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The Syndrome:Analysis from the East-West Center Rising and Conflict with the West

YU BIN

ISSUES

Analysis from the East-West Center SUMMARY Seven years after the end of the Cold , China has yet to take its No. 27 May 1996 place in a number of international fora or have a summit with the United The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center in 1960 to States. For the Chinese, this is bitterly reminiscent of events after the First and foster mutual understanding and cooperation among the govern- Second World , when, despite their country’s contributions to victory, ments and peoples of the Asia Pacific region, including the United they were left out of the post-war deal making. Today, many in China States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government complain that the West ignored abuses under Mao in exchange for China’s with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, partnership against the Soviets, only to criticize and discard China when the corporations, and Asian and Pacific governments. was won. Current frustration is contributing to an intense debate The AsiaPacific Issues series contributes to the Center’s role as between nationalist and internationalist schools over how China should relate a neutral forum for discussion of issues of regional concern. The to the rest of the world. Few issues so feed this debate as that of ’s views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those future, and recent stirrings on that island and apparent shifts in U.S. policy Publishedof the Center. with the support of the Hawaii Pacific Rim Society have heightened China’s expression of a confrontational nationalism. With

U.S.-China relations fraying, Western interests would be best served by a genu-

ine policy of engagement. 2

Analysis from the East-West Center

On two early occasions in this century, China was be sure, the did insist on China’s be- disregarded in and excluded from the remaking of coming a permanent member of the United ’ the world order. The consequence was to fuel Chi- Security Council, but the United States believed that nese nationalism at home and to introduce regional the then weak Republic of China would be a pliable and global instability. That tragic pattern appears to client of Washington in its designs for the post-war be reappearing today, propelling China to behave in East Asian order. an assertive and troubling fashion. Despite China’s de facto alliance with the West Increasingly At the end of , the victorious Euro- during the Cold War, China today is not participat- pean democracies ignored China’s contribution to ing in the formation of a post-war order. It is not treated as an the allied cause. Despite the claims of Wilsonian present at some major post Cold War fora, such as outcast , democracy to champion the cause of national self- the meetings of the G-7 plus Russia. Nor is it al- China responds determination, the major powers transferred Ger- lowed to be a member of the New World Trade Or- with assertive many’s colonial holdings in China to Japanese con- ganization. Its leaders have neither been welcome to nationalism trol. The West rode roughshod over a weak and di- visit Washington nor has an American president vided China. While bringing an end to the fruits of journeyed to Beijing for seven years. While the Austrian and German in Eastern Eu- world appropriately recalled the Soviet sacrifices rope, creating such independent nations as Poland, against fascism during the fiftieth anniversary com- Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in response to the memorations of the end of World War II, the world yearnings of the peoples in those areas, the Western conveniently neglected the Chinese contribution. powers sought to retain the colonial order in Asia. The result of China’s being increasingly treated The impact of this policy on subsequent Chinese politically as an outcast nation, especially by the history was profound. The United States, is predictable: a rising tide of assertive stimulated the rise of Chinese nationalism and gave nationalism, a resort to obstructive behavior, and an birth to the . It turned intensifying debate in China over how to respond to the gaze of many patriotic Chinese nationalists away China’s situation at this historical turning point. from Western democracies, whose behavior at Versailles betrayed the trust many Chinese liberals Nationalists vs. Internationalists had placed in them, and toward the newly founded Chinese leaders are under growing pressure from the Soviet Union that promised a global end to imperial- more nationalistic sectors of both China’s intellectual ism. and foreign policy-making communities not to make The end of World War II saw a similar disregard further major concessions to the West. An emerging of Chinese interests. Though China bore the brunt assertive and confrontational nationalist sentiment of Japanese expansionism in Asia (the number of over the more entrenched internationalist view in Chinese who died from 1931 to 1945 as a direct re- China is increasingly evident, and is clear in a recent sult of the Japanese invasion is conservatively esti- survey of intellectual discussion in some influential mated at 35 million, more than perished in the So- journals. Their differences can be juxtaposed, as fol- viet Union as a result of German invasion) the future lows, with regard to several key issues concerning of China was decided at the Yalta conference with- how China should relate to the outside world:1 out Chinese participation. Stalin’s successful de- mand for Manchurian holdings in exchange for So- Internationalists. China’s earlier failure to “join the viet operations against the Japanese consolidated the world” hurt it, internationalists say, and the same Soviet position in the Far East four years before the mistake should not be made again. Chinese Communists came to power. Thus, in some Nature of the so-called globalization trend. The respects, the Soviet Union’s position in East Asia af- trend toward global interdependence will lead to a ter World War II was secured not through the rise of win-win situation. The faster, bigger, and more ac- the Chinese Communists but because of a policy of tive its participation in the existing international sys- the United States that ignored Chinese interests. To tem, the faster China will modernize. 3

Analysis from the East-West Center

Approach to the existing world trading system. game will be accepted depends not upon the quality China should have a deeper understanding of, adopt of the rules, but upon who has the most power. The a more active attitude toward, and aim at a higher West demands “free trade,” then ties trade with standard for the process of global interdependence. China to political issues. How then can China have If the country desires to eventually become a rule faith in a “free trade” system? Strong states do what maker in the global game, China must first become they will, while weak states do what they must. familiar with and accept the existing rules. This is China should not expect to be able to make accept- the only way to satisfy China’s nationalist feeling in able rules for the more powerful states. the next century. From a technical point of view, an export-ori- Role of the West and the United States. Cooperat- ented economic approach is by no means a universal ing and coexisting with the world system will be developmental strategy and is suitable only for small more beneficial for China in the long term. Past ef- countries. The sheer size of China’s economy cannot forts by both the former Soviet Union and China to be attached to nor accommodated by any existing create another system independent of the most com- economic systems. prehensive and most powerful capitalist one proved Role of the West and the United States. The to be either inefficient or disastrous. If China had United States is the dominant power in the current been a junior partner of the United States and international economic system, and it therefore con- boarded the “American ship” for a “free ride,” China trols the process, speed, and scope of China’s could have been much stronger today and, perhaps, globalization. What would be the result if the could have been today’s . United States, the rule maker of this international Role of Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism process, were not generous enough to make a set of appears to be harmful when viewed with a historical unbiased rules of the game? What if China learns perspective, and it is at least as dangerous and de- how to play the games more skillfully than the structive as the Western-centric imperialism that was United States? The United States has not necessarily strongly resented by Chinese scholars. China has a demonstrated that it has sufficient wisdom to preside rich legacy of extreme, xenophobic, and strident na- over a world ridden with regional, racial, and reli- tionalism; it would not be a blessing for China to gious conflicts. embark upon a chauvinistic road in the future. If Role of Chinese nationalism. Not all nationalism China genuinely aspires to peace and coprosperity is bad for China and the world at large, but only that with the world, the country should not view the de- which is at the extremes. What China needs is intel- velopment of world civilization from a narrow na- ligent and wise nationalism. A great nation cannot tionalistic perspective. be forever silent when it is repeatedly humiliated. That the Russian extreme nationalists won most Nationalists. The limits and potential harm, rather votes in the parliamentary election at the end of than the purported benefits, of globalization are em- 1993 demonstrates that if no enlightened (mingzhi phasized by the nationalists. de) nationalists come forward, the populace will have Nature of the so-called globalization trend. Glo- to accept the more extreme ones. Nationalism is a balization is an idealistic vision and an unrealistic fact of life, whether one likes it or not. It should be dream. There will be more and stronger barriers to guided, not simply suppressed. China’s unrequited love for the existing international system. Prudence and patience are recommended in Not just an intellectual discussion. The debate dealing with the West. Be alert! between internationalists and nationalists in China is Approach to the existing world trading system. by no means conclusive. And although both schools China should be cautious in approaching the exist- of thought view globalization, or interdependence, as ing global trading system which has been dominated the current and future trend in the world, they differ by Western powers whose interests are not necessar- strongly on its impact on China. Neither of the ily in line with those of China. Which rules of the schools views China’s and the Soviet Union’s past 4

Analysis from the East-West Center

attempts to create separate systems as alternatives to bility, therefore, will be paramount for the country participating in the existing international system, during the current and future transitions. but they are deeply divided over the question of how China should relate to the outside world. Although Forces Behind the Debate these different views represent scholarly opinions, Underlying the debate between the nationalists and their influence on China’s official policy should not internationalists is the profound sense of uncertainty be underestimated: many of these scholars are part in China’s thinking about its future. This sentiment of the policy-making community. Indeed, this was expressed recently by a journal with a strong internationalism-vs.-nationalism polemic is clearly An influential governmental and military background: book argued that influenced by, as well as influencing, the official policies of the PRC. Western interven- We are living in a time of dramatic change. Every- These issues are not being debated only among a thing in the future remains uncertain and awaits explora- tion in China few well-connected scholars. In a broader sense, tion. would be a China’s intellectuals, after a few years of inactivity We are still unclear what the world will be like after the collapse of the bipolar system which we dislike but “criminal act” following the 1989 crackdown, are becoming in- had grown accustomed to. What are the consequences of creasingly concerned about the future of the country the exhaustion of natural resources, deterioration of the and its relations with the outside world, particularly environments, and rapid growth of world population? in light of growing pressure from Washington. Can science, technology and the conscience of mankind ensure, with enough future resources, balance among the Perhaps nothing has been so widely and hotly economic, political, and spiritual development of man- discussed in the past year as a book entitled Looking kind? Will the beginning of the third millennium be the At China Through A Third Eye. Ostensibly written new start of human progress or a turning point from pros- by one Luo Yi Ning Ge Er,2 it is generally believed perity to decline? to be the work of a group of scholars and bureau- We are still unclear what the future of China will be crats. The book presents a highly pessimistic view of after its rapid social transformation. What regional and social interests will emerge and what new balance will be a host of current social, political, and economic is- achieved between them? Who will be our friends and our sues in China from a historical perspective. Al- enemies in the future world? Will our ancient civilization though the bulk of the book deals with domestic is- be able to generate new wisdom to free ourselves from sues—including boldly articulated assessments of decline and stand on our feet in the family of nations Mao, Deng, and current leaders—it opens and ends under the pressure of decreased resources, deteriorated environment and a growing population?3 with strong warnings to the West not to intervene in China’s internal affairs. Part of China’s current uneasiness is caused by on- According to the writer, such action against going profound changes within China. Rapid eco- China will fail at best, as was the case of the post- nomic growth and marketization have led to some 1989 sanctions; at worst, it will amount to a “crimi- serious unintended outcomes, including high infla- nal act,” in that China’s natural course of political tion, growing population and unemployment pres- and economic development will be set back indefi- sures, inequality and social unrest, corruption, and nitely. The author argues that Western interven- deterioration of the environment. tions, no matter how well intended and how care- The country is in the midst of its largest peace- fully executed, will be futile in a huge country bur- time social transformation and population migration dened with 800 million poorly educated peasants, (millions of people are moving from rural to urban historically immature intellectuals, and hopelessly and from north to south in seek of work). At the corrupt bureaucrats. Reform in such an environ- same time, the state is experiencing a considerable ment is not only difficult, but an extremely danger- decline in its extractive and regulatory abilities. In- ous experiment, the book asserts. No existing theo- deed, the ability of the state to penetrate society is ries and models, be they from the East or the West, now the weakest in the history of the People’s can solve China’s problems. Social and political sta- 5

Analysis from the East-West Center

Republic of China. These developments, among The United States and other Western powers have others, have created a dilemma for China: the need recently sold Taiwan large quantities of advanced to guide a rapidly changing society and the lack of weaponry, have upgraded their relations with the is- ability—perhaps even willingness—to do so. The land, and have been more willing to admit it into situation is compounded by the change of guard various international fora. The United States deci- from Deng’s Long-March generation to the younger sion in 1995 to allow Taiwan’s president to visit the technocrats whose capacity and vision for China’s fu- United States as a private citizen and the subsequent ture remain to be tested. passage of the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz through However, the current deep uneasiness within the the at the year’s end (the first such pas- country is, in the eyes of many Chinese elite, prima- sage since the 1978 normalization of relations) is rily caused by China’s relations with the outside viewed by Chinese as the first steps toward Wash- world, particularly with the Western powers led by ington’s reversing relations with Beijing and Taipei. the United States. They argue that the United States As a result, Taiwan is now seen as steadily and per- is unable to accept the rise of a major power whose haps permanently drifting away from the mainland, ascent it is not guiding; that the American goal may at the very time that China is the most stable and be to slow and even reverse China’s modernization. prosperous it has been in the past 150 years. All of After all, they say, America is pressuring China on this has occurred within months of the mainland’s many fronts at the very time the country is strug- starting to take a more pragmatic approach, begin- gling to accommodate a massive and rapid transfor- ning with conciliatory gestures toward Taiwan in mation from Maoist totalitarianism to more tolerant early 1995—gestures that were quickly reciprocated. authoritarian politics; from a centralized economy to Many Chinese question whether the real issue for a market-guided one; from a rigid control of society America is Taiwan independence or if Taiwan is sim- to an increasingly emergent and active population. ply being used as pressure point, a way to punish Many political and intellectual elite complain that China for its independence and assertiveness. the West largely ignored the worst human rights Though China’s behavior during the 1995-1996 record in China under Mao in exchange for China’s Taiwan Strait crisis may seem excessive, the United partnership against the Soviet threat. Then, after the States should not underestimate Chinese seriousness West “won” the Cold War, it simply discarded China and resolve. No government on the mainland, precisely when China’s human rights record was the whether communist or not, can afford an indepen- Some argue that best in PRC history. dent Taiwan. The reason is simple: Most Chinese, the United States These developments, along with American state- including most liberal-minded intellectuals, do not ments and action on a number of issues—trade and want to see Taiwan slip away from the mainland. cannot accept the Most-Favored-Nation status, ’s future, Loss of Chinese territory is something few are ready rise of a major weapons sales, nuclear testing, and prison product to accept: Taiwan still accuses the mainland of “sell- power whose exports (as well as China’s recent bids for the Olym- ing Outer Mongolia to Soviet communism” and ascent it is not pics and GATT membership)—are seen in Beijing as would certainly argue that is part of China. guiding by no means unrelated, if not carefully orchestrated, To some degree the Taiwan issue is one case in a efforts of the West to contain China. worldwide trend of continuous breakdown of cen- tralized authority. The world has fought against, The Taiwan issue. For many Chinese, what they throughout the twentieth century, the concentration believe to be the West’s fundamental, unspoken hos- of power in the hands of states and dictators. At the tility toward China is most apparent in the Taiwan end of the century, we are just beginning to learn issue. From Beijing’s view, a collision course is being that there is, and perhaps should be, a limit to the charted by an increasingly aggressive independence breakdown of authority in the name of freedom and movement in Taiwan, based on and facilitated by the self-determination. Such a trend has already led to local democratic process and assisted by outside serious problems, ranging from ungovernability to powers. 6

Analysis from the East-West Center

outright anarchy in places like Bosnia and the vast legal and judicial institutions; joint efforts to de- “near-abroad” area of Russia. Although freedom and velop more transparency in both domestic and in- self-determination are desirable, man may live with ternational business transactions; even training of order without liberty, but not with liberty without Chinese lawyers and law enforcement officers. Pro- order.4 motion of the local election process is another area that the two countries can work on together. An in- Responding To China creasing number of Chinese local officials are elected, and Westerners have been invited to advise How to respond to an increasingly assertive China? A policy of on these elections. Efforts such as these will help to If the rise of confrontational nationalism in China engagement eventually create a socio-political environment con- today is, as in the past, primarily fueled by unsatis- ducive to less arbitrary exercise of power, fewer cor- would promote factory relations with the West, then a policy of rupted officials, and, eventually, more responsive values Americans genuine engagement will be the most productive re- and more representative government. support while sponse. One area in which the United States and China acknowledging A policy of engagement would promote values are ready to work together is the environment. Rep- the American people can support, while acknowledg- Beijing’s concern resentatives from both countries met at the White ing Beijing’s concern about the need for domestic for stability House in April 1996, just weeks after U.S.-China stability. If the 1989 Beijing crackdown did not stop relations were severely strained over the issue of Tai- the social, economic, and political changes moving wan. The meetings were possible, said a U.S. offi- China away from Maoist totalitarianism, one can cial, because “the environment is a priority that su- reasonably expect that the country will continue to persedes those problems.” Whether or not China- depart from its past legacies. But patience is needed. U.S. cooperation on what is, after all, an essentially History shows repeatedly that it is possible to con- technical problem will contribute to improved un- vert, almost overnight, a weak democracy to a com- derstanding on such far thornier issues as human munist/authoritarian system and a free market rights and security remains to be seen. But produc- economy to a centralized one. The reverse is not nec- tive contact between the two countries on any issue essarily true. Building a stable democracy takes must be welcomed. time, as the historical progress of most Western de- mocracies did. The functioning of an effective mar- Keeping The Post-Cold War Peace ket requires both entrepreneurship and the rule of law, which cannot be developed by a “shock therapy” Fifty years ago, Washington chose to side with the approach. Chinese Nationalists, perceiving Chinese Commu- For example, instead of pressing Beijing to im- nists as communists first and Chinese second, de- prove its policy toward only a small number of po- spite the Communists’ repeated effort to gain U.S. litical activists, the United States and West could recognition and economic assistance. Later, Mao’s work with the Chinese to institutionalize the rule of reluctant lean toward the Soviet Union and the Ko- law. Though there are many laws and regulations in rean War froze bilateral relations for some 20 years China, the necessary effort to enforce them is often until Beijing and Washington found the Soviet lacking. One result is abuse of the people by public Union a common enemy. Once that enemy was officials. (Another result can be seen in the failure of gone, bilateral relations became strained again. To- the Chinese to enforce agreements between the day in China and the United States the feeling of United States and China on the issue of copyright novelty of the 1970s and the partnership of the infringement. In fact, the poor enforcement is 1980s have been replaced by skepticism and even mostly due to an inability of the government to en- animosity. Although the overall structure of the force the rules.) Sino-American relationship remains, and has even Working to institutionalize the rule of law could expanded to new areas from time to time, the trust mean more exchanges between Chinese and foreign that is essential for a stable relationship is being 7

Analysis from the East-West Center

steadily eroded to the point where what many Chi- Notes nese feel to be relatively minor issues can be easily For Washington 1For views of internationalism, see Li Shenzhi, “Cong blown out of proportion. Compromise and mutual Quanqiuhua Guandian kan Zhongguo de Xiandaihua Wenti” and Beijing, accommodation have proven to be still attainable, [The global viewpoint of China’s modernization], Zhanlue yu keeping the post- but only after hard bargaining and with considerable Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 1 (1994), pp. 5–6; “Quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo Wenhua” [Globalization and Cold War peace use by both sides of punitive measures instead of ], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], De- has proved more positive rewards. cember 1994), pp. 3–11; Wang Jisi, “Wenming Chongtulun Indeed, the relationship has oscillated between de Lilun Jichu yu Xianshi Yiyi” [An analysis of the theory of challenging than the clash of civilizations and its contemporary implications]; “friends” and “foes,” but has not been based upon a maintaining Feng Tianyu, “`Wenming Chongtu Juedinglun’ Bianxi” [On normal working relationship regarding some out- `the determinism of the clash of civilizations’”], in Zhongguo a Cold War standing international and bilateral issues. The re- Shehui Kexue Jikan [Chinese social sciences quarterly], No. 7 partnership (Spring 1994), p. 28 and pp. 42–43. cent deterioration of relations between China and For views of nationalism, see Shi Zhong, “Zhongguo the United States points to the urgency of a funda- Xiandaihua Mianlin de Tiaozhan” [Challenges facing China’s mental rethinking of the respective roles of Beijing modernization], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and manage- ment], No. 1 (1994), pp. 7–8; Liu Liqun, “Chukou and Washington in the post-Cold War world and Daoxiangxing Jingji Fazhan Moshi bu Shihe Zhongguo the nature of their bilateral relationship, instead of Guoqing” [Export-oriented mode of economic development allowing a free fall of an already fragile relationship. does not fit China’s national conditions], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 2 (1994), pp. 43–46. For Washington and Beijing, keeping the post-Cold 2 War peace has proved to be a more challenging mis- Luo Yi Ning Ge Er, Looking At China Through A Third Eye (Shan Xi People’s Publishing House, 1994). sion than maintaining a Cold War partnership. The 3Introduction to the journal Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and United States and China do not have to love one an- Management], No. 1, November 1993. other for a stable relationship, but they do need to 4Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies understand each other’s interests and culture. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 7–8. 5New York Times, April 30, 1996.

About this Publication Recent AsiaPacific Issues About the Author

The AsiaPacific Issues series reports on No. 21. “Memory Wars: The Politics of YU Bin is an assistant professor, Depart- topics of regional concern. The views Remembering the Asia-Pacific War” by ment of Political Science, at Wittenberg expressed are those of the author and not Geoffrey M. White, July 1995. University in Ohio, and a faculty associate in necessarily those of the Center. No. 22. “Indonesia in the 1990s: More than the East Asian Security Program at the Meets the Eye” by Adam Schwarz, July Mershon Center at Ohio State University. The contents of this paper may be 1995. From 1994 to 1995 he was a visiting fellow reproduced for personal use. If you would No. 23. “The Rise of Global Intellectual at the East-West Center. He has served as like to reprint, excerpt, or adapt the contents, Property Rights and Their Impact on Asia” president, Chinese Scholars of Political or for additional copies or other information, by Sumner J. La Croix, August 1995. Science and International Studies, Inc., please contact the Centerwide publications No. 24. “Sweeping Changes Shape a New (1992-1994) and as a research fellow, office, East-West Center, 1777 East-West Pacific Asia” by Richard W. Baker, Center for International Studies, State Road, Honolulu, Hawaii, 96848. September 1995. Council, China (1982-1985). His PhD in Telephone: (808) 944-7197 No. 25. “Chinese Women’s Lives: Rhetoric political science is from Stanford University. Facsimile: (808) 944-7376 and Reality” by Nancy E. Riley, November He is editor of the forthcoming Dynamics E-mail: [email protected] 1995. and Dilemma: , Taiwan, Series Editor: Elisa W. Johnston No. 26. “Nuclear Energy Thrives in Asia” by and Hong Kong in a Changing World Ronald E. Hagen, November 1995. (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.) Telephone: (513) 327-6106