THE 'NEW THINKING' AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THIRD WORLD REGIONAL CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA by WISDOM JOHN TETTEY B.A. (Hons.), University of Ghana, 1988 Grad. Dip., University of Ghana, 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1991 ©Wisdom John Tettey, 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Political Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date 30th August, 1991. DE-6 (2/88) ii ABSTRACT Since Gorbachev entered the Kremlin, there have been dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy. One area in which these changes, enshrined in the 'new thinking,' have had a tremendous impact concerns regional conflicts. This study analyzed the impact of the changes on the Angolan and Ethiopian conflicts in which the USSR was deeply involved. It also assessed the Soviet response to the two situations, following the emergence of the 'new thinking,' to determine its uniformity or otherwise. The changes in foreign policy led to Soviet disengagement from the two conflicts. The practical manifestations of the 'new thinking's' prescriptions did not, however, emerge until sometime in 1988 ~ three years after the reforms were enunciated. The reasons underlying Soviet retrenchment in these areas included the desire to seek political solutions to regional conflicts, the deideologization of inter• state relations, the new emphasis on mutually beneficial economic alliances, and the avoidance of superpower confrontation. The Soviets, thus, put pressure on their clients to make them seek peaceful solutions to the conflicts. Such pressures took the form of troop and military experts withdrawal, curtailing military assistance, etc. Moscow also extended overtures to the factions fighting its clients in order to solicit their cooperation. However, whereas the Southern African and Ethiopian-Somali conflicts were eventually resolved, the civil war in Ethiopia escalated and culminated in a violent overthrow of the government in Addis Ababa. Soviet moves towards a negotiated peace in Southern Africa were quicker and firmer than those concerning Ethiopia. This was due, partly, to the fact that until 1988 Ethiopia still held more strategic value for Moscow than did Angola. iii Furthermore, the military situation deteriorated faster for the MPLA than it did for the Mengistu regime. The Angolan government was also more receptive to the peace process than was Addis Ababa. On the whole, the study concluded that the 'new thinking' caused significant reversals in Soviet intervention in the two regional conflicts. It was noted, however, that while Moscow used similar policies to promote peace in the two areas, these differed in terms of detail and timing. It is the contention of this study that, in the future, the Soviet Union is unlikely to intervene in regional conficts to defend Marxist-Leninist client regimes and movements, and to project its power. Its involvement in the Third World will rather take the form of expanding ties with more advanced developing economies, from which it can derive benefits. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v DEDICATION vi CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 Operational Definition of Concepts 4 References 6 CHAPTER TWO 'OLD AND NEW THINKING' IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 7 References 17 CHAPTER THREE ANGOLA 19 The Old Thinking and its Manifestations 19 Reconceptualization of the Angolan Conflict 25 Impact of the 'New Thinking' On Conflict with South Africa 29 Impact of 'New Thinking' On National Reconciliation 35 Conclusion 40 References 43 CHAPTER FOUR ETHIOPIA 46 Background to Soviet Involvement in the Horn 46 Soviet Conceptualization of the Ethiopia Revolution, the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict, and Intervention 49 Background to the Eritrean Conflict and Soviet Intervention 57 Reconceptualization of the Conflict in the Horn and Soviet Involvement 61 Impact of the 'New Thinking' on the Ethiopia-Somali Conflict 65 Conclusion 73 References 76 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION 80 Implications for Soviet Third World Policy 89 References 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 94 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Paul Marantz, for his invaluable comments, suggestions, criticisms and words of encouragement. My thanks also go to Prof. Brian Job, my instructor and a member of the examination committee, for his useful comments concerning this work. To my numerous friends and fellow graduate students, without whose useful suggestions and emotional support this study might not have seen the light of day, I say a big "thank you." I very much appreciate their contributions which were of tremendous value to me. My final thanks go to the University of British Columbia whose Graduate Fellowship enabled me undertake this study. I must indicate, though, that I am singularly responsible for any shortcomings that the work might contain. DEDICATION To my family, for its support, and to my God, to whom goes all the praise and glory. 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The world has witnessed dramatic changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy since Gorbachev acceded to the Kremlin leadership in 1985. In the area of foreign affairs the most obvious policy changes have been manifested in the transformation of East-West relations from one of intense rivalry to that of significant harmony. This transformation is evidenced by a series of agreements in arms control, socio-cultural and scientific cooperation, as well as expansion in economic interaction between the two blocs. Whereas East-West relations, and superpower relations in particular, seem to be the area of most noticeable and far-reaching change, following Gorbachev's advent on the world scene, there are other spheres of international affairs where the changes embarked upon by the new Kremlin leadership have had tremendous impact. One such sphere involves interaction between the Soviet Union and the Third World. Here, changes of great and increasing significance have shaped Soviet policy, especially as regards regional conflicts ~ the focus of this study. The result has been policy reforms such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Soviet-supported withdrawal of Vietnamese and Cuban troops from Kampuchea and Angola respectively, as well as the Kremlin's backing for the electoral process in Nicaragua in 1990 that culminated in the removal of the Sandinistas from power. These reversals in Soviet Third World policy have evolved from Gorbachev's twin reform program of domestic restructuring (perestroika) and 'new political thinking' (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie) which emerged as reactions to domestic socioeconomic stagnation and inordinate Soviet power projection abroad. 2 Of these new concepts, the 'new thinking' serves as the main fulcrum of ideas determining the Soviet Union's contemporary interactions with the developing world. The aim of this work is to look at any policy changes emerging from the 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy that have taken place regarding that country's involvement in the regional conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia. It is also to ascertain the impact of such changes on the conflicts. Furthermore, the study will compare Soviet policy toward these African countries to measure the uniformity and consistency, or otherwise, in the 'new thinking's' response to the two conflicts. An attempt will be made to explain the reasons behind the similarities and/or differences in the two cases. The essence of the work is, therefore, to test the validity of the argument that the 'new thinking' has resulted in significant changes in the USSR's intervention in the two regional conflicts and that its responses to the two situations have been similar. Angola and Ethiopia are comparable for several reasons. They have both been Soviet client-states with Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and single Vanguard' parties. Added to this is the fact that the two governments were fighting internal rebel insurgencies in civil wars that traversed the whole period of their rule. They both had external conflicts to contend with. Another interesting similarity is that, in addition to Soviet support, the MPLA and the Mengistu governments enjoyed immense assistance from the USSR's allies and surrogates. The two conflicts were embedded in environments in which the superpowers have modest interests, what George refers to as 'low-intensity symmetry'/ Further to these similarities, the two countries exhibit certain differences that offer a basis for understanding any variations in Soviet attitudes (under the 3 rubric of the 'new thinking') to their individual conflicts. Among these is the fact that whereas the actors in the Ethiopian civil war were all Marxist, the Angolan conflict pitches a Marxist government against a pro-Western organization. As far as the geostrategic positions of the two countries are concerned, Ethiopia seems to be more attractive because of its proximity to the Middle East where the USSR has a lot of economic, political and strategic interest. In terms of the economic viability of the two states, however, Angola offers more prospects because of its ability to sustain itself relatively better than Ethiopia. Its oil resources make it less of a burden for the Soviet Union than Ethiopia. In this era of prudent cost-benefit analysis in Soviet interaction with the developing world, potentials for economic interdependence could significantly dictate Soviet interest, and involvement, in propping up its client-governments in the Third World.