9 IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin JULY 2010

Nonetheless, as the CPLP remains stead of their current painfully slow, CPLP and focused on a language-only associa- bureaucratic, top-only approach pro- tion, the benefits of this organization ducing meager results, governments the politics of will soon start to wane, as some of its would have fewer responsibilities in members continue to grow – espe- the process of integration while the language cially Angola and Brazil. benefits for each civil society would Brazil has long been focused on itself, be enormous. Organizing quarterly on enhancing its position in the world, meetings of ministers, municipalities, Vasco Martins and consequently is not worried about NGOs, national companies and small Researcher, IPRIS cooperation with other Lusophone business should be the key priority for countries. Angola is also becoming less the coming years, now with Angola interested in doing so, especially when leading in the CPLP. The VIII Summit of the Heads of State countries outside the CPLP continue to Although small in size and impact, and Government of the Community nurture its economic development with there have already been such initia- of Portuguese Speaking Countries immense quantities of foreign invest- tives in the past. Most recently, the (CPLP) hosted this July in Angola, ment. As for Portugal, had it invested Portuguese Hospital of the Univer- failed yet again to reach tangible, as much in the CPLP as it did in the EU sity of Coimbra has made deals to concrete results. The CPLP is an in- and NATO, its presence in world affairs help assist the Angolan Hospital of ternational organization of countries would be much more active and impor- Lubango in fighting rare diseases, an who share a common language, Por- tant than what it is today. effort largely implemented by First- tuguese. Sharing a language under- Nevertheless, Portugal has one of Lady Maria Cavaco Silva. Hence the pins a common tie, an intense his- the very last chances to deepen co- political stratum shows it is already torical background, a sense of natural operation with its CPLP partners. aware of the possibilities of city-to- courtesy and interest. However, lan- Despite having lost substantial influ- city partnership and assistance. guage is indubitably not enough if the ence, mainly due to its association Yet promoting civil society exchanges CPLP, and especially Portugal, desire with the EU, Portugal is still by far the requires certain policies which are to keep this relationship special and most developed country in the entire crucial for successful interaction. sustain the advantages it entails. Lusophone organization. Its systems Specific conditions for business must An international organization whose of health, education, communication, be met, ideally based on EU stan- members attempt to cooperate in sports, media, technology, education dards, such as denouncing corruption different spheres but is solely under- and culture must be allowed to par- and reviewing tariffs on trade of goods pinned by a common language will ticipate directly if the CPLP is to thrive and services. Moreover, visa facilita- not thrive in the future. Other similar in the coming future. tion is the one instrument all mem- institutions like the Commonwealth Portugal must propose the creation bers must agree on, as it not only fa- of Nations, although created around of a committee to coordinate and cilitates business but also promotes a common language, have broadened promote cooperation and exchange cultural awareness. Another point of their area of responsibility by includ- at the grassroots level between the interest would be to have privileged ing free trade and environmental is- civil societies of each CPLP member. student exchange programs, target- sues into their framework of action. By allowing a bottom-up approach in- ing all areas of higher education. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 2

Hence, the only option available to keep Even during the global financial crisis, ects, turning defunct what was for a the CPLP breathing is to promote ex- Brazil’s economy was irrepressible. time the world’s third-largest trade change and collaboration between Among the BRIC, only Brazil’s stock bloc. Now Brazil lacks for member- different societies. This would give an exchange experienced a milder de- ship in significant trade agreements. entirely new meaning to the word Luso- cline than the S&P 500. Not only was A study by the Inter-American Devel- phone and to the balance between lan- Brazil the first LatinA merican country opment Bank notes that Brazil is “far guage and foreign policy. Shifting from to exit recession last year, but accord- less equipped” than countries such this language-centric stance towards ing to a report recently published by as Mexico and Canada to capitalize economic, business, political and social the World Bank, its growth in 2010 is on the “global value chains” that free collaboration and participation, with expected to be a “particularly robust” trade agreements deliver, and which civil society at the center, is the em- 6.4%, well ahead of the Central Bank’s the bank identifies as a key determi- powerment Portuguese language and forecast of 5% just a few months ago. nant of stable growth for countries in the CPLP need to create a comfortable, What then, could be wrong? Brazil’s the years ahead. win-win situation to all of its members. growth appears assured for the next Chiding rich nations, especially the Failing to do so will result in the drift- few years, largely thanks to ongoing United States, to “stop the hypocrisy” ing away and loss of interest of its most Chinese demand for Brazilian com- regarding free trade won President promising members. modities. But Lula da Silva, for all his Lula da Silva tremendous support Portugal has much to lose if it does not policy successes, has failed to craft over the years, both within Brazil and play its cards right. Whatever prefer- an effective trade policy for Brazil. throughout the developing world. ence CPLP members might have for Coming in to office in 2003, Lula da When it comes to agricultural prod- working together is waning due to lack Silva inherited an economy poised for ucts in particular, Washington has a of attention and interest, big foreign in- growth, in part because of the dramat- habit of not practicing what it preach- vestment and a larger capacity for eco- ic reduction in tariffs enacted during es by insisting on subsidies to cotton nomic intervention by other countries. the 1990s. He soon oversaw a foreign farmers that prevent Brazilian cotton The creation of a legally binding com- policy of “autonomy through diver- from being competitive in the United mittee of interaction between peoples sification”. Unlike other nations that States, high tariffs on Brazilian etha- is the only option to lift the CPLP from sought to develop by tethering them- nol, orange juice, and other goods. the quagmire it is sinking into. Portu- selves – economically and politically – But America is not the only one going gal, as a historical leader and western to the United States or EU, Brazil would out of its way to protect domestic in- country, must propose a substantial avoid excessive reliance on one or two dustry – Brazil is also guilty. resurrection by firstly understanding foreign partners. Brazil curried ties On average Brazil’s tariffs stagnated that language alone is not enough to with a medley of African, Asian, and over the last decade, whereas most bind peoples in years to come. Middle Eastern nations. The strategy nations reduced theirs. As a result, has worked wonders for Brazil’s “soft Brazil’s average tariff rates are among power,” helping it become a powerful the highest of any nation in the West- voice in the dialogue between devel- ern Hemisphere. Brazil’s tariff rates oped and developing nations. have not just marked time, but in some Brazil: The need But it has been less of a winner in cases they have gone up. For example, securing Brazil’s economic future. tariffs on shoes and clothes were al- for trade reform In ferreting out new partners, Brazil lowed to creep up during Lula da Sil- passed up an opportunity to deepen va’s first term, reaching 35% in 2007. trade bonds with its neighbors, and The real problem with this is not that Sean Goforth other major trade partners. “Auton- Brazil’s neighbors have lower tariffs, it Professor, Coastal Carolina University omy through diversification” came to is that high tariffs nurture low worker be equated with shunning bilateral productivity, which spells a loss of Bra- President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva trade deals with the United States zilian competitiveness to East Asian has presided over an era of impres- and EU. And in an indication of what manufacturers in the long-term. sive advances in Brazil. As a general The Economist recently dubbed Lula Though it can be hard for politicians to illustration: GDP growth averaged da Silva’s “soft spot for leftist strong- tinker with an economy that is not evi- over 4% from 2005 to 2008, compared men”, President Lula da Silva backed dently broke, Lula da Silva’s successor to just under 2% from 2001 to 2004; Venezuela’s full membership into will need to address trade reform. Poli- meanwhile, more than twenty mil- Mercosur in 2005. Absent a strong cymakers should impress that Brazil’s lion people emerged from poverty commitment by Brazil, Hugo Chávez recent fortunes owe to a generally per- between 2003 and 2008. More specific quickly tried to recast Mercosur as missive global economy. Things may examples abound. one of his anti-American pet proj- not always be so easy. Tackling trade IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 3

reform will help to lock in and optimize homed Rafique, director general of ment agenda”. This rhetoric has been the benefits of free trade that Brazil has the Center for Investment Promotion backed up by Coal India Limited’s re- enjoyed over much of the last decade. (CPI) in Maputo, Indian investments cent purchase of mining rights for two may soon top US$1 billion. While this coal blocks in Mozambique. In addi- estimate may be overly optimistic, the tion to these investments in the coal Indian government and Indian busi- sector, India’s Bharat PetroResources nesses are eager to forge stronger is looking to import natural gas from Mozambique: ties with Mozambique as they seek to Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin, which, fuel their country’s growth and feed with 8-10 trillion cubic feet of gas is Can Indian its hunger for resources. considered one of the largest of re- Until recently, while India has been cent gas discoveries. one of the leading exporters of iron While India does appear to be get- investments and steel, machinery, and pharmaceu- ting the better end of the bargain in tical products to Mozambique, it has its relationship with Mozambique, promote received in return mainly agricultural it has also been active in helping to products, specifically cashew nuts and promote development in the African growth for both cotton. However, this is beginning to country. Since 2003, India has pro- change as Mozambique’s previously vided over US$115 million to Mozam- countries? untapped mineral wealth is being dis- bique in credit, with the recent addi- covered and exploited. Mozambique’s tion of a US$25 million credit line to Kai Thaler economy has managed to continue to help promote rural electrification. Affiliated Researcher, IPRIS grow despite the global economic cri- Krishna also announced the provision sis, expanding 9.5% in the first quar- of a US$5 million grant for the devel- ter of 2010, due mainly to exports opment of the education and health As the balance of world power shifts of aluminum produced at the Mozal sectors in Mozambique. eastward, most international attention smelter outside Maputo and exports of Security ties were also discussed has focused on the rise of China as a titanium ore. India’s Tata Steel is also during Krishna’s visit, with aims at diplomatic, economic, and, potentially, reportedly interested in new invest- safeguarding trade between India and military counterbalance to the tradi- ments in Mozambican mines as part of Mozambique and combating piracy in tional powers of Europe and the United its current restructuring of mining and the Indian Ocean. The military rela- States. However, India, China’s partner production operations. tionship between the countries does among the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India- The greatest potential for growth, have potential for growth, but funda- China) group of countries has its own however, lies in the energy sector. mentally, the priority remains trade. grand ambitions for the expansion of Mozambique has for many years been Rafique presented Mozambique as influence and exploitation of resources, an exporter of electricity thanks to the offering India a gateway to the mar- leading it to a similar strategy of seek- Cahora Bassa damn, but its wealth of kets of the other Southern African ing development opportunities in Afri- fossil fuels is just now beginning to Development Community (SADC) ca. In early July, Indian External Affairs be tapped. India is most interested countries, while Krishna stated that Minister S.M. Krishna, accompanied by in exploiting Mozambique’s coal re- “The present level of trade doesn’t re- 26 businessmen, made his first visit to serves. During External Affairs Min- flect the potential, and thus we would Africa since taking office over a year ister Krishna’s visit, he stated that like to have greater strategic partner- ago, visiting Mauritius and Mozam- “Greater cooperation between the ships with Mozambique”. Discussions bique to discuss trade relations and two countries in the energy sector, are already under way for President geostrategic concerns. Krishna’s trip particularly with respect to coal, is Guebuza to pay a visit to Indian Prime marked the first bilateral visit to Mapu- very important”. Toward this end, he Minister Manmohan Singh in the near to by an Indian foreign minister in many announced an Indian grant of US$40 future, so further trade agreements decades, and was highlighted by meet- million to set up mining education are likely soon. ings with President Armando Guebuza organizations under the auspices of Indian investment can help Mozam- and Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi. the state-run Coal India Limited to bique in its development process India has been growing into a steadily train Mozambicans in coal explora- and in building further political ties more important trading partner for tion and extraction. Krishna said, abroad. However, the government of Mozambique, now registering among “Mozambique has been blessed with Mozambique must be cautious and the top five by value.I ndia also invest- very rich coal resources and for India, steadfast in ensuring that only the ed over US$500 million in Mozam- which is growing at 8% every year, en- natural resources, and not the coun- bique in 2009, and according to Ma- ergy becomes critical in our develop- try itself, are exploited. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 4

Timor Leste: The ongoing struggle for a balanced foreign policy

Pedro Seabra Researcher, IPRIS

Having apparently overcome some of the internal strife Despite this righteous commitment made by the in- that scarred its nation-building process in 2006 and in ternational community, certain foreign hurdles still 2008, Timor Leste now appears to experience a period of threatened to taint prospects of internal and regional relative political stability and social order, despite sever- stability. Right from the start, relations with Indonesia al past and unresolved issues still looming in the horizon. were key: after more than two decades under their au- Nevertheless, in this relatively steady context and for the thoritarian rule and the tumultuous and violent seces- past couple of months, Timor Leste has increasingly be- sion process, Timor Leste now faced the crude reality come more vocal on a range of topics that could bring of a necessary working bilateral relationship with its about significant implications regarding the country’s former ruler if it was ever going to succeed, both inter- foreign agenda. This could possibly indicate there exists nally and externally. the political will to enhance and/or diversify the country’s Realizing this difficult situation and in the interest of role in the regional scene, with unpredictable results. state survival, Timorese authorities – including its most Accordingly, this article will start by attempting to under- prominent independence leaders, such as José Alex- stand the current context of Timor Leste’s foreign policy, andre ‘Xanana’ Gusmão, José Ramos-Horta and Marí identifying its main external partners and goals since it Alkatiri – opted to normalize ties with Indonesia.2 At officially joined the international community, with a natu- the top of their mutual agenda, human rights violations ral focus on four actors: Australia, China, Indonesia and perpetrated by the Indonesian military in 1999 were the Portugal. It will then be followed by a comprehensive ex- most sensitive issue. But through the establishment of position of the latest episodes regarding Timor Leste’s a bilateral Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) in newfound bravado, and by a prospective analysis high- 2005, the respective authorities sought to turn a page in lighting the country’s options in the middle term. Conclu- their troubled common history. Recommendations for a sions will then be drawn regarding Timor Leste’s current full reconciliation between both parts soon followed. regional stance and the road ahead. On the other hand, constant visits by the highest au- thorities of both countries were also a sign of bilateral goodwill. For example, the visit by current Indonesian Starting from zero President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2005 to the Santa Cruz Cemetery– where in 1991 dozens of protest- After the post-referendum destructive violence of 1999 ers were shot and killed by Indonesian troops – gave subsided, the UN multinational forces were suddenly in added symbolism to the desirable reinforcement of ties charge of a massive nation-building program seeking to between both parts.3 create the institutions necessary for a viable state – de- Furthermore, Indonesia’s fear of having Timor Leste spite common belief that international assistance would become a launching pad for extra-regional powers was be needed for years to come.1 also appeased when the government declared their in- tention to seek full membership of the Association of

1 T he United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11th, 1999, to organize the national referendum, followed the UN-authorized 2 Xanana Gusmão became President in 2002, having stepped down in 2007 to run peacekeeping mission International Force East Timor (INTERFET) deployed on for Prime Minister, and currently holding that position. José Ramos-Horta held September 20th, 1999, to restore local order. On October 25th, 1999, the United the Foreign Ministry until 2006, when he briefly assumed the office of Prime Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) was established. On Minister, followed by the Presidency in 2007, still ongoing. Mari Alkatiri was the May 17th, 2002, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) first Prime Minister, until his resignation in 2006. replaced it. 3 “Yudhoyono prays at site of Dili massacre” (Associated Press, 9 April 2005). IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 5

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed, this demon- of which are still presently stationed in Timor Leste, strated Timor Leste’s willingness to participate in the working alongside a small policing force collaborating region’s leading integration process, potentially open- closely with the UN. ing new relations with vibrant and prosperous econo- On the other hand, Portugal also has a special bond mies as well as contributing to neighborly stability. with Timor Leste. Since the Indonesian invasion of Nonetheless, such goals have been limited to a mere 1975, Portugal has always fought for the Timorese observing status since 2002, due to some members’ cause – although at different paces – and became a de- doubts. Burma in particular, keeps blocking its bid, es- cisive actor during the referendum and independence sentially due to Timor Leste’s public support of Aung process. Indeed, during the roll of UN-led operations, San Suu Kyi as Burma’s rightful leader and its ongo- Portugal consistently stood as the second highest con- ing criticism of the military regime. The membership tributor of troops on the ground. And similarly to Aus- to the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2005 ended up being tralia, when violence erupted in 2006 Portugal joined a consolation prize, while the country waits for further the International Stabilization Force (ISF) with 120 developments on this front. gendarmes, reaching a present But while Indonesia and total force of 198. Furthermore, ASEAN are crucial to Timor Timor Leste has Portugal has also maintained Leste’s security and political its international commitments, stability, its other predomi- increasingly become having disbursed more than nant neighbor, Australia, is €400 million in aid from 1999 to also granted equal attention more vocal on a range 2006 and continuing to support and focus. Given its contri- the teaching of the Portuguese bution to the independence of topics that could language throughout the coun- process – through the lead- bring about significant try.4 ership of the Interfet forces Albeit with significantly lower – and the geographic prox- implications regarding amounts – when compared to imity between the two coun- Western donors – China has tries, Australia has come to the country’s foreign also increasingly positioned regard Timor Leste as within itself as a reliable aid partner its natural sphere of influ- agenda. This could for Timor Leste. The construc- ence, which has occasionally tion of the presidential pal- tensed up their relationship. possibly indicate there ace, the Foreign Ministry, the One particularly difficult -is exists the political will to vast complex of the Ministry sue concerns the exploration of Defense and Security or the of the vast natural resources enhance and/or diversify headquarters of Timor Leste’s lying beneath the Timor Sea Defense Forces (F-FDTL), are and regulated by the Timor the country’s role in the just a few visible examples of Gap Treaty of 1991 between Chinese presence in the coun- Australia and Indonesia – the regional scene, with try. Coupled with scholarships latter having been replaced and training programs for civil by the newly independent unpredictable results. servants – and bearing in mind Timor Leste as a contracting it was the first country to offi- part in 2002. But although an agreement was possible cially recognize Timor Leste’s independence – it is pos- regarding the sharing of the proceeds from the Joint sible to acknowledge that China is sending a very public Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), the same can- message regarding the seriousness of strengthening not be said about the sovereignty and definite maritime bilateral ties with this South-Eastern nation. boundaries between the two countries. An agreement Finally and although on a different scale, it is also has simply been postponed in the name of the likely worth mentioning the European Union (EU), the US and revenues that both parts can withdraw for the time be- Japan (all major contributing donors), as well as Ma- ing. laysia and New Zealand (who have actively participated Additionally, beyond the significant amount of devel- in preserving Timor Leste’s security) as Timor Leste’s opment aid in the last few years, Australia also still other relevant foreign partners. continues to play a decisive role in Timor Leste’s in- ternal security. In the wake of the 2006 crisis, peace- 4 T he current Indication Cooperation Program for the 2007-2010 period keepers were once again needed to pacify the country comprises €60 million essentially channelled to three areas: Good Governance, and Australia promptly contributed with 1,000 men, 650 Participation and Democracy; Sustainable Development and Fight Against Poverty; Cooperation Cluster. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 6

Increasingly vocal Amidst all this, the Australian government itself was not exempt from criticism. Canberra was accused of not Getting over the 2006 riots and the 2008 assassination at- twisting the arm of one of its flagship companies harder tempts on both José Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmão in the pursuit of a mutually beneficial solution. Indeed, has not been an easy task for the Timorese leadership, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão took the opportunity to but 2010 appeared to hold a new year of relative stabil- dig deep into the past and escalated his rhetoric even ity and consolidation of state structures. Accordingly, it further when, during an international donors’ conference came as a surprise when local authorities began resort- in April, he accused Australia of sacrificing the lives of ing to a noisy external approach, inevitably making waves 60,000 Timorese in World War II and secretly plotting for among Timor Leste’s neighbors in the process. Indonesia to take over what was then Portuguese Timor The most striking situation is that of relations with Aus- in 1963.7 tralia, with a string of episodes straining existing ties. But if the strained relationship was already rocky at best, Firstly, both countries’ attentions are essentially focused the recent change in leadership in the Australian govern- on the Timor Sea, more precisely on its Greater Sunrise ment brought about another difficult topic for both coun- block, with oil and natural gas reserves estimated at 5.13 tries. Indeed, among new Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s trillion cubic feet and 226 policy guidelines, the possibili- million barrels respectively. ty of building an “asylum-seek- Unlike the remaining area – China has increasingly er processing center” in Timor regulated by the Timor Sea Leste immediately sprung a Treaty of 2002 – this par- positioned itself as a reliable row of infuriating declarations. ticular section is under the aid partner for Timor Leste. For his part, Deputy Prime Sunrise International Unit- Minister Mário Carrascalão ization Agreement (Sun- The construction of the promptly declared Díli was no- rise IUA) and the Treaty on body’s “puppet”.8 The fact that Certain Maritime Arrange- presidential palace, the Gillard only initially disclosed ments in the Timor Sea her intentions to President Ra- (CMATS), both ratified in Foreign Ministry, the vast mos-Horta and not to Xanana 2007. These treaties state Gusmão’s cabinet, who holds that any eventual revenues complex of the Ministry of the real authority, also did not are to be shared 50/50 be- Defense and Security or help make her case. tween Timor Leste and Amid such disputes, another Australia.5 To that end, a the headquarters of Timor episode quickly got media at- joint-venture consortium – tention for its alleged geostra- led by Australian Woodside Leste’s Defense Forces tegic implications. On May 20th Petroleum Inc. – was prop- Timor Leste finally received erly formed to expedite the (F-FDTL), are just a few the two Chinese Shanghai III planning and subsequent patrol boats – designed in the extraction of the natural re- visible examples of Chinese 1960s and equipped with 30- sources. presence in the country. millimeter cannons – bought However, in January 2010 two years ago through a every intended plan went US$28 million contract with off track when Woodside disclosed its intention to build Poly Technologies, a defense company with close links a floating platform in order to pipe liquefied natural to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Officially, they gas (LNG) to an existing plant in Darwin. Timor Leste’s are needed to fight the illegal fishery activities in the government bluntly opposed this idea, it would rather country’s exclusive economic zone – which is depriving a new structure be built on its coastline. In their favor, the state of an estimated US$45 million a year in rev- Timorese officials pointed out the country’s 30% unem- enues – and to provide some assistance in securing the ployment rate and the economic activities and inherent 870 kilometers coastline against smuggling and drug social benefits an onshore solution would mean, while at trafficking. Indeed, seeking to fix Timor Leste’s lacking the same time branding the Woodside project as “tech- naval capabilities, Portugal had already donated two ag- nologically untested” and as having “an unacceptable level of arrogance”.6 Press, 30 April 2010). 7 Lindsay Murdoch, “Gusmao lashes Australia for duplicity” (Sydney Morning 5 However, it did not establish any local seabed boundary, whose definition was Herald, 9 April 2010). then postponed until the treaties’ expiration in 50 years. 8 “E. Timor deputy PM rejects Australian asylum fix” (Agence France-Press, 14 6 Xavier la Canna, “East Timor may derail Woodside project” (Australian Associated July 2010). IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 7

ing Albratoz-class patrolling vessels, armed with 20-mil- look at these recent clashes might cast some worrisome limeter cannons in 2002, although the growing need for doubts on most innocuous views. repairs and the US$500 thousand a year required to keep The case for the Greater Sunrise exploration is the most the boats running may have played a part in convincing pressing. Indeed, if a development plan is not approved the country to renew its forces. Nevertheless, the fact by February 2013, or if extraction does not take place by that such vessels are apparently ill-suited for the tropical 2017, then either Australia or Timor Leste can cancel the climate and rough conditions common in the Timor Sea, existing arrangements, meaning that Sunrise develop- combined with the presence of a Chinese crew to man ment would be suspended indefinitely until a new treaty the boats – while the Timorese counterparts are trained was in place. – results in doing little to prevent regional fears and dis- Currently, it is almost unanimous that the 2007 agree- trust of China’s influence in what is generally considered ments were forced upon the Timorese leadership by the as Australia’s natural turf.9 Howard government – who alleg- But apparently, Timor Leste is edly threatened to withhold aid not afraid of picking new fights, Portuguese authorities flows to Timor Leste. But ulti- even with actors who originally mately, Timor Leste’s consent will trusted in the country’s viabil- must be wondering always be required and as further ity against all odds. The latest proof of its resolve, reports have example concerns the situa- if conditions on the surfaced regarding the ausculta- tion of Timor Telecom (TT) – the tion of other potential interested majority of which is held by ground are finally companies – like Malaysian Petro- Portuguese Portugal Telecom ripe for a low-profile nas – that could further interfere (PT) – who in 2002, despite post- with the quick settlement of this independence instability on the withdrawal of their dispute. Although the Timorese ground, took the risk of invest- government is consistently and ing in the burgeoning nation, in National Republican publicly presenting its case as return for a monopoly on local ‘David/impoverished nation vs. telecommunications for fifteen Guard (GNR). As local Goliath/ruthless Australian mega- years. Accordingly, markets corporation’, it needs to be aware were caught off guard when on stability endures, of the risks surrounding the po- May 15th – seven years before the the mistreatment of tentially unfriendly business atti- contract expires – Vice-Prime tude this could originate. Indeed, Minister José Luis Guterres an- Portuguese investors the tense relationship – to say the nounced that the sector would least – with Woodside, and more be suddenly liberalized by the – such as Portugal recently with Portugal Telecom, end of the year or at beginning may prove to be counterproductive of 2011.10 Timor Telecom’s stra- Telecom – will only in achieving the necessary amount tegic plan of investments having of foreign investment the country been disclosed six months prior make such decision so desperately needs. to this news, it is thus considered more likely to arrive Likewise, accusations of bullying to be on hold, waiting for further towards Australia are also likely to official clarification. sooner than later. bear little fruit.11 As the recogniz- able preponderant actor in the re- gion, Australia is bound to assume What lies ahead? an overreaching and overprotective attitude regarding its closest neighbors, of which Timor Leste is an unavoidable With so many ‘combat fronts’, one is left to wonder if element – indeed, its security, stability and cohesion have these latest episodes are in some way connected to an already been upgraded to a national strategic interest by alleged grand design in the regional scenario or if they the Australian defense policy.12 If Timor Leste truly desires are only part of a natural process of the nation’s asser- an equal and effective working relationship with Australia tiveness as a truly independent country, and in that way – as it should – overcoming the usual inflammable rheto- essentially harmless in the long run. However, a closer ric might prove to be a useful and meaningful step.

9 For more on China and Timor Leste’s relations see Nuno Canas Mendes, “The Dragon and the Crocodile: Chinese Interests in East Timor” (Portuguese Journal 11 José Belo, “Proud Timorese are fed up with Canberra’s bullying” (National of International Affairs, No. 1, Spring 2009): 3-11. Times, 15 June 2010). 10 “East Timor government to liberalise telecommunications by start of 2011” 12 See “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030” (Defense (Macauhub, 12 May 2010). White Paper 2009). IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 8

However, both countries and the remaining international ture Timor Leste foreign policy scenario, whatever it may community will inevitably bump heads when it comes to be. Initially, its overwhelming approach was mainly un- Timor Leste’s military needs. Bottom line, the ongoing derstood as a preemptive measure against any possible presence of an international military force appears to Taiwanese influence, but nowadays it is viewed within a contradict the excessively ambitious goals the Timorese larger strategy of insertion in the remaining Portuguese- authorities have set forward for their own military, pro- speaking countries and consolidation of influence in posed in the 2007 defense blueprint Force 2020 Re- Southeast Asia. Although it will try to remain under the port. The unrealistic self-declared need for 3000-strong radar, China’s investments and aid – military, not exclud- armed forces backed by a national conscription process ed – will not stop rising and for its part Timor Leste will and missile-equipped warships – to which the recent pur- most certainly be too willing to receive it. At the end of chase of the Chinese vessels is only considered the latest the day and if anything, these growing ties and the public addition – is enough to leave the international community perception they imply will be increasingly and skillfully wondering about the actual security apparatus the coun- used by the Timorese authorities whenever a neighborly try requires. As justified as Timor Leste is in providing dispute arises, especially with regionally-sensitive Aus- for its national defense, the exaggerated plans and the tralia. apparent political will to pursue them – despite the lack of official approval by the Timorese Parliament – might, in a short-term scenario, compel international forces to Conclusion begin pulling out or at least reduce their presence, like New Zealand did last May. Ultimately, the aforementioned examples showcase an The next in line could very well be Portugal. Given the underlying problem for every small state. Indeed, it is long duration of the country’s commitment to the devel- not uncommon that instead of a long-term foreign policy opment of Timor Leste, Portuguese authorities must be strategy, such states – frequently “new” or “weak”, al- wondering if conditions on the ground are finally ripe for beit not “failed” yet – focus on “intensive bursts of crisis a low-profile withdrawal of their National Republican management”.15 Their ultimate goal consists of search- Guard (GNR). As local stability endures, the mistreat- ing for a neutral status, an alliance with a greater power ment of its investors will only make such decision more or an emphasis on collective security. In Timor Leste’s likely to arrive sooner than later. case, this is not quite so clear, as growing voices point to Within its Southeastern strategy, Timor Leste is also in- an increased detachment from previous positions, seek- creasingly setting its sights on Thailand and the Philip- ing to exhibit an autonomy that the predominant players pines, as potential players in the region, in the hopes of in the region are simply not used to. gaining support for its ASEAN accession. Nevertheless, Still, recent political choices only further reinforce a gen- such a goal is almost certain to be postponed beyond eral perception of persistent disarray within the Timorese 2012, as President Ramos-Horta himself recognized leadership, regarding its foreign positioning and relation- the difficulties in adapting and harmonizing the neces- ship with crucial actors – both instrumental to its inde- sary legislation, inherent to any integration project. Even pendence and vital to its future. so, Burma will probably still remain a blocking force by Arguing that such apparent need for greater emancipa- then. tion is inherent to any state’s growing maturity is un- Reversely, the necessary cohabitation with Indonesia derstandable. However, the fact is that the country still in the island of Timor never looked more feasible. De- remains on the one hand overwhelming dependent on spite the ongoing border disputes and the situation in the foreign aid and assistance from the international com- Oecusse enclave, both countries seem keen on working munity, and on the other deeply intertwined with the fate around it.13 However, despite the clear political will to of the forced/necessary cohabitation with Indonesia and move forward, previous human rights violations are likely Australia. to hover over both parties for the time being as the issue Therefore it is unconceivable that Timor Leste not take still splits civil society and the international community into consideration these important variables. Its leader- in two, calling for either a general amnesty or an interna- ship cannot ignore the trail of confusion and distrust it tional tribunal as a way to finally put the past to rest. 14 is building and leaving behind, and accordingly a careful On the other hand, China is set for a major role in any fu- evaluation of the country’s agenda is needed to prevent any further damage.

13 See “Timor Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border” (International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 104, 20 May 2010). 14 S seeee Paulo Gorjão, ““timorTimor Leste: A ann amnesty is needed once and for all” (IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin, No. 1, November 2009): 4-5. See also “Timor Leste: International Criminal Court: Justice in the shadow” (Amnesty 15 A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������nthony Smith, “Constraints and Choices: East Timor as Foreign Policy Actor” International, 28 June 2010). (New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2005): 15-36. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 9

Timeline of Events

7 July (Luanda): of Luanda (FILDA) and on the eve of the CPLP’s Angola Chinese director general of the Department for VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government African and Asian Trade Xie Yajing visited Luan- that commercial exchanges between Portugal 1 July (Cabinda): da and met with Carlos Maria Feijó, Civil House and Angola reached €2 billion in 2009, and are Deep divisions within Cabinda’s FLEC – Frente Chief for the Presidency and State Minister. centered around finance, civil construction, de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda – were made Yajing declared that the two countries would public works and trade. public. Its historic leader, Nzita Tiago, currently extend their areas of cooperation to include in- exiled in Paris, was excluded from the move- dustry, agriculture and agro-industry. 15 July (Luanda): ment’s presidency by the auto-proclaimed Angolan ambassador to Mozambique Garcia Alto Comando das Forças Armadas Cabindesas 7-8 July (Pretoria): Brites pointed out, in a interview to the Novo Jor- Unidas. Tiago dismissed such allegations and President José Eduardo dos Santos visited nal, the importance of the newly established flight claimed instead to have fired those militants South Africa in a two-day official visit. In the connection between Luanda and Maputo for the responsible that move. meeting with his South African counterpart reinforcement of ties between the two countries. Jacob Zuma, the two presidents discussed bi- 2 July (Luanda): lateral ties – considered to be positively grow- 19 July (Luanda): The Secretary of State for Economic Coordi- ing – and the region’s security situation. Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos re- nation, Job Graça, said that foreign direct in- affirmed, alongside visiting Portuguese Presi- vestment in Angola rose from US$9.57 billion 9 July (Luanda): dent Aníbal Cavaco Silva, his commitment to in 2006 to US$17.17 billion in 2008, a clear Finance Minister, Carlos Alberto Lopes, re- support Guinea-Bissau’s stabilisation process sign of the country’s growing business attrac- vealed a new Chinese loan for his country: the and to avoid military interference in politics. tiveness. China Export-Import Bank will lend around US$500 million. This loan was agreed upon af- 22 July (Paris): 2 July (Luanda): ter José Eduardo dos Santos met Bank Presi- N’Zita Tiago, the exiled leader of the FLEC/FAC In his final hours as US ambassador, Dan dent Li Ruogu. The World Bank estimates that – Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda/ Mozena was received by President José Edu- Chinese loans have reached US$14.5 billion. Forças Armadas de Cabinda – denied the exist- ardo dos Santos. Mozena highlighted great ence of any peace talks with Luanda. Earlier improvements regarding bilateral relations 12 July (Luanda): this month, self-proclaimed military leaders of over the past year, which will soon be con- Italy’s ENI and Angola’s Sonangol have an- FLEC in Cabinda had displaced Tiago. solidated by a strategic partnership agree- nounced a new offshore oil discovery. ment. 23 July (Luanda): 12 July (Luanda): Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates high- 7 July (Washington): A member of Cabinda’s FLEC disclosed that lighted the growing importance of relations and In a World Bank report entitled “Investing preliminary contacts with the central govern- deepening cooperation between Portugal and Across Borders 2010”, Angola is the worst ment were under way to start negotiations re- Angola, after visiting FILDA. ranked country among the 87 states consid- garding the enclave status. ered. It takes as long as 263 days for a foreign 23 July (Luanda): investor to set up a company in the country. 14 July (Luanda): Angola formally assumed the two-year Presi- President José Eduardo dos Santos received dency of the CPLP. President José Eduardo dos 7 July (Washington): his Western Saharan counterpart Mohamed Santos declared in the opening session that the Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos traveled Adelaziz. It is known that Angola favors the CPLP could be a powerful force capable of con- to Washington, where he met Foreign Secre- Sahrawi cause, a fact proven by the acceptance tributing to peace and security and strengthen- tary Hilary Clinton. The visit was justified by of an Embassy in Luanda. In a communiqué, ing all of its member countries at regional and the signature of the Strategic Partnership José Eduardo dos Santos stated that he sup- international level. The Final Statement of the Dialogue Agreement between the US and An- ports Western Sahara’s self-determination and CPLP recognized Equatorial Guinea’s formal gola. Clinton stated the US wishes to diversify independence within the framework of agree- request to join the organization and confirmed its relations with Luanda, still very much fo- ments signed under the aegis of the UN. the needed accession negotiations. It also cused on oil – last year Angola was its 8th sup- commented on the situation in Guinea-Bissau plier. The new agreement boasts cooperation 15 July (Luanda): and adopted a plan to promote and spread the in areas such as energy, security, trade and Portuguese ambassador to Angola, Francisco Portuguese language in the world. Finally, the promotion of democracy. Ribeiro Telles, stated at the International Fair Ukraine and Swaziland formally requested to IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 10

become associated observers. President José designed to formalize the current good terms Brazil-EU Summit, alongside European Com- Eduardo dos Santos presented the top priori- between both parts. Lula da Silva also took mission President José Manuel Durão Barroso, ties for Angola’s presidency of the CPLP. The the opportunity to meet separately with Cape and European Council President Herman van main topics will be the continuous support to Verde’s President Pedro Pires and Prime Min- Rompuy. Climate change, the reform of inter- Guinea-Bissau, the possible creation of a CPLP ister José Maria Neves. national financing institutions, trade and the citizen status, the negotiations for Equatorial Doha round, as well as common cooperation Guinea’s accession. 4-5 July (Malabo): in the production of biofuels, were high on the President Lula da Silva met with his counter- agenda. 25-26 July (Kampala): part from Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang President José Eduardo dos Santos attended Nguema Mbasogo, during his African tour. 19 July (Brasília): the 15th Summit of the African Union (AU). José Bilateral trade possibilities and the Brazilian Argelia’s Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Eduardo dos Santos first met Bissau-Guinean support to Guinea’s membership to CPLP were with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim, President Malam Bacai Sanhá to discuss bilat- high on the agenda. in order to discuss bilateral relations. Agricul- eral relations and AU matters. The president ture, trade and energy issues were high on the also met his Algerian counterpart Abdelaziz 6 July (Nairobi): agenda. Bouteflika, and held a tripartite meeting with President Lula da Silva’s official entourage – in- Jacob Zuma from South Africa and Denis Sas- cluding Foreign Minister Celso Amorim – met 20 July (Brasília): sou Nguesso from the Republic of Congo to with his Kenyan counterpart Mwai Kibaki, Vice- Former Palestinian Foreign Minister and cur- discuss issues related to peace, stability and President Kalonzo Musyoka and Foreign Min- rent Fatah high-ranking official Nabil Shaath development in the African continent. ister Moses Wetangula, seeking to reinforce bi- met with President Lula da Silva, after which lateral relations between the two countries. Six the later announced a pledge of nearly US$14 26 July (Luanda): key agreements aimed at boosting trade, invest- million to help in the reconstruction of Pales- Angola became China’s first oil supplier with a ments, economic and energetic ties were signed. tinian territories. 15% quota, surpassing Saudi Arabia. 7 July (Dar es Salaam): 21 July (Brasília): 28 July (Luanda): President Lula da Silva met with his Tanzanian Paraguay’s Foreign Minister Héctor Lacognata President José Eduardo dos Santos received his counterpart Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete on agricul- met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amo- Cape-Verdean counterpart Pedro Pires, after they tural and energy issues: the possibility of cre- rim in order to prepare the upcoming meeting both attended the AU Summit. Bilateral relations, ating a local production of ethanol was high on between President Lula da Silva and Fernando which are deemed excellent, and international is- the agenda. Lugo. Common infrastructure projects, migra- sues were on the table during the short meeting. tion control and social issues were among the 7-8 July (Lusaka): topics discussed. 29 July (Luanda): President Lula da Siva met with his local coun- An IMF mission visited Luanda to assess the im- terpart Rupiah Bwezani Banda, and signed sev- 22 July (Brasília): plementation of the US$1.4 billion loan agree- eral agreements geared towards enhancing bi- Kuwait’s Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al- ment, which included some clauses on increasing lateral cooperation between the two countries, Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah met budgetary transparency and fighting corruption. including a possible copper mining operation with President Lula da Silva seeking to enhance by Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce in Zam- bilateral ties between the two countries. 29 July (Luanda): bia, as well as local biofuels production. Lula Angola Oil Minister, José Maria Botelho de da Silva also took the opportunity to address 22 July (Brasília): Vasconcelos, received his Congo Brazzaville the Zambian National Assembly. President Lula da Silva offered to mediate the counterpart André Rafael Loemba. The officials conflict between Colombia and Venezuela over agreed to set up a joint oil exploration body to 8-9 July (Pretoria): a crisis that led to the rupture of their diplo- develop the border “Lunzi” field. President Lula da Silva met with his counterpart matic relations. Jacob Zuma. The strengthening of economic bilateral relations was high on the agenda. 22-23 July (Luanda): Foreign Minister Celso Amorim participated 10 July (Luanda): in the CPLP’s Council of Ministers and later President Lula da Silva met with Angolan Vice represented President Lula da Silva in the sub- President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos San- sequent VIII Summit of the Heads of State and Brazil tos. Government of the CPLP.

3-4 July (Sal Island): 14 July (Brasília): 24-25 July (Ankara): President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva attended President Lula da Silva, accompanied by For- Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his the I Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, a gathering eign Minister Celso Amorim, attended the IV Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu to discuss IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 11

the Iranian nuclear program and the previous 31 July (Brasília): 10-14 July (Boston): fuel swap proposal by the two countries. Both President Lula da Silva offered to provide po- Prime Minister José Maria Neves paid an of- officials later met with theirI ranian counterpart litical refuge to Sakineh Mohammadi Ashti- ficial visit to the Cape Verdean community in Manouchehr Mottaki over the same issue. ania, who was sentenced to death in Iran the US. following her conviction for committing adul- 25 July (Jerusalem): tery. 13-15 July (Brava Island): Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Israeli Cape Verdean and Portuguese military forces Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Middle performed a three-day joint military exercise, East peace talks were high on the agenda. dubbed “Garça-010”, to boost relations and enhance civilian and military cooperation. The 26 July (Ramallah): exercise brought together nearly 110 soldiers Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Prime from both countries and included naval land- Minister of the Palestinian Authority Salam Cape Verde ing, reconnaissance patrols on the island and Fayyad and local counterpart Riad Malki, seek- civilian actions. ing to advance Middle East peace talks. 2 July (Sal Island): Ten Heads of State attended the 88th ECOWAS 13-15 July (Beijing): 26 July (Brasília): Summit hosted by Cape Verdean President Foreign Minister Carlos Brito met with his Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro Pedro Pires and Prime Minister José Maria Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi and with met with Brazilian President Lula da Silva in Neves. A common industrial policy, the elec- Commerce Minister Fu Ziying, on the occa- a bid to gain support and mediation for the tion criteria for the organization structures sion of the first meeting of the Joint Commit- ongoing feud between Venezuela and Colom- and the pending situations in Guinea-Bissau, tee on Economic, Commercial and Technical bia. Guinea-Conakry and Niger were high on the Cooperation between the two countries. Both agenda. parts signed various economic and business 28 July (Damascus): agreements. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his 3 July (Sal Island): Syrian counterpart Walid Al-Muallem and President Lula da Silva attended the first 19 July (Praia): President Bashar Al-Assad. Bilateral coopera- Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, where he received Prime Minister José Maria Neves expressed tion agreements, including health and agricul- support for Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat interest in reinforcing CPLP participation in ture, as well as Middle East peace talks high in the UN Security Council. Joint cooperation the resolution of problems in Guinea-Bis- were on the agenda. in development aid and trade was also on the sau. table. 28 July (Brasília): 20 July (Praia): President of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega met with 3 July (Sal Island): As part of a deal struck by US authorities, his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva. Social After the end of the Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, Guantanamo detainee Abd-al-Nisr Moham- and economic cooperation, common infra- President Lula da Silva announced Brazilian med Khantumani was transferred to Cape structure programs and the progress of several oil company Petrobrás would support Cape Verde. regional integration projects were some of the Verde’s efforts to prospect for oil and gas in topics discussed. ultra-deepwater areas around the islands. 21-23 July (Luanda): President Pedro Pires attended the VIII Sum- 30 July (Rivera): 4-7 July (Praia): mit of Heads of State and Government of the President Lula da Silva, accompanied by For- President Pedro Pires hosted his Portuguese CPLP. eign Minister Celso Amorim, met with his Uru- counterpart Aníbal Cavaco Silva as guest at the guayan counterpart José Mujica on the issue 35th anniversary celebrations of the archipela- 25-27 July (Kampala): of enhancing bilateral cooperation, specifically go’s independence. President Pedro Pires attended the 15th Sum- relating to border issues such as transport and mit of Heads of State and Government of the energy. Agriculture, science and defense were 6 July (Praia): African Union (AU). also common topics brought up during their Cape Verde and the Canary Islands held their meeting. first official summit. Prime Minister José -Ma 29 July (Luanda): ria Neves and President of the autonomous President Pedro Pires expressed his trust in 30 July (Vila Hayes): community of the Canary Islands Paulino Riv- the Angolan presidency of the CPLP and con- President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister ero discussed the expansion of the Macaro- ditioned any intervention in Guinea-Bissau Celso Amorim met with Paraguayan President nesia, in order to include Cape Verde as part to a request from the democratically elected Fernando Lugo. Bilateral economic trade and of the EU ultra-peripheral regions. Bilateral government. Pires also took the opportunity common projects regarding the Itaipu dam political and economic cooperation were also to meet privately with his Angolan counter- were high on the agenda. on the agenda. part José Eduardo dos Santos. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 12

Guinea-Bissau will continue to closely follow the country’s in- country, not to hurt its people. Furthermore, he ternal situation and support Guinea-Bissau as stated that “Guinea-Bissau is not the private 1 July (Brasília): long as it “solves its problems”. property of soldiers”. President of Brazil Lula da Silva canceled his scheduled three-hour stopover in Bissau as a 3 July (Sal Island): 13 July (Lisbon): response to the appointment of António Indjai The final joint statement of ECOWAS’s leaders João Gomes Cravinho, Portuguese Secretary of as Armed Forces Chief of Staff. referred to the “lack of progress in the fight State for Cooperation, stated that the consoli- against impunity” in Guinea-Bissau and the dation of stability in Guinea-Bissau suffered an 1 July (New York): “great concern” over António Indjai’s nomina- “extremely severe” setback which damaged the Portuguese Secretary of State for Cooperation tion, calling upon President Malam Bacai Sanhá international community’s trust in the country. João Gomes Cravinho agreed with the content not only to reconsider his choice, but to name of the Secretary General’s latest report and re- an Armed Forces Chief of Staff who was not di- 15 July (New York): asserted that fighting narco-trafficking and -re rectly involved in the April 1st military coup. Special Representative of the UN Secretary forming the security sector were key in achiev- General Joseph Mutaboba presented the lat- ing stability in Guinea-Bissau. 4 July (Dakar): est report on Guinea-Bissau to the UN Security In reaction to António Indjai’s nomination, the Council. Mutaboba expressed his belief that 1 July (Sal Island): US embassy in Dakar confirmed that the US civilian authorities are not fully in charge in On the sidelines of the 38th ordinary session ceased its military support and cooperation Bissau, but that the situation could be solved of ECOWAS in Cape Verde, Representative with Guinea-Bissau. if tackled without delay by the international of the UN Secretary General and Head of the community. The report describes the April 1st UN Peace-building Support office in Guinea- 6 July (Brussels): incidents as a “major setback”. The wave of Bissau Joseph Mutaboba chose to downplay High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Se- political instability is seen as threatening the the content of the UN report on Guinea-Bissau. curity Policy Catherine Ashton, disclosed that positive momentum witnessed in the previous Mutaboba stated that any political appointment EU would re-examine all of its support to Guin- year, putting in danger the implementation of such as Indjai’s is a decision made by a sover- ea-Bissau due to the country’s internal political crucial reforms, in particular in the key military eign state. situation and Indjai’s nomination in particular, sector. which may not be compatible with the Cotonou 2 July (Sal Island): agreement. 15 July (New York): Guinea-Bissau’s political situation was one of Following the presentation of the UN’s latest the ECOWAS 38th ordinary session’s main top- 6 July (Lisbon): report on Guinea-Bissau, the US informed it ics. Sanctions were discussed as a reaction Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva would reinforce sanctions against drug traf- to António Indjai’s nomination. ECOWAS had stated that the international community had a fickers in the country. Yet, theUN Security already canceled its Armed Forces Chief of crucial role to play in Guinea-Bissau’s stability. Council failed to reach any resolution concern- Staff meeting, which was scheduled for the 28th He considered that ECOWAS, the CPLP, the EU ing Guinea-Bissau. and 29th of June in Bissau, as a sign of protest. and the UN were on the front row of support to James Victor Gbeho, President of the ECOWAS weak institutions. 16 July (Bissau): Commission, stated that he did not “understand Ahead of the CPLP meeting in Luanda, Presi- nor approve” Guinea-Bissau’s decision. 6 July (Bissau): dent Malam Bacai Sanhá pressured his Luso- Armed Forces Chief of Staff������������������� António Indjai re- phone peers in a TV interview by stating he 2-3 July (Sal Island): buffed the international community’s criticism hoped that the CPLP would not follow other President Malam Bacai Sanhá participated in of his appointment by declaring that it “does international organizations’ example in sus- the ECOWAS session and the subsequent sum- not understand the Bissau-Guinean military’s pending aid to Guinea-Bissau, thus isolating mit with Brazil. At the end of the meetings, reality” and that censure in itself would not the country. Sanhá declared that the Community would help the country’s development. reinforce its assistance to Guinea-Bissau. Yet 20 July (Bissau): President Sanhá failed to deliver any com- 7 July (Paris): Armed Forces Chief of Staff A������������������ntónio Indjai de- ments on Indjai’s appointment, while he stated Paris Club creditors and Brazil gave Guinea- cided to begin making his own nominations to the Zamora Induta’s liberation was a Justice Bissau a three-year debt suspension until the military command posts, in a move clearly in- matter. end of 2012. This break only includes debt up to tended to reinforce his position of power within 1986, which is estimated at US$240 million. the Armed Forces and weaken the status of 3 July (Sal Island): Bubo Na Tchuto – former Navy Chief of Staff and Although failing to visit Bissau, Brazilian Presi- 9 July (Bissau): participant in the April 1st coup –, thus ignoring dent Lula da Silva conveyed his hopes that In a rare harsh tone, President Malam Bacai the criticism of the international community. Guinea-Bissau would not fall back in its reform Sanhá told Guinea-Bissau’s Superior Council Sanha Cusse, former Navy Intelligence Chief, process, while he reinforced that his country of Defense that the military exist to defend the was named as Navy Vice-Chief of Staff, and Ma- IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 13

jor Carlos Mandugal, whose name was repeat- 23 July (Luanda): body will continue to assist the country togeth- edly linked to drug trafficking, was namedN avy The Final Declaration of VIII Summit of the er with other partners. Operational Commander. Indjai also nominated Heads of State and Government of the CPLP Tomás Djassi, a close ally, as Army Vice-Chief considered the events of April 1st to be a “grave of Staff, as well as new regional military com- incident” against Guinea-Bissau’s constitu- mander. tional order, while it reaffirmed the need for military power to respect civilian rule. It also 21 July (Bissau): called on Guinea-Bissau to “solve” the detain- Ahead of his departure to Luanda, President ees’ situation and remain engaged in the Secu- Mozambique Malam Bacai Sanhá expressed his wish to see rity Sector Reform. a CPLP also working on economic matters be- 2 July (Maputo): sides its natural cultural and linguistic goals. 23 July (Luanda): A Chinese delegation of 46 businessmen led by The President also expressed his support for Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos Deputy Minister of Trade Chen Jian met with Equatorial-Guinea’s bid to join the Community. pointed out that the CPLP will focus its ef- President Armando Guebuza and other gov- forts on organizing a donor’s conference in ernment officials in order to assess possible 21 July (Bissau): other to garner the financial means necessary investment opportunities. Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai tried to strengthen democratic institutions. José to appease the international community by Eduardo dos Santos also declared that dur- 4-6 July (Maputo): stating that “any military who would not subor- ing Angola’s tenure of the CPLP, no options India’s External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna dinate to the political power would be expelled would be excluded in the process of supporting met with President Armando Guebuza, Prime from the Armed Forces” and that “from now on Guinea-Bissau, including a military one – al- Minister Aires Ali and his counterpart Oldemiro the military would constitute an example of dis- though strictly respecting the demands of local Baloi, in order to boost bilateral relations, par- cipline and respect towards civil authorities”. authorities. ticularly in the trade and energy sectors. Krishna also took the opportunity to sign an agreement 22 July (New York): 26 July (Bissau): extending a credit of US$25 million to Mozam- The UN Security Council issued a nonbinding Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior vowed bique for rural electrification and another, worth statement urging Bissau-Guinean military forc- to analyze the UN’s appeal to release former US$40 million, aimed at setting up centers for es to respect civilian authority, and its political Armed Forces Chief of Staff Zamora Induta, planning and training in the coal sector. forces to respect the rule of law. In particular, still in jail following the April 1st coup. the Security Council requested the release of 5-7 July (Gaborone): those imprisoned after the April 1st coup for 27 July (Bissau): President Armando Guebuza met with his their fair and proper trial and an increased ef- Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai re- Botswanan counterpart Ian Khama seeking fort in preventing drug trafficking. ferred that Zamora Induta’s situation as justice to strengthen bilateral ties between the two matter which should therefore be decided by countries. 22 July (Brussels): the courts. Renewed signs that the EU may end or severely 6 July (Maputo): downsize its current Security Sector Reform 27 July (Kampala): Representatives of the governments of Mozam- mission in Guinea-Bissau were once again President Malam Bacai Sanhá participated bique and Luxembourg signed the 3rd Indicative released, but the decision has not been made in the 15th Summit of the African Union (AU), Cooperation Program (PIC), which will be put in yet. where he declared that António Indjai would place between 2010 and 2015. continue as head of the Armed Forces. Sanhá 22 July (Luanda): pointed out that a sovereign country made this 10 July (Pretoria): Ahead of the CPLP summit, Portuguese For- decision and that the international community President Armando Guebuza met with his An- eign Minister Luís Amado rejected the idea of should respect it. As for Zamora Induta’s situ- golan and South African counterparts, José deploying a CPLP security force to stabilize ation, the President clarified that the courts Eduardo dos Santos and Jacob Zuma, and dis- Guinea-Bissau. Amado stressed that the Com- would deal it with. Finally, Sanhá declared he cussed regional common issues. munity had no legitimacy to do so and that counted on Portugal, Angola and Libya to sup- Guinea-Bissau’s issues should be solved by the port his country in international forums. 12 July (Gaborone): international community, namely ECOWAS and As the head of the Southern African Develop- the UN. 30 July (Abuja): ment Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, De- Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan praised fense and Security, President Armando Guebu- 23 July (Luanda): the CPLP’s efforts to support Guinea-Bissau za inaugurated a conflict management center President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the VIII alongside with other international organiza- at the organization’s headquarters with the aim Summit of the Heads of State and Government tions. As such, the President, who is also chair- of linking national crisis management centers of the CPLP. man of ECOWAS, confirmed that the regional of every SADC state member. IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 14

12 July (Maputo): tary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, European Affairs Ministers, in order to assess Electricidade de Moçambique (EdM) and Portu- and with Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires. the planed Belgian EU Presidency. gal’s REN signed a protocol to set up a company for investment projects related to the expan- 28 July (Maputo): 9 July (Lisbon): sion of the Mozambican power network, includ- According to official reports, Mozambique and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate ing the Cesul project which envisages creating Angola plan to reinforce the African Union’s of Oman Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah met a power transmission line linking the Tete and mission in Somalia, currently at 6,000 troops with his counterpart Luís Amado and Portu- Maputo provinces, estimated at US$1.7 billion. but expected to surpass the 8,000 soon. guese Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama. The strengthening of bilateral relations, EU- 14 July (Maputo): GCC relations, the Middle Eastern peace pro- Interpol’s Secretary General Ronald Noble met cess, the situation in Afghanistan, the acts of with President Armando Guebuza, after which piracy in the Horn of Africa and energy issues he announced the international police body were high on the agenda. intends to investigate drug trafficking in Mo- zambique, for fear that it is becoming a transit Portugal 9 July (Seychelles Islands): route for drugs on their way from Latin America Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva, ac- to Europe. This visit comes just six weeks after 1 July (New York): companied by Armed Forces Chief of Staff US President Barack Obama named prominent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Coop- General Valença Pinto met with the Por- Mozambican businessman Mohamed Bachir eration João Gomes Cravinho took part in the tuguese military assigned to the EU’s Op- Suleman as a drug baron. High-Level Segment of the UN Economic and eration Atalanta, seeking to fight piracy in Social Council. Cravinho also took the oppor- the Indic Ocean. Santos Silva also took the 14 July (Maputo): tunity to sign a memorandum of understanding opportunity to meet with President of Sey- Foreign Affairs Minister Oldemiro Baloi hosted with UN Assistant Secretary General for Peace- chelles James Michel, Interior Minister Joel the Interstate Political and Diplomacy Com- keeping Operations, Atul Khare, regarding Por- Morgan, and Foreign Minister Jean-Paul mittee’s session of the SADC. The gathered tugal’s contribution to the UNSAS-Stand-by Ar- Adam, as well as with local Army Chief of officials analyzed the political and security rangement System. Staff Brigadier Leopold Payet. The Portu- situation of the region with particular focus on guese candidacy for a non-permanent seat Zimbabwe and Madagascar, as well as the con- 2 July (Lisbon): on the UN’s Security Council during the solidation of democracy in the SADC area and During preparations for the next Summit of 2011-2012 biennium was one of the topics the preparation of the upcoming Heads of State the Atlantic Alliance to be held in November covered. and Government Summit in Namibia. in Lisbon, NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen held meetings with Portu- 13 July (Lisbon): 22 July (Luanda): guese Prime Minister José Sócrates, Speaker Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Education Minister Zeferino Martins represent- of Parliament Jaime Gama, Defense Minister Republic of Iran Manoutchehr Mottaki met ed Mozambique during the CPLP’s Council of Augusto Santos Silva, and Foreign Minister Luís with his counterpart Luís Amado. Human Ministers. Amado. rights, Iran’s nuclear program and ongoing international sanctions were high on the 22 July (Maputo): 3-4 July (Sal Island): agenda. Dorothy Tembo, executive secretary of the Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the First World Trade Organization’s program to boost ECOWAS-Brazil Summit as an observing party. 14 July (Lisbon): the Integrated Framework, announced it will Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ahmet start providing US$1 million per year to Mo- 4-7 July (Praia): Davutoglu met with his counterpart Luís zambique to support industrial programs in the President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, accompanied Amado, in order to discuss the strengthening country. by Foreign Minister Luís Amado, attended the of bilateral relations, EU-Turkey relations, the 35th anniversary celebrations of Cape Verde’s Middle-East peace process, the Balkans, the 22-23 July (Luanda): independence. Cavaco Silva also held meetings forthcoming NATO summit and the interna- President Armando Guebuza attended the VIII with his counterpart Pedro Pires as well as with tional financial and economic crisis as well as Summit of Heads of State and Government of Prime Minister José Maria Neves, where bilat- energy issues. the CPLP. eral cooperation, the promotion of Portuguese language and the situation in Guinea-Bissau 15 July (Baku): 25-27 (Kampala): were high on the agenda. Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with Azer- President Armando Guebuza attended the 15th baijan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs El- Summit of Heads of State and Government of 8 July (Brussels): mar Mammadyarov in order to discuss the the African Union (AU). Guebuza also took the Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro strengthening of bilateral relations, EU- opportunity to meet with US Assistant Secre- Lourtie attended the Informal Gathering of the Azerbaijan relations, the forthcoming NATO IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 15

summit, energy issues and the Central Asian Amado took the opportunity to make bilateral 25-27 July (Kampala): context. Amado also took the opportunity to contacts with some of the 30 African Heads of President Fradique de Menezes attended the sign an Agreement for Political Consultations State and Government present. 15th summitSummit of the africanAfrican Union (aU).(AU). Me-Me- with his counterpart. nezes also took the opportunity to meet with 26 July (Brussels): Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who 15-17 July (Pretoria): Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU’s announced the pardon of a US$3 million debt. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co- Foreign Minister Council, where further sanc- operation João Gomes Cravinho met with his tions on Iran as a result of its nuclear program South African counterpart Sue van der Mer- were agreed. we, to assess economic relations between Portugal and South Africa. 29 July-2 August (Díli): Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Timor Leste 16-17 (Almaty): Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho held bi- Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his lateral meetings with President José Ra- 5 July (Sydney): local counterpart Kanat Saudabeyev as well mos-Horta and Minister of Foreign Affairs Australia’s new Prime Minister Julia Gillard as Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Naz- and Cooperation Zacarias da Costa, among announced her government’s intention to arbayev before attending the OSCE Ministe- others. build a regional processing center for asylum rial Troika Meeting and later, the OSCE In- seekers in Timor Leste. Although President formal Ministerial Meeting. Amado also met José Ramos-Horta expressed openness to with his Armenian, Belarusian and Serbian the proposal, Deputy Prime Minister José counterparts Edward Nalbandian, Sergei Luís Guterres said that Timor Leste did not Martynov and Vuk Jeremic, respectively. have the capacity to bring the plan to frui- São Tomé tion. The Australian authorities did not con- 18-23 July (Luanda): sult Prime Minister José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, accompanied and Príncipe Gusmão. by an entourage of over 105 businessmen and several government officials including Foreign 7 July (Sydney): Minister Luis Amado, visited Angola in a bid to 22 July (Luanda): Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard said she strengthen cooperation between both coun- Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Tiny, at- was willing to discuss the Woodside Petroleum tries. Cavaco Silva met with his counterpart tended the Council of Ministers of the CPLP. planned Sunrise natural gas project in Timor José Eduardo dos Santos, and with leader of Leste to help win support for a regional pro- UNITA Isaías Samakuva. 22 July (N’Djamena): cessing center for asylum seekers. President Fradique de Menezes partici- 20 July (Kabul): pated in the XII Summit of Heads of State 9 July (New York): Secretary of State for Portuguese Communi- and Government of the Community of Sa- Shigeru Mochida was appointed as Deputy ties Abroad António Braga represented Portu- helo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The or- Special Representative of the UN Secretary gal in the International Donors Conference on ganization’s reforms, a harmonization of General for Timor Leste. Afghanistan, where dialogue with the Taliban, positions on the eve of the Africa Union new aid commitments and a timeframe for the Summit, as well as common economic, so- 12 July (Díli): withdrawal of international troops were de- cial and cultural cooperation were high on The Parliament unanimously voted a non-bind- cided. the agenda. ing resolution rejecting Australia’s proposal to build a regional processing center for asylum 22 July (Luanda): 22-23 July (Luanda): seekers in Timor Leste. Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the President Fradique de Menezes attended the CPLP’s Council of Ministers. VIII Summit of Heads of State and Govern- 14 July (Díli): ment of the CPLP. Deputy Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão re- 23 July (Luanda): jected Australia’s proposal to process asylum President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and Prime Min- 25 July (São Tomé): seekers, claiming that Timor Leste was no- ister José Sócrates attended the VIII Sum- Municipal elections took place, with Prime body’s “puppet”. mit of Heads of State and Government of the Minister Rafael Branco’s MLSTP-PSD win- CPLP. ning the most votes and mandates, followed 21 July (Hanoi): by ADI from former Prime Minister Patrice Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa stated 25-27 July (Kampala): Trovoada. President Fradique de Menezes’s that Timor Leste had not ruled out involve- Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the MDFM-PL did not manage to elect any local ment in a center for processing asylum African Union Summit as an observing party. representative. seekers, but that this idea – developed by IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin | 16

Australia – should be dealt with regionally. 25 July (Díli): ment, border control issues and the Australian Additionally, Costa also said that Austra- Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa rejected refugee-processing center were high on the lia’s Woodside Petroleum was “more open” Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s claims that Aus- agenda. to considering piping gas from the Greater tralia is in “active dialogue” with his country Sunrise fields to an onshore liquefied natu- over her pre-election plan to use Timor Leste 28 July (Díli): ral gas plant. as a processing center for asylum seekers, and President José Ramos-Horta said that his made it clear that that discussions had yet to country had “no plans” to build a detention 22-23 July (Luanda): take place. center for asylum seekers, but remained open Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres at- to discuss the idea. tended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and 27-28 July (Díli): Government of the CPLP. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa 30 July (Díli): met with his counterpart Zacarias da Costa, State Secretary for Defense Júlio Tomás Pinto 22 July (Hanoi): President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Min- called on Australia to continue providing tech- Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa attended ister Xanana Gusmão, seeking to enhance nical assistance to the Timor Leste Defense the ASEAN Regional Forum. bilateral relations. An air transport agree- Forces (F-FDTL).

Reading List

Carrie Manning, “Mozambique’s Slide into One-Party Rule” (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2010): 151-165.

Editor | Paulo Gorjão assistant editorS | Kai Thaler • Laura Tereno • Pedro Seabra DESIGN | Atelier Teresa Cardoso Bastos PRINTING | Europress

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa PORTUGAL http://www.ipris.org email: [email protected]

IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin is a publication of IPRIS. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IPRIS.