The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: an Assessment
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The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson Advisor: Colonel Larry Chandler, USAF, ret. US Air Force Counterproliferation Center 56 Future Warfare Series No. 56 The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment by Michelle Spencer Aadina Ludin Heather Nelson Advisor: Col. Larry Chandler (USAF, ret.) The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 56 January 2012 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama ii The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment Michelle Spencer Aadina Ludin Heather Nelson The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established to provide education, research and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. The USAF Counterproliferation Center is funded jointly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the United States Air Force. Copies of this report and other publications are available on the USAF Counterproliferation Center website: http://cpc.au.af.mil or by contacting them directly by mail at USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427; phone: (334) 953-7538 / DSN 493-7538; fax: (334) 953-7530 / DSN 493-7530; or email: [email protected]. USAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 iii DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report is the result of a year-long Air University research project funded by Headquarters Air Force, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10). We, the authors of this report, appreciate the support of AF/A10 and the USAF Counterproliferation Center for this important project. We would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to all workshop participants and interviewees, who took time out of their hectic schedules to brainstorm on this critically important issue. The authors especially would like to thank Gene Moseley, Buck Buchanan, Mark Stout, and Dale Hill for their tireless support and editorial assistance for this project. Finally, this project would not have been complete without the exceptional advice and assistance of Larry Chandler. Michelle L. Spencer Aadina Ludin Heather Nelson v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1 PROLOGUE ................................................................................................................................. 11 The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons ................................................................. 11 The Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components to Taiwan .................................... 13 The Response: Investigations ................................................................................................... 14 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 17 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 17 Study Findings .......................................................................................................................... 19 DEFINING THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................................... 22 Leadership ................................................................................................................................. 22 Management .............................................................................................................................. 23 Expertise ................................................................................................................................... 24 HISTORY ..................................................................................................................................... 26 The Deterrence Mission ............................................................................................................ 26 Organization and Culture of SAC ............................................................................................. 27 Air Force Organization and Missions ....................................................................................... 28 Comparing Air Force and Navy Nuclear Operations ............................................................... 29 The Demise of the Soviet Union and SAC ............................................................................... 31 ROOT CAUSE 1: POLICY AND OVERSIGHT CHANGES ..................................................... 32 Strategy and Policy ................................................................................................................... 33 The Power of the Atom and the Aging Scientific Community ................................................. 34 Congress .................................................................................................................................... 35 Arms Control Reduces Bureaucratic Clout ............................................................................... 36 ROOT CAUSE 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND OPERATIONAL EVOLUTION .... 39 Office of the Secretary of Defense............................................................................................ 39 USSTRATCOM and Headquarters Air Force .......................................................................... 42 Nuclear Goes Conventional ...................................................................................................... 42 General McPeak‘s Revolution .................................................................................................. 43 Goldwater-Nichols Overhauls Service Structure ...................................................................... 45 ROOT CAUSE 3: INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS ........................................................................... 47 Signs of Nuclear Enterprise Decline Were Ignored .................................................................. 47 vii Air Force Cultures of Compliance and Self-Assessment Are Gone ......................................... 48 Nuclear Education and Training De-emphasized ..................................................................... 50 ROOT CAUSE 4: FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP ........................................................................ 51 Nuclear Weapons Lose Their Advocates .................................................................................. 51 Inaction Can Be As Harmful As Action ................................................................................... 52 ROOT CAUSE 5: FAILURE TO FOCUS EXPERTISE ............................................................. 54 Nuclear Weapons are a ―Sunset Business‖ ............................................................................... 54 Loss of Intellectual Capital ....................................................................................................... 56 Every Airman a Leader? ........................................................................................................... 58 RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 60 Expertise ................................................................................................................................... 60 Put the Nuclear Mission Back into the Hands of the ―Experts‖ ........................................... 60 Reestablish Operational Competence ................................................................................... 61 Incentivize Change and Ensure Retention ............................................................................ 62 Leadership ................................................................................................................................. 63 Reinstitute Core Principles: Communication and Responsibility ......................................... 64 Motivate Managers to Be Leaders ........................................................................................ 64 Require Responsibility at the Highest Levels ....................................................................... 65 Management .............................................................................................................................. 66 Enable Nuclear Staff to Learn From Past and Focus on the Future ...................................... 66 Reinstitute Unity of Command ............................................................................................. 67 Make Change Work .............................................................................................................. 68 Culture......................................................................................................................................