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Serial No. ISBN 978 – 2702 – 41 - 2

Author 1 ECHEZONA, Nduba C.

Author 2

Author 3

Title Hegemonism or a New World Order

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Hegemonism or a New World Order Description

Category Socil Sciences

Publisher Mekslink Publishers (Nig)

Publication 1993 Date

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HEGEMONISM OR A NEW WORLD ORDER HEGEMONISM OR A NEW WORLD ORDER

i

NDUBA ECHEZONA NDUBA ECHEZONA

All rights reserved: Except for the purposes of research, review or criticism, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any' form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photdcopying, recording or otherwise with- out thl pri6t written permission of the Publishers. ,>* First Published, 1993

MEKSLlNK PUBLISHERS (NIG.) P. M. B. 5039 Awka Anambra State, Nigeria. DEDICATION

In memory of my late Palher, VICTOR NWOYE ECHEZONA PREFACE This book is a reflection of what I consider to be the nature of the world we have had to inherit since 1989 or probably a little . earlier. In making an exercise such as this, it bccame necessary to visit the intemational relations of earlicr centuries to find out what is uniquely different between those centuries and now and to start to tinker as early as possible about what the future would be like. As I had stated in an earlier book on Contemporary Issues ,In Wodd Order, because of our lcve! of development and the d~re economic straits which befell us in Africa and Nigeria in particular sincc thc 1980s, there is always the feeling around that we must depend on explanations of international political phenomena from the developed countries. You find that explanation in the way we write when we do - trying to copy the intellectual moorings of writers from those societies without advancing our own perspectives or even the most prevalent attitude, to resign ourselves in the expectation that interpretations of these problems would continue to come from there - a kind of intellectual neocolonialism. The latter attitude forecloses debates on international problems while we consume such debates which emanate from the advanced industrial countries. How do we move forward then? You would remember that in international economic transactions, we berate the fact that we consume what we do not produce and produce what we do not consume. In international intellectual transactions, we consume what we do not produce and produce little which might have no relevance to our society's meeting the rest of the world half way. This is not the first book in intemational affairs by Third World scholars or by African scholars or by Nigerian scholars. Howevcr, books on this score which are worth their salt are too few in spite of the abundance sf scholars in international relations especially in Nigeria. If this book remains in the mould of writing just for the sake of writing, I would plead that I be excused for that because of the problems I have enumerated above but if it succeeds in raising debate a little bit especially from a Third Worlder's perspective, I would decm my task to be an accomplished onc. I am vcry grateful to the Chairman and publisher of the Fourth Dimcnsion and the Frontlinc, Chicf Dr. Arthur Nwankwo, who had affordcd mc thc opportunity to cxpress my views on international affairs in his ncwspapcr, the Outlook, a good proportion of which is cmbodicd in this book. I musl confcss that I was astounded by the manncr in which Chicf Nwankwo proddcd on someone with my own typc of bclicfs into writing and pushing forward my ideas . An intcllectual who has writtcn immcnsely on national and intemational affairs. Dr. Nwankwo bclicvcs that idcas have thc capability of moving n;itio~i\and mount;ilns. Secondly, I do not know. how to makc public knowledge my deb1 to my wife, Il'coma and daughter, Adaczc who have had to cntiurc thc deprivations caused by my ubscncc to write this book or the frustratior~occasioned by the clultcr 01' books, journals, articles th;ct dol our household from bedroom to dining table. Whilc Ifcoma would bc busy trying to cnsurc that the whole mess was arranged and tidied up, Adaczc would wind up with one or the othcr hither and thilhcr and assisrcd in the furtiler litlcring of our rooms. Yct, thcy wcrc ;ill pan of the collcclivc contributions to the writing of this book. All said and done, 1 will bc;u the responsibility for all ihc shortcomings i~ndimpcrl'cc~ions thal have aitcndcd lhis work.

, ". .-NDUBA CHUKWUMA ECHEZONA DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE SF'PTEMBER. 1992. UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA INTRODUCTION It is difficult addressing world order issues from a part of the planet earth where as we had pointed out earlier it is not easy to link how such issues impinge on problems of day to day existence such as food and water which are the world order preoccupations of people in the Third World. However, it is also difficult for a scholar with a geopolitical perspective who is living on this planet in the late twentieth century not to be bothered by events of monumental proportions as reforms in the former , the break up of the former Soviet Union and the , issues that would influence the course of international relations well into the twrnty first century. When scholars like Geoffrey Barclough refer to transformations in international relations and date their findings into between 1890 and 1960, we consume their findings and we become armed with their thinking processes and we wait to use the system of their findings to make new discoveries for the future. But who would believe that in our very eyes in the late twentieth century, transformations would occur and we would not need to use fish nets to find out when they did occur. Rather, their occurence unmasked a mystic that might have been prevalent earlier about international relations - how it began and what direction it would take. O The first and second chapters of this book deal with earlier patterns of international relations in the pre-1648 era into the post 1648 era all the way to the , Detente and the references to a New World Order. It became necessary to deal with earlier relations in order to ascertain how international relations began and to show that the later patterns of relations between states such as the use of power and the search for hegemonism has been the earmark of international relations. Cold War and Detente put into full focus the bipolarised character of international relations from 1945 to 1989, what has been referred to as the Yalta World Order. Every issue of global concern was seen from the bipolarity of world politics in which the Soviet Unim and the were the hegemonic players. Chapter three is weighted on strengthening the path to a new world order. This chapter is significant in that it marks the earlier outlines of a new world order on the international plane but it was not significantly discernible. In the Iradlraq war, in the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from and in the settlement of the conflict in Angola, either the position of the United States was served or the IJnited States became a broker of the peace processes which meant the enhancement of its hegemonic status. These were complemented by the events within - the demands for a plural political system . They were happening at a time when a plural political system was already in place within the Soviet Union. Although a plural political .:AIL nn ~iadnot emerged in China, however the fact that it ignited mass nls in such a country with more than one billion population ~rieantLhat western nay American perspectives on the nature of the dljmcstii political system of states is predictable in China in the incd~uril10 long term future. In chapters four and five, we find a gargantuan change in world politrcs, the nature of hegemony and thus 01 world order. The United States mobilised the world including the Soviet Union and fought the chlf War. Suddenly, the world was awash with colleclive security which it had yearned for since the post Second World War years. This thus armed the United States President into proclaiming a new world order, a proof that world orders are often proclaimed by the lriumphant in a war of global proportions. Complementary to American hegemonic reach was the break up of its major adversary, the Sov~etUnion. Chapters six, seven and eight are an expose on the effects of the New World Order, its impact on Africa, on regional integration and on tile tuturc World Order. The earlier outlines of hegemony and world order scem to depend on the primacy of the United States. How do they Impact on Afric,~,on regional integration and on the future? In jfrica, we find the quest for pluralism; on regional integration, we r~ndU') seemingly benign altitude especially on Europe where ~ritegrationhad advanced more than anywhere else. On the future of vorld politics, it would seem that its earliest manifestations would be Imcricim hegemony. However, the medium to long term might be rrrarked by a multipolarity in economic terms - United States, Japan, Westerr Europe and perhaps, Russia or [he Asian tigers - South Korca (Korca), Taiwan or China. CQNTE.NTS P .* Chapter 1 EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 Multi-State Systems in History 1 The Impact of Rome on the Modem State System 4 The Modem State System 5 Transformations in the International System 8 Balance of Power Mechanism 11 Chapter 2 THE SUPER POWERS: COLD WAR, DETENTE AND A NEW WORLD ORDER THE COLD WAR The Orthodox School The Revisionist School Practical Steps in the Manifestation of the Cold War DETENTE, 1970 - 1989 Detente and Problems of Interpretation The New World Order A Common European Home Developments in East Central Europe The Malta Summit Chapter 3 STRENGTHENING THE PATH TO A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GULF, AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA AND CHINA THE IRANbRAQ WAR: Internationalization of the War United States Policy The Security Council The End of the War SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN ANGOLA THE PRO-DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATIONS IN CHINA IN MAYiJUNE 1989 Historical evaluation of the events of 1989 Chinese Students and Pro-Dcrnocracy Movement Pany Vctcrans and the Old Guards Thc Pcoplcs Liberation Amy (PLA) Thc Open Door Policy lntcrnational Dirncnsion ti hapter 4 i $%EGl rLF WAR Origins of the Gulf War 'The Security Council Military Technology Third World Perspective HEGEMONISM, WORLD ORDER AND POST WAR GULF Thc Vietnam Syndrome Post Gulf Peace in the Middle East Thc Palestinian Question RECONSIDERING WAR, PEACE AND HEGEMONY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR Theory and Empiricism in War and Peace War Between States The Gulf War Future of Western Hegemonism {'hapter 5 THE SOVIET UNION 75 Ev;aluation of the System which the Communists Inherited 7 6 Thc and Intemal Decay 77 , and Soviet Disintegration 7 8 Thr Road to Soviet Disintegration 80 Thc Demise of the Sovict Union 8 3 Thc Commonwealth of Independent States (C.1.S) 85 Impact on World Politics 8 6 Hcgcmonism and Soviet Disintegration 8 8 Chapter- 4 AFRICA African Security 95 LIBERIA 9 5 Political Power and the Liberian State 9 5 The Creation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 9 6 ECOMOG, Liberian Society and Peace Keeping 97 Liberia and the Burdens of Leadership 9 9 I3THlOl'l A 102 SOUTH AFRICA . ' 104 AFRICA AND PLURAL'DEMOCRACY 106 Paetems of Foreign Pressure - 109 Patterns of Pressure by Civil So&Ty' ' 112 Patterns of Multipartyism 114 Patterns of Military Disengagement 117

I Chapter 7 REGIONAL PNTEGRATIOK AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER Regional Integration Functionalism Neo-Functionalism Transactionalism American Attitudes to European Integration Widening and Deepening of the Euqpean Process at the National and International Levels POLICY INTEGRATION, EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND THE FATE OF THE NATION-STATE The Yugoslav Crisis European Responses INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Economic Motivations for Integration Failed Integration Schemes THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER The Character of ECOWAS Economies Plural Democracy Nationalism at the National and International Levels A Security Mechanism for Regional Integration Chapter 8 RECONSIDERING POWER, ORDER AND HEGEMONY Power in International Relations The Fungibility of Power World Order and International Relations Towards an Explanation of the New World Order The New World Order Scenarios for the New World Order Conclusion Bibliography Index CHAPTER 1 EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Multi-State Systems in History The existing state system has not been around and might not last the way we know it, forever. As a matter of fact, not all thc states evolved in the same manner as we refer to the westem state syslcm or the modem state system. Among the states of which therc was any record were those in the Tigris-Euphrates vallcy in about 5000 BC (Schuman, 1953 p. 26). Then, they were referred to as city states: Eridu. around the Persian Gulf; Nippur in the Upper valley; Ur in the Chaldees; Uruk, Assur, Umma, Summer, Lagash, Kish and othcrs (Ibid. p. 26). Why they are said to have existed as states is bccause they traded with one another, went to war against one another, negotiated pcace after war and exchanged ambassadors. Most importantly, after the end of any war, and peace was negotiated, a treaty was signed and dcposifed by each of the warring factions. Around about 5000 BC or possibly earlier as historians point out, in the Nile Valley, mcn had bcgun to build cities out of wood, brick and stone, smelt bronze and uscd picture writing on thc first type of paper made of strips of papyrus rceds. Citics dcvclopctl hcrc and made war upon one anothcr until thcy wcrc amelgarnalcd !hrough impcrialisrn in the two Kingdoms of Upper and Lower and later further unitcd as onc country in about 3200 BC by Mcncs (Ibid. p. 27). Egypt has bcen toutcd as the cradle of civilization. Some of hcr grealcst monurncnts of stone which were built a thousand ycars bcfore Abraham might posscss the capability of outliving the human racc. Egyptian civilization did not dcpend solcly on hcr art and architecturo but in Egypt onc could also scc thc beginnings of modem astronomy, rnalhcmatics, cnginccring and medicine. Anothcr arca whcrc~dcvclopmcntsassocialcd wilh ihe statc systcm might havc rcarcd up'k.&.yd is in thc Caribbean. There, thc Mayas arc said to havc dcvclopcd tho ;In of urban lifc bcforc 500 BC". As was usual with this typc of' civilization, what followcd wcre wars and pclty rivalries betwccn towns and among pclty kingdoms. Wl~r; cmcrgcd was hcgcmonism in which an cmpirc flourished for four ccnturics, bctwccn A.D. 300-690. l'hc successor, the Aztcc sncioty was again in thc proccss of consolid;~ting an cmpirc, when it was ovcrwhclmcd by Spanish impcrialisrn. Towards thc South, in thc Andcan mounlains, tho IIIC;I Ernpirc 01' Peru tud dcvclopcd. Hcl'orc il was similarly conquered by the Spaniards, it had developed a far flung imperium for five centuries (Ibid. 0.31). In Asia, the earliest civilizations revel-d around the Indus and Ganges Valleys, in the Tarim Valley of Mongolia and along the shores of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. The first early steps in civilization were made in the Middle East. They ultimately found their way into what is regarded as the western tradition. However, it is to tbe Greeks more than to the peoples of the Middle East that the attributes of much of the western state system is derived. Greek civilization left documents on areas of state and city politics, arbitration, rule of good faith, pacta sunt servanda etc. Quoting Sir Henry Maine, Schuman contended that "everything that moves and lives in modem civilization is Greek in its origin" (Ibid. p. 33). In terns of their dialects, the Aryan-speaking barbarians who came to settle in the Greek Pemi~sularwere identified as Lonians, Aeolians, Dorians, Macedonims and Thracians. Greek history has been wound in myths and legends which of course historians clutched on and sought to unentangle. In his effort to discover the site of Troy and other places famous in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, Germari amateur archaeologist Heinrich Schliemaa worked first in Asia Minor and uncovered the civilizatidn of Mycenar: A little afterwards, the archaeologist, Arthur Evans located at Crossus on Crete a similar civilization which he called Minoan after King Minos. Zirlce these two great discoveries, archaeologists have continued to wc and piece togethey this early civilization and in 1953 they decip~cr~i,Lhe written materials (Lyon et a1 1909, p. 22). Both Minoan and Mycenaean culture were locked in battle for suprc lacy. fie Mycenaeans prevailed only to fall before a new wave of G ,ck people rolling down from the Balkans about 1200 BC. By 1000 BC this b d of Greeks had swept over the whole of the Greek peninsula and rnbb.+ci m to Crete, Rhodes and the coast of Asia Minor. Thcse wcrc he Dorians. They plunged Greece into four hundl~dyears of darkllcss hring which time the actual configuration orCi.l.:k politic. started to emerge. Geography had forced the Greeks lo .,le i valleys and plains separated by mountains. Greeks became separattd from one another and therefore developed their social and

polltical 11% in small units., This was the origin of Greek particularism wh.ch was the nemesis and at the same time, the glory of the Greeks. Though it destroyed Greck political life, it also nourished the individualism which wiis responsible Cr.1 "the supreme creations of classical civilization" (Lyon 2.24). In Greex, there were two great City states: Sparla and Athens. Belween the eight century LO the fourth cemury BC Sparta was the dom;rlanl land power in Greece. .I[ developed a regimented form of government whereby every male citi~enfrom the age of seven to thirty was trained for military service. To that extent, intellectual life did not flourish as it should have been and Sparta only delighted in military victories. In contrast. Athens became "a capitalist plutocracy enamored of "freedom" in which trade flourished and in the sixth century BC a more liberal regime was enshrined which divided the population into classes based on the value of property. Each class of citizens had various political rights and obligations. Solon, the liberal regime also extended citizenship to the poor ??d legislated that no man should be made a slave because of his indebtedness (Lyon p. 27). Other reforms followed from this in future years. The lesser states in the Greek peninsular were dominated either by Athens or by Sparta. Themistocles built a Delian confederacy through which Athens dominated its allies and evolved the "Athenian - Empire" under Pericles whose various wars, including a catastrophic effort to wrest Egypt from the Persians in 454 BC wasted the strength of the City (Schuman p. 34). Domination of the Greek City states by Athens was ended by the Pelopomesian War which ravaged Greece from 431 to 404 BC. Long jealous of its neighbour, Sparta finally allied with Corinth, a state which also resented Athenian impcrialisrn. The war that ensued was so bitter and long drawn out that Sparta was compelled to ask for assistance from Persia. In his celebrated study of A History of the Peloponnesian War, Thuc,ydides, an Athenian showed how national and individual character had disintegrated under military expediency. Although Sparta emerged victorious, it was eclipsed by Thebes and later the whole of the Greek City states by Philip of Macedonia who after his death was succeeded by his son, Alexander. The age of the small, independent City state was over and what might be regarded as Greek culture took over (Lyon pp. 37-38). The wars in Greece had all the trappings of the modem era - Easwest struggle could be seen in the wars between Persia and the Greek City states and bipolarity in the Peloponnesian wars. In terms of modem intemational law, the actual practices of the City states were based upon general recognition of rules binding upon all. In the first place, there was an assumption that there was a universal "law of nature" or law of reason to which everyone was bound. Although thc Greeks had reserved special laws for barbarians and othcrs solely for Grceks, the relations among the Greek states thcrnsclvcs wcre regulated by principles which closely approximated thc "laws of nations." Thcy covered such areas as personal and propcrty righls as thcy pcnamed to conflicting laws of various states, what in modcm terminology would be called "private intemational law", naturalxition, slatus of aliens, right of asylum, extradiction, alliancc~,diplomatic privilcgcs and immunities ctc. Anothcr major Icalurc ol ~hcGrcck statc systcm which could bc secn as a fore-runner (11 Lhc rnodcrn ktatc systcrn was thc cxtcnsivc d,cvclopment of arbitration and of permanent agencies of cooperation in the world of international organizations. Disputes were sent to an impartial third party for arbitration. Controversial issues were submitted to the arbitration of the Delphic oracle, the Amphictyonic Council, a Third State, or tribunal of individuals picked by the litigants (Schumann p. 37). Why the Greek system decayed and Greece finally collapsed to foreign foes was due to the fact that though the City states recognised their common heritage, they were unable to subordinate their local interests to the general interests of the Greeks as a whole. The Impact of Rome on the Modern State System Rome was founded around 753 BC. The early conquerors of Rome, Latins, Etrusceans, Syracuse, the Gauls were mainly farmers who built an empire, the like of which has never been seen Ixforc. Rocre was divided into two classes - !he Patriciafis and the Plebeims: (rach and poor). Slaves and aliens were barred from citizenship. Sbprerne power was invested in a Scnatc whosc rr~embeiswere appointed by two elected "consuls". Both the Senate and the Consulate were dominated by the Patricians thus making the Roman polity an aristocracy mitigated by a popular Assembly. Chronic class struggles between the nobles arid the plebeians tore the polity apart. During periods of extreme stress in the Roman system, power was usually, temporarily transfercd to a "dictator" (Schuman, p. 40) The growth of Roman power and thus of its imperiuin was phenomenal. After the defeat of the King of Empirus, it shared the spoils of war with Canhage. Rome took southern Italy while Carthage took most of Sicily. The idea of balance of power had not existed in which the smaller powers would have combined against the stronger. What ensued was the formal establishment of Woman imperium through conqucst. This Roman imperium or world empire was based on the climination of the earlier states and the state system on which thcy were based. This was the most impressive universal state ever craftcd by man. It extcnded from Scotland to the Sahara, from the Atlantic to the Ganges. It was marked by centuries of peace, rapid population growth, small population of the adult men in the army, cf'ficicnt systcm of law and justice, the flowering of urban culture and widcsprcad rcligious and cultural toleration. Edward Gibbon in his Dcclinc and Fall of thc Roman Empire attributed the demise of the world Statc of thc Cacsars to the triumph of babarism and religion (Schuman, p. 44). Howcvcr, in spitc of thc dcmise of the Roman empire, it still rctaincd its powcrful influcnccs. The city oi Rome remained the seat of ttic Papacy which asscrtcd its ~~pfe'mhcyovcr the christianiscd tx~rbariar-Ikingdoms and this lcft a lasting impression in thc minds of' ~hcbarbarims of tl~mmorics of thc vanishcd world statc. In csscnx. the perception of Catholic Christianity and the vision of order and peace under a universal Empire were the two great legacies which classical civilization left to its heirs. When we refer to the "Middle Ages", we are in fact talking about the religious and political history of what might be said to be "th,e long spring time of western civilization," the study of the Church and "Empire", the first, a living reality of medieval life adthe latter, the illusions of a vanished past which could never be quite recovered Th; new state system which rose on the ruins of the Roman Empire was for quite a long time, under the spell of the Popes and the Caesars. It was the compact between the Roman Bishop and the German King that laid the basis for what came to be called the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation." This was a curious political structure with a double sovereignty which rested on the notion that the Empire and the Papacy were, each, the tempom? 3i1d spiritual powers designated by the divine will for the governance of Christendom (Schuman, pp. 45- 47). The imperial crown was passed first to the House of Hohenstaufen and later to the Home of Hapsburg where it remained until the extinction of the Empite in 1806. Befo~the final demise of the Empire, the Popes and Emperors were engaged in conflicts over exercise of power and authority even though the authority of Empire was felt only within the German states and Italy and even in these places, imperial power was constantly flouted by dukes, principalities and free cities. In the eighteenth century, Voltaire had proclaimed about the empire, that it was neither Holy nor Roman nor an Empire (Schuman p. 47). The Modern State System The modern world including its state system has its roots in the culture of western christendom which, between the fifth and tenth centuries of this era struggled to emerge from its barbaric darkness. In 1054, the rift between Romc and Greek Christianities reached a final rupture. In a similar way, ihe christians of Central Asia had nothing to do with either ByzaLLiaimor Rome. However, in the west, all christians were Catholics united in a common faith under a common Church. Papal power was very extensive. The Pope was the spiritual head of christendom and at thc same time exercised temporal powers as rulcr of thc Papal statcs in Central Italy and as Vicar of Christ on earth with powcrs over cmperors, kings and princes. Whereas Kings werc crowned by Bishops of the Church, the Emperor was crowncd by the Pope himself. The power of the Papacy over temporal rulers was such that it offered its scrvices in the arbitration and settlcmcnt of disputcs bc~wccnthcm (Schuman p. 51). The church playcd a significant part in the development of diplomatic practices and of international law. From early times, the Popes dispatched envoys known as legati to attend church councils and had regularly maintained ambassadors (a pocrisiarii) at the Byzantine court until relations were severed between Constantinople and the Holy See due to religious differences. The Popes also sent envoys to the Emperor, the courts of England, France, Naples, Hungary, Aragon, Castile etc. In international law, the footprints of the Church could be found in the development of the international law of war and netrality. In insisting on the observance of the "Truce of God", the Church forbade fighting on Sunday. In the eleventh century, efforts were made to extend the period of sabbath peace from Wednesday evening to Monday morning and to apply it to religious holidays and to the whole period of Lent. The Pax Eclesia forbade fighting within the vicinity of church buildings or against clerics, pilgrims, merchants, women or peasants (Schuman, p.' 52). Complementing the church was the development in Arabia of Islam, a situation which would have tremendous impact on the development of International Relations. The disciples of Mohammed, founder of the Islamic faith undertook to conquer the world for Allah. Their armies knowr, as 'he Saracens, infused with holy fervour struck everywhere taking Palestine. Syria. Egypt and Mesopotemia, conquering all of Armenia and Persia, most of Turkestan. Spain was invaded in 711 and the kingdom of the Franks soon afterwards. Other conquests followed and even though they might have triggered off the Crusades, which led to the wresting of the Holy land from Islam, the Ottoman Sultans built a great state and a powerful military machine by the extraordinary method of enslaving the male babies of Christian subjects and training them as professional soldiers, administrators and statesmen. The Turks furthered their empire by invading the Balkans and crushing Christian Kosovo in 1389. The Islamic rule over the Balkans lasted for over four centuries. In 1453, Turkish armies stormed the Roman walls of Byzantium. This imperial city of the Eastern Caesars fell to Islam and became the capital of the Ottoman empire. Sultan Mohammed 11, invaded scuthern Italy and dreamed of taking Rome. His successors conquered Greece, invaded Poland, subdued Armenia, Mesopotamiz and Egypt and made themselves Caliphs of all Islam. Under Suleiman the Magnificient (1520-66) the Ottoman empire reached its zenith by defeating the Hungarians at Mohacs and nearly took Vicnna in 1529. France made alliances with the Sultan and Charles V paid him tributc. At Lepanto in 1571 the fleet of the "Christian League", led by thc Popc, Venice, Austria and Spain, destroyed the Ottoman 'navy and unmasked thc invincibility of the Turks. Turkish armies again laid sicge on Vicnna as late as 1683 but without success. Thcrcaflcr, thc Turkish wavc receded as the imperium of the Sullans dccaycd (Schuman pp. 53- $9 Rcr,:,/c;:l I'"SO and 1650, the uhity which European Christendom ' :,i-tjoycd was Lhrown.into a series' of schisms wnkh ended in '~,:~ceof skir;h proporiions'that threatened the survival of western I !( Xzation as a whole. Catholics and Protestants were at each others' '- ,, :s just as pcasants and nobility fought one another. The q~~,~IJ~r.r;f Mxtl 1 Luther to the German princes at that time, told : ic siory: "strike with the Sword! kill! Cut their throats! Bum, slay, crush the murderous and rapacious peasants." In the same manner, Charles V had advised the inquisition to follow his own way in dealing with heretics in the Netherlands, "where all who remained obstinate in ;heir errors were burnt alive, and those who were admitted to penitence were beheaded." "This orgy of brutality reached its culmination in the Thirty Years War (1618-48). At its close much of Central Europe was a wilderness of ruins, drenched with the blood of the slain, rent with agonised cries of torment, looted by mercenaries, and traversed by pitiable bands of refugces among whom mass madness and cannibalism were not infrequent" (Schuman p. 69). The peace that ensued, usually referred to as the Peace of Westphalia (1648) was the very first of the grand settlements which incorporated the verdict of arms into the public law of Europe. At the end of the prolonged and tedious peace conference which opened in 1642, three treaties were concluded one signed at Munster, January 30, 1648 between Spain and the Dutch; a second at Munster, October 24, 1648, between the Empire, France and the German princes; and a third on the same date, signed at Osnabmck, between the Empire and Sweden. In these treaties, religious freedom was acknowledged. Brandenburg began the process of expansion which was to lead to the crealion of the kingdom of Prussia. The House of Hapsburg was humblcd by thc House of Bourbon. Francc summarily bccame the dominant power in Europe (Schuman p. 70). From the ongoing, the modem statc syslem might be said to Icdc evolvcd wilh the signing of Lhe trcaly of Wcstphalia in 1648 uhich cndcipl thc Thirty years war. It rccogniscd for the first time, the 'naii.pcndcncc and sovereignty of several European sovereign units. ,.>" AC UINLS cnicrgcd largely as a result or lhc "related supercession central govcrnmcnt ovcr fcudal decentralimion and state mlonom) o\ cr lran,ccndcnt rcligious and secular aulhorily in Europc durmg Lhc sixlccnlh and scvcntccnlh ccnluries generally, and during Ihc Th~rlyycara' War ill parlicular" (Puchala 1971 p. 28). R.R. Pclllncr c,lplurc\ Lhc implica~ionsof Lhc emergence of the statc syslem Illus.

T1ic war\ of rcligior~ tlcspilc ~hcrcligious fcrocity shown by 1)arrls;uls ol hoth sidcs, wcrc no ~norcrcligious than Lhcy wcre political ... (They) were essentially a new 'form of the old phenomenon of feudal rebellion against higher central authority. "Feudal" when the world is used of the 16th, 17th or 18th centuries, generally refers not to nobles only, but to all sorts of component groups having rights within the state, and so including towns and provinces, and even craft guilds and courts of law, in addition to the church and the noble class. It remained to be seen whether all these elements could be welded into one body politic. If the reader will recall how hard it is in the Twentieth century to unify an army, navy and air force, or form a tariff union between two states not to mention the problem of international government, he may be less puzzled as to why the history of Europe, for centuries, seems to consist of struggles between "feudal decentralization" and "central power". @.I 14) In essence, it does not mean that states had not existed earlier. They did exist in medieval Europe but not in the way we know them today, under a central authority or ruling houses. Preceding the treaty of Westphalia, international society was exceptionally feudal, made up of baronial fiefs. walled towns, monasteries, tradesmen's guilds, ,secular and clerical social classes and City-states. It was a hierachically organised world from God, the Pope, the Emperor, Kings and Princes all the way down. Each political unit was subordinate to the unit above it. Prior to the Thirty Years War, there were pressures emanating from the rising propertied class who rebelled against for a recognition of their superordinate position in society which would necessarily mean the recognition of the autonomy and independence of the evolving European states in the Holy Roman Empire. Transformations in the International System The western essentially European state system has lasted for more thaii four centuries which might be said to be a durable system. What has happened to the system since 1648? There are arguments to the effect that the system is cyclical and that there are some patterns of relations that have played themselves out. If it is cyclical, where do we stand in the cycle? There is also another argument which posits that the system is secular, that what the system is today is different from what it was a century or two ago and that the secular trend is predictable. F.H. Hinsley puts a good deal of stress on the disappearancc of the Charlemagne pattern and its substitution with the balance of power strategy(Hins1cy 1967). The Charlemagne pattern is such in which powerful kings in the post Westphalia world, sought to recrcatc an cmpirc in the mould of thc Holy Roman Empirc. Louis XlV, thc Napoleons, William 11, Hitlcr, all tricd in onc way or thc othcr to ... .. X establish a new empire only to be thwarted by a grand coalition. Why do we get periodic challenges to the state system in history and counter coalitions to contain them, something that is referred to as the great aggressor - grand alliance? The great aggressors come from elites in countries undergoing rapid,change in the accumulation of material wealth. This causes them to perceive themselves and thus their country to be disadvantaged by the existing status quo. They think that the solution to this situation is that they are justified, obligated to go outside inorder to rebuild the world in the way they see it. A leader emerges within this elite whose ego grows, he believes in his own divinity, legitimacy, Napoleonic inclinations. In Hitler, you find the ideology of living space and racial purity. Are these motivations sincere? Where does one draw the line of political expediency and morality? How strong is ideology a moving force in history? People tend to believe certain things. Such beliefs might not come from historical experience. Some of the grand mistakes in history occur because people believe the wrong things and act on them. The perception that the relative distribution of power had changed and that he who felt disadvantaged by the earlier system could now go to take advantage of ii are often frustrated. This is because such new aspirmls to a hcgcrnonic status start to make attempts to domillate thc s)f!;i(:ail loo early before thzy are really ready. Thcy do not come to und-rsfand rtneir lack Of appreciation of the nature of pwcr in the intcrriational system until they are defeated. With the nature of weapons of conflict today, those who would want to upturn the status quo would not have to rcsort to it through wars or else it would lead tu their entire destruction. For the past one hundred years, secular patterns had crept into European and world politics. This came about as a result of changes brought about in the economy by the industrial revolution. Since the industrial revolution, there has been an exponential rise in the growth of cities and this made it easier to mobilise peoples. Complementing the growth of cities is the development of new cleavage patterns in society - with the entry of the capital owning classes into governments, working class agitation grew, backed by ideological writings such as Das Kapital or Lenin's tracts. Equally, socialist parties dedicated to working class interests sprouted up and probably as a result of their activities, there was extension of sufferage, unions were formed and it was legal to go on strikes, there was greater allocation of resources to such welfare services as health services, old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and appropriations in social services. Spending over defense grew by leaps and bounds. What emerged was the of foreign policy - the masses became involved as a result of their activities in the making of foreign policy. The big jump in these devdopments in Western countries, occured in the post Second World War period. It could have started earlier but it got pushed back by the depression. An imperative was thus created in these countries to govern with an eye to what the masses are thinking about or else there could be mass action that could lead to catastrophic consequences. The impact of democracy on foreign policy has been to enhance the economic imperative. The pressures of the masses at home for their economic well being cause governments .to go into the international system to seek growth through trade, ymodity agreements, areas of intemational investment and capital flo g. The other dimension has to do with the security of the state but this has been supplanted by economic issues. You' strive not to be cut off from international markets and you do not allow your balance of payments to suffer too much. You find this phenomenon in intra-west relations and in the dialogue between the North and the South, it has become increasingly difficult distinguishing between domestic and foreign politics. A third dimension of change in international politics is what Geoffrey Baraclough points out in his book written about three decades earlier about the dwarfing of Europe and the emergence of the pacific age, shift of gravity, demographic transition, decline of colonialism and the democratization of foreign policy (Baraclough 1964, pp. g-153). Baraclough indicates that change became rapid after 1890 and completed itself by 1960. He saw the inauguration of Kennedy as the end of the European age. Kennedy thought that 'the United States had the resources to do whatever she wanted to do in the world, complete opposite of Mcarthy who blamed all communist success in the world on some bad eggs in the United States. The passing of the European age is an important phenomenon for the student of world politics today. The nineteenth century had seen a shift in power from France to Germany. German population, industrial growth, and finally the achievement of unification, the development of rail roads and hard surface were critical variables which rewarded her more than other powers except those who could carry their goods by water. Although British monopoly of the ocean world demonstrated a great capacity to reroute things, however, this was eroded by the rise of Russia, the rise of Japan, the growth of US industry and the rise of Germany. The decision of the Germans in 1898 to create a large navy drove Britain into Europe in quest of overseas alliance, a world in which peace was dependent on building a trjpple alliance, creating a committee of imperial defence, alliance with Japan and generally give up the advantages of insular position. After the first World War, the Russians went into revolution and the Americans into isolation. A further manifestation of the passing of thc Europcan age is the globalization of world politics. Initially, international politics was European and chistian. Thr mcslems were regarded as infidels and thus the Crusades, but by the 1850s. Turkey was admitted into the family of European nations which meant in effect that religion could not stand on the way of interactionbetween nation stales. Beyond this was the phcncnsnon c\f imper;ialism. Through , the Latin American5 and latcr tke Asians and Africans were brought into the system of international relations. A very importan! change that has occured in international relations is in the realm of military technology and foreign policy. If we look at the past four hundrcd years of great aggressor - grand alliance, we can see that thc family of great powers has continued to shrink especially in the military sphere which had hitherto been the measuring rod of great power status. Today, we have a military technology in which the decisive events in a war would occur in the first day thus meaning that you would not have any time to engage in any war time military mobilization. Whatever it was that provided stability in 1945, there are strong reasons to doubt that they would continuc to rcpeat themselves. If you have the notion that a nuclear war is an inhuman way of solving problems in a Third World War. you then find that you have to do all the things you would have done after the war was fought, beforc the war because there might be no human life to engage in such planning after the war. If there have to be allianses, they havc to be formcd in peace timc what is usually referred to as pcace time dcfcr: Y mobilization. War-time alliance formation is outmoded in Lhc nuclcar age. I1 is no more a question of insular powers being able to provide equilibrium because of their insularity. In the nuclear and spacc age, insularity has lost its credibility. Balance of Power Mechanism Balance of power, a mechanism which had marked the intemational relatioils of the state system since its inception in 1648 has undergone some changes and migh~need to be re-examined. The theory sees the whole western state system as being based on the Newtonian gravilational pull. All the various bodies, the greater and lesser powers (the states) are poised' against one another and exercised a gravitational pull on themselves. When any of Lhese bodies, for one rcason or the other, increased its power to such an extent that the gravilalional order would be tilled in its favour, all the others would recovcr an cquilibriurn by producing new combinations. If not so, the ovcrgrowrl power would become so great that it would swallow up the rcsl (Butterfield, 1967 p. 132). Therc is a belief that lhis model of inlcrnalional rclations has also played itself out. First, the family of grcat powcrs has shrunk from five to two and probably LO one. This perccplion derives from the role of mililary technology in international relations. In the post 1945 world in which the United States and the former Soviet Union were the dominant powers, they engaged in internal balancing rather than go into nuclear war per se (Waltz, 1979 pp. 163-170). In other words, both countries in their nuclear development, produced one weapon or the other to deter one another rather than resort to nuclear war which could lead not only to their collective suicide but to those of the rest of the world. This was a way of endorsing the theory in a nuclear era where there are two super powers. Kenneth Waltz had even gone further to pose that a bipolar world was better than a multipolar world because who was a threat to who, who was a danger to who were much more certain than in a multipolar world (p. 165). In the post 1989 era, an era which in military terms would be called a unipolar era, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the fighting and the winning of the Gulf War, how would the theory of balance of power be addressed? Would new combinations be designed to show the prevalence of the theory in economic terms such as the trade wars between the United States, Western Europe and Japan? Hedley Bull had seen the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China and the Soviet Union playing the balance of power act in the post 1945 era in the same manner as England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia from the mid-eighteenth century (Bull, 1977 p.102). Stanley Hoffman was even sceptical that what obtained in the bipolar era could be called balance of power. There were according to him certain conditions that made the balance of power work in the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, there were five or six actors of comparative strength, a central balancing mechanism (the ability of all the actors to coalesce in order to blunt the expansion of one or more powers), the existence of a common language or code of behaviour among the major actors, a hierarchy of power whereby the small states entrust their independence to the balancing mechanism, none of which in his estimation existed at the time he was writing. Although he saw the then super powers at the helm of international power equation, there are various competing centres of power in the various realms of global interdependencies - trade, ideological influence, currency, oil, food and technology (Hoffman, 1972, 1973, 1978). CHAPTER 2 THE SUPER POWERS: COLD WAR, DETENTE AND A NEW WORLD ORDER

~'wocountries in the post 1945 world, the former Soviet Union and the United States were identified as super powers. In the nineteenth century, France, Britain, Austria, Prussia (Germany) and Russia (the Soviet Union) were the dominant powers in Europe and hence, the guarantors of the European status quo. They were then referred to as Great Powers due essentially to the performance of their armies in the field of battle. The concept, super power is a way of distinguishing the type of power possessed by the former Soviet Union and those of the United States from other similarly powerful countries in Europe such as Britain, France and Germany and others in Asia such as China and Japan. The concept was coined by Professor W.T.R. Fox. A perceptive diplomatic historian, he dates the entry of the United States into the family of great powers in the late nineteenth century when she mounted a huge military arsenal in its . Her isolation from European politics, a situation that was forced on her( by her geographical location made her look inwards and to dbvelop a technical and industrious work force superior to the European industrial revolution. By 1890, the United States had built a large navy, a period the naval strategist, Alfred Mahan started to suggest that there was a naval power in the making. In the SpanishJAmerican war in 1899, the United States dealt a big .blow on Spain and took and the Philippines without the major powers in Europe, France, Germany, Britain and Austria - Hungary raising a hand. She further silenced Britain in Venezuela. The opinion of her president, Theodore Roosevelt was sought in the peace settlement in Algiers. In the stalcrnate that ensued in the First World War, the United States mobilised more than four million men, one million of who went into Francc and tilted the outcome of the war against Kaiser Germany. Ir, !hc pcacc sctllernent of Versailles, she set the terms of agreement in ~hcPaciTic and after founding the League of Nations, withdrew into isolalion. Howcver, in 1922, she convened the Washington naval conkrcncc in wh~chthe Japanese participated thus holding ae forth bclorc lhc outbrcak ol the JapaneseIAmerican war in 1941 (W.T.R. Fox, 1944). Thc Sovict Union had participated as the imperial Russia in the 1ntcm;111on,1lpol ilics prcccding the twentieth century. In those years, Russia was not accepted as a truly European power. It was not a Caucasian country. It was predominantly Slavic and in the post revolution period, it was partly Asiatic and partly Slavic. In the twentieth century, after the revolution in 1917 the chsxvy sf it? social system to , all the Europesr~,,~owtrs irn~da;;d:rg the United St.alcc turned against her partly to r a i-- :R -%vtslv' * daii partly bec,.msc Russia had withdraw:: rrt~;h- W*C i;:-.< cbs XSL~ Germany. The Bolsheviks who tt: :it p-x.,. !!I& tev01:lsr:~s had rcasoncd that such an alli~nceagaia?.: Kar:,er f ~~-nt~anywas nght if the impcrial Russ~.!!~rrg1;T was i~ pwwr but wrong since, by the revolu~11 9.; .-I. 1.1 !-at1 wjfhdrawn from the camp of imperialism. The ai!~:.c! . -:, ;? Russia, the civil war and the renewed German of'fc~~,3.1 hussia which ended in the signing of the treaty at Brest Litovsc 111 March 1918, sapped the new Soviet state of strength. how~kcr,as far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, their revolution had triumphed. Unfortunately, its triumph set in stage, the next form of isolation: isolation for the fact that it was the only socialist' state in the world. It took quite a considerable number of years for the capitalist world to start to do international busiiless with a regime which had abolished private property in the means of production and nationalised the commanding heights of its economy. Invoking the Soviet perception of "capitalist encirclement" to enfeeble the new socialist regime, the Bolsheviks using mainly inhuman methods, rcbuilt the Soviet state into a military industrial super state so that by the time the Nazis struck in June 1941, it was not a blitzkrieg but their waterloo. The Soviet Union fought in the anti -Hitler coalition, loosing, about twenty million lives and imposed socialism on the states of East and Central Europe. From henceforth until the arrival of a ncw world order, we have had two types of international relations: those between socialist countries and those between capitalist countries subsumed into a global system of capitalist intcmational relations. In distinguishing between the post 1945 powers in what he calls "chcss-boards" Hcdley Bull points oul that

On Lhc chess-board of strategic nuclear deterrence the United States and the Soviel Union are supreme players, China is a novice and Japan does not figure at all. On thc chcss-hoard of conventi:wr milimy strength thc Unitcd Statcs and thc Soviet Union api:.: . : Ic;~dingplaycrs bccausc of thcir abil~tbto deploy non nuclcrx ;!r ::i :i fm-cc in many parts of thc world, ('liina is a lcss impor~ntplayel hccausc the armcd forcc it h;~scan bc dcploycd only in its own ' i~~~mcdiatcvicinity, and Japan is only a n~inorplaycr. On thc chess- ho:rrds of ~ntcrnationai~noncury affairs and ~nternationaltradc and in\cstmcnt the United St;~tes;IIII~ Japan arc lcading players, the S(\\,~c.t['rrion much lcss i~npor~:rnt:rnd China rcl;lr~ivclyimportml. ..- .' On the chessboard of influence derived from ideological appeal it is arguable that China is the preeminent player (Bull, p. 112). In further distinguishing the super pwrs from other powers Kenneth Waltz says that,

In 1976, for example, the Soviet Union's military expenditures were well over 90 per cent of the WTO total, and those of the United States were about 75 per cent of the NATO total. In fact if not in form, NATO consists of guarantees given by the United States to its European allies and Canada. Furthermore,

...two losses of Chma in the post-war world - first by the Uniib,. Slates and then by thc Soviet Union - were accommodated without disastrously distorting, or evcn much affecting. the balance between Amcrica and Russia. Nor did France, in withdrawing her forces from NATO, noticeably change the bipolar balance. That American policy nced not be mad:: for thc sake of France helps to explain her partial defection (W~I~A,p. 169).

One of tkr i~l(:~tsuccinct analysis of Soviet power in contradistinction to that of the United States and which is germane to the evolution of the new world order is the analysis done by Professor Robert Legvold. He, like others, recognised that the Soviet Union was a powerful country. Nevertheless:

...most are also agreed that the Soviet Union is a seriously flawed power economically disadvantaged, technologically deficient. bureaucratically sclerosced, and threatened by a society that is, in 's words, "like a boiling subterranean volcano (straining) against the rigid surface crust of the political system." Something of a deformed giant, Enceladus with fifty withered arms. mighty in military rcsources and exhilarated by its strength, but backward in other respects and sobered by the need to enlist the West's help in overcoming these problems (Legvold, 1977 pp. 50- 51). As far as Legvold is concerned, power is the ability "to reshape the parts of the international order and for the powerful that is a capacity to compromise - to make concessions." Power also includes "allowing monetary regimcs or the law of the sea to take another form, allowing the IMF, GATT or ihe ECM to be changed or supplanted, and allowing other global economic goals, such as income distribution to have their day" (p. 56). Power has a lot to do with the way in which global interdependencies are managed. "To be positioned at the intersection of numerous and different forms of interdependence is power - unless too many of them are seriously unequal. So also is opting out of interdependent relationships to the extent that minimizing vulnerabilities enhances power." A nation which sidelines itself "reduces its power to the extent that the rewards of participation are passed up." But that is only the beginning for power in an interdependent world "also depends on how fungible other's dependencies are (i.e., how easily their dependencies in one realm can be converted to offset yours in another) ind how servicable your vulnerabilities are (that is, where interdependence is asymmetrical, how much others hurt themselves by hurting you)" (p. 56). Legvold's analysis of Soviet power in the period of transformations in the late is very instructive in explaining the demise of the Soviet Union not only as a super power but also as a sovereign and independent unit. He points out that:

If power is to be measured in terrlrs of a country's ability ro ferry material support great distances to friends fighting in settings like Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union is immeasurably stronger than it was fifteen years earlier when Patrice Lumumba needed help. But if it is to be measured in terms of a country's ability to intervene over the same distances with its own military forces when it does not have friends or when we move to prevent it, the Soviet Union is not strong enough. If it is to be assessed in terms of a country's ability to obtain the material resources it needs without fear of outside interference, the Soviet Union is less well-off than it was ten years ago but a good deal better off than we. But if it is to be assessed in terms of a country's ability to influence the economic decisions of others impinging on its interests, the Soviet Union is better off now, but not nearly so well off as we (p. 56). It therefore follows that the description of the Soviet Union as a super power was exclusively in the military sphere. Legvold furthcr says that,

Where arms are an uncontested entree, the Soviet Union has a growing capacity to influence and, in some rare instances like Angola, to decide events. But sometimes, as in the Horn of Africa, even where ordcr is breaking dam. and 'the Soviet acccss considerable, confusion and cross-cutting interests foil effective Soviet influence. In general, the Soviet Union has a conspicuously greater capacity than it did to contain our use of military force and, to that extent, to influence events. But where it is the shades of Soviet power that worries us, as in Europe, if Soviet influence grows, it will largely be influence that we have created; when the actual resort to force is so implausible, then dangers like that of "Finlandization" are far more a matter of our state of mind than of actual Soviet capabilities (p. 59). The Cold War, 1945-1970 The Cold War may be defined as a war Sought, short of direct military confrontation between the supcr powers. Almost everything about the ongins of the Cold War is debatable - whcn, where, what, how, why and who is responsible for the Cold War. However, two clear cut schools of thought about the have been in contention: the Orthodox school and the Revisionist school. The Orthodox School This school was practically unchallenged until the outbreak of the . The first orthodox view comcs from the traditional power political school of international relations. It points out that the clash of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable at the end of thc Second World War. In a balance of power framework, the United Statcs was scen as the maintainer of equilibrium while the Soviet Union was the disturber of equilibrium or a discquilibrist (Morgcnthau, 1951). The second orthodox view focuses on the character of the Sovict Icadcr, . This view does not agree that it is balance of powcr or communist ideology that causcd the Cold War but the paranoia of onc man, Stalin, his feelings of insecurity and his search for security. His forcign policy in Europe was scen as compcnsation for his failurcs in the domestic front (Shulman, 1963). A third orthodox view secs Soviet foreign policy as dcsigned to seaich for weaknesses in the opposite camp. It is like a hotel bugglcr who tries to gct into a hotel through an open door. This vicw has been attributed to late Scnator Jackson of Washington. Of all thesc intcrprctations, the most influential is that attributed to Gcorgc Kcnnan, a former United Statcs ambassador to the Soviet Union. His position bccamc an article of faith in US policy towards the Soviet Union. Kcnnan proposcd a policy of of the Sovict Union. He suggested that thc sources of Soviet "aggression and cxpansion" emanatcd from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the view that contains thc seeds of its own destruction and imperialism must lead to war and revolution. Although Soviet lcaders cxpccted thc collapse of the non communist world in a revolutionary upheaval, Keman cautioned that no Soviet leader took this view with haw. Rathcr, thcy warn against taking revolutionary action, prcmaturcly. After taking a long lcrm view of thc Soviet political system, the endless process of consolidation of pqwcr in the Soviet Union by the Bolsheviks, the bad state of Soviet economy, domestic , generational conflict, fractional struggle, Kernan forecast the eventual break up or mellowing of the Soviet system (Kernan, 1947). The Revisionist School The revisionist school reared up its head during the Vietnam War when many scholars became dissatisfied with earlier explanations concerning United States involvement in international conflicts. Their first main point is that Soviet behaviour in international conflicts was reactive and perhaps defensive to the actions of the United States. The explanation starts from the Kussian revolution in 1917, a purely internal Russian affair, when ucstcrn annies were sent into Russia on the +f cf counter revo1utions:ics ill ordei to overthrow the new Soh ic' mrr They carry their analyses into thc history of Europe in the aiWF war ymrs when western policies contributed to the rise of Na3-ir aml whearcd the suspicious attitudes of the Bolsheviks, who had ::a &ci. dealings with the west, been accustomed to treat them with suspicion. The west in Soviet view had appeased Thzi Germany at Munich; they had hoped when the Nazis turned against the Soviet Union in June 1941 that both countries would bleed themselves white and in the anti-Hitler coalition, the west had prevaricated in setting up a second front (Gaddis, 1972). The turning point came after Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri in February 1946 in which he had said that an "" imposed by the Soviet Union had descended over the heart of Europe. The implication of the speech was that a permanent division had been wrought in the heart of Europe by the machinations of Joseph Stalin such that the inviduous business going on in the eastern half was not perceptible to the othcr half. This statement rigidified thinking over an eastern communist half and a western capitalist half. Finally, the revisionist school further explains the reason behind the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two Japanese islands in 1945. According to the revisionist view, US President Harry Truman chose to drop those bombs onJhese territories to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States possessed a penultimate weapon with which it could annihilate the Soviet Union in a future war. Several weeks before the dropping of the bombs, the Japancse who had fought on the side of the Germans had given every indication of thcir wish lo surrcndcr. The dropping of the bombs funhcr drovc thc Sovicts into sccking means of offsetting the American advanlagc and might have lcd to thc murderous that markcd. mqch. of thc Cold War cra (Alperovitz, 1970). Practical Steps in the Manifestation of the Cold War Kennan's article on the nature of Soviet behaviour in the post war years and the way to contain it, became the cornerstone of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Between 1946-47, the Soviet Union was identified in American perspectives as an expansionist power. The policies designed to meet its expansionism were enshrined in the , the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), the , and the incorporation of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. All these brought Soviet counter measures embodied in Zhdanov's speech of a two camp world in which the Soviet Union must be an impediment to US globalist designs. The Soviets erected Cominform as an institution to manage the affairs of communists in Eastern Europe and military cooperation in the Warsaw Treaty organization (WTO) was seen as a counterweight to the NATO (Lafeber, 1972). The major arena of the Cold War was Germany. The problem revolved around how to deal with a defeated enemy who had the capability of reinvigorating itself and launching out into a future imperialism. Here, you had perceptions and misperceptions. There were problems regarding how Soviet, French, British and American forces would be positioned, whether the Rhur valley should be internationalised and whether Germany should be restored or destroyed. A breakdown in negotiations resulted in the creation of the Federal Kepablic of Germany in the Western zone and Soviet reply in the creation of a German Democratic Republic in the Eastern zone. Berlin, the capital of Germany was divided into two - West Berlin for the West and East Berlin as capital of the German Democratic Republic. The West moved the capital of the Federal Republic of Germarry to Bonn. The Federal Republic of Germany was rearmed and incorporated into NATO and the GDR became a member of the . With the outbreak of heKorean war in 1950, it became the extension of the Europcm theatre iri 4qia. Usmg the United Natio::.; urnbrclla, the I!uitc,l :i,w~ lt(~vvrdrile 'kontainment"' doctrme 111 pcactlce. 'I'hc L:cail ,.a1 h,:s :cvllr.wc.a 5j tx in 19112, the lndo Chiria and 'jicinam wars, the inauguration of the nuclear age, Sovlct acqu~sit~onof the nuclear device in 1949 and the recognition by both sides that in a nuclear war, neither side could suwive. Ncnce the summit meetings starting with Camp David between Ike Eisenhower and Nikita Kruschev u,. tn ihe ushering in of the era of dclcnte (La feber Ibrd.). Detente, 1970-1989 Detente is a French word which means thc r:laxatlora of tmsions bctween the supcr powers. Tllc tcnsions whlch had dccdmulatcd bctwecn the Sovict Union a~i:llc i'llilcd Statcs 4hcc LIIC in~~.~?~ir)nof the Soviet state, more especially in the Cold War started to show signs of waning by the late nineteen sixties. Earlier. in 1959. the first attempt to break with the tensions came in the Camp David summit between Ike Eisenhower and Nikita Kruschev. In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, both countries decided to install a hotline between Moscow and Washington to serve as a medium of direct consultations between the super powers in future crises. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, reversing Alexander Dubcheck's reforms of socialism tended to create the impression that the process at relaxing tensions between the super powers would be reversed. However, Soviet movement from inferiority to parity in some areas of nuclear armaments, made the process, an irreversible one. In 1969, West German , a package deal and a pragmatic effort by the West German government to come to terms with the outcome of the Second World War helped speed up detente even though initially, the effort created suspicions in the West of a deal between the Germans and the Soviets. At least for once, the West Germans were ready to ratify the post war status quo, a far cry from earlier West German governments which had persistently called for . The Bonn govemment accepted the post war boundaries, renounced the Munich agreement through which the west had given a blank check to Hitler to engage in a greater German homeland, showed a willingness to accept the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NNFT), a four power accord was reached on Berlin and collateral agreements were signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (La feber Ibid ) . In 1972, a summit meeting was held in Moscow between Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev and American President, Richard Nixon and an Anti-Ballistic Missile agreement (ABM) was signed between both countries. This is also referred to as SALT I ( Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ) . A SALT I1 agreement was also reached in 1978 but remained unimplemented due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Strategic Arms Limitation metamorphosed into Stratcpc Arms Reduction Talks (START) and agrecrnents on medium ranf1e weapons in the 1980s accclerated disarrnamcnt negotiatior~s over long range weapons, chemical and biological wcapons, lroop rrductions and increase in confidence building measures. Complcmcnling disarmament in the 1070s was American resort in Ihe Viclnarn war to the Vietnamization or !he 'c :etnamesc army 7 his mranl Ihal !he opcn cnded escalation of rbwa. #as ovcr. ?;.ub\cqucntly,n r: liv ,~ccordwas signed ovcr i ,cln;v- rn 1971 a14 tl,r 1 i~ll(rdSIi11c-. ~:t~i-~~lr~cdit4 withdrawal from II - ic. 1 19-75. LFetenittb and Problems of ~nter~retation Sov~c. onception of detcnle, carnc from its policy of' pcaceful c(,- stence of states with different social systems. It meant that in qn,. of ideological differences, socialist and capitalist states should coexist to save human civilization from catastrophe. It did not preclude the ideological struggle between states or within capitalist states (Bykov et al, 1981 pp. 87-140). The west understood detente otherwise. They felt that detente meant that the Soviet Union should Lone down the socialist ideology and should allow pluralism to obtain in Soviet (Shulman, 1973 pp. 35-58). A few years after the Moscow summit, there were recriminations about who was violating what, and who was ~bservingwhat. First, the Soviets felt that the JacksonIVanick proposals in Congress tying Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to better trade relations with the Soviet Union was a way of using detente against them. In SALT I, there were recriminations in Congress and among foreign policy experts that it did not favour the United States and this went a long way tu reinforce the JacksonJVanick proposals. In 1973, the Arab oil embargo against the West occured; the Bretton Woods order of international economic management had earlier collapsed in 1971. These brought about tensions in the western alliance between the United States and Western Europe, United States and Japan and Western Europe and Japan. All these challenged the basic premises of Detente - would the United States continue to fight an economic warfare with her allies while at the same time building bridges to the command economies of Eastern Europe? In 1973, Salvador Allende was overthrown in a military coup in which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the American State Department were feared to be involved. In Europe, Lhe United States took a hard line on . In 1975, Cuban forces, backed by the Soviet Union entered into Angola Lo suppon the socialist MPLA in the evolving civil war there and detente seemed to be in disarray. The whole history of East-West relations was marked by oscillat~onsbetween Cold War and Detente. Periods of Detente had trappings of Lhe Cold War while penods of the latter had trappings of Detente also. The 1970s wh~chm~ghl be regarded as a period of Detente werc full of tenslons reminiscent of Lhe Cold War. For example, In 1975 ~hc35 member Conference on Security and Coopcralion in Europc (CSCE) was perceived by the Soviet Union as a springboard for ~ntc~lcrcnccIn her inlernal affa~rs.In 1979, Soviet Lroops wcnL InLo Afghamstan and the American Congress refused to rat~fy SALT 11 In 1979, Samo~awas overthrown by the Commandanlcs In N1carq.w~and it sccmcd Cenlral America would bccomc a new ground lor ,I ~cncwcdCold Wdr In 1983, Lhe United S~atc\cntcrcd Grenatid and rcmovcd ~hcsocialist regime of Maurice B15hop from power. In Uc~cmbcrLhaL samc year, US medium range m~ssilcswcrc scnt lnlo Wcstcrn Europc as a counter measure to Lhe deployment of Soviet SS20s in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The New World Order Between 1982 to 1985, there were two successions in the Soviet leadership. succeeded Leonid Brezhnev and a few years after, Konstantine Chemenko succeeded to Yuri Andropv. In these successions, the old, rigid ideological posture ot thc Soviet Union in international affairs continued to manifesl itself. Every iawc was seen from the prism of balance of strength or baisnce of farrcs. Between 1970 to 1985, the Soviet Union had gone into ;L bic ~Lk~encc spending spree, strengthening its land based Inter-Co~~~r!t:i,:df39' J KL. c Missile (ICBM) to the point of threatening US Niinutcman rr,issi!cs i.1 hardened silos. On the American side, then: vras 1 4ivtr:itrrl :.j it,:: Y'-r Wars Programme or the Strategic Defense Inltnw~z(S1Yj. 1 his w r-; ;. defence shield emmated to cost ahout twenty s!. 'J.~!ir..l d:\!lz!c, a. research stdge which could prevent ir~comingS ,pi;[ 11:&1r,; fil.~X reaching their targets in the United States. Thc 12c? of this e ho:~;Gng expenditure which in the final maljsis would drliil~ons of '!31im was intended to draw the Soviets i~!man am': T?SC which &ould Irlc~:! hn already ailing Sovict economy v6h~te a;ld pry ent it frum bein& able to provide even for the minimal needs of the Soviet socie~j: (Echezona, 1992 pp. 146-149). The United States backed the 4fqhan Mujahadeen guerillas against the Soviet installctI rcgime in Kabal. They supported the Contra guenilds in %lcaral;t.m and backed the UNITA movement in Angola. It can be seen that the forces which broulrl,t Vikhatl Gorb,?ch=v Into power in the MarcNApril 1935 plcnum ('I tile ( or~~rrluni~tLJ~l?y of tnc Sovi?! ljnion (CPXT) ut8r.?l;tr~j hot11 iri th? i?tcm:itin?al alem and witI11:i ~hcYovict :-I~IOII ~ts~lf.::dlt;fijc~ig the cvc::cs ~n the lnlcrnal~;),~:~l4ywm in 1tv: 1970,,. ~hr;:,: u& ,\ crying need Lo restructulc intsxal lcm) rc!:tltc!.c a,:.,. ,, **, 1.1 war !o pcace. Thcsc were cornp1cnrcn:cd by dccpcr 'orccs ,v,iri~ri :!i~Sc!mr iirlion 'i'hc Sovict cconomy uds a~ling,the wcst had alll~dcdto il lor quiic a long time hut in the hitter idc .logical dehalc of that cra, the Soviets had rcfused to dcknowlcdgc that Pact A ~111tarySJ~CT ~II v~cr !he .wl\ ' 7,~lic.,t~ was unu~~cst~onably,in corrpallrtm to the l!nitcd :ifnLcs In 15c ccollonilc spherc. 'I th~rdv.or11~ sV.lr: 11 kcme ahandarlllv neccssarj to stccr iiic Sovlct econom, ,iway lrom a wdr prme 13 : coriwmcr nm ie pn A4 Idr h,ick I< 1)ctcmhcr 1984 whcn hc was yct thc nurnhcr r~o 1n.m In I~LK~CITIIII~. x1r4 rh,it~hcr had r~msrkcdaltcr h~svis~t LO 8r11,mtt1,11 M kh,111('o,h,ich(~v w,~s 'i man thc wcst could do husine4s A 11h 01,LL . , ; - ,I p btr li~\.d.o~~~.a-LXJIIL.(CS of gl J~II(W(~OI - \~LT):~~\ 1 ,, 1, lr 1 L ! , ,II~OIIII,r,,~t~~1clllr~:ip) 11111t: ~,vlrc1vhJ "new thinking" in international affairs. He threw one disarmament proposal after another: a stage by stage gl~baldenuclearization by the end of the century, a unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. The authenticity of the moratorium was attested to by American seismologists both in Nevada in the United States and in Semipalatininsk in Kazakhstan. The resultants effect of these peace offensives were the four summit meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and in Geneva. Reykjavik, Washington and Mescow which led to the signing of the Intermediate P9nge (INF) treaty. This treaty immediately showed the qualitative and quantitative difference between the Detente ushered in by SALT I in the 1970s and what might be regarded as the outlines of the new world order. In SALT I, the two countries were allowed ABM sites in Moscew and Washington. In the INF treaty, both sides agreed to destrey medium range weapons in the European theatre worth billions ef dollars thus making the INF treaty the first disarmament proposal in human history in which a whole range of weapons would be destroyed. These weapons constituted about six per cent of the nuclear arsenal in the whole world and started to strengthen thinking into the fact that nuclear weapons could, after all, be destroyed. Earlier, especially after the Star Wars speech of Ronald Reagan in March 1983, the Soviets had charged that a Star Wars programme was a violation of the ABM treaty, that such a shield would give the United States, first strike advantage. The Americans pointed to the Soviet radar complex in Krasnoyask as a violation of the ABM treaty also. Consequently, progress in disarmament was stalled by the Soviets tying it to complete American abolition of the Star Wars project (Echezona, 1992 Ibid). When the Soviets abandoned the whole issue of tying disarmament to Star Wars (since the intended achievement of the project seemed more of a dream than of reality) the INF treaty fell out like a package to be signed, ratified and implemented. The possibility grew for the reduction of strategic weapons by fifty percent, world wide. At Wyoming, in September 1989, the foreign ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union made important concessions and agreed to separate strategic weapons from the American Star Wars Plan, deal separately with qucstions of sea-based cruise missiles and strategic weapons and dismantle the Krasnoyask radar station. They also made progress in conventional forces and chcmical wcapons. Earlier, Mr. Gorbachev had announced unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals in the then Soviet bloc states in Eastern Europe. This did not sccm to mollify West Europeans especially the British and the Frcnch who, with somc Americans had started saying that the INF mxty put thc wholc Nonh Atlantic allian~ein jeopardy since the Sov~ctshad wpcrionty in conventional lorccs. Thcy tllercf~rcfclt that the alliance should seek ways to modernize its short range missiles. The discord which this last posture had posed for the western alliance, between the Gennans who did not want modernization and the rest who wanted modernization were patched up by reverberations in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, there was an upsurge in contacts between WARSAW Pact and NATO military personnel, American and Soviet General Staffs including their journalists at test sites, NATOlWARSAW military manoeuvres, joint visits to secret production sites, seminars in Vienna thus making confidence building measures no more a theoretical issue but a practical one (Echezona, 1992 Ibid.). A Common European Home In July 1989. made state visits to Britain. France and Germany. During those visits, he elaborated on a theme which he had provoked earlier, the concept of a common European home. When this idea was earlier muted, it received a cold respone from the United States and the West Europeans (except the Germans). How they had reasoned would one speak of a common European house when a wall divided Berliners from one another, when an "iron curtain" still existed in Europe, when communists and noncommunists had not yielded their rigid ideological postures? At Strasbourg, on July 6, 1989. Mr. Gorbachev elaborated further on the common European house. He told the twenty three member European parliament that the social and political order in Europe had changed in the past and could change in the future. He spoke of the specific right of every country to choose the social system it deemed fit. In such a situation, even allies had no right to interfere. He maintained that social democrats in Europe were the other complementary side to socialism (Echezona, 1990). This speech was made at a time when far reaching reforms had taken place in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, the Solidarity Trade Union Movement under Tadeusz Mazowiescki was in power, a striking fact when considered in the background of the events in the early 1980s in Poland - the banning of Solidarity and declaration of martial law by the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) under the leadership of General . For the first time. Communists had relinquished their hold on power in Poland. Similar processes were at pace in Hungary. Thus, there was an emergence at thc helm of the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) of elements dedicated toward reforms, a barbed wire fence (symbol of the Cold War) which had separated Austria from Hungary was tom down and a plural political structure was put in place. All thcsc had happcncd without Sovict intcrfcrcnce thus confirming the mcaning of his spccch elaborating 'his' concept of a common Europcan homc. It was an abandonmcnt of the Brczhncv doctrine which Brezhnev had proclaimed when the Warsaw Pact snuffed out the in 1968. In Gorbachev's imagery, a common European house meant a plural political system in every Eumpean country and thereby a common type of political system, joint ventures, the end of division by 'Wls and frontiers and European integration from the Atlantic to %e Ur&. Developments in East Central Europe East Central Europe has been a verv significant region in world politics. The First World War stadin Yugoslavia. The causus belli of the Second World War may be said to be Poland. And the whole region had been sandwiched in the politics of the Cold War. The systematic Sovietization of Eastern Europe took place from 1944 to February 1948. It started from the first phase of genuine coalitions in a plural political structure which varied from country to country. This was followed by bogus coalitions which were dominated by communists. The later laid the basis for the communist parties in Eastern Europe to seize power through the use of salami tactics or the use of force. Equally, American post war foreign policy of containment and the mobilization of the west took place in view of communist take over of Eastern Europe. Western diplomats in Eastern Europe worked with the opposition, the churches and dissidents. In 1948, a very important event occured in Eastern Europe - the Yugoslav/Soviet split. Hitherto, the west had viewed as monolithic. With the split, the west came to appreciate polycentrism within communism. They came to recognise that there were limits to Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Again, in the events of 1956, when, after Nikita Kruschev had proclaimed that there were several roads to socialism and the Hungarians took to the streets seeking to dismantle socialism, they were crushed by Soviet tanks, the west was confronted with the specter of what the Soviets could do when they were pressed to the wall. And this was instructive given the fact that there were flurries of events pointing towards a thaw in Europe: there was a wave of destalinization in Eastern Europe, an Austrian peace treaty was signed and a Geneva peace treaty was also signed. However, in 1968, Soviet tanks crushed the Prague experiment at reforms backed by a self assurance and assertiveness in the that had not been known in Soviet foreign policy before (Gati, 1976 pp.3-17). When, therefore Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, they were received with mixed feelings in the Soviet bloc as a whole. Their experiences in the 1950s and 1960s enumerated above had taught them to be cautious in following any Soviet example that would seem to indicate reforms of the socialist system. Moreover, all the regimes in the Soviet bloc except perhaps the new Soviet regime were Brezhnevite in composition, a whole crust which the Soviet reforms sought to pull down. They did not therefore receive the Soviet reforms with only skepticism but with antagonism also. Unknown to them were that the reforms in the Soviet Uhion would be quite encompassing and far reaching - dissidents were released and even late Nobel prize laureate, Andrei Sakharov was elected into the Supreme Soviet not on the Communist platform, but on a bloc, press freedom was allowed and the Stalinist and the Brezhnevite eras were opened up for debate and criticism. For the first time, entered into the Soviet dictionary in characterising past Soviet regimes. Mikhail Gorbachev had to submit himself for election as Soviet President in the Supreme Soviet and for the first time, viewers of Soviet television, Vremya could see their president openly criticised and his comportment at criticism, constituent Soviet nationalities would flare up and bum without the use of Soviet troops to quell them, Lithuanian communists would declare their independence from Moscow with only pleadings from Moscow for them to rethink (Echezona, 1992 Ibid). It was a thaw, an entire thaw and it seemed quite impossible that the Soviet bloc would go unaffected. From all indications, Mr Gorbachev desired that the Soviet bloc should fall in line. However, it would seem that he wanted things to evolve from within the East European countries themselves rather than as a result of some prodding from the Soviet Union. Poland was the first to respond. Polish opposition to the imposition of communism on her had vividly been attested to by the role of the Solidarity Trade Union Movement closely supported by the Catholic Church in the 1970s and 1980s in its struggle against communism. Hungary also followed suit, rehabilitating who was declared a non person in what had been referred to as a counter revolution in 1956 but in 1989, a revolution. A three man committee under Imre Posgazy was put in place to take charge of reforms. Caroly Grosz who had taken over from Janos Kadar, the communist leader was retired on pension. The Hungarian state which had hitherto been called the Hungarian Socialist Republic was simply called the Hungarian Republic and thc Hungarian Communist Party was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Party. The same processes werc also at pace in Poland. The other Soviet bloc countries secmed resistant to change: the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania. In fact, thcir leaderships startcd to trade insults csp:ltll.v with Hungary which had thcn becomr: an escape rodre ILr :&st Gemas into and with Rumanians over the treilimcnt 3f the Hurlgarian minority there. Thc Siwt crack occurcd in thc GDR: sass denlrqlst&iion§, resignation oP Eri~i431mkrr, , .; a:pldcement by Egcln Kxnz, contimrd illa.,s t~clndnstlatior,fo* 1; .(..ri of travcl and comple~te~democratization.The jarring open of the in ~ecemberq989marked the end of a major pillar of the Cold War and put back the issue of German reunification on the agenda of world politics. In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, mass demonstrations swept the communists out of power and inCt)ice?' places, coalition governments in which "the leading role" af the Communist party in society was no longer recognised. Rumania wasci@xt. A Stalinist regime under Nicolae Ceasescu had ruled Rumania for,(fnrty years with tight fists. Although, like the Yugaslav regime. tlic Rumanian regime was independent of Moscow, however, it.was orae of the most repressive regimes in Eastern Europe. The bloody rnaiwer in which the Rumanian regime ended in the close-of 1989 qhowcd the brittle nature of the neo-Stalinist foundations in".-A ~aste~ii'%'iir'b$. -- -__ It also sunk a long nail into the forty years of division of Europ%,m:er the Yalta agreements between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt (L.nczona., 1992 Ibid). The Malta Summit W". The Malta summit in December 1989 is as significam !,: aitd politics as the Yalta summit of February 1945. Thisb.was,thc :;;st rneetiz

I here are two critical pillars of the world order which became discernible from 1989 onwards. The first is peace and the second is pluralism. Peace had eluded the world partly because it had hitherto been seen with the framework of two ideologies, capitalism and socialism and domestic peace had also been absent because of the above rigid perspectives. As the world evolved into a new pattern of utzniational relations in the late 1980s. it would be necessary to see tic way three wan in which the super powers were involved in infferent ways came lo an end in the Gulf, in Asia and in Africa and ha: way in which Chinese students and workers sought to institute a j~lural political system in the largest country in the world. These ~~!uslstrationsmight indicate the trend towards order and hegemonism nr, an evolving new world order. e IranIIraq War The war between Iran and Iraq started in September 1980 and 1.dcd in 1988. Why did the war take so long? What made it end when Iranian revolution. 11 was iLvt a sucialist one. However, it involved a fundamentalist nisslem rckcuon, ruili-westem in content and aimed at the floutation of all ~h:norm associated with western perspectives on intemationai liiw ~il~has the rights of diplomats. Although the Iranians had run at cross purposes with members of the Organization for Ecmurnk Cogperation and Development (OECD) and NATO over illlegal Iranian terrorism, Britain followed by France had closed hcr cmbassy in Tehran over Tehran's general global attitudes which tcnltled to portray her as an outlaw. Nevertheless, after the Americans had e~~teledthe Gulf and called on their allies to follow suit since the tidf is the life wire of West European oil shipping, the West Europeans seemed to have dragged their feet. This gave the general impression that the United States could not obtain allied consensus over the Ciulf. But a few weeks after, the British and the French fleet entered into the Gulf, and the British were involved in the first skirmishes between Iranian revolutionary guards and the United States. Internationalization of the War It was obvious during the IranIIraq war that !hc lraqis who had a smaller population in comparison to the 1ran:i;uss and who were hard pressed by the Iranians on land were rh~illed by the internationalization of the war. They possessed supriorily in the air and had dealt severe blows on Iraniatl rqarillrne targets, oil installations and cities yet they wanted the imtemationidization of the war to further isolate Iran from the international community. The Iranians on the other hand least wanted the inre~~~ationalizationof the conflict since they reckoned that they stood a better chance to win. They had been at shelling range of the irnpor~antIraqi port of Basra. The Iranian population made up, predominan~ly of Shiite moslems seemed ready to carry the revolution, their matyrdoin to eternity. 'Ibis was the crux of the prolongation of the conflict. While one side wanted the presence of outside powers, the other did not brook it. And all the major powers were ranged in one way or the other, against the Iranians except the Soviet Union which i! would seem, tried to maintain a balance between Iran and Iraq ill the conflict. A United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 of July LO. 1987 calling for immediate ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations was quickly accepted by the Iraqis while the Iranians placed conditions before they could accept a ceasefire: the abdication or overthrow of Iraqi strong man, Saddam Hussein, and an Iraqi acceptance of blame for starting the war. The West neither accepted the lranian conditions nor danced to their tune since the Iranian revolution had dimensions beyond the Persian Gulf (Echezona, Uilpub. 1992, p. 10). The United Arab Emirates and Oman were targets of the Iranian rcvolution as well as the whole moslem world. In the 1987 Hajj opcrations in Mccca, two hundred and seventy-five Iranian pilgrim:, died as a result of riots instigated by them. In the Arab world, there was no clear line about how to deal with Iran. Though one of their strongest supporters, the Libyans tried to nudge them to accept the UN ceasefire, Syria stood squarely behind the Iranians. A complex situation existed for Syria where while the Saudis, one of Iran's least Arab friends bankrolled Syria's Middle East Wars and economy, Syria remained Iran's best friend. United States Policy USentry into the Persian Gulf war started with the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers to ensure their smooth passage through the Gulf. Later, mine forces were moved in and sufficient fire power was brought in to provide enough fire against Iranian missiles and bases. The United States claimed that it was exercising its right to be in intcmational waters, the same right she claimed when she dealt with thc Libyans the previous year. The Secretary General of the United Nations General Assembly, Perez de Cuellar gave an ultimatum to Iran to cnter into a ceasefire with Iraq or face the wrath of the intcmational community. On September 24, 1987, the peace process took a hard knock when an Iranian mine laying ship was battered by American helicopter gun ships, killing three Iranians and capturing about twcnty five of thcm. The Iranians vowed that the American action would not go unpunished. The United States sounded an alarm on its mission throughout the world about a possible Iranian terrorist activity. Thc Soviet Union called on all foreign powers to withdraw from thc Gulf and give the belligerents, Iran and Iraq, room to ncgotiatc among themselves (Echezona Unpub. 1992 p. 12). The Security Council Thc UN Sccurity Council Resolution 598 of July 1987 on thc war was thc first such unanimous resolution in thc Council sincc the 1973 bctwccn thc Arabs and the Israelis. Thc UN intcrccssion in thc war was lost at thc carly start of hostilitics. UN Sccrctary Gcncral, Pcrcz dc Cucllar's call for a ceascfirc after the cnlption of hostilitics in Scptcmbcr 1980 was not sustaincd bccausc of thc intcmational climate [hat obtaincd thcn. In Iran, therc was intcmal turmoil as thc rcgimc of Ayatollah Khomcini tottcrcd from onc crisis to thc othcr. This might havc causcd thc Iraqis to intcrvcnc 10 scttlc an old 'fcstcring border disputc. Thc Iraqi rcgimc undcr Saddnm Husscin had figured that givcn thc intcmal chaos in Iran, thc rcgimc would not only knuckle undcr but would quickly capitulate to lraqi dcmands if struck from outsidc. In thc UN Sccurity Csunci.1; Iraq had influcnccd thc scvcn non pcrmancnt non-aligned mcmbcrs not to .;upport a Sewiry Council debate on the war. And so, the Security Council could not muster thc vccessary nine votes to meet to discuss the issue. -eI d;s. embittered !he iranlans who charged that the United Nations was an impotent 01.~3nir1:im under the dominance of the super powers aad Zionists. Thc lrdriians therefore seemed disposed to fight the war to :IS l-ittcrrst cr.!s. Though the Iranian political system had a?.ror,!ticd, it d4 lmt unravel. However, the disposition of the interm'.ional community caused them to further continue to trample ovcr !n:crF::icn~! !2w using their ties to Shiite muslims in the Arab ~~~ildcsy.?:ially I..cbanon to obtain concessions from Britain, the Un%d Stslrs mi Fwm What was behind the new fcund unanimgty :n tr:rurity Cmncil to seek an end to the war in 1987? Ii the w;: were not internationalized especially by the west, it secned 1iZel) that Iran was more capable of defeating Iraq. Such a sceraio ven~edunacceptable not only to hie super powcrs but to Brit\i;l, F:;;I;Lc arrd China, permanent members of the Security i:oih3~il.tile perception was that if Iran won the war, she would becc;n:c the dominant pwer in the Persian Gulf and would be in a po::ton ro threaten the stares within its periphery with its brand of rvoiinm fundamentalism. If Iran won the war, she would institute a rcgime for he Persian Gulf the life wire of West European and Japafiese shipping. US entry into the Persian Gulf with forces in being, changed the whole equation in the Gulf thus giving the United States a pretext to station permanent forces there and become the preponderant Gulf power (Echezona, Ibid. 1992 p. 14). The End of the War In the wake of the IranJIraq war, me United States had gone into the Gulf to protect, according to her, international shipping. Thc protection of international shipping snowballed into sending forcc5 into the Gulf. On July 3, 1988, an American naval ship, USS Vincemes, downed an Iranian Jumbo jet over the Persian Gulf killing all its nearly three hundred passengers. A day before the incident in the Gulf, a naval war had erupted between the Iranians and thc Americans. It was in the aftermath of this mew that Q,e jumbo jet was shot doan. When this i~cidentoccured, the Americans had claimcd ;hat they h?d shot down dn Iranian F-14 fighter air craft. But aftcr a few kmrs, 11 tmirzn: ol?vious to the Americans that it was a civilian air crafi T?lc ship's cap!m had claimed that the aircraft was flying directly to ilis ship ro the point that it was impossible to say if it was a cibllian 9r militarl. aircraft. A compariwn ms:r,ade of this incident to thc downing of :t Korcw J,r.-,h ,:t by Soviet air force jets five ycJr5 c~rl~crar:) I;?:! a' I:nnl;:I .:\ tl:, p;mcngers invokd in the Iranian ,lir I:n: I 1 ''II I.; ( ic-- 21, ,I> '*I .;(jrnt, !b aircralj hjd ,%I; 1% I' I I

c?. 9 %-- 1 I ?t * squarr tlecp ir~sidc I!r: :;crxiilive Soviet Kamchatka zone. Flying within Lhal zone was :'.rni:rican spy plane. Two Soviet MIG planes immcdiatcly axnt :iii 10 intercept it. It was clearly identified as a civilian aircrirf'l.'l'r:~.~crs were fired several times from the MIGs for it to identify ilsrlf :ill no avail. 'The Soviet fighters shot it down to the conslemation of' IIY wide world. In the Gulf incident, the Iranian Jumbo jcl hxl ~;jkt-rkrql'l' Irorn Handar Abbas for Abu Dhabi, of which i.hc Arncric::~~~v~!i!+i"l wifh ils suwcillance was well aware. The flight path 01 l hc ~J;trlvn il.:15 :I onri rial course. The captain of the American ship ;,I:~irr?:.rj III;~! I:!!. '!ire-r-irf'l. W;IS morning towards his ship and hc. had no ;~!fu!r!:lli;!. fll;:;: lo ~pulit oul of action, How could the captain I:C)~)~IFCiI .Iumbu jr! ic!r ;HI t.:- 14'? Is this a problem of failure of naval ~cchr~ologjor thal 31' a p:wicky naval officer? Arguments had been madr tl.ra1 whcrcas tl-lc B'elxia~~Gulf was a war zone, Kamchatka was not. Some ct.)rnrnental.ors I~xlpointed out that Iran would retaliate whilc so~rcolhcrs though1 that it was a way of acting out her matyrdorn in Ihc race 06 revcrses in thcpar. This was buttresed -as. thcy nolcd by Lhc fact tha they did i;b?f&ci'2fter their pilgrims were mowed down in in [he Hajj operation in 1987 (Echczona, Unpub. 1992, p. 15). Two wecks after thc doivning of thc Jumbo jcl, the Iranians acccptcd UN Reso!uiion 598 calling for an end to the Iran/Iraq war. In facr, ;I Scc1.1rilyC'ouncll debate on the downing of the Jumbo jcl was srill goin}!, on \vhc:n news of Iranian acceptance of UN Resolution 5'38 was trar~srnittr,d.Ir;r~i had bccn boycotting the Security Council sincc thr. onsi.1 of I hc conflicr. In accepting the Resolution, they also droppcd their tl~~~r~arid.;!'or i~pponioningof blamc for the start of the war on Iraq and rIw overthrow of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. Perhaps, by coi~~citic~cc,a day bcforc thc Iranian acceptance of Rcsolulion 598, Satidam tlusscin, in a radio broadcast, had called on Iranians to accept pcacc in thc face of rcvcrscs they had suffcrcd in thc war, in the prcvious !i;n:c rnonlhs: loss of'thc Fah peninsular which thcy had occupicd iri::itfc Iraq two years carlicr which invariably dislodgcd them frc.irn shclling nrngc of' the porl of Basra, a crucial porl to the Iraqis (Ecl~cioria,Ilnpub., 1992, p. 16). Indicalions rl~dIr;!t; migli! change taclics in the war had comc with ~hcchange o! ::!irrlrrr;lrrd, !wo months carlicr. Hasmi Rafsanjani, thc spcakcr of' rllc Ir.;rl~i;~r~t':~r.llan~cnt was cnthrustcd with command of' rlic :~rn~:.d!I!*.. :I!;!\ I!,. promised immediate changes in Lhc r.! , f lii~:.III(- 1r;lnians wcrc suffering incrcdiblc

: ,.,$ <.:!.,,;I .b,i. ,ti,, .,( r!: \l-;~Ihc thought rhar Mr. Ki~fsa~ijani

, j (,.! ,I :!, ,,%, ;,., , .,,,! i,~.j . ,:, $:.$.I(- I'ightir~gof' thc arrncd f'orccs and thc I!cvl?!~llionitr~t;!;~l;i:cls. !%I,:?.ir~slcad, morc losscs lollowcd. 'I'his rri:cc~s~.il;i~ccl:In ;I~~ITI~~;I!c~;1/11up of-rescrvi'

As we are veterans fighting for thc founding and construction of a for several decades, we all profoundly realize that the party and the country will not be peaceful and stable if we cannot end the turmoil created by a few people, and, if this is so, the hard won revolutionary victory which was won at the cost of our blood, and the socialist achievements will be endengered or will be lost, to say nothing of those successes achieved in the reforms during the past 10 years (Beijing Rcvicw June 5-11, 1989). In a prepared writtcn spcech delivered in Shanghai on May 27, wang Li, Chairman of thc Standing Committee of the NPC expressed his support for the imposition of martial law in parts of Beijing and speeches made by prcmicr Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun. He continued:

. I think the patriotic enthusiasm of the studcnts and the broad masses of the people must be protected and no punishmcnt should be meted out to students who made extremist opinions and deeds during the student strikes. .. . ." He also said that:

l'he very few people who have instigated and created turbulences must be exposed (Beijing Review, Ibid.) In his own statement, Li Xiannian, Chaihnan of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) said that a handful of people had violated the original well-intended motives of the students. He pointed out that as a veteran revolutionary fighter, he was very much concerned with the turmoil and pledged that he would do all that was within his power to restore order. He went on to say that there were many people who did not realize that "an important cause of the current chaos rests with certain individuals within the leadership of the Communist Party." He maintained that "once they have understood these facts, ... they would more firmly support the decisions of the party and government in handling the current situation" (Beijing Review, Ibid). In subsequent days, demonstrators started to thin out irom Tiananmen square. On May 29, students erected a model structure of the Statue of Liberty made up of plaster and polythene opposite the portrait of Mao Tse Tung. Workers and students watched even though it did not seem to be energising the demonstrations. There were complaints in the Chinese media and among the Chinese people that the erection of the statue was a shame to China since China was not the United states of America. On May 31, Chinese police arrested 11 agent provocateurs - motor-cyclists who blocked the way for the enforcement of martial law and who were exhorting Chinese workers to continue the demonstrations. These were the first reported incident in the whole episode. On June 1, a series of pro-government rallies took place in Beijing with the police, peasants, workers chanting slogans from pre-arranged texts just like the students. The students resumed their hunger strikes. On a more tactical note - four students would be on hunger strike for four days before being replaced by another four. This was intended to continue until June 20, the day the NPC was billed to meet over the crisis. Meanwhile troops continued to converge on Beijing In spite of blockades erected by students and workers to impede their progress. On June 3, the first clash between hundreds of police and huge crowds of demonstrators took place in front of the Communisl Parly headquarters. The students threw stones while ~hcpolice and lroops uscd lrunchcons and tear gas. Another such cncounlcr Look place in fronl of ~hcGreat Hall of the People. It was also rcported that four demonstrators were killed. And in the early hours of dawn on June 4, long columns of tanks and armoured personnel carriers stormed into Tiananmen square and summarily crushed the pro-democracy movement. Some reports indicate that there were incidents where students who linked arms were fired at by soldiers without mercy. The number of deaths was estimated to be between hundreds to thousands. Chinese Students and Pro-democracy Movement The way to assess the action of the students in the whole crisis is to weigh the impact of China's reforms and Open Door policy on them, and to explain their excesses and thc extent to which they may have misjudged the capability of the Chinese Communist Party to brutally dismantle their popular movement. When they demonstrated in the same measure in December 1986 and January 1987, the Secretary General of the Party Hu Yao Bang was dismissed for being too soft on them and for condoning bourgeois liberalism. However, what distinguished the demonstration then with the one in 1989 is that the former went off without incidents, the students knew when to stop and even intellectuals who urged them on were not purged. A far forward dissident like Fang Lizhi was merely sent to the Academy of Sciences where he continued his research work. Even Hu Yao Bang retained his seat in the Politburo. The party however went a long way to explain why the students demonstrated - their youth in comparison to their counterparts in the and their inability to comprehend why China took the socialist path. The party it explained had taken the socialist road because as a large country, then semi- colonial and semi-feudal, it would have continued to be exploited by capitalist imperialism to the detriment of the Chinese if it had not chosen socialism. To the extent (as the party came to discover in the era of reforms) that there are certain things good with capitalism such as its highly productive system, howcver, the reforms did not entail the abandonment of the socialist path. Rather, as the reforms had shown, some good aspects of capitalism would be integratcd while the bad aspects would be discarded (Echezona, 1992 pp. 27-48;. But it was their perception of the bad aspects of ca?italism, what the party calls "bourgeois liberalism" that had the great1 st impact on the Chinese students. More than 40,000 of them were sndylng in the United States of America, when the crisis took place. They wcre cxposed to all the facets of American life - rock music American liberal values enshrined in the American electoral politics, the frcedom of the press and all thc other frcedonls includtng the Horatio Alger complex (from rags to riches) and the scientific and technological revolution. What they found in tllc llriitcd Statcs, Western Europe and othcr advanccd industrial captalist countrics was by far more advanccd than what they had sccn back homc, a country which had hithcno bccn wrappcd In ctlinoccntrism In its prc and post socialist dcvclopmcnt, a country in which Scudalist norms arc mixed up with socialist rhctorics in a fit of frenzy unknown in global idcologizalion. Having notcd the .conlradictions in the psyche of Chincsc students and knowing that thcy would benefit from it, ideologues in the advanced capitalist countries exploited it to the fullest. Hence, in American Universities where Chinese students were enrolled, pro-democracy movement clubs sprouted- up and were backed 'by some of the conservative organizations in the United States, with linkages to American mainstream such as the Heritage

Foundation. It is possible then to understarid qhy the students erected % an effigy raf the Statue of iiberty at the Tiananmen square. With backing woPlaa dlions of dollars from the Heritage Foundation and other such organizations, the students were able to link up with their counterparts in other universities in China especially the two most important cities sf Shanghai and Beijing. Those at home had earlier Been infected by bourgeois values through the country's Open Door policy, %Ecdqia;alobfuscation through the western mass media, the ~;e:wWy e~s&viry *irwmodity economy and punk culture. &nuts demands were very popular ones - anti corruption naive in h-eA the party and govemment, freedom of the press, a rerooling sf the Chinese educational system where students spend their w:ncsle time studying to pass the English Language, a passport to an AmeFcm : dwhrship and the inflationary spiral which had engdfed ~itiraadue to its overheated economy. They did not qoestion the creeping capitalism, in the so called socialist commodity economy which was the location of the structural problem of the society as a whole. They wanted more freedom and the retirement of China's senior leader, Deng Xiao Ping, architect of the reforms whom they felt was too old and therefore too slow with the reforms. In other words, they wollld WWP Tbina to follow wholesale the capitalist path. They had i*z ' , * , ,..:cfully avoided any mention of the introduction of capiEh%m, ~;,,-e: :iic:unseq~ientialendorsement of the socialist path and clamed knt rhcy vwe for the reform of the political smcture and ,rot for a P IbAon. ~~(JWCVLT,their erection of the Statue-sf Liberty opposite tkar of Marr Tse 'I'ung took the rug from under their feet, showing fully well that 'ky wanted an American system. They had gained the support 121' lb;c majority of Chinese citizens because they had also seen COIP;~~government and party officials grow rich in a system of socialism. I'his unfortunately led the students to over- estimate their power and influence and to under-estimate that of the party and the govemment, the latter were of course backed by an army which believed in the socialist path. When martial law was declared and could not be enforced for two weeks, they falsely concluded that they stood a chance to reverse the socialist path. Party Veterans and the Old Guards This long turmoil brought back into contention, the old guards of the party, the party of Marx, Lcnin and Mao Tse Tung. More than a year earlier, at thc 13th Conflcss of Ihc Chinese Communist Party in 1987, the party had launched one of its major political reforms, the removal of ageing cadres from the major apparatuses of the party and government in order to introduce younger elements with fresh ideas into the scheme of things. This was the brain-child of party leader Zhao Ziyang, ousted from leadership because of the student demonstrations. A champion of reforms, he had used this ploy as a way of dislodging the rigid ideological elements in the party, steamed in the Maoist line of Lhe past and introducing more pragmatic, less ideological elements into the party and government apparatuses. The old guards had felt that the reforms were too far, too fast and had warned about their consequences. In such a situation, they became opponents of Deng Xiao Ping, architect of the reforms and whom the students wanted to be removed. But the Chinese Communist Party could not, given the way it was constituted, afford too much liberalization. Chen Yun and Yang Shangkun, elements in the top hierarchy of the Party were far more cautious on liberalization than Deng, all of them old guards. The studcnts preferred Zhao, who had sympathised with thcm in the demonstrations and who was more disposed to further reforms. Hc had hoped that the student demonstrations would touch on the fabric of thinking of the party where his position would be further strengthened for him to implement more rcforms. Instcad, thc old guards, more concerned with the retention of their power and the power of Lhc party bounced back into action, directing affairs Lhus prolonging Lhe fulurc dilemma of the party. What would Lhc fulurc portend for thc party? If Dcng Xiao Ping dies, there is likely LO bc an anti-rightist campaign in Lhe party and in the country. Thcrc is likely Lo bc intcrnal division and savage fight between thosc who would favour orthodoxy and those who would favour liberalism. In spite of Lhc dcnoucmcnL of Zhao, ~hcrewas no strong man a1 the hierarchy waiting to Lakc ovcr the rcigns of power. Thrm~ghoutLhc crisis, Dcng was rcn only oncc in public on May 16, 1989 Lo wclcome Mikhail Gorbachcv. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) What role docs Lhc army play whcn thcre is a brcak down of law and order in the state'? This is thc qucstion ha^ bcfcll ~hcPLA aftcr martial law was dcclared. This was thc first Limc since thc inccplion of lhc Communist Party in China in which martial law was dcclarcd. Thc army, Lhc party, lhc slalc and thc govcrnmcnl had no1 had any cxpcticncc in cnforcing marlial law. And ~hcs~udcnls wcrc not cvcn disposcd Lo obcy martial law cvcn though.lhe~cxcuscsproffcrcd wcrc that the pcoplc hati not undcrslood what martial law mcanl and Lhc army, being a pcoplc's army could not turn on Lhc pcoplc. Somc olhcr cxpl;rnations cspccially emanating f'rom Lhc wcslcrn mass media revolved around divisions within thc Chinese army, between those who wanted to move against ~hcdemonstrators and those who did not want to move against Lhcm. IL was thought that if one side tried to enforce martial law which would havc led to Lhc deaths of hundreds of sludcnls, ~hcopposing side would countcr attack thus leading to a civil war in ~hccountry. Even whcn the army eventually struck on June 4, Lhcrc wcrc still spcculations that a counler attack could ensue espccially whcn morc than 200 Lanks were massed in Tiananmen square. Therc wcre spcculalions that such a large number of tanks could not have been assembled in anticipation of a student back lash only but a prcparalion against an opposing army. When thesc situations came and passed ~hcPcnlagon was blamed for having failed in its intelligcncc galhcring not LO havc known that no civil war was immincnl and that ~hcparty was in full control of things. Howcvcr, spcculations conlinucd about which Lroops participalcd in Lhc wholc affair, troops within thc Bcijing rcgion or Lroops within Lhc provirrccs, young Lroops or older troops? If ~hcywere from ~hc Bcijing region and if Lhcy wcre young, Lhcy would havc sympalhiscd with ~hcstudcnls; if Lhey wcrc old and if ~hcywcrc f'rom ~hcoutlying provinces, Lhcy would simply enforce thc party linc. Anothcr qucslion was whclhcr ~hctroops which were used came from thc 24~h,27th or Lhc 38th army. Some spcculators pointcd Lo Lhc fact that Lhc 27111 anny wcrc thc personal troops of Yang Shangkun and Dcng Xiao Ping and LhaL Yang had a lot of relations in ~hcuppcr echclons of' ~hc Chincsc anny (BBC broadcasts in ~hccrisis). Bc LhaL as it may, Lhc Pcoplcs Liberation Army savcd socialism in China a1 the time of' its grcalesl pcril in 1989. If there had bccn divisions within its ranks, it would not havc comc fonh the way it did, LO savc ~hcChincsc Communisl party. Therc is no doubt rhat a civil war was imminent cspccially givcn Lhc Pact that Lhc sludcnl dcmonslralions had Lhc backing of Lhc majority of ~hcpcoplc of China. pragmatic policy which downplayed ideology for a pragmatic approach to problems. It sought for the introduction of technology especially from the advanced industrial capitalist countries. It sought to aid China make a decisive scientific and technological breakthrough before the year 2000. A list of achievements had been recorded in the Open Door policy such as the elevation of China's scientific and technological developments, affirming China's place in an interdependent world and fully participating in the international division of labour. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were being opened where a lot of private enterprise were encouraged and several Joint Chinese and foreign ventures undertaken. However, the Open Door policy had also meant cultural interdependence which would result in outfalls which the Chinese political system had not been shaped to withstand such as the prime causes of the student rebellion. International Dimension Western indignation at the measures taken by Beijing especially the measures at Tiananmen squarc was palpable. The United States government annou~cedthe imposition of economic sanctions against China. 'These included all government sales of all items and all commcrcial sdes of weapons. The British cancelled a planned visit to by a Chinese minister of Justice and a visit to Beijing by British minister in charge of agriculture. The Australian primc Mlni:,tcr, Rob Hdwkc cancelled a planned visit to Beijing; the rlrn>pcan Econo~nicCommunity (EEC) also cancelled a planned visit I(? Licl~ing by officials of the European Commission and also c,~nccllcdofficial communication with Beijing. In his own response, tTrcnc.hPrcsldcnt Francois Mitterand said that the Chinese government had no fulurc. The World Bank decidcd to slop further loans lo China and ~hcJapanese announced that thcv would stop further investments in China. The responses from the East European countries were lackadaisical as the communist regimes which were in power seemed LO be counting their days. Meanwhile, Chinese dissidents were leaving their country in large numbers for the United States and Western Europe and the physicist, Fang Lizhi was held up in the United States embassy with his wife. In the final analysis, the developments in China proved that pluralism, one of the salient elements of the new world order might sweep through China alsp. With the Soviet Union reaching out to pluralism and reaching accords with the United States in cont1icts such as Afghanistan and Angola, the United States ensuring its primacy in the Gulf, and the states of Eastern Europe crnbracing pluralist and American values, .it seemed Chirta might be lcft in the lurch as the onlv communist giant in the evolving world order. CHAPTER 4 THE GULF WAR

The Gulf war which was fought from January 16 1991 to April 6, 1991 was a war in which an articulation of what the finer attributes of a new world order would be like. Speaking at an American War College in April 1991 President George Bush explained the new world order this way: it will be a world "where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistances. It will be a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle." It will be "a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak." Such a world order will be marked by "peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples" (Sheffer, 1991 p. 2). Why did the United States president start to articulate the parameters of a new world order after the Gulf war had been fought and won? Was it a reaffirmation of a new found hegemonic status in which case, it is only a hegemon that can say what a world order could be after a major war? What is peculiar about the Gulf war which made it, in spite of all the major upheavals attending it, a point of departure to enunciate a new world order? Why should the pronouncements of the United States President on this score be taken seriously? Origins of the Gulf War Iraq had invaded Kuwait in August 1990 as a result of Iraqi accusation of Kuwait of mining oil in a territory under dispute between both countries. Aft& the invasion, Iraq summarily annexed Kuwait as its nineteenth province claiming that Kuwait had been part of Iraq. The annexation of Kuwait might have jolted Third World countries which live aside other burgeoning hegemonic powers which might have informed the way in which they supported the allied coalition in the war that ensued against Iraq. Earlier, in December 1989, the United States had invaded Panama and seized its President, General Antonio Manuel Noriega and brought him to the United States to answer for drug charges. In the case of this invasion, that usual condemnation which would have attended it as was the case with the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was completely absent. However, when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, condemnations were rife. Saddam Hussein was equated to Hitler, a comparison that could not be sustained because even at the start of the crisis, when the preparations for war were in the upbeat, demonstrations in more than fifteen American cilies erupted. linking the prospects for war to desire for profits by American multinational corporations. It did not seem that there were any such demonstrations in favour of Hitler in the 1930s in countries which were opposed to him (Echezona. Unpub. 1991 p. 6). When it became obvious that the Americans and their allies might not play the game of chicken for quite a long time, that they might be compelled to go all out to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and probably ensure his overthrow, the Iraqis seemed to have changed tactics. They might have reasoned that once the Americans succeeded in mobilising world public opinion against them as they were then doing, it would give them a blank check to attack and defeat Iraq . The Iraqis therefore resorted to holding American citizens and nationals of other countries allied to the United States, as hostages. That in their estimation, might prolong the game of chicken and might further deepen the agonies of the United States including domestic opposition to a war. They had also reasoned that the Americans could not possibly strike at their own citizens who were then being held in the most strategic locations in Iraq and that the Bush administration might not have the same resolve as Ronald Reagan when he invaded Grenada in 1983 or when he engaged in air strikes against in 1986. Although as the reasoning went, George Bush had invaded Panama, a tiny banana republic at the southern tip of the United States, Iraq was not Panama. Iraq had engaged in an arms build up worth billions of dollars and was suspected to be developing a nuclear capability (Echezona, Unpub.. 1991 p. 4). Iraqi prolongation of the crisis seemed to have worked. All roads led from the capitals of all the countries with hostages in Iraq or Iraqi occupied Kuwait to Baghdad to see the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein thus putting him in the mould of great leaders of the world to the consternation of governments in power in these countries. Edward Heath. Yasuhiro Nakasone, Willy Brandt, Tony Benn, Ramsey Clark, Evgeny Primakov, the Italian Peacc Committee were all in Baghdad to negotiate the release of their hostages thus turning the attention of the world from the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait to the question of foreign hostages in Iraq and in Iraqi occupied Kuwait. Some hostages were however released as a token concession to these emissaries. With increased world public furore about the hostages coupled with an apparent western resolve to force Saddam Hussein out of Iraq, symbolised in sending of American forces to Saudi Arabia and beefing up such forces from two hundred and fifty thousand men to four hundred thousand men, Iraq announced that foreign hostages would be released starting from Christmas day of December 1990 up to the end of March 1991. A few'days'after this announcement, the UN Security Council issued a deadline asking Iraq to release all foreign hostages it was holding and to withdraw without conditions from Kuwait. Subsequently, Iraq annoynced that it would free all foreign hostages en masse (Echezona, unpub. 1991 p. 9). What was it that prompted Iraq to use foreign hostages as a bargaining chip in the crisis? Why did it chicken out at the last moment when it was becoming increasingly obvious that public opinion especially in France at that time was against French participation in any multinational force against Iraq in the Gulf? Was it a sign of acceptance of impending defeat? The manner of Iraqi humiliation of foreign hostages it held might have informed the way in which the allies prosecuted the war also. After defeating Iraq, it was expected that the allied coalition would dictate the terms of peace to Iraq. To the extent that they did, they had stopped short of rolling into Baghdad, behaved as if there were no victors, no vanquished, but hoping that the job of overthrowing Saddam Hussein would be done by anti-Saddam forces within Iraq. It was implied in the speeches of allied leaders when it became obvious, in ss of the war, that Saddam Hussein would be defeated. It was e:ess, part of allied strategy. This might have been done in. to be seen to be interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. The %?Us wanted to be seen to be concerned solely with wanting to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. This posture was informed by an analysis of the internal condition in Iraq and the likely behaviour of the Iraqi people to a regime which might be seen as an occupation one. With the type of defeat meted out to Saddam Hussein, the coalition was assured that Saddam Hussein could not last another day in the hands of the Iraqi people who would want to overthrow him for leading their country into a disastrous war. The allies prodded the Iraqi Kurds to mount an insurrection in the north while Iraqi Shittes mounted a similar one in the south. immediately after the war, in order to destablize an already famished polity. The resultant effect was increased repression of Iraqi Kurds, their flight into the mountains and the establishment of an allied intervention force, deep inside northern Iraq to protect the Kurds (Echezona, Unpub. 1991, p. 13). The Security Council In the Gulf crisis, twelve United Nations Security Council Resolution:: were passed without veto, all asking Iraq to comply with one demand or the other. The lasl such Resolution had given it an ultimatum to withdraw from Kuwait on January 15, 1991. Was it a My type of global consensus which indicated that (here was a global ag&Ment of who an aggressor in a war was or was it a manifeiihidm &of hegemonism in global affairs by a country, a group of countries os, the triumph of a particular world view? -When the victorious powers met in San Francisco in 1945 to draw up a charter for a new organization that would supersede t.be League of Nations, they had only the Second World War and the politics that anteceded that war to draw their empirical reference points. They had found the causes of war to lie squarely in the anarchical nature of the international system, the absence of a world government and 2 consortium of power in the hands of the international community to deal with such an aggressor. They sought for a means by which national governments would submit their forces to the new United Nations Security Council, some form of intemational army at the disposal of the Security Crruhcil. Some members balked at such a move. Who would eo~nmaudon who worald control such a force? To what extent would such a force not lx used by the dominant elements in it to interfere in the sovweign~tyof member states? The United Nations ended up without a standing army (Claude Inis, 2nd ed. 1959). Nevertheless the Security Council made up of the five permanent members, the United States,the Soviet Union. France, Britain and China was charged with the task of maintaining international peace and security. The failure of the United Nations to have a standing army showed that the powers which these countries possess translated into military and industrial potential, laid with them and not with a mythical Security Council. That is why when they exercised their veto powers, it had to do with how they interpreted their national interests and not how they interpreted the interests of, again, a mythical intemational community. Let us take as a typical example United Nations Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 which was the last such Resolution by the Security Council before the outbreak of the Gulf war on January 16, 1991. The Resolution demanded that Iraq should comply with all earlier Unite$ Nations Resolutions on its aggression on Kuwait. It sought complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Finally, it demanded that Iraq should release all foreign hostages that it was holding. Thc Resolution was approved by a vote of 12 to 2 with China abstaining. In a similar Resolution over Korea in 1950 which had presaged the Un~tcdNations entry into the , the Soviet delegate had stormcd out of the chambers of the Security Council in protest and the Unitcd States was able to put its forces into Korea under the auspiccs of a Unitcd Nations collective security mechanism. In Resolution 678, the Sovict delegate Edward Shevardnadze gave Soviet backing to it. If thc Soviet Union had vetocd the Resolution as it would have been the casc in the Cold War, it would not have passed. However, it was not likcly that it would have delerred an allied coalition force in thc Gulf which at thc time the Resolution was passed was numbcring morc than four hundred thousand mcn from attacking Iraq. What thc Sovict position did was to providc a conscnsus which did no1 cx1s1 in the Cold War years and to givc moral backing to the western, albeit the American sition in the evolving crisis because of a number of lea sons which fL a lot to do with the changing nature of hegemony and world order: the Soviets were prostrate before the west for economic aid with which to restructure their economy; Gorbachev seemed as the putsch in the Soviet Union in August 1991 came to prove, again dependent on the west for his personal as well as his regime survival. In essence, the Soviet Union was increasingly loosing the attributes of a super power (Echezona, Unpub. 1991 p. 15). It is instructive to note that the Chinese who would otheryise Rave vetoed the Resolution merely abstained from voting, pointing out that resort to war would do no one any good. Only two non permanent members of the Sccurity Council (who had no veto powers), Yemen and Cuba vored agalnst the Resolution. The ,United States as !he hcgemonic ~::wI94 spent the whole of that month in weaving out P consensus over that Resolution. It was an unprecedented diplomacy in which the support of Third World non permanent members of the Security Council was sought as well as the sup n of the permanent ones since a global catastrophe seemed to be P"ooming in the horizon. It prompted United States Secretary of State. James Baker to pay $186 million dollars in dues being owed to the United Nations and U.S. president, George Bush invited the Chinese ambassador to the Oval Office in what might be regarded a$ a pat on the back for not vetoing the Resolution. Hencefonh, the Uniq States was to increase its scientific and technical cooperation with the Chinesc. something which had suffered a setback since relations bctwcen both countries soured over the massacre of students in Tiananmen square in June 1989 (Echezona, Unpub. 1991, p. 20) At the cnd gf the war, thc allies using the instrumentality of the United Nations, tumcd further heat on Iraq to comply with the provisions of thc Gulf War cease-fire.The Iraqis had had to accept how much oil they had to produce to pay for war reparations and how much oil thcy would sell to provide for international food relief for thc Iraqi peoplc. Up and until September 1991. Iraq had accepted every imposition hkc a defeated nation. But as the United Nations team which was chargcd with the responsibility to dismantle Iraqi nuclcar war making potcnlul bccamc too overtly inquisitive. the Iraqi rcgime started to stamp 11s fcct on he ground to protect what it thought was an crmion ol 1t.4 sovcrcignty. In one of such incidents, Iraq1 aulhor!t~c\ rciuwd I'N rnspcccors the right to depart wrth documcnlcd c\~dcrlic\ thcv had obt~~nCddbout Iraqi nuclcar capnbrlrl) 'TIC Irql\ ~l,t~:-,,~~:I!. I 'I; . I ..kr of the UN tcam, Ihr~ci

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4nc!imc1 \ 1: ! I .I ,F a I \'2t\ - 7. David Kay (as well as the other forty members of the team) was an international civil servant under the UN and that the documents were needed by the Security Council to determine the extent of Iraqi -b,$ucrear weapons programme and the means of their consequent #$mination. After prevarication and interventions from the United htes, Iraq complied. A similar incident occured in July 1992. UN inspectors were prevented from inspecting the Iraqi ministry of agriculture. The inspectors had claimed that the ministry was suspected of habouring documents on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqrs refused inspection claiming that from the way the UN inspectors were moving, they would one day want to inspect mosques, private homes and even the presidential palace; that the inspectors were nationals of the Gulf war anti-Iraqi coalition. The settlement that ensued was to allow nationals ofqcountries which did not participate in the Gulf war to do the inspection (Echezona, unpub. 1991 and 1992). What emerged in both incidents is that the United States became the spokesman of the Security Council as it had been all through the Gulf crisis. In the case of Iraqi agricldture ministry, President Bush was engaged in public posturing against lraq - meeting with his Joint Chiefs of Staff, sending an American aircraft carrier off the Iraqi coast in order to irqpress on Iraq that non-compliance would mean a new round of war and finally beefing up American conventional and strategic forces in Kuwait. Equally, b was not clear whether the audience that was being .impressed about Iraqi intransigence was an international community or the American public in an election year. The question posed included, what do the Americans think of George Bush striking Iraq in an election year and loosing one or two air men? Was he trying to reanimate the symbols of the Gulf war and his triumph in it four months before the presidential election? Would it be necessary to leave the job of dealing with Iraq to US dillies such as Britain and France in order not to risk the re-election chances of George Bush? These questions were raised and answered in a way that showed that the US had a stake, an important one in the post Gulf war order. . J Military Technology __A I' The Gulf war might have been a dress rkhwrsal for a Third World War. This was the first major war that was fought since the end of the Second World War. Iraq had amassed weapons of war mostly from the Soviet Union and France estimated to have cost in the range of fifty billion dollars. In order to dereat Iraq, a high premium was put on pounding Iraq from the air in order to paralyse the Iraqi army especially the elite presidential guards. This would mean that if Iraq did not knuckle llnder from aerial bombardment, a ground attack 6, +%* *.,.'* * re, - unt~oGopping up ope

; = worked beyond expectation thus triggering satisfaction among the ~MWthat the air armada might unilaterally decide the war thus ' m&hg it unnecessary to carry out a ground offensive. ,&We stqof the war, there were no responses from the Iqiair force. It was suspected that the Iraqi air force might have been devastated in the firstdfew days of surgical, precise bombing of Iraq, that Saddam Hussein's offensive capabilities might have been destroyed. In the first waves of attacks, the British were jubilht that their much fancied tornado aircraft all came back safely to base. The Israelis were also satisfied that the threat posed on them by Iraqi missile sites in the west of Iraq which were targeted on had been reduced. Iraq was pictured as a prostrate nation before the allied onslaught. Over Baghdad radio, it was all readings from the Koran and when Saddam Hussein spoke, his language had a staunch Arab, nationalist, Islamic slogan in it. He exhorted the Iraqi people to get up and fight for the "Mother of all wars" had begun. He called George Bush a satan who was aided by Zionists. He was sure that God was on the side of Iraq and that Iraq would prevail in the end. The allies henceforth became cautious - the Iraqis they reasoned might have hidden their mobile missiles under bridges in order to avoid detection by radar. It meant in effect .that if the fixed sites had been destroyed, the Iraqis would be forced to put the mobile ones in the open which would be detected and destroyed also (Echezona, unpub. 1991 p. 25 ) A few days after, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Saudi Arabia were hit by Iraqi scud missiles. It was then thought that only about thirty Iraqi aircraft might have been destroyed and the remainder of Iraq's seven hundred aircraft had been hidden in hardened silos which were impregnable. It was thought that though the allies controlled the air, it would take a long time for them to win the war. Speaking before American war reservists, President Bush said that the war was moving on course, that there would never be a repeat of Vietnam, that victory must be achieved over Iraq and Saddam Hussein. His Secretary of State, James Baker was more circumspect. Though he saw victory as inevitable for the allies, he could not discount the resilience of the Iraqi army. The impact of the scud missiles cause4 the Americans to take wunter measures by irmducing the patriot missiles. They proved quite capable nf Wating the Iraqi scuds even though quite a considewble few managed to get through and caused considerable damages in Israel including a few civilian casualties. The moyt damaging scud attack occured a few days befo~ethe war ended when more than thirty American servicemen were killed in Saudi Arabia (Echezona, unpub. 1991 p. 30). It is not possible to say to what extent the scud missiles mi ht have made the allies to escalate the war. What is clear however is tfat in the first three hours of the beginning of the war, more than four hundred sorties were flown by allied airmen on sixty separate targets and about l8.O toh of explosives were dropped on Iraq on the first day of bombing alone. This is equivalent to the power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima in the Second World War. The general emphasis in the war was on air power, to maximise air powzr and to minimize civilian causalities on the ground. After forty days of aerial pounding of Iraq including the pounding of the forward locations of her troops including the much fancied presidential guards, the ground offensive only lasted for barely forty eight hours before the Iraqi forces capitulated (Echezona, Unpub. 1991 p. 30). The performance of the patriot missiles might have informed American postures on the Star Wars programme. On September 27, 1991, Mr. George Bush announced sweeping cuts in US nuclear arsenal, in the air, on land and in the sea. The announcement left room for the United States to continue to modernise its 11uclear forces and allowed research and development in the Star Wars F -ogramme to continue. Administration spokesmen had pointed out that the performance of the Patriot missiles in the Gulf war legitimised the continuation of the Star Wars programme. In defending the president's speech, US Defense Secretary, Dick Cheyney pointed out that the Star Wars programme would continue because in the next few decades, there would be a proliferation of nuclear weapons and Star Wars technology would be expected to perform the same functions which the patriot missiles performed against a conventional weapon of the scud missile vintage, against nuclear weapons (Echezona unpub. 1991 p. 32). Third World Perspective In the cld world ordcr. wc wcrs -a;.custorned to identify lwo clcar cut per ?ectls . r~ !ra6.ct - . il Sovia and Amcric: n. A Wesl European perspective was often subsumed into the American perspective while the French just as the Chinese for the Soviets were seen as the archilless heel of the West European nay the American perspective. Third World peoples took either the American or Soviet perspective in consonance with the ideological thinking of their ruling circles (Jones, 1987 pp 3-254) And so, it might be said that there has never really been a Third World perspective over an international problem but an American or Soviet one yet we can identify meThird World type perspectives in international affairs in the pressures for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the New World Information Order (NWIO), the issue of foreign debts and their payments and the question of world environment. In the new world order, what we have is the dominance of the American perspective while all earlier perspectives take their cue from it. In the Gulf war, British war aims were a representation of the West European nay the American perspective in the war with the French initially playing the role of spoiler of Western diplomacy in the war before they eventually married their perspectives with those of the allied coalition (see the way the French were nudged towards supporting the Security Council Resolutions on the conflict, the division within French society about allied war aims and the resignation of French Defence Minister, Monsieur Jean Pierre Chevenement (Brenner, 199 1 pp.665-676). The Soviet perspective stayed short of commitment of troops on the allied side, supported American position in the conflict but wanted the allied war aims not to go beyond Security Council Resolutions on just the liberation of Kuwait (Fuller, 1991 pp. 55-65). It is true that the Third World is an amorphous whole. Nevertheless Arab, Moslem Third World members of the multinational force had different war and post war aims as the Americans and the West Europeans. Syria and Egypt wanted the liberation of Kuwait, the mainlcnance of the territorial integrity of Iraq and a post war order in which Arab and not the multinational force or any outside force playcd the key role in the Gulf, or in the Middle East and this might have affected the allied decision not to enter into Baghdad and the expectation that the democratic order in lraq would be decided by the Iraqis themselves. Even those Arab and Moslem countries which were not represented in the multinational force had in various ways expressed alarm over Lhe way in which the Americans, the British and to some extcnt the French had prosecuted the war. Was it in consonancc wilh United Nations Security Couticil Resolution on the use of force in the Gulf or was it in terms of thinking in the United States and Wcstcrn Europe to wipe out Iraqi military and industrial potcntial and to rearrange a post war balance of power in the Middle East and [he Gulf which is tilted against Iraq and to ensure the possible overthrow of Saddam Hussein? King Hussein of Jordan had pointed out as the Gulf war raged, that the multinational coalition was more enthusiastic in prosecuting the war than in the diplomatic activities aimed at forestalling a war (Echezona unpub. 1991 p. 35). Most Third World countries share a faith in various degrees in imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. And there were underlying tones of imperialism in the Gulf war. Saddam Hussein had had to draw a picture in which Iraq was seen as a champion of Third World interests while the multinational force was championing imperialist and western interests. It has been pointed out that the United states gets only five percent of her oil needs from the Gulf water way and that the Japanese and the Europeans get more oil through this waterway than the United States (Nye Jr. 1991 and Layne, 1991). This therefore means that US mobilization of five hundred thousand men in the allied coalition was intended to manifest its hegemonism in the new world eider. And of course the Japanese and the Germans were drawn to the war not as combatants but as bankrollers of the allied war effort. In Japan in particular, a furore broke out if this was not a steady assault on the Japanese 1946 constitution which forbade Japan not to participate in any offensive war. Thc west could not go to war over C~cchoslovakiaor ovcr Sovic~ entry into Afghanistan bcwusc thcsc situations did not pose Ihe h;imc cconomic dilcmmas to thcm as thc Gulf crisis did. Moreover, any i~ttcmptthcn to havc invokcd somc NATO rnoblli;t:ition mciisurcs against Sovict actions in Czechoslovakia or Afghiinistiul might have tr~ggcrcdoff a Third World War. Thc Sovict bloc mlght hiivc: ken much morc prcparcd for it thcn than in thc Gulf war whc~the Sovict cmpirc hadl collapsed and thc dissolution of thc Sovict Union ~thcll WIS palpaLhc. Howcvcr, it is vcry clear tha if' Saddam llusscin tiad cngagcd In thc samc action a ccntury carlicr, hc might havc gotten away with his booty likc Germany's Bismirch. And thc Europcan powers then who wcrc busy dividing Africa mighl havc lookcd ashancc since thc Gulf might not hiivc bccn pcrccivcd by thcm as a .\triilcpic Iakc as it came to assurnc a ccntury after. It will bc recalled that iiftcr thc Gulf war, prchidcnt Hu\h pointcd out while relishing iillicd succcss in the war that the f;itc 01 Iraq was 3 . Ichson for all pcoplcs in thc world. It is doubful if the Ic\\on\ of the Gulf war wcrc mciint for the West Europciinh, the Jiipanc\c or the Russians who shiirc somc conimonalitics with the An~crlc,ill\ or posscss countervailing power to thcm. That ih why it I\ pl,iu\lblc 10 W~UCthat thc Icssonh of the Gull' war. wen? .rncarlt m;rinI! lor of' the Third World whcrc such thrcats as thosc posed by Sadd.lnl Husscin had em;matcd from in the past. Libya, Syria (a nicnlkr ol ~II~, allied coalition against Iraq), , Iran and possibly those Third World countries which had failed to imbibe the ideological underpinnings of a new world order which includes plural democracy and nlarketization through whi_ch imperialism might be sustained. Precisely, no Third World county would be expected to harbour hegemonic ambitions. Hegemonism, World Order and Post War Gulf The way to consider hegemonism world order and post war Gulf outcomes is to examine how the age old beliefs about the Vietnam complex were destroyed by the Gulf war and to explain how a post war peace might be sustained. The Vietnam Syndrome There are two ways in which this scenario had been looked at in the past. The first is that a Third World country has the capability of inflicting an unacceptable damage on a super power which might cause such a super power to withdraw from a war between it and a Third World state. To what extent is this scenario falsified by the Gulf war? In the Vietnam war, the Americans had to contend with thick jungles and marsh land while In the Gulf, they had to contend with desert. Both sides were disadvantaged by desert but the Americans had an upper hand because they had been taught a lesson by a "worst outcome" in Vietnam and were doggedly determined to ensure that it never occured. Secondly, American high-tech equipments performed beyond all expectations. Equally, it would seem that the Iraqi troops did not understand their mission in Kuwait. Perhaps, when they annexed Kuwait, they did not conjecture that a force of the calibre of the multinational force would be brought to bear against them. The war proved that their tutelage in the Iran-Iraq war (which false consciously had thought them that it had put their military strength in a new light) was inconsequential in the Gulf war. On the other hand, the Vietnamese were schooled in the MarxistLeninist thought processes on imperialism and revolution which might have prepared them to engage in a tortuous and long guerilla struggle with the Americans who might not have been prepared for such a war in such a territory very far from the American homeland. Another important element which might have caused American withdrawal from Vietnam has to do with the pressures of a moral, conscious world. There were two strands to this morality. The first had to do with the socialist ideolbgy. It found expression in the idea of a socialist commonwealth or proletarian internationalism. This neccssitated ideological and material support from the Soviet Union, China, the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, socialist countries throughout the world and socialists within capitalist countries. Without these kind of support, it would not have been possible that the Vietnamese would have been able to compel the Americans to withdraw. On the side of Iraq, there was no such support from Moslem, Arab countries. In fact, the major Arab countries notably Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were involved in the war against Iraq on the side of the multinational coalition because of their fear of Iraq's hegemonic ambitions in the Arab world. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not come to the aid of Iraq, even though she had a friendship treaty with her. This was due to the changing nature of world order. At a crucial point in the war, when it had become quite obvious that Iraq would capitulate, the Soviet Union threw out a first and second peace'plans, all of which were rejected by the Unitcd States as the multinational force stcamrolled over Iraq in the forty eight hour ground offensive. The other side of global morality was located in the United States itself. There was never a war in this ccnLury in which the Americans were as divided as they were in the Vietnam war. There were inter-party as well as intra-party divisions. Draft dodgers thronged Canada and Westcrn Europe. Equally, to the extcnt that US allies saw in American action in Victnam as the elongation of the Kcnnan doctrine of containing communism world wide, they could not understand how such a global strategy should be translated in Asia in ways that showcd thc Unitcd States to be a global policeman. To that extent, thcy did not givc wholcsorne support to US action in Vietnam as they did in thc Gull' war. All these contributed in wcakening US resolve in thc Victnam war and might have contributed to its withdrawal from thcrc. Thc sccond clcmcnt in ~hcVictnarn syndrome hinges on the sell doubt it had cnshrincd In Amcricar~thinking in the post Victnam era. Americans bccamc conccrncd with what would make powcr credible in thc nuclcar and spacc agc. How codd it be explained that a supcr powcr could not subduc an inconscqurotidl third rate power? At what threshold in a war should a supcr powcr usc its nuclcar arsenal? How would thc Uni~cdS~a~cs right a limitcd war and win? What clcmcnts of powcr should thc Unitcd Statcs cmphasisc in ordcr to dcfcat a third rstc powcr in a war'? Thcsc questions could be found in thc months prcccding thc Gulf war. Gcorgc Rllsh bccamc m~rcdin cautionary movcs and his Sccrctary of S~stc,Jamcs Bakcr was engaged in complex diplomacies. As thc prcparationc for war increased, Congrcss became pccvcd as US troop strcngth In thc Pcrsian Gulf grcw in the hundreds of thousands thus invoking o Victnam nightmare, Congress did not want to be trickcd into an cscylatjon, of thc conflict as was thc case in the Vietnam war when they hid passed a Johnson conlrivcd Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which blcw the Vietnam war into proportions which the country could not control. They clung desperately to the War Powers Act pd wanted to be involved in the decision making about a war if it becqe necessa The prepamdm for the Gulf war took quite a long time and in the % glare of public light. The Congressional elections in November 1990 was enough to measure the early mood of Americans in a possible war. Then was m landslide victory against the Republicans which would have meant a symbol of disapproval of a war which a Republican president might lead the country into. Republican losses were not unanticipated except the way in which Democrats swept the gubernatorial race in Texas and Florida but not the big state of California. However, George Bush slipped in opinion polls although it was pointed out that what it was at that mid-point in his first term of office was higher than that of any other American President at such a point in his career. CongressioMl behaviour had in any case caused George Bush to engage in a television blitz in order to assure Americans that he would mt lead them into another Vietnam quagmire while James Baker cautioned American law makers not to send conflicting signals to Saddam Hussein which might tend to create the impression that the United States lacked the will and resolve to dislodge him from Kuwait (Echezona, Unpub. 1991 p. 36). In the weeks preceding the Gulf war, opinion polls haa phanged. The whole nation was united behind George Bush. The defeat of I therefore robbed off the self doubt which the United States had 3 about its place in the World. The Gulf war established thk United States as the hegemonic power in the international system. The military brass paraded in California and New York to the applause of thousands of their citizens. No such parades took place in any of the towns or cities of the other members of the coalition force which was enough proof that the Gulf war was the triumph of American might and not the might of the world as the Security Council Resolutions tended to portray. General Norman Schwankoft, the commander of the allied coalition was decorated by the Americans and the British. Consequently all roads led to Washington as it did to Rome at the height of the Roman empire. The leaders of the newly evolving plural democracies in Eastern Europe, the leader of the. African National Congress (ANC) and of the Inkata Freedom Party. the British monarch were in Washington either to thank Washington for its triumph over communism and over a regional hegemon it did not approve of or to symbolise America's position in a new world order (Echezona, Unpub. 1991 p. 40). Post Gulf Peace On the Middle East For more than forty five years, the Middle bast has been a boiling cauldrom in the Cold War. In 1967, the first war that shaped the order of things'for so many years took place between the Arabs and the Israelis. In 1973, the Yom Kippur war occured thus placing a yawning gap between peace and war in the Middle East region. Along the line. , Egyptian President, visited Israel a move that shocked the whole of the Arab world. He went further in 1978 in Camp David to sign a separate peace with Israel. Egypt subsequently became a pariah in the Arab world and a solid Arab block within the Arab League was formed against her. So things remained until a year or two before the Gulf war broke out, Egypt was r admitted into the Arab fold, the Palestine Liberation Organizati (PLO) \yas recognised as a sovereign representing the interests %of P estinians and the West was in the process of granting the PLO full de jure recognition when the Gulf war broke out and the PLO took the side of Iraq. After so many years of prevarications, a Middle East conference prodded by the Gulf war took place in Ma&id in Qgtgber 1991 under the sponsorship of the United States ad tha Soviet Union. It will be recalled that in the Gulf war, the Israelis were indirectly drawn into it due to their unique position in the Middle East and due also to the attempts by the Iraqi regime to draw Israel directly into the conflict through scud missile attacks on Israel. The Israelis were restrained by the United States from retaliating against Iraq in order to avoid the possibility of unravelling the multinational coalition which comprised of Arab members who were opposed to Israel as the Iraqi regime. To this end, the United States installed the patriot missiles as a counter weight to the Iraqi scuds. The Israelis had to use the power which the restraints Americans imposed on them to wrench concessions of billions of dollars of economic aid for reconstruction after the war might have ended from the United States. So, a comprehensive Middle East settlement was badly needed in the region as a whole. Every unstable situa/tion in the region had had the Israelis drawn to it which might mean a war with implications for international security as a whole. At the end of the Gulf war therefore, James Baker, the US secretary of State criss-crossed the Middle East for more than twenty times in order to arrange for an international conference on the Middle East (Echezoni, unpub. 1991 p. 42). After so much posturing on both the Israeli and Arab sides regarding the mode of representation of the Palestinians at the conference, whether they should include members of the PLO or moderate Palestinians who were born in East Jerusalem, a Palestinian . delegation acceptable to the Israelis was put in place. Other questions moved to the agenda of such a conference: would the Israelis be prepared to trade land for peace in the Golan Heights, the occupied. territories and in west bank of the Jordan river? Would the Israelis be able to consider the important -question of self rule for the Palestinians. Doubts wcre rife in this area when the Israeli delegation to the first international conference on the Middle East was led by the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzak Shamir, a conservative on the issue of land for peace and the absence of the foreign minister, David Levy, who should have led the deleqation and who was a dove on the question of land for peace. However, the conference got off to a good start and it became a question of where the critical negotiations on these issues would be held, in Washington, in Moscow, in Geneva or as the Israelis had often insisted, in the Middle East, preferably in Cyprus. Beyond the conference other issues which beclouded negotiations; were Israeli repressions in the occupied Arab lands, detention of Palestinians ~artici~atingin the Deace conference, the development of more ~ew-ishsettlements in occupied lands and the posture of the regime of Yitzak Shamir not to give back an inch of Arab land captured in the 1967 June war. The June 1992 Israeli general elections which brought into power the regime of Yitzak Rabin of the Labour party with dispositions towards stopping the building of new Jewish settlements, and trading land for peace, put the peace process in a new and different light. The Palestinian Question Nothing sums up the Palestinian problem sot\9"i~i%iyas the refrain which was heard on and on among Palestinians who weat forcd to leave Kuwait after the Gulf war: "Kuwait is w,country. I love Kuwait. I have never left Kuwait for anywhere else."' This goes to reinforce the age old yearning of the Palestinians for their own homeland. After the Gulf war, more than two hundred thousand Palestinians were forced to leave Kuwait for Jordan. Kuwait had been the largest concentration of the Palestinian diaspora outside the occupied territories. She had haboured more than four hundred thousand Palestinians before the Gulf war. The pressures for the Pdestinians to leave Kuwait came as a result of the support which they gave to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war and the suspicion within Kuwait that the Palestinians in their midst aided and abeted Iraqi entry into Kuwait including infrastructural support for the occupation regime (Echezoria, Unpub. 1991, p. 47). There was no way it could have been conjectured that the PLO would not have supported Saddam Hussein against the United States and its allies. The Palestinians represent that strand of Arab nationalism which had remailted after the demise of Game1 Abdel Nasser. Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Hafez Asad of Syria were also their embodiments. Its expression could be found in the airline high-jackings of the 1970s and 1980s and the accompanying terrorist bombardments. It could also be said to find expression in the Intafada movement of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The defeat of Iraq and the support they gave to the Palestinians brought expulsions on them in Kuwait, strained the capacity of the Jordanians who also supported Iraq in the war in providing the refugees welfare needs such as schools, hospitals and jobs, and they became boxed into a comer in the Middle East peace process. PLO rhetorics in the process of the Gulf crisis and during the Gulf war itself, tended to paint a picture in which Iraq would either prevail in the war or it would be a stalemate. Both situations in their estimation would have made Iraq, seem to have prevailed and a radical solution posed for the Palestinian problem. Prior to the Gulf war. PLO leader, Yaser Arafat had visited Baghdad several times. It was at that stage that Saddam Hussein might have dazzled him with his stockpiles of scud missiles and perhaps those of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, some of which were yet at a stage in which they would not have been used or even if they were ready to be used and actually used by Saddam Hussein, it would liave been suicidal for the Iraqi leader to do so. Warnings to that effect were sent to Saddam Hussein by the Americans throughout the war (Echezona Ibid). Like Saddam Hussein, the Palestinians seemed to have pursued a bad strategy at a time the United States seemed intent cn granting them de jure recognition. In 1974, the PLO Chairman, Yaser Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the plight of the Palestinians. Since then, the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis had intensified and the Palestinian reaction had been terrorist activities on what was considered Israeli and American targets. This led to an atrophy of American position on the Palestinian question and American insistence that before she could enter into dialogue with the Palestinians, its organization, the PLO must renounce violence. In 1986, in addition to the PLO, president Ronald Reagan had named Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua as sponsors of international terrorism. In November 1988, J Palestinian state was proclaimed by Yaser Arafat and in December at a special UN General Assembly in Geneva t11c PLO chairman formally renounced rl :: use of violence. He also acknowledged the right of existence of the state of Israel. The United Statcs immediately acknowledged that the PLO had met its demands for talks and this opened the way for an international conference on the Middle East. In spite of several hurdles on the way, the sudden entry of Iraq into Kuwait in August 1990 changed everything. The PLO went back into its old shell and Jsc 1 * i:: ,P State!: qtlifensd her attitude to the Palestinians when the {.';I I !, i4 therefore not too far fetched to locate why the IIwt i ,it:, WOL~proclaim a new world order after the end of the . .\~li why it should be engaged in every problem that had ~11riir,QL,~ 11\w that war - overt:y concerned for a comprehensive Mictr'le EL,i ;,cace sctllement. Reconsidering War, Peace and Hegemony in the Aftermath of the Gulf War The most persistent problem in international relations is how to pEvent war from occurring and if it occurs, how to consolidate peace and prevent future wars from breaking out. To that extent, theories about war and peace have proliferated. Some theorists find the causes of war to lie in the innate behavioural chdracteristics of man in his state of nature. Others find it in the anarchical nature of the international system and yet others in the internal characteristics of a state i.e. whether a state is democratic or not democratic. The latter raises the intellectual debate about what should a democratic state be - should it be a liberal political system, an autocratic system, a socialist system or what have you. And indeed, if we really create the true democratic state, would there be an absence of war? Since 1989, references have been made to the dawn of a new world order. What is the nature of this new world order in terms of peace and war? Does this new world order smack of an evolving nirvana, that would mark a revolutionary transition from an old order marked by war to a new one marked by peace? What are the major ideological underpinnings of this new world order. and how do they tie with a peaceful and hegemonic world? What new learning processes were engendered by the Gulf war and the outbreak of peace immediately before 1989 and after in terms of reconceptualizing the theories of peace and war in our contemporary age? Thtory and Empiricism in War and Peace Kenneth Waltz a seasoned scholar in international politics had articulated the theories of war in a major book. His work which was shaped by the behaviouralist debate in the 1950s examined three themes which were then relevant as they are today on the causes of war and the consolidation of peace - man, the structure of states and the structure of the international system. He delved into the views of majar philosophers including Rousseau, Spinoza, Cobden, psychologists; anthropologists, statesmen and pamphleteers to conclude that in order to understand the causes of war and how peace could be achieved, we must be able to combine the inputs in man, the state and the international system (Waltz 1954). All necessary inquiries concerning the causes of'war have been made by mortal man. Most such inquiries have revolved around man himself. Are there innate bmlogical characteristics in man which make him prone to aggressive instimts, which could be organised into a war such as his proclivity to rank ordoring and building ritualised forms? In the.@ate"of nature prior to the coming of civil society, was marl a @akefbl pimal? Some schalars even maintain that there are societies that tiad not known wap, that war is a cultural invention and not a therefore war can be abolished the way that it came (Mead, 1940 pp. 402 405). Most of the universe today is organised into states. Man has left the state of nature and entered into civil society. The state therefore becomes the focal point of inquiry about the causes of war because the state has henceforth become the embodiment of the will of its constituting inhabitants in the name of the sovereign. So the question becomes, why do states go to war against other states? Why do break downs occur within states, when the state, the sovereign, becomes, in the perspective of its rebellious part, not the embodiment of the will of all but the will of some? These are the questions we shall be concerned with in the .entirety of this discourse because throughout most of the twentieth.century, these. issues are what have divided ideologues of both the left and me right and ha Qme gemane to the evolution of the Versailles woild':orflw, the %bWda01:.r and possibly the so called new world order. In his treatment of what he calls the "second image" of his work, Waltz enters into a discourse of what a good state would be like. It would be one whose social purposes would steer it awa from war while a bad state would be one whose social purposes wo 9d incline it towards war. Such a war might be an internal war, a civil war or war between states. According to Waltz, Karl Marx defines good "in terms of ownership of the means of production" by the majority class or the proletariat while Immanuel Kant does so "in tems of abstract principles of right" and Woodrow Wilson "in terns of national self determination and modem democratic organization" (Ibid, p. 83). For liberal political writers of nineteenth century England such as John Stuart Mill or Adam Smith or even utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, there is an unanimous agreement that a state whose social purposes are informed by "individual initiative" and the competition arising therefrom is regulated by the free market is a good state. These arguments are summarily put by James Shotwell thus "The political doctrine of international peace is a parallel to the economic doctrine of Adam smith, for it rests similarly upon a recognition of common reciprocal interests which extend beyond national frontiers" (Ibid. p. 98). The empirical reference points tor a book that was written in the 1950s include the First World War and the Second World War. In writing this essay, we are informed by the events of the Cold War and the post war world. The Cold War was a war so we have shown, fought, short of direct military confrontation between the super powers. It was a war nevertheless in which wars, fomented by the ideological differences between the super powers raged within the domestic soCieties of the developing countries and sometimes between devg1apil.lg countries themselves. How could these wars, the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Middle East conflict, the Greek-Turkish conflict, wars of national liberation in Africa, Warsaw Pact interventions in Eastern Europe, wars between India and Pakistan, wars between Vietnam and China, the civil war in Cambodia, ethnic uprisings and inter tribal conflicts in Africa be explained within the purview of the nature of these states or the nature of the rivalry between the super powers, a phenomenon which introduces the international system component to the problem. Let us take two typical examples of conflicts that had domestic and international implications: the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. In these conflicts, it was a question of the ideological+differences between socialism and capitalism. Would we then conclude in the mould of the liberals that the war was caused by a bad stFe whose social purposes were informed by socialising the means of production or as Marxists would argue by a capitalist order intent on enforcing global imperialism. In the past, before the present order, such a debate had seemed like me between two deaf mutes who did not understand what the other was saying. But today, the ideologues of socialism would ,$&m to. & loosing with the constant exhortation for market econonl hd,pluralism. In India, we have had varied conflicts bardexin on it$ cultural pluralism - Moslems versus Hindus, Sikhs ve'rsrrs f ind?. and yet India is touted to be the largest plural demoCrlcy in the world. Why is its plural political structure, a harbiwr of the market system in the economy, unable to pr~videthe safe outlet wibin which Indians would let out the steam of their grievances rather than let it out on themselves? Do such internal conflicts tell us anytl$ng, about plural-democracy and war? Is plural democrati"qp[ac~qjSnd;rdistinguishable from such practices in France,the WedStates, Britain and Japan, countries which are in the wkrds of Karl Peutsch, "plural security communities or amalgamated security communities"? (Deutsch et al, 1957'). Are these societies free from conflicts bordering on the fringes of war? What would we call British pre-occupation in Northern Ireland, a war or something else? The question of cultural pluralism has become an enduring problem in national and international politics. The search for the solution of this problem had polarised the two ideological systems in the world. To the extent that both ideologies share the perspective that

\.\ it is the right of all national groups to exercise their right to self determination, they differ on what might obtain after those rights might have been exercised. While ideologues of pluralism stress that for a society to be a true embodiment of human rights, it must signify a plural political structure with a multi-party system and a market economy, the socialists point out that until the change from a capitalist to a socialist society is accomplished, a human right which has no class bias would not obtain. The Soviet Union had formed the em irical reference point for most of socialist ideologueq. 4 m 9tivariegated, multinational society, claims had been made that the Soviet Union had solved the much talked of its nationality problem through its socialist society. A society of full em]~t:qmxt.free medical care was enshrined. The socialist society h2l i;..qtlr the Russian nationality which had hitherto behaved as 7 rr.aster rratiorx!hy to behave instead as a brother nationality and even to make sacrifices wbich would make some of the other nationalities which were sf the feudal stage to bypass the capitalist stage and enter into socialism. At a point in the Brezhnev era, it was said that a new Soviet man was evolving, that fusion was taking place between the various nationalities (Morris, 1980 pp. 157-176). All these notions, all these assertions have been debunked by the regime of perestroika and glasnost in the Swiet Union, a situation which has also impacted on the multinational structure of Yugoslavia and perhaps, that of Czechoslovakia War Between States In discussions of war between states, the focus changes to the nature of the international system. Here, you have an absence of government or what a writer had aptly referred to as "the anarchical society" (Bull, 1977 Ibid.). But things still get done in such a society. At least, there are rules and regulations concerning international trade which states obey, there are intemational regimes charged with supervising the intemational monetary system and there is international law. However, the laws of war, their acceptance, indicates the nature of the "anarchical society", that war could be a legitimate instrument of settling disputes between states and so the morality or immorality of a war would depend on who wins a war (Bull, 1979. p. 593). Kenneth Waltz provides a scenario of the anarchical society using Rousseau's example of the stag hunt and the hare. A group of men agreed to cooperate to trap a stag but one of them defected to pursue a hare instead. He poses that though the defector "was motivated by a feeling of hunger, his act is one of passion." Reason might have told him that if he cooperated, everyone would benefit. But it was the same reason which told him that if he did not pursue the hare, "the man next to him might leave his post to chase it" leaving the first man with food for thought on the folly of being loyal (Ibid. p. 169). An explication of this theory will lead us back to the internal characteristics of states. If states which cooperate to achieve a parlicular goal arc good statcs, would any of them defect? In international society, statcs whosc social purposes were informed by liberalism as wcll as statcs whosc social purposes were informed by socialism had coopcratcd against onc another. Howcver, the decoupling of the Warsaw Pact, a grouping of socialist states whose common goals wcrc thc thrcat -posed by capitalism and the persistence of the NATO even after the Warsaw Pact had dissolved might pose some pointers. Mrs. Thatcher had alluded to the fact that nuclear weapons have brought peace to Europe for more than forty years, an indicator, perhaps that the caoperation of the NATO countries might have been informed by the so'Wed American nuclear umbrella and not perhaps that liberal states have found more reasons to cooperate than to defect. Does the continuation of the NATO in the present form or in any future form mean that liberal institutions must have a security anto them? Or is it an indication of hegemonism? The Gulf War What is surprising about the Gulf war is that it occured after the new world order might have been launched into being but not proclaimed into being. It does not seem that the new world order pretends IQ obviate war from occuring between states. However, it came about when the two super powers, agents of great capability, who had been the mainstays of the old world order scem to br putting their swords into plough-shares. No doubt the origins of the Gulf war go beyond the war itself into the Iran/?raq war, it nevertheless shattered the belief that the source of greatest instability in the world might be Europe or the Far East but the larger Middle East. Was it the last systemic war? Was it the war which really launched the new world order into king? The Gulf war brought out those critical issues we had earlier tackled thus: To what extent is the nature of man, the state and the international system responsible for the outbreak of war in the Middle East? It would be recalled that Iraq and Iran had fought a war in the region in which more than a million people might have perished. Abdut two years after the war, Iraq turned its gaze on Kuwait over some disputed oil fields, annexed Kuwait, proclaimed it its nineteenth province and set at pace, a multinational coalition made up of all the major industrial powers against her. Earlier, in the war with Iran, the Iranian mercurial leader, late Ayatollah Rhoulla Khomeini had insisted that he could not stop fighting Iraq until the Iraqi ledder, Saddam Hussein was ousted from power and so he exhorted his Shiite Moslem religious followers who are in the majority in Iraq to accomplish that feat in the name of Allah. The impression was thus created that the Iraqi leader was solely responsible for the war and if he was overthrown, the war Would end. In other words, the Iraqi leadership which was the embodiment of the will of the Iraqi people might have misled them into a fracticidal warfare. The Iraqis were not making the same calls on the Iranians to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini. All evidences had pointed out that the Iraqis had started the war at a time when they had calculated that the Iranian leadership was weak. The Iranian revolution which ushered in the mullahs into power after the ouster of the Shah of Iran, saw a resort to Moslem fundamentalist practices and the floutation of all rules and regulations regarding international conduct. They were therefore isolated internationally. The Iraqi leader, a manipulator of thought that it was the best time to strike to seize a disputed temtory from Iran and probably cut off a good chunk of Iranian territory. The war lasted for more than eight years until the acceptance of cease-fire, surprisingly by the Iranians on July 18, 1988 about two weeks after the Americans had downed an Iranian Jumbo jet carrying nearly three hundred passengers. How then would Saddam Hussein start another war in quite a short time thus drawing in an allied coalition of more than 600,000 men backed by the most modem armaments against him, a situation which had not been seen since the end of the Second World Waf? Several images of Saddam HuSsein had hitherto been depicted as a mad man who was ready to sacrifice his people in spite of overwhelming odds, as a tactician in the mould of Germany's Bismirch, as a man without conscience who was unconstrained in his ruthless use of aggression against his neighbours, as a melagomaniac who surrounded himself with psychophant~and finally as a nationalist and probably as an anti-imperialist (USP. October 1990). All these perceptions of Saddam Hussein were gleaned from his radical youth all the way to his assumption of power in the only political party in the country, the Baathist Party. It could therefore be concluded from the liberal view point that the nature of Iraqi society, its domination by a single party whets an authoritarian state which would address forward the personality of Saddam Hussein, a dictator, who would be accountable to no one domestically except the motley group in the who enjoy the perquisites of office and who would remain loyal p%to in spite of all odds. It follows that when he led the Iraqi people to war, he might not have got their mandate to go to war since the assumption that he, the sovereign is the repository of the will of the whole of the Iraqi people became a travesty. It is equally appropriate to look at the goals of the Baathist party. It believes that the division among the Arabs was fomented by outside forces and unless those forces were expelled from the Arab world, the divisiveness would continue. It is the goal of the party therefone to strive for Arab unity under a charismatic leader and to expel the outsiders (USIP, Ibid). Saddam Hussein therefore saw himself in the mould of Game1 Abdel Nasser. In essence, the man Saddam Hussein, was shaped by the nature of security in the Middle East as a whole, a situation which might have impacted immeasurably on the Iraqi society and similarly on other societies in the Middle East region. And of course, the nature of security in the Middle East is directly linked to the central strategic balance, to the global security matrix. In the multinational coalition that fought against Iraq, most of the major Arab countries featured in it - Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirales and Kpwait. Syria and Egypt arf dictatorships of the Iraqi type while the re@ are ruled by Arab sheikhs in the manner of the feudal era. Their participation in the multinational force was not because they were plural democracies but because of their perception and fear of a rising dominant hegemonic power in the region and not of support of outside forces who were coming to divide and further dominate the Arab peoples. Would a liberal political order have obviated the rise of a regional hegemonic power? So, what then motivated the formation of the allied coalition? Were the allies the good states while Iraq was a pariah in the international system that must be clobbered? After all, what might again be considered to be good and bad states had coalesced against Hitler but after the coalescence the Cold War ensued. As we had pointed out earlier, the states which contributed to the multinational force were not all plural democracies but they had one aim in common: to thwart a bourgeoning regional hegemonic power who was accountable to no one internationally as it was not domestically. But why should a state be accountable to any one in an anarchical system? How would authoritarian states and plural democracies have common perceptions and common goals? How would good and bad states perceive a war situation in the same light? Would we say that they were engaged in a just war, a war of their self defence? And how did these states, authoritarian and democratic, mobilise their lpeople towards war? All the postulated causes of war could be found ir. tne Gulf conflict: land, economic questions on both sides (while the Iraqis said that they wanted to get redress for oil mined by the Kuwaitis in a disputed temtory, the advanced industrial countries wanted to keep the Gulf water way open for the shipment of oil for their industrial development and the awe which the whole allied coalition shared about the type of power that could accrue to Iraq if it became the hegemonic country in the region), the question of leadership, the character of states involved in the conflict and the character of the Middle East and the international system as a whole. It is appropriate on this score, to note the domestic political situation in the United States, the leader of the allied coalition. President Bush had told the American public that the war would never be'like the Viemarn war. It was going to be a quick, surgical operation. After forty days of massive bombardment of Iraq and its forward locations in Kuwait, using the most sophisticated aircraft and precision guided missiles, Iraq capitulated only after about two days of further allied ground offensive thus making mince meat of its accumulated nearly fifty billion dollars of weaponry. The success was achieved because there was domestic consensus on the war in the United States and in the other major members of the coalition, France and Britain. In the United States, the elite were not as divided as they were in the Viemam war. Before the outbreak of war, in the months of posturing before actual hostilities broke out, some demonstrations had ensued in major American cities against the war, pointing to the oil companies as the probable cause of an impending conflict. Would domestic consensus have unravelled if the war were not a short and quick one? In the aftermath of the war, the major powers were feverishly trying to put a Middle East peace conference in place. Efforts have been made so far to convince the Israelis to trade land for peace and no one could tell the extent to which the Israelis would go in spite of which regime was in power in Tel Aviv. But the major powers do not seem to be concerned with the nature of the states in the region, nuthoritarian and feudal states and the extent to which their internal dispositions caused the Gulf conflict and probably the general Middle East conflict. Would it be pqsed that if these states were democracies, there would have been no war in the Middle East? It has often been pointed out that the Iblis are the only democracy in the Middle East. To what extent has Israeli democracy then, constrained her from going to war? To what extent is Israeli behaviour in the occupied territories informed by a Massada complex ingrained from centuries of anti- semitism in Europe? Future of Western Hegemonism When Mikhail Gorbachev visited Britain in December 1984, little did the world know that it was the beginning of the end of socialism in the Soviet Union and perhaps in the world and the fusion of Soviet and Western elite perspectives on what might be called a future world order. Then, Mr. Gorbachev was the number two man in the Kremlin. Until the archives of his meeting with Mrs. Thatcher is made public, only the two of them would be privy to the discussions that went on between them. However, from Mrs. Thatcher's statement that Mr. Gorbachev was someone from the Soviet Union with whom the West could do business, that observation would need to be recast in terms of the events which attended the post April 1985 plenum of the Soviet Communist Party after which Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union. By 1984, the ideological bipolarization of the world was still intact but from April 1985, slow and steady assaults were made on that bipolarization and by 1987, perestroika and glasnost were in place. Mr. Gorbachev started to address the question of "universal human values" in socialism an'd capitalism and new thinking in foreign policy. Coming directly from.the mouth of someone whose country had championed the cause of socialism, over capitalism, his pronouncements immediately rendered socialist values prostrate before capitalist ones. Taking a fig leaf from him, East European socialist countries went back to capitalism, Geimany was reunified along capitalist lines, a Malta summit was helr~tweenGeorge Bush and Mr. Gorbachev which was said to mark the knd of the Yalta world thl&gi~ing of a newwgJld%rderfti putsch in the Soviet *;'$y$Prugust 199kfailedl to retuni "te?~ovict'~iionto the status *quo atite. This made Gorbachev to further repudiate socialism and communism, pointing out that they were ideas that-had failed in the solution of the problems of man and that the ulhole world should learn lessons from it (Echezona, Unpub. 1591). Now that socialism would seem to be on the decline and liberalism and market economy are surging with relentless speed, what would be the nature of world order both from an intellectual view point and from policy perspectives? In the new world order, the place of the nation state is still very sacrosanct. Except of course, the ongoing replacement of two hegemonies by one hegemony is indicative that we are movi~gwithout let or hindrance towards a world government a la Americana, however, rather than being recessive, the nation state has continued to assert itself. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have broken up into their constituent parts as the west and the United States would want. And of course these developments, like the resort to democratization would undoubtedly have impacts on multinationai African and Asian statcs whcrc thcre is an ongoing revival of cultural pluralism. Secondly, those who arc proclaiming a mw world order from the policy arena have a Euro-American perspective and seem to have been served right by the collapse of socialism. Their pronouncements are suspcct in the Third World. It does not seem that they have complemented "their national citizenship with an identity as planetary citizen." Since world order studies has its origins also from the United States. "it is perceived elsewhere as a managerial "fix" for global issues tha~merely represent a new geopolitical strategy for perpetuating global, economic, political and cultural hegemony (Falk, 1977, p. 174). The euphoria which had attcndcd the outbreak of a new world order, of an evolving nirvana seems a pipc dream. A westem commentator had pointed out aftcr thc Gulf war, that it was a dress rehearsal for a Third World WLLI,a war that would have to bc fought on thc basis of the highcst fronti;~s of scicrlcc and technology. Iraq was dc!cai i bccausc it wa.; lnd!:t 7s ~~.a,yfrom modem science in spitc 31 hcr stockpiling of biLions r>t' ddms of weapons mainly from thc Sovier lh :~ii,a country whicll %as out of step in scicntiiic and ~cchnicaldcvc'op nmt in tksiv~lian and niililary rcalrnr,. Thc war was an indicator that Svvict sclcncc is not at pace with wcslcm science and the Soviet Union today was then prostrate before the west to assist her in restructuring her economy (Echezona, Ibid.). It would seem from current posturing that the powers of yesterday are trying to reassert themselves in new garbs. Present research has not indicated that if the current powers become market economies and plural democracies, that their global behaviour would be marked by peace. Mikhail Gorbachev and were bent on reversing the framcwork over which the Soviet economy had hitherto revolved upon, on a socialist framework. (although what we were being told was that it was ncvcr a socialist economy but a command and administer economy), towards a market economy and a plural political systcm. Bcfore them, Soviet leadcrs and Soviet commentators had insisted upon [he hct that thc socialist world view was one of peacc while that of capital was one of war. Soviet interventions throughout the world were explained within the purview of socialism and pcacc, in Afghanislan, in support of Vietnam in support of Cuba, in Angola. ctc. And in the late 1980s Mr. Gorbachev sought to encourage the development of commodity economy in the Soviet Union and the cmbourgeoisement of the Soviet population. All these have made socialist ideologues to see him as a "capitalist roader" who was planted in the highest echelons of the Soviet Communist Party to destablise a stable socialist economy for "capitalist vultures". The way and manner in which the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe, signed away and destroyed its medium range weapons in Europe, posturing itself to sign away its ICBM on the land, in the sea and in the air and its conventional forces in Europe, clamouring for a common European house in which she will be admitted, redesigning her federation in thc direction of more autonomy, more pluralism and morc markelization, all in an effbrt to draw the west into some form of alliance for progress tells onc of two things: Either that the Soviet Union is recoiling into its Russian shells to prepare for a present in which shc has fallen out of stcp as a super power and an unknown future which might as yet raise conflicts of to a high pitch, as in thc past betwcen the Slavs and the Caucasians or it is a sudden abnegation of power, trying to recoil back because she has spread herself too thin and a recognition of the risc of new powers to replace hcr. The policy of Mr. Gorbachcv was responsible for Gcrman reunification although the prcssurcs for Gcrman reunification had been there since Germany was dismembercd in 1945. The break down of the Berlin wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990 would be remembered by historians as the end of onc cycle and the beginning of a new one. International political historians have not done a treatise on how German re-intcgration would tip the Europcm balance of forces or balance of slrcngth in favour of Gcrmany and its possible consequences for the future of world politics. True, the source of disturbance of global equilibrium might not be only one. It is important to look at the probable consequences of the policies that were designed in the Gulf war for today. In the Gulf war, the Germans were asked to do morc. Thcy committed their airforce for Turkish defence. They also committed their forces in the Iraqi Kurdish affair. In the cfforl to bail out thc Soviet or Russian economy, they were in the fore fiunt. In thc European Community. Ccimany has assumed an undeniable place as the forcmost pole of power. WiLh the withdrawal of Sovict forces in Evrc:.~ and Lhe dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, pressures mighl rise for the dissolution of Lhe NATO. That is quite an inevitability even though the rhetorics of the day is toaredefine the role of NATO. Oncc ihc issues hat brought the Warsaw Pact and the NATO arc no more Lhcre, the states in the NATO might start to polarise over issues without reinforcing one another. Gemany might, at its prescnt disposition fill lhc European void whether Europe remains divided into its disparate parts or it is unified. That might be ominous for world politics. Market economics have not been known to agrce very easily since competilion is the only thing which they undersland. And Germany might not conlinue to fathom American tutelage. In thc Gulf war again, likc the Gcrmans, the Japanese were asked to do more. They promised billions of dollars and were at the threshold of scnding a token forcc to play welfare roles when a rancour brokc out in Japan over whcthcr Lhey were not going beyond the hund of Lhe 1946 LrcaLy which forbade Japan from having an offensive dcfencc forcc. But Lhc Japancse, in association with their other colleagucs in the Asia-Pacific trianglc are breaking American lradc barricrs and Amcrican domcslic content legislation which discriminatcd against forcign madc goods including those of the Japancsc and Lhe Asian tigcrs. Thc Europcans arc also tying their own legislations against thc Japancsc, lhc Amcricans and the Asian tigers. And wc might say, by Lhc cnd of lhc ccnlury, he Soviets or is it the Russians might have fully restruclurcd Lhcir economy along market lincs and we arc probably going to havc a one world type of intcmalional polltical cconomy in which market economies would jostlc against onc amothcr. How bcnign would such a world be? At the cnd or this century, we arc vcry likely Lo havc bctwecn four to seven potentially grcat powers. This rcminds onc of Lhe nineteenth century whcn thcrc wcrc as much as such numbcr of powers who shared a common bclicr and which cnsurcd pcacc for ninety nine years. There is scrious doubt Lhdt such Ilislory is about lo repeat itsclf in this era of thc long rangc bornbcr, prccislon guidcd missiles and Inter- Comlncntal Ballls[~c M~ss~lcsIn the dcbates in the American Congrcss, 11 would sccm ha^ though Congrcss is inclined to tone down dcfence spcnding sincc thc intcmational political climate has changed, thc Execulive branch and the Military Industrial Complex would seem to ~hinkothcrwisc. You gct things coming out the same way in their own domcstic pcculiaritics in Russia and in Grcat Britain. It does no1 scem as if thc Germans or the Japanese would stay caol if it becomes quitc obvious that thc Russians have taken to the back watcr. At a point whcn thc Americans wcre prcssing the Japanese to increase thcir defence spending in ordcr to bear the burdens of their defence, the Chincse wcre yelling that if the Japanese did so with as much as .05 pcrccntagc of thcir GNP, it would disequilibrate the wholc Asia-Pacific rcgion. How long wou!d thc Japanese remain with their swords into thcir plough-shares and the Gcrmans do the same as bolh countrics continuc to miniaturise thcir scientific and technical inventions and to gobblc up world markcts? CHAPTER 5 THE SOVIET UNIOk

Momentous events have happened in history but no one would havc fathomed the way new history would be yielded by the dissolution of a country which was addressed as a super power and which had participated actively in the shaping of the post Second World War order. How did this come about and what are its implications to the shaping of the new world order and hegemony? Churchill's observation that the Soviet Union was a riddle wrapped in a mystery which is cloaked in an enigma has fully been borne out by the way in which it rose in international politics as a super power and the way it declined into just one of thc states in the international system, as Russia, in so short a time - barely seventy three years after the 1917 revolution (Handel, 1973 p. xvi). Althougk the very complexity of the Soviet Union had prevented a monistic. interpretation of what it really was, yet, Soviet leaders and enthusiast: of the Soviet political system had seen it as the true embodirncnt ol what Karl Man had predicted, a socialist/communist society. In actual fact, it was not Lhe communist society Karl Marx had in mind, nor the social systcm which V.I. Lcnin or Mao Tse Tung had in mind nor was it a totalitarian system which hcr critics had in mind. Rather, it was the cmbodiment of Bolshevism, communism, socialism and the Russian . . rcvolutionary tradition which cut across orthodoxy, nihilism , , dogmatism and Lhc ability to cndure suffering for thc sakc of faith (Bcrdyacv 1972 pp. 7-75). he rise and fall or me sovlet union arc a saga of the twentieth century. It could not be explained how a band of dedicated comp:~rriotscould, in spite of the rclatively awful bQJcwfrdness of Russia in comparison with the west, bring about the modernization, the technological development of Russia and the Russian.empire which came to be called the Sovict Union from the level in which the Czars had left it to some level with the west, at lcast, TO the poipt at which the Soviet Union could be called a super power eqqallo the United States of America only to allow it again to decline into just another power in the international system. It would be recalled that there were formidable tasks which confronted these band of idealists called Bolsheviks: defeat in war by the Germans was complemented by collapse of the economy, breakdown in the communication process, attack of forces from within and from without and yet they held out and achieved their aim. Evaluation of the System which the Communists Inherited Two and a half centuries of Tartar rule had complctely sealed Russia from European civilization. She was thus cut off from the renaissance, the age of reason and the scientific revolutions Shc had, howevcr, a formidable base in textile and timber indcsr!-ics and her rail road system infused with German and French capilal was very highly developed. Secondly, rhe Russian political structurc represented a handful in society. Power was monopolised by the Czars and thcil immediate entourage, the nobility which unlike the nobility in thc west, did not develop a social institution with which to challengc thc monarchy. So, the nobility was created and subordinaled to the Czar and owed its survival to the Czar. Hencc, Russian society was hierarchically organized with the Czar at the apcx, followcd by the nobility and then the slavcs and peasants at lhc bottom, interspersed by a rapidly growing working class. The Russian Orthodox Church within ~hccoursc of three hundred years emerged as onc of the largcst land owncrs in Russia and for a time, threatened thc power of thc Czars. In reply, Patrick the Great replaced the Church with a Holy Synod to be headed by a commissioner appointed and s~lbordinated 10' the Cgar. Since then (including the Soviet pcriod), church and slatc havc ban merged with the state being supcrordinatc. In esscncc, ~hcCzarist content of Russia could be scen all ~hroughthe Soviet pcriod - autocracy which had been the method of rulc by thc Tartars for centuries was embodicd in the pattern of' rulc by Ihc Bolsheviks in thc Soviet pcriod. That is why it was extremely difl'icult for Mikhail Gorbachcv lo prcside ovcr the demise of a command anti administer cconomy and Boris Yellsin would not be expcctcd to f'irir bcttcr. All reprcssivc Soviet inslitutions had a historical preccdcnt to them. The first such institution was thc Czarist Oprichnina. It was briefly replaccd by ~hcChcka in thc pcriod of revolution and countcr revolulion. In addilion, how Russian or Sovict leadcrs had rcaclcd to the problcms of thcir society is put within the framework of the pendulum Lhcory - cvcry period of extrcnic oppression is followed by a pcriod of rclax;rlion which yiclds annt!:;i- pcriod of opprcssion (witricss thc rno\.cmcn( from thc rcprcssivc Slalinis; I,criod to thc . rclaxcd Krusct~cvcra back lo lhe burcaucraliAiorr and slagnation of rhc Brczhncv pcrioil and t~ickonto the Gorbachcv cra which sought to libcralisc thc Sovl:.,i poiili~;.iisysLm). All thcsc arc male against Lhc background of prcss~urciii ,'I!:~vophils(thosc who would want Russia or the Sovict CInio~; li, ~clairiii~. Slav'ic roots and shun westcrn ;i~llucnccs)and thc ~l~c..:tcn~izcrs(;hose who would want Russia or ~lic Sovict Union lo imit:iIc thc wcslj. The Russian Revolution and Internal Decay It was expected that the Russian reVolution would mark a dramatic departure from the system which the BolShcviks had inherited. To the extent that they tended to introduce values which would seem to incline towards mass politics, it did not shed itself of the essential attributes of which were the hallmark of the Czarist oppressive system. While the Czarist autocratic system was vanquished including the parasitic nobility, a new autocracy was put in place represented in the communist party apparatus. A dictatorship of the communist party was institutcd whercby parties of the opposition were abolished. This meant that a good chunk of Soviet citi~enrywere summarily disenfranchised or rather forced to consume communist values in a dictatorial jacket. Hence, a silent opposition was created even though the communists kept claiming that with the coming into power of the party ef the proletariat who were in the majority, there was no need for an opposition. To be fair to V.I. Lenin, the demiurge of the Russian revolution he would seem to have misperceived that for a revolution in which the Czarist oppr"cssivc system was eliminated, any opposition to such a revolution would bc tantamount to infantilism. But that might have been a misjudgement because man in his frccdom to think the way he deems fit would necessarily be prone to oppose. Even within the Bolshevik ranks, there were opposition to a rcvolution on the eve of the revolution itself, which Lenin overruled and after the revolution, there were several tendencies among thc Bolshcviks which got played out in the Stalinist decapitation of thcm. Again, Lenin's effective leadership of the Soviet Union was too short, 1917-1922 (he died in 1923 after a two year paralysis of a gun shot wound he received from an assassin) and stressful for the Soviet State due to civil war and foreign intervention aimed at revcrsing the revolution (a period that was referred to by thc Bolsheviks as a period of war communism). Perhaps, therefore hc might not have had the necessary respite after thc revolution with which to lay the appropriate foundations of a humane political system which Marx and Marxism had envisaged. This foreclosed a constitutional pattern for leadership turnover and thus yielded the Stalinist, totalitarian state. One of the greatest tragedies of the Russian revolution and thus of Russian communism is thc phenomenon of Stalin. True, Lenin had warned on his death bed about thc traumas which could befall the Soviet Union if thc mantelpiece of leadership fell on Stalin yet the institutions which Lenin lcft behind might not have been that too capable of forestalling Stalin's assumption of power. One such institation is an all powcrful party with a "leading role in society" rescrvcd for it. So, for twenty eight years of seventy three years of Sovict powcr, thcre was Lhe rcincamation of the Czarist past whereby political power and power of cocrcion were invested in one man (the personality cuit was substitutcd Tor collective leadership) and a coterie of officials, the apparatchiki .;hid nomenclatura became the "yes" men for the sjstem 117 :ds, those elements whom the J . revolution wa:->'wy _,,d10 SCWC,the working class and the peasantrv ki,-rBuseu ~irii

Soviet I ,,,:I* b: tbc apogee of this great industrial state was

the So- . l.. J in: , e:d complex, a situation which alienated the workik . 1,. . :I - , z I: *~ZAICIdemands of an industrial society -

there . I: A ?,,I> : ,rr tn butter and the working class became pro:,! i , . ;I ; b~rwringburcaucraiised communist party and ,-, , ; he Stalinist state, which became the framewo.. . 1 lr t' dt though it built a great industrial : -:wch thL : isa e;f ~hcSoviet Union in the Second Woi. 1 ,; .mgcd, it nevc~k.&; :. v~dsa state for the collective suicide of th~working clw ,id . :.r?try. Two images of the great Soviet indusln.2 .JLC wcre prevalent 111 l4g: 1930s and 1040s - one was a super irr&~d-! state in the making vliiili: rhc other were mass graves for the Soviet working class ren .r lr of those of Hitler. In the post Stalinist period, it did not seem as if anyou'e had bcen able to redeem the image of totalitarianism which Stalin had stamped on the Soviet state. Nikita Kruschev's secret speech in 1956 .:r$2e destalinization measures that followed were a cr.:ig( h (~ijthe ?~-.~:icc for it was not tno long before the Brezhir :if: i~powa to

launch a madde~r~igarms race with thc 1 :?,.a, :. and ao f~~flt,.:r make consumerism a permanent poir, .:.r - :!iiill ,,. ~ll~3~1vlet working class, to institute stagnation rr o Y .G sph~r,"and to furtner b~xeaucratise Soviet s . . :K nx!cn$ that the competition with the United State!. " ,.- tjl *: iieari~ationof

the Soviet state, it could not exp! I a society which was deemed to be a super powcr . povide its citizens with minimal human nccds as the ' t~.l~~~S~atcsdid, to a good proportion of the American socicty. I Perestroika, Glasr . Soviet Disintegration The assumption of pc Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1985 was

marked by ncw prop t ricw l'ronlicrs, and an cfCort to dcstroy old hislory in ordcr tc , ' h'hcn thcsc rff~rtsbccamc clclrrl y manifcst in ihc rorci , ~II:V ~rc,- "1: I;: 6.; ,,.rts 10 cnsurc global dcnuclclr . noi . . \/cry scnuu{ly hc

wcst. Somc in the wc:, wc' I? *~.~liaticor (;or ~:~chcv'.\ ovcrturcs since they kncb, - _.. . 'T ti bcrn :.lirl; for dccadcs and thc ncw So.: , , , Llr thc mclins ol' laming compcli~lorlrii tilt. II,~'I~.\IL iplicic \o ltldt 11 1111ght engage in internal economic restructuring. This optimism bore fruit in the intermediate weapons accord. This was followed by Gorbachev's elaboration of his new thinking in foreign-affairs, his thinking on universal human values over class values and his concept of a common European house. 'ANdhese happened after about three years of his assumption of power and might be said to be the beginnings of real, radical and dramatic perestroika. On the whole process of glasnost, (more openess) and perestroika (economic restructuring), Gorbachev had pointed out that, I and my colleagues in the party leadership associate the birth and formulation of the concept of renewing socialism on its own foundation and in all spheres where socialist society is developing first of all with the 1985 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Commiaee (L'UNITA 1987). And why it was necessary to renew socialism he pointed out that, Lenin's ideas of socialism were interpreted simplistically and their theoretical depth and significance were often left emaciated. This was true of such key problems as public property, relations between classes and nationalities, the measure of work and measure of consumption, competition, methods of economic management, peoples' rule and self government and others (Novotsi Press Agency, 1987). This was the first time since Lenin when the problems confronting the Soviet state were put in more sordid terms and indeed openly which meant glasnost in practice. It meant in effect that in order to accelerate socio-economic development the producer would have to be emancipated, initiative and economic incentive would have to be substituted for social apathy. It meant also a reform of the political system and with the added specification, reform within the party. What came next was elaboration of tl e concept of glasnost. The approach at first was rudimentary. Then, it was merely a question of additional information which would make for better achievement of acceleration. However it was the momentum cf the reforms that carried it forward. Hence, glasnost became a means of re-examining past history and finding out where. mistakes were made. However. a re-examination of the past would be meaningless if it is not accompanied by the achievement of real democracy. Gradually, glasnost blossomed and started to approach old Scvict taboos - the question of socialism, a multi-party system, thc cnc~alistrevolution, Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Gennany (the famous Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact), thc incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union in 1940, the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet bloc, the events in Hungary in 1956, the 1968 uprising in Czechoslovakia and many other things. What ensued as a result of glasnost were the restiveness in the Baltic Republics. the territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the expunging from the statutes of the communist party of the guiding role in society which had hitherto been reserved for it and hence the rise of new parties and new nationalist movements, the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as President with wider powers, the cbaUmge to Gorbachev's rule by Boris Yeltsin, the decoupling of Eastern Europe from socialism and the rise of new parties there, the rehabilitation of those Bolsheviks decapitated by Stalin, a "hundred flowers movement" in the press and the electronic media, miners strikes and the defiance of the authority of Mikhail Gorbachev by the six union Republics - Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and so many unrecountable issues which had hitherto stayed in the subterranean side of Soviet politics. The Road to Soviet Disintegration With the turmoil engendered by glasnost and perestroika, two questions were permanent in the minds of Sovietologists - would Gorbachev survive? If he did not survive, what would be the fate of the Soviet Union as a political entity in world politics? Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev's foreign minister had tendered his resignation at the Congress of Deputies in Moscow in December 1990. His behaviour was a product of glasnost and perestroika. No Soviet minister would have had the temerity to resign in the past except if such a person was disgraccd by the all powerful Communist Party and declared a non person. In his resignation, he had also wamed about the gro,wth of dictatorship and authoritarianism in the Sovicl Union. This accusalion raised the question as to the extent to which Gorbachev's rcforms might lead to a liberal political system. The reforms had inlroduccd tdo clcar cut opposing forces in Soviet political syslem - he conscrva:ivcs and the liberals. Alexander Yakovlcv, Gorbachcv's altcr ego and Yevgeny Primakov were unqucstionably on thc samc bandwagon wilh Mr. Gorbachev as liberals. But it would sccm [hat whal lhcy wanled was that Lhe Soviet slatc bc rctaincd thc way it had always becn togclher wilh the reforms which dcrc inlroduccd. Othcr libcrals who did no1 agree with them wcrc morc radical on thc rclbrms. Thcy fclt thal lhc reforms were too slow, ~hcydid not carc which way Sovicl f'cdcralism wcnl and they would want LO scc a libcral political systcm along wcsicm lines. Such libcrals wcrc mainly from lhc Russian fcdcralion and scemed to bccomc lhc will of all thc nations and naiionalitics in Lhe former Sovicl Union - Boris Ycltsin, Analoly Sobchak, lalc Andrci Sakharov and Gavril Popov. Thc conscrv$,ivc bloc rcprcscntcd by Ycgor Ligachcv had bccomc mootcd' in ~hciroutspokcncss. I1 was howcvcr obvious that Mikhail Gorbachev was swlfwiched bct'iveen t!~. conservatives and radical liberals. And in sptri: of Gorbachev's liberal credentials, his allies seemed to be maihly in rhe conservative bloc especially the under Dimitry Yazw. The Soviet army had taken a lot of bashing from the radical liberals on their role in Afghanistan. the restive republics, Eastern Europe and on defence spending. It became predictable that a military coup could occui if they continued to encounter further criticisms or if they would bc: asked to further withdraw from the Baltic repukdks. Such threats were heard in the voices of the KGB chief, Vladimir Kruschkov and Dimitry Yazov, he defence minister during the Congress (Echezona, Unpub. 1991, p. 50). On the other hand, Goi-bachev was dependent on rhe radical liberds on the extent to which his reforms could go. At least, it was to them that the majority in rhe counlry listened to. Even before the Congress where Gorbachev was proposing a referendum in the Union republics about their relationship with the centre, the Russian federation as well as other federations had declared that Union laws were not applicable lo hem and Lithuania was begiming to form self defence committees in order to resist 2 future imposition of presidential rule (Echezona Ibid.) What reforms had done in the Soviet Union was to bring out the question of nationality, a taboo topic to the forefront of the agenda of the Union. It might not have been good to have made that point a taboo one because that was why the issue had incubated for quite a long time and to that extent had posed a vol~anicequation to the Union. The only way Soviet authorities came to it in the past was to harp on the formation of the new Soviet man, the fusion of the nationalities whereas the perception in the west was that the Soviet Union was an empire in which the various atio ions remained as captives of the great Russian nation. Immediately perestroika and glasnost were launched, the Baltics wcre in the forefront in demonstrating for their national and self determination. Three years earlier when they wcre up in heir arms, prcssuring that their incorporation into the Soviel Union in 1940 under the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact was illegal, it was dicficult to believe that the Soviet authorities would conscnt to thcir irdependence. In other words, it was difficult believing that one of ~hcaims of the rcforms was to grant autonomy to thc Union republics including implementing the Leninist formula of the right of [he various Soviet nations to exercise their right to secession and independence. True, the Soviet authorities had declared the Molotov/Ribbcntrop Pact invalid ye1 inlerior ministry troops and the Sovict ariny in the Baltics seemed bent on the maintenance of Sovier power. Ho~ever,in thc wake of the failed Sovict coup in August, 1991, ~hcBaltics quietly slipped into independence fEchezona Unpub. 1991 p. 53). Baltic independence had a demonstration effect on the other Union republics. The failure of the putsh went further to weaken the Union, Boris Yeltsin assumed the de facto ruler of the Soviet Union with Mr. Gorbachev clutching onto the reigns of power at his sufferance. The communist party was outlawed and its assets were seized by the state, an indication that the state was henceforth separate from the party. Mr. Gorbachev even went further to repudiate socialism pointing out that it was an idea that had failed. A blank cheque was hereby handed to the Union republics. The parliament of the Russian federation which had for a long time assumed a seemingly independent status voted to take over the assets of the Soviet bank in its territory, a move which in effect meant that a Russian currency independent of the ruble was in the making. Nine of the twelve remaining Union republics signed a document inheriting the debts owed to the west by the previous Soviet regime. Only Ukraine and Azerbaijan could not go along. Uzbekistan did not even want to hear about any debts. The west presented a picture which tended to suggest that they would not want the Soviet Union to break up altogether. The Americans would not grant diplomatic recognition to the Azaris and the Armenians when they sought one. When the independence of the Ukraine was mooted via a refrendum, the United States reacted to the effect that she might recognize her. Mr. Gorbachev was peeved. A statement from the White House indicated that there was no misunderstanding with Mr. Gorbachev on that score. Gorbachev had pointed out that it would be calamitous for the Soviet Union and dangerous for world politics if ( Ukraine left the Union. With nine to one vote in favour of independence in Ukraine on first Decembcr, 1991, the United States came out plainly to say that she would enter into formal negotiations with the Ukraine leading up to its recognition as an independent state. Other allies of the United States also declared their readiness to grant diplomatic recognition. Poland and Hungary were the first states to grant Ukraine, de jure recognition. The independence of the Ukraine brought to a culminating point the events of the six years of perestroika and glasnost and posed the questions of those years anew: Were Gorbachev's earlier postures on Ukraine true? Was the slide of the Soviet Union towards disintegration not woven into the fabric of Gorbachev's reforms? Were Gorbachev's lamentations on Ukraine not a way of trying to dowse elements in Russia and plausibly in the Ukrainc who might have wanted to hold the union together. These includc potential putschists. The Americans and their allies had drawn sccnarios which sho~cdthat with potential putschists lurking behind thc corner and Gorbdchcv's authority further sliding everyday that dawned, they needed to act fast, rccognise Ukraine and the rug would be rcrnovcd Irorn undcr thc~r~f~ciearly cnough (Echezona Unpub. l99l+. The Demise of the Soviet ;Inion hAkhiil Gorbachev had wiirqed in early 1991 that that year would be decisive in his efforts to rest-re the Soviet Union. It was then diHicult to know whether he was aware in that fit of forebod 1991 would lead to his ouster and also to the breakup of ttie?! oviet that Union. The recharging of an economy which had for centuries been acak3toned to command and administration had proved too difficgt in six years hdwhat it could produce was counter tevolution. in . refbrms, he had sought to destroy all those edifices which had 'sew@ as a means of techanelling the power of Russian nationalislp. the comimnist party and the creatioh of his own brand of social deirnocracy in a multiparty set up when Russia had never known pluralism in the western sense. * *' On August 19, 1991, a new leadership consisting of Vice- President, Gennady Yenayev and elements representing the inteltigence, the ministry of interior, the army and the milita indastilal complex seized power from Mr Gorbachev in a coup whi~X laad for about three days. The way Mr. Gorbaehev rode back into powet proved several things. First, the Soviet Union could never be what it used to be - as a communist society and a multinational state: Second, to the extent that the Soviet Union needed reforms at the time or before Mr. Gorbachev entered into the scene, the question had always been, what kind of reforms? Was it reforms on the aegis of the west or reforms within the standards operational in a society which had hitherto been accustomed to a certain mode of democratic standards? What reforms would you enthrone in a society without pulling down a whole edifice which might have! taken centuries to construct? It would be recalled that while the west had Qiled Gorbachev's reforms and went ahead to award him a Nobel prize fer peace, he was inherently unpopular at home exactly because of the poverty which his reforms had entrenched. Thirdly, the popular forces in the country who were opposed to the coup were tied to the west especially the United States and therefore were not out to rescue Mr. Gorbachev but to ease him out and to in~tallMr. Boris Yeltsin as the leader of Russia. There were pointers to the fact that the Soviet Union would not last out this century as a single entity in world politics. One of these pointers was that the Soviet Union was the last remaining empire in the world. All other empires had collapsed as a result of pressures from the masses in territories in which the ertswhile imperial powers were intransigent in granting independence to colonised peoples. South Africa's reversal to black majority rule which had started showing their signs at the same period, might be regarded as the end - of imperial rule in Africa. In hindsight, the Soviet Union was seen as an anachronism in world politics. The ideological bipolarization between the east and the west which practically made for its persistence caused the Soviets to maintain that there was something special about their empire: it was not an empire in the real sense because it was not marired by a truncated class structure in which you had a bourgeoisie which rode roughshod over the working class and the peasantry or a bourgeoisie which could be located among some or a few of the nations or nationalities in a state thus making some nations to be perceived as oppressor nations as the Russians had hithem been perceived by the others in the Czarist oppressive system. They found such a situation to be existent in the capitalist countries, a situation which made the working class and the peasantry in alliance with the petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations to demand for their independence. The above reasoning was taken up by socialist ideologies throughout the world and had in no small measure, impressed ruling circles in capitalist countries. It seemed there was something unique about socialism which made it possible for man to gloss over ethnic, religious and racial differences in order to live in one society with his fellow man. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power ostensibly a committed socialist, he staned processes which would unmask the veil of idealism in socialism about man. The not only vanished in its outer reach in Eastern Eurcrpe but also at home and intercontinentally. Why would a committed socialist be involved in this exercise? Was Gorbachev a men~krof b di~m;ha&.d wmg of thc Soviet Communlisr Pan\ *tho -;;.I:, r,n 2:liiyed b) ih, ,r:c,,+,:,,:!?:~:~ of socialist superior;by OVC~L~I~:E&-.I:; ::\r;:~dih~5' ,. , $',{ -,LL ", admit, csu years nflcr rh; .;i!r.Ll . ; $2 .I. ... .,,7 ,L~z,~L x.:a~:$ it3 ;6cn iti~t~CT ;::' .c -L . >[ci:mi t J:;:~:; i -7.: :a -y,,ct Cpp, ,, 9 1 .I, ,,, J - ,J, 1- .;; LB!, $1 ,-i -, r

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break down of authority and its replacement by new authority structures. First Boris Yeltsiri assumed the dc fact0 leadership of the Soviet Union and Mr. Gorbachev was sidelined. Second, it facilitated the break up of the Soviet Union. After the realization of the independence of the three Baltic Republics (the Soviet Union reco nised it in September 1991). it was clear that the dominoes had startef falling. Of all the remainiqg Soviet republics, it was Kazakhstan that seemed to ncognise the authority of the Union. The o*er Cenvail Asian republics, Uzbekistan, Turkmer$a, and Kirgizia were in various degrees removed from the posture of Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan had declared its independence in August 1991, as the putsch progressed. The republics in the Caucusus had, in the process of glasnost, way before the putsch commenced, been behaving independently of Moscow. This was most applicable to Georgia which had elected a nationalist government and which had ceased to recognise the authority of Moscow. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Armenia were engaged in a dispute over the temtory of Nargono Karabakh and did mt seem to relish Moscow's pretensions to be in control mere while 'R0m.e burnt'. The Armenian earthquake two years earlier in Chich more than fifty five thousand people perished, the level of western aid in qomparison to Soviet aid further weakened the hands of Moscow in Armenia. All told, in the disintegration of the Soviet UNon, the thm Slavic republics of Russia, Ukraine and Byelomsse were expected to steer things around. On the eight of December 1991, the process of formal disintegration of the Soviet Union was concluded by the three Slavic republics. Leaders of these three republics met in Minsk, capital of Byelorusse and agreed to form a Commonwealth of Independent States (C.1.S). Before a week would elapse after this agreement, the Central Asian Republics indicated their intention to join the Commonwealth thus sealing the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Initially, Mr. Gorbachev was resistant to these moves pointing out that it was the peoples of the former Soviet republics and not their leaders who should decide the fate of Soviet federalism. He seemed to have forgotten that a week earlier, the Ukrainians had decided in a referendum to leave the Union and if Ukraine could so decide, there was no union to talk about anymore. The Russians themselves would seem to have resigned themselves to the break up of a union which they thought they had sacrificed too much to keep afloat (Echezona, Unpub. 1991 p. 52). Impact on World Politics With thc break up of political structures at pace, the newly evolving authority structures turned their gaze to control of nuclear weapons. This was essentially at the prodding of the United States which was afraid that with thc Union in splinters, if command and control of nuclcar wcapons wcre not ccntralized, it might lead to nuclear prolifcration and thercfore to global insecurity. The Ukraine and Byclomssc wcrc ready to deslr~y.thestockpiles of nuclear weapons wi~hintheir tcrritory, leaving only Russia as a nuclear power. Only Kazakhstan resisted this move. On the seventeenth of December, the Kazakh president told visiting American Secrctary of State, James ,Baker that Kazakhstan would not destroy the weapons in its territory even if the other republics did so alt'lough he was prepared to submit control of Kazakh nuclear weapqns to a central command mcture. @da summit of the eleven members of the Commonwea~thin Minsk on the qjrtieth of December, an agreement for a central command o$ qll the four republics with nuclear weapons on their territory::Russia, Ukraine, Byelorusse and Kazakhstan was reached. It was expected that while a Russian General would be commander-in-chief,' political qpmmand would remain with aU the four republics. However, it .@came obvious that Ukraine was getting uneasy with the power, which Ru~siawielded in the Commonwealth. To ,that extent, it indicated that $.would want to maintain an independent navy an4 a merchant .mrinc, This posturc of Ukraine had boiled over into Ukrainian claim of ownership of the former Soviet Baltic Fleet in the Crimea and Russian claims of ownership of it also (Echezona Unpub. 1991), With the signing of the agreement for the institutionalization of dhc;C.I.S., the west was not only in the forefront in singing a requiem Lo Sovict disintegration ,but in assigning Gorbachev to the back burner. Jamcs Baker was the first American administration spokcspci-son who pointed out that with the coming inla being of.the Commonwcalth, political authority had shifted to the republics while Mr. Gorbachcv only remained the commander-in-chief of the armed fqr~cs.This role was designed for Mr. Gorbachev in order to ensure that hc continued to control Soviet strategic strike forces in a period of disarray, when there was no central authority to talk about. It was fcared that a disenchanted General or a nuclear scientist could use or #I nuclear weapons to Third World countries. In other words, (3?,rbachcv's slim hold on power after the putsch was to ensure global security in American perspectives. The second administration spdrespcrson to comment on developments inside the Soviet Union was U.$. Sccretary of Defence, Dick Cheyney. At an American &jqvj$ion intcrvicw of fiftccnth Dccember, he had pointed out that WashingLon must dcal with the rcality of the fact that power had @$cg porn thc ccntral govcmment iu Moscow to the republics, that w,,$ovict Union had ccascd to exist and that whether Mr. Gorbachev r~sigpcdor noL, Lhc Unilcd States had to' deal with the reality of the c;~cqli~nof thc Commonwcalth of Independent States (C.I.S.). Like Jamcs Bakcr, hc rcitcralcd thc fact that Gorbachev remained the Commander-in-chicf or thc armcd forces. American position was rurlhcr bultrcsscd by Jamcs Baker's visit to the Soviet Union on the sixteenth ol' Dcccmbcr - hc mct Boris Yeltsin before Mr. Gorbachev ijld his rcasscrlion of carlicr administration position on the new ubuarion in thc Sovict Union. All Gorbachev's protestations that the break up of the Sovict Union should go through a constitutional route melted before James Baker. Both Gorbachcv and Boris Ycltsin assured Baker that the dissolution of the Sovict Union would not pose a security threat to the world. Byelorusse and Ukraine would dcstroy the nuclear weapons in thcir territory whilc Russia would rcmain thc only nuclear power in the zonc. On the scventcenth of Dccembcr, Gorbachev agreed with Boris Ycltsin that all thc instrumcntalitics towards the break up of the Soviet Union be put in placc by thc end of 1991. On the eighteenth of Dcccmbcr, Ukrainian president, Anatoly Kroupchak told Jamcs Bakcr tha~thc Ukrainc would nccd the assistance of the United Statcs in destroying thc nuclear weapons within its territory and hopcd that all such wcapons would bc destroyed by the ycar 2000. Jamcs Bakcr on thc othcr hand pancd him on the back on the funhcr grounds that thc Ukrainc had abidcd by all U.S. requircmcnts towards its recognition - thc dcvclopmcnt of a market economy and thc democratization of its political syslcm (Echezona Unpub. 19Q1, p. 55). On the ninctccnth of Dcccmbcr 1991, NATO announccd that il would help in the distribution of hod aid to thc Sovicl Union. NATO troops in addition to Sovict troops :v~ldbc involved, a collaboration which had ncvcr bccn hcard of in thc post war ycars. In a funhcr move, Boris Yeltsin signcd a dccrcc whcrcby thc Russian government took over thc Sovict forcign, intcrior ministries and thc KGB. On thc twentyfifth of Deccmbcr 1991, Gorbachcv formally resigned as president of thc Sovict Union and thus thc cnd of thc Sovict Union as an entity in world politics. Hc said that hc had dccidcd to resign because of Soviet rcvcrsal to a Cornmonwcalth of' Indcpcndcnt Statcs. According to him, this mcant that Sovict statchood had ccased to cxist. He warncd of ~hcdangcrs inhcrcnt in thc Cornmonwcalth and implorcd thc Sovict pcoplc as buildcrs of a grcat civili~ationto funhcr build on thc ruins of the old onc. Exccpt I'or formcr US dcfcncc Sccrctary, Caspcr Wcinbcrgcr, most wcstcm lcadcrs hailcd thc exit of Mikhail Gorbachcv. Mr Weinbcrger pointed out that though Mr. Gorbachcv had launchcd the reforms,hc still wantcd to kccp Sovicl superiority in armamcnls. Dcnnis Hralcy, formcr labour forcign ministcr in Britain compared Mr. Gorbachcv to , a visionary leadcr. Hc traccd thc origins of Sovict reforms to Nikita Kruschcv wl.,) had vowcd that hc would bury the west. But instcad on the twcntyl'ilth of Dcccmbcr 1991,thc west buricd thc Sovict Union (Echczon;!, LJnpub. 1991 p. 56). Hegemonism and Soviet Disintegration This ccnlury like olhcr i.~ht'uricsbcf'orc it has wilncsscd vcry many momcnrous cvcn~s.It is difficult putting on a dccibcl scalc which of' lhcsc cvcnls has lhc most importanl bearing on world politics: thc First and Sccond World Wars, the Cold War, the break'up and latcr rcintcgration of Germany, the reversal of Eastern Europe to capitalism, thc Gulf War and thc dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ncvcrthclcss, all thcsc cvcnts have had far reaching impacts on world politics and havc to be asscsscd on their own terms regardless of whcthcr thcy arc thc most important of the events that have happened in this century. Whcn thc Gulf war brokc out in January 1991, it was thought that it was thc grcatcst cvcnt sincc thc end of thc Second World War. This is a war in which the grcatcsl armada since thc Second World War was asscrnblcd. This is a' war in which collcclivc security which had hitherto cludcd thc world was achieved. This is a war in which the Sovict Union supported thc wcstcm position. This is a war in which thc primacy of thc Unitcd Statcs in world affairs received unqucstionablc boost. This is a war which military strategists had said, was a drcss rchcarsal for a Third World War. This is a war which gave d dcfinitivc imprint in thc direction of the ncw world order: it would bc onc in which rnarkct cconorny, pluralism in the economy and American valucs would havc sway ovcr any other values. For onc thing, thc dissolution of thc Soviet Union marks the final transition to a new world ordcr: That transiiion started with the arrival ol' Mikhail Gorbachcv at thc lcadcrship of thc Soviet Union and bccarnc cornplctcd with the ouslcr of thc sarnc man as the prcsidcnt of Lhc Sovict Union and Lhc dissolution of the Soviet Union as an cntity in world politics. This thcn raiscs the question about how could thc dissolution of a country change thc nature 'of the intcmarional systctn'? Eithcr as Russia or as the Sovict Union, the USSR has bccn a major participant in thc determination of the cvolution of contcrnporary history. And sincc the end of the Second World War, it sough: hcgcrnonic powcr or balanced other hegemonic powers in thc intcmational systcrn in its own right as a super power. Howcvcr, a few ycitrs bcforc thc dissolution of thc Union, indced after the Gull' War, it bccamc clcarly disccmiblc that Lhc Sovict Union was IN) morc 3 hcgcmon nor could it continuc to providc hcgemonic lcadcrship to its empire within and without ihc intcmalional system. Why tlic dissolulion of' the Sovict Clnion is rnorncntous in world politics is the unbclicvablc way in which thc Union as a Commonwealth of' lndcpcndcnl States ww dclivcrcd to thc othcr hcgcmonic powcr.thc Unitcd Statch on a plattcr of gold, without a fight. Onc who had followcd closcly thc war of ideas bctwccn thcsc ~wogiants 01' the tucnticili ccnlury would hardly bclicve that the sctllcmcnl ol' llic uiir would be mcrcly thc supcrccssion of one idea owr ~hcolhcr idea. Riilhcr. ;I communist rodc into powcr into the Iiigllc\r whclorls 01' communis~decision making, changcd thc course 01' Iliwr! arid rn;idc rhc Witr ~hichmighl have bccn fought bctwccn them on the battle field to bc fought betwecn thc multinational coalition against a Third World country, Iraq in the Gulf war and so ended the war of ideas betwecn socialism and capitalism. The way the putsch of August 1991 was brushed aside by forccs within and without the USSR as if nothing had happened and in fact placed it speedily on the path of break up was unbelievable. Wherc were the residues of those forccs of seventy four years of socialism in the country to fight back on behalf of the putschisls in order to restore the name of socialism, its supcriority over capitalism? Was there no such thing in cxistcncc in that country cxccpt somc emotional upmanship by clcmcnts who bcncfilcd from lhc syslcm and because of their brittle slrcnglh, thcy could no1 stand up againsl thc millions of forces arrayed against lhcm? Wcrc [he pulschisls unawarc of [his situation as they sought to, in lheir own words, "to rcslorc lhc losl prcstige of lhc Soviet Uniw"'? ha; happened after the failure of the putsch shows that emotions cannot stand against the forces of reality. Six years of perestroika had softened up [he iron grip of socialism on Soviet society. The multinational stale might not have been a voluntary Union but a forced one. Although the idea of socialism in cementing the Union might be superior to the idea of capitalism, it was not allowed to contend with other ideas in a free atmosphere to such an extent that the citizenry at large could choose which of them was most suitable to them. The citizenry might have made the choice of socialism but a socialism which was practised under a different form to the one that obtained in the Soviet Union under the reign of totalitarianism. It is not impossible that we might bve had a bridge between Swedish welfarism and Soviet type yelfarism, something shon of the ho gone capitalism of the west but a situation in which we might not have had the Asiatic republics as pan of the Soviet Union or even the Soviet Union in the way we had known it. What the break up of the Soviet Union has shown is that embedded in the ideology of socialism is hegcmonism i.e. in the way it was practised in the Soviet Union and lhal was an aberration for socialist ideology. Here, you had the hcgcmonism of the party apparalchik or the nomenclatura. Thc dissolulion of the Soviet Union might not spell doom for socialism as an idca. It might instead trigger off a re-examination of whclher lhc idea had been praclised in its tenets or not in the Soviet Union in particular sincc the Soviel Union had formed an empirical refeercncc point for lruc socialisl idcologues throughout the world. On thc othcr hand, an cxamination might also ensue as to whether the idea of socialism is an utopia which Man as an intellectual had espouscd as all intcllcctuals havc always been known to engage i~. And also whcthcr lhcrc arc any tcncls of Marxism that are practicable, lhosc tcncls of socialisfn which fuuturc socialisls would latch on and . further qfine and not all those goddam talk of the &volution of the yorking class and so on. ,* The Chinese in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union we@ alone in cqndemning Mr. Gorbachev for presiding over the

> diplytionz of the Soviet Union. The Chinese had said that they would &py world that socialism is superior to capitalism. They accused ,,Qorb,hew of introducing political chaos, ethnic tension and tendencies which built up into the dissolution of the Soviet Union. , ,J'hq,Chinese statement might have to be examined in the light of ,!joy$t dismemberment. Would China be resistant to the wave of wralist dissolution world wide? In the face of the Tiananmen square ,&wqcres in 1989, would the Chinese be said to be practising the me of Marxism? What would be the situation of Tibet and the Dalai in Rhe face of assaults of nationalism against those age old of socialism? Would China hedge against the impact of the splution of the Soviet Union on socialism and the new world order? chezona, Unpub, 1991).

which made the Does it mean the Soviet Union had hitherto been constituted, posed a had had to be divided several times please the powers of those h *er words, the division of Poland between the powers bodrk;; &f *OM politics. In the present century, precisely after the end of the het6nd World War, Germany as well as Korea was divided into two, 'ii ah, to please the dominant powers, the Soviet Union and the Aited States. Today, it is the turn of the Soviet Union. What a way fie world moves? I ' In Order to understand the impon of Soviet disintegration in w0Hd politics, we must have to bring the whole issue to the question bf-belief systems and world polities. At its coming, the Soviet Union nkl sought to shed itself of all the trappings of the Russian empire khlch it hiid succeeded to and saw itself as a new state, embodying the tdhetS2 of Mam and Lenin and different from any state that had bdsttd iin history. This brought it at logger heads with other then txi8ing essentially capitalist in nature. It had removed itself from the doalitiqn that fought Germany in the First World War, baptised that War an imperialist war and urged other working classes of the other countries involved in the war to decouple from the war and engage in an international civil war against the world bourgeoisie who were leading the workers in wars against thcmsclvcs. Given the fact that socialist ideologues were sprcad in all inlcrsticies of the world then and were pleased with the dcvelopments in the Soviet Union which could also serve as a demonstration effect to them, the capitalist countries, Britain, France and the United States attacked the Soviet - Union in order to rcvcrt back to the status quo ante. The west saw in the Russian revolution an attack on their way of life which stresses individualism and thought that this might encroach on them and overthrow them. Although many historians scc thc Cold War as having started in the post 1945 period, a host of othcrs scc it as starting with the Russian revolution in 1917. In thc post Vcrsaillcs world order, thc Soviet Union was seen as a pariah statc. Thc wcst had failed to clobber it and therefore resorted to isolating it in international politics. It was not until 1924 that Britain becamc the first among thc major capitalist powers to rccognise the Sovict Union. Other recognitions followcd but it did not prevent thc world from continuing thc isolation of the Soviet Union with the hopc that it might suffer intcmational paralysis and decay. This lastcd for quite somctimc until in thc 1930s whcn Germany started to threatcn global pcacc. 11 bccamc a qucstion of how to contain Germany. In Hiller's Mcinkumpf, thc Gcrmans sought to banish what they had sccn as a barbaric Russia and at thc same time to clobbcr the west. Internally thc Gcrmans had sccn thc Jcws as the ethnic group which had led thcm to all kinds of wocs and thcy sought a means to decimate them on a global lcvcl. So, for the wcst, they had two threats to global security, one came from Hitlcr's Gcrmany while the other came from Russia. It was a question of dcciding which onc posed the greater danger and how to dcal with it. In spite of the diplomacies that attcndcd thc wcstcm sidc towards Hitler and the Russian side towards Hitlcr, it was thc lattcr, in a pragmatic fashion that poscd thc grcatcr dangcr. Whcrcas thc Russians proclaimed that thcir idcology of socidlis~~lwas pronc to pcacc, thc Nazi idcology of had no apologies about its proncncss to war and yct thc Russians signcd a pact wiih it. In 1939, thc world was lit aflamc by Gcrmany in thc Sccond World War and thc mortal battlc had bcgun with thc Sovict Union surprisingly aligncd to thc wcst against Na~iGcrmany. This was a marriagc of convcnicncc for both sides as thcy sought to survivc thc onslaught which Hitlcr had launchcd on thcm. Thc character of thc marriagc showcd in thc recriminations in thc war timc alliance, about a sccond front, about whcrc who should intcrvenc in Bcrlin, and about thc naturc oP a post war world. Thc dcfcat of Hitlcr borc thc Yalta world order which rccogniscd the primacy of thc Sovict Union and thc Unitcd Statcs and thc division of thc world into thcir sphcrcs of influcncc. Thcsc insuranccs did not makc for global sccurity but rathcr cxaccrbatcd it in the Cold War which ensued. In the 1930s, the Soviet Union was cngagcd in the fashioning of the Stalinist state. It was consummated in thc Cold War period. The Stalinist state was marked by forccd labour, ~hcdccapitatian of all Bolsheviks who had joincd Lcnin in making the revolution, a personality cult in which Stalin was reverred as a god and a onc party state in which psychophants, the so called apparatchiki and the nomenclatura enjoyed the bcncfits which the working classes were supposed to be benefitting from. The west focussed on these 'developments and one could see the development of Soviet studies in western universities. What was the Soviet Union in world politics, a mystery wrapped in a riddle, an enigma or what? Ever since the Cold War period, it would scem that the west had not relented in trying to see to thc break up of the Sovict Union and especially its empire in Eastern Europc. Thc impact of the Stalinist state on thc Cold War, on war and peace has unquestionably becn very devastating. In the United States, there was thc obnoxious Mcanyist witch hunt of thc 1950s in which the American adminislration sought to flush out in the institutions of the state, all known or suspected communists or sympathisers of communism. Although thc Mcartyist era had thawed, the spectre of communist cxpansionism has always hunted all American administrations as is shown in U.S. perceptions of Soviet arms and the entirety of Soviet global bchaviour. Equally, in the Soviet Union, there has bccn a silencing of any pluralist thought, any sympathisers to Amcrican position in the world and any inclination towards a individualism. Both powers had stood at the threshold of nuclear war and if one had cavcd in without a light,the other would rejoice. The Sovict Union has donc so and thc Unitcd States seems to have been scrvcd right. What has bcpdllcn thc Sovict Union might not be explained in terms of its ability to cnhancc global security. The world will continue to bc insccurc until a ncw form of human organization that would transccnd thc statc systcm is fashioned out. From the onset, as a state with vcry divcrgcnt nalionalitics, Soviet disintegration could not be prccludcd. Thc practicc of socialism distoned its direction. The futur will tcll if' Sovici disintcgration would enhance the security of tk world. AFRICA

During the later years of the Cold War, the recolonization of the African continent was a theme which was continuously sung in scminars in Africa. This was due to the fact that in spite of nearly thrcc decades of political independence, Africa had not achi~ved cconomic self reliance. The mode of restructuring African economies was dictated from outside and technological transfers had not yielded thc much sought after tcchnological independence. Second, quite; a considerable number of conflicts in the Cold War were fought in Africa and it became obvious [hat given the dependence of, Africa on outside forces to settle thcsc disputes, Africa was not too far from somc form of recolonization. Thc manner of settlement of the conflicts of thc Cold War in Africa and the exhortation to plural dcmocracy still show that outsidc forces would hold thc trump cads and recolonization comcs out in a much morc salient fashion. In nmy ways, thc hcgcmonic rnanifcstations in the Gulf war and in the dcmisc of thc Sovict Union arc rcproduccd in thc scitlement of African conflicts and in thc prcssurcs for plural dcmocracy. African Security Onc can rccilc a litany of wocs of rcbcls and African regimes. In thc carly 1970's, Sckou Tourc of Guinca ran away from the capild territory of Conakry over whal hc dcscribcd as incursion by Porlugucsc mcrccnarics. Nigcriii Foughk a lwo and half ycar civil war to conlain scccssionisl B~al'ra.Chad is a classic cxamplc whcrc on two occasions, onc lime rcbcls became thc prcsidcnls of Chad. Yowcri Muscvcni, Prcsidcnl ol Uganda, and formcr chilirman of tho Organizalion 01 African unity (OAU) rodc inlo power sl lhc bchcsl of a rebel movcmcnt. Zaire w,is no1 able ro conlain rcbcl movcmcnks in ils Shaba province and had had lo rcqulrc oulsidc ;lid lo do so. With the arrival of a ncH Horld ordcr, il would cccm rhiit lhc much orlcn loulcd n;~tional I~bcral~onrcvolurions in Mo/;imb~quc,Angola and perhaps Ellliopia d~dno1 lahc pl;~cein rhc rruc scnw sincc lhcy could not dclcnd tt~cmsclvc\~mmcdia~c~> rhc So\ icr Unm \aid ihar il could no1 colllinuc lo lullti rhcm. So. Hhlrhcr .41r1~;111~ccurily in lhc ncH Horld ordcr' X lurrhcr a\\c\\mcnr ol rh~\di1cmm;i ~ouldbc dcm H ith wnic ~c'lc'c~~dC.I\C\ Liberia P!#%cal Power and the Liberian State L#erh, a small country of about 2.5 million people became a haven in!@ nineteenth century fur African slaves who desired to return to Africa in order to regain their .freedom. Before the entry of late Samuel Doe into power via a, military coup in 1980, the country had been under the hegemony of the returnees otherwise known as Americo-Liberians. So, the coup by Doe had as its short to medium terql:flak, the removal of the Americo-Liberians from the political pQwer equation in the country. But rather than solve the problems of Liwna, it brought new and worse problems that touched on the ethnic fa@& of Liberia as a whole.

the Manos. In an attempt to broaden his hitherto been perceived by others as lying

he Mandingos had looked down on the Gios and d so the stage was set for killings in which the mselves on the same side of the barricade with anos were on the other side (West

Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) comprising anos to fight for the ouster of Samuel Doe. It recalled that in 1985, General Thomas Quiwomkpa had led a s comprising mainly of Gios and Manos to uel Doe. The rebellion was crushed and Quiwomkpa on took over the leadership of Quiwomkpa's

NPFL on suspicion that it was Charles Taylor who Elma Johnson; a third rebel group broke out from lor's ranks under the lcadership of Prince Johnson who had at one time been the Aide-de-camp of General Quiwonkpa. With the loss of more than nincty percent of Liberian temtory to C%arles Taylor's forces, Samuel Doe seemed disposed to the defence of the capital city of Monrovia itself and it seemed an unprecedented blood bath was in the making. This prompted the start of peace talks under the auspices of a religious group in Liberia, the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee. At the first round of talks in Sierra Leone, all the combat groups were represented. But in subsequent talks, the: NPFL refused to nun up since it seemed victory was in sight. The creation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) It was difficult putting together the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after more than six months of fighting probably because the Liberian issue was seen as a purely internal affair of Liberia. However, it was first preceded by an ECOWAS Mediation Committee , comprising Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone and Gambia under 1 me chairmanship of ECOWAS Chairman, Sir Dauda Jawara. The committee heid two rounds of talks all of which were boycotted by A Charies Taylor's NPFL. Meanwhile, life became unbearable in Monrovia. Light, water and food were nowhere to be found and refugees were streaming out of the country into Sierra Leone and ' other neighbouring countries. While some countries evacuated their nationals, Nigeria found it very difficult to do so because the ships which she sent could not find anywhere to berth as a result of the ' fighting going on or as a rcsult of warnings from Charles Taylor's tnen that such ships would be sunk. It is in this context that one wouldi ' understand the setting up of rhe ECOMOG, a peace keeping force. At its inception, the ECOMOG comprised 2,500 men contributed in; the following ordcr 800 Ghanaians, 700 Nigerians, 105 Gambians, %5!?Skr~a Imnians and 550 Chrareans under the command of Lt. A Gemr-d Amnld Quainoo of Ghana. Its terms of reference include: ' ia briw .:bout a cessc-fire bf-rweer! the warring factions. I '1 S' : :.; a; inferirn 20~srp6 mt. I

A ** iak~ililate df:c;ircfiyt:i. s*' smtifrl services like hospitals, ' C 1,: ' i .ti; WW~~PT.;pi ,; c)d ~1 Y'?J~C<. " .. "., ;+ 1 -. iP. II~of decomposing &ad :

,'*I ' rry$,liir, d :i:i:t~>i\'.~I'cI:~~' %.-? kh i! would set up tt tenm ' governmzrkb ',PraZ wovlir ml,: ~cf.a yex hcfore a laas%;! ' zetleral election. - . ' :I.. irctedrn government wtlidr ~#\>tliCE involvc all interest groups in the . ,~r!ry would exclude all thr leadcrs of thc warring factions. ' Ptesidenr Doc wlelcomcd thc decision of Lhe Mediation committee , , r ptovnised to co-operate with them. Prince Johnson alsb promised ' ;+operate with them while Charles Taylor denounced ECOMOG ;7:e,l wwed to fight them if they set their feet on Liberia. i 96 S~bsequently,an interim government under Professor Amos Sawyer up to oversee Liberia up to a year. The interim government the problem of legitimacy in the eyes of the warring factions y with the death of a leader of one faction, Samuel Doe. A conference was convened but failed to make any head way as came obvious that Charles Taylor had no other god than to frnd elf installed in power as the president of Liberia. After mom than ars of setting their feet on Monrovia, ECOMOG could not s beyond Monrovia, Charles Taylor controlled a major chunk ria and in March 1991 instituted a running battle with Sierra across the Mano river bridge. So, after three years of civil war, ce was not In sight In Liberia, ECOMOG could not be said to be a some success and Liberia, a rather poor country lay in ruins. nal agencies which might have provided relief for her citizens were engrossed in the after effects of the Gulf war, at of Saddam Hussein, the plight of Kurdish and Shiite m Iraq, the conflicts in Yugoslavia especially in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the intractable conflict in Somalia. Society and Peace Keeping out earlicr, at the point at which ECOMOG was a, the forces of Charles Taylor, the NPFL did not sc of Samuel Doe and prince Johnson did. But intervened nonetheless. So, right from the moment entered into Liberia, it lacked the kind of legitimacy which forces accorded an inlervening regimr. It must be pointed hc reasons behind the refusal by the NPFL to grant Ic pirn:i::y bordcred mainly on the suspicion by that group ritionr : 1'1~cor~sti~uling members of ECOMOG. Nigeria i:c>tiet. , antagonism towards Charles Taylor by rent.: tor Samuel Doe. The later had visited i ' rl .. ci:sis to brlef the Nigerian regime on the ::.I..: '. , -:;: I; xcrncd that the Doe forces would be

c, :,;,i slncrlt to the effect that it could grant .. ,', .* iat, cd Ail uproar among the citizenry of .,..,, .. - . .. , , . .,ry unp,;pular figure in the country. And it ..., .)us circles in Nigeria that Doe was warmly . . 1 ..c;;cions of power in the country. He too had .-nrd for Nigeria as a bourgeoning African super . darted a Babangida School of International rty of Liberia. So, for the faction of Charles Taylor, the susi~r~~onabout Nigeria's role was high. Moreover, Charles Taylor s men placed a price on any Liberian whom the ECOMOC bulkt would kiil. They pointed out that they would take foul* Nigcrian hcaclr in reprisal. And stories abound about how thousands of Nigerian refugees at the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia. were mercilessly gunned down. So, there was no lwe lost between. Nigeria and Charles Taylor's NPFL in praetical terns. Charles Taylm had similar although not exactly the same problems with the otha members of ECOMOG. So, one is prone to ask whether the way international organizations can assure peace between belligerents is by interposing forces between those belligerents whether they agreed with the international organization or not or by supporting one side of the belligerency and defeating the other? In the cases of UN peace keeping although it is true that ECOMOG cannot be compared to the UN, UN forces were interposed between belligerents after those belligerents were seen to have unanimously consented to the conditions of UN peace keeping functions and UN forces had had to withdraw immediately one side of the belligerency wanted UN forces to leave (Fabian 1976). It is hard to say at the point of writing whether the entry of ECQMOG into Liberia would ultimately yield peace in that covntry or whether peace would have been achieved if the NPFL forces had been left to achieve a victory which seemed within their reach at the time ECOMOG intervened. It must however be pointed out that the ground" for "! ECOMOG intervention had already been laid when the OAU Chairman, Yoweri Museveni argued that given the stalemate in Monrovia when NPFL forces reached there, that the state of Liberia had ceased to exist and the OAU Secretary General, Salim Salim had also said that a state of anarchy existed in Liberia. So, it was necessary for an outside force to go in to restore the Liberian state and inqtitute a regime there. But what kind of outside force would that be? It must be stressed that ECOWAS is a mechanism for economic integration in West Africa. ECOWAS treaty speaks of security in a long term sense, not in terms of civil wars but to prevent outside intervention in member countries internal affairs. Compared with other icon schemes in other parts of the world, ECOWAS is the lowest form of regional integration. Most states in the region integrate with former metropoles rather than with other states in the region. This is due essentially to the fact that most states in the region aqe monocrop economies which depend on the production of primary product for export like others. And so, the dependence on outside force is so pervasive that one begins to ask the question, how would an ECOMOG force fair in providing peace for Liberia? Most, or all the states represented in ECOMOG depend for their arms procurement on states in Western Europe and possibly the United States or the former Soviet Union. They do not have their arms manufacturing industries. Would it not therefore be right to surmise that the ECOMOG venture might have been underwritten by an outside force? If so, how are we sure that peace in Liberia in ECOMOG terms would bring the actually much desired peacc? It is not too far fetched to seek a security arm to regional imgration just as one would point to NATO as providing the security tear to the European Common Market (ECM), however, ECOWAS is nut in the same mould as the ECM. Both have different functions in an incredibly interdcpendent world. Europe has achieved what Karl Dcutsch calls "a security community" or a situation in which issues oC war have been eschewed in relations between them. And today. Bwqeans are articulating the needs of a European army in a Mfferent international politicrll climate. But in ECOWAS, the ing issues are still vcry ptevalent: war between member states, Merdisputes, accusations of cbup plots and irredentism. So, in such iwituation, how could an intervening force be seen as a neutral inWument in the settlement of the internal affairs of member states? Moreover, most states in ECOWAS nay in Africa are engaged in stnrctural adjustment programnles which need dictations from the World Bank, the IMF and the other international lending agencies as WH as the western countries who are the custodians of these agencies. Thk raises the problem of finrincing the peace keeping operations and complements the point which had earlier been made about the symdrome of dependence on the, erstwhile metropolitan countria by EOBWAS. . It would therefore seem that the peace keeping operation# laight be financed from elsewhere thud raising the problem of impedalb, and peace keeping. How can poor and dependent states a peace keeping operation? What are the implications of poor states financing the peace keeping operations in a poor state? As we are well aware, the OAU peace keeping operations in Chad in early 1W0 was financed by an outside force. Member states in ECOWAS hd started to cry about the costs of financing the ECOMOG adventure and it is plausible to durmise that they would have gone to some financiers who would dictate their terms to the Liberian settlement for financial aid. The implication of all these is that since the peace keepers are as poor as thcir hosts, they would transfer their poverty on ordinary working pcoples of Liberia. What would ensue is that both the peace kecpcrs ahd belligerents are likely to impose their poverty on thc Libcrian population and with the Gulf War and its afiemath, all of which happencd while the Liberian imbroglio raged, the suffering masscs of Liberia would be devoured by their hungry hats, the so called intcmational rclicf agencies would look askance and peace kceping would ilssume the nature of the proverbial ostrich which burics its hcad in thc sand while Rome burnt. Liberia and the Burdens of Leadership It will bc rccallcd that Sw a long time, evcr bcfox thc outbreak of civil war in Liberia, Liberians who were opposed to Samuel Doc Taylor of course had identified Nigeria md their enemy No. 1. This was due. 0s had been to their perception that tfit Nigerian regime was fmLsrslsd in the maintermme d the regime of Samuel Doe in power in q~&of the obvious failures of that regime. When Nigeria went fommd rad instituted the ECOMOG command, they felt that tbeSr su#chs bad been proved right, that the sole aim of the ECOMOO face was to plotect the regime-of Samuel Doe. And Doe's immedirte d the ECOMOG command (someone who had in the pt~ against any iota of interference in Liberia's affairs from -) wa~a OOllClusiVe pfthat ECOMOG came to shoreirp his regime. And so, we had the mayhem committed rgaiast N@fhs especiany by Charies Taylor's forces and the killii of taro NQmb jwmaliss, Tap AwOtDnsin and Krees Imodibie. 'Zhe killing of tbek taro jwmaIists raised an uproar in Nigeria including those who cakd br the capure of Chades Taylor. But no one had taken r utticrl lQaL at the burdens which Nigeria's so called leadership mk hpmts on her. In some circles, there is the claim that Nigeria is a medium power. This probably informed Nigeria's role in Liberia. As the ECOMOG venture progressed, Nigeria's role in championing the peace keqii fuactions in Liberia became clearer. Her contributim in men increased much more than the other members of the coalition, her rlr force suppIied the air cover for the operations and Ni commwdets have since replaced the first commander of ECOtF 00 fixce8 who was a Ghanaian. From the statements of Charles Taylor. it wrs mt too far fetched to conclude that the treatment which his forces meed out to innocent Nigerians bore the imprint of this jealousness of Nigaia's so called medium power status. If you project yout power in the mould of a hegemon in a region, do you have the capability to protect your interests all around? At the time Charles Taylor was dispatching thousands of Nigerian lives to their graves. what pPice did Nigeria place for the punishment of Charles Taylor?, Histodally, the phenomenon of Charles Taylor is not an aberration. Cbarks Taylors continue to rear up thcir heads all over the world. The question is how do you deal with such a phenomenon if you claim thyw have the capability to deal with it. How many broken heads was Nigeria prepared to lose in order to catch Charles Taylor? What did .the Nigerian regime do to ensure that the outcome in Liberia reflected Nigerian interests and that the residues of hatred of Nigeria in Liberia does not spill over into a post war Liberia? ECOMOG was initially opposed by Ivory Coast aid Burkina Faso. That Nigeria might not be an autonomous regional power but a sub-impcrial power was shown after peace talks ovcr Liberia in Bamako, Mali. The Unitcd Sbris~kiyaoftfreconsequencesofits~ or*s~y~~n.huliocd~it~lop-~ ~ntior~Attlesrmedlhe.tle~berdofrak~ ~~~~ttUtWBllada,trltslrre~etbehachga~ emks TqIbr. Tbe Qraimln of U.S. Johu mi& of SElff. Cknenl adB Powen hd 8190 cautiohed Charles Taylor in a vlstt to West Aea ill euly 1992 (Echaoira, Unpub. 1992). WluNigerirhasnot~istheamomtoftnudcnsrcaPatrp ,beg if it defines itself asl the hegemmid power in r rc@n or in 4k rorM, Such a country dust incur the htaed and jeaiowb of odm~~'Ibt Amerhm are viatims of terrorist attacks the ndd becurse of their global reach. .Nigeriars are victims of Cbades ILJbr's terrorist attacks beCause of Nigeria's regid reach. Bit cdr a definition of power dt the regional level is faulty because rliht the Americans. Nigeria does not have the means except of amme in the way it enhas her dependency status to prove it. w'smedium power statbs might be defined in terms of r sub igcW power mould in ordet to make her status meanillgfui, As the lmgmt cotintry in the West African subregion it plays the role of ma#of the larger in the world. As Pomrjpese sub- ilqmialism in its former territories in Africa had shown; wbt tle l@geriaa imperialism does in West Africa might be to deepen d@axkncy. Nigeria is a poor country in spite of the discovery of (I ESautiea which raises the problem of how can a poor country be Ibe kalkr of a peace keeping mission of other poor clMmtrics in m-2 The above question brings into bdd relief what Nigeria could & a, eosme that the outcome in Liberia reflects her interests. Nigh 6fSWab had talked of lauding a fund raising drive for war lorn Uberia What emerges in this scenario is the various donations dtrs dor tk lamiscape in Nigeria. Who will donate? Foreign Cwrpnies nb#r hnn interest in Liberia? Unfomnately there an no ind@mms C#rpuries or indigenous firtns with a transnational outlook like fed@ firms in Nigeria or in any other part of West Africa. If governments do, it will raisc a fumrc in the countries concerned about taking away from the poor in Lheir own countries to give to whomever they cannot identify.. In Likria. as in other African states, the dsnrlions will not trickle down to those for whom they were meant for. 'lhc donations will. form a mcans for the ruling echelons. the Imrcaucratic bourgeoisie. to acquire wealth and pmperty. So. what will ancrgc in a future L~bcriais rlot an cquitable distribution of property bctwccn the rich and thc poor but the funher pauperization of the poor and thc growth of a ncw dcpcndcnt bourgeoisie. This worild start off a new cycle that brought forlh the phenomcnomof Samuel Doe and futurc intc~cntions. There has been a spate of praises for ECOMOG from both academics and policy makers alike. From what we have deposed so far, it might be too early to say that it will be or that it is alrcady a? success since we cannot say that a state of peace has amved in Liberia. However, ECOMOG role in Liberia cannot be equated to the role of, the United States using the instrumentality of the Organization of' American States (OAS) to enforce its peace in Latin America., ECOMOG is not in the same mould as various United Nations peace, keeping functions throughout the world. ECOMOG may not be able to be transformed into a NATO for West Africa because thc issues that' brought the NATO into being do not exist in West Africa. ECOMOG' might in the long term become a nucleus for a future security arm of: regional integration in West Africa. However, at this stage, we cannot, say that we have found the outlines of that anto rcgional integration in West Africa because the problems of the region, the prevalence oEc mini-states, the dependent character of the states in the region, the,: poverty and destitution that pervade the region and the lack of' pervasive commodification in the region as a whole are a hindrance to : such a possibility (see next chapter). "I

,I Ethiopia 7 Ethiopia's dilemma started as far back as 1935 when ~mpeml'; Haile Selasie mounted the rostrum of the League of Nation8 an& asked the League to intervene against Italian invasion of Ethiopia,: The League which had lacked teeth then, could not do so. Eaofia or; then Abyssinia's liberation came in the total defeat of the Axis powers, in 1945. After that, the country went into a feudal autocratic system with the emperor at the helm of affairs. In 1974, the emperor was: overthrown by a military regime. This seemed unthinkable for the! emperor had been so revered as a descendant of the House of David, a 'sense of someone who was very near to God, living on earth. Inthe Lt. Colonel emerged in power and espaused . Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, a general upheaval was taking' place in the Ethiopian society in which thousands of people were killed. This was the much'talked of Ethiopian revolution (Echezona, The Outlook, June 6, 1991). , What might be called the Ethiopian direction took a dramatic turn in 1978, in the war against Somalia. Then, the former Soviet Union which had been identified as a friend of Somalia, had supplied her with all her weapons of war including the building of military bases in Somalia, suddenly switched over to the side of Ethiopia, aided Ethiopia in the war including the provision of assistance by Cuban forces to defeat Somalia in the war and for Ethiopia to occupy the Ogaden region which belonged to Somalia. From then on, the friendship between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union shed and might have ended up in a treaty of friendship between countries which bound one side to come to the aid of the other if ed by outside forces. Why the Soviet Union abandoned not an issue for this discourse but suffice it to say that ensued from Ethiopia to the Soviet Union. There was no which Col. Mengistu did not visit the Soviet Union as the sumed the role of bankroller of the Ethiopian regime in its us problems including the civil war in Ethiopia. The last such ge might have been in 1987 or 1988 when glasnost and ka had assumed a dynamic speed of their own (Echezona mii.)k It) What transpired in the last visit of Mengistu to the Soviet Union &instructive for the chaos which ensued in Ethiopia iind which qmessitated the flight of Col. Mengistu to in April 1991. WailGorbachev had told him and his entourage that the Soviet could not continue to provide the weapons with which he lsayght his numerous rebels. This was the general global policy of the &Met Union in an era of new thinking in foreign affairs and 'tmiversal human values over class values. The entourage was told of $4~numerous internal economic problems which the Soviet Union , problems which made the Soviet Union unable to continue to the role of father christmas. All these were what could be hered from SDviet behaviour to Ethiopia because there was contained in the communique af the meeting exce t names arge contingent from the Ethiopian side and the few from the Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet-UiL 'on who ated. From then on, the Ethiopian rebels: The Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Eritrean es Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigrean Peoples Liberation nt (TPLF) and the Oromo Peoples Liberation Front (OPLF) Mnued to surge and score successes against the government forces. In the wake of pro-democracy revolutions in Eastern Europe, Mengistu promised multiparty politics, the statues of Marx and Lenin were pulled down and Mengistu reshuffled his cabinet on numerous asions in order to accommodate various views in Ethiopia ahezona, ibid.). 5 ln fie month of May, two peace processes were unleashed - an& on Angola and the>other on Ethiopia. The Angolarls wemin bon writing hnc'dimitis to their sixteen year old civil war while , were in London doing the same to their own civil war. owever, the Ethiopian peace pmcess had peculiar implications to the nature of the new world order. of At the time when all the factions in the Ethiopian civil war wcepted American mediation, it was thought that the United States would be an honest broker. But this was not possible in a world order South Africa In 1948. thc South African government passed a series of laws which formally legalii the policy of racial discrimination crlled rputhtid In 1952. the problem postd by was put m rbe agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. Until the mid 198k when it would be said that thc skewed international palitical siturtiQ had thawed. tht dominant powers in the United Nations Seaniq Council had ~epcatedlyvoted against the imposition of econoqric sanctions against the apqhcid regime in South Afkia In making arguments against &he imposition of sanctions on South Africa, the capitalist powcrs had claimed et economic

104 e had not worked in history. They cited &c &ses of (Ra0dtsir)inthel~rudXtalyintbe~uarpaiod comaierddnvrlmtbC-)111116-

-*- ttrc UDtven taczics of * west over the smuiaci pmfits - the west hrd billions of Uoll8r8 of tiica and divestitwe would afhtjobs at ca was seen as an anti communist outpost in it bccame obvious that Go~v'sreform in tk ere going to be far reaching including Sovkl Africa, creeping ecoaomic srnaioaJ were impomd Theseyieldedtwooutmmcs-tkNItioclrlistPgtJ tbelulingpartyinSouthAfricanmoSreaMr.Bolbr fnw office and repdaccd him with Mr. E W. de secondly, * foremost blacL nati- wbo hd bsaP in wcr in South Africa can be discenrtd: the African United Nations would go to South Africa every three months, UN observers were to be sent to South Africa in early August to obsene mass action rallies across the coun and the UN has asked that the South African Security forces, the aC military wing, and the Inkatha be investigated to find out their various culpabilities to South African violence. The postures of the world public in the face of assaults of liberal values were already felt in South Africa. The ANC had hitherto been depicted as an organization opposed to liberal values and Inkatha was seen as an organization that would rather uphold liberal values. Although the ANC was not favourably disposed to market forces in the years of struggle, it had.had to pragmatically accommodate them as socialist forces lost their strength in the global areria. That is why global forces which were always onposed to socialism would very likely accept an ANC government in power in South Africa. Africa and Plural Democracy The dilemma of African politics can best be traced to the place of Africa in the evolving world political economy. In essence, after more than five hundred years of tbq integration of Africa into the world capitalist system, have the .Af@can bourgeoisie emerged with thought processes which are uniquely theirs and with which they can preside over Africa's political future? '&me work which were written several decades before the emergence of what might be referred lo as a new world order are still very useful in looking at the events of the post 1989 period Jack Woddis maintains that due to lack uf "an immediate crop for export, and poor transport facilities compared with West Africa," there was a delay in the emergence of African traders in East and Central Africa who were connected with the European market. This caused much of the trade to fall into Asian hands "who later expanded into $otton ginning and sugar plantations" (Waddis, 1977 p. 268). In effect, trade in East and Central Africa was monopolised by Asians and Europeans $0 the exclusion of Africans. The thread bare African bourgeoisie clutched on to the political process as a means of primitive accumulation. And with the monopoly of the economic sphere by the Europeans, they still dictated the tune of politics even after independence had been won. Even with respect to West Africa which would seem by Jack Woddis analysis to have fared better #an East and Central Africa, he notes, pointing to a study by E. K. Hqwkins that while "foreign firms dominate in the freight trade, Africw firms dominate in passenger traffic and in the carriage of internal trade." He notes, quoting Hawkins that the African capitalist "has asserted himself, notably in the field of road transport, but also in retail trade, buildings and United Nations would go to South Africa every three months, UN observers were to be sent to South Africa in early August to observe mass action rallies across the coun and the UN has asked that the South African Security forces, the 3C military wing, and the Inkatha be investigated to find out their various culpabiiities to South African violence. The postures of the world public in the face of assaults of liberal values were already felt in South Africa. The ANC had hitherto been depicted as an organization opposed to liberal values and Inkatha was seen as an organization that would rather uphold liberal values. Although the ANC was not favourably disposed to market forces in the years of struggle, it had,had to pragmatically accommodate them as socialist forces lost their strength in the global arena. That is why global forces which were always owsed to socialism would very likely accept an ANC government in power in South Africa. Africa and Plural Democracy The dilemma of African politics can best be traced to the place of Africa in the evolving world political economy. In essence, after more than five hundred years of the integration of Africa into the world capitalist system, have the .Affican bourgeoisie emerged with thought processes which are uniquely theirs and with which they can pnside over Africa's political future? '&me works which were written several decades before the emergence of what might be referred to as a new world order are still very useful in looking at the events of the post 1989 period: Jack Woddis maintains that due to lack uf "an immediate crop for export, and poor transport facilities compared with West Africa," there was a delay in the emergence of African trqders in East and Central Africa who were connected with the European market. This caused much of the trade to fall into Asian hands "who later expanded into gotton ginning and sugar plantations" (Waddis, 1977 p. 268). In effect, trade in East and Central Africa was monopolised by Asians and Europeans to the exclusion of Africans. The thread bare African bourgeoisie clutched on to the political process as a means of primitive accumulation. And with the monopoly of the economic sphere by me Europeans, they still dictated the tune of politics even after independence had been won. Even with respect to West Africa which would seem by Jack Woddis analysis to have fared better than East and Central Africa, he notes, pointing to a study by E. K. Hqwkins that while "foreign firms dominate in the freight trade, African firms dominate in passenger traffic and in the carriage of internal trade." He notes, quoting Hawkins that the African capitalist "has asserted himself, notably in the field of road transport, but also in retail trade, buildings and contracting" and that "a number of Africans have bccornc prominent in Lyre relrcading, wood working, the supply of building materiqs. and printing" (Wcddis, 1977. p: 269). Thcrc is nothing in this rendering that is different from the prevailing ~Lliosin Nigeria's or Africa's enaergcnt dominant classes nor his furlhcr prognostication that,

Some of the African capitalists in Nigeria have diversified heir effort, acting as directors of British trading firms, exporting rubber and timber in their own right, entering industry itself with timber mills or rubbcr prtxcssing plants, and eventually employing several hundred production workers. shipping clerks, and so on. Some 6f thcse African cap~di~ts.who commenced as quite petty traders, evolve by s~igcsinto buying as direct exporters on their own accouni, accepting posls as direclors of foreign monopolies, and then commcncing their own manufacture. One can see, in this process, how interlinked with foreign monopolies are these African capidisls, yet, at the same time, different points at which they enter into competition with these very firms both in trade and in manufacture. Furthermore,

In the rnajorlt) of cases, thc oltlcr capitalist scciiorls have bcrn joined by a new ~U~C~~IIL~~~IChodrgco~s~~~,3 stratum of' career politicians - lawyers, civil servanl\. and other petty bourgeois sections (sometimes sons of land owners, traders and r~chfarmcrs) who utilize their new governmental and state positions to acqulrc wealth and economic position. As part of, but some ways separate from this bureaucratic bourgeoisie are the army and police officers, normally mined in Western military academies (Woddis, 1977. p. 270). Gavin Williams had also had to remark that.

The increasing intervenmn of the state in economic life has caused it to control lucrative contracts and the disposal of monopolistic advantages. Consequently, politics has become the primary source of capital accumulation by Nigerians. Through the political process, professional men. bureaucrats. and merchants were able to accumulate capital and carve out monopolistic advantages for themselves within the neocolonial political economy. and thereby form a "bourgeoisie" (Williams, 1977 p. 284). Evcn with all thc wcalth thcy haw accumulated, the Nitx rian "bourgeoisie" 'nay the African "bourgeoisie" have not been able to immcfietbemschresintheproduction~totbtw&ntthattfre ~especirllyEuropeanardAmencan~~refroin from dfcuting m them what the naturt of Africa's politid and ccoaomicdirectbnwouldbelikc.ThisstemsfromtbefrcttbrtObe AMcrn "bourgeoisie" are lazy. unpatriotic and lack the innarative capacity of their counterparts in Europe and America. Wlmeas the latter .have. with their capital been able to develop new fhmim of scientific and technical brealrthrough in super ductod, COllSUmer ekcgrmics. semi-conductors and high definition television. tbe brier sits oh their capital. acquire more of it, all of which have no direct linkage to their production capabilities but to their linkage to the 'tical pnwxss or to some economic activities which rely on imports em the Americas and Europe and which cannot possibly cause the African societies to make scientific and technical pmgress. Gavin Williams had pointed succinctly to a fact about the Nigerian bowgeoEe which is generalizable for the Aliican bourgeoisie tbu. The Nibourgeoisie lack. the commianents of a socialist. or nationalist character of the rationalizing. crpiP1- . accumulating. surplus-expropriating classes of Britain. Rd, Gamany and Japan during their period of indusaialization @. 285). And in terms of development. he noted that:

... there is a.contradiction between the requirements of the development of peasant production, and the derelopment of ~poductimConsaquentlytbenarein&anaicontrabctms. . iabenatinthedevebpmentstraOegyitselfandbetwaenitsobpcti~~~ and dre meansadopmlfortheir~ .: the impk substituting seaor genesates few badrward Md famd 1ibLage.s with the underdeveloped economy irself;in partbbr. payments of profits and sllaries are skewed in favour of exproriue and indigenous managers. whose consumption pattenrs are biased towards imparts and goods with a high impart content and agaimt the consumptior!of foodstuffs @. 290). The pnw;ess at democratization in Africa has been hinged m the inability of Africa's ruling circles to generate economic development It has been pointed out that such states as South Korea. Morda and Chile -made economic progm when dictatorships were in power. Why would that not be the case with Nigeria. Zaire, Togo, . Malawi. etc? If the dicMtorShips of various African counnies lnd been able to engender economic development, Africa cannot be plshed bither or thither by any foreign power no matter how geWine its ~wwEdbe.iofollow~dtbatpolitica~.~it migbtdammAfricur~afbxtbe~~rwesges~t hve W proper mots. that Ccomanic dcveaopmcd is as elpsivc as ever.~Gnmscibadtopdntmthat,

'Lbe ~ancstianhas been raised by Claude Ake whether in African s@al romartims,asulteexists?Ifastaoeerisffthenarulkrgclasswithderr cut interests would exist to channel economic end political dcvleaopnenCto meet tbeirnaeds. In Ahicgas Claude Akhasshh, thestsmeitselfisinvalvedinthcclasssrru~mthatyoudcm't it nmabhg above society ss exists in othcr ccmirdig fomakm (Ake- 1985 p. 9). Patterns of Foreign Pressure

This genualization was made for the Third Worid as a wbde i.e. Asia, Africa and Latin America But among these. Africa bas fwad itself in the worst suaits. There is no African theoretical thinking which7is rooted in Africa's past and which could stand against pe~a'om from elsewhere. And even if we claim that we live in a space ship earth which has shrunk as a result of denudation by scientific and technological forces, we have not shown that we can pssibly shape our destinies or that we are producers rather than consumers'of global intellectual goods. In the 1960s. a smogasboard of thinking has been said to be African political thought was as unfortunately to African leaders, whereas the thought processes which had changed the world, most of which had emanated from Europe, whether of the socialist or of the liberal persuasion came not from those who were at the citadels of power but from those exegesis who had taken it as their task, to look at society from up downwards. Moreover, those so called African thought processes had been corruptions of European thought processes. The dependency in thinking as well as technological dependency have combmed to make Europeans and Americans push Africa hither and thither in its quest for democratization. There is however every reason to believe that plural value%have taken precedence over collectivist values in the hew world order. Itcclls not even a convergence of socialist and capitalist values as some,s'@olars had dreamt of in the past but that with the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union, we have the surgeaf free-wheeling capitalism throughout the world and Africans have been told to conform. How have 'they been conforming? We would take illustrations from Zaire, Togo and Kenya. Towards the end of September 1991, riots broke out in Zaire's capital, Kinshasa and spread to other parts of the country in which troops and Zaire's civilians participated. The riots took place because of the hard times in the country and in the background of the aborting of a national conference which was looking into Zaire's political future. Food warehouses were ransacked and looted and foreign nationals were forced to flec the country. The threat posed to foreign nationals was what forced Belgium and French troops to intervene. Most Africans who have followed Zaire's affairs wondered why foreign troops should intcrvene in a situation which was purportedly, a purely internal Zaircan affair. Foreign troops had intcrvcncd in Zrlirc in the Cold War era in order to protect the regime of Mobutu Scsc Scko. What would such troops be doing in Zaire in an cra which has bccn proclaimed as a new world order? (Echezona, October, 1991). Mr. Mobutu :~ppointcd Eticnnc Tshisckcdi leader of Zaire's Sacred Opposition as his primc minister, a very surprising move since Mr. Tshisckcdi was his avowcdly arch opponcnt. It was understood that Amcrican prcssurc forccd him to do so and also prodded the Bclgium and thc Frcnch to enter into the fray sincc Mobutu had more linkages to them than to thc Unitcd States. Mobutu had served thc United Statcs wcll during thc Cold War by allowing Zaire to be the conduit through which Amcrican supplics wcrc scnt to Angola to assist Jonas Savimbi in thc civil. war against thc socialist oriented rcgimc in Luanda. With thc cnd of thc war and thc rcvcrsal to plural politics in Angola, the timcBwasripc to casc Mobutu out. So, thc dcmands 10 rccall lhc national conl'crcncc camc stridcntly from Americans, the French and the Belgians. And in order to peqetuate his authoritarianism, Mobutu had recalled ,the national conference, sacked it and recalled it the umpteenth time. At the same time, he had sacked Etieme Tshisekedi, put in Bernadine Mungul Diaka and later replaced him with Ngouza Karl-1-Bond all within two months thus proving that throughout the twenty seven years of his reign, Mobutu had rendered the opposition susceptible to penetration and division by him (Echezona, January 1992). On August 15, 1992, Etie*~e Tshisekedi was reappointed prime minister as a candidate. bf the national conference and it was understood that the Americans had told Mobutu that he must work with him. In Kenya, the controversy centred around Mr. Arap Moi. He assumed power in 1978, after the demise of Jomo- Kenyata and became leader of its sole political party, the Kenya African Nationalist Union (KANU). During those years, he tried to silence all opposition. This was possible in the years of the Cold War when the west perceived Kenya as a major bastion against communism in East Afriea. So, the West ignored human rights violations in Kenya. It afforded western tourists the best game reserves in the African continent and they flocked there. The west did not want to rock the, boat of the authoritarian regime because if they did, it might invoke forces in Kenya which were much more popular than KANY and which might threaten western interests. With the end of the Cold War. the west asked Kenya to engage in multiparty politics or lose western eqnomic support over which the country's economic development had depended (Echezona, March, 1991). Late in 1991, large pro-democracy demonstrations were abona by police on the orders of the KANU regime. The Kenyan authorities charged that there was foreign interference in their internal affairs because they found eight vehicles belonging to the American embassy at the venue of the demonstrations. The American Charge d'Affaires replied that thcre were only two of their vehicles at thc vcnuc of the dcmonstrations to observe what was going on thcre Kcnyan forcign ministcr. Wilson Ndols Aya wcnt further to charge that the Amcrican ambassador to Kcnya, Smith Hempstonc was too disrespectful to thc Kcnyan Prcsidcnt. Hc maintaincd that hc behaved like a slavc mastcr and chargcd him with racism. It was unbelievable that allies of much rcccnt timcs could dcsccnd ro this Icvel? Even though the ~girncof Arap Moi was authoritarian, when did embassies start to attcnd political rallics in countrics to which they were accrcditcd? But thc Amcrican Statc Dcpartmcnt and thcir allics could nor be dctcrrcd. Thcy backcd thcir ambassador and at a subscquent Paris Club mccting, Kcnya was summarily told to introducc multipany politics or thcrc would bc no morc aid from thc west. Shc compllcd t Echc,wna. Sovcmbcr. 190 1 ).

111 Togo pml something dirCerent but similar to Ole situation in Zaire. After a prMnctcd impasse between Gnrssimgbe Eyakn8, Prcsidaro for. twenty-seven yerrs and Togo's opposition motrea#rt. r military rebellion wedthe transitional prime miniEostpb Kokm Koffigoh to go and & rdnstatcmcnt of the pwty of the pmidentwhichhadbetmabdishcd.hencb~fiomtbtF.iarg ~mCamalAfrica~intoBudn~babseneCvaltS in Togo. Thrwghout the fracas. these forces bid aM cnOa ~SDlbgo and it was not easy knowing! whether they hd any i- m tbe outcome of events. Howeverqit was stnssed that thc reason why tbe French did not engage in afhy fwmrl intervention was d# to the speci~zdattonshipwhichhddcvclopedbet~thesmofPreridmr Mitterud who had a stint as r jommlist in T Pr&knt Gn8ssimgbe Eyadcmr. As special assistant to his 0aAfrian offairs. to = he hdurged for a soA appmach Mr. Eydcasr (Echaorrr, November 1991). What Togo. Zaire md illpStntCd is that whether you atl it pluralpoliticsordreoncpur~lm#,Afriaisain.rdepadar~eva on the world capitalist system for the dynamics of its 'tical econ~~~n~yunot~~W.r.~cwMeiCsas&~ Mozudbique and Angola which hd shown some semblance of socirlia orientation were plunged into civil wars by the world capitalist system while tht qhesof Wbutu !hsc SeLo. Gnrssigagbe Eyadcma and Amp Moi were protected. With the anivrl of r new world order in which capitalist values have assumed unquestionable sway. Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola h& to renounce any iou of "socialist orientation and hd to rmbnclc capitalist values while those ~hJaire.Togo and Kenya had the rug of protection by wcstcm-countries rcmoved frwn under thcir feet as they were thrcatcncd to abide by lhe true dictates of capitalism - pluralism in Ihc political and cconomic sphcrcs or be clobbtrtd. Patterns of Pressure by Civil Society From thc cvcnts that happcncd since lhe onset of the new world ordcr. no ideology could be said to have monopoly over the thought proccsscs of thc masscs in any society. It was the masscs of Russia that rosc In Pctrograd in 1903 and 1907 ovcr thc Crarist oppressive pollclcs and thc Bolsheviks might havc bccn swcpt into power by them It was again ihc inability of the socialists to solve the age old pmblcm of Russia: providing brcad and butter for thc masscs that m~ghthavc made lhc masscs to support lhc thrust towards pluralism in the former ~ovic8union. In thr sm$ manncr. Africa's post colonial rcgimcs wcrc swcpt Into poucr thrgugh thc.activltics of thc masscs. Howcvcr. it was difficult to fidl?onc rcpimc In Alrica whlch had harkcncd to thc interests of the masses after it bad come into power. That is why the masses have been swayed by ' every reigning ideological weltanshauung. Take Togo for exampkc Tbe s~ugslefor Togo had raged for quite some time, between President Eyadema ud members of Togo's opposition movemeat reguding bow to bring .bout a multi-party set up in that country. Like Mobutu Sese Seko, Eyrduna had stonewalled fbr a long time any movement towards democracy and hundreds of people had perished in that st-. A mtianal conference took place but Eyadema seemed to have retained iarmense powers aher he had seemingly made concessions to the opposith In countries like Bepin Replblic, Togo's neighbour, and congu BmviIle, a national COnfeCMce was very sweeping and far rwching. in fact the national conference in Congo was what yielded a demonstration effect to the rest of the French speaking teriitDrics in Africa. During the national conference in the Congo, the president was completely boxed into the comer so that the deliberations of the tmdbena were not done with the fear of some guns hanging behind tht beads of the conferees. It was not So in Togo. After the national confwend, president Eyadema was asked to remain as president while a prime minister, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh was appointed from the opposition. In three separate incidents, each of which lasted for weeks, saldius took over the breadcasting station to amounce the overthrow of the prime mieister and in each of these incidents several lives were lost. It was in the last such incident in January 1992 when it seemed that tlq march towards democracy in Togo might be msted that tht French postured themselves as if they would iqtervene. The prime minister was forced as a result of these developments which included his near asashtion to make a lot of compmmise/s. What is very instructive about Zaire on the other h_ad is that - most members of the Sacred Opposition had at one time or Ihe o@r been associates of Mobutu Sese Seko. Etienne Tshisekedi. Mungol Diaka and Ngouza Karl-l-Bond had either served as minister or prime minster to Mr. Mobutu. That is why in spite of the nature of opposition to him, he never took the opposition seriously. However, of these three, Elienne Tshisekedi had shown himself to be a man of iron That is why the Sacred Oppositi~nthought that he would be the appropriate person who whld lead a transition overnment in the aftermath of the anarchy that descended on Zaire &r the riots by t4e masses and the army in September 1991. After he had en appointed as prime minister. Mr. Tshisekedi refused to Swear allegiance to Mobutu, a man whom he considered to be a mqnster. Mobutu and his men on the other hand declared his regime ~llegal because according to them, he had among other things, deleted a portion of the constitution which had refereed to the Zairean leader as the guardian of the nation. This episode set in place a chain reaction in which Tshisekedi was locked out of his office which was surrounded by troops, more rampages broke out in Zaire's second largest city, Lumumbashi, more foreigners fled and Mungdl, Diaka was appointed prime minister. With renewed international and domestic pressure on Mobutu to revert to a national conference and to reappoint T-ekedi as prime minister, he appointed Ngouza Karl- 1-Bond on Novembw 25, 1991 from the Sacred Opposition as prime minster, recalled the national conference which had earned suspensions from him any time it seemed it was moving in the direction of makine Mobutu Sese Seko yield power (Echezona. January 1992). In Kenya. the opposition had not been allowed the right to ass,emble and to hold political views until January 17, 1992 when the first rally of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was permitted by the regime. Prior tc! this, state functionaries talked about not allowing the opposition the right to hold rallies as if it was a protective measure for the opposition. The President, Arap Moi talked about it as if the right to be the sole government of the country was ordained by God. At the Commonwealth summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, in late 1991, Arap Moi spoke to the BBC correspondent about the situation in Kenya. He said that the youths in the country who were yearning for multiparty politics in Kenya did not understand the nature of tribalism in the country. A multiparty system he pointed out would divide the country along tribal lines although he promised that he would introduce multiparty politics in five years time. When eventually FORD was permitted to hold rallies in Nairobi. he pointed out that it was forced on Kenya by foreigners (Echezona, November 1991). What the pressures for reform to a society governed by the rule of the law in these countries illustrate is that Africa's socio-economic situation is too far off from resembling the societies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Civil society has not developed up to the point where it could superimpose itself over society as a whole. The outcomes are dictatorships of the civil or military types which see themselves as the repository of the good of the nation. Because of the apathy of the mass publics, they had often waited for the army to intervene when a civilian regime had drifted off course only for the new military regimc to perpetuate the same wrongs which brought it into power hence the resort to thc much talked of musical chairs. With the surge of democratization world wide, African masses were again awakened into denouncing the military and civilian authorities of the past as lhey sough1 for new aulhorily slruclurcs.

Patterns of Multipartyism , . Presidcnr Arap Moi'of Kenya had raised the issue that a multiparty set up was not in the best interest of a society with so many tribes. If so, what would then be the best type of political organization for African states most of which are multitribal in character? Would politics then be frozen at the level in which one party monopolizes the affairs of society, one man st in power indefinitely, and society would be adjudged to be the betteraYgb r it if its citizens stay apathetic? Nigeria followed a simplistic solution in which a military regime which was thought to be disposed towards democratization, forced a two party set up on the country. Like the military regime whose governance is informed by unitarism and a one-party set up, a two party system is informed by British and American politics where two parties predominate. Why such a proclivity is seen to be simplistic is because the hegemony of two parties in these countries came through a process of evolution rather than through the wand of a putatively benevolent military dictatorship. In legislating two political parties into being in Nigeria, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), the Babangida regime thought that it reflected two main ideological currents within society, the SDP, "a little to the left" and the NRC, "a little to the right", without knowing that there are those in society who had views other than these. And the regime thought that if it half measuredly instituted politics based on ideology, it would attenuate ethnic, regional and religious politics in the country, a fact which was clutched on by the leadership of the labour in the country. Mr Paschal Bafyau, the leader of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was credited with saying two things on different occasions with reference to which of the parties, labour should join. In one instance, he had said that labour should throw in its lot with the SDP and at another time (due to criticism of his earlier stand), that the Nigerian worker was free to join whichever political party he saw fit. But from the theatrics of the labour leader, it was clear that his mind set was with the SDP (Echezona, April 1991). As has been pointed out earlier, it would SGGU mat in asking workers to join with the SDP, Paschal Bafyau had his eyes on politics in the advanced industrial capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America. But the SDP in Nigeria could not be measu~dwith say the Labour Party of Britain. First, there were too many tendencies in the Nigerian SDP which made its working class content inapparent - there were anarchist, socialist, reactionary, opportunist, right winger tendencies jostling for position and power. Secondly, the nature of the Nigerian state, its lack of a commodifying bourgeoisie and commodified labour prevents the emergence of class politics as it exists in the parties of western Europe (Ake, 1985). Thirdly, a party of the working class cannot emerge out of the goodwill and assurance of a regime whose proclivity to working class interests was highly suspect thus the refrain "a littlc to the left" and "a little to the right." The Nigenan regime had prided itself that it was ahead of reforms in Eastern Europe-and the rest of Africa but it would seem that the evolution of multipartyism in Africa in spite of the obvious foreign pressure was happening with the higher involvement of the masses thus creating the impression that it was through their energies that change was coming about. In Zambia, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) spearheaded the defeat of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), a party tha~ had governed as the only political party in the country for twenty seven years. The target of the MMD, was to remove Kenneth Kaunda from power. If they needed to have more opposition parties to iislodge him from power, they did not seem to need anyone to tell hem so. The difference between Nigeria's attainment of a plural olitical system through a seen hand after so many attempts and those f Zambia through an unseen hand can tell which one of them has lore potentials for success. Prior to the elections in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda had said on very many occasions that he was a depocrat and he was too sure of his success at the polls. The outcome of the elections, which came as a shock to him, proved that the longer one stayed in power, the more he was out of touch with his people 'Echezona, December, 199 1). Another illustrative case of multipartyism is Kenya. The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was initially led by a former parliamentarian, Martin Shikuku. Most top notchers of FORD were former members of Kenya African Nationalist Union (KANU). Although FORD'S avowed aim of destroying KANU made it suspect as a party which, like its predecessor, KANU might not respect the fundamental rights of Kenyan citizens, it nevertheless formed a rallying point at that moment for Kenyans to ensure the defeat of KANU at the polls. Several other parties sprouted up also but FORD possessed more credibility than any of them. It was even in FORD that many intellectuals from the Universities had found themselves, a distinctive example from the Nigerian case where University lecturers were not expected to become members of a political party except if they resigned their posts in the Universities. The essence of the Nigerian two party system was to cage the various fissiparious tendencies in the Nigerian body politic. Like the 1979 constitution, there was no ingenuity in the 1992 Nigerian Constitution since both were only a lifting of the presidential systcm of government as practised in the United States of America. In the next few years, especial.1~-when the current experiments going on in African countries would be assessed in the light of their failures or successes, a second look might be taken at the Nigerian pattern of forced two party system against the prevailing norms in Africa. Patterns of Military Disengagement One of the most persistent phenomenon in African politics and in the politics of Latin America is the participation of the military in the political process. In the more advanced countries of Europe and North America, the military has been engaged in the performance of military functions, national security problems rather than dabble into politics. Why then did the military in Africa nay in developing countries fail to follow their erstwhile colonial masters in this wise? Are there no national security functions to perform and because of the fact that there are no challenging tasks for them, they dabble into a terrain which is riot of their calling? It could be seen that because of this fact about Africa, the civil society has lost control of the military so that even when the military had said that it had gone back to the barracks, they were soon back in power to subvert the institutions of civil society. How have they positioned themselves in a world order in which the place nf the military in political affairs is being immensely under attack? In Nigeria as we have shown elsewhere, the military was presiding over return to civil rule which puts into question its sincerity in that wise, since it is known that it had presided- over the same process thirteen years earlier only to stage a come-back and in the thirty two years of Nigerian independence, it was in power for twenty three years. Chief Alex Akinyele, one of the regime's former ministers for information was asked in a BBC interview in 1991 what the military regime was doing to ensure that the army remained in the barracks after it might have relinquished power, he pointed to retirements in the army whose aim was to create an efficient and professional army ad the creation of the National Guard. When asked what would be the situation if the Naticnal Guard became an instrument of destabilization, he said that a whole set of checks and balances had been put in place to ensure that it did not occur. How could a National Guard be a better defence of the constitution of the land than the institutions of the state which might have evolved out of the creative energies of the Nigerian peoples to ensure a democratic polity? An institution like the National Guard would mean that its creators do not have trust in the other institutions of the state especially the army (Echczona, ~pril1991). The military in Nigeria had midway in the Babangida adrn~nislration conduclcd seminars to drum into the ears of the Nigcrian military about its nccd to maintain professionalism. This was so becausc thcre would sccm to havc bccn a wholc retinue of elcmcnts cntcring lhc army with the sole hope of going lo conduct a coup since 11 would afford thcm the opportunity for primilivc accumulation. The latest intervention in this score was an address by General Colin Powell, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Nigerian army on military professionalism. What could give credibility to a civilian regime in Nigeria nay in Africa is the extent to which such a regime is corruption-free and is able to eradicate conuption in the African body politic. If the military is by the nature of its rule corrupt, it cannot possibly, using the institutions which it had created, yield a stable civilian political system in Nigeria or Africa. There might be hundreds of seminars on military professionalism, there might be thousands of National Guardsmen to protect the state. However, once the institutions of the state are corrupt, they will afford the military, an institution which itself might not be corruption-free to ride into political power and legitimise a coup as a means of undermining civil society. Except for Ghana under Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings and perhaps the new military regime in Mali under Lt. Col. Amadou Tomani Touy. no military regime in Africa had disposed itself like the Nigerian military to relinquishing power to civilians by seemingly being an umpire between civilian competitors for political power. The Babangida era has become the second time the Nigerian military was being an umpire to transition to civil rule.. What had obtained in most of Africa was for a military leader to transform himself into a civilian leader over night and to perpetuate himself in office. This was the case with Mousa Traore of Mali, Gnassimgbe Eyadema of Togo, Mathieu Ke~ekou of Benin, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo Brazaville, Mobutu Sex Scko of Zaire, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Samuel Doc of Liberia. All of them had had to bow out or had disposed themselves to bowing out in the new surge for t' mbinalization sweeping through the continent except Mobutu Sese Szko. Zaire's troops wele involved in the looting that took place in September 1991 when the first waves of anti Mobutu demonstrations swept the country. It might be argued that Mobutu, as a civilian president, was not answerable for the misdeeds of his army. Nevertheless, he switched to civilian president from commander of the Zairean army and was instrumental in the death of the foremost Zairean nationalist, Patrice Lumumba. Wnat was surprising about the whole Zairean episode was that the army, unlike in other pans of the African continent had never posed a threat to the twenty seven year old regime of Mobutu. While the melee would be going on in Zaire, Mobutu would be busy enjoying himself in a yatch. Another similar regime to the Zairean one was that of Gnassimgbe Eyadema. He infused into the Togolese military, people of his ethnic group so that he was able to perpetuate himself in office for twcnly eight years. In the bid to return Togo to multiparty democracy, the army pcjsed a stumbling block even when their leader, Eyadema seemed disposed to relinquishing power so that it became difficult knowing when the army was acting independent of the president. A similar situation also ensued in Congo where after the world had praised the courage of the people of that country to engage in a national conference that had had far reaching demonstration effect on other French speaking states in Africa, the army stirred the political process by calling for the dismissal of the transitional prime minister, Andre Melongo and a reshuffling in the army to reflect its interests. It would seem that the armies in Africa have been equivocal about relinquishing political power and this would be ominous for Africa's future political development. After having smelt political power, return to barracks to accept civilian authority over them when they possess the gun seemed a far fetched dream. There was a tendency in the past to think that why they intervened in the political process was because they were the most disciplined in the state apparatus. After about three decades of frequent military intervention in the politics of African states, it was found lhat the military are not more disciplined than others in the state apparatus. Their resort to the gun to usurp political power is an indication of their indiscipline. The way the armies would shape out in the transition to democracy in Africa would depend among other things on the attitudes which the upcoming politicians display towards them, the way the amlies see themselves as an important element in this transition and the character of 'the new world order. The liberalization measurcs in Africa wml:l be aszessed in ~hc future on the extent to which 11ar:y ":L ,I: , :.:,: r . id -~ccnnmic development and social change. .As ~i,crwiiues werc bcing implemented, forebodings of a dire cconomic frmrc for Africa in the was being sounded. In thc 1998s, Arrk states went into serious ecoriomic crises and a debt burdcn which it would not seem they could casily come out from. The solution which was forced on African statcs was the structural adjustment programmes, which again was the component of pluralism in the political sphere, in the economic front. If as most of them werc engagcd in structural adjustmcnts werc also able to rcach out to plural dcmocracy, we would in the next decade be assessing thc extent to which freewheeling capitalism had allowed Africa to makc cconomic and social progress. Then, we could begin to assess President Moi's assertion that multiparty politics would tcar a multi-tribal socicty apart or to comparc the economic and social progrcss madc in the Cold War ycars, in the new world ordcr. We would also be ablc to assess the extcnt to which thcsc mcasures havc made Africa a self-reliant entity and a socicty wherc all the apparatuses of a statc, are each engaged in plotting its dcfincd functions in thc intcrcst of society as a whole. Chapter 7 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TFJF NEW WORLD ORDER

The dominant mode of analysis in international relations has fol a long time been informed by force and power, the realist school Prior to the power school, there had existed the idealistic school, theii position of which informed the motto of the United Nation! Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) - war i! perceived to begin in men's minds. If men's minds werr reformulated you would have less wars. Education is the road tc peace. The realist school may be said to be more vocifero,us in thr Second World War and immediately after the war, since idealism wa! unable to explain the evolving international political structure Henceforth, most scholars in the traditional school had had to line u~ behind realism until other scholars rebelled against realism anc developed new paradigms which do not emphdsize force bu cooperation such as integration, interdependence and dependence. Regional Integration Karl Deutsch defines integration as "the attainment. within I territory" of a "sense of community" and of "institutions an( practices, strong enough and widespread enough" which woulc assure for quite a long time, "dependable expectations of peacefu change among its population ("Deutsch et al., 1957). Emst B. Haa! defines integration as

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and ~oliticalactivitics toward a ncw centre where institutions Dossess or bcrnand jurisdiction ovcr pre-cxisting national states (~aa~,1958 pp. 62-83). Intcgrationisls arc conccrned with the manifestations of peacefu changc in inlcmalional politics rathcr than war. They found sucf phcnomcna as pcacc and coopcralion taking placc in Europe after thc Sccond World War and thought that that was thc wavc of the future Karl Dcutsch and thosc who followcd his tradition of using mail tradc, lclcphonc, studcnt cxchangc to mcasurc thc raw of growth o inrcgralion in Wcstcm.Eu.ropc arc groupcd undcr thc nomenclature transactions school while E. B. Haas and his group are referred to as the nm-functionalist school. Functionalism The earliest developmqnt of a theory of integration is by the functionalist school. What had motivated their writings was the havoc wrought by the First World War. Europe was completely wrecked in that war and a country like France for example, lost a whole generation. David Miuany is the most influential 01 the functionalists. The emphasis of the functionalists is on common needs, universally accepted criteria which stem from a scientific rationality over power. By responding to these common needs, an objective universal criterion will be created. Rather than confront the nation state, you sneak-in on it. The state is seen as a set of shackles building insecurity, irrationality and alienation through national boundaries. What Mitrany calls "unnatural state" took the place of natural society. To change this, a mechanism would have to be built in order to bring the countries of the world together into what unites them. This will shape attitudes away from political divisive issues into attitudes towards practical solutions to collective tasks (Mitrany, 1966 PP. 62-83). Functionalists identify a whole range of human concerns which can only be performed at the intemational level by governments. These include welfare problems such as fisheries, water pollution, standards and safety in mines and factories, and inter calibration. Once such issues cm be identified, they are turned to technocrats and experts and by emphasizing a common index of needs over a common index of power, a universal welfare orientation will be created and a web of knots will tie the nation states together thus preventing the outbreak of war. Neo-Functionalism - E. B. Haas is the fore-runner of neo- functionalism. He takes off from the' functionalist strategy and examines its intemational applicability. He found that the motivation towards integration comes from national governments. It may be for technical as well as for power political reasons. In any of these, he found that it is impossible not to come into confrontation with the nation-state. Power and welfare are inseparable issues. Moreover, in integration, there is no gradual approach. Once the process starts, spill over occurs from one sector to the other. Neo-functionalists assume that in advanced industrial societies, no sector is discrete from other sectors. Once you et involved in Lhe coal sector, you also get involved in the steef sector. Once he issue of capital arises, other issues such as financial markets, banks, financial inslitutions and labour arise and an interdependent wcb is crcated in society. At every stage of this, you face choices of withdrawal or continuation. According to Haas, me logic for governments is to move forward because if they do not do so, it may lead to unintended consequences (Iiaas, 1971 pp. 3-42). Those who initiate sectoral integration are not capable of seeing its consequences. There is likely to emerge a core of people with career aspirations who are interested in seeing things moving. This core of people are likely to go beyond institution building in order to form an elite network which keeps integration moving. As sectoral integration takes place, new issue areas are poliiicised by interest groups and transnational constituencies are created thus getting political groups interested in decision making beyond the nation state. As more and more people get interested in what is going on, a new political centre begins to emerge. Even groups wbo are ideologically or pragmatically opposed to integration are unable to fight this logic of things. Such groups find that they have to work within the system if they have to make an impact on policy making. This causes a change in the role of national governments: sovereignty erodes and more and more tasks are assigned to regional institutions rather than to national ones. Transactionalism Karl Deutsch is the principal exponent of the transactions approach to integration. His first pioneering work is his study of the dynamics of nationalism and the role which socid communication ylagerl in fi rwping srid~nalwity and national consciousness (Deutsch, 1953). A tew )eats later he, in conjunction with a team of researchers' examined the formation of integrated communities or their disintegration in ten historical cases, ranging from the successful integration of England in medieval times to the break up of the Austro Hungarian empire in the twentieth century (Deutseh et al. 1957). In this study, nationalism is seen as a process of social assimilation in which diverse groups become a single whole in terns of identity and respectivity to symbols. Once this is established, political institutions arise to provide structures to the new entity. This could be generalized at the international level. Here, there is a movement from nationality to supranationality and through this means several islands of peace are created, a situation which ensures a peaceful world. Karl Deutsch identifies two such situations. The first is a plural security community such as the situation between the United States and Canada on one hand and the situation in Western Europe on the other. The sccond is an amalgamated security community such as the United States of Amcrica (Dcutsch Ibid, pp. 5-6). These transformations occur bccduse thcsc communities identify with one another. Since they exhibit mulual unprompted responsiveness to one another, their bchavinm wnuld hcnccfonh be predictable. Whcre do they originate from? It is a learning process. They begin by contact and communication. And usually when people begin to communicate with one another, trade develops and scientific and technical exchanges develop. Karl Deutsch argues that comunication breeds familiarity. The basis of contact is the basis for community formation. In order for patterns of communication to lead to community, the interaction has to be rewarding. Transactions must produce positive dimensions to them. The frequency of communication must be both quantitative and qualitative to make it credible to the communicants. Policy makers must also get a feed back from communicating. It is a stimulus - response type of process. It may be termed the politics of bridge-building. What do you do to generate positive interactions? The two way flow of communication must be genuine and cyclical. For example, in international trade, you use artificial means to balance trade flows. In term4 of labour migration, you take steps to make jobs available. You have to take steps to improve your national capability to generate rewarding communication flows. You have to be familiar with very many languages in order to be able to handle the communication flows which you generate. You have to develop the political capability of building coalitions and clienteles and to control the quality of information flow. Finally integration and international communication would be more promising if the integrating governments are strong and can fulfil their commitments at 'the national level before the building of a community. American Attitudes to European Integration The United States had championed European integration at the policy and theoretical levels. The Europeans might be said to Lave supported integration among the less developed countries also: witness the accords over the various Lome conventions. Every policy support for any issue in the international sphere during the Cold War had a geopolitical content: while the Americans sought a West European wedge against the former Soviet Union, the Europeans sought to keep the less developed countries at the level of primary producers and as the former metropole, to keep out the effects of socialism and enforce market economy techniques. However, intentions do not always translate into actual outcomes. US support of Western Europe caused it to become a competitor of the.United States and sometimes, a drag to allied consensus over global issues. True, the new world order might have sung the nunc dimitis to socialism, it might also mean the intensificalion of economic conflict among the advanced industrial economies. The Europeans and the Americans have been involved in various trade wars, lhc most serious of which is the question of Europcan subsidies in agriculture and this has formed a TdiJG:. bone of contention in the Uruguay round of GATT talks which started since 1986. To the extent that the United States might cherish an integrated Europe as a partner in global governance, it does not seem as if it would be damn too enthusiastic as it was about Europcan unification between 1945 to 1960 when the threat posed by the defunct Soviet Union was perceptible to all and the Europeans depended on a very high scale for American management in European recovery. This scenario is supported by events since the end of the Cold War: The United States was not pleased with Germany's upmanship in the Yugoslav crisis and it is noteworthy that Germany is the major power within the European Community. It is plausible :hcrefore to argue that the United States would not want an assertive Europe but a Europe which is completely on its side. In the Gulf War, it would seem that it got wholehearted European support, but this is not so (see Brenner, 191, pp. 665-676). That problematic could be found in sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Since the post 1989 world order is still very new, one might forecast future polarizations between hc Americans and the Europeans which would not reinforce one mother thus leading to further American alienation from Europe, a \!!ualion which might push the Europeans to fasten the pace of iratrgration or to decouple into various nation states and only uniting over hose residues of earlier tries at integration. Areas of future polanlation might include the role of NATO, the CSCE process and a i;ranco/C;erman army as a forerunner of a European army. idening and Deepening of the European Process Six countries had started the European process. After quite some ,;ignificant hulls and faults, it moved to nine and then to twelve. The lesi three to enter into the European process, Spain, Portugal and Greece were initially stalled kcause the Community did not approve cf thc nature of plural democracy in these countries, human rights and the level of their induwial bases. These were the rules and regulations that bound the Europcan society together and immediately they conformed with the first two, th- Community under Lvrolc thcir poor industrial bases leading to a Community of twelve. 'i'urkcy which had craved for quite a long time to be included in the C"!m:nuniry was deemed not qualified because of the three reasons ci-i~in~cra~cdabove but much more plausibly but although unspoken .!:!o:it, thc I.act that Turkcy is not truly rcgarded as a European

!'. 1.., : >., :I wciety which is unitcd undcr christcndom. Turkey is a ., i!l\ii.'n) hta~c.That notwithstanding, Turkcy is a mcmbcr of thc :.. .j;i 0 an(! har conformed lo Community's forcign policics in , :.-.,. . to rhc I,'nltcd S[a~csin the Gulf War, in its attitudes to the war

; '\.,rrircir:c, K:lr;lhak 11 hctwccn Azerbaijan and Armenia and in the overall developments in the former Asiatic Soviet Republics. But Turkey might be left in the lurch to mature before being admitted into the European Community. With the end of the C~ldWar, the idea of widening the community has assumed increasing momentum. When Mikhail Gorbachev elaborated his cGncept of a Common European House, little did the world know that the collapse of socialism was in sight or that the Soviet Union would split into its constituent parts (Echezona, 1990). In expatiating on a Common Europan Home, Mr. Gorbachev had sought for a common roof for the right, the socialists and social democrats. Although there are no socialists to refer to in Europe today but to the right and , however, with the collapse of socialism, all Europeans would want to be linked in one way or he other to the European Economic Community (EEC). The Austrians, the Swiss, the Swedes, the Norwegians and the former socialist countries, Hungary, poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Russia, Ukraine, etc are seeking permanent status or obsewer status in the EEC. This widening of the Community is complemented by deepening of the community which we shall treat below. Nationalism at the National and International Levels The study of nationalism at the national level has shown that such a phenomenoc can be replicated at the international level (Deutsch 1953). In essence, the question of transference of loyalties from some particularistic attachments to a sovereign no matter how defined has been found to be the same whether at the domestic level or at the international level. What regional integration uies to address is how loyalties drawn towards a particular attachment can be drawn to a larger whole without recoutse to war. According to Karl Deutsch, Western Europe is an "amalgamated security community." If so, what prevents Western Europe from moving into a full blown union in which its various pans would surrender their sovereignties? 1992 had been set as a date for sealing a treaty to economic merger. Before and after the Maastricht Summit in 1991, it seemed the British would be the ones to torpedo the movement to the political and economic union of Europe. But with the referendum by the Danes on June 2 1992 rejecting the Maastricht accords, Euro-sceptism replaced Euro- ~ptimism.The Danes showed that they would not submit their sovereignty to the machinations of the bureaucrats in Brussels. Decisions in Brussels seem to take place behind closed doors. The question posed by the Danish vote is what is the place of national decisions to decisions taken in Brussels? Where do national dec~sions end and Community decisions take over'? How democratic would a future Europe be? Would the European parliament be strengthened'? Wou!d the remaining eleben go ahcad while Denmark is accommodated to the extent that it wants? What is the likely direction of the EEC if the French and Irish referenda do not favour Maastricht? Would the Danes and the others (i.e. if they vote against) be waited upon to conduct another referendum which would afford them a chance to rejoin the European train? Would the shock of the rcfcrcndum belie the other applicants - Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway, etc?+++ It is very clear that the Danes are not basically against the EEC. They benefit from it. However, in Denmark as in many other European countries, there is an old latent feeling of distrust against Germans which dates back into the nineteenth century. The Danes never forget that each time you talk about rhe Community, it is Germany that you are referring to. Germany is the pole of power in the Community. The Germans on the other hand are reeling against the possibility of fusing rheir all powerful German Mark into a European Currency Unit. So. the vote in Denmark is a vote against Danish politicians who passed the Maastricht treaty, against the Community bureaucracy and against Germany. However, if the Europeans would need a European super state, they might as well speedily move into a Community before the next century or else Germany might grow so strong that it would not need the Community anymore. However, the Danish vote underscores the point that nationalism is still a potent force in world politics in a post Cold War era. Policy Integration, European Nationalism and the Fate of the Nation-State The EEC was very freely disposed towards the break up of the Soviet Union and perhaps of Yugoslavia, two countries where socialism might be said to have come through indigenous efforts. Leaving aside the Soviet Union, why would the EEC not have insisted that ;i unitcd plural democratic Yugoslavia was in rhe best interests of Europe and the world at large? How would the break up of \'ugoslavia assure a more stable Europe? Why these questions seem vcry pcnincnt is because after the wars in Yugoslavia, it would be cvpcctcd that the new states that emerge from it - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hcrccgovan;i, or a Bosnia-Hcrccgovana divided along Serbian, Croatian and moslcni lines. \laccdonia. Serbia, Montenegro and who knows. Koswo might scck one >talus or thc other wirh the EEC and in the long tcmi ;IS full mcmtxrs of the EEC. What difference does it mahc in tcnn?; 01' the bloodshed which ensued in Yugoslavia if they came under the umbrella of a Yugoslav state or under the umbrella of six or so distinct sovereign states when the essence of regional integration is the merger of territories, economies, political systems etc? Would it not have been possi,ble to leave Yugoslavia the way it was physically while systematically ;hanging its social, political and economic system. These issuds are quite pertinent to a continent likc Africa where regional integration is new and where cultural pluralisn. is higher than what exists in Europe. Yugoslav Crisis The nation state as we have known it had evalved nut of thc settlement in Westphalia in 1648. The system of statcs of which w,: in Africa are also descendants of, has also been referrcd to as thc European state system. In its initial evolution, the nation state was ruled by Kings and Princes. In the age of revolutions either of scientific or mass movements, rulership had moved into the hands of the propertied classes. The perception of who should be protected under the umbrclla of a nation state started to change with the French revolution of 1789. It had hitherto been assumed that a state could be multinational in character provided it was able to provide the minimal needs of its citizens. But with the French revolution everything changed. Thc revolution was the first of its kind to talk about the rights of man auu these rights, when channelled into the domain of the nation state referred to the needs of the boundaries of a state to be coterminous with the nation. The nation was defined as one single linguistic and cultural group. This was the beginnings of the right to national self determination. It set in train, revolutions in Europe and somc statcs in Europe might have owed their independence to the French revolution. In order to checkmate the revolutionary fever which it had sct in Europe, the Viema order of legitimism was set in place. The Prussians however went a step further and forcibly integrated all the Gcrman states together in 1870, and Germany was able to triggcr off a First World War. When Hitler went another step further and sought to include Austria and the Sudetan Germans in his Lebensraum politik, it had a devastating impact on world and European politics in the Second World War. The outcome of the First World War, reaffirmed the basic tenets of the French revolution in its proclamation of the right to national self determination. V. 'I. Lenin under the socialist slogan had championed it and Woodrow Wilson under the American slogan had also championed it. For the victorious powers, however, 11 mean1 self- determinatioh for dependent territories of the defeated powcrs 'I i,,)sc which were German were placed under mandates whilc 7x .,I,. hxc granted independence. This explains the emergence of the state of Yugoslavia 8s an entity in world politics. Yugoslavia, a patch work of various nationalities .which had been spread in the Ottoman empire and the Austm-Hungarian empire, was woven into a fabric containing the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes after the war, in 1918. This became the nucleus of the state for the much touted South Slavs who, because of their smallness, had been exploited by the bigger nations that surrounded them. The founding of the new state, meant that they now had protection under the umbrella of a big stale which would give them protection. It was a marriage of convenience in some ways, and on the other a manifestation of reai-politik. It was not until fie triumph of the socialists that the right of national identity was also extended to the Macedonians, the Montegrins and the Moslems in Eiosnia- Herzegovina. All these constitute the six Yugoslav republics in addition to the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. It must be recalled that what had held Yugoslavia together since the end of the Second World War was the charismatic figure of Josip Broz Tito. A great Yugoslav patriot. Tito led the Yugoslav partisans through the tumultuous era of the Second World War during which the Axis powers established an independent fascist state in Croatia and sought to tear the new Yugoslav state apart into its disparate units. After the war and reunification, Yugoslavia was again embroiled in a struggle with Stalin over its independent socialist path. What ensued in 1948 was its ex-communication from the socialist commonwealth and Tito launched what has since been labelled in the West as or market socialism. So, of all the then socialist countries, Yugoslavia had been ahead in reforms, albeit, under the aegis of the Yugoslav League of Communists. It did not however prevent the rumblings within its disparate nationalities. As a pragmatist and sensing the dawn of his passing. Tito instituted a six man rotating presidency, later increased to eight in order to accommodate the two autonomous provinces. to rule Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav had once said that he could not recall the name of any of their presidents after the passing away of Tito because the presidency changed hands every other year. Immediately after the death of Tito in 1980, the question has been asked, when would Yugoslavia break up or when would the Soviets using the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty invade Yugoslavia? The debacle in Yugoslavia which led in June 25 1991 to the announcement of secession fmm the Yugoslav federation by Croatia and Slovenia and the later. spc~ssjonof Bosnia-Hercegovina has its roots in the above slated scenario. Slovenia was the most developed and Slovcncs thought that they provide the economic mainstay of the federation which was dominated by Serbia. The Croats had for a long ti me nurtured the dream of independence and terrorist movements had sprouted up from there, all directed at Serbia. And this was very surprising given the fact that Serbia and Croatia speak the same language, Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb. But unfortunately they see their cultural pluralism on religious lines. While the Croats are Catholics. the Serbs are Orthodox Christians. And the further solution of the Yugoslav imbroglio had moved towards the division of Bosnia- Hercegovina between Croatia and Serbia since Bosnia-Hercegovina contained proportions of Croats, Serbs and Moslems. Another area with potentials for instability is Kosovo. Kosovo province contains eighty percent Albanians against twenty percent Serbs and would want to be merged with the state of Albania instead of continuing as a province under Serbia. Secondly, the root of the impasse could also be ~raceainto Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika and Glasnost. It was not now Brezhnev invading with his armies but Gorbachev invading with his ideas. After the revolutions in which East Central Europe moved to pluralism, Yugoslavia seemed unaffected. However, later, Slovenia was at the lead with multiparty elections in which communists were displaced by nationalist parties. Croatia followed suit. The response from Belgrade and Serbia was the rise of Serbian nationalism under the leadership of the Communist Party. The Communist Party in fact went further and won the elections in Serbia thus putting the rotating presidency in danger with communists and non communists. And when it came to the turn of Croatia to take the mantle of leadership, Serbia vetoed it, all these happening and leading to the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the onset of hostilities between them and Serbia. European Responses The Yugoslav crisis is very instructive and teaches a whole lot about the evolution and transformation of world politics. First, the European Economic Community (EEC) got involved in the crisis when Yugoslavia was not a member of that organization. Secondly. the EEC statutes do not include a military involvement in European issues which do not concern it. The EEC involvement in Yugoslavia therefore means that a vacuum existed in East Central Europe which it had had to fill. In his articulation of a new world order, President Bush had said that Europe would have to shoulder more burdens than it had hitherto done which would mean that the EEC role in the' Yugoslav crisis was a way of playing the bidding of the hegcmonic power. However, in the Yugoslav crisis, the EEC had not shown that it would stand as an independent and authentic force in world politics. In spite of its seeming to be a potent force, it sought a United States pre-eminent role in Yugoslavia. Secondly, the major powers in Europe, Germany, France and Britain seemed reluctant to commit their forces in Yugoslavia sensing that it might be a prelude to a major cataclysm in Europe a la the First World War. Third, in its inability to deal with Yugoslavia, the EEC had let a lot of heat on the United Nations which had caused the Secretary General, Boutros Ghali to complain of inadequate consultation and the eurocentricity of the Security Council when there were similarly burning issues like the civil war in Somalia. The outcome of the Yugoslav crisis might detemline a whole lot about the future of the nation state as well as the future of regionalism. If regional organizations aid the break up of a nation state on whatever reasons they might be based, what forms of organization would be most suitable for mankind in a new world order or in a future world order? This question is very pertinent for Africa where potential future ethnic and national explosions exist. Africans had clutched on the ideas of European nationalism which launched the question of a nation state. At the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, one of its founding fathers, Julius Nyerere added a caveat to the OAU charter to the effect that colonially determined boundaries in Africa were sacrosanct. This was done in order to defuse the confusion over whether after a colonial state might have won independence, its inhabitants, which could be multinational were not justified to seek their independence in the spirit of a nation being coterminous with its boundaries, a nation being made up of a people with one culture and language. When Biafra seceded from Nigeria in 1967, it Was Nyerere who in recognising it as a new state, pointed out like the French revolutionaries that where a regime failed to give protection to a section or sections of its citizenry, it was the right of those citizens to demand for a separate state including the use of force to make those demands (Echezona Unpub. 1991). Integration and Developing Countries The experiment at regional integration started first in Europe. The motivations to integrate came as we had pointed out earlier from both the internal, and external dimensions. Essentially, the desire to integrate Western Europe was aimed at carving out a super powerful capitalist sociely in Western Europe in the overall global struggle between capitalism and socialism. In developing regions, the exhortations to integrate came either from regional or international organizations such as Lhe Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the United Nations. The urge lo integrate is borne out of the fact that many countries in lhc developing world are quite small and resource- deficient and cannot on an individual basis bargain in a complex and multi-variegated world or'p~oVidifor the minimal basic needs of their inhabitants on their individual selves. These differences between the reasons for integrating in Western Europe and in the developing areas demand that the analyses of integration in these two areas be based on a different framework. However, most scholars ~hoare interested in integration in developing countries anchor thelr perspectives on the Haas md Deutsch models. These models were developed with the advancod industrial capitalist countries of Western Europe in view. These societies, the fore-runners of imperialism are engaged in the highest fmntiers of advanced technology whereas most of the countries in the developing world are exporters of raw materials and importers of finished manufactured products. Although at the early stages of the European Common Market (ECM). Europe was passing through the devastation wrought by the Second World War, the society as a whole had had an advanced industrial base prior to the war nonetheless. And the intentions of the Haas and Deutsch models are to build on this base and with support from the United States, to cooperate to build a complementary super capitalist state in a world of insurgent socialism. In analysing integration in developing countries therefore, such analyses must be different - integration for the purposes of development. Such analyses would aim at the moulding of political consciousness regarding the origins of the underdevelopment 'of developing countries and the need to cooperate to conquer underdevelopment. In Europe for example, there is an elite consciousness regarding integration. The elite, in both governmental circles and owners of capitalist firms decide the pace at which integration would proceed. In developing regions, the owners of foreign capital are transnational monopolies for whom the compradorial bourgeoisie stand as middle men. This raises the problem of integration in dcvcloping areas thus, integration for who? If the state is weak and the local bourgeoisie is weak, integration in developing areas would servc the interests of foreign capital. That is why the framework of analyses of integrdtion in developing areas must strive to develop tools that steer these regions towards independence and self reliance. If as Karl Deutsch has pointed out, elite consciousness spreads where communication grows thus developing into a community it can be found in developing regions especially in Africa, that such communication flows among the elite is barely discernible. This lack ol' flow of communication is an indication of the degree of dcpendence of developing areas to the developed ones and the process does not seem to be yielding due to the increased poverty in the developing regions and the ties of the dependent bourgeoisie to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Economic Motivations for Integration Bela Balasa traces the stages in the economic integration of states. The first stage starts with the movement from a free vade area whereby a cluster of countries agree to remove tariff against the outside world. The next stage is economic union which implies the free movement of labour, capital and the solution of common economic problems (Balassa. 1973). As we noted earlier, the process of economic integration in Western Europe has led to trade wars between Western Europe and its partners, the United States and Japan. Secondly, there has been intra European vade problems in say pharmaceuticals between France and Gennany and in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). If capitalist integration is full of problems why should developing countries enter into the same type of association? The argument is made that positive welfare gains accrue from integrating and that in an era of expanded markets, more trade flows back and forth thus encouraging specialization. Secondly it is argued that integration encourages economies of scale. Since small units are sub-optimal in size, the confines of national markets are too restricted for large scale production to occur. Finally it is argued that integration encourages swcialization and maximises each country's comparative advantage such as in the rationalization of productibn location and quality of resources, technology, skills, proximity to cheap transportation etc. In developing regions, how much trade can you cut off from the rest of the world and survive since most of the developing countries, given the character of their economies are tied to the outside world? If diversion of trade has social implications such as generating employment and protecting industries. why has this not taken place in the European Community where each country experiences high unemployment and where patterns of specialization become so complex that firms prefer to merge at the national rather than at the supranational level? For developing countries where expansion is limited, and external market is badly needed, there are negative side effects in integrating. Factories are closed down, industries are dislocated, factories go bankrupt and unemployment climbs very high. Furthermore it encourages the more developed among the underdeveloped to perpetuate the underdevelopment of the least developed countries. So, how could integration in say West Africa be addressed in a post Cold War era? Failed Integration Schemes Failcd integration schemcs' in the developing arcas includc the East African Common Markct, thc Caribbean Federation and the United Arab Federation. Evcn thosc which have continucd to thrive such as the Economic Community of West African Statcs (ECOWAS), the Andean Group or those newly evolving ones in Southern Africa or in Asia cannot be equated to developments in the European Common Market. This is as we had earlier pointed out due first to the newness of the countries and' the dependence of their indigenous bourgeoisie to the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Within some of the

' integrating states such as Uganda in the East African Common Market, there are various ethnic groups who may not have given their loyalty to the post colonial state not to talk of a fledging m$nwational authority. As the case of Uganda has further illustrated, the degree of social ferment and instability in society does not make swranationalism a credible option: regimes had changed wiEhout institutions overreaching from one regime to the other; the hedonic massacres that had attended one if not many of the regimes in Uganda, and the inability of the regime to provide for the minimal needs of members of its society are cases in point. The military intervention of Tanzania in the affairs of Uganda which went against the norms of independence and sovereignty of states met with the silence of the international community because the regime of Idi Amin operated below the tolerable norms of the international community. In the Economic Community of West African States, integration cannot be assessed to have moved beyond meetings of Heads of State or foreign and finance ministries of member states. No protocol, including the protocol on free movement of persons has been implemented. After the signing oi the agreement in May 1975 bringing the association into being, issues that can derail integration continue to mount - e~pulsionsof so called "illegal aliens" from member states, border co~flictsbetween member states, accusations of coup plots against member states and the inability of member states to fulfil their financial comrr-itments to the association. Finally it has been pointed out ntnat the fallua of the East African Common Market, a situatmn that r7ay attund me O'!PP~ integrations in developing countries was dw to the ideological polarization in the Community. Whereas Tarlzania pmferred the socialist option, Uganda and Kenya preferred the capitagist option (Mugovba, 1978). The Ecmonaic Community <.A West African States

(ECOVJ ':5) ant' rlre NLWFlvorlc Order Thc I--~rasm.~.:m;i.~~ni + of bkse African States (ECOWAS) could $F $:it?:0 f9i1+ ' c 1:: :* ched 5x0 king when the old world order .. ;.: ne iic L. . .> . elj ~~r 1375 What then are the under, ~niningelemenl., nt' fCCjX"2L -"~lir,h: lake it a chiid of the old world order? What arc L;P . iIC;;rC;d tt3cJ~ derivable from the European experience whirh in ' mriQhe f-: ?;lti~nand management of ECOWAS? To what Cxic; " iw cEs. 'iaafs stagnated or made ECOWAS move forwad? How would ECOWAS be steered to meet the needs of a changing world order? 'In the ECOWAS subregion, the question of a Soviet threat and the way to meet it did not exist as it was in Europe. However, as in Europe, there was a realization by states within the region that the larger they are the more impact they could make in the political economy of world politics. There was also a realization that colonialism had entered a neocolonialist phase and because some of the states are either too small or resource deficient, they can only bargain against neo-colonialism if they fuse into a common whole (Nkrumah. 1965). All these perceptions were at the level of thinking and not at the level of policy making in the region. First, many of the states in the region seem to nurture neocolonialism rather than seek its removal. This was done primarily through the phenomenon of military rule, one of the greatest tragedies for regionalism and national development in much of Africa. During much of military rule. corruption became a pattern of ec~nomiclife and even where military regimes yielded to a so-called civil rule, it was for those military regimes to take off their military uniforms and put on civilian clothes. Even as in the case of Nigeria where military regimes have yielded entirely to civilian regimes, the pattern of relapse to civil rule was such as to lay the foundations for another military intervention. What obtains in much of the national life is economic mismanagement, corruption and the embourgeoisement of a little segment of the population. In this situation, lip service is paid to national development and regionalism remains at the level of heads of state meetings In the old world order, corrupt civil and military regimes in Africa were supponed by the West if they abhored socialism. When they endorsed socialism, everything was done to ensure their overthrow. This was the major reason for the lack of elite complimentality in West Africa. At the onset of independence in the late 1950s. three countries, Ghana, Guinea, Mali were seen to be toeing the socialist path. The rest followed the capitalist path of development. In the 1970s, other regimes which might be thought to be radical even though their credentials were questionable - Benin and to some extent Ghana came to the fore. However, whether it was the capitalist or the socialist path to development, no country in West Africa resembled a true market economy or a truly collectivised economy. Every ideological inclination served for the perpetuation of a corrupt clitc. You cannot possibly point towards a West African elite in thc making. The burc.au~raticclitc might not be thought of as an elite in rcgional integration because they are not like captains of industry with a trans-regional perspective who want integration to move forward because they benefit from it or you don't have the 'mob& of tabour lin which case yoy would eqwt ttsc benefits of fobgr~8onto trickle down to the popul~onat Lyc rbo would start ,eodev? n West African ~~OUSILC~~SwMch would $tart to wmpete with tb national consdwsness. What we hrvt hrs so far is the 'emof West Africans in Ghba, Ouinen, Nigeria aab Mauritania. In considering ECOWAS in the new world order, we shall place on the following themes which have informed the litics of world ordbl: the character of plural 8"emocracy, human rlgbb, nadonalism at .lbe domestic and int-national levels and a security Ilaechanism in n@onal integralion. TB~Character of ECOWAS Economies 'l'he breakdown pf was and bntien in Eump hrve focussed - the attention of the advanced industrial countrkg ~ficallyon Burope. This singular phenomenon has made the i~sfieswhich bmght the politics of integration into bein# in and the developing.world much moxe salient than ever befom. In the years of the Cold War, a good chunk of Africa had xelied on aid fnm the West to develop. Not only was the level of aid insufflcieqt, tfrey were in many instances not properly managed. There ,was abundant comption, inappropriate development phm3 and a lot of projects were left midstream, abandoned. In the nineteen eighties when the African continent became immersed in debts, Africans wen? asked to engage in st~cturaladjustment programmes. After nearly a decade of structuring and adjusting, the continent is too far away fonn a market economy. This is due to the fact that most African countries or West African countries are mono crop economies. Their economies still follow the old metropolitan lines of exporting raw materials and importing finished manufactured goods. Moreover, a capital owning class does not exist in West Africa the way it does in capitalist states. Most reduction ventures are publicly owned rather than privately owneB (Ake, 1985. p. 3). The nineteen nineties are full of forebodings of impending economic doom for the African continent - population explosion, higher debt burdens. conuption and environmental degradation are the order of the day. How does West Africa meet the challenges posed by a new world order in which there will be a high surge of market forces? How does it deal with a world in which, though it is marked by a scientific and technical culture which makes for global interdependencies, regional groupings are in the upsurge: Western Europe is likely sometime to achieve a full blown market and union; Europe as a whole might even fuse; the Americans, the Mexicans and the Canadians might emplace a North American Free Trade Area and in Asia, an Asia-Pacific Basin is brewing. How does ECOWAS develop an economic development progrmme with a trans-wional which will ensue a W- rdirat path to development in a whole and move'its excdve dg)eadcacc on the It his been found thnt the qwm why the s~uctumledjustqiu not work is rrot only because then is nothiq fo but because the balefits of what io 8t~ctwedud djust6d, fall into the hands of a corrupt bureoucdc eUU. Therefore if tbc rtructuret adjustment programme is a way out of ttre tcomnk woe8 of the pzglon nay of Africa, the Wts of the exerctse should be back to the benefits of the society at lar e through the =of rcgims which are dirpowd towards privatization qht8which will dispose themselves towards examination by society as a wbkas to the txteht to whicb they are comply' with the liiws governing market techniques. By this means, it is possi'=% le to enthrone one or two rc es which will beCBme models of development for the =#on and wf? ch others might follow. If the election of ,Professor Alpha Oumar Konaxe in MaIi with dispositions towards accountability is indicative of future trends in the region, then the region might withstand the winds of the new world order. Plural Demaracy One of the major pillars of the new world order is the surge of plural politics. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the socialist countries in Eastem Europe have given fillip to the idea that plural politics, multiparty systems should be the organising principle m the ovemance of states. Equally as the collapse of the Soviet Union fi as shown and the further strengthening of the EEC, the adherence to pluralist values might strengthw.; .:? ;..regration movement. To what extent is this so in West Afrim'l' Some former one party states in the ngim : x>b" mdtip*y types - Benin, and Mali. Others are steadily pkluiY-i~~fpm,, 4 wit5 SO much pains that it becomes very doubtfull if p8naid pdrtics st' i thrive

not only in the region but in Africa as a whole. I.$ :, .: 5. ' :wo

+ party system has been forced down an the p. !v + YJ the pulls towards cultural pluralism, ii d~.,. s 6?. .iul'afve pressures of ethno-cultural forces e~ chay- : ,, "$tics dicn to the African? This is again, a plzce ~h-l-+-r- Gn - - . -~-~rise might have to be adopted to see the em., .. or , ... + adopt plural politics prescribed from fo~:: - . , , a- -("he extent to which it can fuse it with dernowt' - , - t?) the African in a trans-regional manner. If a &"! ".A ,. .- .. . . 2 .-. L~cis far fetched in the region, then regional integ:ari:m ~rt;~,. . , ii~ve*A convergence of thought is emerging throughcut the wmd showing that pluralism might be an essential goal of humanity if it is indigenised. .. - Human Wghtr The wa human rights like plural democracy has been discus& so far thn-mg Lt the world wod4 also seem to be an imposition hu outside: the ri to life, the right to freedom of speech, the ri*t ro form associa$* ons in consonance with one's cbnscience and the various other inumerable rights which a socieiy owes to a human being. However, when these rights are close1 examined, they a= found to conform with national or particularld c norms to suit (with some adjustments) the society or societies which are to gumtee these rights. In an interdependent world too, one society trles to >imbibe the human rights nonn obtainable from another society because it finds such practices civilized and useful in the conduct of its affairs. It is also recognizable that some societies which cham on a human rights regime throughout the world do so because o P' their enormous power and because they have been able to satisfy some of the basic needs of some of their citizens. This is the point at which some societies see their exhortation to maintain a human rights order is an interference in their domestic affairs. Furthermore they reason that those societies which champion a global human rights regime were at some points in history grossest violators of human rights such as the enslavement of African peoples, imperialism and colonialism. All these notwithstanding, what the European Community teaches us is that for national societies to develop and for integration to move forward, there must have to be some common standards for the treatment of peoples. Such standards inhere from what are indigenous to a society and what happens elsewhere. Where both do not conform, one must give way to the other in our spaceship, earth. A plural global democratic order goes hand in hand with certain rights and privileges for the individual including the rights to form political parties & Buernment and to form political parties in opposition. Military rult!%%Ta&rration. One party regimes are also a misnomer. The process towards a multi-party system has taken very hard bocks in Togo. And even in those countries in West Africa that would seem to be making smooth transitions to plural democracy, the% might be a need to wait to see whether they are mere cosmetics or the laying of the solid foundations for a true democratic order. Whichever way things go, a human rights regime is a prerequisite to regional integration in the new World order. Nationalism at the National and International Levels As we have seen with the European Community, in spite of the fact that it epitomises international merger, much more than such experiments elsewhere, nationalism still drags the efforts to fuse national and cultural pluralism in Western Europe. The Danish vote against Maastricht is r fypidal example of th. mdfestadons of nationalism over ioDemationalism. However, tbere is mahing wbtsb the Danish vote has done in terms of whether Europe would move forward or move backwards: first is the politicization of Mlustricht and second is to bring the discourse of integration down to the grassroots - it is not the business of 'politicians or bureaucrats in Brussels to tell the pjdewhere to belong to, it is the people that will say where to go to. In West Africa ECOWAS bas not yet StNck at those mots which will touch on national difkmnm within which there will be a decision as to whether to move forward or to mqve backwards with ECOWAS. The expulsion of aliens welled up national sentiments against the ex- state but it did not raise questions about whether in national constitutions there are laws protectwe of ECOWAS citizens. In other words, to the extent that the expulsions might have revolted the conscience of the citizens of the expellers, they at the same time accepted it as Wig in the right of the expelliig state to decide who to expel. The feeling of a West AM- had not staxted to geminate ;snd the attitudinal change towards integration were barely visible. Perhaps, we might have started to see such a development in the phenomenon of armies of West African States who were sent into Liberia under the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to secure peace in Liberia. That is to say that after some years of peace keeping in Liberia under an ECOMOG command, some members of the peace keeping force might have lost their lives thus triggering off a discourse about what West African integration means to individual countries within the Community. It might lead to a spillsver affect into the progress of West African integration or it might lead to spill back thus tending to unravel the whole process. Whatever it is, it is more likely to lead to some attitudinal change towards the feeling of West Africa as it competes in national consciences with national feelings. We shall deal in greater detail with this development. However, the fact of civil wars thus necessitating a peace keeping force tells us that we are too far away from a "security community" in West Africa or even the border wars such as that between Mali and Burkina Faso, accusations of plots to overthrow a regime emanating from member states, means that the process of Community formation might take quite a considerable length of time. A Security Mechanism for Regional Integration The civil war in Liberia which made for the putting into being of an ECOWAS peace keeping force, ECOMOG is one of the major developments in regional integration in West Africa. It does not mean that an ECOMOG command- was 'put in place because a new world order was being ushered in. In fact, when the command was organioed, in 1990, a new world order was not that easily discernible although it was predictable. However, among the factions in the Liberian civil war, there was no consensas regarding the invitation of an outside force to intervene and within West Africa there was a perception in some quarters that ECOMOG was a manifestation of Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions in the region (Echezona, 1991). As we have posed earlier, the discourse that ensued over ECOMOG in West Afnca i.e. with regard to a perceptible hegemonism might have necessitated the widening of the command to include Senegal. Quite unfortunately, as the ECOMOG command widened their base of operation, six Senegalese troops were killed by the forces of the major rebel faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which was the most vocal in condemning Nigeria's hegemonic pretensions and als~in calling for the inclusion of Senegal in the ECOMOG command probably as a counter-balancing force to Nigeria. ECOMOG's success would depend largely on the support of outside forces especially the United States hiding under the instrumentality of the United Nations. ECOMOG's problems had laid on the following: First is the fact that the region is largely poor and might not be able to fund a peace keeping venture for a long time - the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had failed in a similar mission in Chad a decade earlier as we had pointed out. Second inheres from the first: the region is dependent on outside forces for the procurement of weapons. In other words if outside forces stopped funding the rebel faction in the civil war, the war would end and save the ECOMOG forces some embarrassment. On the other hand,if outside forces stopped providing weapons for ECOMOG, the whole venture would also become a failure. However, in a new world order informed by the dominance of one ideology, support for the ECOMOG venture is based on that ideology. That is why the ECOMCG operation might succeed. This would depend not just because outside forces are in support of the operation but if there is the political will to carry the operation through. The existence of such a political will would depend on the extent to which there is a complimentarity of regimes in the region, elite complimentary, the gradual erosion of national consciousness and the raising of regional consciousness and global stability as a whole. There is no doubt that the outcomes in the new world order would be much supportive of regional integration in West Africa than it was in the old world order. However, in the new world order, what will lead to the mergcr of states will not necessarily hinge on the solution of sccurity problems but more on the solution of economic problcms that could cmcrge from three discernible blocs: a North Amcrican Frcc Trade Area managcd by the United States, an Asia- Pacific basin managed by Japan and a larger European Economic Community under the dominance of Germany. We are not too sure whether this scenario would lead to the replacement of the Cold War situation with a trade war situation. However, for ECOWAS which is one of the lowest forms of regional integration in the world, if it waits for too long from integrating those things which are on the margins of integration and sensitizing national sovereignties over supranationalism, it might be much more marginalised in the new world order than it was in the old world order. If the frontiers of scientific and technical culture have eluded the region, it can engage in practices which are universal and which will make national societies resemble one another so that the politics of merging for the sophisticated politics of tomorrow will be easy: establishing true type plural political systems and engaging in market economy techniques. In West Africa, it is possible to manage the fall outs from the economic mergers in North America, in Western Europe, in Asia or in Latin America, if a trans-regional perspective at least in the economic sphere is developed. Choosing political merger m!ght be a pipe dream if the region does not strengthen economic merger. This is because national societies in West Africa are yet at the stage of nation building. Nationalism or cultural pluralism is still very high in West Africa. Nationalist assertion in former Yugoslavia is a case In point or evcn the Maastricht vote in Denmark, in a Europe w.iich had assumed thaElhe whle framework of economic merger ~ol;lJbe accomplished 4tn.19992 is enough to show that economic rwgcr 17 bctkr pursued than political merger. Chapter 8 *- "4 RECONSIDERING FOWER, ORDER AND HEGEMONY

wnen one moves in the maze of theories of international relations, one finds it difficult to find a concept whose explanatory value permeates all issues and all other theories whether dependence, interdependence, integration, transnationalism or im rialism as the theory of power. That is why at this stage in worl rpolitics, it has become necessary to reexamine the concept of power and to see to what extent it could still be useful or eclipsed as the general discourse in intemational affairs today centre on a new world order. To what extent is order in world politics related to power? How we pursue this enterprise is to examine the theoretical basis of power, apply it to events that have preceded, attended or continuing within the new world order such as the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the demise of the Soviet Union as a super power, the further increase' in US power complemented by the rise of Japan and Germany. Secondly to examine the premises undergirding the discourse of order in world politics and to relate the nature of power in any day and age to the ordering mechanism of that era. In our era, it would initially seem as if there is one hegemony over which consensus hinges on. But so far, everything seems to be in flux. With the defeat of an old enemy, the Soviet Union, not in a war but in a war of ideas about social change by market economies, new contradictions will likely usher in competing hegemonies among the dominant market economies - US, Japan, Germany, EFC, etc. Power in International Relations Power has been for millennia, the most succinct conceptual tool in the discipline of political science. Anyhow you try either to control it or to tame it, it re-emerges in one way or the other as a guiding framework in relations between states, or in characterizing the domestic politics of nation states. However, there is,one dominant way of analysing relations between states for quite a long time and that is the realist conception of power. Realists believe that states exist in an intemational system of anarchy. In such a situation, they resort to the use of their powcr translated in terms of force in the solution of their problems. The earliest writers on power include Nicolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. In the twentieth century, realist writers have proliferatcd. These include E.H. Can, Martin Wight, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz, Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffniam and a host of others. Karl Deutsch defines power as "the ability to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles" (Deutsch, 1978 p. 23). Frederick Schuman sees power as

the ability to win friends and influence people, to evoke sympathy, to command obedience, to employ effectively all the devices of Coercion, propaganda and material indulgence and deprivations likely to induce ~spectand cwueration (Schuman, 1969, p. 272). After distinguishing between power in a nation state in which various power blocs compete for power, and the nature of power between one nation and another nation, he concludes as most realists do, that "the ultimate ratio regum of sovereigns in dealing with other sovereigns is force." Such a generalization does not tell us why, in spite of the tight bipolarity in the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union did not go to military confrontation with one another. It does not explain why in the face of the serious blow which the Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s inflicted on the advanced industrial economies, they did not apply force to obtain oil from the Arab world. However, it might be said to appropriately explain the entire western responses to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait two decades after in 1991, by the triggering off of a United States led coalition against Iraq ostensibly for similar purposes which is that, if Iraq, a country which does not dispose itself towards any intemational accountability got control of the oil of the major Arab producers, through its hegemonism, it might again hold the west, hostage to oil. Western counter measures were couched in the noble principles of restoring the independence and sovereignty of Kuwait, salient attributes of the western state system and of intemational law. One man whose name has mostly been associated with the realist school of thought in the twentieth century is Hans Morgenthau. He says thao Statesmen and peoples may seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal ... But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of intemational politics, they do so by striving for power ... In international politics, in particular, armed strength is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation ... The struggle for power is universal in time and space. .,. .. True, the history of international relations has since its inception been marked by power. Nevertheless, in the late twentieth century we have acquired more tools in the analysis of relations between states beyond power. There are relations Wch, though the driving force is they are marked by a perceptiolr tbat we live in a global &$% mankind in which we are each others keeper. In other words, the= yc relations between states in which transnational relations are the name of the game rather than relations which depict states like bouncing balls in an anarchical universe. A very important element in the arsenal of states due to changing technology of conflict is nuclear weapons. Mrs. Thatcher's notion that it had prodnced peace in Europe for forty years might be a truism if we reflect on the fact that it might have deterred both powers from going to war between themselves on one hand and in Eumpe on the other where they have had spheres of influence, what has aptly been referred to as "nuclear deterrence", "mutuai assured destruction" or the "nuclear stalemate". It follows therefore that the continued production of weapons of mass destruction were not intended to be used by both adversaries because it would not only be calamitous for their societies in particular but for the global society as a whole. At the threshold where one side achieves superiority due again to its capability to exploit the frontiers of science and technology much more than the other, Morgenthau's "struggle for power ... universal in time and space will begin". Thanks to some inexplicable reason, we did not reach that threshold except of course, it is explained that why the previous Soviet state embarked upon perestroika and glasnost in intemational affairs was because it had knuckled under in the competition with the United States. In other words, rather than go the whole hog like Iraq, posturing and hoping that the west would chicken out in the nuclear game, only to be clobbered and made prostrate, it embarked on a deliberate unravelling of the Soviet empire, a renunciation of the ideology which had informed Soviet behaviour and an embarkation on an cconomic reform measure which would put the former Soviet state or rather Russia in an "alliance for progress" with the west. As we had pointed out, realists do not seem to separate the economic power of a state froni' its military power. It would seem that to them, economic power is subsumed into military power. How do we then explain the economic power of Japan or a future integrated Europe or even of Germany outside the European Community? Except of course it is shown hch economic conflict can translate into military coilflict we might have to look at, economic power separate from military power. V. I. Lenin is one such writer though not e.rgalist in that classical sense of the termp who had seen the hand of imperialism, the quest for markets byahe dominant class in societies as the cause of major wars (Lenin, 1976). There is some sense in which the Great Depression of the 1930s might be said to be a major cause of the Second World War but that might not be able to explain by projecting into the future,a relapse by the United States and Japan into a major war. Although world politics moves in cycles which would make us become more circumspect in assessing the possibility of spill-over of Japanese economic power into a future military power in which case the Japanese ability to exploit the highest frontiers of scientific and technical know-how would have surpassed that of the United States. But present status quo does rsot explain such a future. It would seem that the Japanese are highly entrenched in their economic superpowerd~mafter they had shed themselves of all attributes of militarism. Economic superpowerdom has paid off incredibly to that nation state in terns of a heightened respect within the international community much more than it probably would have been the case if it were an imperial power in its "Asia coprosperity sphere." Morgenthau's "political realism" explains a lot about what he means by power. "Real man" he says is a composite of economic man, moral man, religious man etc. A man who was nothing but political man would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but a moral man would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence ... Recognizing that these facts of human nature exist, political realism also recognises that, one has to deal with it on its own terms (Ibid. p. 14). "Political man" in this conceptualization is the anthropomorphization of the state. Here, the state is seen to be the repository of the will of all its constituent citizenry and the sovereign is the instrument through which their hopes and aspirations are realized. This takes us back to the centuries of yore when kings and princes perceived the state as the embodiment of their desires. Then some of the kings and princes ruled as tyrants. How would that be seen as "political realism" when their perceptions of a global order was one in which they conquered as much temtories as possible? In . our own century, we have seen the battle between the opposing ideologies of capitalism and socialism. Socialists would have put Morgenthau within the framework of an ideologue of capitalism. Here. "real man" who is a composite of political man, moral man. religious man etc. would seen as the attribute of the capitalist state. He would be engaged in the maximization of his profit at the expense of others, what you have is the freewheeling profit motive and when translated into the larger world of international relations, what emerges is anarchy. That would be the way in which ideologues of socialism would have interpreted it and it would fit too well into thp critique of Lenin about the linkage of the economic motive into imperialism. However, in free markt economies which form Morgenthau's reference poirlt, man does not pursue only private interests. Man is also concerned with such public interests as abortion laws, crime and juvenile delinquency, human rights, prevention of accidents on high ways and a high scale of sSilanthropism. In the global order, states are concerned with mafir.: the world body, the United Nations, a true instrument for dialogue and the provision of a framework for managing a peaceful world, ways ad means of population control, pollution control especially the obnoxious phenomenon of transferring industrial waste to developing countries and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The anthropomorphization of the state however raises the problem of how do we know that the sovereign, in engaging in political struggle with other sovereigns, the much talked of power politics, he is not thwarting the will of his people. The argument has been made that if the people were asked to vote between war and peace, they would vote for peace; this is the big differen& between a totalitarian state, an authoritarian state and a plural, democratic society. Does that explain why the United States went to war against Iraq? That is to say, that the American going to war against Iraq was sanctioned by the American public represented by Presidept Bush. What then was the situation in the Vietnam war? If the Viepam war had, like the Gulf war, been marked by a quick, surgical aperation, some element of blitzkrieg, it would have been said to be supported by a cross section of the American people. And if the Gulf war had dragged on for upwards of six months, domestic consensus in the United States would have unravelled and then, there would have been some soul searching about why the United States went into the Persian Gulf in the first place and we would be back to square one as to how did the opinion polls really know that the majority of the Americans backed their President and if and when the majority withdrew its went, did the president abide by the majority will. The point about all this, is that the anthropomorphization of a state is illusory no matter what type of state is being referred to. This is because it is important to distinguish at what point a people are deceptively carried into a war to salvage their interests and at what point a war is the ego trip of a leader of a state. The Gulf war or the Viemam war might not offer us clear mirror images of these situations but a careful examination of the entire gamut of four hundred years of international relations would do so. Morgenthau's position about political man seems to be complimented by E.H. Can who says that The utopian who dreams that it is impossible to eliminate self assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes bat altruism is an illusion and that all political action is based on self seeking. In essence, power without morality would produce Morgenthau's Pbeast". In the years of the Cold War both the Soviet Union and the United States claimed to be the true upholder of what the global status quo should be like in their own different perspectives. While the Soviet Union would not want to be associated with the realist perception of international politics since according to Soviet theoreticians,with the coming into power of the working class, in Russia. it would not be possible to classify the Soviet Union in the realist mould whether from the intellectual standpoint or otherwise. They would want it to be classified as a completely diffemt state in world politics. However, in hindsight, it would seem as if the realist school has been borne out with respect to the fonner Soviet Union. The relationships between the new states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) brings out in bold relief, the proverbial anarchical society - now you have to deal with various in a situation we had hitherto been told that nationalism has been transcended by internationalism and there is the question of how the former Soviet army would be treated - the Ukrainians would want officers in the Black Sea Fleet to swear allegiance to Ukraine, the Russians would say that the Baltic fleet belongs on one hand to them and on the other hand to the whole C.I.S. and the Russians have gone further to start to reclaim the Crimea, something that had been settled in 1954 in favour of the Ukraine. The Fungibility of Power As we are aware, the earth is round and all the resources in it are distributed unequally. These resources: military technology. manpower, degree of industrialization, skill, will and natural resources are the key issues over which power hinges on and only very few countries have them in abundance. However, even if some states possess them and others do not, the way they are combined to achieve power or influence by one state over another state is a problem in modem international relations. This is what is meant by the fungibility of power. A whole bunch of scholars who are also informed by the power political school have been concerned with this henomenon es dally when viewed against the'eveflts of the late 19d s and early 19P" 0s. For cxample, former U.S. Senator. J. William Fulbright had opined that 'wclcar weapons have deprived force of its utility as an instrument gplier$' Wbright, 196q p. 56). Even before becoming U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger-had pointed out that "power no longer translates automaticqlly into influence" (Kissinger, 1968 p. 589). Bemoaning the transfer of resources from welfare needs to armaments, Seymour Melman cautioned:

... most of us have agreed with Volt* that God is not on the side with the heaviest battalions. If it were true that the strongest military power will always get its way then the United States, possessor of the greatest stock of nuclear military weapons in dre world. should be able to exercise its will among other nations with substantial success. But this has not been the case; military powis becoming increasingly ineffective as an instrument of national policy (Melman. 1965 p. 157). This assertion is further buttressed by Klaus Knorr who says that many people believe that armies and navies am military power, a that great national wealth is economic power and they am inevi puzzled when, in real life, superior national power. so defined, 22 to mea wegker state, or when the superior power gets by an inferior one (Knorr, 1975 p. 9). Most analyses of power had centred on the above @remises especially after the United States failed to subdue the communists in Vietnam and to enthrone a plural political system in that country in the early 19709. How. they had reasoned, could such a country with such enormous power be unable to bring its power to bear on a third rate power like Vietnam? With the ability of the allied coalition led by the United States to subdue Iraq in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the question even takes a different dimension: How could the Americans achieve what they could not achieve in 1975 in 1991? Would the ability of the American led coalition to subdue Iraq modify the theories earlier stated'? It must be stressed that though we speak of a coalition, it was clear that the United States would have been able to change the status quo created in thc Gulf by Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, alone. It would seem that the Unitcd States sought an allied coalition before engaging in such LI gargantuan war in order to show that its action was sanctioned by thc international community. Second, the Vietnam war had served as a demonstration effect for third rate powers in their dealings with the supcr powers in the years thereafter: the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Cubans, the Iranians, terrorism and aircraft high-jackings ctc. The Gulf war might have afforded the Unitcd States an opportunity to do something wilh which to clear off the sense of doubt about its global capability and its global responsibility. Third is the resolve of the American administration. Thcy were prepared, it seemed, to climb all the thresholds of escalation including a nuclear war with Iraq. That is why the American bombing of Iraq, according to a United Nations expert, had reduced that country to a pre-industrial era. The type of. air power tHat was used, high attitude planes with precision bombs; the missiles hat wcrc used were such that would make the Gulf war, a dress rchcarsal for the Third World War. Iraq did not seem to be prepared for such worst outcome scenario but had clung precariously on the Victnam syndrome. And the American fit was accomplished with an imprcgnable naval blockade. Fourth is the resolve of the Iraqis. They had bccn sapped of strength by the Iran-Iraq war which raged for ncarly adecade. They did not fathom that the will existed in the Oval Oll~ccin Washington after Reagan had left it.to mount such an unprcccdented land, air and sea offensive on Iraq since the end of the Sccond World War. Having enjoyed the fruits of petrodollars, the Iraqis could not endure the deprivations occasioned by the Gulf war. They misperceived that they might get the type of stalemated condition that ensued in the IranIIraq war and they misjudged the attitudc of the international community to such a war, especially that 01 thc Arabs. Finally, they failed to understand that while Soviet powcr was receding, American power was growing. 'T'hc rise and fall of the Soviet Union have been a major issue for study by students of international relations. Either by design or by , dclaull, it was the Soviet Union which launched the new world order into bcrng. True, there were certain policies of its major adversary, the Un~tcdStates which might have led it to launch "new thinking inv forcign affairs", yet, its ability to abnegate its power, is of major impor l.irice to the evolution of the new world order. It did not seem tha~111 August 1990 when Iraq went into Kuwait, it was mindful of this incr~d~tdyradical development in international life. Rather, the Iraqi Icndc~\l~ipseemed to have left their thought processes at the level of thc c.1 ,I of the Cold War. But by 1990, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europc had crumbled, Germany was reunifying and Berlin, that major ou:pou of the Cold War, was re-emerging once morc as tl~cc api1n1 of Gcrin.~rlyand reverberations within the Soviet Union did nor indicatc hi! I would remain as onc entity in world polilics. In othcr words. thr rc~~\dn of Soviet power partly made for thc succcss Amcti;,~, powcr in the Gulf. Although the Soviet Union might not have gonc to a war with the United Statcs over lhc Gulf il thc Unrtcd Statcv insictcd that Iraq must withdraw from K7~wait,howcvcr, nr! A:!~L.II,.,,:,,11.11i>rr (11 the fxe of a Sovict opposition) would nave exccwlvcl! c h,\igcd 111, intcrr~dtional political atmosphcrc. But ui~hthc 11,1:ut~. nf th

intcnut~onalpolitical climale.at. thc trmc ol ttlc *.II ttl-, I I j (,I !I,, war, yielded a somewhat relaxed international political outlook and the freewheeling of the new world order. World Order and International Relations Wilh the type of world which we had inherited in the post- Second World War order, political scientists have been engaged in analysing and sometimes prescribing what a world order could be. At a c~aferencein Belagio, Italy in 1965 on the "Conditions of World Order", Stanley Hoffman had noted the divergences and inconsistencies of views on world order. He was however thankful to Raymond Aron, his teacher in Paris for providing the conferees, with appropriate working tools for the conference. He discerned five possible meanings of the concept of "world order" and chose one of them as the basis for discussion. According to Hoffman, Two of the meanings were purely descriptive: order as an arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts. Two were analytical - partly descriptive, partly normative: order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the minimum conditions for coexistence. The fifth conception was purely normative: order as the condition for the good life (Hoffman, 1966 p. 456). Raymond Aron Lhereforc proposed that the conference should adopt thc fourth mcaning and concentrate discussions on "... under what conditions would men (divided in so many ways) be able not merely to avoid destruction, but to live togcther relatively well in one planet" (Ibid. p. 456). The proposition of Aron dovetailed with that of Saul Mendlovitz and Thomas Wciss who define world order as,

the ludy of interdona1 relations and world affairs that focuses on the manner in which mankind can significantly reduce the likelihood of international violence and create minimally acceptable conditions of world wide cconomic well being, social justice, ecological stability, and participation in decision-making processes. In short a studcn! of world order seeks to achieve and maintain a warless and more jlist world to improve the quality of human life (Mendlovib and Weiss, 1975 p. 157). Except for very few, most writcrs do so witil evideme available in their age. Those writers who are able to predict the futurc are often not that listened to by those who are afraid of such future in policy making. Throlighoul thc post wilr pcriod, evcryonc \r :I \ I~\ily constructing scenario!: for a pcaccful world. But what wc t~.:,.,~~li,d tix bccn a wry dangcrc;~.;and dcslruc~ivcworld. Evcn all,,: ll~crlcw world ordcr had tu:n s;inction~dinto being, in Malla l!i>'l. iic srill had the Gulf war after which the "real" world order was proclaimed. No one was able to predict the catastrophe unleashed on the Iraqis by the Gulf war or that such a war was fought and won because it was the case of a David and a Goliath in which the latter prevailed. Tne successful prosecution of the Gulf war yielded the new peace dividend for the Middle East but it does not seem that beyond the Middle East, we are capable of building new institutions that would forestall a future threat to international stability on the proportions of those created by the Gulf war. To the extent that it would seem that the superpowers might do away with a whole range of their armaments, a secure peace seems too far fetched, a peace which would make all the states put their swords into their plough shares, a peace which would ensure the diversion of funds meant for armaments to redressing the problems of developing countries such as debts and economic development at the same time as the question of assisting the countries which were once under the command and administer economy is addressed. Gerald and Patricia Mische capture the above sentiment very well: They distinguish two types of world orders. The first "is the order that presently exists on the planet, an order of dependent relationships between allegedly independent sovereignties that are dominated by raw economic, monetary and military power than by law" which they reject and the second "envisions an order of relationships determined by law and based on social justice of all persons; an order whose universal principles embrace the centrality and sovereignty of all human person" which they endorse (Mische. 1977 p. 64). Hedley Bull in his own definition of world order stresses what he calls the "elementary goals of social life."

By order I mean those patlerns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elemen~aryor primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole. He explains it further:

... the facts of human vulnerabilily to v~olenceand proneness to resort Lo it lead men to the sense of common interests in restricting violence. The fact of human interdependence for material needs leads them to perceive a common interest in ensuring respect for agreements. The facts of limiled abundance and limited human altruism lead them to recognise common interests in stabilising possession. ... .' and Within international society,however, as in other societies, order is the consequence not merely of contingent facts such as this (i.e. balance of power) but of .a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life; rules prescribing behavim that sustain these goals; and institutions that help to make these rules effective. Finally, Hedley Bull examines alternatives to the present system in the quest to achieve order and justice or. a giobal scale - a disarmed world, a solidarity among the states, a nuclearly proliferated world, ideological homogeneity, world government etc. and concludes that the present state system is durable and superior to any fon of human organization in spite of its obvious shortcomings. At the time these postulations about world order were being made, the world was reeling in the Cold War. Today, we are in a post Cold War era. To what extent would they be useful in plottin the post Cold War era? Bull's prognostication about the durability o f the state system might well be borne out. See the way Yugoslavia is breaking up into its ~omponentparts and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a stop gap measure before all the eleven former Soviet republics in it go their separate ways. How far would such a situation make for the observation of the elementary goals of social life? If such an observation would entail a peaceful world, how would the addition of about thirty new states in the system of states within a few years make for stability for the post Cold War era? You have to deal with how to manage nuclear weapons in five former Soviet republics, you have to deal with how to manage former Soviet scientists who might be displaced as a result of the turmoil in their country (you don't want them to fall into the hands of states who are treated as pariahs in the international system), you want to deal with territorial disputes arising from the demise of the Soviet Union as an entity in the global order. Richard Falk offers us his own approach to world order: My approach to world order comblnes analytic. empirical, ideological and normative cc~cernsin its definition. Such a conception of world order involves studying the extent to which a given past, present, or future' arrangement of power and authority is able to realise a set of human goals that are affirmed as beneficial far all people and apply to the whole world, and achieve some objectivity by their connection with some conception of basic human needs, as required for the healthy development of the huma person. and Underlying my assessment of the historical situation,however, is also my conviction that the state systek is not capablr of a satisfactory performance in relation to the gods set forth, and that contained within its main operating dynamic are excessive risks of thermonuclear, ecological, economic and cultural determination, and even of collapse. For these reasons, my approach to world order does entail the construction of relevant utopias, as well as the depiction of transition paths. Richard Falk puts the various approaches to world order to three- system maintaining approaches, systcm enhrrncing approaches and system transforming approacties. He endorses thc system transforming approaches. According to him,

The distinguishing characteristics ol sysienl wmsfmning approaches to world order is the acceDtance of the riecd to h-ansfom the suiicture of international relations by diminishing the tcrk of sovereign states in some dcciuve respects. Even more so than with advocates of sys~cm-rclorrn,hose who propose system- sfo or mat ion seek an i~ncpratd.;urii!cgy of change guided by certain values and aiming toward the t ktiasuacllon 01 a ~ohcrcntsystem of wdd order.

11s scc:; the wr1r:d ordcr Models Project (WOMP) of the Institute of World Ordcr a:. "an cxalnple of systcm transforming perspective."

WOMP, initiaicd in 1968, is constituted by groups of scholars asswiatcd with pimipal regions and/or actors of d~eworld (Latin Amcnca, Africa, japan, Europe, Soviet Union, India, United States. with indirect rcprcscntation for China and for thc network of transnational actors). The WOMP group, through periodic interaction, evolvcd a framework of wurld order values which were gcrlcral cnough to command consensus and yet distinclive enough to establish an idcnlily, the values agrccd upon as suitable criteria for world order appraisal were as l'ollows: mi:;;r-.izationo; collective violcncc; maxirniza~ionof cconomic wcll -:.,,ng: maximization of social and political justice; maximichon of ecological quality. Hc funhcr maintains that

W€hlF as a 5yr~cm-chmgmgpcrspccuvc also takes a political ~WWC~that I\ morc pgu11st than is characteristic of system rwlnl;\iwr\~or \p.lc:n reformers. IL seeks to inspire, or to take part In, s I,~ovcnmuI

1.5.' iir ;eJk shifts in values, behaviour and structures. This transnational group of scholars, therefore is committed to the search for peace with equity, and seeks to evolve a globalist ideology that draws on liberalism tc check the abuse of state power in the relations between governmenuad people ,on socialism to depict a humane set of economic relationships based on societal well-being. on ecological humanism to reorient the relations between human activity and nature and on global modelling to put complex interactions of societal processes at various Iwels of organization into a dynamic, disciplined framework. There does not seem to be any difference between any of the proponents of world order. In the years of deep ideological bipolarization, those who would be referring to global socialist transformation would be seen as oulside the realm of articulation of a just world order since their prognostication would be seen to be revolutionary and not system Lransforming. Hedley Bull has posited that the organization of the world into a system of states is the best form of human organization so far. Yet, until we are able to find a means out of the shackles of anarchy created by the state system, it does not seem we would have pcace. Every other problem on earth has come as a result of:this division of tRc world into several nation states and as we have shown earlicr, $thenation stale is no1 receding. It is rather resurgent. Thal is why those syslcm transformen like Richard Falk are commendable in their "acceptance of the need to transform the structure of international relations by diminishing the role o! sovereign states in some decisive respects." On the other hand, it is not plausible to argue that the WOMP group does not coristitute of intellectuals who have a stake in the present status quo. In other words, the fact that they regard "most political elites especially those with a stake in the existing system, as likely to resist shifts in valucs, behaviour and structures," does not mean that they themselves do no1 share the samc interests with the former especially when the chips arc down. For example, how many scholars from the dominant counlrics in the world would like to sacrifice their values and living standards in order that developing countries would have a living space? The point is that a lot of verbiage has been poured out into the world in thc so callcd search for alternative futures but the elusiveness of thesc Su~urcs also stem fromi the pretentiousness of their proponents. Scholarship vSould beo more, meaningful if there is a missionary comwnent lo it. $s far &figarc ooncemed, there is a need to bcsl~e,alisLicin articulating Wat a future world order could be ar what'the prcjcnl world order $ like. A, , Towards an Explanation of the New World Order Hedley Bull's formulation has been very helpful in discerning the appmpnate parameters of the new world order. He points out that

To say of a number of things that together they display order is, in the simplest and most general sense of the tm,to say that they are related to one another according to some pattern, that their relationship is not purely haphazard but contains some discernible principle. Thus a row of books on the shelf displays order whems a heap of books on the floor does not. The evolution of world order in international relations has a lot to do with the nature of dominance within the systein of states and the character of an age. In the nineteenth century when a good part of it had been referred to as the Vienna world order, there were five dominant powers. Britain, France, Prussia (later Germany), Russia and Austria which shaped that order. And from 1815 until 1914 when the First World War broke out, a period which has been referred to as the period of the long peace, not because there were no wars, but because there was no war of major consequence which had the capability ol' causing the system to break down completely, some international political historians have seen it as an age in which international politics worked in their preferred patterns and they would, in tnw methods of analyses want to recreate it (see Kaplan, 1% /). Those preferred patterns would seem to be that the five power directorate steered a global order in which the system did not break down to the point of leading to the reversal of ihe Westphalia state system (that most cherished dream of independence and sovereignty of states) or that no state grew much more powerful than the rest that it could dictate the terms to them. Why then did break down occur in 1914? If we say that it was because Germany grew much more powerful than other powers in the system, then, there must be something fictitious about earlier thinking about stability. In other words, if the Vienna world order was the preferred world order, everything would have been done to strengthen it and probably to freeze the status quo ante. True, world politics does not move in that fashion. Probably what the break down of 1914 teaches us is that a cycle in world politics was completed and another cycle was taking its place. After the breakdown of 1914 and the onset of the Versailles world order in 1918, new powers, different from the nature of previous powers entered into the scene. Though Russia had been a prominent membcr'of the Vienna directorate, it =-emerged in 1918 as the Soviet Union possessed of new ideologies which were a threat to the ancien powers. At the same time, the United States also emerged, set the tone of the Versailles world order, the adherence to international organizing but quickly went into isolation. The Soviet Union was the first socialist state in world history and it introduced a revolutionary component to domestic and international politics, questioni the legitimacy of a world order in which a few capital owners domi\ ted domestic and international relations. The existing capitalist powers treated the Soviet Union as a pariah in world politics until the anti-Hitler coalition of the Second World War. But that coalition broke down immediately after the war in 1945 and there was a relapse to what has been described as the Cold War. In essence the post order was very unstable and might have been immensely responsible for the cataclysm that xcurred in 1939. In fact, one group of historians on the origins of the Cold War, go deep down to 1917, the year in which the Bolsheviks came into power in Russia to seek the origins cf the Cold War an#to carry their analyses into post Second World War era (see Alperofitz, 1970). The Yalta world order or the post Second World War order has informed in so many ways our so-called new world order. In that order, two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union finally emerged on the ruins of the ancien powers to preside over world politics - in the division of Germany or in tl$e division bE Berlin, in the or in the strategic politics of the Asia- Pacific region. in the decolonization of the African continent or in the type of regimes that would obtain there. Much more impmtly. on the question of peace on earth, about nuclear weawns and strategic strike forces. Each of these non European powers possessed exclusive spheres of influence which were quite germane to that world order and indeed to the evolution of the present order - the Soviet Union in East and Central Europe andLtheUnited States, in Western Europe. In other words, the Soviet union and the United States passessed awesome powers which no state had possessed in world history. Sandwiched in between this bipolarised structure of world politics were two ideologies which sought to bury one another in the name of two hegemonies. 'orld Order ve chosen to treat order and power bedause of :our ng that there is no way you can treat order Without talking about power in a system whose essential attributes is anarchical, interspersed by transnational linkages. As we had pointed out, the new w~rla~~~iderwas y,ie@ed first when the Soviet Union abnegated its power ddsecond with the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf war. Because of the Tvailability of nuclear weapons, it would seem that both the Soviet and American leaderships became racional enough to understand that such a war will spell doom for human civilization. In that competition too. it would seem that the Soviet Union had been sapped of strength. It could not continue to balance the United States through internal measures. It was completely out of tune with first rate tecsh~ol?giesnot only in the r~uclearrealm but also in the civilian reafi. And Mikhail Gorbachev, a revolutionary reformer was thrown up into the ladder of leadership to make the Soviet case about its abnegation of power. The years 1984 to 1989 were very informative abouta"thenew world order. No one had fathomed the event of 1984 but 1989 was full of predictions and revolutions. In December 1984 when Mikhail Gorbachev was said to be next in rank to the then Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet' Union (CPSU), Konstantin Chemenko, he had paid an official visit to Britain. After his meeting with Mrs. Thatcher as we had pointed out earlier, zhe said that this is the man with whom the west could do business (BBC Broadcasts). Why Gorbachev's visit and Mrs. Thatcher's remarks were very instructive is because Mrs Thatcher had been known to be an avowed anti-communist. To turn around to say that a communist leader who would preside over the affairs of his country in four months timc, precisely in April 1985 when evcntually Chemenko died, is the man with whom the West could do business tells us so many things when we review Soviet hi:,~ory from thc April plenum of the CPSU in 1985 and the world we have inherited since then. up till the er.d of 1991: that thcy had agreed (i.e the west and Gorbachcv) lo form a "subversivc conlition" [o overthrow the post Second World War order. It is good to rimcn~bcrthat the wc5t "lad been building sc,sarivs atml a p:;!ilmhncv Stjii~:leadership (not Injst hndropav or post C'hcrra.,nko) in a[) era in which thc Sovicl Union had regrcsscd badly on the ec(.iili~i~iiifrolit dnd she was confronicd with a Gorbachevisr type, somwric who would emphasize technological ~hngc,over i&,oltrgy (Lhwisiid. 1987')? ' , 1989 was the most eventful year. it starteb with Gorbachev's enunciation of a Common European House. That specch had lhen been intcrpretcd as calling for something short of the demise of communism or the brcak up of the Soviet Union but in hindsight, he had long scen socialism as "an idea that had failed% and he did not see any reason why it would have to be salvaged. In other words, from 1984 to rL949, Mr. Gorbachev was engaged in the systematic revolutions in late Central Europe we the new world order were funhcr darified: the break up of the Sovk Union became accepted as a fact of international life. Gorbachev ws out of power and we probably starleds$o dcal with eleven or more former Soviet republics. Scenarios for the New Wodd Order By early 1992, we cannot be too sure how the new wor:d order will fluorish, that is to say, we cannot aclually say @at this or 'that :node of behaviour will mark the relatio%ships of thetynits, Wfh old and new in the system or even that therc might be a revcrsal to the old way of doing things. However, as political scientist, we engage in predictions. To the extent that things might not cum out the way we might have imagined thcm, our ability to prcdict'on the basis of available evidcnce is what marks ourcdiscjpline as science of policy making. One scenario which has bcen it1rciniri.d by the evcnts since 1989 is the quesrinn of ~mipolarity.Thal is, ths in the absence of anothcr power co balance thc bnitcd States in thc international equilibrium, what wc migilt i-aavc in the medium to long term future is thc dominancc of one ideology and orne hcgcmony and such a situation might bc ominous for world politics. This scenario is informed by ebc post 1648 history of international relations which abhors the dominancc of the systcm by onc country. It failed, to take cognition of the risc and fall of all previous empiks. True,thc'.American empire is diffcrcnt from all cmpircs we havc known: it does not go with the flag-and some casily percepliblc political control.RatRer, it gocs with a far flung military and economic powcr which draws the world into various typcs and levcls of dcpcndencies to it. Howcver, more recent cvcnts beyond the Gulf war indicatc otherwise: what wc might havc is a multipolar rathcr than a unipolar world especially if thcsc concepts arc used in the economic rathcr than in the military sense or probably new concepts might be coined in the future to explain thc types of rclationships that will emerge. Some relationships which had remained dormant as markct economics coalesccd togcther to fight socialism and command economics arc likcly to come to the fore since the common enemy is no more there. In csscncc, Gcrman and Japanese Entema'tional relations are likely to bc morc economically aggressive than they hscd to bc and statcs might resort to thc use of the econoh'ic muscle more than the military musclc in the new world order. President Gcorge Bush of the United Statcs took his first trip in 1992 to the Asia-Pacific region. His visit to Japan was informcd by the impact afdx Japancse zconomy on thc American economy - American trade deficits to the &"forty ona?billion dollars. Whereas Americans uy ~apancd!'~~~;the Japanese would not do thr

1 5 7 same because American cars are too large for their roads and thev guzzle too much fuel. Moreover, the ~m%icansaccuse the ~a~ane& of domestic content ledslations which discriminate against American investment in Japan w&reas Japanese investments in & United States have a field day. In effect, the Japanese are said not to be abiding by free and fair trade whereas their major trading partner, the United States, does so. The comment b Chrysler Chairman, Lee Iacoca who was one of the three car manu !acturing chiefs who accompanied the United States President on the trip is very instructive. He pointed out that given the nature of relationships between the United States and r Japan, the former has ipso facto become the colony of the latter (BBC Broadcasts, February 3, 1992). This is a way of trying to recoup American economic aggression. It underscores the inner feelings of the average American about the Japanese and further underlines the dilemmas in the management of power in the new world order. This might have triggered off the statement by George Bush in his acceptance speech at the Republican Congress in the summer of 1992 that the United States must remain a military super power, economic super power and trade super power. Further developments in the JnpaneseIAmerican tango do not indicate that the economic warfare might be abating. Recriminations have been towering over both the American and Japanese borders. Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa blamed 'America's economic woes to the loss of the American work ethic in a speech at the Japanese Diet. He said that instead of producing high quality competitive goods, they produced merely to earn a living. President Bush's rebuttal was mild - he maintained that American workers were " as good as anyone anywhere in the world. Earlier, a Japanese politician had said after President Bush's visit that American workers were not only lazy but illiterate. Congressional leaders have not been as diplomatic as the American President. Richard Gephadt in answer to the Japanese prime minister's speech had called it an "ignorant expression of Japanese racism" (BBC Ibid.). An anti-Japanese sentiment had welled up in Congress and legislators were expected to pass legislations against Japanese goods in the future. Within the mass publics, anti-Japanese demonstrations were in the upsurge in the United States. Did we shed the Cold War for a trade war? What thea~apamesecase illustrates is that the competition between the United States and Japan might lead the United States into some sense of isolatiimism - a feeling that she has borne the global burdens for too long - propping up Japah in the era of the Cold War as arl "unsinkable aircraft carrier .in. the Pacific only to turn around to become the Japancsc "whipping boy" and no one can tell what the situation could be if Europe becomes an integrated whole. The United States has been engaged in an agricultural war with Europe even during the Cold War. The outcome of these economic conflicts is that the "Asia co-prosperity sphere" could be reinvigorated, not in the way it was in the Second World War but ils 5 way of organising Asian nationalism against American hegemonism.*The Chinese who wm isolated as a communist country and the international assaults on her as a result of the incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989 might be ready to play ball in this Asian nationalism. Other nations outside Asia which are questioning the legitimacy of the present world order might be drawn into this alliance. On the other hand, the ability of the United States to sail over the competition which the Japanese would mount in the future might also depend on the spill-over that occurs from the military to the civilian sphere as it cuts back from defence s ndin . And of course, whether the Japanese would now channel tReir in% ustrial potential into military realm since they might increase their defence spending in order to bear their own burdens and also play peace keeping functions under the United Nations is another case to consider. Paul Kennedy in his seminal work on the rise and fall of Great Powers contends that the decline from world domination of, in their turn, imperial Spain, the Netherlands, Bourbon France, and 'Great Britain came from an inability or unwillingness on the part of these countries' political leadership to balance the military expansion required of a world power with the needs of their dnmestic economies. He maintains that the United States faces @e same potentially disastrous result if a political leadership cannor reduce either military spending or public entitlements (Kennedy, 198n). In fact, what might mark the new world order is that wuntries which had hitherto hidden behind the so called American "nuclear umbrella" might become more assertive in international affairs. An example is Gennany. Gennany preceded the European Economic Community by a month in recognising the two break-away republics of Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation and might have been instrumental in nudging the whole Community to do so on January 15, 1992. Meanwhile, the United States had not recognised these break away republics. In the Cold War years, Gennany would have waited for an American lead. How Gennany addresses its power within the Community if full merger is achieved, is anybody's guess. Gennan Chancellor, had said in the wake of criticism against an assertive Geman foreign relations that Gennany would not continue to wear the cloak of recent history forever; that Germany is an economic ower and would behave in its true interests (BBC, January 10, 1! 92). Beyond these manifestations of assertiveness by the Gennans, they would want to join the Security Council (like the Japanese who claim that their contributions are larger than those of Britain and France combined); they are in the forefront in bailing out from cconomic conucopia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, would want their anny to participate in peace keeping as. Like the Germans and the Japanese, many more ec~nomic . re awakening in the horizon. x second scenario hinges on the question of peace. How far .: new world oider, yielded peace? This question became more :u wiih the end of the Gulf War, a war which was fought after v world order had been sanctioned into being in Deccmber n, Mdta by Presidents George Bush of the United States and 1 Cimtlachev of the defunct Soviet Union. Why was a war of 3ormous proportions fought when the edifices which would ~zdesuch a war possible had been shattered? This question was itswered by the way the whole world came to the war - .; lltly united under an American led coalition to defeat Iraq, a I diy which had eluded the world since the post Second World War (Jars. Would such, unity become the norm in the future? What guarxitees are there that there would be no future disgruntled memtx.rs of the international society who would question the iegitimxy of the order which was being ushered in by the Gulf War? Thougi the Gulf war rendered a peace dividend plausib1"e for the .b'iiddle Sast, it might no1 be conjectured at the early beginnings that rhe parties in dispute in that region have disposed themselves of old ibinking after ccmprehensive Middle East conferences have bgen held 111 Madrid, Waslungton and Moscow since the end of Octok ¶?I. With the medium range weapons agreement on Europe, agreements on ICBMs, and the break down of walls and frontiers in Eurqx. thcre is no doubt that we might have, in many ways,' been spnrcJ d the nuclezr holocaust, at least in the short to the m dium t~i~:.,.IKowevcu, as ve had painted out earlier, the split of the 8oviet I:nion arid Yugoslavia do n6t seem as if they would enhance peace in the world. Thc war in Yqoslavin bordering on cultural pluraiism has s5:ittcrcd I!?< belief which had ken canvassed by Mrs Thatcher that bic,clcar wcapuns had brought peace to Europe. Though there might he :me jubilatiorr and enthusiasm in some quarters about the vwrpru of thamCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), we are . nTr~vt:cti by rhe dilevma of severally nuclearly armed independent i.t'jlti:)iu:q '311 th(: ruins ol tl~eformer Soviet Unioq. Secondly, there is ikwcnario ol ~h~rdc.ountries who question the legitimacy of the msznl world crdcr acquiring or rather enhancing their nuclcar d~quisilwrldrives b, crnployirlg d~wr~chantedformcr Soviet nuclear wcapon \;icntiw. So,smch sccnarin of nuclear weapon proliferation '.,f :hLlin1ti:d Slates illto spending billions of dollars in enhancing ~'IPi,;~ rnriwd cdpnciry of thc Star Wars programme and keeping . . vt i< rc,~lllic.f\ 1i1 c;!:c prcqcnt dctcrrencc fails. The British

I ",*( ri i : \. \lr Ton? K.'.;;. t~,rJin rc.1.i) it Russian pressures i. !I, to \c,r',: dohn h~~r-J: bull I 1,;. ~IJih:it Bnuin woul,i maintain her minimum nuclear deterrence. He insisted hat such a deterrence was necessary as long as the Russians have any semblance of nuclear arms. He concluded by saying that Russian possession of nuclear war heads meant that potential threat exists, an indication that peace is elusive in our age (BBC, January 10, 1992). The last scenarios bothers on the fate of developing countries. In the old world order, given Soviet challenges to that order, they had room for manoeuvre. They sought for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which also touched off on a New World Information Order. What they received was a bureaucratised set up in the United Nations to take account of Third World demands. Like all bureaucracies it became an instrumentality for careerism and jobs for the "good boys". A New International Economic Order was foreclosed, debt burdens increased and the plea for aid to develop continued. With the arrival of the new world order, the west as a..whole is channeling all interests on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The eagerness to put them on the wheels of market economy and plural democracy throu~hconferences and the spending of billions of dollars could be put in the same proportions as the Marshall plan aid in 1948 to stem Soviet expansionism in Western Europe. And Mr. Boris Yeltsin and Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev had made by, short +rift of thig invoking the nightmarc: 01 the revival of + ria- if a&irrehs failed as a result of what they felt was the madequacj of we Throughout the outcry of Third World peoples for the cancellation of debts d piled tfI6n~~ the characier of international ecunomic *rean them solely exporters of raw materials at prices w sanctions, the west has only replied with various csotcrib plans and debt cancellation which merely scratch the problems without going to the source. The other recourse is to insist on a market economy and a plural democratic structure. But where an authoritarian fegilne was seen as a bulwark against communism, such a regime was endorsed. plural dcmocracy was foreclosed and repression increased. The new world order does not bode too well for developing countries. Alliances might freeze at thc lcvel of racism which all arld suridrj thought wcrc evaporating in rhe old odd order. has been used is to hanker to an utopia in which states exercise some benigness in the management of their power. After four centuries of international relations, power remains the most unassailable con"bpt in the analyses of relations between the units of international society. It is only the most powerful states that can mange the ordering principle in world politics. In the Cold War, it was a bipolar system, managed by the Soviet Union and the United States. In the post Cold War order; it might, in the short run be unipoIar but in the medium to long ten it might be multipolar where economics will most likely be the basis for tlae assessment of the power of states. Other relationships in the new world order - peace, the place of the Third World will revolve around these. 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JcIjmp Y.: .'rt b ;:very u'wr:a.~>,:uiyp,q.ws hjc:;:;~, v Nsv&TYI'I'A ;n~ervie;\, iwvosti Press Agemy Ra"yT". me Outlok?k (Nigeria). INDEX Abraham I anarehical society 65, 150 Abu Dhabi 32 anarchisr 11 1 Abyssinia 102 anarchy 136, 139 Acadcmy of' Science 42 Andcan Group 133 104 Angola 16, 2:, 22. 28, 34, 35, Acolians 2 72, 94, 103, 110, i 11, 112 Afghan Mujahadcen 22 anthropologists 63 Afghanistan 20, 21, 28, 33, 34, anthr~po~orphization144, 145 47, 56, 72, 78, 105 Anti Balistic Mlssilc (ABM) 20, Africa 28, 65, 94, 96, 105, 106, 2 3 109, 111, 112, 114, 117, anti-Mitler coslit~on155 118, 119, 129, 136, 147 anti-Iraq coalition 52 African National Congrcss anti-Japanese 153 (ANC) 59, 101, 102 anti-Semitism 69 Africans 11 apartheid 104 aggrcssor 50 apparatchiki 78, 87, 90 Aircraft 53 Arab 20, 21, 53, 55, 58, 59, 60, B-52, 53 142, 143 F-14, 31 Arab League 59 F-15, 31 Arabia 6 Airlorcc 53 Arafat Y .- 62 Ahc C. 109 Aragon 6 Akinyclc A. 117 arbotion laws 145 Albanian 124 ;~rmada53 Alcxandcr 3 Armcnia 6, 80, 86, 124 Algicrs 13 army 83 alicns 133 Aron R. 142, 149, 150 Allah 6, 69 Aryan 2 Allcndc S. 21 Asad H. 61 Alliance formation 1 1 Asia 28, 58, 109, 133, 135, 153 alliances 155 Asia Coprospcrity sphere 139, Allicd coalition 47, 67, 68, 69 153 allied intervention force 49 Asia Minor 2 . allied stratcgy 49 Asia Pacific Basin 74, 135, 1 39, Alpcrovi~zG. 1 I; 149, 157 Amalgamalcd Sccuri~y Asian Tigers 12 Commun~ty46, 122, 125 Asians 11, 106 America 52 Assur 1 60 American 130, 143 Athcns 2, 3 Amcrican War College 47 .. . . Atlantic 4, 25 Americana 7 1 atomic bomb 18 Americo-Liberians 95 Amin I. 137 Austria Peace Treaty 25 Bcntham J. 64 Austrians 120 Berlin 19, 20, 148, 155 Austro-Hungarian Empirc 129, Bcrlin Wall 27, 72, 151 148 Biafra 94, 130 authoritarian 140, 155 biological weapons 20, 62 authoritarianism 75 bipolar 12, 156 autocracy 75 Bishop M. 21 autocratic system 63 Bismirch 68 Awotunsin T. 100 Black Sea Fleet 146 Axis 123 blitzkrieg 14, 145 Axis powers 99 Boipatong 105 Aya W. N. 111 Bolshevik 14, 17, 76, 77, 80, 89, Azaris 80, 82 108, 112 Azcrbaijan 78, 80, 82, 86, 124 Bolshevism 73 Aztec 1 Bond Ngouza K.I. 111, 113, 114 Bonn 19 Baathist party 68 Bosnia-Hercegovina 97, 126, Babangida I 101, 115, 117, 118 127, 128, 129 Babangida School of Botha 105 International Studies 97 bourgcois liberalism 36, 44 backwater 72 bourgeoisie 80, 104, 126, 127, Baiyau 115 128 . "Baghdad 4-8, +9, 5'3, 55, 61, 62 burcaucratic 98, 103 Baker J. 54, 58, 59, 60, 84, 85, Brandt W. 48 87, 88 Brehncvitc 26, 76 balance of powcr 12 Brcst Litovsk 14 Balassa B. 1 32 Bretton Woods 21 Balkans 2, 6 BrcThncv doctrinc 24, 25 Baltic Flccr 87 Rrczhnev I,,[email protected],25, 66, 76, Baldc Rcpublics 78, 79, 80, 8 1, 129, 156 82, 85 Britain 13, 24, 29, 31, 50, 52, 70, Bamako 100 72, 89, 107, 115, 125, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155 chemical weapons _if), 62 Chen Xitong 38 Chen Yun 39, 4 1 Chernenko K. 2 1 f ZC. Chevcncrncw .! -i Cheync) 7) h, :hicken our -10 ' tlhilc 1 OK "hina I?, l4 I- , , 4",3ti, SO, 63, 8% I 4 hinesc 153 :hinese Pcoplc Pdl! LA ConsulLalive Conference (CPPCC) 40 Chou En Lai 4 5 Christianitcs 5 Christians 124 Chrysler 158 Churchill W. 18, 26, 73, 88 cities 5 City states 8 civil society 64, 113 civil war 94 Clark R. 48 Claude Inis 50 clerics 6 coal 1 17 coalition 142 Cobden 63 coercion 137 coexistence 144 Cohen H. 104 Cold Wer 17, 19,X L1,25,26, 27, 50, 59, 64 kh, 89, 90, 94, 106, 108. '19, 122, 127, 130, 134, 137. 140, 143, 145, 14b, IS..,153, 156 Collectivc Sccunlq TO, 89 colonialism 56. 12';. 132 Cominform 19 command and adrnmister cconomy 72 command and control 50, 52, 84 command cconfm' 52

wnmc,dlr: 7 I Common Agricultural Policy Cuba 13,51,62,72,79 (CAP) 132 Cubans 147 Common European Home cultural hegemony 71 (House) 24, 125, 156 cultural pluralism 65, 135, 154 Commonwealth of Independent cultural revolution 41 States (CIS) 83, 84, 85, 86, currency 12 87, 88, 146, 151, 159, 160 Cyprus 61 communication flows 127 Czarist 75, 82 communism 25, 75, 151, 155 Czars 74, 75, 108: Communist Party of China Czechoslovakia 20,21,26t27, (CPC) 35 47, 56, 66, 79, 125 x;; ,, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 22.23.77. Dalai Lama 88 156 Danes 125 communists 24 Danish 121, 137 comparative advantage 127 Das Kapital9 Conakry 94 David 150 Conference on Security and De Clarke F. W. 105 Cooperation in Europe De Cuellar 29, 30 (CSCE) 2 1, 124 de facto 82 Congo Bra. 113, 118 de jure 59, 60, 6 1, 82 Congress 20,21,58,73 debts 155 Congress of Deputies 80 Delian 3 consciousness 130 Delphic Oracle 4 consensus 50 Democrat 58 conservative 60, 80, 81 democratic societv 143 Constantinople 6 Deng Xsiao Ping 36,42,43,44, constitution 112 4 5 Consulate 4 Denmark 125, 135 consumer electronics 108 denuclearization 23. 78 containment 17, 19, 24 dependence 116, 1 '3" Contra 22, 23 depcndeccies 15 1 Cordovez D. 33 dcstalinization 25, Corinth 3 BMcratr 19 71, 23 counter revolution 26 IICULSC~ I<. 65, 99. I. 122, coup plots 128 123, 125 Cox R. 105 Uiaka Brrnadinc M ' 11, 113. Crete 2 ?I4 Crimea 87, 139, 141 Drct 158 Crogtia 126, 128. 1'7, disarm:mcnl 23 Croato-Scrb 124 riisarrncd world 15 1 Croats 127, 12f, : 2*) Doc S. 95, 96, 97, lM!, 112, 118 Crossus 2 dogmatism 73 cruisc missilcs 51 dollars 22, 155 ('madcs 11 domestic conscnsus (38 domestic content legislation 73, Ethiopia 72,94, 102, 103, 104, 15 8 105, 112, 118 Dorians 2 Ethiopian Peoples Liberation draft dodgers 58 Front (EPLF) 100 Dukes 5 Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Dupchek A. 20 Democratic Front (EPRDF) Dutch 7 103, 104 ethnic 92, 111 Earth Summit 124 Etrusceans 4 East African Common Market Euro- American perspective 71 (EACM) 132, 133 Eurocentricity 125 East and Central Africa 1b6 Eurocommunism 2 1 East and Central Europe 25, 156 Europe 8, 10, 112, 123, 130, East Jerusalem 60 147, 153, 154 East- West 21 European 11, 74, 106 Eastern Europe 19, 24, 25, 59, European Common Market 100, 11.1, 143, 155 (ECM) 15.99, 126, 128, ecological 146 129, 130, 131 Economic Community of West European Currency Unit (ECU) African States (ECOWAS) 122 96,98, 128 129, 137, 134, European Economic 138 Community (EEC) 44, 120, economic 1.52, ;.,? 121, 122, 125, 134, 136, 138, 153 4* Evans A. 7 'Every Woman Newspaper 88 ECOWA.) Mwrl loring Group expellees 133 EUOMuG) 93,94,95,96, expulsions 133 97.98, 133, 134, Eyadema G. 112, 113, 118 ego trip 140 Egypt 1, 3, 6.55, 57.58, 59, 60, factories 117 68, 69 Fah 32 Eisenhower 1. 18, 20 Falk R. 151 elcctronics 104 Fang Lizhi 42.45 clitc 9, 131 Far East 67 clitc cornplimcnlarity 134 Federal Republic of Germany embourgcoiscmcnt 129 (FRG) 18, 19 Emperors 1, 6 feudal autocracy 99 Enccladus 15 feudal stage 66 England 5, 1 1, 1 18 fiefs 8 cnvironmcntrrl degradation 130 finance 117 Eradu 1 Finland 121 Eritrcan Pcoplcs Libcralion . Fjnlandizaiion 17 Front (EPLF) 103 First World War (WWI) 25.64, Esthonia 80 86, 127, 129, 154 fishcries 1 17 Ghali B. 130 five power directorate 148 Ghana 96, 118, 129, 130, 134, Florida 59 ' 135 food 12 Gibbon E. 4 Forum for the Restoration of Gios 95 Democracy (FORD) 1 14, Glasnost 22, 25, 33, 34, 6 , 69, 116 76,77,78,79, 80, 8 P, 83, Fox W.T.R. 13 99, 129, 138, 143 France 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15.24, global consensus 49 28.29, 30, 31, 50, 52, 54, global equilibrium 73 70, 89, 106, 108, 109 121, global policeman 58 125, 132, 148, 154 global security 89, 138 FrancoIGerman 120 global security matrix 68 Franks 6 God 55, 102, 141 free and fair trade 152 Golan Heights 60 free movement 128 Goliath 150 French 49.52, 121 Gongzhufen 38 French Cegion 1 12 Gorbachev M. 22,23,23,26, 27, French revolution 127 37,38,69,70,71, 74,76, Fulbright W. 146 77,78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, functionalism 121 86,88,99, 101, 119, 124, fundamentalist 66 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 160 Gaddafi M. 61 Gramsci A. 109 Gambia 96, grassroots 132 game of chicken 48 Great Depression 144 Ganges 2,4 Great Hall of the People 37, 38, Gauls 4 3 9 General Agreement on Tarriffs Great Powers 11, 73, 153 and Trade (GATT) 15. 124 Greece.6, 124 General Assembly 61, 104 Greek/Turkish conflict 65 Geneva 22,23,32,33,34,35, Grenada 2 1, 48 61, 62 Grosz C. 26 Georgia 80, 86 guilds 8 ' Gephardt R. 157 Guinea 94, 96, 129, 130, 134. German 2.5, 7.75, 85, 152, 154, 135 155 Gulf 27, 28 Geman Democratic Republic Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 58 (GDR) 19.21.26 Gulf War 12,47, 55, 56,57,59 German reunification 7 1 61, 67, 86, 91, 97, 120, 136, Germany 10, 13, 14, 19, 24, 72, 143, 150, 151, 154, 160 84, 88, 104, 119, 125, 126, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136, Haas E.B. 120, 121, 122, 131 138, 143, 148, 149, 153, Haifa 53 154, 155, 159 Hajj 29, 30, 31, 32 Hapsburg 7 idealist school 116 Harare 114 ideological 12 Hawke Bob 44 ideological homogeneity 15 1 Hawkins E.K. 106 ideology 21 Heads of State 127 illegal aliens 128 Healey Dennis 88 llliad 2 Heath Edward 48 Imodibie Krees 100 hegemonic 133 imperialism 17, 56.57, 126, 132, hegemonism 49, 57, 86 14 1 hegemony 62, 141, 151 Inca Empire 1 hemlock 32 India 63, 65, 147 Hemstone S. 11 1 Indonesia 108 Heritage Foundation 42 Indus 2 high definition television 108 industrial waste 140 high jacking 61, 147 industrialization 14 1 Hindus 65 infantilism 77 Hinsley F.H. 8 influence 137, 141 Hiroshima 18, 54 Inkatha Freedom Party 59, 105, Hitler Adolf 9, 20,47,48, 69, 76, lo6 92, 127 Institute of World Order 147 Hobbes Thomas 141 Intafada 61 Hoffman Stanley 142, 148 integration 120, 141 holocaust 154 intellectuals 148 Holy Roman Empire 5, 8 intelligence 83 Holy Scc 6 Inter Continental Balistic Holy Synod 76 Missiles (ICBM) 21, 71, 72, Hommcr 2 160 Honeckcr Eric 26 Inter Faith Mediation Committee hostagcs 49 9 6 House of David 102 inter caliberation 121 Housc of Hapsburg 5 interdependence 16, 120, 14 1 House of Hohcnstaufen 5 interior 80 Hu Yao Bang 35, 41 Intermediate Range Forces (INF) Human Rights 65, 119, 130, 137, 22, 23 145 International Law 6, 137 Hungarian 6 International Monetary Fund Hungarian Socialist Workcrs (IMF) 15, 99 Party (HSWP) 24 International Relations 63, 155 Hungary 6, 24, 25, 26, 79, 82, Internationalc 36 119 internationalism 132, 141 tlusscin Sadam 29, 30, 32, 47, investments 152 38, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, Iran 27, 56, 61, 67, 68, 142 61, 67, 66, 67, 68, 97 Iran/Iraq war 27, 28, 29, 67, 148, 149 Irangate 27 Iranian revolution 27, 28 Kcnnedy J. FK 10 Iraq 27,28, 47,48,49,54, 57, Kennedy Paul 159 58, 67, 69, 71.97, 147, 148, Kcilya 108, 109, 113, 114, 115, 150, 154, 15.2 116, 128 Iraqi 137 Kenya African National Union Irish 121 (KANU) 111, 116 iron curtain 18, 21 Kenyata Jomo 11 1. 1 16 Islam 6 Kerekou M. 1 18 Islamic 53 KGB 85 Israel 54 Khomeini 27, 30, 3 i , C, ;3, 67 Israelis 60, 70 King Hussc (ti !(~f +cq $6 Italy 4, 5, %, 105, 143 King Mrrm .) Ivory Coast :.Y) .* tnv T tc Jackson Sr..it,,. 1 > Jackson/Vtr.~! ammend~ncr:? 20, 2 1 Japan 10, '. , :;. i 1, 5u. ;5-. 132, i34 141, 144, 147, virr :. 152, 153, 157 > >li-GpOI I . i2, & + Japanese 5.5. 71, 152, 154. 157 :,oh1 H. 15, Jaruzelski W. (General) 24 Konare A.C . 136 Jawara D. 36 Korea 50, 155 Jewish emigration 2 1 Korean War 19, 6.1 Jewish Settlenients 60 Kosovo 6, 126. 127'. '2R Jews 89 Krahns 95 Johannesburg 105 Krasnoyask 23 Johnson Elma 95 Kremlin 70 Johnson L. 58 Krenz E. 26 Johnson Prince 95, 97 Kroupchak A 88 Jordan 61 Kruschev N. 20, 25, '6,78, 88 Jumbo jet 32, 68 Kruschkov V. 78 juvenile delinquency 145 Kurdish 72, 97 Kurds 49 Kabul 22, 33 Kuwait 47, 48,50, 57, 58, 59,60, Kadar Janos 26 61, 66, 69, 137, 147, 148 Kaiscr 14 Kuwaiti aircraft 52 Kamchatka 32 Kuwaiti tankcrs 27, 29 Kant I. 64 Kaplan Morton 148 La Faber W. 19 Karma1 B. 34 Labour 129 Kaunda K. 116 Lagash 1 Kay David 51, 52 landslidc 58 Kazakhstan 23, 86, 87 Latin America 102, 105, 117, Kcnnan 17, 19, 57, 58 134, 147 Latin Americans 11 mail 116 Latins 4 Maine H. 2 Latvia 80 Malawi 108 League of Nations 13, 50, 98 Mali 109, 118, 129, 131, 133 Lebanon 28, 30 Malta 27, 149, 160 Lebensraum politik 127 Malta summit 26, 7 1 Left 111 Mandela N. 105 Legati 6 Mandingos 95 Legislators 158 Mano River 97 Legvold R. 15 Manos 95 Lenin V. I. 9,43,44,75, 77, 79, manpower 141 84, 88, 90, 100, 124, 143. manufactured goods 130 144 Mao Tse Tung 40,41,42,43, Lent 6 44,45,75 Lepanto 6 Mariarn M.H. 102, 103, 104, Levy D. 61 1 I8 Li Peng 38, 39,40,41 maritime targets 28 Li Tieying 38, 39 Mark 122 Li Xiannian 40, 41 market economy 155 Li Ximing 38, 39 Marshall plan 19 Liberal 110 martial law 38 Liberal political system 62, 80 Man K. 43,44, 64, 75, 82, 90, Liberia 995, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 100 101, 102. 118 Marxism-Leninism 102 Libya 48, 56, 62, 101 Marxist-Leninst 17, 57, 104 Ligachev Y. 80 massada complex 70 limited war 58 masses 10, 108, 109 Lisbon 103 master nationality 66 Lithuania 25, 80, 81 Mauritania 135 Lome Convention 123 mayas 1 London 45, 103 Mazowiescki T. 24 long range bomber 73 Mcarthy 10 long range weapons 20 Mcarthyist 92, 93 Louis XIV 8 Mcad M. 64 Luanda 110 Mccca 29 Lumuba P. 114. 116 Medieval 5, 8 Lumumbashi 114 medium range weapons 23,72 1 .lither M. 7 154 Mein Kumpf 92 Maastncht 125, 126, 138 melagomaniac 68 Macedonia 126, 127 Melman S. 147 Macedonians 2 Melongo A. 119 Machiavelli N. 141 Mendlovitz S. 149 Madrid 60, 154 Menes 1 Mahan A. 13 Mcrchant marine 84