The Billy Mitchell Syndrome A

Airpower advocates always have, and always will, face certain occupational hazards. The Billy Mitchell Syndrome By Rebecca Grant Mitchell, shown standing at his 1925 court-martial, wrote that airmen “are bluffed and bulldozed so that they dare not tell the truth [about airpower], knowing full well that if they do, they will be deprived of their future career.” irpower advocacy is part of tion of complex capabilities, delivered Air Force chief historian, has written being an airman. Air Force at just the right time, in the right place, that one result, among senior airmen, Doctrine Document 2 tells to the right persons. The message has is a “tendency to not be as aggressive Aall USAF members, “Each of you must not always been welcome. Today is in arguing the airpower case as one be articulate, knowledgeable, and un- no different. would expect them to be.” Call it the apologetic advocates.” It adds, “We Advocacy has a checkered history Billy Mitchell Syndrome. must understand what it means to be an in the Air Force and its predecessor Mitchell, America’s first great air airman” and explain “what air and space organizations. Start with Brig. Gen. commander, was the master of airpower can bring to the joint fight.” William Mitchell in the 1920s, and power advocacy. (See “The Real Billy Advocacy rarely has been easy or you see that speaking up for airpower Mitchell,” February 2001, p. 64.) He safe. It has required reasoned articula- carried risks. Richard P. Hallion, former saw that it was a multipronged task, 52 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 requiring work in the joint community, American officer knew who to convince, mirals.” That all-out Washington brawl with allies, inside the US government, what to say, how to explain airpower, pitted Air Force backers against Navy in the press, and in the public arena. and when to close the deal. That was partisans in open conflict, and no one His singular achievement came late a true success story in airpower ad- on either side minced words. Air Force in World War I, when he talked his vocacy. officers gave at least as good as they Army superiors and Allied chiefs into The armistice did not slow Mitchell’s got. (See “Revolt of the Admirals,” letting him plan and lead a major air efforts. If anything, he became even May 1988, p. 62.) campaign. The September 1918 Battle more determined to build up America’s Air Force officers stayed on the of- of St. Mihiel was the greatest air combat airpower. It is instructive to note that, fensive well into the next decade. In event of the war. Bringing together this upon his return home in 1919, he the May 1956 issue of this magazine, offensive took all of Mitchell’s powers carefully confined himself to working for example, Gen. Otto P. Weyland, of persuasion. within the War Department and follow- commander of Tactical Air Command, Stand back for a moment and consider ing the rules of the bureaucratic game. delivered an amazingly blunt asser- how things looked in summer 1918. Only after all such measures failed did tion of the supremacy of airpower. America was not yet a great military he move on to employ other tactics. He argued, “Airpower, as exemplified player; the US, though it had been at It was no secret that strong advocacy in the United States Air Force, is the the Western Front for about a year, of airpower caused resentment and fundamental military threat restraining was still very much the junior partner opposition within Army and Navy the enemy.” The general went on to say, among the Allies. The 1.2 million circles. Mitchell himself, in his famous “United States Air Force airpower is Americans in Europe were still, for the September 1925 statement that sparked ... the decisive, dominant force assur- most part, firing French guns, flying his court-martial, charged that airpower ing a continued Free World.” Through French aircraft, and taking their training partisans were forced to remain silent the 1950s and early 1960s, Weyland, from French and British officers. Gen. about the sad state of air operations—or Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Gen. Nathan Henri-Philippe Petain, commander of else. “The airmen themselves,” he F. Twining, and other senior leaders all French forces, summed up the mat- wrote, “are bluffed and bulldozed so spoke widely and wrote extensively ter this way: “There is no American that they dare not tell the truth in the about the pivotal place of airpower in army as such, as its units are either in majority of cases, knowing full well the defense of the nation. training or are amalgamated with the that if they do, they will be deprived Then, in the mid-1960s, the tide be- British and French.” US airpower had of their future career, sent to the most gan slowly to turn, and open advocacy a commensurately low profile. out-of-the-way places to prevent their again became increasingly difficult. A Fortunately, Gen. John J. Pershing, telling the truth, and deprived of any particular strand of Cold War scholarly the top US commander in France, chance for advancement.” revisionism put strategic bombing in a longed to change all that by proving In 1925, Mitchell, by impugning the negative light. Assessments of armed American mettle in a battle fought Army and Navy leadership, deliberately operations ranging from the firebombing under US command. It turned out to provoked a court-martial, seeing it as of Dresden in Germany and the atomic be the Battle of St. Mihiel Sept. 12-16, the best and fastest way to bring the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1918. Some 550,000 US troops fought airpower debate to a climax. Though Japan to the Cold War preparations for German forces on land and in the air. convicted at trial and forced to retire, massive nuclear retaliation against the (See “The St. Mihiel Salient,” February Mitchell continued to speak out until Soviet Union all cast US airpower in 2000, p. 74.) his death in 1936. Gen. Henry H. “Hap” the role of villain. Arnold, a Mitchell supporter who be- Mitchell’s reputation also sank. Re- Fast Talking came Chief of the US Army Air Forces visionist criticism of the famous airman It was during that engagement that in World War II, said, “The public was grew strong in the 1960s. Writing in the world got a clear view of Mitchell’s on his side, he was righter than hell, 1964, the influential naval historian audacious airpower creed. He saw St. and he knew it.” Others questioned the Samuel Eliot Morison accused Mitchell Mihiel as an opportunity to raise the wisdom of his ways, and there is little of keeping the Navy “weak” in the Air Service profile in Pershing’s eyes, doubt that Mitchell’s fate made airmen decade before World War II. Gen. if, he said, “we delivered the goods.” of the 1920s and 1930s think twice Benjamin D. Foulois, an old Air Ser- To do it, Mitchell had to do some before speaking their minds. vice rival of Mitchell’s who lived until heavy persuading—and fast. He first 1967, left an autobiography that sullied importuned British Gen. Hugh M. All-Out Brawls Mitchell’s image even further. Trenchard to lend him use of the RAF In World War II, American air domi- In the post-Vietnam years, a full independent bombing force. Mitchell, a nance helped secure victory, and advo- reversal of course occurred. A bum- fluent French speaker, won operational cacy returned with full force. Candid per crop of military histories blamed control of hundreds of French fliers. talk about airpower ran strong during America’s failure in Southeast Asia Pershing also gave him full authority the war years, of course. When the largely on deficiencies of airpower. By over virtually all US Air Service pursuit independent Air Force was created in the late 1970s and 1980s, a doctrinal units, which enabled him to command 1947, there was no lack of outspoken reaction had elevated land power to them for air superiority and battlefield partisans. Take, for example, the late prime position and had reassigned interdiction sweeps. 1940s, which featured a freewheeling airpower to a supporting role, a junior In short, the major Allies—Britain, discussion about the unification of partner to the Army in the AirLand France, and the United States—all the services and a bomber vs. carrier Battle concept. New perceptions de- trusted Mitchell to command the big- argument that culminated in what is valued the historic achievements of gest air offensive of World War I. The now known as “the Revolt of the Ad- airpower—whether with regard to AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 53 aggressors. In mid-September, Dugan made a trip to the Gulf and, in several sessions with reporters, offered a candid assessment of airpower’s contribution in the war to come. Washington Post reporter Rick Atkin- son, who was present at Dugan’s press sessions, summed up his remarks in a long Sept. 16 article in that newspaper. The Chief of Staff had strongly (and, as it turned out, accurately) portrayed airpower as an offensive option that would overwhelm Iraq’s Air Force and destroy much of its Army. Air attacks, he said, would not remain limited to targets in Kuwait but would range across Iraq. “The cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad,” Dugan told Atkinson. Mitchell, shown in France with his airplane, won operational control of hundreds Cheney’s Problem of French fliers and virtually all US Air Service pursuit units for the Battle of St.

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