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Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 42-47 DOI: 10.2968/064004010

so many ages in sweat and hunger to the wheel of material existence.” A frightening nuclear legacy At one level, Atoms for Peace was about cooperation. But Atoms for Peace Early expansion of nuclear energy was at its core a gambit. One purpose was to establish and strength- resulted in dangerous dispersal of fissile en strategic ties, especially with devel- oping countries, by promising to share material and weapons proliferation­— what many people saw as the most mod- ern of technologies. Atoms for Peace threats that persist today. Is it possible also served a policy to build domestic ­support and foreign markets for U.S. nu- to prevent history from repeating itself? clear technology. Competing Atoms for Peace pro- grams emerged as the and By Zia Mian & Alexander Glaser other Western countries, notably Cana- da, Britain, France, and later Germany, sought clients and markets for their na- scent nuclear industries. These coun- tries saw providing nuclear research reactors, fuel for these reactors, and training scientists and engineers in the new technology as the key to shaping po- litical relationships with clients, as well as the choices that developing countries would make about what nuclear facilities to buy and where to buy them. Between 1955 and 1958, the United shadow looms over the would share its nuclear knowledge and States signed more than 40 nuclear coop- possibilityA of a nuclear-powered future. help the world “to apply atomic ener- eration agreements with a range of gov- It is the legacy of the first expansion of gy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, ernments, including apartheid South Afri- nuclear technology, which started in the and other peaceful activities. Its special ca, Francisco Franco’s fascist government mid-1950s and lasted roughly a decade. ­purpose would be to provide abundant in Spain, the shah of Iran, , India, Fifty years later, the world is still strug- electrical energy in the power-starved , and many others. Other would- gling with the inadvertent, and at the time areas of the world.” be suppliers, with more limited political, unimaginable, consequences of those ini- The idea of a wondrous future pow- economic, and technical resources, found tial efforts to create the nuclear age. Nu- ered by atomic energy was by then al- fewer takers—although some countries clear facilities, technologies, and exper- ready 50 years old. Soon after Fredrick signed up with multiple nuclear donors. tise, it turns out, often outlive regimes and Soddy and Ernest Rutherford discov- The Soviet Union signed agreements with political and strategic relationships, and ered in 1901 that radioactivity involved China and North Korea; France assisted can have unexpected impacts beyond pol- the release of energy, Soddy claimed Israel; Britain and Canada made deals for icy makers’ initial intentions. that it offered a potentially inexhaustible research reactors with India. In his December 1953 speech to the source of energy. He described an atom- Today, it is widely acknowledged that United Nations, President Dwight D. ic future in which humanity could “trans- in the search for influence and advantage, Eisenhower announced what became form a desert continent, thaw the fro- Atoms for Peace and similar programs known as the Atoms for Peace program. zen poles, and make the whole Earth one created problems for the countries that The initiative spurred the United States, smiling Garden of Eden.” The dream en- supplied nuclear know-how and tech- its superpower rival, and its Western al- dured the building of the atom bomb and nology as well as those who were being lies to promote nuclear science and tech- the destruction of Hiroshima and Naga- encouraged to pursue it, fueled region- nology at home and abroad. In his speech, saki. Three days after the destruction of al rivalries, and became the bane of the Eisenhower warned of the dangers of nu- ­Nagasaki, the New York Times editorial- international community. Some of the clear weapons and the arms race, calling ized that atomic technology “can bring countries that participated in Atoms for nuclear technology the “greatest of de- to this Earth not death but life, not tyr- Peace went on to set up nuclear weap- structive forces.” But, he argued, it “can anny and cruelty, but a divine freedom,” ons programs using the knowledge and be developed into a great boon for the and could bring “dazzling gifts” to the resources acquired under these pro- benefit of all mankind.” America, he said, “millions of China and India, bound for grams. The nuclear fuel for many of the

42 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 research reactors remains unsecured, a ­exhibited at Geneva, used low-enriched China’s 1964 nuclear test fueled su- possible target for theft. The foreign po- uranium (LEU) fuel, enriched to just perpower fears of the further spread of litical, economic, and technical support below 20 percent, which was and still is nuclear weapons to regions where they for nuclear science and nuclear energy the enrichment level considered of least might want to intervene and led the Unit- programs helped create powerful concern. By 1958, however, ed States and the Soviet Union to pro- complexes that have distorted the devel- the United States began to export HEU pose the 1968 Nuclear Non-­Proliferation opment of both science and energy poli- for use in research and other reactors. Treaty (NPT). India’s 1974 nuclear test, cy in developing countries. Rather than a blessing, the nuclear age became in many ways a costly burden. Atoms for Peace and similar programs created problems for the countries that supplied nuclear

Atoms for Peace found its first know-how and technology as well as those and most public venue at the August who were being encouraged to pursue it, fueled 1955 U.N.-sponsored International Con- ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic regional rivalries, and became the bane of the Energy held in Geneva. The U.S. delega- international community. tion, by far the largest, included almost 200 scientists and was accompanied by a ­swimming-pool type nuclear research reactor that was installed and ran at the conference site. Tens of thousands of people visited the reactor. Some were even allowed to operate it. As historian This helped the United States to avoid which used plutonium from a reactor of science John Krige has noted “[T]he the problems associated with having dif- supplied by Canada for peaceful purpos- presentation of the U.S. reactor in Gene- ferent sets of reactor designs and fuels es, spurred further concern about nu- va was a masterpiece of marketing. It was for use at home and abroad, and took ad- clear proliferation in developing coun- intended to demystify and vantage of its rapidly growing stockpile tries. The United States launched a to show that anyone and any nation could of HEU that began to accumulate after series of initiatives in response. Among exploit it safely and to social advantage.” 1956, following a massive four-year ex- these was the Nuclear Suppliers Group Between 1956 and 1962, the United pansion of its fissile material complex. (NSG), which established agreed rules States awarded Atoms for Peace program From that point forward, weapon-grade for the international sale of nuclear tech- grants to 26 countries for the purchase of HEU became the default fuel for research nology for peaceful purposes. The Unit- research reactors. The recipients of these reactors worldwide, despite the fact that ed States also initiated the Reduced En- grants included Argentina, Brazil, South the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshi- richment for Research and Test Reactor Korea, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, ma had been made from 60 kilograms of (RERTR) Program in 1978, aimed at con- and Taiwan, all of whom went on to de- HEU with an average enrichment of only verting research reactors using HEU to velop nuclear weapons programs. Most 80 percent and that the simple gun-type LEU fuel and targets. In an irony of histo- of these programs were eventually aban- design of the weapon was considered so ry, the United States and other suppliers doned, but some succeeded. The exam- reliable that it was used without testing. are now offering recipients financial as- ple of research reactors is important be- The drive to use HEU even led some op- sistance to return the HEU fuel that was cause it shows the imbalance between erational research reactors to be convert- once given as a gift. the short time it takes to establish nucle- ed from LEU to HEU. In total, supplier As of 2008, after three decades of U.S. ar technology, the longevity of such tech- states (all of whom had nuclear weapons) and international efforts to eliminate the nology, and the tedious and costly effort provided nearly 50 countries with HEU use of HEU in the civilian nuclear fuel to replace it once it is recognized as hav- to fuel hundreds of civilian research re- cycle, only 14 countries have been cleaned ing been a mistake. actors that were built up until the mid- out of the material (see “The Global Dis- From the beginning, most domestic 1970s. The United States alone export- tribution of Civilian HEU,” p. 44). If U.S. and Russian research reactors were ed almost 26,000 kilograms of HEU to not for recent concerns about nuclear fueled with weapon-grade highly en- fuel research and other prototype reac- ­terrorism, progress would be even less riched uranium (HEU), enriched to 90 tors. Today, nearly 100 metric tons of significant. Under the most optimistic as- percent or more of the isotope uranium civilian HEU (both in fresh and spent sumptions, it will take at least 10–20 years 235, which was skimmed from military fuel) remain worldwide, far less than the to consolidate and dispose of the fresh production in both countries. In contrast, 1,600-metric-ton global military HEU and spent fuel recovered from these fa- the early U.S. research reactors supplied stockpile, but enough for thousands of cilities. Most facilities may simply be shut to foreign countries, such as the one nuclear weapons or explosive devices.1 down rather than converted.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 Another major focus of Atoms for Peace was training foreign students in The global distribution of civilian Heu nuclear science and engineering. The overlap between the knowledge and skills needed for research, development, and management for nuclear power and those needed for nuclear weapons didn’t discourage the U.S. program. U.S. government laboratories played a particularly important training role. Between 1955 and 1977, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its suc- cessor, the Energy Research and Devel- opment Administration, hosted more than 13,000 researchers from nearly every country in the world—from Af- ghanistan to Zambia. A 1979 investiga- tion by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that some of these re- searchers “participated in unclassified research projects which could, at least indirectly, provide skills useful to a nu- clear weapons program.”2 HEU at research reactors In addition to these research oppor- More than 10,000 kilograms tunities, there were also training pro- 1,000–10,000 kilograms grams. The Argonne International 100–1,000 kilograms School of Nuclear Science and Engineer- 10–100 kilograms ing ran from 1955 to 1960 and trained 1–10 kilograms 413 students from 44 countries. Another Less than 1 kilogram (cleared) Argonne program ran from 1960 to 1965 Only low- and trained 256 students from 29 coun- tries. The Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology hosted 115 students from 26 A total of about 100 metric tons of countries between 1959 and 1965. These civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU)— training programs were aimed at foster- enough for more than 1,000 simple ing the nuclear knowledge base in cli- nuclear weapons—is spread across ent countries, but this turned out to in- roughly 100 sites, in 40 countries. clude the know-how necessary to build nuclear armed states also maintain nuclear weapons. The GAO concluded, large stockpiles of HEU for weapons “While some of the training related di- and, in some cases, for naval fuel. rectly to such key technologies as urani- um enrichment and reprocessing, other aspects, in our opinion, could also have scientists who went on to become senior program. Khan presided over PAEC until enhanced, at least indirectly, a nation’s officials in nuclear programs in apartheid 1991, and was both architect and manager nuclear weapons capability.”3 South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Egypt, of the nuclear weapons program. He over- The programs were seen as presti- Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. saw the establishment of the uranium en- gious and made a big impact on nuclear One prominent graduate of U.S. training richment program at Kahuta (made fa- science in recipient countries, creating was Pakistan’s Munir Ahmed Khan, who mous by A. Q. Khan), the design and start a privileged group of scientists and ad- studied at Argonne. He went on to work at of construction of the Khushab plutonium ministrators. An AEC study found that the International Atomic Energy Agency, production reactor, the design and cold- “[m]any of those who have completed becoming head of the Nuclear Power and testing of nuclear weapons, and the set- various types of training in the United Reactor Division. In 1972, Pakistani lead- ting up of the nuclear test site. He also had States now hold positions of leadership er Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made Khan head ambitious plans for Pakistan’s civil nuclear in nuclear energy programs, universities, of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis- power program, including many power re- and industries and research centers in sion (PAEC) at the same time that Paki- actors, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and their home countries.”4 Alumni included stan decided to launch a nuclear weapons even ­plutonium-fueled breeder reactors.

44 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 The global distribution of civilian Heu TERI ALs AN E L O N FISSI L E M A TIO NAL P SOURCES: I N TE r n A SOURCES:

The U.S. laboratory training programs power program aimed at building more more than $6 ­billion. Thirty years later, largely ended in the mid-1960s not be- than 20 reactors. The United States en- with Iran accused of having a nascent cause of concerns about their prolifera- couraged and supported this vision by nuclear weapons program, Kissinger ex- tion risk, but because similar courses had what was then a key strategic ally in the plained the U.S. rationale: “They were become available at U.S. colleges and uni- Middle East. Iran was also very wealthy an allied country, and this was a com- versities. University degree programs and after the increase in oil prices that fol- mercial transaction. We didn’t address programs offered by businesses involved lowed the 1973Arab-Israeli war and of- the question of them one day moving to- in the nuclear industry trained thousands fered a lucrative market for many U.S. ward nuclear weapons.”5 of foreign students and technicians. While goods and services. In 1975, Secretary of As part of its nuclear plans, Iran of- these programs made nuclear training State Henry Kissinger signed a National fered to pay MIT to admit 50 students more common place, they also created Security Decision Memorandum, “U.S.- to the master’s of science program in new dilemmas for the United States. Iran Nuclear Cooperation,” that laid the nuclear engineering. Since this would In the early 1970s, the shah of Iran basis for the planned sale of nuclear re- almost double the number of students proposed a very ambitious nuclear actors to Iran at an estimated cost of in the program, Iran offered to pay

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 45 MIT more than $500,000 for ­additional ­professors, classrooms, and support ­facilities, in addition to the tuition costs for the students. The then-head of MIT’s nuclear ­engineering department later explained, “The attitude then was much differ- ent than it is today about the potential dangers of somebody diverting pluto- nium and making weapons. . . . I taught a course in enrichment, reprocessing, fuel manufacture, and the like. We were teaching [the Iranian students] how to do it, as we were teaching people from all over the world.”6

Today, some argue that a global ex- pansion of nuclear energy is necessary to help reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that drive climate change and to meet growing demand for electricity, especial- ly in rapidly urbanizing and industrializ- ing countries. The World Nuclear Associ- ation, an industry lobby group, reported in July 2008 that nuclear energy was under “serious consideration” in more than 30 countries that do not currently have reac- tors.7 Other analysts have identified near- A cautionary tale from the congo ly 20 countries that have no nuclear power plants and in many cases few nuclear sci- he story of the first African reactor is among the more vivid examples of the un- entists and engineers, yet since 2006 have toward legacies of Atoms for Peace. announced plans to build one or more re- T Since the 1940s, the Belgian Congo had attracted international attention for actors by 2020. They include Algeria, Aus- its large reserves of uranium, and became a key source of raw material for the Manhat- tralia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Isra- tan Project. To receive a as a quid pro quo was the idea of Monseigneur el, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Luc Gillon, a Belgian priest and later president of the Catholic-Jesuit ­University of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Lovanium in Leopoldville, now the University of Kinshasa. According to Michela Wrong’s Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen. In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, “like a colonial administrator who uses his years in the With cost estimates in excess of $4 bil- tropics as a chance to build up his butterfly collection, Mgr. Gillon seized the opportu- lion for a typical 1,000-megawatt plant, nity to indulge in his hobby: nuclear research.” Despite resistance from within the Bel- suppliers of nuclear technology have gian government, he managed to acquire and transfer to Africa the research reactor been lining up to make deals in what is that had been erected and operated at the Second Atoms for Peace conference, held akin to a nuclear gold rush. As part of its in Geneva in 1958. But history has its own tempo. Barely 18 months after the reactor Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the went critical, colonial rule ended in the Belgian Congo. United States signed up 21 countries, in- The United States in 1970 replaced the first Congo reactor with a higher power TRIGA cluding Ghana, Senegal, Jordan, and many (Mark II) reactor (above). Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, who had seized power in 1960, was a former Soviet states, as well as former U.S. ally and saw the reactor as a symbol of power and prestige and good relations with Soviet-client states in Eastern Europe. Washington. The TRIGA II reactor never used highly enriched uranium, but two of the re- France has created a new government actor’s fresh fuel assemblies did go missing from the site some time in the 1970s. One of body, the France Nuclear International, the assemblies resurfaced in a 1998 sting operation in Rome, where it was for sale on the to help countries create the structures black market. Nothing is known about the whereabouts of the second fuel assembly. required to establish and operate nucle- The reactor is still listed as operational. It continues to stand as an object lesson that ar programs. The French nuclear indus- one cannot parachute a nuclear reactor into a developing country and expect it to be an try giant AREVA has signed contracts automatic source of progress and development. < Zia Mian & Alexander Glaser across Africa, including with Alge-

ria, Libya, Morocco, and South Africa, N EWSCOM/ A FP/ L IO E HE AL I N G

46 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 to train nuclear engineers and share nu- enrichment and plutonium separation the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report, clear expertise. These training efforts, ­(reprocessing) plants. A 2004 report by ­authored largely by J. Robert Oppen- AREVA hopes, will lead to the sale of Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Har- heimer, which concluded: “So long as power reactors. The United States, mon Hubbard, however, pointed out the intrinsically dangerous activities may France, and the United Kingdom have all need “to revise the conventional wisdom be carried on by nations, rivalries are signed nuclear cooperation agreements that LWRs are a safe proposition for sit- inevitable and fears are engendered that with the United Arab Emirates. Russia’s ing in just about any country so long as place so great a upon a system nuclear industry is also seeking to ex- pand. It has offered to sell reactors and provide training to Egypt, and wants to Expanding nuclear power around the world will build additional reactors in India. China inevitably lead to a further increase in the stocks hopes to build more reactors in Pakistan. The United States, Russia, France, and flows of uranium and plutonium, materials and Britain have all signed nuclear deals that are fundamental parts of the nuclear with India, even though it has refused to sign the NPT, has a growing nuclear ar- fuel cycle and could be used to make nuclear senal, and is currently banned from the weapons. international nuclear marketplace by the rules of the NSG. But as part of what has been dubbed the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the United States has been leading the charge to exempt India from these rules. Even before the U.S.-India nuclear deal has been fully realized, it is having there are no accompanying commercial of international enforcement by ­police troubling consequences. Pakistan and uranium enrichment facilities or repro- methods that no degree of ingenuity or Israel, which are also denied access to cessing facilities.” The report highlight- technical competence could possibly the nuclear technology marketplace for ed that “contrary to conventional wis- hope to cope with them.”10 the same reasons as India, have sought dom LWRs can be copious sources of Given the current international politi- similar exemptions and so far been re- near-weapon-grade plutonium that can cal and economic system, the globaliza- fused. The India deal is also feeding the be used to make powerful nuclear weap- tion of prevailing nuclear energy tech- South Asian arms race.8 Pakistan’s Na- ons” and that “small, clandestine repro- nologies is likely to trouble the world tional Command Authority, which has cessing plants could provide the reactor’s for decades to come. As with the lega- responsibility for its nuclear weapons owners with militarily significant quanti- cies of Atoms for Peace, it will matter program, declared in August 2007, “The ties of nuclear explosives.”9 little whether the efforts to promote nu- U.S.-India nuclear agreement would However one judges the risks of par- clear energy as a way to ward off cli- have implications on strategic stability ticular technologies, some things are mate change and to power economic as it would enable India to produce sig- clear. Expanding nuclear power around growth are well-intentioned or a return nificant quantities of fissile material and the world will inevitably lead to a fur- to the use of nuclear technology as a nuclear weapons from un-­safeguarded ther increase in the stocks and flows of source of profit and influence. nuclear reactors.” The authority “ex- uranium and plutonium, materials that The only effective way to reduce the pressed firm resolve to meet the re- are fundamental parts of the nuclear fuel risks may be to confront and resolve the quirements of future credible minimum cycle and could be used to make nuclear sources of the “rivalries” and “fears” that deterrence.” Recent satellite imagery weapons. It will also be accompanied by drive decision makers’ sense of insecu- shows that Pakistan is building two new more nuclear research to improve exist- rity. Prudence, to say nothing of other plutonium production reactors, and ing technologies, to develop new ones, reasons, suggests that the international it may have accelerated its HEU pro- and to acquire basic expertise by coun- community should consider how to es- duction by using more of the powerful tries that have little or no capability so tablish a credible, equitable, and just nu- ­centrifuges that it was recently reported far. Together these constitute a criti- clear nonproliferation and disarmament to have developed. cal dilemma for nuclear power: a nucle- regime before taking seriously the vision Today’s proponents of a nuclear- ar program that is small by commercial of a nuclear-powered world. < powered future argue that the prolif- standards, perhaps no more than a re- For notes, please see p. 57. eration risks are small from the light search capability, is still generally large water power reactors (LWRs) that are enough to support a substantial nuclear Zia Mian is a research scientist and Alexander Glaser is a member of the research staff in the Pro- now being offered for sale and would weapons program. gram on Science and Global Security at Princeton be even smaller if limits were imposed This is not a new conclusion. Rath- University. Glaser is a member of the Bulletin’s on countries having their own uranium er it confirms a fundamental insight of Science and Security Board.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 A frightening nuclear legacy 8. Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and of a reserve of warheads like the United States M. V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and and Russia. We estimate, however, that France the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Re- has a small inventory of spare warheads. continued from p. 47 search Report No. 1, International Panel on Fissile 5. Sarkozy, speech given at the presentation of Materials, September 2006. Le Terrible, Cherbourg, March 21, 2008. 1. “Global Fissile Material Report 2008,” Inter- 9. Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon 6. On January 19, 2006, on the occasion of his national Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton, NJ, Hubbard, “A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation visit to the Strategic Forces, former French presi- forthcoming, available at www.fissilematerials Dangers of Light Water Reactors,” Nonproliferation dent Jacques Chirac stated: “As I emphasized im- .org. Policy Education Center, Washington, D.C., October mediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, 2. “Difficulties in Determining if Nuclear Train- 2004, www.npec-web.org. nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanati- ing of Foreigners Contributes to Weapons Prolif- 10. Full text available at www.ipfmlibrary.org/ cal terrorists. Yet, the leaders of states who would eration,” General Accounting Office, April 23, 1979. ach46.pdf. use terrorist means against us, as well as those 3. Ibid. who would consider using, in one way or another, 4. Ibid. weapons of mass destruction, must understand 5. Dafna Linzer, “Past Arguments Don’t Square With that they would lay themselves open to a firm Current Iran Policy,” Washington Post, March 27, 2005. French nuclear forces, 2008 and adapted response on our part. This response 6. Farah Stockman, “Iran’s Nuclear Vision First could be a conventional one. It could also be of Glimpsed at MIT,” Boston Globe, March 12, 2007. continued from p. 54 a different kind.” Although the language used by 7. World Nuclear Association, “Emerging President Sarkozy does not mention terrorists, Nuclear Energy Countries,” July 2008, www 1. Nicolas Sarkozy, president of the French Re- the phrase “whatever form it may take” could be .world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html. It lists them public, speech given at the presentation of Le Ter- interpreted as including a state using terrorist by region. In Europe: Italy, Albania, Portugal, rible, Cherbourg, March 21, 2008. means as well. Norway, Poland, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, 2. We are grateful for valuable editorial com- 7. French government, “Fighting Prolifera- Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa: Iran, ments provided by Bruno Tertrais at the Fonda- tion, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: Gulf states, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, tion pour la Recherche Stratégique. France’s Contribution,” 2005, p. 64. Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco; in Central and 3. Nicolas Sarkozy, speech on defense and na- 8. Jacques Chirac, speech given during his visit Southern Africa: Nigeria, Ghana, Namibia; in tional security, Porte de Versailles, June 17, 2008. to the Strategic Forces, January 19, 2006. South America: Chile, Venezuela; in Central and The white paper is available at www.defense 9. Bruno Barrillot, France and Nuclear Prolif- Southern Asia: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, .gouv.fr/livre_blanc. eration (Lyon: CDRPC, 2001), p. 16. Mongolia, Bangladesh; and in Southeast Asia: In- 4. Sarkozy also declared that France “has no 10. Air Actualités, No. 579 (March 2005), p. 6; Air Ac- donesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, other weapons beside those in its operational tualités, No. 611 (May 2008), p. 61. To learn more about Australia, New Zealand. stockpile,” a statement that excludes the existence Air Actualités, see www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/air.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57