Airpower advocates always have, and always will, face certain occupational hazards. The Billy Mitchell Syndrome By Rebecca Grant

Mitchell, shown standing at his 1925 court-martial, wrote that airmen “are bluffed and bulldozed so that they dare not tell the truth [about airpower], knowing full well that if they do, they will be deprived of their future career.”

irpower advocacy is part of tion of complex capabilities, delivered Air Force chief historian, has written being an airman. Air Force at just the right time, in the right place, that one result, among senior airmen, Doctrine Document 2 tells to the right persons. The message has is a “tendency to not be as aggressive Aall USAF members, “Each of you must not always been welcome. Today is in arguing the airpower case as one be articulate, knowledgeable, and un- no different. would expect them to be.” Call it the apologetic advocates.” It adds, “We Advocacy has a checkered history Billy Mitchell Syndrome. must understand what it means to be an in the Air Force and its predecessor Mitchell, America’s first great air airman” and explain “what air and space organizations. Start with Brig. Gen. commander, was the master of air- power can bring to the joint fight.” William Mitchell in the 1920s, and power advocacy. (See “The Real Billy Advocacy rarely has been easy or you see that speaking up for airpower Mitchell,” February 2001, p. 64.) He safe. It has required reasoned articula- carried risks. Richard P. Hallion, former saw that it was a multipronged task,

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 requiring work in the joint community, American officer knew who to convince, mirals.” That all-out Washington brawl with allies, inside the US government, what to say, how to explain airpower, pitted Air Force backers against Navy in the press, and in the public arena. and when to close the deal. That was partisans in open conflict, and no one His singular achievement came late a true success story in airpower ad- on either side minced words. Air Force in World War I, when he talked his vocacy. officers gave at least as good as they Army superiors and Allied chiefs into The armistice did not slow Mitchell’s got. (See “Revolt of the Admirals,” letting him plan and lead a air efforts. If anything, he became even May 1988, p. 62.) campaign. The September 1918 Battle more determined to build up America’s Air Force officers stayed on the of- of St. Mihiel was the greatest air combat airpower. It is instructive to note that, fensive well into the next decade. In event of the war. Bringing together this upon his return home in 1919, he the May 1956 issue of this magazine, offensive took all of Mitchell’s powers carefully confined himself to working for example, Gen. Otto P. Weyland, of persuasion. within the War Department and follow- commander of , Stand back for a moment and consider ing the rules of the bureaucratic game. delivered an amazingly blunt asser- how things looked in summer 1918. Only after all such measures failed did tion of the supremacy of airpower. America was not yet a great military he move on to employ other tactics. He argued, “Airpower, as exemplified player; the US, though it had been at It was no secret that strong advocacy in the Air Force, is the the Western Front for about a year, of airpower caused resentment and fundamental military threat restraining was still very much the junior partner opposition within Army and Navy the enemy.” The went on to say, among the Allies. The 1.2 million circles. Mitchell himself, in his famous “ airpower is Americans in Europe were still, for the September 1925 statement that sparked ... the decisive, dominant force assur- most part, firing French guns, flying his court-martial, charged that airpower ing a continued Free World.” Through French aircraft, and taking their training partisans were forced to remain silent the 1950s and early 1960s, Weyland, from French and British officers. Gen. about the sad state of air operations—or Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Gen. Nathan Henri-Philippe Petain, commander of else. “The airmen themselves,” he F. Twining, and other senior leaders all French forces, summed up the mat- wrote, “are bluffed and bulldozed so spoke widely and wrote extensively ter this way: “There is no American that they dare not tell the truth in the about the pivotal place of airpower in army as such, as its units are either in majority of cases, knowing full well the defense of the nation. training or are amalgamated with the that if they do, they will be deprived Then, in the mid-1960s, the tide be- British and French.” US airpower had of their future career, sent to the most gan slowly to turn, and open advocacy a commensurately low profile. out-of-the-way places to prevent their again became increasingly difficult. A Fortunately, Gen. John J. Pershing, telling the truth, and deprived of any particular strand of scholarly the top US commander in France, chance for advancement.” revisionism put strategic bombing in a longed to change all that by proving In 1925, Mitchell, by impugning the negative light. Assessments of armed American mettle in a battle fought Army and Navy leadership, deliberately operations ranging from the firebombing under US command. It turned out to provoked a court-martial, seeing it as of Dresden in Germany and the atomic be the Battle of St. Mihiel Sept. 12-16, the best and fastest way to bring the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1918. Some 550,000 US troops fought airpower debate to a climax. Though Japan to the Cold War preparations for German forces on land and in the air. convicted at trial and forced to retire, massive nuclear retaliation against the (See “The St. Mihiel Salient,” February Mitchell continued to speak out until Soviet Union all cast US airpower in 2000, p. 74.) his death in 1936. Gen. Henry H. “Hap” the role of villain. Arnold, a Mitchell supporter who be- Mitchell’s reputation also sank. Re- Fast Talking came Chief of the US Army Air Forces visionist criticism of the famous airman It was during that engagement that in World War II, said, “The public was grew strong in the 1960s. Writing in the world got a clear view of Mitchell’s on his side, he was righter than hell, 1964, the influential naval historian audacious airpower creed. He saw St. and he knew it.” Others questioned the Samuel Eliot Morison accused Mitchell Mihiel as an opportunity to raise the wisdom of his ways, and there is little of keeping the Navy “weak” in the Air Service profile in Pershing’s eyes, doubt that Mitchell’s fate made airmen decade before World War II. Gen. if, he said, “we delivered the goods.” of the 1920s and 1930s think twice Benjamin D. Foulois, an old Air Ser- To do it, Mitchell had to do some before speaking their minds. vice rival of Mitchell’s who lived until heavy persuading—and fast. He first 1967, left an autobiography that sullied importuned British Gen. Hugh M. All-Out Brawls Mitchell’s image even further. Trenchard to lend him use of the RAF In World War II, American air domi- In the post-Vietnam years, a full independent bombing force. Mitchell, a nance helped secure victory, and advo- reversal of course occurred. A bum- fluent French speaker, won operational cacy returned with full force. Candid per crop of military histories blamed control of hundreds of French fliers. talk about airpower ran strong during America’s failure in Southeast Asia Pershing also gave him full authority the war years, of course. When the largely on deficiencies of airpower. By over virtually all US Air Service pursuit independent Air Force was created in the late 1970s and 1980s, a doctrinal units, which enabled him to command 1947, there was no lack of outspoken reaction had elevated land power to them for air superiority and battlefield partisans. Take, for example, the late prime position and had reassigned interdiction sweeps. 1940s, which featured a freewheeling airpower to a supporting role, a junior In short, the major Allies—Britain, discussion about the unification of partner to the Army in the AirLand France, and the United States—all the services and a bomber vs. carrier Battle concept. New perceptions de- trusted Mitchell to command the big- argument that culminated in what is valued the historic achievements of gest air offensive of World War I. The now known as “the Revolt of the Ad- airpower—whether with regard to

AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 53 aggressors. In mid-September, Dugan made a trip to the Gulf and, in several sessions with reporters, offered a candid assessment of airpower’s contribution in the war to come. Washington Post reporter Rick Atkin- son, who was present at Dugan’s press sessions, summed up his remarks in a long Sept. 16 article in that newspaper. The Chief of Staff had strongly (and, as it turned out, accurately) portrayed airpower as an offensive option that would overwhelm Iraq’s Air Force and destroy much of its Army. Air attacks, he said, would not remain limited to targets in Kuwait but would range across Iraq. “The cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad,” Dugan told Atkinson.

Mitchell, shown in France with his airplane, won operational control of hundreds Cheney’s Problem of French fliers and virtually all US Air Service pursuit units for the Battle of St. Mi- Secretary of Defense Richard B. hiel. He considered the huge battle an ideal opportunity to prove airpower’s mettle. Cheney found fault with Dugan’s re- marks and imposed a harsh penalty. specific battles or to the persona of Soon, USAF leaders were running The Pentagon chief demanded and Billy Mitchell. into troubles of a kind scarcely seen got Dugan’s immediate resignation, in decades. The worst was the attack charging that the Chief “showed poor Shortage of Mitchells on Gen. Michael J. Dugan, which was judgment at a sensitive time.” There was Institutionally, airmen were thrown perhaps the most improper political little doubt, however, that part of the onto the defensive. Outspoken, Mitch- assault on an airman, or any other mili- problem was that Dugan had extolled ellesque advocacy became uncommon. tary figure, since the days of Mitchell. the singular capabilities of airpower. A sign of the times appeared in 1982, Dugan, a fighter pilot, became Chief of Dugan, unintentionally, had trod in the when USAF’s Air University Review Staff in July 1990. On Aug. 2, barely footsteps of Mitchell in asserting a claim published a controversial article by a month later, Iraq invaded Kuwait. that few understood or believed. Most USAF Lt. Col. Timothy E. Kline. The USAF forces rushed to the Persian Gulf galling, to some, was his suggestion title was, “Where Have All the Mitchells as President George H.W. Bush began that airpower could act independently Gone?” Kline lamented what he saw as preparations for defense of allies and of ground forces. Cheney slammed an expanding managerial culture within for a possible offensive against Iraqi Dugan for “demeaning the contributions the Air Force that, as he perceived it, was robbing the service of its special sense of mission. According to Kline, what the Air Force lacked was not Mitchell’s methods or flamboyance; it lacked his vision and his willing- ness to articulate it. “The Air Force,” wrote Kline, “desperately needs a new Mitchell—not to do battle with the Throughout the 1950s and establishment but to provide a vision 1960s, Air Force leaders such for airpower’s future.” as Gen. Curtis LeMay (pic- tured), Gen. Otto Weyland, and Inside or outside the service, it be- Gen. Nathan Twining spoke out came increasingly perilous to maintain forcefully about the merits and publicly that airpower had special value. unique capabilities of airpower A key point was reached in 1986 with for defending the nation. passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a law giving major new powers to the centralized “joint” establishment while sharply weakening the power of the military services. In 1990, the Air Force released its Global Reach-Global Power white paper, but Hallion, working for Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, recalled that “airmen seemed very reluctant to speak to the value of airpower in national defense.”

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 throughout the Air Force. Members of Congress weighed in with censorious DOD photo commentaries. Even years later, airmen and airpower backers would wince at the mention of McPeak’s remark. Somehow, McPeak—like Dugan before him—had traduced some iron law of jointness by accurately describing the capabilities of airpower in modern war.

Roughed Up In retrospect, it becomes clear that airpower’s success did not quiet the critics but only inflamed them. By the mid-1990s, it was open season on airpower, and the officers of other services were only too ready to rough up anyone speaking out for airpower. One of these was Army Col. Douglas Before the 1991 Gulf War, Gen. , Air Force Chief of Staff, correctly A. Macgregor, author of a widely cited told reporters that airpower could overwhelm the Iraqi forces and make Baghdad 1997 treatise on landpower reform titled the “cutting edge” of the upcoming offensive. Breaking the Phalanx. Toward the end of the book, Macgregor unfurled his hostility. “Today’s argument,” he wrote, of other services.” Army Gen. Colin Much later, after a full and rounded pre- “that things have now changed, that L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint sentation, a reporter asked McPeak: “Is precision strike and smart munitions Chiefs of Staff, was “particularly upset it conceivable that, by continuing the air have finally come into their own—aside by comments [suggesting] that the Air war alone for another period, the Iraqis from ringing with the same false hopes Force could win a war single-handedly,” would have been totally defeated without as the last 70 years of promises from wrote Michael R. Gordon and Bernard a ground war?” McPeak’s response was, airpower enthusiasts—is based on data E. Trainor in their Desert Storm book, “My private conviction is that this is the of very questionable reliability.” The Generals’ War. In reality, Dugan first time in history that a field army has It was a claim stated and restated never said anything of the sort. been defeated by airpower.” by ground-pounders and their amen Within months, the Gulf War had Though McPeak’s very next words chorus in the press and Congress. In amply vindicated Dugan, as American re-emphasized the joint nature of the 1998, Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles airpower dismantled Iraqi forces so victory, the political damage was done. D. Link summed up the problem for thoroughly that Army forces needed McPeak’s comment was widely pro- USAF leaders. “When a soldier talks only 100 hours to rout the pulverized claimed in the press as yet another about using airpower to support troops remnant and drive it from Kuwait. example of an “airpower über alles” on the ground, he’s applauded for his However, Washington’s nerve endings mentality that supposedly runs rampant ‘jointness,’ ” said Link. “When a sailor were still acutely sensitive to any claims of airpower dominance, as was soon made clear. On March 15, 1991, Pentagon spokes- man Pete Williams gathered reporters for a briefing by the new Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, about the performance of US airpower in the war. It turned out to be a prime example DOD photo TSgt.by Rose Reynolds of the Billy Mitchell Syndrome. (See “The Keeper File: McPeak on Desert Storm,” May 2004, p. 136.) McPeak described the war as “a suc- cess story for US and coalition air forc- es,” but then immediately emphasized the point that it was “a combined-arms operation in which all of the services made a very important contribution and, of course, all of our allies as well.” The Chief then told the reporters, “I hope you’ll forgive me, now, if I talk mostly Defense Secretary , flanked here by Air Force Col. Alton Whitley and about the air campaign for the rest of this Saudi Brig. Gen. Abdul Aziz Al-Sudairi, commander of Joint Forces , time, since that’s my piece of the thing.” promptly fired Dugan for his comments about airpower.

AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006 55 Hill with “books all tabbed and filled with figures and facts.” Then, said DOD photo Dougherty, “the first question [Brown] got from the committee was, ‘General, why do we need an Air Force?’ ” No one conceived that such a question would come up. Advocacy is an art advanced by many airmen, at many levels. It begins—as it Gen. Merrill McPeak (stand- did for Mitchell—with operations. The ing), Dugan’s successor, was dispatch of high-ranking air liaisons criticized in an event that is from the combined force air component now legendary in the annals of joint force political correct- commander to other components was ness. Asked late in a briefing if one major example. Begun informally airpower alone could have de- just prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, feated Iraq, McPeak said, “This the process is now a standard part is the first time in history that of combat airpower practice. It’s a field army has been defeated by airpower.” It was immediate- also classic Mitchell—airmen forg- ly forgotten that McPeak had ing relationships and making sure led off by extolling the joint joint commanders understood what nature of the victory. airpower could do. At command levels, it’s crucial. Turning battlespace achievement into joint wisdom and historical re- cord is another tough process. In the current armed forces, there is still a tendency to downplay the contributions of airpower, particularly in public settings. A case in point concerns the talks about using Air Force tankers to defense. The Washington Post’s William recent air strike that killed Abu Musab extend the range of naval aircraft, he’s M. Arkin, a frequent but not unfair critic al-Zarqawi, a top al Qaeda operative lauded for his ‘jointness.’ But when of the Air Force, picked up on the lack in Iraq. The ability to track and target an airman talks about using airpower of understanding of airpower. In a recent a terrorist so precisely stems from Air independently to kill the enemy instead Armed Forces Journal article, he mar- Force-led intelligence-surveillance- of putting our troops in harm’s way in veled at how Americans—including, ap- reconnaissance measures, choice of the first place, he’s being parochial and parently, Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, weapons, and development of tactics. ‘unjoint,’ which is now viewed as a sin head of US Central Command—had no While airmen were not the only ones on the order of adultery.” idea how effective airpower would be doing the work, it was surely an oc- Over the past 15 years, a succes- in Afghanistan. Arkin asked, “Could it casion for pride in what airpower can sion of Pentagon civilian leaders and be that Franks, CENTCOM, the Army, do, yet official Air Force comments high-ranking officers in the joint world and Washington all lack[ed] an appre- emphasized only teamwork, the collec- have turned jointness into something ciation of airpower’s potential and of tive nature of the fight, and so on. of a secular religion. Any claims of the service’s fundamental obedience No harm done, perhaps, so long as special military competency are reviled to precision?” the American public and officials are as “service-centric” and “unjoint.” fully aware of the value of air and space Because such charges have negative Why Do We Need One? power and are willing to support it, but political consequences, it is not sur- The advocacy vacuum has led highly too much modesty for too long could prising that unapologetic advocacy of placed elected officials to wonder why cause problems. Mitchell unabash- airpower hasn’t been heard as often the Air Force even exists. Retired Air edly—and unapologetically—shaped as in years past. (The rules, for some Force Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, for- the debate over airpower. Today, the reason, don’t seem to apply to ground mer head of , task is to do the same. Proper steward- power, sea power, and all other forms recounted the story of preparing Gen. ship of air and space power requires of military capability, which are advo- George S. Brown for 1973 hearings airmen not only to push the limits in cated openly and boisterously.) The on his nomination to become the Air combat but also to emphasize, publicly big debates on combat concepts and Force Chief of Staff. The staff, said and frequently, what is special and vital programs found airmen forced onto Dougherty, drilled Brown about cur- about air and space power. No one else the defensive or keeping quiet to avoid rent issues and sent him to Capitol can be counted on to do it. ■ being boxed in. Frequently, tamping down discussions about airpower was Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is president of tactically astute. IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for RAND, the Advocacy includes informing both Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Grant is a fellow national leaders and the public about of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public policy and research arm what airpower does. Lack of informa- of the Air Force Association. Her most recent article, “Are Airships for Real?” ap- tion inevitably distorts debate about peared in the November issue.

56 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2006