crisis since cess to training, discipline, and professionalism. the success of Garuda XII can Khmer Rouge demands One key to their success was a willingness to could not be met. An quickly establish good relations with the Cambo- be attributed to implementation UNTAC officer subse- dian people and members of all political factions. of doctrine and tactics quently flew to Kam- There was no “enemy.” This is a difficult concept pong Thom to negoti- for Americans who are used to “good guys and ate the release of the bad guys” to accept. Somalia was a poignant ex- hostages but could not land because his heli- ample of an inability to maintain evenhanded re- copter was fired on. The UNTAC commander lations with all sides in a conflict. then called on the Garuda contingent. Indonesia cross-attached elements of three The Indonesians agreed to help on condition services—army, navy, and national police—in its that no other national contingents be involved. unit deployment. While joint units may not be They prepared a negotiating team and special op- appropriate in all peace operations, it is essential erations quick reaction force for use if bargaining that skills, requirements, and the environment be failed. Negotiations were tense, with the Indone- considered in tailoring forces for an operation. sians placed under armed control. But following Finally, Indonesian success can be attributed to some highly emotional exchanges, the Khmer a national policy that fosters participation. A will- Rouge released the hostages. ingness to support international peacekeeping was critical in the national-level commitment to the Lessons Learned Cambodian mission. Within ABRI, participation in Major General Tamlicha Ali, Indonesian U.N. peace operations is an organizational and per- army—who served as UNTAC military chief of staff sonal plum. Units take pride in such deployments for more than a year—has outlined six lessons and officers view their involvement in them as ca- from the Indonesian experience in Cambodia. reer enhancing. In short, commitment to peace op- ■ Develop broad knowledge of the area of opera- erations is integrated at the national and individual tions, including geography, demography, socio-eco- level in Indonesia. This is a dimension of peace op- nomic conditions, culture, customs, and religion. erations that is obviously lacking in the debate ■ Maintain vigorous standards in selecting per- within the U.S. policymaking and doctrinal devel- sonnel and units, including psychological testing. opment communities. JFQ ■ Require high standards of personal and unit discipline since soldiers routinely face situations requiring great restraint. ■ Besides English, key contingent leaders should master the language of the area and individual soldiers should have a basic vocabulary in both English and the local language. ■ Train officers in negotiation techniques and other diplomatic skills. ■ Ensure that civic action and humanitarian assistance are an integral part of military doctrine. While not always thought of as integral to peace operations, they proved successful in Cambodia and were the basis for winning popular support and thus cooperation from the various factions.

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Supplying War:

Supply Line in Kunming, China (November 1945) by Loren Russell Fisher. U.S. Air Force Art Collection U.S. Air Force Interservice and Interallied Cooperation in China-Burma-India By LEO J. DAUGHERTY III

he China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, best strategy for defeating Japan, the command perhaps the most political front in and control of forces and resources in theater, World War II, has been largely ignored postwar decolonization, and U.S. policy toward T by students of military history. One China.1 Finally, CBI was a backwater, receiving lit- reason for this inattention is the bitter interser- tle in the way of men and equipment despite the vice as well as interallied friction that nearly led extent of the front and the number of Japanese to a collapse of cooperation between Great Britain on the Asian mainland. Only through the dogged and the United States in the southeast Asian the- determination of those who fought there, and the ater of operations. The squabbles were over the belated importance attached to CBI after the Tri- dent conference of May 1943, was the theater given resources for a three-pronged offensive aimed at removing the Japanese threat to British- Leo J. Daugherty III, a military historian and former Marine Corps controlled India as well as driving them from intelligence analyst, currently serves as associate editor of Marine Burma, China, and Indochina. Corps Gazette.

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Students of World War II, Korea, and Viet- nam should not ignore the obstacle which faced American and British planners in southeast Asia as they fought both among themselves and against the Japanese, all in the name of joint and combined operations. Thus, it is relevant to examine not only the Anglo-American command— later Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)—but also the often acrimonious Army-Air Force relations in supplying China. The lessons of the airlift and military assistance conducted in the CBI theater to interservice cooperation serve as important precedents for jointness. The experiences of the Army and the Army Air Forces in CBI, as well as between the United States and Britain, influenced post-war joint and combined warfighting. Background Before the United States entered the war in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, China and Japan had been fighting for four and a half years, with the Chinese forces under Chiang Kai-shek being gradually pushed inland by the Japanese army. With the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Malaya the United States and Great Britain were drawn into the Sino-Japanese struggle. Even prior to the

Alexander McVean Japanese attacks on American and British forces On the road to China. across the south and southwest Pacific, however, U.S. lend-lease assistance had been flowing to em- battled nationalist Chinese forces for a year and a One vital aspect of fighting in the CBI theater half. AVG volunteers, led by Claire L. Chennault, a were the efforts between December 1941 and June former Army Air Corps captain, at that time were 1944 by air and ground-based logistic forces to fighting a desperate though successful air war support the Chinese nationalist field armies under against more experienced Japanese aviators. Chen- Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the British Four- nault, an advocate of offensive airpower, accompa- teenth Army under General William Slim, and the nied the Chinese director of air operations, Major Fourteenth Air Force—formerly American Volun- General Mao Pang-tzo, to Washington in Decem- teer Group (AVG)—under ber 1940 to plead China’s case to President experiences in CBI influenced General Claire Chennault. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Army chief of staff Gen- This dimension of the war in eral George C. Marshall. post-war joint and combined CBI illustrates the complexi- Along with a request from communist Chi- warfighting ties of both interservice and nese forces for 500 combat planes and crews, the interallied cooperation that nationalist Chinese government requested an ad- existed until the theater was ditional lend-lease loan of $30 billion in ground reorganized after the Trident conference and the force materiel. Mao Tse-tung as well as T.V. Soong, Anakim decision to retake northern Burma. Much the governor of the National Bank of China, also of the bickering then can be traced to the failure of received a credit extension of $100,000,000 in both the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and the lend-lease assistance of which 25 percent was for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to agree on a sound pol- armaments. Despite approval of this loan, the War icy regarding CBI and the Japanese threat there. Department, which was strapped by its own re- The U.S. inability to formulate a solid strategy led quirements, replied that it could not totally com- to postwar breakdowns in policy whereby Allied ply with the request. But Mao’s plea for aircraft interests gave way to “recolonization” instead of fared better. Stanley K. Hornbeck, who was on the “decolonization.” Ultimately, failing to prioritize Far East desk at the Department of State, and the support for CBI as well as relegating the theater to President assured that no objections would be minor importance was directly linked to the politi- raised to a request for aircraft. The sale of 500 com- cal and military failures in Indochina in 1946–54 bat planes was dealt with by the War, State, and and again in 1965–73. Treasury Departments without difficulty.

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Daugherty Alexander McVean Burma, 1944.

The first serious War Department effort to Shortly after our entry into the Pacific war, develop a unified military policy for China came Washington put the 500 planes promised China in July 1941 at the suggestion of the British mili- on hold pending review largely because of imme- tary attaché to China, Major General L.E. Den- diate requirements by both the U.S. Army and nys. Fearing a Soviet collapse and subsequent re- the Royal Air Force (RAF). The availability of 100 lease of thousands of Japanese troops in of the latest P–40B fighters produced a tentative Manchuria for duty in China proper, he urged agreement among Air Vice Marshal Sir Robert Washington to establish a military mission to co- Brooke-Popham, Chennault, and the U.S. military ordinate lend-lease assistance. He argued that whereby the former would transfer P–40s to such a mission could serve as the basis for a the- China while Britain would receive a similar num- ater command should the United States became ber of the new fighters. In addition, Brooke- involved in a war in the Pacific. Popham agreed to rearm the aircraft and offered With Marshall’s approval, the American Mili- the use of RAF airfields in Burma to train Chinese tary Mission to China was to serve as a liaison for pilots and crews as well as logistical support. strategic planning and cooperation with China. Pre-war discussions between Washington Under Brigadier General John Magruder, the mis- and London on China or the CBI theater pointed sion would coordinate lend-lease with the to differences in Anglo-American strategy on the Chungking government to: defense of the vital natural resources of Southeast ■ advise and assist in all phases of aircraft pro- Asia. As early as October 1941, the Americans and curement, transport, and maintenance British, fearing further moves by the Japanese to- ■ advise and assist in the training, use, and main- ward Burma and Southeast Asia, discussed form- tenance of weapons and equipment ing AVG into an Anglo-American organization. ■ when requested, assist the Department of State China likewise grew in importance since Wash- and other agencies in carrying out the Lend-Lease Act ington and London saw the Sino-Japanese con- pertaining to China flict as a large holding action to delay Japanese ■ help obtain prompt and coordinated adminis- armies from being committed elsewhere in the trative action to ensure the orderly flow of war materiel Pacific. Despite various attempts to make China a to Chinese forces ■ explore port, road, and railroad facilities with a view to establishing and maintaining an adequate line of communications.2

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Supplying War in CBI: From Dockside in Calcutta to Airfields in China

pilots dubbed the Hump the “aluminum trail” because of the 3,000 aircraft that went down

LEDO

LEGEND

Barge Route

Pipeline (6 inch) Source: Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI. The China-Burma-India Theater. U.S. Pipeline (4 inch) Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1985).

Airlift to China Major Airfields major wartime front, its sig- During the Arcadia meeting in December 1941, Broad Gauge, Double Track Railroad nificance diminished with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Broad Gauge, Single Track Railroad the “Germany first” (Rain- S. Churchill reaffirmed the “Germany first” strat- Meter Gauge, Single Track Railroad bow 1) strategy once America egy though both acknowledged the necessity of entered the war.3 defending Burma and supplying Chiang’s beleaguered forces. They agreed, moreover, that CBI The Arcadia Conference was to remain solely defensive until Germany was Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, not sur- defeated. Despite the low priority assigned to prisingly believed that China and Asia should be China, Roosevelt believed it crucial to not permit the Allied focal point. On the very day the Japan- it to either pull out of the war (as Chiang hinted ese attacked Pearl Harbor, he called a meeting of several times) or side with the Japanese. He like- Allied representatives in Chungking to discuss wise advocated that China be given great power creating a council which he would chair to direct status and permitted to direct the war in China the war in that theater. Besides calling for sever- from Chungking (later Kunming) instead of ing Japan’s lines of supply and communications granting General Sir Archibald Wavell overall through strategic bombing, he proposed that he command. Roosevelt also believed the British and now be given control “and priority” over all lend- French hold over Asian colonies would not sur- lease equipment. The Generalissimo rightly vive the war, and thus a strong China would be thought Britain would try to “preempt the lend- needed as a “policeman” to arrest any Soviet lease arms that were piling up in Burma on con- moves into the region. Churchill, who was in not signment to China...[and] wanted American in the mood to compromise Britain’s postwar po- leadership of the war council to keep the British sition in Asia, including India, told Roosevelt in from taking his goods.” 4 effect that what went on in British colonies was Chiang’s “Asia first” strategy was quickly set none of his business. aside at the first major interallied conference.

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I David C. Hall Fuel for Chennault.

By Land or Air? As long as Britain controlled Burma and the vital “Burma Road” from Mandalay to Lashio and on into China, the Allies could supply both Chi- ang and Chennault. During Arcadia, Churchill in fact had been pressured by Roosevelt to focus The Allied leaders nonetheless formulated a British efforts at defending the only land route to strategy that was purely defensive and would con- China, much to the disgust of General Sir Alan tinue supporting Chiang against Japan as well as Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, who holding the line against further advances into considered the scheme wild and half-baked. Burma and India. China’s strategic and opera- Throughout early 1942, British, Commonwealth, tional importance was as a base to defend Burma, and Chinese forces waged a rear-guard action India, and the Malay-Java barrier and possibly as after losing Rangoon to protect both the Burma a “jumping off” point for retaking Indochina. In Road and Yenangyaung oilfields and prevent the order to reduce the friction between Chiang and Chinese from being cut off in the northeastern the British (whom Chiang believed imperialistic), Shan states. the War Department would take responsibility for Loss of Burma and the vital rail and road China while Southeast Asia Command assumed networks into China would force the Americans responsibility for Burma. This separation of to undertake an aerial resupply effort over the Hi- Burma and China disrupted regular logistic chan- malayas in northern Burma. Lieutenant General nels, leading to problems of command and con- Joseph W. Stilwell, the War Department’s per- trol in CBI that threatened the conduct of the war sonal emissary to Chiang, proposed that a new against Japan on the Asian mainland. It was at truck route running through northern Burma, this point that the questions of how to supply from Ledo to Myitkyina, be constructed after the both China and British forces fighting in Burma, area was cleared of Japanese by a three-pronged while also maintaining Chiang’s forces in the Allied offensive. The British and Chinese saw the field, arose. For Marshall and the War Depart- idea as time-consuming and wasteful. The British ment, the problem did not center on the need to proposed instead a new offensive to recapture the supply CBI but on how to do it with the limited port of Rangoon and reopen the old Burma Road assets available during the first fourteen months from Lashio to Kunming. To meet short term after Pearl Harbor. needs the British and Chinese suggested a massive airlift. The Combined Chiefs reached a com-

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■ SUPPLYING WAR U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force Drawing water, India.

promise: the Americans would undertake the air- Division hammered out planning for the road, an lift even as Allied forces launched a series of of- interim route was found via Sadiya, India, and fensives to retake Myitkyina, opening the way to Kunming over a rough and forbidding stretch of build a new land route to China. terrain soon to be known as simply the “Hump.” Getting lend-lease to China even before U.S. The Chinese foreign minister, T.V. Soong, es- involvement in the war was not simple. Prior to timated that 100 C–47 Skytrains or Dakotas could the fall of Rangoon in fly 12,000 tons of supplies into China every getting lend-lease to China even March 1942, ships car- month. Despite Roosevelt’s concern that the un- rying lend-lease sup- armed transports would be easy prey for Japanese before U.S. involvement in the plies would dock and pilots, Soong assured him that “the supply route war was not simple unload at Rangoon, to China via India can be maintained by air even then be trucked via the though there should be a further setback in Ran- Lashio Road. The new goon.” Though Soong promised air support, Burma Road was to stretch from Ledo, India, many transports flew missions under a constant through Fort Hertz and Myitkyina to Lung-Ling in threat of attack. And much of the fighter cover China. Chiang optimistically believed it would provided came from Indian based RAF squadrons. take only five months to build the road while It was not until 1944 when Merrill’s Marauders Washington estimated two and a half years. Sup- retook the Japanese airbase in Burma at Myitky- port nonetheless came quickly from Marshall and ina that the enemy air threat was eliminated. presidential adviser Lauchlin Currie. In fact, Cur- Washington instructed Stilwell, appointed in rie told Roosevelt that building such a road under January 1942 to command U.S. personnel and American auspices would eliminate many of the lend-lease in China, to “set up the airline to problems between Chiang and the British, permit- China even though the Burma Road was held.” ting lend-lease to flow relatively uninterrupted to Chinese forces. But as Chiang and the War Plans

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Daugherty U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force Gurkas jumping into Rangoon.

Despite emphasis on building a land route, logis- the American, British, Dutch, Australian Supreme tical and engineering problems as well as the Command (ABDACOM) throughout the theater. drain of manpower and materiel to other theaters These same problems caused acrimonious debates delayed construction, forcing the War Depart- among the Anglo-American leaders and China ment to resupply the Allies with a massive airlift. over strategy. Squabbling about who got which This would establish a vital link with Chiang’s share of the little support reaching CBI strained forces in China and set the stage for the retaking tenuous relations between the Americans and of Burma in 1944. British as well as between British and Chinese forces in Burma. CBI, 1942–44 From the outset the British sought to have Despite delays in building a road to China the airlift placed “at its disposal and under the air and the shortage of men and aircraft because of officer commander in chief (India).” Although more pressing needs, the Army inaugurated Pro- JCS rejected this plan, Marshall personally as- ject 7A which requisitioned 25 American Airways sured Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the British liai- transports for the Assam-Burma-China Ferry son in Washington, that the Tenth Air Force Command. Its mission was to deliver equipment would be turned over to British forces in India and supplies to British, American, Chinese, and when necessary. Stilwell, suspicious of the lack- Indian soldiers as well as aiding fleeing refugees. luster British efforts in Burma and trying to pla- Despite Washington’s desire to placate Chi- cate Chiang’s demands, drew up his own plans ang, operations in Europe were a constant drain for a limited air and ground offensive that would on transport aircraft for the Ferry Command. keep the pressure on the Japanese and the Chi- American strategy in China thus became hostage nese fighting. to the European theater with regard to JCS and The center of Stilwell’s program in summer CCS priorities on both men and materiel. Chiang, 1942 was an air campaign to support a series of on the other hand, insisted that by August 1942 limited ground offensives in China and Burma. “the monthly aerial support should be 5,000 While Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force was to tons,” impossible given the build-up for Gym- assist Chiang’s forces inside China, Tenth Air nast, later renamed Torch, and Sledgehammer, Force, flying from bases in India, was to “bomb the invasion of northwestern France. In fact, strategic targets in Burma and China” when they troop and support problems plagued Stilwell and

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■ SUPPLYING WAR U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force Arriving in Kunming, China.

could be supported there. India Air Task Force, ac- at 17,000–20,000 feet. The transports, including tivated in October 1942, supplemented India- converted B–24s, carried no armaments. Even ma- China Ferry Command. Leading the airlift to CBI chine guns in the rear of B–24s were removed to was Air Service Command, under Brigadier Gen- add room for cargo. “The old slow transports, not eral Francis M. Brady. His task was to “receive and designed for such conditions, flew without aids to train crews for combat and transport operations” navigation or arms against Japanese pursuit.” 5 flying back and forth into China. Working Pilots flew from 13 to 14 hours a day, round through Brady’s American Air Service Command the clock, seven days a week, in all types of was its own Air Service Command. The group, weather. The only “down time” was during the based throughout northern India (Agra, Alla- monsoon from May to late October when only habad, Chakulia, Bangalore, Dinjan, and Chabua) limited flights took place. The C–46s carried 500- and at Kunming in China, served as a mainte- pound bombs, 50-gallon drums of 100-octane nance and supply echelon. Directing the entire aviation fuel, small arms ammunition, and what- resupply effort for China was Major General Ray- ever else Chiang or Stilwell required. Loaded by mond A. Wheeler’s Service of Supply (SOS). De- British, American, Indian, and Chinese ground pending on a 12,000-mile, four-month odyssey crews, the tightly-packed “gooney birds” flew off by ship from Los Angeles to Karachi and through runways made of steel mats or concrete and India’s vast interior to Assam on an antiquated crushed gravel on flights of up to five hours. rail and road network, SOS performed a miracle When flying through the monsoon and at in getting supplies to Stilwell and Alexander. night, pilots relied on “AI,” or actual instrument flying. Chinese and American technicians like- Over the Hump wise operated beacon radars to guide aircraft fly- Missions across the Hump and into Burma ing on instruments to Luliang and Kunming as were long and dangerous. The Hump portion of the flight averaged over 600 miles from either Assam or Delhi to Kunming. It began on leaving Myitkyina where pilots with oxygen masks flew

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well as all major air installations in India. Pilots Anakim simply came to know the approaches and landing The pace of the war in both the Pacific and sites by heart. the Mediterranean increased after the Casablanca Most problems with flying the Hump, how- conference in January 1943. As Trident and Quad- ever, were due to the weather. As one veteran, rant demonstrated, Stilwell’s and Admiral Lord Lieutenant General William H. Turner, wrote: Louis Mountbatten’s theaters became ever more Looking at the Hump weather on a year-round basis, dependent on an ever dwindling pool of logistical it’s easy to see that it was no picnic any time of the and air support. Even before Trident, JCS put forth year. The combination of weather and terrain would a more aggressive plan, Anakim, for a series of of- have made the Hump airlift a difficult one even if the fensives to reopen the Ledo Road into China. Mar- route had been over the middle of the United States.6 shall’s motive for backing it met serious resistance from both the British and Chinese. The British Pilots dubbed the Hump the “aluminum maintained that any operation to open the Burma trail” because of the 3,000 aircraft that went Road was a waste of resources that could better be down over the four years the Army Air Force ran used in the Mediterranean, for example. The Chi- the supply line, 85 percent of the losses due to nese, on the other hand, agreed to participate only weather. if Britain provided adequate naval and air support. Besides flying to Kunming and Luliang, 4th When Wavell informed the Generalissimo that Combat Cargo Group supported the advance by Britain could provide only a “limited amount,” Slim on Rangoon, ferrying and inserting into the Chinese declined. Burma radar teams and the long-range penetra- At Casablanca, Roosevelt and Churchill dis- tion units. The group also transported Chinese cussed problems confronting the Allies in the soldiers from bases in India and Burma to China. third full year of war. The President, aware that But the bulk of the flying before and after Trident both the public and his chiefs wanted an ex- was in support of Allied military operations in panded effort in the Pacific and China, sided with China and Burma. Slim wrote of the latter: Churchill’s desire to first secure the Mediter- There were, of course, some anxious moments: we had ranean basin and prepare for an eventual “second some over air supply. The American and British trans- front” in Europe (Bolero) to remove pressure from port aircraft were proving too few to meet our increas- the Soviet army on the Eastern Front. Although ing demands....This difficulty was met by Admiral they fought off suggestions for a major offensive Mountbatten obtaining the permission of the Com- in Burma, Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King bined Chiefs of Staff to borrow aircraft from the convinced the President to approve a limited Hump. Twenty-five Commandos [C–46s] were lent Burma offensive for late 1943. Roosevelt and Mar- for three weeks, thus enabling Dakotas to be sent to shall pledged that supplies expended in Burma [Orde] Wingate’s force [Chindits] to tide over the would be replaced immediately from American peak demand.7 stockpiles to placate Churchill’s fears that CBI In fact what made “flying the Hump” all the would drain lend-lease. more successful was the flexibility of responding Marshall’s desire for even a limited offensive quickly to operational requirements which also was twofold. His first goal was to reopen the line has been typical of subsequent air relief opera- of communications to China to secure bases for tions. During Slim’s advance down the Irrawady operations against Japan’s home islands. The sec- River in April–May 1945, American C–46s kept ond, and more important to both him and JCS, British forces supplied by flying round-the-clock was to obtain staging areas and airfields in north during the battle for Kohima Ridge until relief China for bombers to launch a strategic bombing came after two weeks of bitter fighting. Crews campaign (Matterhorn) against Japan. braved heavy antiaircraft fire by dropping ammu- Despite Roosevelt’s approval for a limited nition, water, and food to the beleaguered British Burma offensive, Marshall and King stressed to and Indian forces. Kickers pushed bundles from Stilwell that priority must go to rebuilding the pallets onto drop zones usually designated by Chinese army into a credible offensive force. CBI flares or coordinates. This system was repeated was to get only enough logistical support to pre- during the U.S. resupply of Chiang’s forces during vent collapse. In the end, Chennault’s Fourteenth the Chinese civil war (1945–49) and the first In- Air Force and not Stilwell’s half-starved Chinese dochina conflict when American-hired transport and American force received greater support due crews helped French paratroopers at Dien Bien to the belief on the part of Roosevelt and a reluc- Phu in 1954. tant Marshall that airpower would be a “quick- fix” alternative to Stilwell’s plan to refit 30 Chi- nese divisions. Despite this change of priorities in CBI, the impact of Anakim on SOS and Air Trans- port Command was immediate.

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■ SUPPLYING WAR

2,500–3,000 tons of supplies not only to protect air routes to China but to strike the Japanese along the Chinese and Burmese coasts. Despite Stilwell’s opinion that airpower alone could not defeat the enemy, Marshall ordered the CBI commander in chief to give Chennault a “firm allocation” of 1,500 tons a month regardless of Chiang’s needs. Stilwell complied and told JCS that Chennault would receive an added 1,000 tons per month. Chinese forces would still get 2,500 tons monthly, providing that in bad weather Chennault would “share equally with everyone else” no matter what it did to air operations. Chennault saw Stilwell’s plan as undercutting his efforts to launch the air campaign against Japan. He not only insisted on priority in Hump tonnage but that he get enough “to fly and fight.” Aggravating Stilwell’s command problems with Chiang and Chennault was interference by the President in theater operations. Roosevelt

U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force often circumvented the normal chain of com- Going behind mand in Washington—Marshall and JCS—to con- Japanese lines. duct the war in the same ad hoc way that pre-war policy on China had been formulated. While During the Trident conference in spring Roosevelt’s aim was to assure Chiang that “China 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their Combined was a full partner,” his meddling frequently sent Chiefs sought to finalize the agreements made at confusing signals, hampering the war effort. Casablanca the previous winter, particularly with Moreover, his personal relationship with Chen- regard to Anakim. Both Chennault and Stilwell, nault, which went back to 1937, hindered Stilwell the latter representing Chiang Kai-shek, pre- in reforming the Chinese army into an effective sented their plans on how to best defeat Japan in force. In fact, it inhibited the war against Japan China. After a lengthy presentation by Chennault and later in creating a working coalition with the on the efficacy of airpower, Stilwell discounted Chinese communists. Roosevelt’s insistence that airpower and Chennault’s grandiose plan warn- Chennault receive a “guaranteed monthly mini- ing that if compelled the Japanese had more than mum” not only reduced the chance of Stilwell ac- enough power to march on both Chungking and cumulating the requisite supplies, but forced a re- Kunming. Stilwell maintained that defeating the vision of the planned offensive into northern Japanese on the mainland required 120 Chinese Burma. The decision to maintain the pressure on divisions. the Japanese via an air offensive also impeded an The British, on the other hand, believed any effective Chinese effort against the enemy in offensive in Burma would divert manpower and Burma and China. logistics just when the war in Germany was enter- Despite War Department pronouncements on ing its most crucial phase. In fact, Churchill and the bravery and fortitude of Chinese soldiers, in- the British chiefs advocated bypassing Burma as terallied squabbling and British mistrust of Chi- the Americans were about to do in the south and ang’s pro-Indian sentiment slowed down efforts central Pacific. The British favored a limited am- by Stilwell to build a Chinese army able to defeat phibious campaign to retake the northern tip of the Japanese as well as the Chinese communists Sumatra and reoccupy Singapore. They likewise during the civil war (1945–49). Interallied friction thought it impossible to airlift sufficient supplies over priorities, strategy, and operations likewise over the Hump to sustain even a limited offensive scuttled plans to resume the offensive in CBI in in Burma given other priorities. 1943. Not until the Quebec conference (Quadrant) in August 1943 and Mountbatten’s appointment Supplying China would the Allies resume a major offensive against Any offensive to retake Burma or to assist the Japanese in Burma and China. In fact, Trident Chennault in his proposed air campaign against set in motion both the reconquest of Burma and Japan would demand flying increased tonnage the opening of the Burma Road in late 1944. over the Hump. Chennault based his requirements on 150 B–17 bombers; 32 B–24, B–25, and B–26 medium bombers; air and ground personnel; and

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Cooperation at Last 10,000 tons a month would not be reached until The immediate result of the Trident confer- British and American engineers completed all air- ence was increased Hump tonnage reaching both fields and maintenance facilities then under con- Chennault and Stilwell in China. Chiang’s ap- struction and each one was fully manned by proval of the Trident decisions meant that train- maintenance personnel. ing and equipping Y-Force (the 30 refitted Chi- It was only at the Quadrant conference that nese divisions) had to go forward, and tactical the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided when and plans for Burma had to be updated. Decisions where to strike the Japanese in the Pacific. While reached in Washington by Roo- approving of the central Pacific drive by Admiral with the increase of Hump sevelt, Churchill, and CCS on a Chester W. Nimitz, the chiefs sanctioned a series limited offensive into Burma set of limited offensives which would not only link tonnage to 10,000 per in motion plans for Slim’s re- India to China by a new road network but expel month came expansion conquest and opening the the Japanese from all of Burma. The conference culminated two years of interallied and interser- of Wheeler’s SOS Burma-Ledo Road in late 1944. Trident also gave more emphasis vice disharmony over how to supply China while to Chennault’s plan for an air defeating the Japanese. It became apparent that campaign. Roosevelt’s backing of Chennault di- the enemy would have to be defeated on the verted resources from road construction to air- Asian mainland before the status of British and fields in India. French colonies and U.S. policy toward China With the increase of Hump tonnage from could be resolved. It was only the persistence of 4,000 to 10,000 per month came the expansion Marshall and Mountbatten that focused the Allies and reinforcement of Wheeler’s SOS. After Tri- to fight the Japanese instead of one another. The dent, his first task was to get SEAC permission to China-Burma-India theater provides an illustrious build several airfields to enlarge the effort in case for the study of joint and combined opera- China and Burma. Wavell readily agreed and flew tions conducted under divergent and conflicting to Assam to survey construction of four main political and military objectives. JFQ bases: Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating, and Jorhat. The British commander gave Wheeler’s NOTES engineers license to requisition materiel for the 1 The author based numerous depictions of opera- airfields. Mountbatten rushed trucks, steel mat- tional details on interviews with veterans who served in ting, and gravel crushers and rollers to Assam to CBI during the events recounted in this article, includ- complete the airfields in time for the planned ing Platoon Sergeant Robert Boehm (Army Quartermas- spring offensives. ter Corps), Captain Ed Goodman (Army Air Force), and th Despite Anglo-American differences, CBI Captain David C. Hall (4 Air Cargo Group Command). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding Allied began to experience a steady influx of men and strategy in the China-Burma-India theater, see “Grave materiel by mid-1943. Acting on Marshall’s re- of a Dozen Schemes,” by H.P. Willmott in Joint Force quest for added aircraft for the China-Assam ferry, Quarterly, no. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 82–91. the War Department rushed 30 C–46 transports 2 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s to Wheeler. In order to not strip the planes from Mission to China. The China-Burma-India Theater. U.S. Sledgehammer, the Army requisitioned them Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center of from Trans World and Northwest Airlines. Mar- Military History, 1987), p. 11. shall, recognizing that Roosevelt’s air campaign 3 Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and could not be launched without more men and Preparations. The War Department. U.S. Army in World equipment, started to divert both from Britain War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military His- tory, 1985), pp. 367–410. and the United States to bolster Stilwell and 4 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience Chennault. By mid-1943 the theater was receiv- in China, 1911–45 (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 234. ing a quarter of all supplies coming off assembly 5 Ibid., p. 303. lines at home. 6 William H. Tunner, Over the Hump, (Washington: By summer ACT had three more transporta- Office of Air Force History, 1985), p. 75. tion groups and four airway detachments, with 7 William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 3d edition (Lon- more personnel arriving monthly. Whereas before don: MacMillan, 1988), p. 242. each transport had one crew they now had two, permitting round-the-clock flights. By August 1943, JCS had assigned 46 extra crews to the CBI theater, thus alleviating shortages in event of losses. Despite the additional personnel and materiel after Trident, it became clear that a goal of

Summer 1996 / JFQ 105 18JtWd 9/26/96 7:38 AM Page 106

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg (1899–1954) Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

VITA orn in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; graduated from Military Academy (1923); flying school (1923–24); commander, 90th attack squadron (1924–27); instructor, flying school (1927–29); commander, 6th pursuit squadron (1929–31); instructor and flight commander, Randolph Field (1931–34); tactical school and command and general staff school (1934–36); Army War College (1936–39); plans divi- Bsion, Office of Chief of Air Corps (1939–41); operations and training officer, Air Staff (1941–42); assigned to United Kingdom to assist in organizing air forces in North Africa; chief of staff, 12th Air Force; chief of staff, Northwest African strategic air force (1942–43); deputy chief of Air Staff (1943); head, air mission to Russia (1943–44); deputy air commander in chief, Allied Expedi- tionary Forces, and commander of American air component (1944–45); assistant chief of Air Staff (1945–46); director of intelligence, War Depart- ment General Staff (1946); director, Central Intel- ligence Group (1946–47); deputy commander and chief of Air Staff (1947); vice chief of the Air Force (1947–48); and chief of staff of the Air Force (1948–53); died at Washington, D.C.

. . . there is a difference of opinion as to whether the JCS, as a body, should determine the strategic concept for future war and establish the major elements of forces required to carry out such a concept. I firmly believe that law and precedent make this, together with the strategic direction of forces in the event of war, the primary function of the JCS.

—Letter from Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Secretary James V. Forrestal, November 1948 Art Collection U.S. Air Force Portrait by Charles Baskerville.

106 JFQ / Summer 1996 18JtWd 9/26/96 7:38 AM Page 107 JOINT FORCEJFQ QUARTERLY . . . coming in the next issue THEGOLDWATER- NICHOLSACT Ten Years Later

To mark the 10th anniversary of the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Autumn 96 issue of JFQ will feature a series of original contributions on various aspects of this law and its implementation by past and current government officials, senior military officers, and defense specialists, including the following: Introduction—From the Chairman General John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols Next Steps in Joint Force Integration by The Honorable James R. Locher III by General John J. Sheehan, USMC former Assistant Secretary of Defense Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

Defense Organization Today Warfighting CINCs in a New Era by The Honorable John P. White by Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN Deputy Secretary of Defense Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

Past Organizational Problems Emergence of the Joint Officer by General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.) by Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, USA (Ret.) former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff former Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, and Don M. Snider The Chairman as Principal Military Adviser Visiting Professor, U.S. Military Academy An interview with General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.) former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Prospects for the Military Departments by The Honorable Michael B. Donley Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force by Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.) former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Future Trends in Defense Organization and James R. Blaker by The Honorable Sam Nunn Visiting Fellow, National Defense University Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. Senate

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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■ THE JOINT WORLD

“joint staff techniques” and “procedures Exercises in theatres and joint overseas opera- History tions.” Announced by Secretary of the OSPREY ’96 Navy James V. Forrestal on August 13, THE JOINT BOOKSHELF 1946, AFSC held opening ceremonies on A NATO Partnership for Peace The Joint History Office has recently February 3, 1947. Among the distin- (PFP) exercise, Cooperative Osprey ’96 issued two new publications. The first, guished guests were Fleet Admiral (CO ’96), was held from August 12 to 30 So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, is an Chester W. Nimitz, chief of naval opera- at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. It account of the U.S. Transportation tions; General Carl A. Spaatz, comman- focused on NATO marine training, in- Command during Desert Shield/Desert der of Army Air Forces; Rear Admiral cluding amphibious operations, tactics, Storm written by command historian Walden P. Ainsworth, 5th Naval District; and procedures. CO ’96 increased inter- James K. Matthews. The author concen- Rear Admiral James Holloway, U.S. Naval operability and cooperation of NATO trates on strategic mobility activities of Academy; and Richard D. Cooke, mayor and its partners in both peace and hu- the command and its components. The of Norfolk. manitarian operations in a littoral oper- topically-organized narrative focuses on With the National War College and ating environment. broad issues and problems of strategic de- the Industrial College of the Armed A total of some 1,100 troops from ployment. Matthews provides details on Forces, AFSC is today one of three con- 16 PFP countries—Albania, Austria, Bul- airlift, sealift, land transportation, port stituent PME institutions which comprise garia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kaza- the National Defense University. Both khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the National War College and AFSC trace Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Slovak their origins back to the Army-Navy Staff Republic, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan— College (ANSCOL) which was organized and three NATO nations—Canada, the in 1943 on the recommendation of Netherlands, and the United States—took General Henry H. Arnold, commander of part in the exercise. In addition, Azerbai- Army Air Forces, to address deficiencies jan, the Czech Republic, and Denmark in preparing officers for the conduct of participated as observers. joint and combined operations. ANSCOL CO ’96 was conducted by com- trained its students “in the exercise of manding general, Marine Corps Forces command and the performance of staff Atlantic, on behalf of NATO supreme duties in unified and coordinated Army allied commander, Atlantic. JFQ and Navy commands.” The anniversary was celebrated by a Education ceremony conducted on the campus at Norfolk Naval Base and cerebrated by a two-day symposium sponsored by the GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY National Defense University on “Joint The Armed Forces Staff College Warfighting into the 21st Century” on (AFSC) marked the 50th anniversary of its August 14–15 at the college. JFQ founding this summer. Established after World War II, the college was mandated to train mid and senior level officers in

operations, containerization, and mis- Missing an Issue? sion support activities. Copies may be re- Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited quantities to members of the quested from the author by writing: Command Historian, Headquarters Armed Forces and institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address TRANSCOM, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois 62225–7001. or FAX number listed on the masthead. JFQ The second publication is a mono- graph entitled Operation Just Cause, by Ronald H. Cole of the Joint History Office. It examines the role of the Chairman and Joint Staff in planning and directing combat operations in Panama. The narrative begins in February 1988 and concludes with the surrender of Manual Noriega. This study, originally prepared in January 1990, was recently declassified. It is available by contacting: Director for Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 1B707, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318–9999. JFQ

108 JFQ / Summer 1996 18JtWd 9/26/96 7:39 AM Page 109

THE JOINT WORLD ■

1996 CJCS ESSAY COMPETITION The 15th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition was conducted on May 23 at the National Defense University. This event challenges students at intermediate and senior colleges to write on some aspect of international security, defense policy, or military affairs, with special emphasis on a joint topic.

CO-WINNING ESSAY Major John N.T. Shanahan, USAF (Naval War College) “No-Fly Zones Operations: Tactical Success, Strategic Failure, and the Missing Link”

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, USAF (Air War College) “Discerning Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: An Examination of Motivations, Strategic Culture, and Rationality”

DISTINGUISHED ESSAYS Donna M. DiPaolo, Department of State (Industrial College of the Armed Forces) “Foreign Ownership Restrictions in Communications and ‘Cultural Trade’”

Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Gunzinger, USAF (National War College) “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review”

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Roman, USAF (Air War College) “The Command or Control Dilemma: When Technology and Organizational Orientation Collide”

Lieutenant Colonel Randal K. James, USAF (Air War College) “The Islamist Challenge in the Middle East and North Africa”

Major Christopher M. Bourne, USMC (Marine Corps Command and Staff College) “Unintended Consequences: The Effects of Goldwater-Nichols on Civilian Control of the Military”

Lieutenant Colonel Billy J. Adams, USA (Marine Corps War College) “Defense Depot Maintenance Management for the 21st Century”

Summer 1996 / JFQ 109 18JtWd 9/26/96 7:39 AM Page 110

UPCOMING SYMPOSIA

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective This annual topical symposium will be held on December 3–4, 1996 at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

For details on future symposia or registration material on the above event, please contact: National Defense University ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 Telephone: (202) 685–3857/DSN 325–3857 Fax: (202) 685–3866/DSN 325–3866 Internet: [email protected]

Coming next year . . . Further information on upcoming events, recent publications, et al. is available to Internet users via the National Defense Annual NATO/European Symposium University World Wide Web server. Access any Web March 3–4, 1997 browser (for example, Mosaic or Netscape) by addressing in Washington, D.C. http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programs and registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior Annual Asia-Pacific Symposium to an event. April 28–29, 1997 in Honolulu, Hawaii

110 JFQ / Summer 1996 18JtWd 9/26/96 7:39 AM Page 111

Beginning with this issue look for JFQ on the World Wide Web http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

In an effort to enhance the awareness of joint doctrine and other information related to jointness, the Joint Staff has established a Web site on the Internet. The Joint Doctrine server can be accessed through any Internet provider and viewed using most browsers. This allows users to:

■ download all approved joint doctrine publications, key service publications, and related research material

■ access the most current terminology approved for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and all approved acronyms and abbreviations in the Joint Acronyms and Abbreviations Master Data Base

■ view abstracts of all approved joint publications on-line

■ participate in the “Joint Doctrine Forum” facilitating full discussion and open debate of doctrine

■ provide instant access to other related Web sites

■ and view the latest issues of Joint Force Quarterly.

For more information contact the Joint Doctrine Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), at (703) 614–6469 / DSN 224–6469.

Summer 1996 / JFQ 111 19OTS 9/26/96 7:43 AM Page 112

■ OFF THE SHELF

ARE WE REALLY READY FOR AN RMA? A Book Review by BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 428 pp. $64.95 [ISBN 0–521–55241–9]

s the debate over whether a revolu- Ation in military affairs is emerging in the United States continues, a relevant book has appeared. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period presents seven case studies on how new forms of warfare developed between the two World Wars. It also offers three chapters on the problems of radically changing the ways in which armed forces fight. Each case examines how three different militaries advanced warmaking developments that greatly determined the course and outcome of World War II: armored warfare, amphibious operations, strategic bombing, close air support, carrier aviation, improved submarine warfare, and radar. The book’s editors, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, each wrote several case studies and either authored or co-authored three interpretive essays. They were joined in creating Military Innovations by historians Richard B. Naval Historical Center Muller, Geoffrey Till, Holger H. Herwig, USS Langley. Alan Beyerchen, and Barry Watts. Each of their contributions is superb. Together, editors and authors have created a vol- nate events and institutions of the past and strategic approaches to war endure, ume that is highly informative, filled to inform warriors today. The first work, which is also the message of Military In- with significant insights for our time, and the three-volume Military Effectiveness novation. While the latter details the cre- written in a very literate and accessible (1988), considers myriad political, strate- ation and adaptation of certain military style. Most importantly, it raises major gic, operational, and tactical strengths technologies, it concentrates much more questions about whether an American and weaknesses of great powers in both on the processes than on hardware. That revolution in military affairs is really World Wars and the two decades be- makes it very much a book for the pre- underway. tween them. It was followed by Calcula- sent rather than just a historical study Military Innovation is the third col- tions (1992), more narrowly focused on that many might consider irrelevant. In laborative effort by Murray and Millett how major powers conducted net assess- particular, it examines the role, as well as which examines aspects of war in the pe- ment—for better or worse—in the years limitations, of new technology in chang- riod 1914–45. This series has been intel- leading to World War II. Military Effective- ing the basic patterns of warfare. lectually and financially supported by ness received considerable attention and Technology plays an enormous role the Office of Net Assessment within the has come to be regarded as a classic. Cal- in America, including the Armed Forces. Office of the Secretary of Defense under culations, appearing in the recession of In fact, for many Americans—inside and the leadership of Andrew Marshall. Each the early 1990s, has been largely over- outside the military—technology appears includes case studies and analytical chap- looked. But military professionals should to be the determining factor in war. Mili- ters by prominent historians that illumi- read both collections. Moreover, these tary Innovations argues otherwise. While earlier works create the foundation for the book discusses the development and Military Innovation, the concept that manufacture of weaponry and equipment Brian R. Sullivan is a research professor in while military technology and opera- in detail, the case studies point out the the Institute for National Strategic Studies tional techniques change, basic political at the National Defense University.

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crucial cultural, psychological, strategic, military had a service dedicated whole- and concludes that “without extensive bureaucratic, and political processes that heartedly to amphibious warfare in the cultural changes...and the moral para- led to the success or failure of a particular 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, after 1933 meters within which they view the technology on the battlefield. After all, as the United States and the Armed Forces world” they will not be able to carry out Murray points out in the opening chap- had in Franklin Roosevelt a leader who such sweeping changes. These insights ter, the British invented tank warfare and considered himself an honorary marine. raise significant questions about the so- together with the French and Germans That proved an enormous advantage to called “American RMA.” pushed the development of armored war- the Corps when it competed with other In his general examination of in fare technology in the interwar period. services for scarce resources. Finally, the novation from 1919 to 1941, Millett Furthermore, when Blitzkrieg erupted into gigantic industrial capacity and wealth of stresses the complexity of the process France in May 1940, French tanks were the Nation allowed the Marines to tap re- wherever it took place. No single expla- generally superior to those of the Wehrma- sources after December 1941 which nei- nation suffices. However, he concludes cht. But it was the way the British, French, ther the British nor Japanese amphibious by emphasizing the importance of and Germans employed armor that forces could duplicate. While the Marine nonmaterial influences: largely decided the outcome. Although Corps and their Army peers may have The patronage of politicians and senior mili- Murray advances no single explanation lagged behind the Japanese and British in tary leaders is essential....Political inter- for the defeat of British and French armor amphibious warfare techniques and vention is especially crucial in innovations in the spring of 1940, he stresses the great equipment at the time of Pearl Harbor, that cross or merge service specialties. Sheer influence of General Hans von Seeckt, they could push developments at an technical innovation, as the Germans head of the German army from 1919 to ever-increasing pace until V–J Day. Nor- proved, does not win wars. Instead, the inter- 1926. Seeckt improved an already excel- mandy, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Oki- action of technical change and organiza- lent professional military education sys- nawa were bloody operations. But the ul- tional adaptation within a realistic strategic tem. He directed a penetrating and objec- timate American victories there hardly assessment determines whether good ideas tive study of the lessons of World War I would have been possible with the am- turn into real military capabilities. and created an officer corps open to inno- phibious vehicles and doctrine of three vative thinking, lively debate, and uncon- or four years earlier. These advances came In the final chapter, Barry Watts, a ventional problem solving. Within this about through human, not technologi- retired fighter pilot who is an analyst at environment, the army not only adopted cal, factors. Political support in high Northrop Grumman, joins Murray in tanks after Hitler threw off the restric- quarters, fiscal and industrial largesse, considering the essential issue of our time tions of the Versailles Treaty but devel- and the single-minded devotion of a ded- in a chapter entitled “Military Innovation oped ways to use them as part of a highly icated service that made the United in Peacetime.” They pay deserved tribute effective combined arms approach to States the leader in amphibious opera- to Andrew Marshall for his great assis- warfighting. These factors, not armored tions by war’s end. tance to the cause of successful military technology per se, brought victory in the Space does not permit similar de- innovation in the United States over the Battle of France. The lack of such leader- scriptions here of the five other historical past quarter-century. But they return to ship, thought, training, and application— case studies in Military Innovation. Each the theme that gifted individuals cannot not the quality of combat vehicles— does provide an outstanding investiga- carry their organizations into the future largely explains the Allied defeat. Tech- tion of its topic. Nonetheless, this re- on their backs. Institutional support and nology was hardly irrelevant to the viewer was disappointed that American, an atmosphere conducive to free inquiry, German success in 1940. But the intellec- British, and German examples so domi- iconoclasm, and daring imagination are tual approach to armored technology and nated the studies, with Japanese and far more important. In the concluding the institutions that adapted it in the French efforts mentioned only once. chapter Watts and Murray note that inno- German army proved far more decisive. Surely examples of innovation by other vation is necessarily an untidy business Allan Millett describes a different countries could have been chosen in that cannot be controlled or managed story in his account of the development order to base the book’s conclusions on through a rigidly centralized system. In of amphibious warfare by the Japanese, far broader ground. For example, an ex- fact, efforts to eliminate such messiness British, and American militaries. He amination of Italian development of un- are likely to stifle innovation. What se- points out that both geography and strat- derwater assault could have been joined nior civilian and military leaders can do is egy prompted all three countries to cre- to studies of the American and British ex- choose an imaginative and relevant vi- ate the means to land large forces on periences. Soviet armored warfare and sion of warfare in a period of change, hostile shores. Yet their forces also had close air support case studies also might thus indicating a general course for inno- other pressing military needs. In all three have been included. Even failures at in- vation to follow. However, while such cases, amphibious warfare received less novation, such as the massive Japanese long-term goals may be envisioned and than the resources necessary for full real- and Italian submarine programs, could set within the next few years, their real- ization of its potential in the interwar have yielded useful lessons. ization may require far longer. During period. Both Japanese and British am- Much more significant, however, that time, leaders must create and pre- phibious warfare theorists surpassed their are the book’s strengths, especially the serve an intellectual as well as an institu- American counterparts in terms of inven- final interpretive chapters. In “Innova- tional atmosphere to allow the innova- tiveness. Nonetheless, by 1945 the tion Past and Present” (a version of tory process to succeed. It remains to United States had vastly superior am- which appears in this issue of JFQ), be seen if the Armed Forces will enjoy phibious capabilities. Millett indicates Murray declares that brilliant individuals such enlightened leadership over the that in its Marine Corps the American count far less than flexible organizations coming generation. JFQ in pursuing innovation to a successful conclusion. He is concerned whether our Armed Forces allow for such advances

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CAMPAIGNING Macedonian patrol. UNDER THE U.N. BANNER A Book Review by JEFF S. KOJAC

The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping edited by William J. Durch New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 509 pp. $19.75 [ISBN 0–312–10401–4]

he current administration’s decision Tto deploy forces to Bosnia as peacekeepers illustrates not only the continued U.S. role as a security guarantor but the necessity for the Armed Forces to understand peace operations. Joint Publication (Charlie Parshley) U.S. Air Force 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- dures for Peacekeeping Operations; U.S. nate multilateral forces of differing Collectively, the cases argue that such Army FM 100–23, Peace Operations; and strengths. Political and military mission operations are imperatives since they the Joint Task Force Commander’s Hand- heads who run operations must function allow protagonists to make peace with- book for Peace Operations published by the as a team in arbitrating with nongovern- out surrendering. Moreover, as various Joint Warfighting Center address doctri- mental organizations as well as with local authors note, if the United Nations is to nal considerations and supporting func- civilians and military forces. Moreover, continue as a forum to defuse grievances tions inherent to peace operations. the U.N. bureaucracy must support peace in the interest of international stability, it Clearly, though, such missions should operations without hindering them, must be able to succeed in the field and not be undertaken without historical per- often a seemingly impossible task. not turn into another ineffectual League spective. Bridging the gap between the- Despite its strengths, the book is of Nations. ory and experience is The Evolution of limited in scope. There are only sum- After the Korean War, Moscow U.N. Peacekeeping, a superb study of the mary comments on U.N. missions in El barred Washington from directly partic- operational level of U.N. peacekeeping Salvador, Cambodia, the former Yu- ipating in peace operations. With the operations edited by William Durch, a goslavia, and Somalia since these opera- end of the Cold War, the Armed Forces former foreign service officer. tions were still in progress when the have been repeatedly called upon to sup- The book recounts details of twenty work appeared. In addition, the Multina- port missions undertaken by the United U.N. missions in a case study format. The tional Force and Observers (MFO) group Nations. Undoubtedly, the United States mandate, funding, planning, composi- in the Sinai and the Multinational Force will continue to be drawn into such tion, and logistics of each operation are (MNF) for Lebanon are noted but not missions. With that in mind, The Evolu- surveyed, and the actual field operations evaluated since the coverage is limited tion of U.N. Peacekeeping is recommended are lucidly described. The incisive exclusively to operations conducted as a reference that educates and provides assessment of what these operations ac- under the U.N. banner. perspective for warfighters charged complished and their benefits to local, Overall, the contributions succeed with keeping peace. JFQ regional, and global communities is com- in describing the complexities of peace pelling. The strategic context is discussed operations. And while the case studies though not stressed. Tactical aspects are are sobering, they certainly are not grim. portrayed but only from the level of the force commanders and their staffs. Ac- companying each case study are excellent maps of troop positions and charts dis- Notable and Quotable playing supporting data. The necessity for jointness is recognized today in American and British military cultures as never before. Besides providing a rich operational Nonetheless, the trail toward a truly unified vision of defense preparation and war has been long, some- history, The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping times interrupted by substantial roadblocks and diversions, and remains incomplete. The Goldwater-Nichols offers lessons learned. Individual peace- DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 was an important milestone on the jointness trail, as was the British deci- keepers and observers must be able to ne- sion in 1994 at long last to create a permanent joint headquarters for the armed forces. An important mo- gotiate as ombudsmen. Commanders tive for this British innovation would appear to have been financial, but that apparent fact should not de- need leadership skills to control subordi- tract from appreciation of the strategic merit in the move. By way of the laying down of a professional marker of no small symbolic significance, in 1993 the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., launched a new journal, unambiguously titled Joint Force Quarterly. Captain Jeff S. Kojac, USMC, is assistant — Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy operations officer, Marine Air Control (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996) Squadron 7.

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region seems destined for an ever greater cause of friction over control of sea lines of THE PACIFIC share of global product. Japan and Greater communication, but because of the subtle China alone hold two-thirds of the foreign ways in which a dynamic and moderniz- CENTURY AND exchange reserves on earth. ing China could aid aggressive regimes FUTURE CAUSES OF Focusing on the impact of such in the Middle East. Thus energy, opines growth, Calder argues that there is a Calder, might be the catalyst for an WAR “deadly quadrangle” of expansion, the “Islamic-Confucian embrace” by raising the specter of a “clash of civilizations” A Book Review by energy required to fuel it, geostrategic in- security among the major powers, and (a term coined by Samuel Huntington). PATRICK M. CRONIN military modernization. The second likely manifestation of In essence, he relies on basic princi- growing Asian energy consumption ples of supply and demand to get at the would be equally distressing for U.S. or Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and Asian security planners, nuclear prolifera- America’s Future in Asia root problem of exponentially expanding consumption. Avoiding the neo-Malthu- tion. Unlike the United States and most by Kent E. Calder of Europe, Asia is relying more on nu- New York: William Morrow and sianism of Lester Brown, Calder fixes on energy consumption more than other re- clear power. The Department of Energy Company, 1996. forecasts that Asia may account for half 253 pp. $25.00 sources such as arable land or the ozone of the entire increase in nuclear capacity [ISBN 0–688–13738–5] layer. In addition, he is most attuned to China’s consumption rather than India’s between 1992 and 2010. Most of it or Indonesia’s. Even so, by reducing the would come in Northeast Asia, particu- ars, at least those involving great problem to rising use of energy resources larly Japan and Korea. Wpowers, occur when the interna- in China over the next few decades, he There is a disturbing link between tional system and major actors on the captures and animates salient security the expansion of nuclear power plants world stage fail to integrate ascendant challenges: and the potential to build and sell nu- nations. This was exactly the wisdom im- clear weapons. As Calder writes, “when a parted in hindsight by Thucydides in his The problem for Asian stability, growing country develops a civilian nuclear capa- account of the Peloponnesian War. with each barrel of Chinese oil imports, is bility, it also proceeds much of the way Without appealing to an oracle, now clear. It is the danger that China’s at- toward possessing a nuclear device.” En- political economist and Japan watcher tempts to safeguard its oil supply lanes and richment and reprocessing procedures Kent Calder cautions us in Pacific Defense: defend its historical “sovereignty” in adja- are potentially destabilizing, especially in Arms, Energy, and America’s Future in Asia cent seas poses for other nations of Asia, es- a region marked by geostrategic insecu- to brace for a power shift in the next cen- pecially for Japan. rity. Thus, many Asians worry that Japan tury. In almost Churchillian terms, he While Thucydides was not con- may amass 100 tons of plutonium by foretells the coming of a “new danger cerned about consumption in ancient 2010—both through imports from zone” and of a “great arc of crisis stretch- Greece, one can find in Pacific Defense a Britain and France and from its own ing from southwest to northeast of shadow of the classical historian: “What three breeder reactors expected to be in Tokyo.” Such prognostications are not made war inevitable was the growth of operation by then. That stockpile of fis- new: some 35 years ago Claude Buss pub- Athenian power and the fear this caused sile material would surpass the amount lished The Arc of Crisis, which identified in Sparta.” The author, who directs a pro- currently contained in all the nuclear Southeast Asia rather than Northeast Asia gram in U.S.-Japan relations at the warheads of both the United States and as the locus of conflict. Nonetheless, Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the former Soviet Union. Calder presents a compelling case that begins by looking at just how little aver- Given the lack of regional multilat- new centers of power in Asia will trans- age citizens of China consume today. eral mechanisms for monitoring this inform, dislocate, and perhaps overturn the Then he turns to the sobering implica- creased reliance on nuclear power in existing international order. tions of growing energy demand in Northeast Asia, Calder’s idea of a At the crux of his analysis is the China if, for instance, its people con- sector-specific, subregional body— tremendous growth of Asia and the po- sumed as much as South Koreans: oil similar to what some call Pacific Atom tential cost of that growth, regionally needs would be double those of the (PACATOM)—seems to be a judicious and increasingly internationally. Calder United States. multilateral response to help constrain does not simply assert Asian growth but This trend is well underway. The nuclear proliferation in the 21st century. documents it with measurable indices Asia-Pacific region overtook Western Eu- But consumption is not without that place it in a global context. For in- rope in 1990 as the second largest oil- moderating influences. Indeed, it is inex- stance, he notes: consuming area after the United States. tricably related to classical liberal eco- [Asia’s] economy already makes up a third of Meanwhile, a booming auto market in nomic notions that increased commerce the global market and 41 percent of the East Asia alone will lead to further makes nations more pacific in outlook as global bank reserves, up from 17 percent in consumption. they concentrate on producing wealth 1980. But with half of all the people on Such an Asian “Achilles heel of en- and become economically interdepen- earth, high savings, ever more sophisticated ergy” might become manifest in two ways, dent. This reassuring element is brought technology, and explosive, often double-digit each with implications for the United out in Calder’s examination of the do- growth rates across much of its periphery, the States and the region. First, an expanding mestic political attitudes within Asia’s appetite for energy means that by 2000 two great powers, Japan and China. some 87 percent of oil imported by East Calder depicts Japan as an economic Patrick M. Cronin is a research professor in Asia will flow from the Middle East. This great power with latent great-power mili- the Institute for National Strategic Studies, dependency is worrisome not only be- tary potential. The question of whether it National Defense University. will develop defense-industrial strength

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and become a “normal” power is timely powers (namely, the United States, Rus- derscores the yawning policy gap stem- given the evolving debate over whether sia, China, Japan, India, a unified Korea, ming from “American neglect of Asia” the Japanese constitution permits putting and Vietnam), the rhythm of world poli- and dangers borne of disillusioned trade military forces in harm’s way for any- tics will be driven far more by the charac- policy and populist calls for retrench- thing other than pure self-defense ter and prerogatives of Asia than by the ment. Most members of the bureaucracy (namely, for the right of collective self- United States and the West (such as the remain Eurocentric, senior officials ap- defense). Impending political realign- current group of seven). pear more eager to fly to the Middle East ment within Japan could produce a more Not all players in this balance of than Asia, economic and security issues forceful policy line with regard to power game are equal. First, China “is a are treated independently rather than Tokyo‘s regional security responsibilities. clear case of a nation with strong incen- comprehensively, and policymakers are Japan’s neighbors, especially the two tives to play balance of power politics. It hamstrung by legal micromanagement Koreas and China, are set against any en- has the leverage of a large, rising power that hinders opportunities and leader- largement in its defense capabilities or and the detachment of one without es- ship. Worse, the private sector is only missions. U.S. opinion on this point re- tablished allies.” Moreover, at the “crux slightly better than the public sector at mains divided or ambivalent. Meanwhile, of the emerging power game” are Sino- formulating a creative, serious, and sus- as Calder argues, Japan is defined by Japanese relations. These two great Asian tained U.S. approach to Asia. hawks (realists and Gaullists) and doves states have the capacity to polarize the Calder offers us a series of 10 policy (traders and progressives). Ultimately, region, initiate a new great power arms prescriptions. Having devoted the lion’s however, only a signal event, a serious re- race, and contest influence on the Ko- share of the book to a compelling de- gional crisis, would seem able to alter the rean peninsula. Calder concludes: scription of the challenges facing the present Japanese trajectory toward a very Ultimately Asia’s dangerous new power United States, however, his solutions gradual assumption of responsibility for game, with the specter of a heavily armed seem somewhat unsatisfactory. As such, regional security: “Absent a potent exter- and unified China and Korea on its doorstep he starts the book writing like Zbigniew nal shock to set a new course for national that it presents in worst-case scenarios, Brzezinski and concludes it more like policy, Japan seems unlikely in the bal- threatens to destabilize Japan’s traditional Cyrus Vance. But among his prescrip- ance of this century to radically realign it- low-posture military orientation. It also tions are four useful thoughts: self in international affairs.” threatens to provoke over the long run a seri- ■ The United States needs a more com- Likewise, an ascendant and ever- ous arms race, centering on Japan and prehensive and integrated approach to policy more-consuming China seems to be tem- China, that could have global implications. that simultaneously takes into account Asia’s pered by domestic political trends, ac- rising power and the interconnection among cording to Calder. For one thing, it has Given the enormity of Asia’s grow- security, economics, and energy. “never had a Hitler or a Napoleon.” For ing power, can a relatively diminished ■ The U.S.-Japan relationship is at the another, it faces a number of significant United States expect to sustain its role as core of our long-term influence in the region. challenges, including rising regionalism a regional balancer with its present level If it is curtailed, then all assumptions about future stability and security must be reexamined. and a devolution of central authority, of commitment to the Asia-Pacific region? Clearly if Washington pursues a ■ The Korean peninsula will be increas- generational change, rapid urbanization, ingly important as the crossroads of great pow- course advocated by isolationists who stresses on domestic infrastructure, un- ers and as a major force in its own right. seek “the twilight of globalism,” the an- even economic growth, reintegration of ■ Washington must treat China “even- Hong Kong, and the thorny issue of Tai- swer is a resounding no. But even if it handedly” like the great power it is. If America wan. Despite these, China is not likely to simply holds to a steady course in terms is to help integrate China, then it must hue to dissolve in chaos like the former Soviet of its military, political, and economic a more consistent and coherent policy. (While Union: “Deng Xiaoping has not been presence in Asia, Calder implies the an- not saying so explicitly, the book suggests a China’s Gorbachev, and none of his suc- swer may also be no. While U.S. invest- felt need for a strategic framework for China. Failure of such a broad understanding has led cessors is likely to be either.” ment in the region rose some 40 percent to nearly $80 billion from 1989 to 1992, to sharp fluctuations in U.S. policy toward Nationalism will probably be the China in recent years and could bring about a it was outstripped by Japanese invest- central force that enables China to co- polarized Asian-Pacific region. As Henry here in the decades ahead, but it will not ment. Similarly, how can the Nation ex- Kissinger recently observed: necessarily be a virulent form of nation- pect to keep a lid on mounting Asian ca- alism. Calder’s bottom line—at least for pabilities and competition with 100,000 In the absence of overarching political or the next twenty years—is more reassur- troops deployed in the entire area? As strategic objectives, stress on social issues as ing: “Despite rising capabilities that Calder writes, referring to the debate over the principal objective of foreign policy is could lead to more militant, nationalistic U.S. presence on Okinawa and in Japan perceived as pressure and produces con- power projection, China most likely will more generally: frontations that undermine other interests, be constrained in its militancy by deep— Whether Okinawa...in the globalism that including geopolitical ones, or doom America and still rising—economic interdepen- it still symbolized, can assure a pacific fu- to irrelevance. dence with the world, especially the ture for Asia beneath the Eagle’s wings, as In short, Calder offers a motherlode major advanced industrial nations.” the shadows of regionalism and intrare- of insights for strategists to consider as Calder’s survey of domestic trends gional rivalry continue to deepen, remains to they mull the next century—and none in Japan and China at first appears some- be seen. Therein lie major consequences for too soon. It was the rise of Athens that what at odds with his initial thesis of an both the strategy and tactics of an effective caused fears among Spartans and led to “arc of crisis.” However, one is then Pacific defense. the Peloponnesian War. Similarly, rivalry forced to contemplate the potential dy- A central challenge to the United between two ascendant Asian powers, namic interaction within the evolving China and Japan, could make the balance of power, globally and in the re- States is whether it will be as important in the next century as today. Calder un- Pacific century much bloodier than gion. In Calder’s world of a new seven the American century. JFQ

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Christman, Daniel W. NATO’s Military Future, no. 11 Cumulative Index (1995–1996) (Spring 96), pp. 76–81 ISSUES 9–12: CONTRIBUTORS Clark, Paul C., Jr. D-Day Veracruz, 1847—A Grand Design, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 102–15 Ballard, John R. JMETL: The Key to Joint Clawson, Patrick L. Proficiency, no. 9 (Autumn 95), A Prince of a Tale: A Book Review, pp. 95–98 no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 131–32 Balza, Martin Antonio Tuning the Instruments of Changing Argentine Military National Power, no. 10 Culture, no. 11 (Spring 96), (Winter 95–96), pp. 82–88 pp. 64–66 Cogdell, Matthew W. Bender, Trevor J. Medical Dimensions of Joint A Primer on Naval Theater Air Humanitarian Relief Operations, Defense, no. 11 (Spring 96), no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 90–97 pp. 22–28 Collins, John M. Binnendijk, Hans More Than Deeds of Derring-Do: Focus on the Middle East, no. 9 A Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), (Autumn 95), pp. 5–6 pp. 128–29 The Security of the Americas, no. 11 Cope, John A. (Spring 96), pp. 36–39 The Security of the Americas, Allard, C. Kenneth no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 36–39 Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Tuning the Instruments of Joint Doctrine, no. 9 (Autumn 95), National Power, no. 10 Cronin, Audrey Kurth pp. 105–09 (Winter 95–96), pp. 82–88 From Strategists to Strategy: A Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Anderson, Gary W. Boorda, Jeremy M. pp. 129–31 Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel, Leading the Revolution in C4I, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 69–75 no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 14–17 Cronin, Patrick M. The Pacific Century and Future Andre, David J. Boutelle, Steven W. Causes of War: A Book Review, The Art of War—Past, Present, AFATDS: The Fire Support Window no. 12 (Summer, 96), pp. 115–16 Future: A Review Essay, no. 9 to the 21st Century, no. 11 (Autumn 95), pp. 124–28 (Spring 96), pp. 16–21 Daugherty, Leo J., III Supplying War: Interservice Bullock, Harold E. and Interallied Cooperation in Training the Pacific Warriors, China-India-Burma, no. 12 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 16–21 (Summer 96), pp. 95–105 Carr, Nevin P., Jr. DiFronzo, Vincent P. A Primer on Naval Theater Air Unity of Command—Countering Defense, no. 11 (Spring 96), Aircraft and Missile Threats, no. 11 pp. 22–28 (Spring 96), pp. 29–35 Carvalho, Luiz Paulo Macedo Dryden, George M. A Brazilian Strategic Outlook, The C–17 Transport—Joint Before no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 59–63 Its Time, no. 12 (Summer 96), Caton, Jeffrey L. pp. 67–73 Joint Warfare and Military Echevarria, Antulio J., II Dependence on Space, no. 10 War, Politics, and RMA—The (Winter 95–96), pp. 48–53 Legacy of Clausewitz, no. 10 Chilcoat, Richard A. (Winter 95–96), pp. 76–80 Strategic Leadership and the “Fourth” Army War College, no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 74–81

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Einaudi, Luigi R. Hochevar, Albert R. Security and Democracy in the Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of Region, no. 11 (Spring 96), War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 pp. 67–72 Hutzler, Patricia Insley Everett, Michael W. Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial JLASS: Educating Future Leaders Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), in Strategic and Operational Art, pp. 97–101 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 29–33 Hyde, James C. Filak, Ronald JLASS: Educating Future Leaders AFATDS: The Fire Support Window in Strategic and Operational Art, to the 21st Century, no. 11 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 29–33 (Spring 96), pp. 16–21 Joseph, Robert G. Fogleman, Ronald R. Regional Implications of NBC Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Proliferation, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Force Team, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 64–69 pp. 9–15 Keaney, Thomas A. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, A Jubilee for Airmen: A Book no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 75–79 Review, no. 11 (Spring 96), p. 134 Marr, Phebe Foster, Gregory D. Kelley, Jay W. Gulf Security and Iraq’s Uncertain Research, Writing, and the Mind Brilliant Warriors, no. 11 Future, no. 9 (Autumn 95), of the Strategist, no. 11 (Spring 96), (Spring 96), pp. 104–10 pp. 50–54 pp. 111–15 Kojac, Jeff S. Marshall, Andrew W. Freeman, Chas. W., Jr. Campaigning under the U.N. The 1995 RMA Contest: A The Middle East: Challenges Born Banner: A Book Review, no. 12 Postscript, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), of Success, no. 9 (Autumn 95), (Summer 96), p. 114 p. 81 pp. 40–45 LaPlante, John B. Mata, Jose F. Garner, David P. Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial Defense of the Hemisphere: Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), An Historical Postscript, no. 11 Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 97–101 (Spring 96), pp. 73–75 pp. 97–101 Lewis, William H. McCaffrey, Barry R. Giangreco, D.M. The Growing Reach of Radical A Former CINC Looks at Latin Operation Downfall: The Devil Islam, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 46–49 America, no. 11 (Spring 96), Was in the Details, no. 9 Linn, Thomas C. pp. 44–51 (Autumn 95), pp. 86–94 Joint Operations: The Marine Human Rights and the Goldberg, Joseph E. Perspective, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Commander, no. 9 (Autumn 95), The Military in Israeli Society: pp. 16–18 pp. 10–13 A Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Magee, Roderick R., II p. 132 McKenzie, Kenneth F., Jr. Strategic Leadership and the An Ecstasy of Fumbling: Gottlieb, Aryea “Fourth” Army War College, no. 12 Doctrine and Innovation, no. 10 Beyond the Range of Military (Summer 96), pp. 74–81 (Winter 95–96), pp. 62–68 Operations, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Mahnken, Thomas G. pp. 99–104 Mendel, William W. War in the Information Age, New Forces for Engagement Policy, Gray, Colin S. no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 39–43 no. 10 (Winter 95–96), On Strategic Performance, no. 10 Maiorano, Alan G. pp. 25–29 (Winter 95–96), pp. 30–36 A Primer on Naval Theater Air Metcalf, Marvin G. Haseman, John B. Defense, no. 11 (Spring 96), Acoustics on the 21st Century Garuda XII: Indonesian pp. 22–28 Battlefield, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Peacekeeping in Cambodia, no. 12 Marchio, James D. pp. 44–47 (Summer 96), pp. 89–94 Days of Future Past: Joint Moseley, Edward H. Intelligence in World War II, D-Day Veracruz, 1847—A Grand no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 116–23 Design, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 102–15

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Murray, Williamson Reimer, Dennis J. Sheehan, John J. Innovation: Past and Future, Joint Warfare and the Army-Air U.S. Atlantic Command and no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 51–60 Force Team, no. 11 (Spring 96), Unified Endeavor ’95, no. 10 pp. 9–15 (Winter 95–96), pp. 11–15 Oakley, Robert B. Developing a Strategy for Troubled Robards, James A. Sifers, Steve C. States, no. 12 (Summer 96), Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of JMETL: The Key to Joint pp. 82–88 War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 Proficiency, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 95–98 Mogadishu Duet [Part One]: Roberts, Mark J. A Book Review, no. 10 Iran and the “Great Satan”, no. 9 Singh, Ajay (Winter 95–96), pp. 125–26 (Autumn 95), pp. 55–57 Time: The New Dimension in War, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 56–61 O’Neill, William G. Rokke, Ervin J. Moral Obligation Versus “Beeper Military Education for the New Snyder, Jed C. Ethics”: A Review Essay, no. 11 Age, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 18–23 Turkey’s Role in the Greater (Spring 96), pp. 130–33 Middle East, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Rollins, George A. pp. 58–63 Owens, William A. Improving Force Closures, no. 10 The American Revolution in (Winter 95–96), pp. 119–20 Soofer, Robert W. Military Affairs, no. 10 Joint Theater Missile Defense Schafer, John M. (Winter 95–96), pp. 37–38 Strategy, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of pp. 70–74 Parker, Jay M. War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 Change and the Operational Stevenson, Jonathan Commander, no. 10 Mogadishu Duet [Part Two]: (Winter 95–96), pp. 89–96 A Book Review, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 127–28 Passarelli, Ralph W. Unified Endeavor ’95 and Stocker, Jeremy R. Modeling Effective Training, Canadian “Jointery”, no. 10 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 11–15 (Winter 95–96), pp. 116–18 Peay, J.H. Binford, III Story, Ann E. The Five Pillars of Peace in the Beyond the Range of Military Central Region, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Operations, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 32–39 pp. 99–104 Perry, William J. Sullivan, Brian R. Good Bridges Make Good Are We Really Ready for an RMA? Neighbors, no. 11 (Spring 96), A Book Review, no. 12 pp. 40–43 (Summer 96), pp. 112–13 Pierce, Terry C. Tata, Anthony J. Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel, A Fight for Lodgement: Future no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 69–75 Joint Contingency Operations, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 82–89 Pitts, W. Darren A Guantanamo Diary—Operation Schwamb, Frank E. Tillson, John F.C. Sea Signal, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Unified Endeavor ’95 and Building a Joint Readiness pp. 114–20 Modelling Effective Training, Training Reporting System, no. 12 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 11–15 (Summer 96), pp. 22–28 Price, George W. The Impact of Nationalism on Shalikashvili, John M. Toner, James H. Joint Force Planning, no. 10 A Word from the Chairman, no. 9 Leadership, Community, and (Winter 95–96), pp. 20–24 (Autumn 95), pp. 1, 4; no. 10 Virtue, no. 11 (Spring 96), (Winter 95–96), pp. 1, 4–7; no. 11 pp. 98–103 Randolph, Leonard M., Jr. (Spring 96), pp. 1, 4–5; no. 12 Medical Dimensions of Joint (Summer 96), pp. 1, 4–5 Humanitarian Relief Operations, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 90–97 Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military—Preparing for Tomorrow, no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 34–49

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Tritten, James J. DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military Developing Naval Doctrine... personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make From the Sea, no. 9 (Autumn 95), their requirements known through command channels. Corrections in shipping instructions for pp. 110–13 service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

Setting the Record Straight: ■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer or write to the U.S. Army A Book Review, no. 10 Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (Winter 95–96), pp. 129–32 (reference Misc. Publication 71–1). ■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance Vitale, Michael C. (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be Jointness by Design, Not Accident, sent by FAX to (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UIC, and full address). no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 24–30 ■ MARINE CORPS—For one-time distribution write to Marine Corps Logistics Base (Code Ware, Lewis 876), 814 Radford Boulevard, Albany, Georgia 31704–1178; request by FAX at (921) 439–5839 / Warriors of the 13th Generation, DSN 567–5839. To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 8–10 (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex, Washington, D.C. 20380; request by FAX at (703) 614–2951 / DSN 224–1463. Weidner, Glenn R. ■ AIR FORCE—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (with issue number)” to the base Operation Safe Border: The publications distribution office to establish unit requirement through the Air Force Distribution Ecuador-Peru Crisis, no. 11 Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896. (Spring 96), pp. 52–58 ■ COAST GUARD—Contact U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations Whetstone, Shawn C. Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001. Of Arms and Men: A Book Review, In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 128–29 service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the Yakeley, Jay B., III Editor at the address below. Training the Pacific Warriors, no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 16–21 SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) on the order Yost, Mark and mail with a check for $16.00 ($20.00 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account Where are the Arleigh Burkes number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Today? no. 11 (Spring 96), Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be pp 125–27 purchased at GPO bookstores nationwide for $8.00 each. Young, Thomas-Durell CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as “Top Down” Planning and Joint from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including Doctrine: The Australian foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of Experience, no. 12 (Summer 96), 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the pp. 61–66 editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material Zackrison, James L. (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. Of Cabals and Complots: Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. A Book Review, no. 11 (Spring 96), To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. pp. 135–36 Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but Zepka, James M. endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. Both the Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the JFQ journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally sent to authors for review. Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected for publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces or employees of the Federal Government are forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of articles submitted by servicemembers or U.S. Government employees. If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on the submission of contributions is available Articles published in JFQ are listed in the by calling (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or Air University Index to Military Periodicals. writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), In addition, a complete cumulative index of Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066. JFQ issues 1–12 can be found on the Internet at http://www.ndu.edu.

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coming next... THEGOLDWATER- NICHOLSACT Ten Years Later

with original contributions by John M. Shalikashvili, James R. Locher III, John P. White, David C. Jones, Colin L. Powell, William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, John J. Sheehan, Joseph W. Prueher, Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, Michael B. Donley, Sam Nunn, and others in the Autumn 96 issue of JFQ

JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.